SLOVENIAN YOUTH 2013
Living in times of disillusionment, risk and precarity
Slovenian YOUTH 2013

Living in times of disillusionment, risk and precarity

First CEPYUS -
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)
Youth Survey
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1 On the study of youth

Youth is not a universal human condition. A number of scholars have previously argued that childhood and youth cannot be comprehended as a unique period (Aries, 1962); nor can youth be considered as a special, homogeneous social group. Nevertheless, studies of youth, both as group and a concept were first articulated in the 19th century, predominantly in urban centers of the countries at the forefront of industrialization and modernization.

The first understandings of youth phenomenon came from Hall (1904), a psychologist who conceptualized adolescence as a time of “storm and stress”. However, in asserting the concept of ‘adolescence’ as the initial framework for youth studies, it seemed that physiological and psychological processes had not been understood well enough to treat youth as a separate social group. The trajectory of youth studies changed when Mannheim (1923/1952) delineated the essence of youth in his study of generations. According to him, youth is the generation that apprehends the social world, fostering attitudes substantively different from their elders.

The crux of youth studies is in grasping the substance, not particularly of the social and cultural changes themselves, but of how they mold new generations from their experiences, group identity, and behavioral patterns, as well as their expectations, ideologies, and “anxieties and aspirations”. This includes the common peculiarities evident in the transition pattern from childhood to adulthood. As such, the study of youth seeks to not only depict and explain the group, but as well assess the group’s particular transition, identity, subculture, and other features indicative of the society as a whole, and of the times to come. Of course, it is important to avoid hyperbolic and mechanical claims, i.e., that the characteristics of youth always reflect the changes found in society. More specifically, the particularities of youth do not necessarily indicate the direction of social change. Nevertheless, youth studies have become a prominent topic in the social sciences, including but not limited to sociology, psychology, political science, criminology, and economics. Consequently, this has not only generated a multitude of arguments on what factors make up youth, but also has raised many issues of how and what should be studied.

1.1 Youth culture and youth as a subgroup

Marcuse (1968) asserted that youth could be a potential revolutionary and emancipatory agent in society. Whereas he viewed the alleged phenomenon with hope (1969), others regarded it as dangerous and subversive. The latter was associated with “moral panics” towards particular youth styles, groups, and youth in general (Cohen, 1972). Such variations notwithstanding, this particular study focuses on youth subcultures, lifestyles, and identity. Comprehensions of the so-called
“essence” of youth first received attention in the late 1960s and 1970s, and largely corresponded to the emergence of a number of different social phenomena, including the appearance of drug and psychedelic subcultures, the communes, peace and anti-war movements, which depict an attempt by youth to withdraw from the general course of social life. The landmark studies of youth subcultures focused heavily on their unique characteristics, particularly where they distinguished themselves from adult, i.e., “mainstream” culture; the understanding was that this was politically motivated, which differed from adult modes of thought (McWilliams, 2000). Furlong (2013) is critical of this strand of literature, arguing that it bypasses social inequalities and forms a false idea of a uniform youth culture. Moreover, too much attention was allotted to the deviant and spectacular, which contrasted heavily with mainstream youth culture. This type of study could be traced to Mannheim (1923/1952), who considered the generation of youth to be determined by specific historical conditions that affect directly upon its worldview and value system.1

1.2 Transition and what shapes it

While the issues above relate to youth attributes, the question remains as to what shapes the transition process itself. Among those who understand youth primarily via the concept of transition,2 a number have focused on the individualization of transition (although it should be noted that the true limits of individualization are often contested). Beck and Beck Gernsheim (2002), in addressing the concept of individualization, argue that it is typical for today’s youth to “reflexively” trace their individual routes. In other words, the authors find that “reflexive individualization” has become the crux of living in the “second modernization” stage (the conditions are supplemented by a socially induced, generalized risk permeating current living conditions). The institutional framework, which had previously suppressed the concept of liberty in earlier generations and molded behavior into rigid patterns, is gradually eroding. One of the casualties is the ‘family,’ which has become “a zombie” (a term suggesting that it is lifeless, although not officially dead). Arnett extends this argument further in claiming that this type of living peaks during “emerging adulthood”, i.e., from the late teens lasting into one’s 30s. It is typified by qualities like exploration, instability, so-called feelings of “in between” (adolescence or even possibly youth and adulthood), focus on the self, and wonderment to life’s possibilities; it is a time “when people are highly optimistic about how life will eventually work out for them” (2006, 114)3. Arnett, after having consulted Chisholm and Hurrelmann (1995), frames this portrayal within a psychological development perspective, and allows independence to be the prime trait of emerging adulthood; i.e., to be in Europe while “remaining at home”, as “autonomy and relatedness are complementa-

1 It should be noted that Mannheim specifically asserted that the entire generation does not necessarily embrace all of the same concepts, rather only those affected by certain changes.

2 Furlong (2013, 3) sees youth as “semi-dependence”, which contrasts to the dependence of childhood and independence of adulthood. Other possibilities of defining youth are either imprecise or difficult to operationalize. Moreover, some are imposing and arbitrary, e.g., the legal definitions of “coming of age” and attaining the right to vote. The United Nations presently defines youth as the group aged between 15 and 35; this definition replaced an earlier statistical formulation of 15-24 (UNESCO, n.d.).

3 Arnett condemns the general term “youth”; he claims that it lacks content, boundaries, and definition. “Emerging adulthood” is preferable because it is a new term for a new phenomenon: “the long period of years that lies between attainment of biological maturity and entrance into stable adult roles” (2006, 119).
ry” (2000, 475). Such claims lead to the conclusion that the actions of youth are more individually (rather than socially) determined. However, one could argue that many of the problems affecting transition concern education and work, specifically the inequalities encountered by youth in these two spheres. Transition itself is heavily structured by social conditions and often in a manner unfriendly towards youth. Moreover, it should be noted that the conditions affecting youth are highly varied, particularly those between the so-called underclass and the elite. And of course, there are obvious diverging possibilities of independence and of independent navigation.

The possibilities allowing youth entry into adulthood are seriously limited, even blocked by the changes found in the workplace, i.e., the ever-greater precariousness of employment. To counter these limitations, the social system allows for more permissiveness in one’s personal life. Another instrument the social system disposes of is “qualification inflation” (Furlong, 2013, 73). This is not to say that joblessness is absolute, but if there are jobs for youth in contemporary Europe, they tend to be casual, part-time, and lacking in security. Reflexively, some have termed the present generation as “the scarred generation” (Morsy, 2012); thus, it is not surprising that Angela Merkel finds this problem to be “the most pressing one in Europe” (Conolly, 2013).

In sum, one of the main issues found within youth studies concerns the wider question of whether man is able to mold his own social destiny. This is often expressed as the dichotomy between structure and agency with regard to explanatory power. Structural approaches focus on identifying patterns of normative life courses, which undoubtedly had a stronger explanatory power in the past when transition was understood as having stricter norms enabling a more generalized approach. The study of the individual as an agent implies that the destinations of individuals are, to a significant and possibly decisive extent, the product of their conscious activity and choice. As such, destinations may substantially differ because of each individual’s actions. The idea of agency in the study of youth development converges on the idea of individual “navigation”, “recognizing the capacity to act, the skills individuals develop to enable them to read signals, anticipate problems and develop life management strategies” (Furlong, 2013, 9). Such an approach also encourages qualitative studies of individual biographies (Chamberlayne, Rustin and Wengraf, 2003).

2 Comprehension of contemporary youth

The nature of today’s youth, whether identified as “Generation Y” or the “Millenials,” has received a voluminous amount of debate and speculation. Drawing on Howe and Strauss, Furlong summarizes that they “are presented as optimistic, engaged, and accepting of authority. They are viewed as team players who place a premium on achievement both in the classroom and in the world of work ... the Millenials are presented as conformists who value learning and are committed to “making something of themselves”... so committed to achievement they sometimes regard work as better than sex” (2013, 15). Still, others find contemporary youth to be “outer fixated, group oriented and civically minded” and “cooperative team players” (Twenge et al., 2008, 879). While this may be typical of contemporary American youth, there are substantial differences across cultures. In Greece, it has become common to refer to youth as €700 (i.e., those who cannot expect a monthly wage higher than 700 EUR). “They’re overeducated, underemployed and, for the most
part, still dependent financially on their parents. And, as the wave of riots that shook Greece last December sharply illustrated, they’re also increasingly disillusioned” (Itano, 2009). The French, in referring to this same phenomenon, refer to their youth as “the precarious generation” (Itano, 2009).

Another issue at the forefront of contemporary youth studies considers the characteristics of narcissism and entitlement. Numerous authors have noted that contemporary youth have come to harbor unrealistic attitudes, specifically where it concerns special treatment and entitlement components, including exploitativeness. Thus, numerous expressions have appeared for young people, including the “me generation” and the “whatever” generation, as well as the “me first” generation, which depict a nominal “we don’t care” attitude towards the world (Kirbiš, 2011). Lessard et al. (2005, 522) consider narcissism and other expectations of entitlement to be increasing among youth, i.e., they have “expectations of special privileges and exemptions”. Twenge and Foster focused on “the narcissism epidemic,” and in particular, how this increase can be quantified with a measure of exactness. They have found that not all ethnic groups are affected in the same manner. However, they do note that there has been a general increase since the onset of the 21st century (Twenge and Foster, 2008). Once again, these findings must be viewed with some caution as his work focused on the United States. Questions remain on whether a similar evolution has transpired in Europe, particularly when factoring in the new social condition of youth transition. One may speculate: if it is true that narcissism in on the rise, the confrontation with precarious social conditions will be dramatic. The above notwithstanding, narcissism has also been noted to be a typical feature of Slovenian youth by Godina (2010), a domestic social science scholar.

A further issue worth consideration is whether the youth period is followed not by adulthood itself, but by the so-called emerging adulthood, i.e., a post-youth period where many of the major transitions have yet to be completed. This issue should not be determined subjectively with an intent to investigate and experiment with different lifestyles, but by examining the constraints found within the social system, e.g., the lack of employment possibilities (Cote and Bynner, 2008; Fur-long, 2009; 2013). However, this does not appear to be a period of what Arnett called independence and exploration, but rather as an imposed period, whereby the possibilities to enter adulthood are constrained. This report shall identify how this issue is particularly relevant in Slovenia. Not only is emerging adulthood seen as a new transition, but also adulthood—as a state—has become a questionable concept. As noted by Wyn, “boundaries between age categories are increasingly fluid” (this should be understood as yet another component of the “fluid” nature of society itself underscored by Bauman, and quoted by Wyn). Furthermore, “for those born after 1975...transitions into adulthood are routinely seen as flawed, slow, [and] partial” (2011, 36).

In sum, youth are a historically and socially determined group. The changes found within contemporary social life may enhance its prominence; however, such changes primarily affect its nature. Further, it has been argued that the concept of youth often eludes a specific definition, along with other basic social notions like religion and family. However, certain indicators and features of youth are prominent and beyond dispute:

- Youth is a transitional stage, although the commencement, duration, and finality of its transition are disputable; it leads to adulthood and independence;
- It is closely associated with degrees of education;
- It is associated with sexual bonding, with marriage possibly occurring at later stages of life than was the case for previous generations. Moreover, “marriage has lost much of its significance for youth-adult transitions” (Furlong, 2013, 112);
- An agency nature of youth is limited, constrained by objective factors;
- Cultural specificity is also limited and constrained, although youth cultural styles abound and often replace one another;
- Youth are always socially stratified; moreover, major social inequalities are reproduced through the period of youth;
- Despite numerous and universal technological and social influences on youth, it should still be acknowledged that the nature of youth is not universally identical.

