Shared Governance of Peace and Security

The Malian Experience
Dr. Zeïni MOULAYE / IGP Mahamadou NIAYE

Shared Governance of Peace and Security

The Malian Experience
About the author

Zeïni MOULAYE holds a Doctorate Degree in Political Science, with specialisation in International Relations and Communication. He is a Former Minister and also held the positions of Deputy Director-General, Political Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs of Mali and Special Adviser to the President of the Republic of Mali. As a freelance consultant since October 1, 2008, he is the Coordinator of the "Shared Governance of Security and Peace Programme (PGPSP)", a joint UNDP / MALI initiative.

The Inspector General of Police Mahamadou Niakaté is Secretary-General of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection in Mali since October 2011. Among other responsibilities, he is Chairman of the Police Reform Commission in Mali and member of the Interregional Committee of the Ten-Year Development Programme of the Mali Northern Regions (PDDRN).

Imprint

Published by:
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office Abuja,
12 Marrakesh Street, Wuse II, Abuja, Nigeria

Tel +234 (0)9-4137977
abuja@fes-westafria.org
www.fes-westafria.org/abuja

Coordinator:
Sebastian Sperling

First impression in December 2011

Layout by Samson Nnah, samoskill@yahoo.com
Printed in Abuja

Printed by Single Vision Limited, Abuja, Nigeria
07032105185, 08050371359

© Copyright with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
# Table of Contents

**Abbreviations and Acronyms** ................................................................. 4

**Introduction** ......................................................................................... 5

I. **Some security related concepts** .......................................................... 6

II. **National internal security and civil protection policy in Mali** .............. 12
  2.1 New security vision in Mali ................................................................. 12
  2.2 The process of developing a national security policy ............................ 13
  2.3 Objectives of the national security policy .......................................... 14
  2.4 Strategic axes and implementation strategy ....................................... 14

III. **Shared Governance of Peace and Security Programme** ................... 15
  3.1 Programme objectives ..................................................................... 15
  3.2 Intervention areas ........................................................................... 16
  3.3 Organisation and implementation ..................................................... 16
  3.4 Resources ....................................................................................... 16
  3.5 Some consolidated results 2008-2010 .............................................. 17
  3.6 Partnership ..................................................................................... 18

IV. **Lessons drawn from the implementation of the programme** ............. 18
  4.1 Reaction from actors on the field ..................................................... 18
  4.2 Effects of the programme ................................................................ 19

V. **Possibilities of replication within the ECOWAS space** .................... 20
  5.1 The need for a common security strategy ........................................ 20
  5.2 Approach to the establishment of democratic governance of security within the ECOWAS space .............................................. 21

**Conclusion** ............................................................................................ 22

**Reference documents** .......................................................................... 23
Abbreviations and Acronyms

AQMI: Al Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (Al Qaïda in the Islamic Maghreb)

AU: African Union

CDAF: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

CEDHD: Centre d’Etudes des Droits Humains et de la Démocratie (Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (Morocco)

CNLCPAL: National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms

CONASCPAL: National Civil Society Coalition for Peace and the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms

CREN: Coordination pour le Renforcement de l’Exécution Nationale (Coordinating body for Strengthening National Execution of Plans)

CSO: Civil Society Organization

CTB: Belgian Technical Cooperation

DCI: General Directorate for International Cooperation

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African State

FES: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation)

IGP: Inspector General of Police

MAECI: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

MATCL: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Government

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

MSIPC: Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection

NGO: Non Governmental Organization

OC: Orientation Committee

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAGRK: Support Project for Strengthening Local Governance in the Kidal Region

PDDRN: Ten-year Programme for the Development of Northern Regions

PGPSP: Shared Governance of Security and Peace Programme

PNSIPC: National Policy on Internal Security and Civil Protection

PSPSDN: Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in the North

SIK: Senter for interkulturell kommunikasjon (Inter-cultural Centre for Communication) of Stavegen (Norway)

SSR/G: Security Sector Governance/Reform

SSR: Security Sector Reform

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

ZIC: Wildlife areas.
Introduction

The security landscape in Mali has been for a long time marked by growing urban and suburban crimes, many community conflicts sometimes longstanding, recurrent rebellion in the North, educational crisis and demands for better working conditions which worsen the insecurity situation, etc. These scourges intensified in the 1990s due to the 2nd rebellion which engulfed Northern Mali (1990 – 1996), armed conflicts in the sub region and rising organized crime. This situation is largely fostered by the vast nature of the national territory (1,241,328 km²) and a long border line (7,240km) which is uncontrolled and shared with seven neighbouring countries. This security trend is a real threat to social peace, security of persons and properties, political stability as well as the country’s development.

In the face of this situation, a number of citizens, elected local authorities and civil society organizations have often engaged the highest authorities and sometimes in a pressing manner about their security. In such circumstances, both the authorities and citizens have been asking the same questions: how to defend themselves against all the external and internal threats facing the country? How to reconcile the need for freedom and democracy with national sovereignty obligations? How to involve all sections of the nation in the management of security issues in the country? How to integrate the security sector into the overall democratic and developmental governance to ensure a wider popular participation and a relevant democratic control? How to move away from force, opaqueness and laxity towards more standards, transparency and effectiveness?

