



Anthoni van Nieuwkerk

TOWARDS PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A critical analysis of the revised Strategic Indicative Plan
for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO)
of the Southern African Development Community

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Cover picture: Participants in Exercise Golfinho, aimed at testing SADC's abilities to stage a peace-keeping mission. About 6 500 troops, police and support staff from 11 SADC member states participated in the exercise, which was held in the Northern Cape, South Africa, in September 2009.

Gallo Images/Foto24/Cornel van Heerden

CONTENTS

| | | |
|---|--|----|
| 1 | Executive summary | 5 |
| 2 | Conceptual framework | 5 |
| 3 | Security regionalism in Africa | 6 |
| 4 | The formation of the Southern African region | 8 |
| 5 | The evolution of SIPO II | 11 |
| 6 | SIPO II: A sectoral review | 11 |
| 7 | How relevant is SIPO II?: Seven policy questions | 15 |
| 8 | Summary, conclusions and recommendations | 18 |
| 9 | <i>Endnotes</i> | 22 |

Acronyms and abbreviations

| | |
|---------|--|
| ACCORD | African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes |
| AMU | Maghreb Union (AMU) |
| APSA | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| ASF | African Standby Force |
| AU | African Union |
| CA | Constitutive Act of the African Union |
| CADSP | Common African Defence and Security Policy |
| CCR | Centre for Conflict Resolution |
| CEN-SAD | Community of Sahelo-Saharan States |
| CEPGL | Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region |
| COMESA | Common Market of East and Southern Africa |
| CODESA | Conference for a Democratic South Africa |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| DRR | disaster risk reduction |
| DRRR | disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation, reintegration and resettlement |
| UN | United Nations |
| EAC | East African Community |
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EISA | The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa |
| FES | Friedrich Ebert Stiftung |
| FLS | Frontline States |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit |
| ICP | International Cooperating Partner |
| IGAD | Inter-Governmental Authority for Development |
| ISDSC | Inter-State Defence and Security Committee |
| ISPDC | Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee |
| ISS | Institute for Security Studies |
| MCO | Ministerial Committee of the Organ |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| OAU | Organisation of African Unity |
| OPDSC | Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation |
| PSC | Peace and Security Council |
| PSO | Peace Support Operation |
| REC | regional economic community |
| REWC | Regional Early Warning Centre |
| RIC | Regional Integration Community |
| RISDP | Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan |
| ROCTA | Regional Organised Crime Threat Analysis |
| RPTC | Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SADCC | Southern African Development Coordinating Conference |
| SADSEM | Southern African Defence & Security Management Network |
| SARPPCO | Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation |
| SEAC | SADC Electoral Advisory Council |
| SSF | SADC Standby Force |
| SIPO | Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation |

1 Executive summary

This study offers a critical analysis of the revised and updated Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Informally known as SIPO II, it supersedes the original Strategic Indicative Plan, or SIPO I, adopted in 2004 for a five-year period. Following a lengthy review process, SIPO II was approved by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia, in August 2010. By late 2011 it had yet to be released for public consumption; presumably, its implementation was also lagging.

This study locates its approach in the ‘new regionalism’ literature, particularly the concept of ‘security regionalism’. It then examines the continental and Southern African peace and security terrain before turning to the evolution of security co-operation among SADC members. Next, it unpacks SADC’s structures and processes for co-ordinating its political, defence and security objectives. It then offers a detailed analysis of the revised SIPO.

It argues that, given the region’s overwhelming poverty challenges and democracy deficits, SADC has not yet been able to fully transform its conflict-generating interstate and intra-state relations, or behave like a regional security actor. There is also little evidence of SADC having a track record as a security actor beyond its own region. Moreover, its relationship with the African Union (AU) is underdeveloped. The study notes that the South African government has played a prominent role in re-energising the SADC Organ, but asks whether it is advisable for SADC’s peace and security agenda to be shaped by one regional player. Regarding the content of the revised SIPO, the report highlights an awkward sectoral approach, the lack of involvement of key regional stakeholders in developing the plan, and the need to revitalise the relationship between the SADC Organ and the International Cooperating Partners (ICPs).

2 Conceptual framework

The primary conceptual issue we are seeking to address is how the current patterns of formal, interstate security co-operation in Southern Africa could best be explained. Can we regard SADC as a coherent and capable security actor? In this context, what is the role of SADC’s SIPO? These questions cannot be divorced from the broader drivers of integration in Southern Africa, of which peace and security are only two. The literature on the ‘new regionalism’ provides a rich conceptual terrain for our analysis (‘new’ is used to distinguish it from earlier functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches to regional integration).

For Söderbaum and Hettne, prominent architects of this new

approach, contemporary regionalism is plural and multidimensional in nature. In recent decades, they note, there has been a major increase in various kinds of co-operation and integration projects, which in their view is closely linked to the shifting nature of global politics and intensifying globalisation. They point out that regionalism involves almost all governments, but also a rich variety of non-state actors, ‘... resulting in multiplicities of formal and informal regional governance and regional networks in most issue areas.’¹

In the next section we trace the historical evolution of regional co-operation in Southern Africa as a basis for understanding current attempts at regional integration. Before we turn to past experience, however, we need to clarify the multiple meanings associated with regionalism. This conceptual clarification draws on the work of Hettne and of Söderbaum and Hettne. In a further development, academics have developed the notion of regions as development, trade or security actors, introducing the concepts of ‘regionness’ and ‘actorness’.²

Regionalism refers to a tendency and political commitment to organise the world order in terms of regions; more narrowly, the concept refers to a specific regional project. According to Söderbaum and Hettne, regionalisation refers to a complex process of forming regions ‘... that leads to patterns of co-operation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space’.³ A region can be more or less coherent, leading to the notion of ‘regionness’: a high degree of regionness and regional identity implies the capacity to act, or ‘actorness’, while a lower degree of regionness implies a greater impact on the region from the outside. Actorness has four main ingredients:

- A shared commitment to a set of overarching values;
- The domestic legitimisation of decision-making processes and priorities relating to external policy;
- The ability to identify priorities, and formulate consistent and coherent policies; and
- The availability of and capacity to utilise policy instruments – diplomacy/negotiation, economic tools, and military means.

Regions, then, are not natural phenomena – they are social constructs, and therefore politically contestable. Regional integration, Hettne points out, belongs to an earlier discourse primarily related to spiralling translocal market integration.⁴ The concept of integration should preferably be broken down into economic integration (the formation of a transnational economy), social integration (the formation of a transnational society), and political integration (the formation of a transnational political system). Regional co-operation is somewhat less com-

plex, and normally refers to joint efforts by states to solve specific problems. However, some have argued that this notion can only be understood in terms of the national interests of individual member states, and that the politics of regional negotiations invariably involve the accommodation of these by all partners. By contrast, regional integration is normally taken to involve some inroads into national sovereignty.

The new regionalism literature also conceptualises relations between development regionalism and security regionalism. According to Söderbaum and Hettne, development regionalism means concerted efforts by a group of countries in a given region to enhance the economic complementarity of constituent political units in order to strengthen the total capacity of the regional economy.⁵ Security regionalism, on the other hand, refers to attempts by states and other actors in a particular area – a region in the making – to transform a security complex with conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations into a security community characterised by co-operative external (interregional) relations and internal (intraregional) peace.

There are several links between regionalism and security. One has to do with the conflict management role of the organised region. This may include a role in internal regional security ('regional order'); managing conflict in its immediate vicinity; or a role in maintaining world order, to the extent that there may be enough 'actorness' to influence global affairs. Managing conflict in the immediate vicinity or external environment can refer to efforts to manage a particular crisis or to transform a conflict situation by means of either stabilisation or integration (thereby enlarging the regional organisation).

The region can thus be the cause (the regional complex), the means (regional security management), and the solution (regional development). The level of regionness can be changed in order to increase actorness and conflict management. The new regionalism literature suggests that security co-operation within a given region might improve stability, thus helping to attract international investment and trade, and that development regionalism would mean a more efficient use of available resources.