One characteristic noted above is particularly relevant for youth in Slovenia, where they are often termed the “independence generation”. Namely, they are those who have experienced the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of an independent Slovenian state at an early life stage. Such events have likely molded the institutional framework for their social future. In addition, they are also experiencing the first major economic downturn, i.e., the so-called “economic depression generation”, when even tertiary education fails to offer reliable job placement. As will be elaborated on in the following chapters, permanent employment is within reach only for a small minority, whereas the majority will likely face unemployment and career casualization (Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011).

The current study represents the latest contribution to Slovenia’s long history of youth research (see: Naterer and Lavrič, 2011, 35-37), and aims to capture how and why today’s youth “feels and breathes” in the context of fluid, reflexive, and risk-prone social reality.\footnote{List of references on pp. 28-29.}
1 Objectives

The current study follows, on the one hand, the longitudinal and comparative Shell series of studies that began in Germany, specifically where it concerns its foci and methodology (Hurrelmann et al., 2010), and, on the other hand, the more longitudinal Slovenian studies of youth (Ule, 2001; Lavrič et al., 2011). Thus, the present study, which is limited to survey and quantitative methodologies, may help indicate the extent to which Slovenian youth have changed, whether any possible turnabouts may be noticed, and whether any comparative insights may be drawn. As noted above, this study is the result of a survey investigation. The data was collected in June and July of 2013, a period associated with tremendous economic crisis in Slovenia. Since the beginning of 2008, Slovenia’s gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen by approximately 8.5 percent; all indications are that this trend will continue in the near future. It is generally understood that this is the most important basic social fact currently impacting youth in Slovenia.

Our main objectives were to uncover:

- **Descriptive factors**, i.e., observing and analyzing youth transition processes, youth identity, and youth behavior patterns in 2013;
- **Structural factors**, i.e., analyzing phenomena and constructs that affect the issues under description. These include both social and psychological factors, including the patterning and association of the very phenomena under study, and their components;
- **Longitudinal factors**, i.e., determining the changes of transition, identity, and behavioral patterns over time, when preexisting data allow for such analyses;
- **Comparative factors**, i.e., contextualizing Slovenian youth among national youth groups in other European countries, when preexisting data allow for such analyses.

As such, this study corresponds primarily to the strand of research underscoring transition as the essence of youth; an issue that has become ever more acute, particularly as it relates to length (which has apparently expanded) and destination (which has increasingly become questionable).
2 The structure of the study

The main guidelines of this study were established by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). The following fields have been stressed as the fundamental research goals:

- Living conditions and socioeconomic status;
- Education, employment, and mobility;
- Lifestyle - leisure, health, and media use;
- Family and social networks;
- Trust and belonging;
- Anxieties and aspirations;
- Politics and democracy;
- Governance and development.

These fields served also as fundamental guidelines for processing and classifying the data in the final report. Thus, this study analyses young people in Slovenia from various aspects. Likewise, the scope of the research (the eight fields listed above) attempts to address broader social phenomena.

- Part One provides a detailed view of the youth socioeconomic positions, and includes an analysis of the income available to young people, poverty, and other similar conditions. This section concludes with an analysis of the most important factors contributing to the postponement of young people leaving their parental home.
- Part Two provides an overview of youth in the labor market; special attention is given to unemployment and temporary employment. Here, there appears to be degrees of special treatment, particularly for women and university educated young people. This part also deals with the issue of geographical mobility.
- Part Three begins with an analysis of the (considerably high) involvement of young people in the education system. Special attention is given to the academic success of today’s youth and how they feel about school. This section offers insight into how young people regard non-formal forms of education and their activities in this field.
- Parts Four, Five and Six offer general insights on how young people live their lives in terms of leisure activities, media use, and health considerations.
- Part Seven examines family structures and youth attitudes toward marriage.
- Part Eight presents a general discussion of youth anxieties, and as well their aspirations and value orientations. This part also taps into the personality traits of young people, and presents a unique discussion on how youth envision their social and personal futures.
- Part Nine deals with youth trust and belonging, where special attention is given to their feelings on religion and religiosity.
- Parts Ten and Eleven examine youth political attitudes and political participation,
together with their views of politics, democracy, and challenges faced by youth in the contemporary world.

- The final chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main findings in this study and attempts to place them within wider social and theoretical contexts.

3 Target population and sample

The target population of the Slovenian Youth Study consists of all citizens of the Republic of Slovenia aged 16 to 27. According to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (Surs, 2013), there were altogether N = 282,194 Slovenian citizens in that age group in 2012. As a means to research this target population, a sample size of n = 900 respondents has been chosen as sufficiently reliable in order to draw inferences to the whole population. The standard sampling error in this case, assuming a 95 percent level of reliability, accounts for +/- 3.3 percentage points. This means that population parameters differentiate from sample statistics by a maximum of +/- 3.3 percentage points, which is below the standard sampling error's threshold value of +/- 5.0 percentage points. Hence, samples of this size are generally considered sufficiently representative for studying large populations in Slovenia.

Of course, the representativeness of a sample does not only depend upon the sample size. Consideration must be given to how the sample was drawn from the target population. Due to some technical and administrative issues, it was not possible to sample randomly from the Central Registry of the Slovenian Population, which normally generates the most representative samples. In order to achieve the best substitute for a random sample, a stratified quota sample was used. The target population was first stratified according to 12 statistical regions and 5 community types (communities with a maximum of 2,000 residents; communities with 2,000 to 10,000 residents; and communities with more than 10,000 residents, Maribor and Ljubljana), which resulted in 35 independent strata. Next, a two-stage sampling method was implemented within each stratum. First, target settlements (primary sampling units) were randomly selected from the complete list of settlements corresponding to particular statistical regions and settlement types (stratum). Second, respondents were then chosen from the selected primary sampling units according to the pre-set quota requirements.

To be more specific, the shares of the target population within each stratum were first computed. Based on these shares, it was then assessed how many respondents would be required to select from each stratum to achieve the net sample size of n = 900 respondents, so that the structure of the sample would proportionally fit the structure of the target population according to statistical regions and settlement types. The number of primary sampling units selected in the first sampling stage within each stratum depended on the number of respondents required to select within each stratum in the second sampling stage. As a rule of thumb, no more than 10 respondents were generally selected per each primary sampling unit (Maribor and Ljubljana are exceptions as both cities are categorized as one settlement and it was required to select more than 10 respondents from each city in the sample). For example, in Podravska region there were 12 respondents to select from settlements with 2,000 to 10,000 residents. As a means to achieve more variability, two
primary sampling units were selected (Slovenska Bistrica and Lenart) with six respondents being interviewed in each primary sampling unit (instead of having all 12 respondents selected from one primary sampling unit). Altogether 100 primary sampling units were selected. A detailed structure of the sample is summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1:  Structure of the required sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATISTICAL REGION</th>
<th>SETTLEMENT TYPE*</th>
<th>STRATUM</th>
<th>POPULATION SHARE</th>
<th>REQUIRED SAMPLE (RESPONDENTS)</th>
<th>PRIMARY SAMPLING UNITS (SETTLEMENTS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pomurska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podravska</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koroska</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savinjska</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zasavska</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.006</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spodnje posavska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jugovzhodna Slovenija</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osrednjeslovenska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorenjska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notranjsko-kraska</td>
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<td>0.015</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goriska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obalno-kraska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.000 900 100

Note:  Settlement types: 1 – settlements with a maximum of 2,000 residents, 2 – settlements with 2,000 to 10,000 residents, 3 – settlements with more than 10,000 residents, 4 – Maribor, 5 – Ljubljana.
The interviewers were instructed to search for potential respondents only within the selected primary sampling units that were allocated to them. During the selection process, each interviewer had to fulfill pre-set quota requirements with respect to gender, age, and completed level of education. For each primary sampling unit, interviewers were given detailed instructions on (a) how many males and females to select, (b) how many respondents from each of the three age groups (16-19 years, 20-23 years, 24-27 years) to recruit, and (c) how many respondents with different levels of completed education (primary education, secondary education, higher education) to interview. Quotas were non-interlocking, which means the structure of respondents with respect to gender, age, and education was only controlled at the level of the overall sample (not in each stratum, nor in each primary sampling unit respectively).

4 Data collection

Data collection took place between May 29 and July 20, 2013. The data was collected by means of personal, face-to-face interviewing in the field, mostly in households. Before conducting fieldwork, all of the interviewers attended one of the three introductory seminars (in Maribor, Ljubljana, or Koper), where they received detailed instructions about interviewing and the selection of proper respondents. Besides quota requirements, interviewers were also instructed to interview only one person per household, which is a common practice in sample selection due to the likely greater similarity of respondents from the same household. Besides, if the potential respondent had refused to participate in the survey, the interviewer had to write down the reason for his/her non-response.

The questionnaire consisted of an oral and written part. The oral part was administered by an interviewer, which means that the interviewer read aloud the questions and filled in the answers of the respondent (for certain questions the interviewers were instructed to use show-cards to make it easier for respondents to choose among the answers that were provided). After completing the oral part of the questionnaire, the interviewer distributed the written part of the questionnaire to the respondent and asked him/her to fill in the answers personally. The written part of the questionnaire included more personal and intimate questions. It was assumed that the respondents would likely give more sincere answers when being able to go through the questions on their own.

After an interviewer had finished with the fieldwork and returned the filled-in questionnaires, the validity of his/her questionnaires was checked with control phone calls to the respondents that were interviewed in order to prevent fraud. Interviewers asked respondents to provide their personal and contact information only for checking the quality of the fieldwork. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality of collected information, a number of precautions were implemented to prevent the potential abuse of personal data. Personal data was treated separately from respondents’ answers to survey questions, so there has been no possibility to link the given answers with particular respondents.
4.1 Response rate and reasons for non-response

During the fieldwork, 1,163 potential respondents were invited to participate in the survey. Among them, 907 valid interviews were completed and incorporated into the data, while others refused to participate. Thus, the overall response rate was 78.0 percent. The response rate is somewhat higher than would have probably been achieved had this study utilized a random sample of respondents drawn from the Central Registry of the Slovenian Population. Because this study used stratified quota sampling, interviewers were not given a list of respondents to interview; instead, they could select potential respondents among their friends, peers, acquaintances, and family members, etc., which probably resulted in a higher response rate.

The reasons for non-response are briefly summarized in Table 2. It is evident that the majority of refusals were due to a lack of interest or unwillingness to participate (43.0 percent). More than one-fourth justified their refusal on the grounds that it is a waste of time (27.3 percent), while more than one-tenth of refusals were due to an unwillingness to share personal information (12.9 percent). As well, several other reasons were provided as justification for nonparticipation.

Table 2: Reasons for non-response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am not interested, I do not want to participate</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a waste of time</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It invades my privacy; I do not share personal information</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I never participate in surveys</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate theme (I do not know enough about it, I do</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not have an opinion, it is too difficult for me, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am being interviewed too often</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not trust surveys; I have had bad previous experiences with surveys</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons (e.g., health issues)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>256</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Data weighting

Although the sample was carefully constructed to meet the criteria with respect to the relevant demographic variables, some minor discrepancies from the “optimal structure” have nevertheless occurred (e.g., interviewers were not able to meet the pre-set quota requirements). To achieve a better representativeness of the sample, the data were weighted prior to the data analysis in order to adjust the demographic structure of the sample to the actual demographic structure of the target population. Weights assign greater impact to some subsets in the sample and a lower impact to other subsets. Data weighting was based on the following variables:

- gender
- age
- level of completed education
- settlement type
- statistical region.
First, a post-stratification based on the combination of gender and the three age groups was administered. Afterwards, a ranking method was implemented to adjust the weights according to the level of completed education, settlement type, and statistical region.