As a way of addressing these issues, the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection (MSIPC) initiated in 2005 a brainstorming on the security sector reform through a consultative process which began with local consultations and ended with a big national forum known as “the National Conference on Peace and Security in Mali”. Participants at this forum which was held from 21st to 23rd November 2005, offered an objective diagnosis of the state of security in the country and made recommendations that are likely to prevent, and if need be, combat internal and external insecurity. They proposed a new vision of security (based on human security) and a comprehensive strategy (based on prevention) to reverse the security trend at the time and move towards a new governance of security where roles and responsibilities would be shared among all stakeholders in the security sector.

This process led, among others, to the implementation of the “Programme on Shared Governance of Peace and Security (PGPSP)” and the preparation of a “National Policy Framework Document on Internal Security and Civil Protection”.

This booklet deals essentially with the Malian experience which could serve as a basis for reflections and deeper and cross cutting studies in the area of security sector governance/reform and pave the way for a convergent strategy against insecurity in general and organized crime, in particular, in West Africa.

The first part is dedicated some conceptual considerations, the second part describes the security context in Mali at the beginning of the security sector reform and the third part provides a summary of some modest results achieved during the implementation of the concept of shared governance of peace and security between 2008 and 2010.
I. Some Security Related Concepts

The security related terminology and its derivatives give rise to many interpretation difficulties from one country to another, one political regime to the other and from one era to the other due to differences in political and cultural approaches to security issues. However, over the last few years, a consensus has been emerging on the definition of each term. This explains why we found it necessary to introduce this booklet by defining security and some related concepts. We have no monopoly over the knowledge and originality on this issue. This attempt to clarify concepts was made from our own understanding of these concepts as well as definitions provided by other individuals and corporate bodies such as experts on the issue and organizations like the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (CDCAF) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) etc.

1.1. Security

It is a polysemic, cross-cutting and multidimensional concept. It is above all of a state of mind, a sensation and a sentiment. According to Montesquieu, security is the peace of mind which flows from the opinion everyone forms about his safety”. In the conventional sense of the term, security is a situation where a thing or a person is not exposed to any danger, any risk of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or deterioration etc. The holistic modern conception of security covers areas as varied as individual security, collective security, social, political, economic, legal, judicial, food, financial, health humanitarian and environmental security etc. While it is admitted that security appears sometimes as a perception issue (State protection of citizens and their rights, absence of threat against society and its values), other times it is more concrete and refers to a functional set of supervisory institutions as well as interdependent operational services (ministry of security and security services). In this case, it represents a State Service that has the duty and role to protect institutions, citizens and their properties. In this context, it must be appreciated in its double military and non military dimensions. In fact, security involves functions such as defence, maintaining law and order, intelligence, management of threats and attacks against state security and peace. It is made up of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. As a polysemic concept, security also has a humanitarian and developmental dimension through the notions of human security and practical micro-disarmament (giving up arms for development concept launched by the United Nations in the 1990s as part of the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons). The importance of security is such that it affects some fundamental values of human rights such as freedom, democracy and development.

1.2. Safety

The term safety is often interchangeable with that of security. Safety generally refers to a set of conditions which ensures that one is safe from harm. By extension, it means the absence of danger and protection against abuse, injustice, attacks and external infiltrations. It is also the state of mind of an individual who is aware that his welfare is secured.

1.3. National security

It is both internal and external security. Internal security is the security of persons, properties, the State and its institutions within a given space. It is manifested on the national, federal or regional territory through the
maintenance of order by a public force (police, gendarmerie, army and paramilitary force, etc.) and the organization of public private security (surveillance and security, cash transportation and personal protection companies). It generally involves maintaining public order which is ultimately reflected in the absence of troubles and disturbances within the State. External security. It is the absence of external threat or aggression against the State. It refers to national defence in the conventional sense of the word and usually arises in terms of combating external threats. The means of external security of the State are both the defence system and external intelligence system used to assess a threat, the initiators of a threat and sources of a threat as well as the forces available in order to adopt the right posture to face it.

1.4 Collective security
This concept emerged after the two world wars. Having realized there were serious threats to international peace and security, the international community instituted an international security system based on peace among Nations. However, collective security must not be confused with collective defence though the two concepts are close. In fact, collective defence involves establishing a defence system that covers several countries and under which there is a distribution of roles and responsibilities.

1.5 Private security
In the restricted sense, it is the security of individuals. By extension, it is the set of means to be used to ensure the protection of individuals and corporate bodies and their properties against all sorts of risks without any State intervention. Security, cash transportation, personal protection companies, for example, provide private security services. These are businesses and service providers authorized by the ministry in charge of the security sector and governed by appropriate regulations.

1.6 Human security
In the narrow sense of the term, it is the absence of danger and threat against the physical integrity of individuals through violence. In this case, State security gives way to that of individuals. In fact, with the concept of human security came the idea that the state should not be the sole object of security. The most comprehensive definition of the concept appeared for the first time in the UNDP Human Development Report, 1994 which gave it the recognition. In this document, human security covers both State security and that of individuals. It concerns at least eight areas, including political, economic, food, health and environmental areas etc. According to several sources, human security in its holistic sense is defined as freedom from fear and want. It can now be understood as the protection of people against real or perceived threats backed by violence or without violence. These threats may come from disease, famine, unemployment, poverty, urban or sub-urban crime, terrorism, violation of human rights, environmental degradation, natural disasters or social, political, economic and cultural upheavals etc. They can also be national, transnational or cross-border, man-made or natural. This approach to human security led to a new way of reflecting on threats weighing on human beings and addressing these threats. Without undermining State security, which is a necessary guarantee but not enough to ensure people’s security, it gives precedence to the provision of primary security needs of individuals and proposes significant changes in the practice of international security. This appears relevant because since the end of the cold war, countries no longer wage war against each other and the centre of gravity of threats to peace and security has shifted from outside to within countries, jeopardising civilian populations and development. In the face of this situation, the human security approach places individuals instead of the State at the heart of security. It promotes the right of citizens to live
in a secure environment which guarantees all human rights. It calls for the respect of human dignity and the responsibility to protect people. It compels countries to prevent identity conflicts and fight against impunity within the security forces. The human security concept aims to place human being at the centre of security and free him from fear and want. It develops a comprehensive approach based on the harmonious articulation of peace, security, democracy and sustainable human development.