Having discussed the key features of the new regionalism, we now provide a brief overview of security regionalism in Africa, which will set the scene for a more detailed analysis of the dynamics of security regionalism in Southern Africa.

3 Security regionalism in Africa

Regional conflicts in Africa were managed differently in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. During the Cold War, conflicts were addressed by way of interventions by superpowers, former colonial powers, or powerful neighbours. Even though

most post-Cold War African conflicts have been defined as domestic, they have all been deeply embedded in a regional and/or cross-border context.

Most conflicts in Africa spill over into neighbouring countries, or draw regional actors into what is often better understood as regional wars rather than 'domestic conflicts'. This pattern leads, in turn, to a much greater role for action, mediation, and intervention at the regional level by affected neighbouring countries and especially by regional organisations.

Flowing from this, the AU was created in 2001–2 to secure and promote African democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. It hopes to end violent conflicts on the continent by improving the socioeconomic conditions of its people – hence the ideal of establishing a continent-wide economic community, built in turn on five regions referred to as regional economic communities (RECs).

This new attempt at continental co-operation differs significantly from the activities of the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), seen by many as a club of dictators, and marked by grand annual summits which were high on symbolism but low on action. Engel and Porto write that the AU differs from the OAU in at least three respects: its institutional design, its focus on development, and its peace and security architecture.⁶ Both the AU and its New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) programme assume that economic growth and human development cannot take place in a context of war and violent conflict. Consequently, security considerations feature prominently in the AU's objectives and institutional structure.

3.1 The AU's peace and security architecture

The AU's peace and security architecture is set out in two main policy instruments: the Peace and Security Protocol, and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa are meant to vest in the seven RECs.

The Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 (hereafter the CA) is its founding document or constitution.⁷ The CA is a visionary document, but is also tempered by practical considerations. Its preamble recognises the quest for continental unity and collective action, as well as the fact that conflicts are impeding Africa's development. It also recognises that peace, security and stability are prerequisites for implementing the AU's development and integration agenda.⁸

According to the CA, the peace and security objectives of the AU are to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its member states (Article 3b); promote peace, security and stability on the continent (Article 3f); and co-ordi-

nate and harmonise policies among existing and future RECs (Article 31).⁹

The supreme organ of the AU is its Assembly, which determines its policies, and provides directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war, and other emergency situations, and the restoration of peace. The Executive Council comprises the ministers of foreign affairs of member states, and meets at least twice a year in ordinary session.

The AU Commission is the AU's secretariat. It comprises a chairperson, deputy chairperson, and other commissioners. As the section below on the PSC will demonstrate, the chairperson and commissioner in charge of peace and security play an important role in conflict prevention and resolution.

3.1.1 Key security institutions and mechanisms

The AU did not immediately decide on its approach to security. In 2001 its assembly incorporated the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and, in 2002, it adopted an amended version of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (the Protocol). This is a comprehensive document which spells out the AU's objectives and policies in respect of security, and provides for a number of instruments and institutions to achieve these in practice.

The Protocol describes the PSC as a 'standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts', and a 'collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response[s] to conflict and crisis situations in Africa'.¹⁰

Its more specific objectives are to promote peace, security, and stability in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts, including promoting democratic governance, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction; prevent and combat international terrorism; and promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and respect for the sanctity of human life, 'as part of efforts for preventing conflicts'.¹¹

It provides for a Council of 15 members elected from the Assembly, and tasked with a number of responsibilities surrounding the PSC's objectives. Other key instruments and role players are:

The chairperson of the AU Commission: The chairperson plays a vital role, namely to 'deploy efforts and take all initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, management and resolve conflicts'.¹² To this end the chairperson is meant to bring matters which may threaten peace, security and stability on the continent to the attention of the PSC; bring relevant issues

to the attention of the Panel of the Wise; and ensure that relevant decisions of the Assembly and PSC are implemented and followed up.¹³

Panel of the Wise: The Panel comprises five 'highly respected African personalities', selected by the chair of the Commission on the basis of regional representation (presumably one panel member per region), and tasked with advising the PSC and chairperson on issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.¹⁴

Continental Early Warning System: This comprises an observation and monitoring centre, or 'Situation Room', located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the AU, responsible for collecting and analysing relevant data. Regional observation and monitoring units are meant to be linked directly to the Situation Room.¹⁵

African Standby Force: The Protocol provides for an African Standby Force (ASF) tasked with undertaking observing and monitoring missions; other types of peace support missions; interventions in member states in respect of 'grave circumstances' or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security; preventive deployment; peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation; and humanitarian assistance in cases of conflict or natural disaster.¹⁶

As one commentator has noted: 'The ASF is one of the most critical elements of the APSA that will enable the AU to deliver on its promise of intervention to protect people in grave circumstances, and to provide a prompt and robust response to manage and resolve African crises'.¹⁷

In terms of the PSC Protocol, and subsequent operational planning documents called roadmaps, the ASF is meant to consist of five subregional stand-by commands comprising forces up to brigade size (3 000 to 4 000 troops), providing the AU with a combined stand-by capacity of 15 000 to 20 000 troops; between 300 and 500 trained military observers ready to deploy on 14 days' notice; a police stand-by force of at least 240 individual officers and two company-strength police units (gendarmerie), which should enable the AU to staff two complex peace operations with police components; and a centrally managed roster of civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian assistance, governance, and disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR).¹⁸

The ASF was developed to play an effective role in six mission scenarios, namely military advice to a political mission; AU observer mission co-deployment with a UN peacekeeping mission; a stand-alone AU observer mission; a traditional peacekeeping or preventive deployment mission; complex

multidimensional peace operations; and peace enforcement, or what the ASF Framework document refers to as ‘intervention missions’.¹⁹

However, at mid-2011 it was clear that, despite extensive policy and operational development, the ASF was not ready to assume the responsibilities envisaged for it in terms of these scenarios (although it could arguably deploy under scenarios one to three).

The PSC is meant to work closely with regional security structures and mechanisms. Although Article 16 of the Protocol refers to ‘Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’, a definition or list is not provided. Regional mechanisms can be assumed to be similar to RECs. The seven RECs identified in the Protocol are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), The East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).²⁰ At least four – COMESA, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC – have developed systems for security management. The other RECs appear to have underdeveloped, dormant, or weak security functions.

Further complicating the situation is the fact that the AU has adopted the OAU’s delineation of five African regions – North, Southern, East, West and Central – but also talks of Inter-Governmental Organisations (such as the EAC) that overlap these five regions. Confusingly, the AU’s strategic plan for 2004–7 also identified a number of Regional Integration Communities (RICs). Therefore, there is a significant overlap between geographic regions, RECs, RICs, and Regional Mechanisms. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for example, is a member of ECCAS, SADC, COMESA, and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL). This state of affairs has led to considerable confusion about the roles of regional organisations. While the AU has acknowledged that they need to be rationalised,²¹ much more needs to be done to ensure the effective operationalisation of the AU’s security architecture.

4 The formation of the Southern African region

4.1 The development of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The idea of ‘Southern Africa’ as a coherent region is a relatively recent one. It is, as argued by Immanuel Wallerstein and Sergio

Vieira, a construct of the 20th century, with a pre-history that can be traced back at most to the 1870s.²² For them, the starting point has to do with global forces, notably the decline of the British Empire, as well as global economic stagnation, which led to the notorious ‘scramble for Africa’ by various European powers. In this context, two factors played a prominent role in shaping Southern Africa’s future. The first is its extraordinary mineral wealth, and the second, its relatively large and permanent settler populations.

A struggle ensued for political control of the region. African kingdoms were defeated in battles, and forced to sign disadvantageous treaties. They were partially or totally dispossessed of their land, which was included in new political units established by colonial authorities. At the turn of the 19th century, Britain also declared war against the Boer Republics in the South African interior, and defeated them as well.

