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**Walking the Talk? A critical perspective
on Sustainable Peace and Reconciliation
in Mozambique**



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Cover Art

“Between fear and trust”, 2019. This artwork articulates the dilemma between fear and trust in the negotiation of space. The diminutive faces show the exploration of agency within collectivity. The interiority of each figure is asserted at the same time as it forms part of the crowd. Nelly Guambe (born 1987 in Inhambane, Mozambique) is the winner of the Inaugural Emerging Painting Invitational prize, Harare, and the Mozal prize in the Category ‘Artes Plásticas’ (both 2019). Guambe completed a BA in International Relations and Diplomacy, and in 2017 co-founded the Deal Creative Space in Maputo, promoting Design, Entertainment, Arts and Literature.

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INTRODUCTION

Reconciliation is considered an important element in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, especially after prolonged periods of civil war (Lerche, 2000; Galtung, 1998; 2005). Its relevance for Mozambique has been highlighted by Igreja (2008) and Bueno (2017, 2019) among others. All three peace agreements signed between a Frelimo government, in power since Independence in 1975, and the leaders of the armed opposition group Renamo – in 1992 (in Rome), in 2014 and in 2019 (in Maputo) – alluded to the need of reconciliation. Reconciliation between the signatory parties of the agreements and with the population, suffering from the effects of armed conflict. However, reconciliation never was fully embraced by the authorities and declared a reasonability of all Mozambicans. In practice, it boiled down to a ‘Mozambican Solution’ (Bueno, 2017) which consisted of a general amnesty for war crimes committed by both parties coupled with community-driven practices and rituals of cleansing, and reintegration of ex-combatants into society. One of the key elements of reconciliation, the addressing of past war crimes and transitional justice has not been part of the ‘Mozambican solution’.

This study¹ analyses the role attributed to reconciliation in the most recent Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (MAPR) signed in August 2019, comparing it with that of the Rome General Peace Accord (GPA) of October 1992 and the attempts to consolidate peace under the Chissano government mandate (1994-1999). By doing so it seeks to provide answers to critical questions such as:

- What are the consequences of repeated amnesties without substantive reconciliation and restorative justice?
- What are the effects of unaddressed ‘memories of the past’ and the impunity of perpetrators of violence on peace consolidation?
- What would be key elements of a peacebuilding which includes reconciliation proactively as a building block?
- What, in the absence of a strong commitment of the formerly belligerent parties to reconciliation, can non-state actors do to promote reconciliation, considering best-practice gleaned from other countries?

1 The study arises from analytical work produced by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), undertaken on behalf of the European Union Delegation in Mozambique, of which the author was part. He is indebted to his colleagues Ana Leão, Guy Banim and Kees Kingsma for joint interviews with key informants, fruitful discussions and valuable comments on drafts, as well as to Pravina Makan-Lakha, General Manager: Operations at ACCORD, for her unwavering support. A special Thank You goes to the EU Delegation in Maputo who did not object to use material and information generated by the ACCORD consultancy for the publication of this study. All those persons interviewed during the research merit the author’s heartfelt gratitude. A special thanks goes to Teresa Weimer, London, for proofreading the final draft.

THE AUGUST 2019 MAPUTO ACCORD FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

This article seeks to understand the consequences of the August 2019 agreement for the consolidation of peace in Mozambique, with a particular focus on reconciliation. Embedded in a critical analysis of the August 2019 MAPR, the study understands reconciliation to have been at the margin of the present agreement as well as of its two predecessors of 1992 and 2014 and their respective implementation. Reconciliation efforts were rather left to individuals, communities, religious organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This means that reconciliation was only partially reflected in government policies, budgets, and efforts to consolidate peace.

Without an amnesty legislation addressing the crucial issues of truth and justice to accompany the implementation of the Peace agreements, and in the absence of systematic public efforts at reconciliation, peace consolidation and the emergence of a strong culture of peace may be in jeopardy.

The Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation was signed on 6 August 2019 by Mozambican President and Frelimo Chairperson, Felipe Nyusi and the Renamo leader, Ossufo Momade. Two weeks later, it was turned into law by Parliament, with the votes of Frelimo (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*) and Renamo (*Resistência Nacional de Moçambique*) parties. The third party in parliament MDM (*Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*) largely abstained. This agreement is considered definitive by the two signatories, after six previous

attempts to negotiate a political settlement between the Frelimo government and Renamo, the armed group turned militarized political party had failed, despite producing two peace agreements. The first agreement was the General Peace Accord (GPA) signed in Rome on 4 October 1992 by President Joaquim Chissano and the late Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama, followed by the second Peace Agreement of 5 September, 2014, signed by President Armando Guebuza together with the Renamo leader.

The signing of the MAPR was preceded by almost 30 months of direct negotiation between the two principals, Nyusi and Dhlakama, respectively Momade, facilitated by the Swiss Ambassador, Mirko Manzoni. Most of the meetings took place in the Gorongosa area, where the Renamo leadership had established the military headquarters of its residual armed forces. The negotiation process had already produced a ceasefire (in December 2016) as well as a Constitutional Reform on Decentralization, cast in a piece of legislation on 1 April 2018 (Law 1/2018), and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on military matters agreed upon by the principals on 1 August 2018.

The 'definitive' peace agreement focuses primarily on the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) of Renamo's armed wing and defines Renamo's responsibilities in this regard. It incorporates, the August 2018 MoU, which among others, formally ends the armed clashes between the two belligerents. The Annex also contains the Terms of Reference for the peace negotiation process and provisions for the implementation of the peace agreement, together with a Declaration by the Minister of Economic Affairs on the budgetary impact the implementation of the peace agreement would have.

Thus, the August 2019 MAPR basically represents the negotiated results of Pillar/Provision II (on Military Affairs). The agreement meets the main strategic objective of the Frelimo government .i.e. the dismantling of Renamo's military capabilities. The negotiation process around Pillar/Provision I on Decentralization and Autonomy of Provincial Governments, strategically much more important for Renamo as a way to potentially access power and resources at provincial level, had already been concluded with the amended constitution of April 2018. It foresees a coherent three-tier system of devolved sub-national governments based on the subsidiarity principle, which includes a degree of autonomy of provincial governments and the direct election of provincial governors. And it enshrines the figure of the Representative of the State, at provincial level, for non-devolved matters such as public order and security, mineral exploitation and public finance and taxation. Although the August, 2019 agreement mentions the constitutional reform in its preamble, no specific Article is dedicated to the Pillar/Provision I subject matter.

At the very beginnings of the 2017-2019 peace negotiations it was thought that Pillar/Provision III on Reconciliation and Conflict Prevention could possibly complement the negotiations on Pillars/Provisions I and II. This idea was dropped during the process, with the August 2019 Peace Agreement simply referring to 'reconciliation' and the preamble states that peace and reconciliation are prerequisites for socioeconomic development.

As a consequence, if we picture the MAPR as a 'building' which houses peace, DDR and reconciliation, it was basically constructed on one central pillar only, i.e. that of Military Affairs (Pillar/Provision II).

The statement, in the Annex, by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (MEF) suggests that the implementation of the Agreement is neutral to the Mozambican planning and budgeting process budget. That means, that no cost whatsoever, related to the consolidation of peace is to be borne by the Government of Mozambique. This implies that particularly the DDR process, and whatever is undertaken in the realm of reconciliation, are not to be funded by government, but rather by donors and international partners.

To assure a high international visibility of the August 2019 agreement, its signing was formally witnessed and endorsed, in writing, by high national and international dignitaries. They included the Presidents of Namibia (at the time also holding the presidency of SADC), of Rwanda and Zambia, the former Presidents of Tanzania, and of Mozambique, as well as Don Mateo Zuppi, archbishop and cardinal of Bologna (erstwhile one of the Sant' Egidio mediators of the Rome GPA) and other dignitaries such as the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, and the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. The Swiss Ambassador Manzoni, already having been nominated as the future special envoy of the UN Secretary General, also attended the ceremony.

Demilitarization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)

DDR is the key element of the MAPR. The document sets out the principles of DDR and also addresses the integration of a number of senior Renamo elements in the command structure of the Mozambican Armed and Defence Forces (FADM) and the Police of the

Republic of Mozambique (PRM), a condition set by Renamo to accede to the Agreement. So far, 14 and 10 ex-Renamo Officers have been integrated into senior positions in FADM and the PRM, respectively.

The MoU also established a Military Affairs Commission, composed by representatives of government and Renamo, supported by three technical sub-groups. These are i) the Joint Technical Group on Placement (JTGP), ii) the Joint Technical Group on DDR (JTGDDR), and iii) the Joint Technical Group on Monitoring and Verification (JTG MV). The latter includes an International Component (IC), composed of senior military advisors to provide technical assistance and assure credibility of the DDR process. The governments of Germany, India, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Tanzania, the US and Zimbabwe have commissioned senior military staff to the IC, which is led by the Argentinian General, Javier Aquino.

Regarding demobilization and reintegration of Renamo combatants into their community of origin, a list of 5,221 names was submitted by Renamo to the JTGDDR, and the Peace Secretariat, respectively, and subsequently approved by Government. At the time of writing, about 300 Renamo combatants have been registered, and some firearms were handed over.

According to the DDR plans elaborated by the Peace Secretariat, those combatants officially registered and having handed over their arms are to be guaranteed support in two ways. Firstly, they will receive a *reinsertion package* of an estimated value of US\$ 1,000, consisting of tools, clothing, seeds, and other items for personal use. Secondly, during each of the 12 months after the formal demobilization, each demobilized combatant is entitled to receive a

monthly cash payment, totalling of 1,000 USD over the 12 months. He/she is also entitled to a national identity card and to open a bank account. The proportion of women in the total is estimated to be 5%.