1.7. Security system

It refers to a set of policies, machineries, mechanisms, state, parastatal and private structures, operational forces and support personnel that work directly or indirectly to protect, safeguard, provide relief and defend the State and/or regional community. The security system covers sectors such as the judiciary, prisons, military and civilian intelligence, public finance, safety of industrial facilities, customs, migration, nature preservation, prevention of manmade and natural disasters, training as well as monitoring and control of these sectors. It also includes armed non conventional and illegal actors who operate on the national and regional territory and can manifest themselves in the public space. These are private and partisan militias, rebel groups, dissident factions of legal forces, organized gun trafficking networks and other channels of armed violence, including drugs traffickers and cross border armed groups. In the past, the concept of security system was often interchangeable with that of security sector.

1.8. Security sector

It has been for a long time considered as an exclusive area of intervention of defence and security forces. Today, the concept is much wider and covers not only the field of security, in the strict sense of the word, but also all other areas associated with human security, namely: food, environment, health, education, employment, accommodation, etc. The security sector therefore covers a wide area, ranging from state security institutions to individual actors through state or non state institutions and organizations (government institutions and their agencies, civil society organizations, public or private security companies, individuals or groups of individuals). This range of military, civilian, political, economic, social, cultural organizations contribute to the formulation and implementation, regulation and monitoring of national security policies.

1.9. Security sector actors

refer to individuals and corporate bodies as well as institutions responsible for the administration, organization, direction, control and supervision of the delivery of security services. The concept of security sector actor does not prejudice the legality or legitimacy of the mandate of individuals, groups of individual, organizations, and implementation bodies considered. The actors are identified through a classification which brings out two categories: statutory actors and non statutory actors. Their status and specific function are defined in the law and regulations under the rule of law. While the issue of actors’ status is settled by law, that of their legitimacy is based on their actual relationship with the rule of law and the people. The security sector defined as such is run by several state and non state actors:

- Conventional Security forces (police, gendarmerie, etc.);
- Defence forces (army, air force, national guard, national navy, etc.);
- Paramilitary forces (customs, water and forest protection, civil protection, prisons wardens, etc.)
- Private security companies (security firms, cash transportation companies, and personal...
primacy of law which should build the States’ capacity to reduce vulnerabilities and fight effectively against threats to internal and external security. The security sector reform calls for at least four fundamental actions:

- The definition of a clear institutional framework to ensure security;
- Involvement of all actors in the management of security issues;
- Rational allocation of resources to technical institutions and services of the security sector;
- The establishment of competent and professional security forces accountable to civilian authorities, especially through parliamentary control.

1.11. Security Sector Reform (SSR)

It is a relatively recent concept associated with the democratisation of society and observance of some principles of good governance such as transparency, accountability of public authority with the aim of improving the security situation. The security sector reform is a deep transformation of security instruments to make the forces more professional, subject to the political authority and accountable. It is often based on the trilogy economy-effectiveness-efficiency. It is a process which aims at changing the paradigms to create a secure environment conducive to good governance, growth and development. This environment must also promote the development of democratic institutions based on the protection companies, etc.);
- Judicial institutions and services;
- Private militias (partisan or for self-defence, etc.);
- Civil society organizations (associations, alliances, coalitions, traditional chiefs, religious authorities, media, research centres…)
- Technical and financial partners etc.

1.10. National security policy

It is first and foremost a strategic vision, a principle based on a number of considerations (political, economic, social, cultural, threats, vulnerabilities, alliances etc.) which enable the State to honour their kingly obligation to protect people, properties and institutions while fulfilling their international commitments in terms of alliance, integration, respect for human and people’s rights. Most national security policies aim at three fundamental objectives: formulation of major directions and basic principles, assigning responsibilities in terms of security, organization of relations between the various actors within the security sector.

1.12. Democratic control of the security sector

Security services are public services and as such are accountable to the people or at least to their representatives, for that matter, parliamentarians. It should be possible for the institutions of the Republic to question them through the executive, legislative and judicial powers. This control must be perceived as a means of guaranteeing the integrity of security structures and ensuring that they perform their sovereign functions. This is exercised at several levels:

- Administrative (Hierarchical control, action by supervisory bodies of the Government);
- Judicial (violations of human rights, criminal acts committed by the police force among others);
- Parliamentary (written and oral questions, summons, no confidence motions, parliamentary commissions of inquiry);
- Citizens (through civil society organizations, independent institutions such as the Ombudsman, the Auditor General, Committee
on equal access to State media or institutional authorities like the Forum for Democratic Consultation in Mali.

1.13. Security governance

It is the way the security system is managed in a country, region or a given space. It refers to the various processes of security policy formulation, implementation, regulation and control of responsibilities related to security. It affects the general structure of security institutions, actors, resources (their allocation and use) in interaction with other public and private sectors, especially in the decision making and development process. Aside the institutions, it also calls for a set of societal regulatory and conflict resolution mechanisms which contribute to the promotion of peace and often anticipate threats resulting from community life.