By 1910 the current political boundaries in the region were largely in place. This was followed by the creation and consolidation of the political and material infrastructure needed to govern the region and build and manage western-style economies, largely based on exporting primary products such as diamonds, gold and coal. South Africa emerged from World War Two in a strong political position, as its minerals seemed even more important to the world economy than before. In 1948, however, the Anglo-Boer political compromise of 1910 was undone by the ascent to power of the Afrikaner-led National Party, which introduced the notorious policy of formal racial separation, or apartheid. This led to the creation of an elaborate system of oppression and marginalisation, and generated a large pool of cheap African labour (drawn from the entire subregion) that was vital for the establishment of the country’s industrial base.

The Nationalists sought to project South Africa as a country with its own hinterland, the neighbouring states of Southern Africa. However, other countries in the region strongly resisted its attempts at regional dominance (conceptualised by the ruling National Party as a ‘constellation of Southern African states’). This ran headlong into the dramatic decolonisation dynamic that swept large parts of Africa from 1954 onwards. In the early 1970s, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe were all fighting wars of liberation. In 1974, the Portuguese government was overthrown by its military, which led to the independence of its colonies, including Mozambique and Angola, a year later. Far from bringing stability, the new political order introduced more uncertainty. Civil war in Angola brought several external actors, including Cuba, the Soviet Union and South Africa, into the fray. Countries in the region felt the impact of these conflicts as well as the apartheid state’s interventionist and violent policies, and created the Front Line States (FLS) alliance in response.

In 1980, Zimbabwe gained its independence, which enabled the alliance to establish a more structured regional co-operation project: the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). However, attempts by the apartheid regime to destabilise its neighbouring states continued, and the region remained embroiled in conflict. This cycle of war and attrition was broken by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of communist rule in the then Soviet Union. These events (preceded by Perestroika and Glasnost) had a decisive impact on the politics of the Southern African region. Soviet, Cuban and South African forces withdrew from Angola, leading to a peace process (and the eventual demise of UNITA's Savimbi) and the independence of Namibia in 1990. In the same year, the South African state president, F W de Klerk, announced the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela. This led to a period of negotiations (the CODESA talks) which resulted in a relatively peaceful transition from apartheid to democratic rule.

SADCC read the signs well and admitted South Africa to its ranks, reforming the organisation into SADC at the same time. By 1994, when the ANC rose to power, Southern Africa faced an entirely new situation, marked by the demise of one-party systems and autocratic rule in favour of multiparty democracies. Yet regional dynamics were still shaped by a number of historical trends, including South African dominance of the region's political economy and infrastructure, and widespread poverty and underdevelopment within and across countries. The 1990s also saw the dramatic and violent eruption of tensions in the Great Lakes region, which invariably impacted on the newly reformed SADC as war and peace-making drew various SADC member states into its vortex.

4.2 SADC's evolution as a security actor

As suggested above, formal, inter-state co-operation in Southern Africa is a relatively new phenomenon.

In June 1996, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC).

In August 1999, Heads of State and Government decided to restructure all SADC institutions, including the Organ, and adopted a review of the Operations of SADC institutions at an extraordinary summit in 2001.

On 14 August 2001, Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which provided an institutional framework for co-operation by member states in these areas.

4.3 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO)

In January 2002, the SADC Summit mandated the OPDSC to prepare a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which would provide guidelines for implementing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation over the next five years. As the 2004 foreword to the SIPO document notes:

The SIPO is not an end in itself ... it is an enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda embodied in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The core objective of the SIPO, therefore, is to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will endeavour to realise its socio-economic objectives.²³

The SIPO was designed to achieve three objectives: provide guidelines for action (strategies and activities); shape the institutional framework for the day-to-day activities of the Organ (including the operationalisation of the Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact); and align SADC's peace and security agenda with that of the AU (particularly the AFS and aspects of good governance).

In theory at least, SADC decision-making in respect of peace and security is comprehensive as well as complex. The primary SADC bodies dealing with political and security co-operation are the Summit of Heads of State and Government and the OPDSC. The key policy frameworks guiding decision-making in the areas of politics and security are the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The Organ is managed by a troika of elected member states. The Summit elects an Organ chairperson for a one-year term. This functionary is assisted in her/his work by a deputy chairperson – who will take over after a year – and the previous chairperson (troika members are informally called the serving, incoming and outgoing members). The troika is supported by several committees, including the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). The MCO comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security, and state security of each member state. Decisions taken by the Organ are referred to the Summit for discussion and approval. The SADC Secretariat plays an important co-ordinating but not decision-making role. Decisions by the Summit and the OPDSC on political and security matters are generally made by consensus.²⁴

4.4 Achievements and shortcomings

What has SADC achieved under SIPO I? Given Southern Africa's history and developmental profile, securing peace and stability remains a challenge. The security challenges facing the region are not primarily military, but largely political, social, and economic. Poverty and underdevelopment are at the heart of the region's human insecurity, and, given external as well as internal dynamics, insecurity continues to deepen. Essentially, the region faces a dual crisis. It is experiencing a crisis of state-building, including the social and psychological dimensions of violence in relation to the perceived security assumed to derive from the state. It is also affected by the global financial and economic crisis: the global political economy tends to reproduce economic insecurity that is a prime source of social and political conflict.²⁵

In this context, achievements under the SIPO can be summarised as follows:

- The building of trust and confidence by sharing and exchanging information, particularly co-operation in various defence areas, such as information exchange, visits to and the sharing of training institutions, and joint exercises.
- The introduction of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. The Organ views this as a regional commitment in respect of self-defence and the preservation of peace and security.
- The launch and operationalisation of the SADC Standby Force (SSF). This is seen as a commitment to a collective approach to defence and security affairs.
- The integration of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPPCO) into the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), aimed at improving co-operation in respect of policing in the region.
- Establishment of an Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) tasked with helping to anticipate, prevent, and manage conflicts.
- Progress on issues relating to political governance and the observation of elections via the establishment of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) and a mediation unit.

However, SIPO I was also poorly implemented in numerous respects. In particular, the production of a business plan for addressing its 130-plus objectives never materialised, and no serious effort was made to develop strategies for operationalising the Organ.

There are several explanations for this. The first is the gradual and piecemeal evolution of the SIPO itself. SADC's preference for consensual policy-making resulted in a number of countries adding their voices to the activities of the working group which

was set up to draft the plan. As a result, the final document reflected the combined national interests of 14 countries instead of serving as a unified tool for guiding Organ activities. As such it reminds us of the delicate nature of security perspectives and preferences among members of the SADC.

In this respect, Paulino Macaringue, a member of the original drafting committee, notes that 'SADC can only be understood in its complexity': at the time of developing the SIPO, the entire region was in transition, and its various members were at different stages of democratisation.²⁶ A few member states have successfully reformed their security sectors; others have attempted to conduct similar processes and stopped halfway, while others have not attempted this at all. He then comments:

Politically, SADC still faces an identity crisis, and it cannot be assumed that it is in a position to spell out common values and indicate clearly that its citizens are at the centre of individual state efforts. Different states still view and articulate security in divergent ways. Comprehensive security arrangements that include standardisation of democratic practices, human rights, the rule of law and even civil-military relations are still a long-term goal. The human security notion, although embedded in the key SADC policy documents, is still far from being the foundation of a regional practice.²⁷

Secondly, during the period of implementation of SIPO I, the Organ had very limited administrative support. The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence And Security Co-operation merely notes, in article 9, that the Secretariat 'shall provide secretariat services to the Organ'. This had obvious implications for SADC's ability to implement, monitor, and evaluate its peace and security agenda. The choice of a 'minimalist' Organ Directorate related to divergent political outlooks and priorities of member states and hence the desire to remain in full control of national security agendas: some ruling elites were preoccupied with regime security, while others tended to emphasise human security.