The low number of registered Renamo combatants thus far points to the fact, that the DDR process has been facing a number of technical and political challenges and is considerably behind schedule. The political challenge is attributable to what appears to be a profound split in the former Renamo guerrilla force and, in fact the party as a whole. The self-declared *Junta Militar* operating in central Mozambique, led by General Mariano Nhongo does not recognize the election of Ossufo Momade as Renamo party leader, even threatening to eliminate him. And thus, it does not recognize the party leader's signature under the August 2019 peace agreement, which it considers null and void in technical terms. It is therefore not entirely clear whether the Junta's fighters are, or not, included in the official list of combatants to be demobilized.

The technical and institutional challenges have to do with the transition of the Swiss-led leadership and financing of the Peace Secretariat and its operations to that of United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), together with questions regarding accountability of the Peace Secretariat. Other challenges concern questions raised by some (potential) supporters of the DDR Trust Fund on the composition and characteristics of beneficiaries as well as on the delivery modalities of support to demobilized combatants, either individually or collectively, regarding in the latter case the communities they are supposed to return to, primarily in Sofala, Manica and Zambezia.

Amnesty Legislation

The MAPR is associated with an Amnesty Law, unanimously passed by Parliament at the end of July 2019. From a legal perspective, these are two distinct, yet interrelated pieces of legislation, since both negotiating parties conditioned the signing of the peace agreement to a general amnesty for atrocities and violent criminal acts committed during military confrontations from 2014 onwards. Previously, an amnesty law (2014) had been enacted in the wake of the peace agreement signed by Guebuza and Dhlakama (2014). Other amnesties were legislated in 1987 (to entice Renamo 'armed bandits' to lay down their arms and hand themselves over to the authorities) and in 1992, as part of the Rome GPA. Analysing the 1992 amnesty law, Igreja suggested that this legislation was particularly in Frelimo's interest in order to avoid accountability for past war crimes committed by its members and those of the armed and police forces, and in support of a general, verbal public commitment to reconciliation by the Chissano government. Urban civil society organizations (CSOs), notably those dedicated to human rights largely remained on the side-lines, not demanding accountability (Igreja, 2015; Igreja & Skaar, 2013). At the same time this contributed to an 'open-endedness' (Igreja) of the post conflict transition, in which contested war memories were used as weapons in the fierce struggles for political legitimacy by both parties (Igreja, 2015). As a study in the Gorongosa district suggests, the lack of accountability turned into what Igreja & Skaar label as 'embodied phenomenon', in the sense that:

It is inseparable from the lived experiences of the war survivors and their relatives. Embodied accountability means that the alleged perpetrators and their victims become tied through the suffering that shatters their bodies and

everyday lives, thereby compelling both perpetrator and victim to act in the pursuit of truth and acknowledgment of responsibility. The alleged perpetrator seeks resolution, whereas the victim seeks justice in local cultural terms (Igreja & Skaar, 2013: 151).

As Human Rights Watch argues, all the four amnesties neither contributed to sustainable peace nor to ending human rights abuses. In their view, the contrary is true since the amnesty laws protect the perpetrators of criminal acts related to political violence and armed action while denying justice to victims, likely to fuel future abuses (HRW, 2018)². A recent study provides ample evidence that women are particularly affected by crimes committed by the belligerent parties / signatories of peace agreements, impacting negatively on their personal and social lives, health, and wellbeing. They have never really benefitted from any peace dividend that may have resulted of previous peace agreements (MULEIDE et al, 2019). The sexual abuse, abductions and killings of girls and women, allegedly committed by government forces occupying strategic positions in central Mozambique in general and the Gorongosa area in particular, even during periods of absence of armed activities is often overlooked. This makes the amnesty legislation problematic and does not necessary lend itself to reconciliation, given the deep-seated fear, trauma and even hatred of the victims of such human rights abuses.

International Dimensions

The Annex to the August 2019 Agreement details the architecture of the agreement's implementation including regarding its external

² See also: Weimer & Bueno (forthcoming)

financing. Constituent elements are i) the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General³, ii) the Contact Group⁴ and iii) the Peace Secretariat. The latter funded previously by Switzerland, and from January 2020 onwards, by the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) under the project entitled: *'Implementation of the Maputo Accord on Peace and Reconciliation'*. A Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) has been established by the Swiss, administered by the Peace Secretariat. Apart from Switzerland, contributors are, so far, Canada, Finland and Ireland. Other development agencies such as the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom (UK) contributed to the Secretariat's capacity by seconding specialized staff. Germany is not part of the Contact Group, but collaborates with the Secretariat and selected donors such as the European Union Delegation (EUD) in Mozambique on an ad hoc basis in areas of interest, particularly regarding DDR, small weapons collection and reconciliation. The Joint Technical Group on DDR is also part of the international arrangements.

The appointment of Mirko Manzoni as Special UN Envoy and the replacement of the Swiss Embassy by UNOPS as manager of the Peace Secretariat makes the MAPR fit into the UN Agenda for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Some of its key elements are: i) the 1992 Agenda for Peace, ii) the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2003); iii) the creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), together with the establishment of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in 2005; iv) the establishment of the Expert Advisory Panel on Peacebuilding in 2015; and, finally, v) the incorporating of 'peace and conflict resolution' in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 2030 as Goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions).

The UN Peacebuilding concept has now evolved into a discussion (and resolutions) on Sustaining Peace. This is understood as a broader concept than Peacebuilding. The twin UN resolutions on the 2015 peacebuilding architecture review, General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282, recognize that efforts to sustain peace are necessary at all stages of conflict. The UN also emphasizes, in theory, the role of women in the resolution of conflict and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective into all Security Council resolutions in line with Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, adopted at the initiative of Namibia.

Thus the UN Security Council in its resolution 1325 on women, peace and security has recognized that including women and gender perspectives in decision-making can strengthen prospects for sustainable peace. The landmark resolution addresses the situation of women in armed conflict and calls for their participation at all levels of decision-making on conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Since the agenda was set with the core principles of resolution 1325, the Security Council adopted three supporting resolutions - 1820, 1888 and 1889. All four resolutions focus on two key goals: strengthening women's participation in decision-making and ending sexual violence and impunity.

Since 1999, the systematic engagement of the UN Security Council has firmly placed the situation of children affected by armed conflict

³ On 28 July 2019, the UN Secretary General appointed the Swiss Ambassador, Mirko Manzoni as his Personal Envoy, who ceased his function of Swiss Ambassador on 31 October 2019.

⁴ Members: Botswana, China, Norway, Switzerland, UK, USA

as an issue affecting peace and security. The Security Council has created a strong framework and provided the Secretary-General with tools to respond to violations against children. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict serves as the leading UN advocate for the protection and well-being of children affected by armed conflict⁵.

South Africa, which presided over the UN Security Council from October to November 2019 furthered initiatives to promote a major inclusion of women and girls to peacebuilding processes, seen as undervalued and under-resourced to date. The argument is that women and girls continue to be severely affected by conflict situations, especially regarding sexual abuse and violence⁶.

The UN Peacebuilding Fund, established in 2006 to support activities, actions, programmes, and organisations that seek to build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict, however, is notoriously underfunded. In 2018, the Indian Government, one of the major contributors to UN peacekeeping efforts, showed concern about this state of affairs, alleging lack of political will by member states to genuinely support UN-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The budget for peacebuilding was less than one per cent of that of peacekeeping operations.

While the UN peacebuilding operations may be constrained by lack of funding, the EU has resources to be allocated to peacebuilding in Mozambique. Already in July 2018, the then-EU ambassador had publicly indicated the EU's commitment to be at the forefront of supporting the peace process in Mozambique, alluding to the EU's credentials as a laureate of the Peace Nobel prize in 2012⁷. However, 'a peace agreement for the country would only be

important if it passed from signature to action and with a credible process of national reconciliation'⁸. It transpired that the funding for peace support was to be part of the € 290 million funding that had been allocated for general budget support to Mozambique, but frozen in 2016, because the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the donor community stalled support to the Mozambican budget in the wake of the odious debt scandal. Eventually a sum of € 60 million were communicated to the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and the public in general. The commitment to spend € 60 million has been reiterated by Federica Mogherini, the EU's 'foreign minister', who as mentioned earlier, witnessed the signature of the Maputo Peace Accord on August 6, 2019⁹. This support reflects the logic of the EU's key *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace* (IcSP)¹⁰, its main approach to peace consolidation support. Other relevant EU guidelines include its Council's Concept for Support to DDR and several factsheets produced by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on key aspects of peacebuilding¹¹. With these instruments the EU has contributed decisively to peace processes in countries such as Bolivia, Central African Republic, East Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone.

5 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/peace-and-security/>

6 <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-16-sa-champions-closer-un-au-co-operation-in-resolving-conflicts/>

7 On the occasion of the official reception marking the Europe Day on 9 May.

8 <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/eu-success-of-peace-agreement-in-mozambique-depends-on-reconciliation-process/>

9 https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mozambique/66239/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-signature-peace-agreement_en

10 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-governance/peace-and-security/instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace_en

In September 2019 it was announced that the EU was contributing US\$ 2.8 million to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). It aims at building, strengthening and consolidating national capacities for conflict prevention in conflict-affected, fragile countries, as well as countries undergoing political instability or difficult transitions.