1.14. Democratic governance of the security sector

It is the inclusive management of security issues between security services and their political, economic and cultural environment. It presupposes the adherence of defence and security forces to the principles underlying democracy, transparent management of security issues and their submission to the rules of democratic control. It calls for the opening up of security services to other actors in the security sector and the widest possible participation of public authorities, the central government, political associations, civil society, private sector, local authorities, communities and development partners in the management of security issues. It requires the involvement of the security sector in the general democratic process and a redistribution of roles and responsibilities among all security actors in such a way that security becomes a determining factor of development. In addition to the widest possible participation of all sections of society in the management of security issues, the democratic governance of the security sector presupposes the submission of security forces to democratic control. The direct democratic control must be ensured by institutions such parliaments which are empowered to control governance. However, in a democratic context, another type of control could be exerted by some civil society organizations which work in the area of peace, security and human rights: social watch. This indirect social watch seems necessary in the sense that it offers the dynamic forces of the nation the opportunity to ensure quality governance of the security sector. Most experts on the issue recognize that the democratic governance of the security sector hinges on some fundamental principles such as:

• Priority given to peace and security by policy makers, expression of political will;
• Involvement of the security sector in the general democratic and developmental process of the country or region,
• Submission of security forces to legal civilian authorities;
• Adherence of security forces to the basic principles of universal democracy;
• Security forces’ access to professional training which take into account the requirement of democracy;
• The management of resources meant for security in accordance to public expenditure management requirements, especially transparency, accountability and control;
• A clear definition of rights and obligations of civilian and military actors;
• The right of civilian authorities to exert political control over the security sector;
• The possibility for civil society to be involved in the management of security issues and to participate constructively to debates on security policies.
create an environment conducive to the promotion of internal and external investments as well as sustainable human development.

1.15. Shared governance of security

It is the practical aspect of democratic governance of security. It is essentially based on the distribution of roles among all institutional and non-institutional security sector actors: public sector, private sector, political societies, civil society, local authorities, communities, technical and financial partners, etc. It presupposes the adherence of security forces to the basic universal principles of democracy, their submission to legitimate civilian regimes and their compliance with the rules of democratic control. It requires the opening up of the security services to other actors of the security sector, especially civil society and the possibility for them to get involved in an active, conscientious and responsible manner in the management of security issues. At this point, the security services come into partnership with other actors in the security sector on a basis of complementarity, results and performance in the interest of the governance of security if not governance as a whole. In this regard, it is the most efficient way for the security services to fully assume their sovereign function with the highest chance of being successful. Thus, all security sector actors participate collectively in the creation of the general conditions required for economic and social development. This responsible participation is even more needed because security is a development cost that must be borne by all actors of the security sector. In fact, there is no sustainable development without reliable security. The shared governance of security, as an instrument at the service of economic, social and cultural development, must help
II. NATIONAL POLICY ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND CIVIL PROTECTION

Since the mid-80s, we have witnessed a gradual upsurge in serious crime. This situation was compounded by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and uncontrolled migration due to armed conflicts in neighbouring countries, inter community conflicts, rising religious intolerance, escalation of anti social acts resulting from the wave of democratization of public life, increased numbers of road and waterway accidents etc. In the last two decades, security issues came up so strongly that the Government had to organize in 2005 an extensive national debate to:

• Identify securities issues, their nature, form, origin and trends;
• Involve all sections of society in the national debate on security issues;
• Develop realistic and coherent strategies adapted to the national, sub regional, regional and international environment;
• Assess needs and design medium and long term action plans to fight against insecurity.

In addition, this led the Government of Mali to formulate and implement a national policy on internal security and civilian protection.

In Mali like anywhere else in Africa, security is a common good that must be preserved and maintained. The national strategy for the management of security issues must therefore be transparent, holistic, inclusive and credible. It must also be adapted to the national and international environment, implying some interactivity. The national security policy must therefore be primarily a choice of a clear, coherent and comprehensive vision which stimulates national cohesion and solidarity around common objectives in the face of common threats. It is secondly the choice of specific and priority strategies and actions which are the focus of the national effort. It is finally, the linkage with other public policies in a way as to manage harmoniously upfront national issues that can have an impact on security in the country.

2.1 The new vision of security in Mali

In Mali, the vision of security is based on human security. The consequent global and integrated approach requires that human beings are the focus of security and development is linked to security in such a way that it becomes the central axis among factors that promote development. The choice of this vision is due to the realization that since the end of the cold war countries no longer wage war against each other. The centre of gravity of threats to peace and security has shifted from outside to within countries, thus exposing numerous internal factors of threat to peace and security as well as vulnerabilities of the country. Violence has gained ground in all sections of society. The dangers are multiplying and are becoming increasingly complex and sometimes unpredictable – especially in the case of natural disasters. Human beings are at the centre of all these threats and vulnerabilities. Hence the need to review the conventional scheme of security which is so far focused on the protection of states institutions and their agencies in favour of a new approach to security that will place human beings at the centre of security concerns and compel all actors of the sector to work together for a qualitative change of mentalities and behaviours. This brings to the fore the idea of “shared governance of security” which is the practical aspect of “democratic governance of security”.