It would therefore be misleading to expect the SADC Secretariat (or, more specifically, the Organ Directorate) to engage in political decision-making relating to politics and security matters: it exists by design of the member states, in order to carry out political instructions. Put differently, the SADC Treaty and the mandates of the secretariat and directorate restrict the organisation to an administrative (or implementing, , monitoring and evaluation) role with little or no decision-making powers. SADC member countries have not (yet) chosen to establish a regional institution with supranational powers in the areas of politics, defence and security – a vital precondition for moving the institution towards a security community.

Given these strictures, the relationship between the secre-

tariat and individual member states becomes key, as does leadership behaviour. The SSF, although technically committed to the AU's grand strategy of having standby forces ready for deployment by 2010, remains resource-poor and depends on political guidance at the Summit level. It is unclear whether there is any real political will to use this instrument in a robust fashion, beyond fact-finding and mediation by retired members of the presidential club. Despite prescriptions to this effect in the Protocol, SADC's security architecture does not necessarily harmonise with that of the AU, giving rise to a range of tensions, least of all the question of agenda-setting (who determines action, when, and how?) and deployment authorisation (which body decides to deploy whom, at what level, and with what accountability?).²⁸

In analysing SIPO II, we will examine whether or not the status of the Secretariat and Directorate has evolved over time, and trace the implications of this finding for implementation.

5 The evolution of SIPO II

5.1 The SIPO review

A formal SIPO evaluation exercise, held in Dar es Salaam in February 2007, recommended that the SIPO be reviewed before it expired in 2009. The meeting noted the need for regular (five-yearly) reviews and evaluations. A second review workshop was held in Swaziland in March 2009.

At its meeting in August 2009 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) directed the Secretariat to ensure that the revision was completed by 2010.

Following the MCO decision, member states convened in Gaborone in May 2010 to 'consolidate' the SIPO, in line with the Swaziland review. The meeting recommended that the Organ Troika meet in June 2010 to 'harmonise' the reviewed document. This process involved reviewing the objectives, strategies and activities undertaken by the various sectors relevant to peace and security specified in the SIPO, as well as the inclusion of the police as a stand-alone sector of the Organ.

The revised document, known informally as SIPO II, was approved by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia, in 2010.

In reviewing the regional environment, the document notes a range of ongoing challenges: climate change, economic recession, unconstitutional changes of government, the growing vulnerability of national borders, illegal migration, an increase in organised transnational crime, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illicit mining, and maritime piracy.

It states that SIPO I has been restructured to respond to previously and newly identified challenges. It also notes the weak-

nesses of SIPO I in responding to challenges, the need to rethink the Organ sectors, human resource constraints, and a lack of co-ordination in implementing the SIPO objectives. It acknowledges that proper implementation would require regular monitoring and evaluation, and recognises the need to develop annual implementation plans to this end.

5.2 SIPO II: structure and content

SIPO II is structured around five sectors: political, defence, state security, public security, and police. The discussion of each sector follows a standard format, namely an introductory analysis followed by a number of objectives, each elaborated in turn with detailed strategies, activities, and expected outcomes (presumably in aid of monitoring and evaluation).

In the section below, we will focus on the expected outcome for each sector, in order to get a good idea of the focus of SIPO II without getting lost in the detail of strategies and activities.

The identification and naming of the various sectors is also a complex issue. One question is how the new 'police sector' differs from the previous 'public security' sector. But a more complex question relates to the grouping together of the 'politics and diplomacy' sector and the security-related sectors. This creates various conceptual difficulties. Defence, police, crime and intelligence issues belong together, and can be managed as part of the security sector. Political issues (democratisation, governance, elections and so on) arguably display a different set of dynamics, and need a different style of management. It therefore sits uneasily inside the security framework. This is not to deny the relevance of the one vis-à-vis the other, or their interconnectedness (obviously, poor governance can lead to political crises and violent conflict, which might require political and diplomatic interventions to resolve). However, we will leave this dimension aside for the moment and proceed to the sectoral review.

6 SIPO II: A sectoral review

6.1 Politics and diplomacy

Summary: This sector seeks to promote good governance among member states on the basis of shared political values and practices, improved conflict management, improved civilian participation in peacekeeping, and the effective management of regional disasters.

According to SIPO II, the region is experiencing a high level of peace, a deepening of democratic practices, and the strength-

ening of 'existing common values and culture'. In support of these processes, SADC has established the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) and a Mediation Unit. SADC also participates actively in the institutions and programmes of the AU, its PSC, and NEPAD.

However, the document also identifies a range of ongoing challenges. These include a socio-economic cluster of issues (poverty, underdevelopment, HIV-AIDS, DRRR, corruption) conflict (inter- and intra-state conflict, illegal movement of people, absent disaster management systems) and politics (the need to consolidate democracy and good governance).

It then identifies seven objectives for the political sector, detailed strategies for achieving those objectives, and specific activities under those strategies. The objectives and the expected outcomes are:

Objective 1: Protect people of the region against instability arising from conflict.

Expected outcome: Enhanced communication among SADC states and between SADC and the AU Commission, effective threat prevention, sustainable development, strengthened capacity for peace-making and peacekeeping, and the enhanced participation of civil society.

Objective 2: Promote political co-operation among member states; evolution of common political values and institutions.

Expected outcome: Enhanced political co-operation, effective interaction between the Organ and civil society, co-ordination of foreign policies.

Objective 3: Conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Expected outcome: Strengthened capacity and enhanced civil society participation.

Objective 4: Build democratic institutions and practices, observe international human rights.

Expected outcome: Common electoral standards and improved electoral process management in the region, good governance in member states, improved human rights and delivery of justice in the region.

Objective 5: Observe and implement international treaty obligations (UN and AU).

Expected outcome: Member states governed by the same international legal regime; harmonisation of positions and approaches on international issues of mutual interest.

Objective 6: Peacekeeping capacity-building for regional and international Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

Expected outcome: Effective participation of the civilian component in PSOs.

Objective 7: Disaster risk management capacity-building.

Expected outcome: Create and capacitate a regional disaster risk reduction (DRR) co-ordination unit, and establish and activate a plan of action for the improved management of the region's disasters.

6.2 Defence

Summary: This sector seeks to enhance participation in peacekeeping, roll out the SSF, and provide support to civilian authorities.

According to SIPO II, defence co-operation in the region has contributed significantly to peace and stability, and as a consequence the focus is currently on participation in Peace Support Operations, or PSOs (bilaterally but also via the SSF), humanitarian assistance, and support to civil authorities.

Intriguingly, however, it identifies a wide range of ongoing threats in need of action (diplomatically phrased 'challenges which impact on the defence sector'). These can be grouped into three sets of issues: 'Hard' issues (intra-state armed conflict, arms trafficking, maritime piracy, land mines, disaster relief support capability, terrorism and external aggression); societal issues (HIV and AIDS, DRRR, illegal migration); and policy development issues (peacekeeping, regional defence technology, Defence Force inter-operability doctrine).

On the basis of this analysis, the SIPO II document identifies seven objectives (with accompanying sets of strategies, activities, and expected outcomes). As before, we will focus on expected outcomes.

Objective 1: protect people of the region against instability arising from conflict .

Expected outcome: a peaceful and secure environment. (Note: the strategies and activities associated with this objective are a conceptual mismatch. Proposed strategies range from policy development to the linking of operational units. What emerges from the detail however is a desire for the SSF to play a key role in securing the region).

Objective 2: Promote regional co-ordination and co-operation in defence and security.

Expected outcome: The consolidation of operational mechanisms (especially the SSF).

Objective 3: Enforcement action in accordance with international law.

Expected outcome: An enhanced deterrence capability, and consolidated collective defence and security mechanisms (in particular the SSF, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, or RPTC, and the Mutual Defence Pact).

Objective 4: Consider the development of a collective security capacity, and conclude the Mutual Defence Pact.

Expected outcome: Identical to objective 3 (above).

Objective 5: Observe and implement international treaty obligations (UN and AU).

Expected outcome: Regional Forces observe and are aware of international legal regime.

Objective 6: Develop a peacekeeping capacity, and co-ordinate participation.

Expected outcome: Enhanced regional capacity to participate in PSOs (essentially, this objective speaks to the operationalisation of the SSF).