Critical Assessment

While the MAPR had received the blessings of international statespersons and dignitaries, the reactions in Mozambique were mixed. Not only did the majority of MDM members in parliament abstain from enacting the peace agreement into law. This party, considering itself as non-belligerent in contrast to Renamo and Frelimo, felt excluded from the peace negotiations, stressing that peace in Mozambique concerns all Mozambican and political actors, and not only the two 'belligerent' ones. Civil society representatives argued that the peace negotiation was overly secret in nature, negotiated with little transparency and only among parts of the Frelimo and Renamo political elites. The idea of calling for a broad based national forum or constituent conference, launched in 2017 by parts of the civil society, and endorsed by the former First Lady of Mozambique, and South Africa, Graça Machel, was ignored by the key actors of the ongoing negotiations. The supporters had argued, that a secretively negotiated elite settlements would not reflect on alternatives to the hitherto pursued, failed approach to peacebuilding and the necessary societal and economic transformations (IESE, 2017). This idea, still alive, is echoed by the rector of the Technical University of Mozambique (UTM) in an interview¹². He maintains that the elite settlement between armed

political parties bore the risk of ignoring the opinions of the Mozambican people and their strong desire for socioeconomic justice and an effective separation of powers for fighting impunity and poor governance. The risks of 'falsifying democracy' and of 'failure' thus were built into the August agreement from the very beginning of the negotiations. He maintained that a national conference on what he called *A Third Path*¹³ for Mozambique continued to be necessary, with multiple local conferences throughout Mozambique feeding into the debate of rethinking of Mozambique and sustaining peace (interview, 26/09/2019). Other CSO representatives argued that the MAPR with its narrow focus on DDR of Renamo soldiers is gravely ignoring the socioeconomic situation of poverty of the vast majority of Mozambicans and the state fragility to address it.

Another sceptical voice is that of Prof Lourenço do Rosário, former Rector of A Politécnica University and one of the mediators of the – failed – national peace negotiations during 2004–2015 in Maputo known as the Chissano Conference Centre process. In an interview with the ACCORD Team¹⁴, he stressed that both parties whose leaders signed the Maputo Agreement, Frelimo and Renamo, were neither

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- 11 E.g. on Mediation and Dialogue in transitional processes from non-state armed groups to political movements/ political parties; Mediation and Dialogue in electoral processes to prevent and mitigate electoral related violence; Strengthening National Capacities for mediation and dialogue: National Dialogue Platforms and infrastructures for peace. See: Banim, Guy (2019).
 - 12 Interview with Prof Severino Ngoenha, Maputo, 26/09/2019
 - 13 In Ngoenha's logic, the *First Path* was represented by the socialist phase, from Independence up to the change of the constitution in 1990, emphasizing national unity and social justice, however at the cost of liberal freedoms. The *Second Path* was characterized by the liberalization of the society and the 'dollarization' of the economy, however at the cost of social justice and increasing corruption and impunity.
 - 14 Interview with Lourenço do Rosário, Maputo, 25/09/2019

reconciled internally nor between each other. Both had profound internal rifts of a regional, ethnic, and economic nature, attributable to the failure of building national unity. Hence confidence building and reconciliation within the parties, with their own history, and with that of the country, was a necessary condition for sustainable peacebuilding. As an example he mentioned the divergent opinions on the concept of 'who is a Mozambican', or *Moçambicanidade*, which were not reconciled, given Frelimo's history of categorizing Mozambicans in those of 'first, second and third class'. In his view, one of the major obstacles to sustainable peace, or rather causes for continued warfare, are the manipulated electoral outcomes since 1999, all contested by the opposition and triggering political violence to various degrees. Even if the principals of the parties were genuine in their intentions to peacebuilding, their rank and file members would seek opportunities to gain power and access, to resources and rents at the cost of excluding others, both within their own party and that of the other, facilitated by the established clientelist system of governance. Hence do Rosário was particularly weary of the chances of a successful DDR process, since, in his view, the retention, threat, and use of arms were an effective leverage for access to power under the given conditions to which Renamo was accustomed. The present split of Renamo into a pro-peace and an armed *Junta Militar* / Nhongo faction thus does not come as a surprise. As a consequence and priority, reconciliation would need to focus on trying to unite Renamo under the banner of the Maputo Agreement.

This task of completing 'unfinished business', is seen as the responsibility of both Government and the Renamo leadership, with facilitation by the Peace Secretariat.

With the peace negotiations focussing exclusively on the principals, i.e. Nyusi and Dhlakama, respectively Momade, and taking place under a shroud of secrecy, it may be argued from an analytical point of view, that potential spoilers in both parties may not have been sufficiently engaged during the negotiation process, a necessary condition for sustainable peace agreements (Newman & Richmond, 2006; Stedman, 2000). This does not mean that the peace agreement is necessarily doomed to fail, but it needs to be recognised that not all relevant societal, political, and military forces are supportive of the outcome of the negotiations, since this may be seen to threaten their power or interests.

From that angle, the architecture and process of the peace negotiation has been questioned. Initially, two joint working groups, composed of government/Frelimo members and Renamo had been established, one on Decentralization and one on Military Affairs. Each could draw upon the inputs and prestige of experienced international advisors.

However, the final agreement on Decentralization on behalf of the Frelimo party was not in the hands of the working groups, but in those of the party's political commission. And, according to well-informed sources, it is from there that the figure of the Representative of the (central) State found its way into the reform, absent in previous versions of the negotiated reform document. Once the Constitutional Reform on Decentralization was achieved under Pillar/ Provision I, the respective working group ceased to exist. Without any possibility of feedback to the original negotiating team, the subsequent legislative package on decentralization consisting of six laws provided a golden opportunity for the spoilers in Frelimo who had grudges against what they saw as far reaching concessions made by Nyusi to Dhlakama on provincial

autonomy. They were instrumental in shaping the legislation package with an emphasis on central government control. This is widely seen to not correspond to the letter and spirit of the agreement reached by Nyusi and Dhlakama, and to have been watered down by Frelimo members in government and parliament opposed to far reaching decentralization concessions to Renamo with the potential opportunity to access provincial power and resources in case of electoral wins. Their three 'trump cards' were, indeed, the Representative of the State, or Secretary of State at provincial level, nominated by the president, the limiting of functions and resources for the newly created provincial executives under an elected governor, and overly strict oversight and upward accountability provisions. These are seen by analysts as institutional obstacles introduced at the last minute of the negotiation process, and thus not corresponding to the initial decentralization deal struck by the principal negotiators. This issue did not only put Renamo and Frelimo at loggerheads during the parliamentary debate, with Renamo not being able to make substantive legal changes due to the passing of the legislation by a simple Frelimo majority. The strongest criticism, however, came from the Frelimo Mayor of Maputo, who, in a letter to Parliament criticised the new decentralization dispensation as a step backward¹⁵. And Mozambican intellectuals such Ericinio de Salema, Director of EISA, and Adriano Nuvunga, Director of *Centro de Democracia e Desenvolvimento* (CDD), held that the decentralization provisions and the election of the provincial governor from 2019 onwards are no guarantee, whatsoever, for sustaining peace if the electoral process and its outcomes are considered unfair or manipulated¹⁶. They also stress the point made by do Rosário cited above, that the widely perceived manipulation of previous elections triggered the resurgence of political violence and armed

activity by Renamo, irrespective of the existing peace agreements and decentralization arrangements.

Regarding Pillar/Provision II on Military Affairs, the strong opposition of an armed wing of Renamo operating in central Mozambique out of hideouts in the Gorongosa and Gondola Districts (Sofala Province) to the agreement became clear even before the signing of the MAPR. The so-called *Junta Militar* under the command of Mariano Nhongo does not recognize the peace agreement and its DDR provisions and refuses to disarm, unless a new Renamo president other than Ossufu Momade were to be elected¹⁷. In turn, the Renamo leader labelled the dissidents as '*undisciplined deserters*' suggesting that the National Defence and Security Forces (FDS) should deal with them. The fact that this group is likely to be behind attacks on civilian buses in the period from September/ October 2019 to March 2020 shows the group's armed capability, putting into question the complete implementation of the DDR provisions in the MAPR. Apparently efforts are under way, said to even involve Mirko Manzoni and other national facilitators, to promote unity among the rival Renamo factions. The MDM leader, Daviz Simango, understands that the split within Renamo is attributable to the dissidents not being adequately informed about the details of the DDR agreement due to a lack of transparency of the process. Thus their aspirations may have been ignored¹⁸.

15 <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/proposed-law-of-representation-reflects-a-backward-step-in-decentralisation-maputo-municipality-136693/>

16 <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/election-of-governors-insufficient-to-end-political-conflicts-in-mozambique-analysts/>

17 <https://observador.pt/2019/08/04/grupo-militar-na-renamo-recusa-entregar-armas-sem-eleger-novo-presidente-do-partido/>

In political terms it is far from clear how, if ever, the split within Renamo can be politically healed. The continued armed attacks on civilian traffic in central Mozambique costing the lives of 10 persons in 2019 are attributed, by Renamo, to armed banditry of dissidents and not to its combatants, while the party leadership reaffirms the commitment to the August 2019 peace agreement, including the DDR agenda. The government, however, has a different view. It squarely places the responsibility for the armed attacks at Renamo's doorstep and has reinforced FDS contingents in central Mozambique.

Apart from being criticised for exaggerated secrecy and for not sufficiently engaging potential spoilers, the chief facilitator of the peace process has also come under scrutiny for his dual role as, on the one hand, formally representing Switzerland vis-à-vis the Mozambican Government in his position as ambassador, and acting as a neutral facilitator on the other. Especially some members of the opposition and of CSOs suggested a certain bias of the facilitator towards government and its political agenda. This view is reflected in the brochure produced by the Swiss Embassy in Maputo commemorating 40 years of bilateral cooperation with Mozambique¹⁹.

Summing up, we hold, that the MAPR of August 2019 is an important national milestone to definitively settle the Government-Renamo conflict, which has been ongoing since 1977. And it is a success for Swiss diplomacy, represented in the person of the Ambassador Manzoni, after two previous national and international failed attempts to settle the conflict, to produce favourable results for peace consolidation. For the first time, direct face-to-face talks between the principals Maputo, have taken place outside the capital i.e. in the Gorongosa

Mountains of Sofala Province. And for the first time a detailed DDR plan for Renamo soldiers was thrashed out, with the Renamo leadership agreeing to negotiate away its military capabilities against winning considerable concessions regarding political power at the level of provincial governments through more autonomy and direct elections of governors. As a political elite settlement or bargain between party elites, negotiated with hardly any feedback loops in relation to potential spoilers and to civil society, it took the risk of not paying sufficient attention to spoilers, ready to derail the process since their interests were threatened or not reflected. It also does not substantively address the manifold causes of the conflict now formally settled with the MAPR, notably the inequalities of access to power and resources, and the electoral processes and outcomes of previous elections widely seen to have been manipulated to favour the incumbent party. Finally, the Agreement is tacit on the substance of reconciliation. It is therefore not surprising that the reception of the Maputo agreement by the Mozambican civil society was lacklustre, having been met and commented upon with some scepticism, notably by intellectuals speaking of a 'poor peace'²⁰.