Table 3: Comparison of demographic structure of target population with unweighted and weighted sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>POPULATION (%)</th>
<th>UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE (%)</th>
<th>WEIGHTED SAMPLE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 282,194</td>
<td>N = 907</td>
<td>N = 907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-23</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-27</td>
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<td>39.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of completed education</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>60.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement type</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>up to 2,000 residents</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 to 10,000 residents</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<td>more than 10,000 residents</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maribor</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ljubljana</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Pomurska</td>
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<td>Podravska</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koroska</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<td>Savinjska</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
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<td>Zasavska</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spodnje-posavska</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jugovzhodna Slovenija</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osrednjeslovenska</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorenjska</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notranjsko-kraska</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goriska</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obalno-kraska</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unweighted and weighted data are summarized in Table 3 above. Here it is evident that the demographic characteristics of the sample only slightly deviate from the demographic characteristics of the target population, which means that a good quality sample has been achieved. Further proof that the sample required only minor adjustments can be attributed to the relatively small range of weights: the smallest weight accounts for 0.61 and the largest weight accounts for 1.60.

5 References


PART I
LIVING CONDITIONS AND SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION
OF YOUTH

1 Introduction

Living conditions and socioeconomic status, often understood as indicators of the position that an individual or a group hold in a social structure, are among the most analyzed categories of social life. This corresponds to the idea that at the core of the social sciences lies the question of social stratification, namely what determines one’s position in a given social structure, and how does that position influence an individual’s life(style) and worldview. Consequently, there is not only an abundance of literature which deals with the issue of social structure and stratification, but as well there are a great number of studies that hypothesize some sort of relationship between the individual’s social (class) position, developmental outcomes, lifestyles, and world views, etc. As such, questions pertaining to living conditions and socioeconomic status are of paramount importance when analyzing youth. More specifically, the socioeconomic situation of youth is often associated with the formation of their values and attitudes (Lewis, 1959; 1961), behavioral problems (Merton, 1968; Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1961; Miller, 1958), and success in educational endeavors (Bourdieu and Boltanski, 1981; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bernstein, 1971; Boudon, 1974). The latter point is of particular importance since it is often argued that in modern societies, the socioeconomic position of individuals is largely seen as being heavily dependent on educational achievement. In short, the socioeconomic situation of youth is commonly a factor of degree attainment (Considine and Zappalà, 2003; Graetz, 1995). Of course, the issue of whether schools function as a “just” system, i.e., awarding those that are the most hardworking, or whether they are merely mechanisms that enable social reproduction and legitimize social inequality (Apple, 1992) is still highly contested. Of course, this debate does not change the fact that the socioeconomic situation of youth matters for a number of reasons.

Assessments on youth socioeconomic situations vary tremendously, but most scholarly research focuses on poverty rates among youth, disposable incomes and their primary sources, before analyzing the factors that determine the level income and their correlates. Here, scholars generally emphasize categories like employment status and levels of educational qualifications; however, it is not possible to ignore other associative issues, e.g., access to the labor market and education, mobility, housing and social policies, and social protection, etc. In this light, the economic and social statuses of youth are closely associated with policies relating to the labor market,
welfare state measures, education, family, and other social policies. Inside this framework, most studies also include indicators such as household income, where emphasis is given to parents’ social, cultural, and material capital.

2 Poverty among young Slovenians (still) below the European average

As Nagode, Smolej, and Boljka (2009) argue, when it comes to poverty, young Slovenians are in a relatively good position compared to their European peers. However, they added that this favorable position “cannot be attributed to the labor market, which is hard for young people to get into, but primarily to the functioning of an informal support network evident in young adults extending the time they live in their original family [home], and the relatively successful functioning of the social protection system” (Nagode, Smolej and Boljka, 2009, 57).

According to Eurostat (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalent income after social transfers), the situation had not changed significantly between 2009 and 2011 (the last year for which the data is available). The percentage of youth that was at risk of poverty was still at a markedly lower level than it was for those in the EU-27 or EU-15 (see Figure 1). Specifically, the data indicate that the poverty rate for Slovenia in 2011 was around half of the EU-27 or EU-15 rate. This suggests that Slovenian youth (aged 16-24) “enjoy” the second best relative position in the whole EU-27 area (only Cyprus has a lower official at-risk of poverty rate for this age group). However, it is also true that the level of poverty risk in Slovenia is also below the European average (13.6 percent vs. 16.9 percent for the EU-15; see Figure 1). This data contrasts Slovenian public opinion. In 2010, 78 percent of Slovenians believed that poverty was very widespread (compared to 73 percent of Europeans) (Eurobarometer, 2010). In addition, social transfers in 2011 lowered the poverty rate in Slovenia by 10.6 percent, which was higher than the EU-27 average (9.2 percent) (UMAR, 2013). Thus, the social safety net in Slovenia is clearly working, both for youth and the general population.

The Eurostat data also indicate that while young people in Europe (aged 16-24) were more exposed to poverty risk than the average European (aged 16-64; data not shown), in Slovenia the opposite was true. The same discrepancy could be observed for the oldest segment of the population (65+; Figure 1) or for the total population (Figure 1). Furthermore, for the period 2008-2011, the increase in the share of those who were at risk of poverty was relatively smaller for youth (aged 16-24; +0.5 percent) than for the general population (+1.3 percent). Interestingly, a large part of Slovenian youth (43 percent) believes that elderly subsidies should be cut in favor of the younger generation (Figure 2).

As indicated in Figure 2, negative sentiments are much more common among Slovenian youth than among German youth (43 percent vs. 30 percent, respectively), regardless of which Slovenian study is considered (Youth 2010 or Youth 2013). This is especially surprising when considering the fact that German youth are at greater risk of poverty than Germans aged 65+ (the opposite is true when observing the same age cohorts in Slovenia). In addition, the share of Slovenian youth who believe that the young should reduce their claims in favor of the elderly has also dropped significantly, indicating that solidarity among generations is decreasing from already low levels.
Figure 1: At-risk-of-poverty rate (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalent income after social transfers) by age, sex, and region, 2011

Note: The level of poverty risk is expressed as the percentage of persons living in households with disposable equivalent income below the threshold of poverty risk (60 percent of median income per equivalent member). 


While this “lack of objectivity” (a factor often associated with perceptions of poverty) is hard to explain without more in-depth analysis, the relatively low levels of poverty among Slovenian youth may be partly ascribed to the system of informal support, and to the fact that young people in Slovenia tend to remain in the parental home longer (Mandič, 2009; for an in-depth analysis of why young Slovenians stay at home for longer periods, consult Section 6 of this chapter, and see Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011). This suggests that the late departure from home is actually functional in terms of maintaining this relatively favorable picture of youth social standing.

Disposable equivalent income or disposable income per equivalent member is obtained by first calculating for each household the annual disposable net income (all net incomes from all household members are added up: employment, including reimbursement for food and travelling to work, self-employment, pension, unemployment benefit, reimbursement for sick leave, stipends, family and social benefits, interest, dividends, cash transfers received from other households, credit for the use of a company car for private purposes and part of the proprietary production of self-employed persons – the value of products transferred to the household from one’s own workshop, company or shop; transfers paid to other households and property tax, including compensation for the use of building (and) are deducted from this. Then, for each household, disposable net income per equivalent member is calculated using the OECD adjusted equivalence scale. The scale gives the first adult member a weighting of 1, the second member aged 14 or over a weighting of 0.5, and children under 14 a weighting of 0.3. A four-member household of two adults and two children will thus have 2.1 equivalent adult members (calculation: 1 * 1 + 1 * 0.5 + 2 * 0.3 = 2.1). Income per equivalent member of household is calculated by dividing annual disposable net income of the household by the number of equivalent members of the household.
Another factor seen as an indirect net against youth poverty is the mass inclusion of Slovenian youth into the formal education system. Here, Slovenia ranks first in the EU-27 in terms of youth inclusion in regular education (in 2011, 71.7 percent of youth (aged 15-24) were included in some sort of formal education). Enrollment bequeaths a number of benefits to the youth, including the possibility of receiving subsidized food and transportation, access to the state grant system, and access to student labor, which enables those who are enrolled (aged 15+) to enjoy a “privileged” position in the labor market. In previous research (Lavrič et al., 2011), respondents were asked whether they were supplementing their income through earnings from occasional work, working via the student employment service, or receiving earnings by other means. Among full-time students, 78.3 percent answered in the affirmative in 2000, while 84.1 percent did so in 2010. In other words, the vast majority of students use this scheme as a means to improve their economic position, at least for the period in which they are enrolled in the education system (which in Slovenia is above the EU-27 average). In addition, the proportion of working students has increased markedly over the past decade.

6 These privileges should be understood in the context of lower taxes that the employer needs to pay when employing someone under the student work scheme. In addition, the employer has almost no obligation towards the employee - there are no health insurance expenses to be paid (those who work under this scheme are insured either via their parents or via their own contributions). The time spent under this scheme also does not count as an official work experience, and thus does not count as worktime when an individual reaches retirement age.
Nevertheless, this “parallel” hiring system gives rise to several (potential) negative externalities, which over the long-term, could actually worsen the economic situation of young people. Problems include the fact that the hiring system only benefits young people enrolled in the formal education system, generates less tax revenues, creates opportunities for abuse among student employees, and provides an incentive for young people to cheat the system by prolonging educational enrollment. The program also promotes uneven competition on the labor market. Specifically, it creates less demand for those seeking a “regular”, full-time job, including young graduates, as employers move to turn more and more jobs over to a temporary work staff. Klanjšek and Lavrič’s recent study (2011) reveals that the proportion of temporarily and partly employed persons (aged 15–24) in Slovenia exceeds the proportion of the same group in the economically most advanced countries of Europe (EU-15) and the EU as a whole (EU-27); this has been on the rise over the past decade. Specifically, while the proportion of those that were permanently employed was almost cut in half between 2000 and 2010, the proportion of young people performing contract work has almost doubled. In 2010, contract workers accounted for more than one-quarter of those performing steady work. As this scheme exerts a downward pressure on earnings (see the section on incomes), and given that temporary employment increases the risk of poverty (the rate is higher among temporary employees than those with permanent jobs, UMAR, 2010, 138), it is reasonable to anticipate that this will negatively affect the current rates of poverty. In fact, recent statistics show that this has already begun. Slovenia was one of seven countries that in 2009-2011 experienced the fastest increase in at-risk-of-poverty rate (2.3 percent; EU-27 average 0.6 percent) (UMAR, 2013).

3 Incomes of young people in Slovenia – stagnating and falling behind

A longitudinal analysis of Eurostat data indicates that for 2005, the average annual equivalent net disposable income of young people in the EU-15 (aged 16–24) was approximately 70 percent higher than the income of young people in Slovenia (or 35 percent higher against the EU-27 average). By 2009, the gap had shrunk to around 38 percent (or 15 percent using the EU-27 average), suggesting that Slovenia was a success story. However, from 2009 onward the gap has begun to widen, and as of 2011, stood at 45 percent. The current negative economic situation in Slovenia suggests that this gap will likely increase in the coming years. Similar trends can be seen for neighboring EU countries (particularly Croatia, and to some extent Italy and Hungary) and diverges when compared to those less affected by the economic crisis (Austria). Until 2009, Slovenia had been able to close the gap somewhat with its northern neighbor; however, this has widened from around 70 percent (in 2009) to more than 83 percent (in absolute terms) in just over two years (Figure 3).