Objective 7: Enhance disaster management capacity; co-ordinate international humanitarian assistance.

Expected outcome: Enhanced Regional Disaster mitigation capacity (this objective essentially speaks to the operationalisation of the DRR co-ordination unit, and emphasises the role of the armed forces in its activities).

6.3 State security

Summary: This sector seeks to prevent the subversion of the constitutional order, and deal with economic threats to member states, by regularising intelligence exchanges among state security agencies and services in the region.

According to SIPO II, political co-operation in the region has created a 'conducive environment' for ongoing security co-operation, marked by the regular formal and informal exchange of intelligence among security services. The state security sector's main achievements to date relate to the development and implementation of the REWC.

The main areas of concern for member states are threats to the constitutional order, and activities designed to undermine the economic interests of member states and the region. The latter seem to refer to the perceived negative effects of globalisation (border vulnerabilities, increased drug and human trafficking, money laundering) but also includes issues relating to climate change, food insecurity, maritime piracy, foreign interference, and terrorism.

SIPO II identifies five state security sector objectives (with associated strategies, activities, and expected outcomes), as summarised below.

Objective 1: Protect the people of the region against instability arising from conflict.

Expected outcome: Effective monitoring of threats leading to improved security (this objective and its strategies and activities focus on the sharing of intelligence, in a variety of ways, including via the REWC).

Objective 2: Promote regional co-ordination and co-operation in defence and security.

Expected outcome: Enhanced co-operation and co-ordination at a regional and continental level (as with the previous objective, this objective and its strategies and activities focus on the sharing of intelligence on regional but also continental levels, via a range of agencies).

Objective 3: Conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Expected outcome: Strengthened capacity to prevent conflict (with a particular emphasis on the development of insecurity and conflict indicators for the REWC, the sharing of intelligence, and lending support to mediation processes).

Objective 4: Implementation of the Mutual Defence Pact in response to external military threats.

Expected outcome: Attainment of a regional collective security capacity.

Objective 5: Co-operation between law enforcement agencies and state security services among member states.

Expected outcome: Improved security in the region through the effective monitoring of threats (particularly cross-border crime and illegal migration).

6.4 Public security

Summary: This sector seeks to address the threats associated with organised crime syndicates by co-ordinating the activities of law enforcement, public safety, correctional services and prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife, and customs and refugee agencies.

SIPO II dwells at some length on the purpose of the public security sector, probably in anticipation of questions about the relationship between the public security and police sectors. It states that the public security sector is meant to provide ser-

vices in respect of law enforcement, public safety, corrections or prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife, customs and refugees. All these areas, it says, are characterised by increased co-operation and collaboration among the various services and other law enforcement agencies – notably participation in joint cross-border operations aimed at combating crime and recovering stolen property. This sector also helps to implement the SADC protocols on the Combating of Illicit Drug Trafficking and on Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related Materials.

Despite these achievements, the document notes that numerous challenges remain, including a wide range of transnational criminal activities by organised criminal syndicates and criminal intelligence networks (it lists 21 such challenges).

Based on this analysis, SIPO II identifies four public security sector objectives and four recommendations (a feature unique to this sector).

Objective 1: To promote public safety and security in the region.

Expected outcome: Enhanced public safety and security in the region (via the implementation of strategies to deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the sector, training public security officers in the effective maintenance of law and order, developing a common approach to deal with rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders, dealing with prison overcrowding, and developing a common approach to combating poaching and the trade in wildlife products).

Objective 2: To promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on public safety and security matters.

Expected outcome: Improved co-ordination and co-operation (in particular relating to the SADC protocols on the interstate transfer of prisoners, the facilitation of the movement of persons, and the UNIVISA system²⁹).

Objective 3: To develop capacity and incorporate prison officers in peacekeeping operations.

Expected outcome: Through training and participation in exercises, capacitate these officers to undertake peacekeeping duties.

Objective 4: Enhance regional co-operation in respect of disaster risk management and the co-ordination of regional disaster responses and international humanitarian assistance.

Expected outcome: Through support for and co-operation with the evolving SADC Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Unit and its plan of action, enhance the sector's capacity in disaster management.

Finally, the document makes four suggestions relevant to the public security sector, including the need to harmonise annual

work plans with the requirements for evaluation of implementation, establishing a post (presumably at the OPDSC Secretariat) for a senior public security officer, and professional information and documentation management

6.5 Police

Summary: This sector focuses on the prevention of cross-border crime, and enhancing law and order by co-ordinating the activities of the region's police services and forces.

SIPO II struggles to explain the purpose of the police sector in a way that distinguishes it from the public security sector in SIPO I. Its 'situational analysis' suggests that policing is seen as crime fighting, and that the focus is very much on dealing with cross-border crime. It notes that law enforcement agencies in the region have been active in implementing the SADC protocol against corruption, the protocol on extradition, control of firearms, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, and combating illicit drugs.

The impression of a blurred dividing line between the public security and police sectors is strengthened when we examine the document's identification of the sector's most pressing challenges. Except for one item ('financial and hi-tech crime') the list of challenges faced by the police sector is identical to that faced by the public security sector. Could an analysis of the rather extensive list of eight police sector objectives, with their various strategies and activities, shed further light on the unique characteristics of the police sector?

Objective 1: Protect people of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order.

Expected outcome: Law and order maintained; crime reduced.

Suggested strategies to achieve this outcome are regular reviews of joint crime management strategies (to the extent that they exist at all), combating cybercrime, addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic in national police services or forces, and developing a regional police training policy.

Objective 2: To promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on safety and security matters.

Expected outcome: Establishment of a 'criminal database' (working with INTERPOL, and implementing the Regional Organised Crime Threat Analysis, or ROCTA).

Objective 3: Enforcement action.

Expected outcome: Maintenance of law and order in the region (via training in rapid response and special operations).

Objective 4: Observing universal human rights.

Expected outcome: Maintenance of law and order (via the domestication of UN human rights conventions and the incorporation of a police code of conduct in police training programmes).

Objective 5: Close co-operation among the police, state security, and other law enforcement agencies.

Expected outcome: Reduction in cross-border crime.

The strategy for achieving this objective is to co-operate on the management of all forms of cross-border crimes. Suggested activities include the exchange of information and sharing of experiences among all role players.

Objective 6: Implement conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament.

Expected outcome: Control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The strategy for achieving this is to encourage the ratification of the various legal instruments on arms control, and activities to promote this include information dissemination.

Objective 7: Participation in peacekeeping operations.

Expected outcome: Enhanced peacekeeping capacity (presumably among members of the police sector).

Strategies for achieving this objective are twofold: promoting the joint training of SADC POL elements for ‘peace support missions’; and promoting gender equity in deployments for ‘peace support operations’.

Objective 8: Enhance regional capacity for disaster risk management, and the co-ordination of regional disaster responses and international humanitarian assistance.

Expected outcome: Through support for and co-operation with the evolving SADC Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Unit and its plan of action, enhanced capacity (presumably of the police sector) in disaster management.

In brief, SADC regards good political and economic governance as the two key ‘enablers’ of regional integration.³¹ Article 5 of the Treaty requires member states to ‘promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate, and effective’. According to SADC, it ‘firmly acknowledges that economic growth and development will not be realised in conditions of political intolerance, the absence of the rule of law, corruption, civil strife and war’. It states that its member states ‘are cognisant of the fact that poverty thrives under such conditions, nurturing further political instability and conflict’.³²

SADC also notes that its members ‘are committed to the ideals of the AU and the NEPAD programme which identifies democracy and political governance, including peace and security, conflict management, post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and the combating of illicit trafficking in arms and related materials, as essential prerequisites for achieving sustainable development’.³³ This is consistent, it notes, with the approach in the RISDP, which has however added trafficking in drugs and human beings to this list.