As Alex Vines , the Director of London's Chathamhouse Africa Programme puts it: *...the Agreement, if it is to last,[...] will require political good will, compromise and an acceptance of more inclusive national politics by*

18 <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-simango-says-renamo-dissident-guerrillas-case-caused-by-lack-of-transparency-138626/>

19 Embassy of Switzerland (2019). Switzerland – Mozambique, 2019: Forty years of Partnership and Cooperation. Maputo.

20 <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/ataques-no-centro-de-mo%C3%A7ambique-denunciam-uma-paz-pobre-dizem-analistas/5158396.html>

both parties; the 15 October 2019 elections and their conduct could make or break this new elite bargain...

It requires continued international and domestic engagement. It attempts to encourage alternative peaceful livelihood opportunities through training of RENAMO's past and current armed militia. This should help RENAMO to gradually disarm its militant wing if post-election confidence grows (Vines, 2019, Summary).

Regarding the second point, signs are on the wall, that the elite bargain may suffer fractures in the wake of the 15 October 2019 elections and their outcome, which produced an overwhelming victory for Nyusi and an absolute majority for Frelimo in the National Assembly (AR), and, simultaneously in a position to govern all provincial governments. Not only the proliferation of political violence during campaigning, the manipulation of voter registration in Zambezia, Nampula and Gaza in favour of the incumbent party, the assassination of a senior national member of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) coalition for election observation Casa de Paz, and the withholding of credentials for more than 2,000 national observers are indicators thereof. Worse, the lack of transparency in the production of the results by the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and clandestine retrospective 'correction' of the official electoral result statement by the supreme electoral institution, the Constitutional Council (CC), do not mitigate the strong doubts about the elections having been free, fair and with accurate results. This is why both the opposition parties do not recognise them, with Renamo threatening nationwide demonstrations to challenge the official electoral outcome. Such type of demonstrations and heavy-handed reaction by the PRM may easily trigger political violence and loss of

life, as the case of Montepuez demonstrates. In the wake of the 1999 electoral contestation by Renamo, its armed men occupied and ransacked this major town in Cabo Delgado Province. The authorities reacted by detaining 119 persons in the town's small prison who died of dehydration and/or asphyxiation (Lalá & Ostheimer, 2003: 21).

No wonder, then, that national and international analysts have expressed scepticism about the sustainability of the peace process, arguing that electoral fraud and political violence may eventually derail it (Louw-Vaudran, 2019; Müller & Vorrath 2019). The assassination of Anastácio Matavel, a senior member of a registered CSO electoral observation group in Gaza²¹, seen by many to be a stern warning to national NGOs as a whole, may not offer a comforting position for a peace consolidation after the MAPR. What is even more worrisome is the fact that the senior leadership of the signatory parties to the Maputo Agreement remain largely tacit on the violence, loss of life and transgression of laws before, during, and after the elections. Another shadow over the sustainability of the peace emanating from the MAPR is the fact, that since its signing, the armed clashes in Cabo Delgado between insurgents and government forces and the number of casualties have increased, with a militarization and internationalization of that war following suit. This is hardly reconcilable with the key messages of the August Peace Agreement.

21 <https://www.cipeleicoes.org/oficial-assassinios-de-anastacio-matavele-sao-agentes-da-policia/>

RECONCILIATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN MOZAMBIQUE

It has been argued, that since the Rome General Peace Accord (GPA) ended the 16 year civil war in 1992, reconciliation has never really taken root in Mozambique (Bueno, 2019). The author highlights that it lacked three dimensions for taking the peace process further in the sense of reconciliation: inclusion, truth, and justice. This 'package' may not have been in the mind of the signatories of the GPA, despite president Chissano stressing in his speech in Rome: *'National reconciliation is a responsibility of all Mozambicans. Together we must heal the wounds, replace hatred with understanding and solidarity, revenge with forgiveness and tolerance, distrust with brotherhood and friendship'* (cited in Bueno, 2019: 431). But he carefully avoided touching on the sensitive issues, such as war crimes and transitional justice.

'Walking his reconciliation talk', Chissano, in the period 1993-1995, promoted a series of what may be called confidence-building measures (CBM) on an ad hoc basis. These bolstered the spirit of the GPA and demonstrated the need to reintegrate the former 'armed bandits' into society and, to some extent, the state. As stated above, the amnesty law of 1992 provided the GPA signatories with some cover and protection against accountability for war crimes, and helped the Frelimo government to reach out to the former enemy with some generosity and conciliatory gestures. Already in 1993, Chissano had the governors of the provinces considered as Renamo strongholds (Sofala, Manica, Zambezia, Nampula) work with three Renamo 'advisors' each, to have Renamo's voice heard at subnational government, and for the 'advisors'

to gain experience in the day-to-day running of a province. This, of course, did not put into question the fact, that the governors were directly subordinated and accountable to the President. He also asked the Ministry of State Administration (MAE), then led by Minister Alfredo Gamito, to include Renamo-nominated administrators and *Chefes de Posto* in MAE's local government training programmes and to employ them at local government level as *eventuais*, i.e. public servants not occupying formal posts in the public service. Another CBM was to have the Ministry of Defence led by a civilian, Aguiar Mazula, formerly the head of MAE, who had been part of the Frelimo delegation at the Rome peace negotiations. He was charged with overseeing the setting up a new Mozambican Armed Defence Force (FADM) composed with a ratio of 50:50 by former Renamo and Frelimo combatants, and equipped with new defence policy and doctrine, but with very few resources, including a lack of recruits to serve in the new army. Chissano also encouraged joint missions and conference participation of mixed Renamo/government delegations, for example to observe elections in South Africa, study decentralization in Uganda and to review the peace process in Angola and Namibia. And he agreed to have joint government and Renamo participation in national conferences and seminars on post-conflict and peacebuilding topics such as 'electoral legislation', 'women in peacebuilding' and 'post-conflict socio-economic development perspectives'.²² However, these CBM were not always viewed with benevolent eyes by senior members of his government, including Armando Guebuza, at the time

²² These joint missions were often organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Maputo Office, in collaboration with the Instituto Superior das Relações Internacionais (ISRI) and the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM). These CBMs counted on the trust and support of Chissano and the Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi.

Minister of Transport and Communication and former head of the government delegation at the Rome peace negotiations.

Chissano also needs to be credited with the acceptance of the proposal made by civil society to declare 4 October as *National Day of Peace and Reconciliation*, commemorating the date the GPA was signed. This happened with a delay of almost 10 years, due to the resistance of hardliners in the ruling party. In 2003, the parliament adopted, in the spirit of reconciliation, a new national anthem (*Pátria Amada*) which substituted the previous Frelimo anthem. In December 2005, however, in the first year of the first Guebuza mandate, the Frelimo parliamentary majority rejected a new national flag (without the AK-47 assault rifle), although parliament had bestowed an award to the winner of the design tender for a new flag. The argument put forward was that the rifle in the flag symbolized the armed struggle for independence and was part of the country's history, and hence could not be dispensed with.

In fact, also the national CBM in the form of joint seminars and the gradual opening of public service to Renamo administrators had their days counted with the exception of the integration of Renamo combatants into the army, some of them in senior positions, such as the Deputy General Chief of Staff. This was a result of the provisions of the GPA which had a quasi-legal status. It happened at the time 1995 to 1999. Other of the GPA's security relevant provisions such as the integration of Renamo combatants into the police force and the intelligence services were not and would not be realized. This was already clear in 1995, at a 'post mortem' conference on the achievements of United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), to the dismay of international observers (Kuehne et al, 1995).

Immediately during the implementation of the GPA the government started building up the police force and revamping the Forças de Intervenção Rápida (FIR) into a combat force, to replace the army.

Not by design, but by default, post-war reconciliation in some districts in Nampula was considerably furthered by the gradual introduction of participatory bottom-up district planning. From 1994 onwards, this programme – later known as *Programa de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas* (PPFD), and up-streamed into the National Programme for Decentralized Planning and Financing (PNPFD) – was piloted in selected war-torn districts of Nampula Province. It was initially supported by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) agency, under oversight of the National Directorate of Planning and Budget (DNPO) in the Ministry of the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF). An impressive ethnographic film authored by Sophie Kotanyi and shot on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER) in 1993 shows the coming together of brothers of one family in Mecuburi District who had been separated politically during the Civil War (1977-1992)²³. After a reconciliation ritual with the ancestors the film shows them taking part in sessions of participatory district planning. On one occasion one of the brothers states: 'now Peace has definitely arrived and will stay, since we are all sitting together, without discrimination, to discuss our livelihood priorities'²⁴.

23 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/peace-and-security/>

24 Cited from memory. The original film, entitled *Viver de Novo: Não se decide sozinho*, co-financed by SDC, has unfortunately been lost in the archives both of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and of the Swiss Embassy in Maputo.

As Bueno (2019) rightly suggests, the era of CBM and reconciliation efforts came to an end with Guebuza's ascent to power and his largely successful attempts to merge the Party with the state administration. Exemplary is the case of the former Director of the Postal Services, a manager reputed for his efficiency. When it transpired that he was a member of Renamo, he was dismissed from his post. The remilitarization of the army and the ousting of ex-Renamo combatants from senior positions in FADM was part of Guebuza's rollback strategy to the pre-GPA status quo²⁵. Without doubt, this furthered mistrust of the Renamo signatory of the GPA, Dhlakama, and it prepared the way to the resurgence of post-electoral political violence in central Mozambique in 2009 and particularly after 2014.