However, as can be seen in Figure 3, the differences in disposable incomes are smaller when prices differentials are taken into account (PPP - right side of Figure 3). In this way, the aforementioned difference between the net disposable income of Austrian and Slovenian youth falls from
80 to 50 percent.7 The reduction in the difference is even more noticeable when young Slovenians are compared to their Italian counterparts. Whereas young Italians in 2011 had a disposable income that was, in absolute terms, just over 30 percent higher than the disposable income of young Slovenians, that same income would buy them only 9 percent more (of comparable goods). Nevertheless, the data indicate that from 2009 onwards the purchasing power of Slovenian youth has decreased alongside their Croatian counterparts. In all other neighboring countries, the purchasing power of youth (aged 16-24) strengthened.

**Figure 3:** Average annual equivalent disposable net income* of youth (16-24), expressed in EUR 1999 and in PPP**, by countries neighboring Slovenia, 2005–2011

Notes: * The basis for the calculation is the annual equivalent disposable net income of households that participated in the survey of income and living conditions (SILC) on the basis of which the disposable net income per equivalent member is computed. This provides the basis for calculating average income for Slovenia overall, and by specific age groups. Average income is thus not calculated on the basis of income received by persons at a certain age, but on the basis of the equivalent income of persons of a certain age (which depends on the income of the household in which the persons live). The (weighted) equivalent income of persons in the age group is added up and divided by the number of persons (weighted) in the age group.

** PPP – purchasing power parity (excludes the effect of price differences).


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7 It is important to note that in 2009, this ratio was 70 to 30. Thus, in just two years Slovenian youth lost a significant part of their purchasing power when compared to their Austrian peers. The same holds true when comparing Slovenia against Hungary and Italy.
As indicated by Klanjšek (2011), this process started even before 2009 for those who had been working via contract or the student work scheme (Figure 4). In other words, the economic situation of some groups worsened even when the average disposable net income for the whole grew.

**Figure 4:** Estimate of average monthly disposable income of young people (16–25 yrs.) by employment status, in Euros*, 2000 - 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Youth 2000</th>
<th>Youth 2010</th>
<th>Youth 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent employment</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed term/temporary employment</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (incl. farmers)</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract/student work</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No steady employment/Does not work</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Average disposable income for 2000 was converted at the official exchange rate into EUR and then revalued, with the start and end date taken as 15 June (2000/2013). The same procedure was employed (sans conversion) for 2010 data.

Sources: Youth 2000, Youth 2010 and CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Based on the total disposable net income estimates for young people, one could argue that in the last 13 years only certain groups of young people have gained, mainly those that are steadily employed or those who are self-employed. However, in 2013 even these groups have experienced income reductions. The results show that after 2010, the situation deteriorated for all occupational groups except for the economically weakest group, i.e., those with no steady employment and the unemployed. The situation appears to be even worse for those performing contract work and those doing a variety of jobs via the student employment service. In real terms, their position was better than that of their peers in 2000. All this has led to a situation where the average monthly

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8 The reduction in earnings from contract work can doubtlessly be linked to the increased scope of student work, which also includes increasingly poorly paid work, for which growing numbers of eligible people are competing (expansion of tertiary education).
disposable income of young people today is practically identical to what it was 13 years ago (2000: 410 EUR; 2010: 389 EUR; 2013: 385 EUR).  

Further, young Slovenians today live in a far more unequal society in terms of income distribution than was the case 13 years ago. According to Eurostat, the Gini coefficient for Slovenia rose from 22 in 2000 to 23.8 in 2011 (last available data). Mirroring these statistics is the growing gap between the number of young people who feel that their family’s material position is “below/well below average” and those who feel it to be “above/well above average” (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Self-assessment of material situation of respondents’ family, Youth (16-25 yrs.), 2000-2013

Sources: Youth 2000, Youth 2010 and CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Despite the constant push for a more flexible labor market (i.e., a remedy for Slovenia’s slipping competitiveness; WEF [2012]) and for less social security (considered necessary to close the growing budget deficit increasing public debt; SURS [2012]), it is not surprising that Slovenian youth are relatively pessimistic about the country’s economic outlook (Table 4).

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9 The data also show that the amounts presented are noticeably lower than those given by Eurostat. Specifically, our research indicates that the average disposable annual income of young people (16–24 years) hovers around 4,600 EUR, the equivalent annual disposable income in 2011 for the same age group in Slovenia amounted to 11,794 EUR. Although this can be attributed to a different method of calculation (“equivalisation”), it still seems that the Eurostat data is somewhat inflated. Namely, the amount for 2011, listed by Eurostat is higher than the amount obtained by multiplying the average net monthly pay, which according to the Slovenian statistical office (SURS), amounted to around 980 EUR in September 2011.

10 However, it should be noted that this is still well below the EU-28 (30.7) or the EU-15 (30.8) average, making Slovenia still one of the most egalitarian societies in the European community.
Table 4:  Mean analysis (ANOVA) of “What will, in your opinion, be economic situation in your country in the next 10 years?” 16-25 yrs., by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>2.74a</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>3.44b</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>3.90c</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>284.2</td>
<td>p&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What will, in your opinion, be the economic situation in your country in the next 10 years?

(1=will be much worse; 5=will be much better)

Note: Means having different superscript letters are significantly different at the p<0.001 based on Tamhane’s T2 post hoc comparisons.


The results of the mean analysis (ANOVA) indicate that Slovenian youth (aged 16-25) are significantly (p < 0.001) more pessimistic about the future economic situation of the country than their peers in Croatia and Kosovo (although both are socially and economically worse off)\(^\text{11}\). More specifically, almost **44 percent of Slovenian youth expect that the economic situation in Slovenia over the next ten years will be much or somewhat worse than it is today** (by comparison, for Croatia 13 percent; and for Kosovo, 8 percent).

4 Slovenian youth still relatively satisfied with their lives in general, but the effect of economic crisis is showing

Given the current economic situation in Slovenia, one could surmise that the country’s youth feel less satisfied with their lives than previous generations had. More precisely, various studies indicate that subjective well being (SWB), income (security), and economic stability mutually reinforce one another (see for e.g., Inglehart, 1997, 2000; Diener and Seligman, 2004; Lima and Novo, 2006; Diener, Tay and Oishi, 2013).

Indeed, the below longitudinal analysis clearly indicates a fall in subjective well-being among youth, which had been climbing between 1991 to 2005 (Figure 6).

One indication of the relationship between economic turmoil (since 2009) and SWB can be seen in the statistically significant correlation (r=0.10 p<0.05) between respondents’ income (which, on

\(^{11}\) Although there is no official UN data for Kosovo (it is still included under Serbia), Serbia ranks lower (64) on HDI than Croatia (43) and Croatia ranks lower than Slovenia (21).
average, is stagnating or even decreasing for some occupational groups) and SWB (controlling for the effect of age, gender, occupational status, health, social ties and appearance)\(^\text{12}\).

Figure 6: Assessment of subjective well-being, Youth 18-25, 1992-2013

Note: 1=very dissatisfied, 10=very satisfied


5 Young males still earning more than young females, but the gap is small and shrinking

A mean comparison of disposable income by gender indicates that young men have significantly (\(p < 0.05\)) higher disposable incomes (424 EUR) than young women (342 EUR). This remains true for each occupational group. However, when performing a mean analysis (t-tests) across different occupational groups (see Table 5), the results show that the only statistically significant difference (\(p < 0.05\)) could be observed for those in a “fixed-term employment” group (“permanent employment” being close).

\(^{12}\) The selection of controlling variables was made after analyzing zero-order correlations, which for example indicate that the effect of age on SWB is negative, while the effect of age on income is positive, weakening the effect of income on SWB.
Table 5: Mean analysis (t-test) of respondents’ income (16-25), by gender and occupational status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>FIXED TERM/TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>SELF-EMPLOYED</th>
<th>STUDENT</th>
<th>UNEMPLOYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males (disposable income, in EUR)</td>
<td>Mean t/Sig.</td>
<td>Mean t/Sig.</td>
<td>Mean t/Sig.</td>
<td>Mean t/Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>931 1.94</td>
<td>897 2.40</td>
<td>981 0.53</td>
<td>274 0.33</td>
<td>353 0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females (disposable income, in EUR)</td>
<td>773 0.06</td>
<td>750 0.02*</td>
<td>600 0.64</td>
<td>281 0.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.05.

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

This corresponds to the official Eurostat data, which indicates that the Gender Pay Gap in Slovenia (for the whole population) is the lowest (2.3 in 2011, down from 5.0 in 2007) among all EU countries for which data exist and well below the EU-27 level (2011: 16.2). For example, in Austria the Gender Pay Gap remains around 24; by comparison, Hungary (18), Croatia (17), and Italy (16) are further behind (all data is for 2011).

6 Living in relatively small households, together with more educated parents - “The Mediterranean” pattern continues

The current study reveals that Slovenian youth live in comparatively smaller households in terms of the number of people living under one roof (Figure 7).

Specifically, the average household size in Slovenia is comprised of 3.4 persons. For comparative purposes, Croatian households are made up of 3.6 persons, and Kosovar households average 5.7 persons. Slovenian youth also tend to have better-educated parents than was the case in 2000, but comparatively, parents of Slovenian youth have achieved (on average) the same educational level as those in Croatia. However, both the percentage of those having tertiary education, and the share of those who have finished the primary level are higher in Slovenia (Figure 8).

13 The unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG) represents the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and female paid employees as a percentage of the average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. The numbers presented are for industry, construction, and services (and exclude the activities of households acting as employers and extra-territorial organizations and bodies).

14 These numbers are understandably higher than the official data published by national statistical offices or Eurostat since all youth surveys used in the current study exclude households that did not include a young person.
Figure 7: Average household size, by country


Figure 8: Education level, respondents’ parents, Slovenia, 2000 and 2013, Croatia 2012

Sources: Youth 2000, CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, and IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study.
Corresponding to the relatively higher level of economic development, almost all Slovenian youth live in households that own a car, television set, mobile phone, refrigerator, and personal computer. Only 0.1 percent of households have no personal computer; this percentage is much higher in Croatia and Kosovo (14.9 and 12 percent, respectively; see Figure 9).

**Figure 9:** Percentage of households NOT having a specific item, by country

![Figure 9](image_url)


Moreover, Slovenian youth also live in households that have the highest average number of rooms. This fact corresponds well with Lavrič and Klanjšek’s (2011) study, which showed the tendency for young Slovenians to remain at home for extended periods of time based on their difficulties in finding employment, which is often linked with moving out of parents’ household, encourages youth to move away only if there are spatial pressures. It could be that Slovenians build bigger houses knowing that their children will remain at home longer, or that because there are bigger houses, young people do not feel as much pressure to move out (Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011).

Overall, the situation has not changed drastically since 2010. The share of Slovenian youth (aged 16-25) that still live with their parents (85.5 percent) is slightly higher than in Croatia (82.6 percent) and significantly higher than in Germany (69.3 percent), although the results indicate a slight decrease over the past three years (Figure 10).

Although the issue of leaving home has been recognized as functional in terms of protecting young people from the heavily segmented labor market and poverty (Nagode, Smolej and Boljka, 2009), another body of literature argues that this has a dysfunctional effect. Namely, the transition to an independent household is frequently understood as one of the key indicators of completing
the transition to adulthood. As Mulder (2009) finds, this transition coincides with the assumption of adult roles, e.g., running a household, making independent decisions about financial matters and dietary consumption, coordinating leisure time, etc. Further, such a transition is usually accompanied by a change in the relationship between children and their parents.

Figure 10: Persons with whom youth (16-25) is living, by country

Sources: Youth 2010, CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, Shell 2010 German Youth Study.