In Mali, it is believed that if security is centred on human
beings and governed in accordance with democratic norms and good governance criteria, it can generate a new impetus in the development process. Thus, the National Policy on Internal Security and Civil Protection is built around three pillars:

- The first pillar is the need to build a security with a human face, in other words, develop a mode of security which is respectful of human dignity and universal values that form the basis of democracy. This mode of security must also link security and development in such a way that development becomes a fundamental dimension of security and a development cost which must be borne by all actors of the security sector;

- The second pillar is a wider involvement as possible of all actors of the security sector (public authorities, central government, political societies, private sector, civil society, local authorities, communities, technical and financial partners etc.) and the judicious distribution of roles and responsibilities among them during both the design and implementation of the national security policy. In this regard, two orientations were chosen: the establishment of consultative bodies at the national, regional and local to effectively address security issues and implementation of a coherent communication strategy to ensure a massive popular support for the national security policy and the best possible ownership;

- The third pillar deals with the inclusion of the national, sub-regional, regional and international dimensions in the formulation of targets to be achieved. This is even more necessary as security challenges are now largely shared by all countries of the world at varying degrees.

The originality of the process of developing a national policy on internal security and civil protection in Mali lies, first and foremost, in its inclusive nature. In fact, article 53 of the Malian Constitution of 25 February 1992 provides that “the Government shall determine and implement the Nation’s policy. Each ministry shall develop and implement policies related to its area of competence as well provisions of the decree stipulating the specific powers of Members of Government”. Consequently, the development and implementation of a national security policy are within the purview of the Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection. In spite of this constitutional provision, it was the consultations on peace and security, largely dominated by civil society, which generated the general orientation and strategic axes of the national policy on security and civil protection through an unprecedented participatory process.

2.2 The process of developing a national security policy

The process of designing a national security policy was conducted in three phases:

- During the first phase, the Government sent sensitization missions on the field and sometimes as far as provinces and villages to make the various actors aware of the need for national debate on security issues and how to manage them in time and space;

- During the second phase, the Government organized consultations under the auspices of regional Governors on core thematic issues such as cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms, community conflict management, urban and sub-urban, road and waterway insecurity,
street demonstrations and acts of vandalism on public highways, etc.

- The third phase was dedicated to the organization of “Consultations on Security and Peace in Mali”, which brought together 300 actors from the local, regional and national levels: Government representatives, commanders of military regions, regional leaders of security services, civilian representatives of the regions and civil society organizations, private sector, political parties, local authorities, communities, financial and technical partners, etc.

2.3 Objectives of the national policy on internal security and civil protection

- The general objective of the national policy on internal security and civil protection is to ensure the security of the State, persons as well as property and to promote social peace.
- The three specific objectives are as follows:
  - Build the capacity of the State to respond to citizens’ expectations and democratic requirements in terms of security;
  - Involve all actors in the management of security issues;
  - Create an environment of social peace conducive to economic, social and cultural development.

2.4 Strategic axes of the national policy on internal security and civil protection.

The national policy on internal security and civil protection is based on nine priority strategic axes:

a) Culture of prevention through a permanent presence on the field and the establishment of a reliable and user-friendly databank on security in Mali. The presence on the field can be through increased general policing measures, sensitization and education of the populace.

b) Capacity building for security forces by:

- Developing the human resource in terms of recruitment, training and code of conduct;
- Deploying in a rational way security forces across the national territory based on the nature and seriousness of threats;
- Using a combination of forces due to the relatively small numbers of existing personnel;
- Giving priority to the consolidation of existing structures instead of the proliferation of structures that are difficult to operate;
- Strengthening internal control.

c) Building national capacity in the prevention and management of disasters by sensitizing and educating people on the need to change their daily behaviours in the face of disaster risks and dramatic consequences of some behaviours. This implies the development of a national strategy for the prevention of disaster risks, an action plan and a national platform for the coordination of various actors.

d) Curbing insecurity on roads and waterways through sensitization activities on the behaviour of road and waterway users and where necessary augment the arsenal of repression when sensitization actions show their limits.

e) Promoting real neighbourhood police, especially through the constant presence of security forces as much as possible among citizens. This requires a rational coverage of the territory by a security mechanism adapted
to real security needs.

f) **Strengthening the fight against terrorism in all its forms**, particularly in the northern regions of the country which are hideouts for armed bandits, drug and arms trafficking networks, illegal migration, and residual criminal activities etc.

g) **Implementation of the shared governance of security** which presupposes a wider participation in the management of security issues as well as a distribution of roles and responsibilities through consultative and coordinating bodies made up of all sections of society. In this system, the State has a prominent role to play. It must, among others, ensure the cross-cutting dimension of security and create a clear and coherent framework of complementarity for all actors.

h) **Consolidating and strengthening multilateral and bilateral cooperation**. In view of the transnational and cross-border nature of crimes, among others, international cooperation is required. This cooperation could be achieved through various existing legal instruments (treaties, conventions, agreements) as well as bilateral, regional or multilateral cooperation mechanisms (joint commissions of cooperation, bilateral border committees, joint security commissions, etc.).

i) **Implementation of an appropriate communication strategy**. The effectiveness of actions undertaken within the framework of the security sector reform depends on the clarity of objectives to be achieved and the visibility of results. Consequently, no public security policy can have an impact on target groups without an adequate ownership of its goal and objectives, scope and expected results. This can only be achieved through a coherent communication strategy. This is where the shared governance of security makes more sense to the extent that the media and all other actors in the security sector will serve as a medium for the State to share the security vision and convey the message to the entire populace.