The big question for most political analysts is to what extent SADC and its member states are able to claim a shared understanding of and commitment to democratic principles and practices. And does SADC really speak for the people of the region on matters relating to democracy? Khabele Matlosa’s typology of regime types (and corresponding democratic practices) in the region is useful for analytical purposes.³⁴ He distinguishes between:

- Closed authoritarian regimes (that is, unreformed autocracies) such as those in Swaziland and Angola (and perhaps Madagascar);
- Electoral authoritarian regimes (or facade regimes) such as those in the DRC and Zimbabwe;
- Electoral democratic regimes (that is, regimes that reduce democracy to simple electioneering) such as those in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique; and
- Liberal democratic regimes (regimes that allow for room for promotion of civil liberties and political rights in between regular elections) such as those in Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa.

Writing in 2008, Matlosa argued that ‘[w]hile generally transitions have taken place in a majority of states in the SADC region, democracy and governance remain in a state of flux’.³⁵ Indeed, between 2008 and 2011 new crises of governance arose in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Madagascar, and doubtful progress was made in Angola and Lesotho.

To some extent, the section on politics and democracy in SIPO

7 How relevant is SIPO II?: Seven policy questions

Which themes, norms and principles guide SIPO II? To what extent does SIPO provide norms and principles with respect to security sector governance and the nexus between security and democracy?

Both SIPO I and SIPO II state that they are guided by the ‘objectives and common agenda’ of SADC, as elaborated in Article 5 of its amended Treaty.³⁰

II addresses some of these problems. It seeks to strengthen recent innovations such as the SADC Electoral Advisory Council, and standardising electoral management throughout the region. However, as long as SADC remains a predominantly state-driven project, its attempts at promoting democracy will be limited. Progress on this front will require SADC to live up to its obligation under Chapter Seven of its Treaty, namely to ‘fully involve the people of the region’ in its activities. Instead, the SADC Secretariat, the Organ, and most member states pay lip-service to this people-friendly vision, utilising instead a limited range of prominent NGOs and consultants to design, implement, and evaluate its projects.

Several analysts have argued for a new participatory paradigm in regional integration processes through deliberative policy-making involving not only the political and civil society elites, but ordinary people themselves through community-based organisations.³⁶ Not only is SADC found wanting on this score, but so too are civil society elites – many of whom appear content with the status quo.

How did SIPO evolve?

SIPO II is remarkably similar to SIPO I. Specifically, it follows the same method, namely to analyse the region’s political and security situation and current challenges, and identify objectives, strategies, and activities for overcoming those challenges. Also, both documents were developed in the same way, namely by task teams of SADC officials (primarily from the SADC security sector) with political oversight by the Organ’s committees (ISDSC and ISPDC) and the Ministerial Committee of the Organ. The final drafts were considered and adopted by SADC Summits (in the case of SIPO I, the Summit of 2004, and in the case of SIPO II, the Summit of 2010). It appears that very little input was received (or solicited) from civil society.

SIPO II differs from the original in two key respects. First, it now defines five sectors instead of the four in SIPO I: political and diplomatic, defence, state security (intelligence), public safety, and police. The latter is new, but, as noted previously, there are conceptual difficulties in distinguishing the police sector from the public safety sector. The difference seems to revolve around the police sector’s focus on co-ordinating attempts to combat cross-border crime. Second, SIPO II pays far more attention to monitoring and evaluation. Besides a series of objectives and strategies, it defines detailed activity plans and expected outcomes for each sector, which theoretically enables more rigorous monitoring and evaluation than previously. The question remains: who will undertake this, and how?

Who has driven SIPO II? The SADC directorate, certain member states, or external actors, such as donors?

It is difficult to pinpoint a single actor which has driven the development of SIPO II. It may be fair to say that SIPO II was developed by SADC officials as a response to political pressure emanating from a combination of sources. SIPO II was produced well after SIPO I reached the end of its five-year life (it was supposed to be implemented from 2004 to 2008). The donor community and civil society have been persistent in their critique of the perceived lack of implementation of SIPO I. This became evident following the 2006 SADC Consultative Conference which adopted the Windhoek Declaration on relations between the donor community and SADC, and particularly support for the SADC Common Agenda as expressed in the RISDP and SIPO. However, discussions around the SIPO did not feature strongly at the Conference, partly because SADC officials were reluctant to indicate specific areas of engagement via the SIPO. It was also obvious to conference participants that SADC officials were unable to articulate the RISDP / SIPO interface.

After the conference, the establishment of a mutually agreed mechanism for regulating donor support for SIPO objectives was delayed for many years, frustrating donors (as well as NGOs working in the field of democracy and security). On the other hand, many SADC insiders defend its track record in terms of implementing SIPO, and argue that undue pressure on SADC to reform SIPO should be understood as political attempts to dictate its agenda. Our comparison of SIPO I and II suggests that the organisation has chosen to review and update the plan based on its own internal logic, with little assistance from outside. Several research, training, and policy institutions (ACCORD, the CCR, EISA, the ISS, and SADSEM) have sought to engage with the SADC Organ, its directorate, and individual member states on issues surrounding the SIPO agenda, and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, formerly GTZ) has continued to provide the Organ Directorate with valuable technical support. However, the extent to which any of this may have influenced SIPO II is hard to determine. What is clear is that any meaningful implementation of SIPO II activities will have to be undertaken in collaboration with three partners: the donor community; relevant research, training and policy institutions in the region; and CSOs or CBOs. The institutionalisation of working relationships among these potential partners should receive priority attention.

Is SIPO II based on new insights drawn from a learning process, or policy shifts on the side of SADC or SADC member states? To what extent does it reflect the fact that SADC is part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)? Does it refer to continent-wide security threats, and to SADC responsibilities in the context of APSA? Is SIPO consistent with the main policy principles of APSA?

Following close interaction with the region's security sector, we believe SADC officials responsible for implementation have come to realise the difficulties of putting into practice a rather ambitious set of activities – especially in the context of limited financial and human resources. A gap seems to have developed between SADC's political leaders (ministers and heads of state) and the officials responsible for implementation. For many years these officials made – but lost – the argument for additional support to enable more election monitoring and management, mediation, training and education for the security sector, preparations for the UNIVISA, and so on. It is only in the last few years that progress has been made, largely because of the support of GTZ/GIZ.

As regards policy shifts, the promotion of democracy is very much on the minds of SADC officials – however, on terms defined by SADC ruling elites. This gives rise to questions relating to the transitions in Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Why this apparent discrepancy? In times of crisis, solidarity among regional elites (in the context of a lingering liberation struggle paradigm) overrides the values associated with open, transparent, and accountable democratic governance. This seems to be true in the case of Swaziland and, to some extent, Zimbabwe. In the latter case, SADC prefers mediation from within its ranks (by Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma), despite the fact that some heads of state (notably the late President Levy Mwanamasa of Zambia, and Presidents Ian Khama of Botswana and Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania) have openly criticised Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe.

In the case of Madagascar, the picture remains opaque: on the one hand, SADC has brought substantial pressure to bear on President Andry Rajoelina by suspending his government from SADC, and supporting a mediator (an in-house appointment in the form of former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano), and reluctance to be persuaded by the so-called road map for political change in Madagascar – a document that favours the incumbent. SADC's mediation effort also seems to be bedevilled by the involvement (even meddling) of the AU, the UN, and a range of Western interests (particularly France). At the time of writing, it seemed as if another mediation round (this time with South Africa's active involvement) was making progress towards all parties adopting a revised road map to democratic normalisation.³⁷

Regarding peace and security, a major effort seems to have been made to harmonise SADC's security architecture with the emerging APSA framework (although much work remains, including the question of how to structure SSF decision-making and its relations with the AU and UN). As we have argued elsewhere, there is an unresolved tension between the AU and its role in the APSA versus the roles and responsibilities of RECs.³⁸ In essence, given the realities of resource constraints on the AU which impacts negatively on its ability to deliver on the expectations created by the APSA, the question is to what extent it is willing to allow RECs to run with the peace-making and peace-keeping ball (as demonstrated by the Madagascar imbroglio).