Although Mitchell (2000) reported that young adults have increasingly delayed leaving home, research on the age at which youth leave home indicates that there are substantial differences between societies. As Mulder (2009) argues in her analysis of the most economically well-developed societies, the greatest differences can be seen on the north-south axis. More specifically, young people leave the parental home earliest in northern Europe (led by Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) and North America, and latest in southern Europe (Italy, Spain). During the 1980s, 90 percent of Italian males (aged 20-24) lived with their parents, compared with only 26 percent in Denmark. Various studies indicate that Slovenia follows this southern Europe trend, having the highest percentage of men and women (aged 18 to 34) who still live with their parents among European countries (the percentage is higher for young men; Mandič, 2009; Choroszewicz and Wolff, 2010; Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011). The most recent figures confirm these findings (Figure 11).

In 2011, the share of young Slovenians (aged 18-34) that lived with their parents was noticeably higher than the EU-15 average; this pattern was more often found among young males than young females. In 2011, 69 percent of all males lived with their parents; this was true for “only” 54 percent of females. For comparison’s sake, a similar pattern can be seen in the EU-15: 50.5 percent vs. 38.5 percent). However, the data indicates a slight decrease, mirroring the findings from this study, which drops Slovenia from second place (2008) to fifth place (2011) (after Croatia, 80.1
percent; Slovakia, 74.4 percent; Malta, 69.5 percent; Bulgaria, 66.7 percent; and Italy, 62.3 percent). Nevertheless, Slovenia remains in the group of countries with an above-average share of youth staying at home.

Figure 11: Share of young adults aged 18-34 living with their parents, Slovenia and EU, 2005-2011

Source: Eurostat (2013) – Population and social conditions/Living conditions and welfare/income and living condition/Living conditions.

Choroszewicz and Wolff (2010) listed the following potential factors that explain the differences between countries. These include:

- Material opportunities for creating independent households; in this respect, the key factors are access to suitable employment, and real estate market conditions;
- Inclusion of youth in education; higher inclusion percentages correlate with remaining in the parental household longer;
- Moving necessitated by education or job; the small size of the country, whereby youth can drive to school/university or work in larger towns appears to be a factor for elongating their stay at the parental home. The objective living situation in the parental home is also important. The better it is (e.g., a larger home), the lower the interest in moving out. The (modest) accommodations in university and secondary school dormitories have a similar effect;
- Cultural factors, such as the importance of the nuclear family and adjustments by the family of origin with respect to providing independence for youth at home, can have a significant impact on motivations to leave home;
- The percentage of youth who cohabit in a partnership relationship; the formation of
cohabitation partnership relationships increases the likelihood of moving away from the parental home earlier.

While the above list indicates the general reasons why Slovenians choose to remain at home longer, there are as well as number of individual factors (described below).

6.1 The material opportunities for moving out are narrowing

Various studies indicate that material factors such as regular employment, income, housing prices, and rents are a key factor in why youth decide to leave the parental home (cf. Nilsson and Strandh, 1999; Vertot, 2009; Choroszewicz and Wolff, 2010). Given that the percentage of fully employed youth (aged 16-27) has decreased from 39 percent in 2000 to 21 percent in 2013 (see also the section on employment), and that the percentage of temporarily employed youth (aged 15-24) has increased dramatically over the same time period, from 43.2 to 72 percent (Slovenia is “a leader” in this regard among all EU-27 countries), some could argue that the position of youth on the labor market during the last decade has worsened with regard to stability and employment security. Lavrič and Klanjšek (2011) note the relationship between employment and the likelihood of leaving the parental home. Their study shows that 59.3 percent of young people (aged 25-29) who were employed in a permanent position lived at home, while this share was much higher (70.9 percent) for all other respondents in the same age group. Similar findings were obtained in the current study (albeit a different age group was analyzed). The share of youth living with their parents was lower among those permanently employed (70 percent, down from 72.5 percent in 2010) than it was for those in all other employment categories (82 percent, down from 86 percent in 2010). However, as noted above, Lavrič and Klanjšek’s study (2011) clearly demonstrates that employment encourages youth to move away from home if there are spatial pressures and if one’s employment generates a sufficiently high income (which enables renting a flat or paying off a housing loan).

Support for the latter hypothesis can be seen in mean comparisons of disposable incomes (for those who are permanently employed) and place of living. Namely, the results indicate that those permanently employed and living with their parents had on average lower disposable incomes (872 EUR) than those who lived alone (1140 EUR) or with their partner (975 EUR). The importance of material factors can also be traced to the major discrepancy between wishes and reality regarding moving out. Among the permanently employed but still living with their parents (aged 16-27), 78 percent expressed that they would leave home if financial circumstances allowed. This sentiment was shared across all occupational groups. Specifically, among those living with their parents, regardless of occupational group, more than half stated that they would rather live in their own household if they had the financial means to do so. This sentiment was markedly different among Croatian youth, where percentages were much lower. This possibly indicates why Croatia ranks first in the EU-28 in terms of the share of young adults (aged 18-34) who cohabitate with their par-
ents (i.e., indicating why the share of young people living with their parents in Croatia drops less\textsuperscript{15} with age when compared to Slovenia; see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Attitudes of youth (16-27) toward various living conditions/arrangements, Slovenia and Croatia (Which of the following statements best describe your situation/your wish regarding living arrangement?)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure12}
\caption{Attitudes of youth (16-27) toward various living conditions/arrangements, Slovenia and Croatia (Which of the following statements best describe your situation/your wish regarding living arrangement?)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{15} In Slovenia, the share of youth (aged 16-27) that lives with their parents is around 80 percent, dropping to around 62 percent when the older cohort is included (aged 18-34) (Eurostat data). In Croatia, around 74 percent of youth (aged 16-27) live with their parents (IDIZ-FES Croatian Youth Survey, 2012), while the share of those aged 18-34 is approximately 80 percent (Eurostat, 2013).

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study.
6.2 Low levels of family discord, short distances, adequate infrastructure and high education enrollment levels all weaken the pressure to leave home

Among the many factors for leaving the parental home, authors also note the level of family discord (less harmony contributes to sooner departure) (Mulder, 2009). In terms of relationship quality between children and parents, Slovenia ranks first among European countries. According to data from 2010, 84.5 percent of all respondents consider their relationship with their mothers to be good or very good; with respect to fathers, this figure is 76.4 percent. 88.8 percent mostly or entirely agree that their parents love them (Lavrič et al., 2011). However, as Figure 13 indicates, the level of family (dis)harmony between Slovenian, Croatian, and German youth reveals no significant differences. It should be noted here that the share of German youth (aged 16-25) who still live with their parents is considerably smaller than in Slovenia and Croatia (Figure 10).

Figure 13: Family (disharmony) among Slovenian, Croatian and German youth (16-25)

![Bar chart showing family (disharmony) among Slovenian, Croatian and German youth (16-25)]

Sources: CEPMYS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, Shell 2010 German Youth Study.

In fact, the highest level of family harmony can be found among German youth, regardless of which group was analyzed (all/only those that still live with their family). On the other hand, the highest level of family disharmony is in Croatia, which as indicated above, ranks first across the entire EU-28 in terms of the share of youth (aged 18-34) still living with their parents.

As such, one could argue that family (dis)harmony among Slovenian youth is not a decisive factor in terms of leaving the parental home when compared to other issues (e.g., the position of youth on the labor market and stagnating/falling incomes). Along with good living and emotional conditions of parental (co)habitation, and the fact that over 91 percent of youth travel to school or work by car, bus, or train (where the average distance to work or school is only 22 km), this seems to alleviate the pressure on youth to move away from their parents.
Moreover, it is worth reiterating that Slovenia sits at the top of the EU-27 in terms of youth inclusion in regular education. According to data cited by Choroszewicz and Wolff, Slovenia (77 percent) ranks first in Europe by a wide margin in terms of the percentage of youth (aged 18-24) who live at home and are simultaneously enrolled in the education system (for the entire EU-27, this figure is 58.8 percent). However, as indicated by Kuhar, Slovenia has a relatively high student dropout rate (one-third of all those enrolled) and an above-average length of study period (seven years on average). In her opinion, higher education “serves mainly as a kind of incubator which enables people to delay their entry onto the labor market” (2009, 29). As mentioned above, enrollment in regular education enables youth to participate in the student labor scheme, which contributes considerably to extending the study period and to the mass enrollment in higher education. However, the downside of this is lower (security) income, which likely prevents youth from pooling enough material resources to leave the parental home.

**Notes:** *Mean is significantly different at p<0.001.

**Sources:** CEPYUS-FES Slovenian Youth Study 2013, Shell 2010 German Youth Study.
6.3 What about culture?

Results from a number of studies suggest that there is a considerable variability in the leaving home process throughout western industrialized countries (Mitchell, 2000), which often materializes in a north-south pattern (Mulder, 2009). Aassve, Iacovou, and Mencarini (2006) offer interesting insight into why this might be so. In countries with more liberal models of adult transition, the risk of poverty for youth who do not live with their parents is substantially higher than for those that stay at home. In countries with a sub-protective (Mediterranean) transition model, these differences are nearly nonexistent. The authors suggest that this pattern can be explained purely through cultural factors. Namely, in countries with a liberal model of transition, the period of risking poverty and social exclusion (including the risk of this period extending throughout one’s lifetime) is acceptable and it might actually be understood as a particular kind of youth initiation. Perhaps it is even desirable. In countries with the sub-protective (Mediterranean) model, youth are typically more risk-averse and prefer the shelter of the parental home for longer periods. In other words, it seems that there is not only an important difference in how youth perceive risk/security, but as well, in how they value individual freedom versus security.

Table 6: Association between living preference and attitudes, Slovenian youth 16-27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM (1=completely disagree; 5 = fully agree)</th>
<th>CRAMER’S V* (1=WITH PARENTS 2=ALONE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is necessary to know what one wants to achieve in life</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He who does not risk, does not get anything</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who care for others will ultimately be rewarded</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It makes no sense to set goals today because everything is so uncertain</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order for society to function we need moral values</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today it is impossible to sympathize with others in grief</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is necessary to believe in fate and accept what life has to offer</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In life you have to surround yourself with people, who can be leaned on</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In life, it is enough to have some friends and have fun</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is necessary to focus on a career, everything else is less important</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is necessary to distance away from the outside world and live in your own world, because otherwise life is very difficult</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An important part of life represents an interest in current events in society</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In life, it is the best to adapt and to do what others are doing</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Variables that measured respondents’ preference of ways he or she wanted to live were dichotomized (1=with parents, because this is the most convenient way or 2=alone), then an adequate measure of association was calculated.

** p < 0.05.

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian Youth Study 2013.
Although cross-cultural research is plagued by problems (how does one adequately “measure culture”), the following analysis represents an attempt to identify differences/similarities among youth living in two different developmental contexts (Slovenia and Germany). This study uses a wide set of measures in order to identify better the differences and potentially extract useful information with regard to culture’s influence on leaving home (Figure 14).

The results indicate that on average, Slovenian youth are significantly (p < 0.001) more “passive-fatalistic” (e.g., “It makes no sense to set goals today because everything is so uncertain;” “It is necessary to believe in fate and accept what life has to offer”), “apathetic” (“An important part of life represents an interest in current events in society”), “hedonistic” (“In life, it is enough to have some friends and have fun”), “conformant” (“In life, it is the best to adapt and to do what others are doing”), less career-driven (“It is necessary to focus on a career, everything else is less important”) and less goal-oriented (“It is necessary to know what one wants to achieve in life). Interestingly, there is one particular attitude type —risk-taking— where mean analysis reveals no statistical significance (although it was close: Sig.= 0.06). In other words, while there are important differences in attitudes on surroundings, the question remains as to whether and how much they contribute to leaving the parental home. The following section, including Table 6, attempts to explain these attitudes.

The results above show that a preference to live (or plan to live) with parents is significantly associated with different attitudes to risk, hedonism, reclusivism, apathy, and conformity. Thus, it is possible to argue that differences in the selected attitudes matter (to some extent) and that such differences between Slovenian and German youth do play a role in decisions to leave home.