What about reconciliation in the era of President Nyusi and in the context of his direct talks with the Renamo leaders, resulting in the Maputo Peace Agreement?

In a speech in Chimoio in July 2017 Nyusi explicitly linked reconciliation with DDR and particularly with reintegration of demobilized and disarmed Renamo soldiers into the community. Alluding to the past errors regarding DDR he appealed to his audience to avoid having fear of the other and to know to live together in the community²⁶. Such clear words were not recorded on the signing of the Maputo Accord. In Nyusi's speech, there was no specific reference to the aspect of reconciliation. While the Agreement had space to allude to the future wealth to be produced by the gas exploration in Cabo Delgado, there was no specific mention of reconciliation.

However, a few days after the signing of the MAPR, on the occasion of the visit of Pope Francis to Mozambique, Nyusi, like Chissano

in 1994, emphasised that it is all Mozambicans, who have the responsibility 'to protect peace and reconciliation in Mozambique'²⁷. This point was stressed again in the President's speech to army staff on the Day of Victory (7 September). He noted that 'we are all brothers who share the same territory' and for this reason 'we must bet on a future of peace and reconciliation' in which 'dialogue should prevail and be the only means to resolve differences'. He stressed a need 'to practice tolerance' and where no one is allowed 'to use intimidation to engage in politics'²⁸.

Summing up, we can state, that particularly for the Chissano and Nyusi governments, reconciliation was part of the political discourse and, in the case of Chissano, of pragmatic politics, without however, any concrete and publicly known policy or programme to go by. A certain exception is the National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security 2018-2022 (GoM, 2018), which, despite its exclusive focus on women's important and most often neglected role in peacebuilding, does, however, not explicitly address issues of reconciliation and transitional justice.

All Mozambican governments led by the different presidents since 1992 were satisfied with i) having a peace agreement in hand, and ii) an amnesty approved by parliament. They were not interested in examining the past and aspects of truth and justice, and were clear that Mozambique therefore would need neither a Truth Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as was

²⁵ Interview with Aguiar Mazula, Maputo, 26/09/2019.

²⁶ <http://opais.sapo.mz/filipe-nyusi-diz-que-tem-que-se-aprender-com-erros-do-passado-na-desmilitarizacao-da-renamo>

²⁷ <http://portaldogoverno.gov.mz/por/layout/set/print/Imprensa/Noticias/Os-mocambicanos-devem-protoger-a-paz-e-reconciliacao-Filipe-Nyusi>

²⁸ <https://www.presidencia.gov.mz/por/Actualidade/Presidente-Nyusi-dirige-cerimonias-do-Dia-da-vitoria-com-mensagens-viradas-a-paz>

the case in South Africa during the immediate post-Apartheid era under the Mandela Government, nor would there be any necessity of following the example of, for example Rwanda post-1994 genocide which included the establishment of a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, a nation-wide consultation campaign, and the famous Gacaca communal justice institutions, among others. As a consequence, reconciliation was left to the communities in the war-affected areas, and the places of origin of demobilized soldiers of both government and Renamo forces. A key role was also played by religious institutions, most of which with a credo of forgiveness, as well as civil society at large. This absence since 1992 of policy directions and formal institutions regarding reconciliation sets a precedent for creatively designing a reconciliation programme for the post-August 2019 peace agreement period.

Community and faith-based initiatives

The absence of a government-led reconciliation approach or policy, post-GPA, enabled a flourishing reconciliation practice at community level. The cleansing and healing processes and procedures helping the reintegration of demobilized soldiers of both sides into local society have been amply documented (Honwana, 2003; Ilundi, 2006; Igreja, 2007; Huyse & Salter, 2008; Wiegink, 2014). In these cases the rituals which these persons had to undergo aimed at reconciling the past with the present, the individual with the community and the mind of warfare with that of forgiveness and empathy. As such they had a powerful dimension of post-conflict trauma healing.

Lesser documented is the work of the major established churches, which in their rites and sermons appealed to the human capacities of

forgiveness, compassion and sharing in the name of Allah, God, Xikwembu or Mwari, and the intermediaries been them and the human being²⁹. An Interreligious Council (*Conselho Inter-Religioso de Moçambique* - CIREM), was founded in 1994, driven by the Bahá'í Congregation in Maputo. It had the explicit aim to promote not only interreligious dialogue, but to also contribute to post-conflict peace consolation and reconciliation. CIREM with all major religious denominations being part was key in the organization of the 10 year anniversary of the GPA in 2002, and in the successful endeavour to have a square in Maputo named *Praça de Paz* by the Municipal Council. CIREM was later replaced by COREM (Mozambican Council of Religions). In 2018, it was chosen to organize conferences on peace and reconciliation in an initiative by the German Embassy and supported by the EU. The first summit³⁰ held in Beira in January 2018 produced what is known as the Beira Declaration, which argues in favour of the elaboration of a National Plan for Peace and Reconciliation. The second summit took place in Tete, only four days after the signing of the MAPR. As can be expected, the participants expressed major concerns regarding postaccord peacebuilding, notably referring to potential electoral violence and the conflict in Cabo Delgado. And they stressed the inclusion of DDR, and reconciliation as important components in a gender-sensitive peace consolidation programme (Leão, 2019). It is no secret that the present COREM leadership is aligned with Frelimo and religious denominations such as the *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus* (IURD) which are close to the ruling party (Fiorotti, 2017, interview³¹).

²⁹ Meaning of Lord in Shangaan and Ndaue languages spoken in Southern and Central Mozambique

³⁰ With the title: *Juntos Dialogando e Orando por Moçambique - Por uma Cultura de Paz, Perdão, Reconciliação, Cura Divina e Espiritual de Almas e Direitos Humanos- Paz para sempre*"

It can be assumed, that the religious groups within and beyond COREM will continue, individually and collectively and in various forms their valuable task of promoting peace and reconciliation in Mozambique. This is certainly the case with the Catholic Church, and particularly its Commission for Peace and Justice. For several years it has been promoting the organization and training of Peace Clubs, notably in some of the conflict-prone areas of Sofala Province. In 2019 they also have been involved in electoral observation. This has grown into a broader, multi-religious effort in which several religious denominations participate, in different parts of the country. The focus is on using the teachings of the various religious doctrines for the training of trainers and spreading of activities, with a focus on those areas in which ex-combatants are being reintegrated³².

Civil Society Initiatives

After the 1992 Rome GPA two cultural initiatives to promote peace and reconciliation made headlines in Mozambique and beyond. The first is the ballet *Ode a Paz*, a translation of the key elements of the Rome GPA into a choreography produced by the *Companhia Nacional de Canto e Dança* (CNCD) under the leadership of David Abilio (director) and Casimiro Nyusi (choreographer). Organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in Maputo and financed by the EU, *Ode a Paz* was presented in almost 100 of the then 128 districts of the country. It conveyed the ‘danced’ message of peace and reconciliation to hundreds of thousands of spectators, including to demobilized Renamo combatants in the organization’s then bush headquarters in Maringue, Sofala. One lesson learned is that if the message of peace and reconciliation is embedded and transmitted in an accessible cultural medium, dance in this case, the impact

on the community in terms of receptiveness, response, and joy is maximized.

The second example is the mini soap opera *Nao é preciso de empurrar - há espaço para todos* (translation: no need to push -there’s room for everyone) a nation-wide TV series of seven episodes. It was produced by the filmmakers Sol de Carvalho, Chico Carneiro, and Bert Sonnenschein of Promedia, based on a script by Mia Couto. It was financed by the FES and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The telenovela showed the coming together of a once divided family, in the context of post-war multiparty elections, the need for mental demobilization, tolerance and for reconciliation within that family and its generations. Targeting an urban audience of TV spectators, each episode was followed by a debate in the TV studio with politicians and other public figures, commenting upon and answering questions on topical issues addressed in the telenovela.

A third approach to transmit key messages of peace and reconciliation – tailor-made to a specific local context and audiences – is popular theatre (which often includes dance and music). This medium has not explicitly merited major consideration in a reconciliation approach of national dimension. Yet, there is sufficient evidence of the use of popular theatre, often interactive, as a civic education tool for transmitting information and messages on matters such as HIV/AIDS prevention, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), municipalization, environmental and civic rights education in a localized project context (interview Evaristo Abreu). Well-known theatre groups, based in Maputo, include *Mutumbela Gogo*, *M’beu*, or *Companhia Gungu*. Some of their leading

³¹ Interview with TS, Maputo, 27/09/2019.

³² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onP3G3inI9s&feature=youtu.be>

actors and directors such as Rogério Manjate or Evaristo Abreu have been specializing in Action Theatre (teatro aplicado), which is taught at the Art Faculty at *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* (UEM)³³. Their action theatre approach is influenced by the methods used by founder of the *Teatro do Oprimido* in Mozambique, the Brazilian Augusto Boal, who based his approach on the emancipatory theory and conscientization praxis of Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* of the 1970s (da Conceição, 2019).

Finally, a rather unique contemporary NGO initiative merits mention: the School of Peace in Gorongosa created in 2002, associated with the Peace School Foundation of Monte Sole, near Bologna in Reggio Emilia, Italy. It aims at promoting training and peace education projects and non-violent conflicts transformation, respect of human rights for a peaceful living together in a community without violence towards human beings and their environment. The Gorongosa School in collaboration with the Monte Sole centre is supported by Helpcode Italy and financed by the EU. Their project Resilience (2017-2018) aimed at training facilitators such as teachers to engage in the promotion of a culture of peace. Methods such as debate and brainstorming; dramatization of stories, theatrical techniques, cooperative games, drawing and painting, dance and music, etc., are being employed (Monte Sole et al, 2018).