To spread and sustain the national policy on security and civil protection, the Government of Mali established an instrument specifically dedicated to the implementation of the **Shared Governance of Security and Peace Programme (PGPSP)**.

### III. SHARED GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY AND PEACE PROGRAMME (PGPSP)

As an instrument for the implementation of the national policy on internal security and civil protection, the “Shared Governance of Security and Peace Programme (PGPSP)” is an initiative of the government of Mali. It is derived from a resolution adopted during “National Consultations on Peace and Security in Mali”.

#### 3.1. Objectives

The aim of the Shared Governance of Security and Peace Programme is to contribute to the creation of an environment of peace and stability which is conducive to sustainable human development in Mali. It has three specific objectives:

- Support the development and adoption of a new national security policy as recommended by national consultations on peace and security held in 2005;
- Support the implementation of this policy at the national and decentralized levels;
- Support the building of sustainable peace and security in Northern Mali.

These objectives are fleshed out into a series of activities.
which fit into a complementarity dynamic to contribute to the achievement of the Programme’s goal.

3.2. Intervention areas of the Programme

The programme is articulated around the following activities:

- Development and implementation of a national policy framework document on security and civil protection as recommended by the national consultations on peace and security in Mali;
- Building the capacity of civil protection and security services, civil society organizations, private sector, local authorities, local communities in security governance;
- Prevention and resolution of community conflicts in collaboration with civil society organizations, local government bodies and State representatives;
- Capacity building in the prevention and management of disasters;
- Design and implementation of a pilot system of municipal policy;
- Development and implementation of a communication plan for a shared and decentralized security;
- Preparation of a proximity advocacy and local communication plan on peace in the Northern regions of Mali;
- Promotion of a culture of peace;
- Control of small arms;
- Conflict prevention and management of security in neighbouring countries;
- Fighting against illegal migration and migrants trafficking;
- Organization of a Round Table to mobilize resources for a reform of the security sector;
- Support for strengthening consultation and decision making structures for the consolidation of security and peace in the Kidal region.

3.3. Organisation and operations.

The implementation agency of the Programme is the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. The programme is run by two bodies: the Orientation Committee chaired by the Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection and a Management Team led by a high ranking official of the said ministry.

The Programme is operated under two principles: nationwide implementation and results based management. It is run by a small, dynamic, and versatile team made up of a National Director, a National Coordinator and an Expert in charge of institutional issues concerning security governance, an Expert in conflict prevention/management and local development as well as an administrative and financial assistant.

Within a spirit of solidarity which compensate for its low numerical strength, the Team works to ensure the successful implementation of activities in close collaboration with beneficiaries and other stakeholders on the field. It provides analysis and advice as well as technical and/or financial assistance and supports the implementation of activities planned by institutional and non institutional actors in the security sector.

3.4. Resources of the programme

The three-year initial phase of the programme began on 1st October 2008. As at 31st December 2010, all the funding stated in the project document had been obtained and even exceeded.
3.5 Some consolidated results (2008-2010)

With regard to the three fundamental objectives, the mid-term results obtained are as follows:

- **General objective 1**: Support the development and adoption of a national security policy derived from the National Consultations on peace and security.
  - **Major result achieved**

- **General Objective 2**: Support the implementation of the shared governance of security at the national and decentralized levels
  - **Major results achieved**:
    - Capacity building for actors in the security sector:
    - Thirteen (13) conferences on security challenges in Mali and institutional responses, security sector reform and PGPSP in the 8 regions of Mali and Bamako District at the Parliament the Economic, social and cultural Council, National Police College, Gendarmerie College and National Council of Civil Society;
    - A round table on human security and security governance organized in partnership with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (CDCAF);
    - Thirty (30) security officers were trained in stock accounting;
    - Fifty (50) officers trained in airport safety;
    - Hundred (100) security officers in Public Accounting;
    - A feasibility study on provincial police at finalization stage;
    - A study on the establishment of a database on crimes in Mali completed;
    - A study on the Communication Strategy and a communication plan completed for the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection.

- **Prevention and management of community conflicts, social and political dialogue**:
  - Seven (7) requests financed in the area of conflict prevention and resolution in the regions of Kayes, Sikasso, Mopti, Gao, Kidal and Bamako District;
  - Ten (10) information and sensitization missions on issues of security and non institutional responses received technical and financial support from the Programme;
  - Ten (10) inter-community meetings organised with technical and/or financial support from the Programme.

- **Specific objective 3**: Support the building of a sustainable peace and security in Northern Mali.
  - **Major results achieved**:
    - Establishment of a three-year support project to build local governance capacity in the region of Kidal;
    - Demining operation in Tinzawatene and its environs for the benefit of 2257 people;
    - Six (6) information and sensitization actions carried out in the region of Kidal;
    - Five (5) intercommunity meetings supported in the regions of Gao and Tombouctou.

In all, the shared governance of security is making
headway in Mali. The main actors of the sector are increasingly aware of their roles and responsibilities and are assuming them with ease. Relations between civilians and the military are improving and actions are often carried out in synergy between security services and civil society organizations working in areas of peace, security and human rights. This is observed through the numerous conferences, intercommunity meetings, training programmes, sensitization actions and other capacity building activities organized or supported by the Programme.

3.6 Partnership
Within the country, sensitization actions targeted at State institutions, the armed and security forces, political parties, civil society organizations, local authorities and communities have helped to create awareness about the programme and to position it as a credible partner in terms of promoting the democratic governance of security. It often receives requests from various actors in the security sector for information and training sessions on democratic governance of security.