6.4 Why girls move out sooner?

As indicated by this study and others (Lavrič, et al., 2011), the percentage of young men who live full-time in their parental home is higher than the percentage of women regardless of age group. For example, one study in 2010 (Lavrič et al., 2011) found that while nearly 40 percent of women (aged 25-29) do not live with their parents, this is true only for 19 percent of men in the same age group. Similar discrepancies can be seen in this study (see Figure 15).

Mulder (2009) hypothesizes that the difference between men and women is a matter of maturity, i.e., moving away from home requires a certain level of maturity, and women move away sooner because they tend to mature earlier than men. One question here is whether women are simply able to leave home sooner because of help they receive from an (older) partner, or whether they want to live alone as suggested by Mulder (2009; see also Hooimeijer and Mulder, 1998). For young Slovenian women, the latter explanation seems unlikely given that among all women who do not live at home (aged 24-27) only 13 percent live alone. For men, the share is much higher (30 percent). This is also discernible from figures concerning the whole population of women (aged 24-27): around 5 percent live alone (men, 8 percent) and around 31 percent live with their partner (men, 16 percent). Therefore, one can conclude that women probably do not leave the parental homes sooner than men only because they mature earlier or want to live alone. Rather, they on average form partnership relationships with slightly older men who are “willing/able to support them and
with whom they live in their own (rented or owned) residence or their parents’ residence” (Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011, 368).

Figure 15: Persons with whom Slovenian youth (16-25) is living, by age and gender

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian Youth Study 2013.

In sum, there is a complex interplay of various factors relevant to understanding why youth stay or leave home. As a means of obtaining a clearer picture, further comparable cross-cultural research should be undertaken.

7 Key findings

- In terms of poverty, young Slovenians are in a relatively good position compared to their European peers. However, this favorable position, which is not objectively detected by youth, cannot be attributed to the heavily segmented labor market. Instead, it is a function of both an informal support network, which allows young adults to extend their time in the parental home, and the relatively successful functioning of the social protection system.

- Eurostat data and the results from this study indicate that disposable income of young Slovenians is noticeably lower than the EU-15 average, and that this gap, which had been closing until 2009, is once again expanding. In other words, if the disposable income of young people (aged 16-24) was growing in real terms (and, after compensating for price differences, even approaching that of young people in economically more advanced EU countries), the trend has since reversed (figures from 2009-2010).
Analysis of the estimated total monthly disposable income of young people (aged 16-25) in Slovenia reveals a significantly lower figure than is depicted by Eurostat data. Moreover, these figures have been stagnant (in real terms) over the previous 13 years. This is perhaps a consequence of the reduction in the number of young people with steady employment (who are on average higher earners), and an increase in the proportion of contract workers (whose incomes are falling because of increased numbers). Further, detailed analysis indicates that after 2010, the situation has deteriorated for all occupational groups except for the economically weakest group (composed of those with no steady employment or the unemployed).

Official Eurostat data and the current study indicate that economic inequality in Slovenia is on the rise.

Results from a mean analysis indicate that Slovenian youth (aged 16-25) are significantly ($p<0.001$) more pessimistic about the future economic situation of their country when compared to their peers in Croatia and Kosovo (although in both these countries, the youth are socially and economically worse off). Almost 44 percent of Slovenian youth expect that the economic situation in Slovenia over the next ten years will be much or somewhat worse than it is today (compared to Croatia (13 percent) and Kosovo (8%)). Consequently, a longitudinal analysis of subjective well-being indicates a negative trend.

Although young men earn more than young women irrespective of employment status, the differences continue to fall, putting Slovenia at the bottom of the gender pay gap among countries with the lowest gender pay gap.

Slovenian youth live in relatively small, materially well-equipped households (almost all households have a car, personal computer, access to the Internet, and a mobile phone, etc.). Moreover, parents tend to be better-educated. On the other hand, the results indicate that “the Mediterranean” pattern continues in terms of the share of youth that still live in the parental home (Slovians are far above the European average). Yet the results from this study indicate a break in the trend, i.e., that the share has begun to decrease. This finding is supported by Eurostat data, which indicate that Slovenia fell from second to fifth place in the EU-27.

8 References


1 Employment

The transition of young people from education to employment is among the most active areas of youth studies (Furlong, 2013, 73). Over the preceding decades, this particular area of studies has become complex given that the transition to employment is taking longer and appears less certain. Some authors even cast doubt on the term “transition”, since for an increasing portion of the population, stable employment seems simply unattainable.

Like most European countries, Slovenia has undergone radical changes in the labor market, particularly over the last decade. On the one hand, unemployment rates are considerably high and continue to rise. On the other hand, traditional forms of permanent employment have increasingly been replaced by less secure and more flexible forms of employment. Such changes tend to be more pronounced when it concerns young people. Some authors even speak about the “age-segregation of the labor market” (Ignjatović and Trbanc, 2009), a reference to the disproportionally high levels of unemployment and temporary employment among young people.

1.1 Youth unemployment is high and rising

As evident in Figure 16, between 2007 and 2012 the youth unemployment rate has increased dramatically, both in Slovenia and in the EU. For the most part, it is a direct consequence of the broader European economic crisis.

Another important finding in this period is that Slovenian youth have lost their favorable position among the EU-27. In fact, according to the latest data (June 2013), the youth unemployment rate in Slovenia was 24.1 percent (European Union Youth Unemployment Rate Chart, n.d.), whereas the EU-27 average was 23.2 percent (Slovenia Youth Unemployment Rate Chart, n.d.). This is likely a direct consequence of the recent severe macroeconomic problems that have swept through Slovenia as similar trends can be seen in adult unemployment rates.

A third finding evident in Figure 16 is the growing difference in the unemployment rate between young people and the rest of the economically active population. In 2007, the difference between the two groups was 5.9 percentage points; by 2012, this had risen to 12.7. A similar trend can be observed in the EU-27, whereby one can conclude that the age gap regarding unemployment has increased during the past ten years. This falls in line with the findings of other youth unemployment studies, which argue that this group is much more sensitive to economic fluctuations, i.e.,
in times of recession, youth unemployment rates rise with greater velocity, while in periods of recovery, these same rates fall dramatically (Makeham, 1980; O’Higgins, 2001).

**Figure 16: Unemployment rate of the age group 15-25 years and 25-74 years, EU-27 and Slovenia, 2003-2012**


It should be noted that the age gap in the labor market tends to persist regardless of the general macroeconomic conditions. Already in the early 1980s, this systematic pattern began to appear in western societies following the recession in the United States and Western Europe (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007, 36-37). In general, Furlong (2013, 77) identifies two basic reasons for the higher unemployment rates among young people. First, young people are typically transitioning out of school and seeking employment; thus, when macroeconomic conditions experience a downturn, employers cease to recruit. Second, young people are more likely to find temporary employment, which makes them more susceptible to layoffs in times of crises.

For Slovenia in particular, it should be stressed that the observed age gap parallels the long-term pattern of developed countries, where the unemployment rate of young people is on average two to three times higher compared to the adult unemployment rate. Scarpetta, Sonnet and Manfredi (2010) show that in 2008 the youth unemployment in OECD countries was on average 2.8 times higher than adult unemployment; by comparison, Slovenia’s youth unemployment rate was 2.6 times higher in 2012.
1.2 The subjectively perceived unemployment is even higher

The Labor Force Survey, on which the above analyzed data are based, defines an unemployed person as someone who, in the week prior to the survey, did not work one paid hour (in money or in kind), but who in the past four weeks was actively seeking work and is willing to take work within two weeks. Unemployed persons also include those that have already found work and will begin that work after the survey (EU labor force survey – methodology, n.d.).

This study’s survey data enable an examination of the youth unemployment rate from the perception of the individual. In line with more established approaches, this report considers only the economically active population, i.e., the employed, self-employed (including farmers), and unemployed, where unemployed persons are considered those who perceive themselves to be unemployed.

Figure 17: Employment and unemployment of economically active young people (16–27 years),

When measured this way, the unemployment rate indicates similar trends to those observed by Eurostat: the youth unemployment rate in Slovenia has increased considerably over the past 13 years. On the other hand, this subjective approach tends to reveal considerably higher unemployment rates. If the data set examines only the 16–24 age group, which is most comparable with the Eurostat data (15-24), the differences are even greater. According to the methodological approach of self-perceived unemployment, 36.1 percent of young people were unemployed, compared to only 24.1 percent reported by Eurostat (Slovenia Youth Unemployment Rate Chart, n.d.).

In all likelihood, this large difference can be explained by differences in perceptions, whereby many young people actually perform some kind of occasional work, but do not consider it a real job and therefore consider themselves unemployed. As described above, these young people do not fit the definition of an unemployed person according to the Labor Force Survey (LFS) standards. In addition, there is the potential that unemployed young people might be among those who have discontinued their active search for employment. Both groups are likely to consider themselves...
as unemployed, while the LFS standards consider them as either employed or economically inactive. Of course, such indicators are well-known by the research community. Andy Furlong, one of the leading authors in the field of youth studies, argues that “unemployment is a term with an internationally agreed definition that is applied in ways that exclude large numbers of workless people” (2013, 74).

Using a subjective approach, this report observes further the presence of unemployment among different groups of young people.

*Figure 18: Youth unemployment rates based on self-perception of the young, by major socio-demographic groups*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-27</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-23</td>
<td></td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Tertiary level</th>
<th>Secondary level</th>
<th>Elementary school or less</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of residential settlement</th>
<th>Ljubljana</th>
<th>Maribor</th>
<th>10.001 and more inhabitants</th>
<th>2.001 to 10.000 inhabitants</th>
<th>up to 2.000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

The sizable gender gap with regards to youth unemployment has increased substantially since 2000, when there were virtually no differences between young men and women. In 2010, the unemployment rate for women was 12 percentage points higher that it was for men (Klanjšek and Lavrič, 2011, 153); this difference remained approximately the same in 2013.

Not surprisingly, sharp differences can be observed according to age. Once again, younger age groups are more likely to be unemployed. This is at least partially connected to the fact that older age groups have attained higher levels of education. Indeed, the differences in unemployment are the most salient when factoring in achieved educational levels; 50 percent of the unemployed have received only a primary level of education, while 13 percent have attained a tertiary level degree. Similar patterns were observed in a recent youth study in Croatia (Ilišin et al., 2012, 11).
The only (and somewhat surprising) exception between these two studies is that young Croatians who have attained only a primary level of education have a relatively lower unemployment rate.

Some of the more interesting differences appear when looking at community sizes. Not surprisingly, Slovenia’s capital Ljubljana has the lowest youth unemployment rate, while as many as one-third of the young population in middle-sized towns (from 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants) consider themselves unemployed.

1.3 Has the safe haven of formal education reached its limits?

Some scholars argue that rising youth unemployment rates can be attributed to falling school enrollment rates. As Furlong (2013, 78) notes, the youth unemployment rate in some European countries did not increase sharply (primarily) because increased educational participation had removed a sizable segment of the population from the labor market. According to data presented in the Youth 2010 study, Slovenia had the highest school enrollment rate in the EU (in 2008) and at the same time a comparatively low youth unemployment rate (Klanjšek and Lavrič, 2011). Further, Metka Kuhar, one of the leading youth researchers in Slovenia, also noted that the country’s inclusive education system “serves mainly as a kind of incubator which enables people to delay their entry onto the labor market” (2009, 29).

Figure 19: Predominant activities, including schooling, of young people (aged 16–27)

Figure 19 illustrates the relationship between rising school enrollment rates and the falling share of economically active youth. While these figures were largely stable between 2000 and 2010, they have seemingly reversed over the last three years. Thus, the stability of the education enrollment rate appears to be among the most important factors affecting the unemployment rate, i.e., the high education enrollment rate in Slovenia over the past decade likely prevented the youth unemployment rate from increasing even more.