Finally, it appears that the SADC Organ has recognised the need for a more comprehensive understanding of (and response to) the challenges associated with public safety and security (the traditional policing and criminal justice agendas). It is unfortunate that the structure of the SIPO document prevents this vital set of activities from being given a proper set of objectives and activities in harmony with the rest of the security sector. Separate 'public safety' and 'police' sectors strike one as rather artificial.

To what extent is SIPO II based on a consensus about security threats in Southern Africa? Does it reflect the changing character of security co-operation by including 'new topics', such as maritime security and organised crime?

SIPO II does make an effort to capture the dynamic nature of the security environment – but its treatment of the political environment remains divorced from reality. Moreover, the strategic analyses are often deficient. In many cases, the linkages between the strategic analysis and objectives and activities in a given sector are not obvious. The analyses are sectoral and not holistic, which is understandable if one assumes that sectoral actors members know their business well. However many of the sectoral analyses seem dated, often repeating or partially repeating those in SIPO 1. The strategic analysis of the political terrain in Southern Africa appears unconnected to the real-life struggles of people in the eastern DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, or Swaziland. The sector's opening sentence casually states that 'The regional political situation is characterised by the acceptance of political pluralism', and elsewhere it talks of the prevailing peace and deepening of democratic practices. Imagine the value of strategic analysis drawing on the reservoir of available, open-source, credible assessments of the state of democracy in the region.

The strategic analyses in the public safety and police sectors are virtually identical, casting further doubt on the value of adding a police sector. The impression the document seeks to create that dedicated analyses have led to appropriate objec-

tives and activities is weakened when it becomes apparent that a common method has been applied to all sectors in both SIPO I and II. Objectives are identically phrased across all sectors. This template looks good in a spreadsheet or log frame, but actually creates an artificial structure which induces mechanical sectoral responses.

Does SIPO II accurately reflect current foreign policy and security policy thinking in the region? For example, does it reflect the shifts in foreign policy in Southern Africa under the Zuma administration?

SIPO II is practically silent on this issue. The question of how and to what extent SADC is able to develop and project commonly agreed foreign policy positions has received some analytical attention in recent years.³⁹ The findings – which we briefly outline below – suggest that collective foreign policy-making in Africa and elsewhere is a slow process of learning, accommodation, and compromises because of the persistence of national sovereignty and the diversity of interests and experiences in managing complex external environments. Khadiagala points out that SADC has the advantage of having fashioned a practice of building foreign policy co-ordination around some core issues at the height of the apartheid and decolonisation era that seems to hold some promise for the future.⁴⁰

More soberly, Cawthra argues that while there has been some convergence around certain principles within SADC, the process remains superficial. He concludes that SADC is likely to remain an intergovernmental rather than a supranational organisation for the foreseeable future.

Regarding external trade, Vickers argues that while there have been salutary attempts to develop, adopt and advance collective SADC and broader Africa positions vis-à-vis external trading partners, domestic policies and interests often trump regional concerns during the crucial endgame of trade negotiations. Most importantly, SADC countries, including SACU, do not share common trade and industrial policies, notwithstanding the SADC FTA and the RISDP.⁴¹

Van Nieuwkerk concludes that, in order to meet the challenges of a globalising, insecure, and unequal world, SADC needs to pay much more attention to the operationalisation of its Organ protocol requirement to ‘develop common foreign policy approaches to the issues of mutual concern’, and ‘advance such policy collectively in international fora’.⁴²

SIPO II does not provide any guidance on this score, so the impetus will have to emerge elsewhere: in our view, this is part of the leadership challenge facing SADC and its member states. Incidentally, we do not restrict ‘leadership’ to elected politicians or state managers only; we also have intellectual, cultural,

entrepreneurial, spiritual, sport and artistic leaders in mind – a wide repertoire of thinkers and practitioners with whom Southern Africans are familiar. The question then is to what extent the OPDSC, its implementation plan, SIPO II, and SADC itself can be persuaded to adopt a less state-driven and regime-centred approach to regional integration.

How relevant is SIPO II to security co-operation in Southern Africa? What are its practical consequences for SADC and its members? Is it more of a guide to policy development, or does it constitute a binding policy/legal framework for political decision-making?

SIPO II is not meant to be a binding policy document or legal framework for decision-makers, but a guide to collective behaviour. The previous director of the SADC Organ noted that SIPO I was designed to do three things: provide guidelines for action (strategies and activities); shape the institutional framework for the day-to-day activities of the Organ (including the operationalisation of the Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact); and align SADC’s peace and security agenda with that of the AU (particularly the SSF and aspects of good governance).

This ought to be the standard against which SADC’s performance is measured. And although SIPO II has not yet assumed the status of binding policy, or even reached parity with its twin, the RISDP (constituting, together, the SADC common agenda and work plan), it contains enough in-built challenges to keep SADC leaders and officials, other role players in the region’s security sector, and SADC’s partners busy for the next five years..

8 Summary, conclusions and recommendations

8.1 Summary

This study begins by locating its approach in the ‘new regionalism’ literature and particularly the concept of ‘security regionalism’, which refers to attempts by states and other actors in a particular geographic area to move from conflict-generating relations towards co-operative external relations and internal peace. It also notes the link between security and development, namely that security co-operation within a region could improve its stability, thereby attracting more international investment and trade.

It then introduces the African interpretation of security regionalism, and offers a short description of the African peace and security architecture (APSA). It later discusses the extent to which the AU and SADC share security concepts. It finds that multiple memberships of regional structures are impeding the

effective and efficient implementation of the APSA, and in particular the operationalisation of the ASF.

The report then describes the evolution of security co-operation in Southern Africa. It identifies the early 1990s as a vital period in the history of the region, marked by the demise of one-party systems and autocratic rule in favour of multi-party democracies. However it also emphasises the continuation of a number of historical trends, including South Africa's domination of the regional political economy and infrastructure, as well as widespread poverty and underdevelopment within and across countries. Against this background, it unpacks the SADC structures and processes relating to the co-ordination of its political, defence and security objectives. This includes a brief analysis of SIPO I, adopted in 2004.

The study then focuses on the review process which resulted in a revised and 'harmonised' SIPO (referred to as SIPO II), and analyses its contents. It discusses the key objectives, strategies, activities and expected outcomes associated with each of the five sectors in SIPO II.

On the basis of this analysis the report then discusses a range of policy questions designed to further illuminate the revised SIPO. It explores the impulses for its review, the nature of the content of the plan, and the extent to which it harmonises with continental peace and security structures and plans.

8.2 Conclusions

This discussion of SADC's SIPO has been situated in current patterns of interstate political and security co-operation in Southern Africa. In particular, it asks whether SADC could be regarded as a coherent and capable political and security actor – and whether the OPDSC and SIPO strengthen SADC's role as such an actor.

If we assume that democratic governance provides the foundation for such behaviour, the region has much to do. To state, as SIPO II does, that '... the region experiences peace [and] a deepening of democratic practices' is to tell only half the story. The other half relates to ongoing governance crises in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Madagascar; and persistent tensions in Swaziland and, until recently, Lesotho. The SADC Organ appears preoccupied with these 'matters' (it avoids crisis management language), yet seems unable to resolve many of them. Crises typically drag on for years, or are resolved by other means. These events demonstrate the complex nature of transitions to democracy, and the reality of democratic reversals. We would therefore suggest that SADC has not yet been able to fully transform SADC as a security complex with conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations, or assumed the role of an effective regional security actor.

There is also little evidence of SADC beginning to establish a

track record as a security actor beyond its own borders. Its relationship with the AU is underdeveloped (perhaps because it is still relatively young), but also because it is based on divergent understandings of peace and security requirements under the APSA. For the region, mediation is the preferred method of intervention, while elsewhere, the ASF concept represents a preference for more forceful intervention methods (ironically, an approach undermined by the AU's inability to provide the resources required for such robust behaviour).