Beyond the borders of the country, the programme generally has a good reputation. The inclusive process set up by the Programme is particularly appreciated. The financial partnership began with a contribution from UNDP which supported the Government right from the beginning of the consultation process. Other financial and technical partners such as Luxemburg, Switzerland, Norway, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (CDCAF), Intercultural Centre of Communication (SIK) of Stavegen, Norway, Moroccan Centre for Studies on Human rights and democracy etc. gradually joined the UNDP.

IV. LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME
Like any other innovation, the Programme is facing some difficulties generally related to cumbersome administrative procedures, low quality of projects submitted for funding as well as the quality of reports of activities funded. Given the specific nature of the area of security, which has for a long time been the preserve of security services, the Programme is confronted with the difficulty of finding qualified human resource to conduct some specific studies (Communication Strategy, Database on crime in Mali, Pilot Project on Municipal Police, etc).

Besides, the security sector reform process remains very slow and the ownership drive extremely weak among security forces.

4.1 Reaction from actors on the field
Undoubtedly, in view of the sensitive nature of security (area of sovereignty and secrecy) reserved for a long time exclusively to security services, institutional and non institutional actors (especially central government and local government institutions) were initially cautious and sometimes apprehensive towards the reform process. However, at its inception, the programme has benefitted from three types of support:

- The first support came from the highest authority, for that matter, the President of the Republic and the Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection, who expressed the government’s commitment to follow the path of democratic governance of the security sector during the national consultations;
- The second support was that of civil society.
Indeed, a few months after the national consultations, many civil society organizations working in the area of peace, security and human rights under the National Coalition of Civil Society for Peace and the Fight Against the Proliferation of Small Arms (CONASCIPAL) spontaneously decided to support the Government’s efforts at reforming the security sector and promoting a democratic governance of the security sector. In January 2007, CONASCIPAL organized the “First National Civil Society forum on Democratic Governance of Security”;

- The third support came from communities, particularly those in northern Mali.

With time, people across the national territory showed their adherence to the ideals of the Programme through numerous project initiatives bordering on information sharing, sensitization, training, intra and intercommunity meetings, etc. However, in spite the relatively positive results from the reaction of actors on the field, there is a setback, that is the low level of ownership by the security forces. This seems to be linked to the natural resistance to change which is a variable that must be taken into account in any process seeking to bring about change. It is obviously necessary to step up sensitization activities targeted at security forces and focus on parameters of radical change of mentality and behaviours. Nonetheless, the interest generated by the Programme within civil society, local authorities and especially communities as well as the commitment of some development partners are grounds for satisfaction and a source of energy to move the programme forward.

4.2 Effects of the Programme

The programme has supported various institutions of the Republic (National Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Ministries, etc.). It has also provided assistance to many communities, local authorities and civil society organizations in their initiatives on the prevention, management and resolution of some conflicts, especially community ones. The space for dialogue and consultations created on these occasions helped to generate fruitful debates on security issues in the country. Peacemakers and security actors have often drawn relevant lessons and resolutions which contributed to the consolidation of peace and security in the hinterlands of Mali. Below are three examples:

- In the Dogon plateau, the Guinna Dogon Association, through a series of inter-communal meetings funded by the programme, was able to make some belligerent factions sign a ten-year moratorium during which they will refrain from any form of belligerence, which give enough time for the definitive settlement of disputes;
- In the Kidal region, some communities have been since the 2007 provincial elections on the verge of confrontation. In 2010, thanks mostly to the support of the programme, the war hatchet was buried during major intercommunity meetings;
- In the Gao region, a mission of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection sponsored by the Programme enabled the Touareg and Fulani communities to meet and make peace after several months of bloody confrontations.

Beyond these results, four observations must be noted as gains to be built upon, consolidated and developed:

- The first observation is that the implementation of the Programme has given a boost to the security sector reform. It supported activities that have given some
concreteness to initiatives within the framework of the national policy on internal security and civil protection;

- **The second observation is that** the programme has contributed extensively to the improvement of general governance in Mali. The dynamic of involving civil society in the prevention and management of conflicts and natural disasters is taking root in a sustainable manner. At the level of communities in particular, there is a feeling of regained self-confidence and awareness about the need to focus efforts on prevention as a comprehensive strategy for peace and security. If this enthusiasm within communities to mobilize themselves to contribute to their own security is consolidated, the security coverage would be more effective in Mali. This is probably one of the best and relevant indicators of progress in terms of security in Mali today;

- **The third observation is that** the financial and technical support provided to institutional and non-institutional actors in the security sector helped to a large extent to reduce tensions between civilians and the military, social tensions, and trends towards anti-social behaviours;

- **The fourth observation is that** the Programme’s support for strengthening security in the North and particularly the establishment of a project dedicated to the proximity management of peace, security and local development issues in Kidal, has contributed significantly to a reduction in the level of violence and insecurity in the region.

We consider these modest gains as very important since they have a positive impact on human beings, the greatest asset of a nation. Once people become aware of the relevance of an enterprise as vital as being involved in ensuring peace, security and stability, then there is hope. For the rest, with the help of political will, conviction and perseverance will surely lead to the establishment of an environment of peace and security conducive to the growth of individuals and communities as well as sustainable development. And this is the very essence of the Programme on Shared Governance of Security and Peace in Mali. Can this experience be replicated in other West African countries?