Support for this conclusion can be drawn from the 2012 study comparing Croatian and Slovenian youth, which revealed similar results.
Figure 20: Predominant activities, including schooling, of young people (16–27 years), Slovenia (2013) and Croatia (2012)

What do you do at the moment? Are you:

- Slovenia
- Croatia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employed</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time employed</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil/student</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In order to make a comparison more clear, the category “other” was excluded from both samples. Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study and IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study.

Figure 20 shows the large number of young Slovenians enrolled in the formal education system. At least partially, these results show higher shares of employed youth in Croatia (31 percent opposed to 24 percent in Slovenia); overall, however, this difference translates into much higher unemployment rates among Croatian youth.

Thus, the argument that high education enrollment levels act as a buffer against unemployment is quite convincing. However, a hasty glance at the data suggests that this macro-economic buffer has reached its limits in Slovenia. This is the result of (at least) two factors: the high cost of financing high numbers of students by the state, and the increased saturation of the labor market by tertiary degree graduates (Lavrič, 2011).

1.4 The increasing gender gap in transition from school to work

Lower rates of participation among women are one of the common patterns found in youth employment. According to a special report by the International Labor Organization (n.d.), men made up 54 percent of the labor force in developed economies in 2005, compared to 49.6 percent for women. The difference was even larger if one considers the world as a whole (63 percent vs. 46 percent, respectively).

A similar pattern can be observed in Slovenia if one combines the different basic activities into three main groups (as seen in Figure 21).16 Further, the presented data clearly show a longitudinal

---

16 It should be noted that official statistics considers students performing student work as employed persons, whereas in our analysis we regard them rather as students, since this is (in most cases) in fact their primary activity. Consequently, the presented data are not directly comparable with official rates of labour force participation.
trend with regard to the increasing gender gap in the labor force. In 2000 the labor force participation of men (51 percent) almost equaled that of women (50 percent); however, the difference had sharply increased by 2013, when labor force participation was substantially greater among men (38 percent) than among women (26 percent). This most likely stems from the fact that more women are regularly (and increasingly) enrolled in the formal education system.

Figure 21: Three basic social activities of young people (16-27), by gender

As noted above, the higher rates of school enrollment might be seen as a form of retreat from the saturated labor market. Following this logic, one can equate the continuously rising female school enrollment rates to the fact that they find it more difficult to find a job than men do. Indeed, Figure 22 shows the frequency distributions of different groups of economically active young people, which illustrates that the pattern of deteriorating conditions on the labor market is more pronounced for women.

During the observed 13-year period, the subjective unemployment rate has increased by 11 percentage points for men and by 17 percentage points for women. Even more important, the share of full-time employed women has fallen much more sharply (from 78 to 55 percent) than it has for men (from 80 to 70 percent). As such, the data confirms the increasing gender gap in the labor market. Further, as shown in the next section, women are also much more likely to be employed in less stable sectors.
1.5 Youth as the flexible workforce

1.5.1 Flexible forms of employment

As discernible from the previous two figures, the share of young people in part-time employment has gradually risen since 2000. More precisely, the share of part-time employment has increased from 3 to 6 percent.

Perhaps an even more important dimension of the increasing workforce flexibility is the growing share of fixed-term jobs (i.e., contracts typically lasting three-months to one-year).

Sources: *Youth 2000, Youth 2010 and CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.*
As shown in Figure 23, the share of fixed-term jobs increased substantially between 2000 and 2010, but has curiously declined over the past three years (though these fluctuations are rather small).

Further, student labor, particularly in Slovenia, represents the most common form of flexible youth employment. The Labor Force survey considers young people performing student work as employed persons. According to the data in this report, young people devote a substantial amount of time to their student work. On average, student work amounts to 26.3 hours per week, which is more than half of the average number of working hours per week (41.5) for formally employed youth. The importance of student work becomes even more apparent when comparing the total number of working hours per week for each of the relevant groups.

Table 7: Youth (16-27) by type of employment and by working hours per week

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Employment</th>
<th>Average Number of Working Hours</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Sum of Working Hours</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents</th>
<th>Percent of Working Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employment</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>4585</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time employment</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3017</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student labor</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>8232</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed*</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>16209</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Including farmers.

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Based on the above calculation, it can be assumed that student work is by far the most important form of youth participation in the labor market. Almost 60 percent of young people who work use this form of employment, making up more than half of all the (taxed) work done by youth in Slovenia.

Previous studies on Slovenia have noted the relative and increasing importance of student work. Most recently, Klanjšek and Lavrič (2011, 161) argued that student labor played an increasingly important role in the lives of young people in Slovenia between 2000 and 2010. For the purpose of this study, the current situation is compared against the Eurostudent SI 2007 survey, which showed that student work was performed by 65 percent of Slovenian students at the tertiary level (Eurostudent, 2007). According to this project’s data, the current number is about 63 percent, which indicates that, along with enrollment in education, the student labor pool has reached its peak and begun to gradually decline. One of the many reasons for this decline can be linked to the increased taxation of student labor, which began in June 2012 as part of the national austerity measures. In broad terms, there is reduced demand for any kind of work given the current economic forecast.

Nevertheless, student work remains by far the most important form of youth employment. Together with the other two types (part-time and self-employment), flexible forms of employment represent 82 percent of the officially recognized work done by young people. In other words, only
28 percent of the total working hours by Slovenian youth fall within the category of regular full-time employment.

As previously mentioned, there is a pronounced gender gap with regard to flexible forms of employment.

*Figure 24: Young men and women (16-27) by type of employment, including student work*

While only one in four young working women hold a full-time regular job, nearly half of these positions are held by young working men (46 percent). The primary reason for this difference can be traced to the larger share of women enrolled in the education system (70 percent, compared to 49 percent of men).

1.5.2 Taking a job outside the area of one’s education

Another dimension of workforce flexibility results from the level of preparedness and ability to work in different kinds of jobs.

According to Figure 25, Slovenian youth generally appear to be flexible labor force participants, especially if those performing student work are factored in. *Only 25 percent of employed young people work within their profession.* However, even if student workers are excluded, it appears that the majority perform jobs that they have not been formally educated to do.

Here, the gender gap is most pronounced. Whereas one-third of working men are employed within the profession for which they were (or are being) educated, the same is true for only 16 percent of women. Once again, much of this difference can be traced to the fact that women are more involved in student work. Yet even if student work is excluded from the data, the ratio remains relatively high (50 to 37 percent in favor of men).
The horizontal skills mismatch is somewhat less for those who have attained a tertiary level of education. If student work is included, 44 percent of this group works in their field.

Figure 25: Horizontal skills mismatch among Slovenian Youth

Among all levels of graduates in Slovenia, flexibility can be observed in terms of preparedness, i.e., taking on a job that does not require tertiary education. In Slovenia, approximately 35 percent of graduates perform jobs for which they are overeducated to do. Overall, 42 percent of young graduates work within the profession for which they have studied, and at the same time perform a job that requires their level of education or higher. On the other extreme, 21 percent of graduates work in jobs outside their profession and without requirements for their achieved level of education.

Once again, it should be noted that the education-employment match is much better if the data excludes graduates performing student work. In this case, 58 percent of employed graduates work within their profession, among which 27 percent are considered overeducated for the jobs they are performing.

In sum, if student work is included in the analysis, the majority of employed young people in Slovenia, including graduates, work outside the professional boundaries of their education, which points to a relatively high degree of workforce flexibility.

1.5.3 What would young people do to get a job?

Another way to approach the flexibility of the youth workforce is to measure the respondents’ declared standpoints and intentions. Figure 26 presents the frequency distributions for several such items. Where possible, this study compares data measured within the Youth 2010 study.
The overwhelming majority of young people (88 percent) declare that they are prepared to learn new skills and acquire new knowledge, whereas 84 percent declared the same in the 2010 study. The majority of young people would also be prepared to take on temporary jobs (78 percent) and to drive further to their place of employment (79 percent). While the distribution of these two items has not changed since 2010, young people today express greater levels of preparedness to take lower positioned jobs with lower pay (47 percent in 2013, compared to 35 percent in 2010).

In order to validate statistically the above comparison, the data have been combined into one variable for each of the four items noted above. The average value of this variable amounted to 3.70 in the 2010 sample, compared to 3.83 in 2013. The results of the T-test confirm that the differences between the two samples are statistically significant (p<0.01). Thus, it can be concluded that the declared willingness of young people to undertake different actions in order to reduce the risk of unemployment has increased in the period 2010 to 2013. It should be added that the Youth 2010 study revealed that this preparedness had been increasing at least from 2005 (Klanjšek and Lavrič, 2011, 159).

17 Cronbach alphas amounted to 0.674 in the 2010 sample and to 0.671 in 2013 sample. The combined variable was computed by averaging the values of the four items for each statistical unit.
As can be seen in Figure 26, three other items\(^{18}\) have been used to measure the preparedness to travel to further away employment venues. Not surprisingly, in these cases the preparedness is much lower. The data, however, strongly correlates with the preparedness expressed within the previous four items, which enabled a more robust 7-item cumulative measure (Cronbach alpha = 0.64). Based on this measure, the data is able to dissect the strongest and most interesting correlates of the preparedness to accept different costs in order to travel to a place of employment.

The strongest significant correlations were found between this measure and age (rho = 0.12; p < 0.01), the frequency of reading books and newspapers (rho = 0.11; p < 0.01), and the respondents’ level of education (rho = 0.08; p < 0.05). The observed preparedness tends to be higher among well-informed youth. As such, it is reasonable to assume that older and more educated young people who read more books and newspapers tend to be better informed.

It should be noted that women tend to be more willing (t(563) = 2.77, p < 0.01) to take different kinds of action in order to reduce the risk of unemployment. Although the difference is rather small, it nonetheless fits well into the general pattern of women demonstrating higher flexibility within the labor market.

1.6 Expectations regarding the employment confirm high levels of flexibility

The growing uncertainty on the labor market can be seen in young people’s expectations regarding their future employment. As Figure 27 illustrates, *approximately one-third of young Slovenians enrolled in the formal education system do not believe that they will be able to find a job soon after graduation*; less than one-fifth believe they will.

Comparing the results of the Slovenian sample to similar studies conducted in Croatia and Kosovo (2012) an interesting pattern can be observed. According to the data, Kosovo youth are the most optimistic; only 23 percent of the respondents did not believe they would find a job soon after graduation.\(^{19}\) Interestingly, Kosovo has by far the highest youth unemployment rate (60.1 percent as of June 2012, as reported by the Kosovo Agency of Statistics, n.d.) among the observed countries. Croatia follows with 39.6 percent (Croatia Youth Unemployment rate Chart, n.d.). Still, Croatian youth are substantially more optimistic than their Slovenian counterparts, where youth unemployment is far lower (19.1 percent in June 2012) (Slovenia Youth Unemployment rate Chart, n.d.). Thus, a paradox emerges, whereby the graver the labor market situation, the more youth tend to be optimistic about future employment.

Here there are at least three possible explanations. First, young people in different countries are perhaps poorly informed about the realities of the current labor market conditions. As such, Slovenian youth perhaps have the clearest understanding. A second complementary explanation might be that personal optimism is a kind of psychological shield to the high levels of uncertainty. Thus, the worst the situation gets, the more individuals might convince themselves that they will

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18 Those items were: “Work that includes breaking the law i.e. avoiding taxes”, “Life-threatening work”, and “Work that demands giving up moral standards”.