In this approach, the historical past and heritage are not neglected but are part of developing a culture of memory necessary to understand the causes of the dividing lines in a conflict. Thus it is not by coincidence that Gorongosa, the symbolic epicentre of the Renamo Frelimo conflict, and the location of the direct Nyusi-Dhlakama/Momade peace talks were selected for the project. The locality of Canda in the Gorongosa District also featured as the venue of the first ever all-

women international work camp on the topic Peace, Security, and Economic Empowerment, from 6 to 7 November 2018. Organized by groups associated with *Marcha Mundial de Mulheres* (MMM) the camp gathered representatives from all Mozambican provinces and from Angola, DRC, Colombia, and Zimbabwe sharing their experiences in dealing with conflict and promoting peace. Among others, the gathering produced concrete proposals for the implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (2018-2022). The event was supported by UN Women, Misereor, the FES and the Consorzio Associazioni con il Mozambico (CAM)³⁴.

In sum, reconciliation practice in Mozambique represents and continues to represent an unfinished puzzle, in which various actors, including government, religious organizations and NGOs have undertaken initiatives towards putting together some relevant bits and pieces. Probably the most consistent part in the reconciliation puzzle is that put together by community-based actors, including traditional healers, traditional leaders, and religious institutions. According to some interviewees, the major issues in reconciliation have still not been addressed: reconciliation with the Mozambican history, with the ethnical and cultural diversity, within the two main political parties, Frelimo and Renamo, as well as reconciliation between the intentions and public announcements regarding peace, on the one hand, and the political practices of exclusion and the discourse of enmity, notably in parliament and on public occasions. This may explain why Renamo, until today, has never participated in the celebrations National Peace and Reconciliation Day on 4 October.

³³ Interview, Evaristo Abreu, 25/09/2019

³⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tI067EiHrWU&feature=youtu.be>


RECONCILIATION - FRAMING AND EXPERIENCES

'Reconciliation' is an ambiguous term with different meanings for different people and contexts (Bloomfield et al, 2003; Lederach, 2009). It is not only used in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, implying, for example, coming together again (in the etymological Latin origin of the word), but also, the settling of accounts, or restitutive justice. In a conflict transition context reconciliation is considered a long-term process with several dimensions, ranging from healing individual war traumata via promoting social cohesion, to state building, i.e. democratic reform of the public administration and the security forces. In its broadest term reconciliation may be described as a process of collective social and inter-institutional reform, which aims at re-

defining social relations and transforming the power structure of a country in such a way, that the causes of the previous conflict are addressed and the risks of a new outbreak of violence are minimised.

The concept itself may be circumscribed by several dichotomies, namely those between i) Peace vs Justice, ii) Retributive vs restorative justice, iii) Amnesty vs judicial proceedings, iv) Forgiveness vs accountability, v) Healing vs impunity, and, vi) Individual healing vs community coherence (Manzi, 2016; Tamai, 2017). Most importantly reconciliation is associated with conflict transformation which is considered part of the peacebuilding process, which, in the perspective of one the pioneers of theoretical and practical peacebuilding work, John Paul Lederach (1997, 2003, and 2009) follows a peace making process. In this theory, reconciliation is considered a function or an outcome of a process, in which four moments have to

Figure 1: The Place called Reconciliation



Source: adapted from Lederach, 1997, and Lederach, cited in Tamai, 63.

come together, namely Justice, Truth, Mercy, and Peace. This is depicted in the figure below. Further, using the analogy of the human body, Lederach, the founding director for the Centre for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University, further suggests that conflict transformation can only be successful if the following aspects are considered in practical peacebuilding efforts (Lederach, 2003):

- a. **Head:** the realm of attitudes, perception and convictions, as well as of the capacity to analyse causes of conflict and its results, to envisioning different outcomes, and opportunities and actions to produce them, i.e. intentional perspective and attitude that provides direction and purpose.
- b. **Heart:** the centre of emotions, intuition, and spiritual life. It is the heart which can be considered an instrument of change of human relationships, in the spirit of compassion and altruism.
- c. **Hands:** the 'tools' to building relationships and things, working together, 'able to touch, feel and affect the shape that things take'. They are responsible and build and form new national qualities in a family and community.
- d. **Legs and feet:** they keep us grounded, i.e. in touch with a material reality and with constraints, thus preventing us to become utopian. And they generate movement, momentum, and direction.

The analogy in non-Christian, e.g. Asian (Buddhist) perspective and with a focus on the conflicts in South East Asia (Cambodia, Myanmar), would be looking at *actions of body, speech and mind* in reconciliation efforts. This implies an integrated process of self-reflection on the causes and consequences of suffering (one's own and that of the 'enemy') as well as the active building of relationships based on

compassion and altruism (Arai, 2017). Thus, Buddhist-inspired practice of conflict transformation requires building structural awareness, understood as 'educated, enlightened consciousness to appreciate and act responsibly on the complex chains of causal relations which generate conflict' (Arai, 2015). This approach clearly diminishes the role of justice in reconciliation.

Whether we use the 'head, heart, hands and feet' model or the 'body, speech and mind' model of reconciliation, both are posited on the assumption, that human beings are, firstly, able to take conscientious decisions and engage in acts which both help us to address the cause and consequences of violence (including in our own acts of thinking and speaking). Secondly, they are also able to make deliberate choices regarding attitudes and motivation of social and economic interactions with the other member of the community. In this, according to research from microeconomics experimental economics, a posited innate human tendency towards altruism may be a vehicle for expressing empathy and solidarity, and for the construction of social coherence (Fehr, 2015).

The more conventional reconciliation concept has been used in part in what has been labelled as deterministic and liberal approaches to peacebuilding and consolidating (Bloomfield, et al, 2013; de Coning, 2018). Apart from its contested usefulness due to its multiple meanings, the determinist liberal approach to peacebuilding in post-conflict settings has been questioned, given its positivist assumption concerning liberal tenets of statehood, multiparty democracy and market-oriented economies. This approach has failed, most notably, in Iraq and Afghanistan. As in Africa, the institutions of a liberal model of statehood show notorious, structural features of fragil-

ity and partial failure, and of their capture by elites and through elite bargains.

Linked to the liberal approach, a holistic framework for has been proposed, premised on i) a central role and commitment of the state and government to reconciliation and ii) on a victim-perpetrator dichotomy (Sisson, 2010). As we have argued above, the first assumption appears to be unrealistic, not only in the Mozambican case, while the clear distinction between victim/perpetrator may be blurred and its assumption unrealistic.

The deterministic liberal approach is gradually being replaced by what is termed 'adaptive peacebuilding'. It implies an approach which is process-oriented and not focused on a single outcome such as a peace accord or a completed DDR process. And it attempts to work closely with communities and people affected by conflict, with methods of learning adapted to the cultural, socioeconomic, etc., contexts. Investment into resilience and social coherence of local communities and national institutions are part of the approach (de Coning, 2018).

Ingredients for reconciling societies

There is no systematic analysis of what has worked, where and why regarding reconciliation, but the literature (Vernon, 2019, Haier, 2019, Lederach 2009, Bloomfield et. al, 2013) gives at least certain hints to necessary ingredients for a successful reconciliation process. The points below can be considered necessary, but not sufficient conditions for successful reconciliation. These innovative approaches are by no means a complete list or mutually exclusive.

Focus on local, rural and community settings

There is evidence from a number of countries, including Afghanistan, Sudan and Uganda (Vernon, 2019, Hadai, 2019) that reconciliation is more effective, the more it helps empower the community, repossesses (local) history and the more it provides ownership by local stakeholders, including (former) members of the opposing sides in the conflict. Local ownership in particular has been emphasized as condition for successful peacebuilding (Donais, 2012). This approach helps to turn the local community into the subject, not object, of their own history and narrative of the conflict and helps ground any perspective and action of peacebuilding solutions in a given contextual reality. In fact, DDR and reconciliation programmes 'going local' is considered essential for effective conflict transformation (Paffenholz, 2015).

Use of technology and social media for peacebuilding

These have been recognized as important media and providers of platforms for engagement in peace building, especially targeting youth and their mobilization. Such platforms and networks and their users may be physically distant and in different 'local'/ 'cultural' settings, but are able to rally the users around the central theme of peace building. The platforms can host different technical forms and media such as video/audio, TV/radio, podcasts, internet, even SMS. There are manuals and websites available which address communication for peacebuilding, encourage research and document best practices, as well as trends and challenges. Preventin of violence and conflict is another key topic.³⁵

Inclusion of a strong women and youth focus in reconciliation activities

Women and youth are usually the victims of armed conflict through violations, abuse, and forced recruitment for providing services of varied kind (e.g. domestic, sexual, transportation) to the men at war. Yet in post-war reintegration and reconciliation they often have hardly any voice and peace dividend. Consequently the UN has, in 2016, developed guiding principles on young people's participation in peacebuilding³⁶.

In cases such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Uganda, and Colombia, youth were recruited as child soldiers, taught and forced to commit atrocities. As a consequence, many of them are suffering from deep-seated mental distress and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This has been equally observed in adults, both female and male, living through war situations, forced migration, and abuse of different types. Symptoms are fear, depressions, anger, and latent violence towards members of the community and the other sex (Bramsen & Poder, 2018). While persons with PTSD may require psycho-medical and psycho-social treatment and counselling (Mollica, 2011) including through traditional rituals of cleansing and healing, the provision of access to food, shelter, work, security and health services, are equally relevant, as the case of South Sudan demonstrates (Roberts et. al, 2009). Traditional Chinese medicine has developed and tested and used a PTSD treatment protocol based on acupuncture (Chang et al, 2018).