5. **POSSIBILITIES OF REPLICATING THE MALIAN EXPERIENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES WITHIN THE ECOWAS SPACE**

It is relatively difficult to think that the Malian experience can be replicated exactly in other countries of the sub region. On the other hand, it can serve as a source of inspiration for some neighbouring countries since they may be confronted with the same security challenges. In this case, it is desirable that the Malian experience serve as a catalyst for a better sub regional integration in terms of peace and security.

5.1 **The need for a common security strategy**

Three arguments, at least, support the need for a common security strategy and synergy of actions within the ECOWAS space:

- The first one is the similarity of security problems confronting all countries within the ECOWAS space due to the geographical, historical, social and cultural links. In addition, the porous nature of borders makes it easy for a factor of insecurity in one country to spread through the borders and affect neighbouring countries. Each conflict bears the seeds of spill-over to neighbouring countries. It therefore stands to reason to give priority to a collective security approach through
5.2 Approach to the establishment of a democratic governance of the security sector within the ECOWAS space

Based on the modest Malian experience, we are tempted to suggest the creation of more room for exchange, consultation, collaboration and cooperation in the governance of the security sector. It will be desirable that West African military and political leaders understand definitively that security is no longer a “reserved issue” but rather a “public issue” like health, education, and above all a full concern of any nation.

In this perspective, it can be suggested to each ECOWAS Member State to initiate a security sector reform through a coherent and interactive approach in three stages:

• The first stage will involve organizing local consultations to inform, sensitize and generate the interest, participation and commitment of the various actors to the democratic debate on security issues. These local consultations should make an objective diagnosis of the security situation and propose the most appropriate remedial measures to enable the country prepare effectively to face all forms of threat to peace and security.

• The second stage will be a National Forum on Peace and Security which will deepen the debate initiated at the local level on the situation and outline a national policy that take into account the basic principles set forth by ECOWAS in its security sector reform and governance framework;

• The third stage should be dedicated to the design of basic documents based on recommendations made during the consultations, especially:
  > A Framework Document on National Security Policy or a National Security Strategy;
  > A security sector reform programme backed by an operational (three, five, ten-year) action plan;
  > A communication strategy to back and support the national security policy and a security sector reform programme.
CONCLUSION

In the current context marked by increased globalization perceived by some as an opportunity to be seized and others as a dictat of a single worldview, an era of frustration, injustice and domination tendencies, the situation in Mali in the broad area of peace, security and development shows serious gaps and deficits and enormous needs that are detrimental to the democratization process and development. The country is currently overexposed to numerous threats and vulnerabilities related to climate change, the proliferation of arms, drug trafficking, terrorism, consequences of conflicts from neighbouring countries, epidemics and pandemics, effects of political instability, economic and financial crisis, etc.

Under these conditions, it appears urgent to match these security challenges with a triumphant resistance. This can only be achieved through a collective response within the framework of inter-state relations based on mutual trust as well as planned and participatory security sector governance. This process is desired everywhere by the West African people and it is feasible in the current context of democratization of the sub region. It would be a matter of capitalizing on complementarities, best practices and fruitful consensus among States to move towards a common strategy for fighting against insecurity in general and organized crime in particular. It should be a strategy based on shared governance of security within the framework of a “CONVENTION FOR SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA”. This convention will include a series of standards and regulations that will contribute, on one hand, to the harmonization of the normative framework and, on the other, an improvement of the overall security system within the ECOWAS space. The sub region will then experience a new era of security: the era of standards without force.

With Good governance and an improvement in other parameters of development, security would become not only a balance of military force but simply the fruit of dialogue and consultation, the effect of democracy and respect for human rights and an improvement in the standard of education and life, economic prosperity and social well-being. West Africa (Mali in particular) will experience not only peace, security and stability but also productive investment and real political, economic, social and cultural development.
REFERENCES

I. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

• Constitution of the Republic of Mali of 25 January 1992

II. WORKS

• Zeïni Moulaye, Gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali : un défi pour le développement durable, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert, décembre 2005, 197 pages.
• Zeïni Moulaye (directeur), Société civile et gouvernance de la sécurité, Bamako, Coopération technique belge, 2007, 103 pages.
FES Peace and Security Series No. 7

The lack of security is one of the key impediments to development and democracy in Africa. The existence of protracted violent conflicts as well as a lack of accountability of the security sector in many countries are challenging cooperation in the field of security policy. The emerging African Peace and Security Architecture provides the institutional framework to promote peace and security.

As a political foundation committed to the values of social democracy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims at strengthening the interface between democracy and security policy.

FES therefore facilitates political dialogue on security threats and their national, regional and continental responses. The FES Africa Peace and Security Series aims to contribute to this dialogue by making relevant analysis widely accessible. The series is being published by the FES Africa Security Policy Network, namely:

- FES Maputo (FES Regional Security Policy Project Southern Africa),

About this publication.

Shared governance of the security sector responds to the question of the involvement of all components of a nation in managing their security concerns. Based on human security, the concept of shared governance of the security sector highlights the mechanisms that identify the roles and responsibilities of actors called upon to take ownership of the initiative in a participatory manner, with the necessary oversight and accountability required from any reliable democratic process.

The Malian experience that is presented in this publication shows that the involvement of actors other than the usual sovereign forces to share the security sector management is possible and even more, can be replicated at a regional level, for so little that policy makers in West Africa pledge to develop a common strategy to fight against insecurity.