What about the argument that the presence of a regional power will enable the region and its institutions to behave with more confidence as a security actor – able and willing to take steps to resolve interstate and intrastate conflicts, and exercise power and influence beyond its borders? South Africa's post-apartheid relationship with the region is an intriguing one. It has the power to dominate, and in fact does so, particularly in the economic domain. But politically it seems to be a reluctant hegemon, or ambivalent partner. It maintains an ambitious foreign affairs posture, aiming to be a global player, if not a continental leader, and a force in shaping South-South relations. Some believe that in the course of this process (driven with gusto by Mbeki but much more tentatively by Zuma) it has tended to neglect its relationship with its neighbours – if true, a potentially tragic oversight.

Recent indications are that the South African government intends to reclaim lost terrain. First, a white paper on foreign policy, released in May 2011, reaffirms Africa as central to its international relations.⁴³ It states that South Africa will continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction. The white paper proposes a strengthened relationship between the SADC Organ, the AU PSC, and the UN Security Council. Second, after assuming the chairpersonship of the Organ in August 2011, the South African government released a detailed statement of its regional policy objectives – a significant development in itself, and suggestive of a renewed engagement with SADC.⁴⁴ It announced a proposed SADC strategic plan for combating illegal migration, a policy to combat piracy in SADC waters, the linking of the National Early Warning Centres of South Africa, Botswana and Angola to the SADC REWC as a pilot project, and its intention to facilitate development of this capacity in the remaining SADC member states once the project proves successful. South Africa also aims to position SADC as a continental security actor: it recently suggested that SADC should engage the AU regarding peace-making in Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland (this links back to the approach on piracy).

However encouraging this is, South Africa is not SADC. Its role is vital, but SADC cannot subsume its policies under those of South Africa. As the white paper clearly demonstrates, South Africa's foreign policy positions are increasingly determined by

its national interests: for example, it regards the putative Tripartite Free Trade Area between SADC, COMESA and the EAC (the T-FTA) as a key priority. Together with its fellow members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), namely Namibia, Botswana and Lesotho, it has a special relationship with the EU (via the trade and development co-operation agreement). It also maintains relations with selected European countries (via so-called strategic partnerships), and prioritises relations with emerging powers, bilaterally but also via the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) alliances. Moreover, it aims to become a permanent member of a restructured UN Security Council. To what extent are these key priorities for other SADC members?

Despite SADC's sophisticated security architecture, then, the behaviour of its members suggests that they are not yet willing or able to share democratic political values and norms, or harmonise national decision-making structures and practices in order to enhance SADC's ability or authority to make, implement, and enforce rules. Underlying this reality is SADC's difficulties in proceeding with regional economic integration – a project bedevilled by the region's unequal power relations, and the tendency by outsiders to select trade partners on a bilateral basis with little regard for local efforts to establish a regional free trade area leading to a customs union and common monetary area. All in all, then, SADC is a stable (but not very efficient) institution, used by members to behave in a disaggregated manner, driven by the overriding demands of national interest and sovereignty.

As regards the norms and principles which guide SIPO II, SADC regards good political and economic governance as the two key 'enablers' of regional integration. SADC members are also expected to adhere to AU and NEPAD principles, norms and values in respect of democracy and peace and security. SADC member states have much to do, individually and collectively, to realise this vision. A key argument is that SADC, as a state-driven project, has in-built limitations (for example, its attitude towards the Zimbabwean and Swaziland governance crises suggests that ruling elites tend to protect each other against criticisms, and pressures for reform). SADC should do more than pay lip-service to the notion of engagement with civil society. In order to address poverty and underdevelopment, and promote stability and democracy, it ought to become people-driven rather than state-driven.

Both SIPO I and II were developed in virtually identical processes dominated by defence and security officers and officials, with no acknowledged contributions from outsiders. The sectoral analyses are mechanically forced into a uniform template, and their quality is uneven. However, the plans differ in two key respects. First, SIPO II encompasses five sectors, with the police added, but struggles to distinguish this sector from the public

safety sector. Second, monitoring and evaluating the performance of each sector is a prominent feature of SIPO II. However, this raises the question: who will undertake this, and how will it be done?

SIPO II was developed by SADC officials in response to various pressures. The first was a technical requirement, emanating from inside the organisation, for a review. Second, the donor community and civil society have consistently criticised a perceived failure to implement SIPO I. Thirdly, implementing the SIPO will require significant donor support. SADC member states cannot afford the budget of the full SIPO. Hence the development, following the Windhoek Declaration, of a structured relationship between the SADC Organ Directorate and the donor community – now referred to as International Cooperating Partners, or ICPs – in the form of a Peace and Security Working Group. Although not yet activated, it holds much promise for a more realistic approach to the implementation of a range of SIPO II objectives. There is also no doubt that it will have to be accompanied by involving appropriate research, training and policy institutions of the region, as well as a renewed engagement with broader civil society.

There is evidence that SADC has sought to harmonise SIPO II with the AU's APSA. However, given the AU's resource constraints, the question is to what extent it is willing to allow RECs to run with the peace-making and peacekeeping ball (as demonstrated by the Madagascar imbroglio). As noted earlier, South Africa has played a major role in advancing the SADC peace and security agenda in continental and global institutions. However, beyond this renewed – and laudable – South African drive to make SADC more responsive to the problems of the region (and beyond), there is little evidence of a collective effort to develop a shared foreign policy approach. This is a task to which the region's leaders must rise, if SADC is to become more than a loose collection of ruling elites.

8.3 Recommendations

To the SADC Executive Secretary:

- Launch SIPO II at a conference of key stakeholders.
- Involve the region's civil formations in the quest for regional stability, growth, and development.
- Harmonise the relationship between SIPO II and the RISDP.
- Activate the SADC-ICP working group on peace and security. Acknowledge the preparatory work, and institutionalise the partnership, which will boost implementation.
- Communicate! Share intent, decisions, developments,

and successes with SADC colleagues, regional citizens, and the international community.

To the SADC Organ Directorate:

- Rethink the SIPO sectoral approach: the public security and police sectoral approach is artificial. Politics and diplomacy as a sector sits uneasily with the various security sectors.
- Engage civil society in agenda-setting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The region is blessed with a rich and active ensemble of CSOs, NGOs, academic institutions and parliaments engaged in peace and security. Deepen the relationship with these actors.
- Communicate! Share intent, decisions, developments, and successes with SADC colleagues, regional citizens, and the international community.

To regional stakeholders (governments, officials, civil society):

- Assist with harmonising the SIPO/RISDP interface.

- Call for the strengthening of SADC's capacity for implementing SIPO II. Human resource, financial and project management deficits are hampering SADC. The Directorate needs more senior staff, properly remunerated, and working in a professional environment.
- Conceptualise peace and security as a people-driven project: persuade officials to change their mindsets and engage with their citizens rather than viewing all non-state actors with mistrust.
- Engage the international community in terms of restoring a partnership based on trust and accountability.

To the international community:

- Respect the sovereign space of SADC and its member states.
- Refrain from imposing 'Western solutions' to the region's problems.
- Support SADC, its members, and its people in developing indigenous, credible Southern African voices on peace and security and democratic governance.

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About this study

This study offers a critical analysis of the revised and updated Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Informally known as SIPO II, it supersedes the original Strategic Indicative Plan, or SIPO I, introduced in 2004 for a five-year period.

Written by Prof Anthoni van Nieukerk of the Centre for Defence and Security Management of Wits University, South Africa, it draws on years of close interaction with SADC and its security structures.

It argues that SADC has not yet become an effective security actor, in the region itself or beyond it. Moreover, its relationship with the AU is underdeveloped.

It notes that the South African government has played a prominent role in re-energising the SADC Organ, but asks whether it is advisable for SADC's peace and security agenda to be shaped by one player.

It argues that the Plan itself is marked by an awkward sectoral approach, and reflects a failure to involve key regional stakeholders in its development.

It concludes with a series of recommendations to key SADC officials and institutions, regional stakeholders, and the international community aimed at addressing these shortcomings and facilitating the Plan's implementation.

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