While the psycho-medical and psycho-social approaches to reconciliatory, altruistic and compassionate action, including those based on the understanding and insights of neuroscience (Singer & Bolz, 2013) are clearly

outside the scope of this analysis, the early integration of women and youth in reconciliation and peacebuilding may add value to these efforts. Especially early involvement of women may produce empowering effects given the women's multiple and different roles in the community and society. This implies designing reconciliation programmes in which women's groups are integral part. As lessons learned from peacebuilding in Iraq show, the more diverse these women groups are in terms of sectors, faiths, ethnic groups, etc., are, the more their voice is heard (O'Driscoll, 2017). Effective communication and networking systems between women's groups may increase their effectiveness in the implementation of reintegrating and reconciliation programmes.

The importance of including youth and children in peacebuilding and as agents in reconciliation programme has been underestimated for a long time. A recent study with insights from Nigeria, Madagascar and DRC (Cirhigiri, 2019) suggests, that, despite the youth's general exclusion from the political and policy processes, they are usually against the use violence for furthering their aims and seeking change from the status quo. This is also reflected in Mozambique by studies conducted by IESE, CDD, and MASC on social coherence in northern Mozambique, which show that cultural and ludic activities have a major integration potential. This is confirmed by a case study on the role of sports for peacebuilding in Colombia (Cardenas, 2012).

35 https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Grants-Fellows/GrantsDownloadsNotApps/CfPeace%20Report_vFINALFORMATTEDPhotosFINALv1Rev2June.pdf

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf>

36 <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/guiding-principles-on-young-peoples-participation-in-peacebuildi.html>

Exceptions are cases, where violent encounters with police and security forces inflict trauma on youth, and where peer leaders entice youth to join radical movements and/or criminal gangs (Weimer, 2018). This has been confirmed by a UNDP study on radicalization of youth in Africa (UNDP, 2017). The case of Sierra Leone is also a relevant one, in that a Children's Forum and even a radio (Voice of the Children) have been successfully operating as promoters of peacebuilding and reconciliation (Bah, n.d.). A good example of children engaged in peacebuilding is the project: The Taste of Future: A Treasure Chest for Kids. Supported by UNESCO, it has been implemented and documented, in video and print, in 15 countries (in Africa, Asia, and Latin America). The initiative was launched by Faust Film+Projects GmbH, Berlin³⁷, in collaboration between local institutions (schools, youth centres, etc.). In essence it is a process of identifying, discussing, and selecting key political, social, economic, cultural, and environmental and other issues of major concern to the present generation of young people. In a creative process these concerns are translated into messages produced artistically (dance, poetry, sculpture, painting, video, etc.) which are stored in a symbolic treasure chest or time capsule, to be opened by future generations who need to be familiar with what to avoid and what to cherish.

In light of these experiences it is therefore recommendable to

- Perceive youths as young peace builders and good allies in reconciliation programmes;
 - *'Open political spaces for youth to fully participate in both the formulation of decision-making structures and actual decision-making processes in such programmes,*
 - *Undertake intersectional analyses to understand and address factors impeding*
- the full recognition of the contributions of young women and other marginalised youth groups. It important to promote the inclusion of girls;*
- *Support the establishment of intergenerational councils to discuss challenges related to youth inclusion in peacebuilding' (Cirhigiri, 2019: 43).*

Local cultural wisdom in peacebuilding

The use of practices, gestures, proverbs, etc., of what may be called (local) 'sources of cultural wisdom', have been identified as crucial elements for successful peacebuilding, reconciliation, and social solidarity. Proverbs and storytelling in particular have great potential. An example in southern Africa is the ancient concept of Ubuntu, a term in the Nguni family of languages (or *Botho*, in the Sotho language family) which is often translated as 'I am because you are'. The term is used in interpersonal relations and in African philosophic traditions to describe being unselfish, recognizing the other as same human being as I am and on which I depend, courtesy towards the other, expressing trust in the other³⁸. Beyond interpersonal relations, the concept has been used, in the case of Botswana even as a vision and ethical base for development planning, for example in education. Authors such as Murithi (2017) and Anyeko (2013) report experiences

³⁷ A documentary available on DVD has been produced by Faust Film in collaboration with the *Evangelische Zentrum für Entwicklungsbezogene Filmarbeit* (Protestant Center for Development-related Film Work, www.ezef.de).

³⁸ Nobel Peace laureate Desmond Tutu defined a person with Ubuntu as person who is 'open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, based from a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed' (Tutu, 1999).

with traditional approaches for peacebuilding, including, the use of proverbs and storytelling, in other African countries such as Uganda. And Sarr (2016) argues that the recourse to African wisdom is fundamental not only for peacebuilding, but for the healing and reconstructing of African polities and economies, which have been failing by relying on the neo-liberal model institutions of statehood and politics. The use of cultural wisdom in peacebuilding and reconciliation is, however, not restricted to southern Africa or Africa for that matter. Beyond Africa, the merits of traditional wisdom have also been observed in peacebuilding efforts in Asia, e.g. in Mongolia (Uvsh, 2008). In interviews with the authors, both the Director of the governments National Authorizing Office³⁹ Manuel Ubisse, and the former Rector of A Politécnica, do Rosário, stressed the importance of use of traditional sources of wisdom and particular proverbs for reconciliation (interview Ubisse, and do Rosário).

Music, Dance and Theatre and Film for Peace and Reconciliation

Dance, theatre and film have been employed in Mozambique to convey the message of peace and reconciliation to a nationwide audience. The increasing relevance of visual and performing arts for peacebuilding has been scrutinized in a volume entitled *Mediating Peace: Reconciliation Through Visual Arts, Music, and Film* (Kim et al, 2015). The book assembles a number of historical and contemporary cases from various countries and regions in which these art forms have been successfully used for furthering peace. A case study on Rwanda shows that particularly music, theatre and dance have the capacity not only to transcend the material reality of suffering, but also that of harmoniously bringing people together, inspir-

ing and uniting them for the cause of reconciliation (Amanze, 2015). They also generate joy, laughter, awe, inspiration, and empathy, and help participants and actors alike to freely express feelings and to connect the human reality to the spiritual realm (Stephenson, 2015). Culturally embedded music in particular has the capacity to increase respect and self-esteem among community members in conflict areas (van Eck, 2015).

Video and film are another media which have proven their worth in post conflict transformation. Experience in South Sudan demonstrated that participatory video is an ideal tool for promoting peace-building, giving its strength to reach out to and involve marginalized groups, and relative cost efficiency. The experience has been thoroughly documented and turned into a manual for local video producers (Anon, 2015). The more conventional approach of documentary film has worked very well in the reconciliation processes in Rwanda and northern Uganda among others (Fisher & Mitchell, 2015).

Finally, the potential of local community radios to echo, transmit and multiply messages of peace and reconciliation to a wider group of listeners should not be underestimated. Although not directly related to this topic, the Mozambican innovative experience of capturing news items focussing on corruption⁴⁰ merits consideration, and possibly adaption to peace-building. The CIP news items are edited, translated into five local languages, and posted as podcasts on a platform, from which community radios can upload and incorporate them into their programmes. A feedback loop surveying radio listeners is built into the system⁴¹.

³⁹ within the framework of the cooperation with the EU

⁴⁰ The approach has been introduced by the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP), in collaboration with media lab consultants, the Xipalapala platform and plural media.

⁴¹ Interview with Teresa Lima, Maputo, 27/9/2019

The role of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in promoting reconciliation

Mozambique already has considerable experiences with faith-based organizations in peacebuilding; the Rome based FBO Community de Sant' Egidio was instrumental in bringing about the GPA in 1992. A recent study suggested that religious actors could play a more decisive role in peacebuilding, particularly in local contexts than they actually do (Browne, 2015). As Sandal (2019) has argued, their propensity to be an ally in peacebuilding efforts has sometimes been overlooked, despite their assets such as ethical and spiritual credentials, motivation and long term commitment, a wide outreach via their members and do not depend entirely on external time-bound project finance for their sustainability. Above all, all religions have their own source and teachings for nonviolent behaviour (Sandal, 2019). With notable exceptions, usually they are politically and religiously tolerant. Risks may be seen in them lacking focus on peacebuilding and tendencies of proselytization (Bouta, et al 2005). Religious institutions, FBOs and their transnational associations⁴² do have, of course a degree of international recognition and respect for their vast experience in mediation and post-conflict peace-building and reconciliation in many parts of the world. They employ instruments such as advocacy, convening dialogues, education and teaching (including peacebuilding workshops), providing for

data collection and transmitting relevant information, and occasionally mediation (Browne, 2015). As such, it is recommended that donors supporting peacebuilding should consider the potential of FBOs and promote the involvement of FBOs in practical peace work, actively seeking to collaborate with them, under well-defined conditions (Bouta et al, 2005).

Thus, there are lessons to be learned from other countries as well as from Mozambican history. Innovative practices can be harnessed and used as important building blocks for initiatives in support of peace and reconciliation, especially at local level and in a community context. In designing programmes the qualities for successful local peace-building initiatives are considered to be crucial (Vernon, 2019). The more a programme contributes to restoring trust, uses local language, knowledge and connections, is practically oriented and cost effective, works with the grain to change the grain, and produces cumulative effects by linking the local to the regional and national, the better are the prospects for producing tangible outcomes and impact.

42 e.g. Lutheran World Federation: <http://www.lutheranworld.org/>; Religions for Peace: <http://www.religionsforpeace.org/>; Action by Churches Together (ACT Alliance): <http://www.actalliance.org/about>; Caritas Internationalis: <http://www.caritas.org/>; Aga Khan Foundation: <http://www.akdn.org/akf>; Muslim Aid: <https://www.muslimaid.org/>;

TOWARDS RECONCILIATION AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE – A POSSIBLE AGENDA

What are the consequences of this analysis and what are possible key elements in designing a peace and reconciliation programme for Mozambique, which adds value to the ‘Mozambique solution’ and beyond?

Firstly, attempting to apply to Mozambique approaches which focus on truth and transitional justice in a national framework, e.g. a *Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, are likely to receive no support or even hostile reactions by the Frelimo government and Renamo. Both are path-dependent on their previous practice of granting amnesty without justice, thus guaranteeing impunity of those who committed crimes during the many years of conflict. Igreja & Skaar (2013) speak in this context of a case of *embodied lack of accountability*. Thus, there will continue to be an absence of formal reconciliation policy, legislation, and institutional arrangements, which factually results in the banning of dealing with past war crimes and holding perpetrators accountable. This implies that some elements of the ideal approach to reconciliation as conceived by Lederach and shown in Figure 1, such as compensatory justice, will be lacking.

Secondly, this does not necessarily, however, mean that truth and (in)justice cannot and should not be addressed in well-defined local contexts, e.g. through *research and dialogue projects* which promote local history, e.g. through storytelling and producing ‘war accounts’ in a variety of cultural settings. In

such an effort, the incorporation of representatives from all sides e.g. of the army and the armed opposition, men and women and age groups of the community and the neutral role of the researcher/historian as facilitator into the process cannot be over-emphasized. Results of such endeavours may eventually find their way into curricula and schoolbooks, especially if the process produces agreements on reconciliation, forgiveness, and closing the past.

Thirdly, this could dovetail well with approaches to healing aspects through *traditional and religious rituals* to reconciliation in the sense of reinsertion of former combatants into the community. This has been part of the ‘Mozambican solution’ and seems to have worked well in different cultural settings, not only in Mozambique. Such cultural processes and rituals of cleansing are largely community-driven, occur ad hoc and make use of local cultural understanding of and approaches to purification and healing.

Fourth, in line with the international experiences reviewed above, a *culture-based approach* which includes performing arts the use of locally grounded wisdom entailed in proverbs as well as ludic activities (sports, play, etc.) seems promising. We consider popular theatre, music, and film as suitable ways to promote reconciliation, in that it combines different media as well as activities which link the local context to regional and national level. As we have seen above, Mozambique has a lot to offer in terms of experience and creativity. The figure below illustrates this approach.

Fifthly, regular *public roundtables*, *TV shows on peacebuilding and reconciliation*, e.g. on days which mark peace agreements, with participants other than members of the ex-belligerent parties, may serve to remind the public

Figure 2: Reconciliation by popular theatre and media

Source: author

in general of the fact, that peacebuilding and reconciliation are ongoing challenges. This is particularly true when looking at Mozambican history of political violence, the 'unfinished peace business' in central Mozambique and the 'new war' (dos Santos, 2020) unfolding in Cabo Delgado, under the eyes of the Mozambican and international public.

Finally, educational institutions have, in the opinion of the author, a particular responsibility to engage in *education and training for peacebuilding and reconciliation*. The understanding is a broad one and includes, research, dialogue, training of trainers, performing arts, creative methodologies, etc., in settings of formal and non-formal education. Particularly schools and community training centres run by both (local) government and NGOs can be places to learn to strengthen resilience and foster tolerance and understanding. Special

frameworks can be developed for bringing returnees, people living with disabilities, trauma, and local communities together to discuss issues affecting their daily life and for seeking approaches for solutions. Development and testing of a curriculum for reconciliation, as well as teaching material and methods that include local context that help bring issues to light, include differing points of view, visions for peace, etc., are part of the approach. It obviously also needs to distinguish between target groups by criteria of gender, age, social and war experiences, literacy, etc. What would be considered relevant contents and messages to be generated in reconciliation activities? They could include following:

- *Understanding and narrating the (local) conflict*, its causes and effects on individuals and the community;
- *Building of trust, empathy*, and a sense of

belonging and relationships of respect and self-esteem, with the use of local narrative, proverbs, etc. Learning to practise empathy implies the ability to understand and share the feelings of another (to put oneself into the position of the other person). The role of others' affections and care is crucial for our own well-being.

- *Forgiveness*, i.e. a process of asking forgiveness, of offering forgiveness and the ability to offer forgiveness to oneself. In this both religious and non-religious approaches are available.
- *Mutual interdependence as a condition for well-being*, possibly around material issues (water, land, welfare, etc.). Well-being results from a sense of purpose that transcends narrow self-interest and produces a sense of relating to others or belonging to a community. Our survival has depended and depends on receiving care and support from others.
- *Altruism*, i.e. acting in a way that is costly for oneself but provides a benefit to someone else. The actor is not motivated by direct or indirect future material benefits associated with the act, but she may still re-experience psychological benefits such as feeling better. Altruism increases

the volume of mutually beneficial transactions (Fehr, 2015:84).

- *Promoting Non-violent communication (NVC)*. This concept, developed by Marshall Rosenberg (2001) implies honestly expressing and emphatically listening, via observation, expressing feelings, needs, and uttering requests.

In proposing such a list of possible activities towards promoting peace and reconciliation, we are aware of Galtung's warning, that none of the available approaches is sufficiently adequate for dealing with the complexities of after-violence situations. Rather it is necessary to design good combinations of activities (Galtung, 2005). At this present stage of the peacebuilding process it is important to open up local and national public spaces through a variety of initiatives which allows addressing reconciliation as a necessary, if not sufficient element of peacebuilding. In our view, successful reconciliation projects in Mozambique would need to draw on the wealth of valuable Mozambican experiences from the past in combination with the innovative approaches derived from international lessons learned. The author sees a key role for non-state actors and academic institutions for initiatives sketched above.

CONCLUSIONS

The August 2019 Maputo Accord on Peace and Reconciliation appears not to be standing on entirely solid ground. Not only has the decentralization agreement suffered from last minute 'adulteration', but also the DDR process has been lacking speed and rigour. The circumstances and outcomes of the October 2019 elections have cast doubt on the extent to which Renamo will abide to the August 2019 agreement. The party appears to be split on the matter of the – officially disowned – armed *Junta Militar* maintaining low-intensity, nevertheless deadly, attacks on civilian traffic in central Mozambique. Thus it remains doubtful at the beginning of 2020 to what extent the ambitious DDR process, the key Pillar/Provision of the most recent peace agreement, may be implemented and by when. Further, the institutional setup of the Peace Secretariat and the donor-financed MDTF for DDR process leave doubts about national ownership of and responsibility for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which uses reconciliation as a token, but avoids getting to its substance. Apart from these factors, the summary amnesty legislation benefitting both former warring parties prevents the possibility of publicly discussing justice and pursuing war crimes. With Frelimo's impressive, albeit amply contested, win of the 2019 elections at the national level and provincial tier of government, the paradigm of 'winner takes all' may come back into political reality, which in the past had triggered armed conflict and prompted political negotiations on some degree of power sharing through decentralization arrangements. In some senior political circles, this paradigm is now paraphrased as the introduction of a *benevolent authoritarian African regime*, at the

cost of democratic checks and balances and a strong civil society. Under these circumstances, reconciliation initiatives as sketched above, primarily promoted by civil society in the broadest sense and including FBOs, would seem a viable strategy to breathe new life into the August 2019 agreement and opening space for the youth to actively engage the political parties which, up to today, they had talked peace but remained prepared for war. Only Chissano, in the aftermath of the Rome General Peace Accord, attempted to 'walk the reconciliation talk'. The present constellation and the terrible consequences for lives and livelihoods in Cabo Delgado would also represent a strategic opportunity to become actively involved in peace consolidation, from which the Mozambican CSOs have been kept at a distance, leaving peace-making to political leaders only. A Malawian proverb suggests that he *who thinks he is leading but has no followers is only taking a walk*⁴³.

If Mozambican CSOs and FBOs would succeed in accompanying and engaging their political leaders, they would have contributed to the realization of the wish of Tuija Talvitie, the late Executive Director of Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) at the Brussels-based European Institute of Peace (EIP). Her motto was: *Peace is too precious to be left to the whims and selfish endeavours of power politics*⁴⁴.

⁴³ <https://howafrica.com/top-african-proverbs-on-peace-and-leadership/>

⁴⁴ <http://www.eip.org/en/news-events/memorial-tuija-talvitie>

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AR	National Assembly
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CC	Constitutional Council
CDD	Centro de Democracia e Desenvolvimento
CNE	National Electoral Commission
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DNPO	National Directorate of Planning and Budget
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding (UN)
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
FADM	Mozambican Armed Defence Forces
FDS	National Defence and Security Forces
Frelimo	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GoM	Government of Mozambique
GPA	(Rome) General Peace Accord
IC	International Component
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
JTGDDR	Joint Technical Group on DDR
JTGMV	Joint Technical Group on Monitoring and Verification
JTGP	Joint Technical Group on Placement
MADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development
MAE	Ministry of State Administration
MAPR	Maputo Accord on Peace and Reconciliation
MASC	Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil
MDM	Movimento Democrático de Moçambique
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MEF	Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance
MMM	Marcha Mundial de Mulheres
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MPF	Ministry of the Ministry of Planning and Finance
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission (UN)
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office (UN)

PNPFD	National Programme for Decentralized Planning and Financing
PPFD	Programa de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas
PRM	Police of the Republic of Mozambique
Renamo	Resistência Nacional de Moçambique
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UEM	Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Services
UTM	Technical University of Mozambique
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

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About this study

Reconciliation is considered an important element in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, especially after prolonged periods of civil war. In Mozambique, all agreements signed between a Frelimo government and the leaders of the armed opposition group Renamo alluded to the need of reconciliation. However, reconciliation never was fully embraced by the authorities and put in action. The addressing of war crimes and transitional justice have never been part of the conflict settlement.

Bernhard Weimer's contribution to the FES Peace and Security Series seeks to analyze the latest peace agreement and its impacts for the consolidation of peace in Mozambique. The study concludes, that reconciliation has been only partially reflected in government policies, budgets, and efforts to consolidate peace. Reconciliation initiatives promoted by civil society in the broadest sense seem a viable strategy to breathe life into the August 2019 agreement and to pressure actors to walk the talk.