19 Interestingly, the authors of the Kosovo study (Pasha et al., 2012, 42) interpret these numbers as an indicator of students in Kosovo being cautious about their future employment chances.
(eventually) gain employment. Finally, there might be substantial differences in defining what really constitutes a job. For example, Slovenian youth might be more demanding than youth in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the parameters of this study limit testing of these and other possible hypotheses.

Figure 27: Expectations regarding the ability to find a job soon after graduation

Do you believe that you will be able to find a job soon after graduation?

- Yes, I believe I will be able to find a job soon after graduation
- Yes, I believe I will be able to find a job after some time
- I don’t know / I hope
- No, I do not believe that I will be able to find a job soon after graduation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes, some time</th>
<th>I don’t know / I hope</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When considering future employment, 45 percent of young people in Slovenia prefer employment in the private sector. This is a huge increase compared to data compiled in 2005, when only 26 percent showed a preference for the private sector. For comparative purposes, this figure was 34 percent in 2010 (Klanjšek and Lavrič, 2011, 166). In this dimension, young people in Slovenia also differ significantly from their counterparts in Kosovo (28 percent) and Croatia (32 percent). In both countries, young people still heavily favor employment in the public administration.

As can be expected, substantial gender differences can be noted: young women tend to favor employment in public administration (37 percent, compared to 29 percent for men).

Among Slovenian youth, connections and friends represent by far the most important factor in finding a job. Almost half (46 percent) ranked this as the number one factor in finding a job; by comparison, 33 percent of Croatians, and 37 percent of Kosovars agreed. Further, Slovenian youth place a relatively low importance on professional skills. Only 11 percent ranked this factor as the most important in finding a job, while this share was 26 percent in Croatia and 23 percent in Kosovo.

Connections and friends seem more important to younger respondents (rho = -0.11; p < 0.01), while professional skills are acknowledged more among older respondents (rho = -0.13; p < 0.01), as well as those with higher levels of income (rho = 0.09; p < 0.01) and education (rho = 0.07; p <
Interestingly, political connections are substantially more highlighted among respondents living in rural areas (\( \rho = -0.14; p < 0.01 \)).

**Figure 28: The preferred sectors for employment**

In which of the following sectors would you like to be employed?

- Public administration
- Private sector
- International institutions
- NGO
- Other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International institutions</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

**Figure 29: Perceived most important factors in finding a job**

Which of the following factors matter most in finding a job?

- Connections/Friends
- Educational level
- Professional skills
- Luck
- Political connections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connections/Friends</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luck</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political connections</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

With regard to accepting or declining a job, salary is seen as the most important factor; almost half of all the respondents ranked it first.

Only 15 percent of respondents ranked job security first, compared to 30 percent in Kosovo and 32 percent in Croatia. The relatively low emphasis on job security is another indicator of the relatively high flexibility seen amongst young Slovenians. Curiously, job security is more important to younger (\( \rho = -0.07; p < 0.05 \)) and less educated (\( \rho = -0.10; p < 0.01 \)) respondents. As noted
above, these two groups are the most vulnerable to the risk of unemployment. On these grounds, it is possible to hypothesize that the lower unemployment rates of older and more educated respondents is partially a consequence of their higher flexibility in seeking and accepting a job.

**Figure 30:** Most important factors with regards to accepting or declining a job

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which of the following factors matter most in accepting a job?</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job satisfaction</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with people you like</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.*

### 2 Mobility

Within current social sensibilities, the mobility of people is usually understood as having predominantly positive effects on the well-being of individuals and society as a whole. Mobility enables an individual to acquire the knowledge and skills currently demanded by the global labor market, i.e., knowledge of foreign languages, open-mindedness, tolerance, preparedness for intercultural dialogue, and the capacity for cross-border cooperation (Klanjšek, 2011, 401). Mobility seems to be especially important for young people, as it contributes to easier integration into the international labor market. Studies have also shown that student mobility is related to higher-paying jobs and expanded opportunity in terms of employment.

On the other hand, many point to the undesirable effects of youth mobility, including the so-called “brain drain”. A good example of this can be seen by recent developments in southeastern Europe, where great numbers of talented and highly educated young people have moved to more prosperous regions as a means of securing better-paid careers. However, the outflow of young people can lead to social degradation, with children or parents left behind. Moreover, this is troubling for the economies of regions experiencing an exodus of skilled workers, especially for sectors depending on high-skilled labor like health or research (Rossi, 2013; Brusselmans, 2009).

Debates on the pros and cons of youth mobility have recently entered into Slovenian public discourse, especially as the number of young Slovene emigrants has increased over the last several years to record levels (SORS, 2013).
2.1 Young people feel little need to move within Slovenian borders

In terms of national mobility, the data show that about one-quarter of young people in Slovenia express the willingness to migrate somewhere else in the country, with minor differences seen across major groups.

Figure 31: Willingness to migrate somewhere else in Slovenia, by gender and educational attainment

![Chart showing willingness to move](chart-image)

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

The only statistically significant predictor of the willingness to move within national borders seems to be gender (C = 0.124; p < 0.01), with females expressing somewhat higher willingness levels. In addition, a systematic, although not statistically significant, impact corresponds to the education level attained by the respondent. Although differences between groups may appear marginal at first, the differences in the proportion of those not willing to move are quite noticeable.

The willingness amongst young Slovenians to move compares broadly to data obtained in Croatia and Kosovo. However, a closer look at the motives for internal migration reveals some interesting differences.

Among the motives for relocation, young Slovenians rank improving living standards first (39 percent), which is followed by better employment chances (22 percent). Both motives are less common in Croatia and Kosovo. The same national comparisons can be seen within the category on opportunities in starting a business. Thus, compared to Croatia and Kosovo, as well as the international mobility data, (see the following subchapter), the economic pressures for intra-national migration among youth in Slovenia appear to be relatively low. Since macroeconomic conditions have worsened, one would expect the above reasons to fall in the opposite direction. However, at least two possible explanations should be considered.
First, this can be attributed to Slovenia’s small size and good traffic infrastructure. Second, this could relate to the relatively high dependence of young people on their families of origin (Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011, 368-384). Similarly, one could argue that this corresponds with the motive to earn a better education (although this was not ranked highly), where a widely developed network of universities and colleges undoubtedly plays an important role.

2.2 International mobility: Austria, Germany and the US are prevailing targets

The willingness to move out of Slovenia seems to be somewhat higher when compared to the data concerning international migration. **About one-third of young Slovenians are at least somewhat willing to emigrate from their country.**

In this regard, young people in Slovenia are slightly more mobile compared to young Croatians, but far less when compared to Kosovar youth. The difference between Slovenian and Croatian youth can be at least partly explained by the closeness of Slovenia to Austria as a viable target for young jobseekers (Figure 34).

The willingness to emigrate from Slovenia is substantially more present among young people from larger (and more urban) residential communities (\( \rho = 0.148; p < 0.01 \)), and among those whose parents have achieved higher levels of education (\( \rho = 0.128; p < 0.01 \) (for mother) and \( \rho = 0.104; p < 0.01 \) (for father)).

**Figure 34: Preferred target countries of immigration among those expressing willingness to emigrate**

When compared to Croatia and Kosovo, **Slovenia has a high share of young people that prefer Austria as a possible destination.** The obvious reason is that Austria not only neighbors Slovenia, but also is, at least relatively speaking, economically stable. This is strongly supported by the fact...
that Austria is disproportionally popular among young people from northern regions neighboring Austria (Gorenjska, Koroška, Štajerska and Pomurska).

Figure 35: Preferred target countries for immigration, by region

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

While youth from northern regions prefer Austria (31 percent; compared to only 10 percent of all others), young people from other regions prefer Germany (15 percent, compared to only 5 percent of northern Slovenian youth). The only other country that can match the region’s two strongest economies is the United States (17 percent). However, it should be noted that intentions to relocate to the US rapidly decline as the age of the respondent increases. While 27 percent of those aged 16-19 would choose this option, only 15 percent of those aged 24-27 would do the same. On the other hand, the inclination towards Austria increases substantially with age. While Austria is the first choice (15 percent) amongst 16-19 year olds, it is by far the most desired for those aged 24-27 (23 percent).

The preferred countries of immigration appear to be a good reflection of the reasons respondents gave for possible migration.

Young people wish to emigrate from Slovenia mainly for economic reasons (77 percent). This is particularly true for males aged 24-27 (86 percent).

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20 In the category of economic reasons we combined search for (1) a better living standard, (2) employment opportunities and (3) opportunities for starting one’s own business.
Figure 36: Main reasons for wishing to emigrate from Slovenia among those expressing willingness to emigrate

3 Key findings

3.1 Employment

- Since 2007, the youth unemployment rate has risen dramatically, and Slovenian youth have lost their favorable position within the EU-27.
- High rates of enrollment in education during the past decade have prevented the youth unemployment rate from increasing even more.
- Both the age and gender gap amongst the unemployment have substantially increased during the past ten years.
- Whereas in 2000 labor force participation of men almost equaled that of women, the difference has sharply increased by 2013.
According to the methodological approach of self-perceived unemployment, 36.1 percent of young people were unemployed as of June 2013, compared to only 24.1 percent as reported by Eurostat.

The inter-group differences in unemployment rates are the sharpest in terms of achieved educational level, e.g., 50 percent of the unemployed have attained a primary level education; and an additional 13 percent have received a tertiary level degree.

Student work is by far the most important form of youth participation in the labor market, representing more than half of all the (taxed) working hours done by youth in Slovenia.

While only one in four working young women holds a full-time regular job, nearly half of young working men do so. The major reason for this difference can be attributed to the larger share of women working as students.

The majority of employed young people in Slovenia work outside the professional boundaries of their education.

The declared willingness of young people to take various actions in order to reduce the risk of unemployment has been increasing since at least 2005.

The relative majority (45 percent) of young people in Slovenia prefer employment in the private sector. This is considerably high when compared to previous surveys conducted in Slovenia, Kosovo, and Croatia.

The relatively low emphasis on job security, particularly where it concerns accepting or declining a job, is one of the several indicators pointing to the high levels of flexibility amongst young people in the Slovenian labor market.

3.2 Mobility

The economic pressures for intra-national migrations of youth in Slovenia appear to be relatively low. Only one-quarter of Slovenian youth has the willingness to migrate somewhere else in Slovenia.

About one-third of young Slovenians declare their willingness to emigrate. The most preferred destinations are Austria (especially by youth from northern regions), the United States, and Germany.

Economic reasons for international mobility are on average substantially more important for males, older age groups, and urban youth.
Figure 37: The relative importance of economic reasons for emigration from Slovenia, by basic demographic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71,0%</td>
<td>84,5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>69,1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-23</td>
<td>77,4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-27</td>
<td>81,7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of residential settlement</th>
<th>Urban (more than 10.000)</th>
<th>Rural (up to 10.000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81,0%</td>
<td>76,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Figure 37 illustrates that economic reasons are on average substantially more important for males, older age groups, and urban youth, i.e. those living in residential communities with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

4 References


Lavrič, Miran et al. (2011). Youth 2010: Social profile of youth in Slovenia [data file]. Slovenia, Maribor: Univerza v Mariboru = University of Maribor, Filozofska fakulteta = Faculty of Arts [production], 2010. Slovenia, Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani = University of Ljubljana, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov = Social Science Data Archive [distribution].


1 Introduction

Education is constitutive of youth. Youth as a notion and as a social reality (in contrast to young people) appears alongside the development of secondary education, i.e., when tertiary education being more frequent and less of an exception. The Enlightenment, socialism, and more generally, the entire “progressive” ideological camp also favorably influenced the expansion of education. In short, one could have seen no limits to education being both positive and emancipatory. Later, market-oriented economists also applauded education as an “investment” in “human capital”. Finally, the European Union has set out to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, by—among other things—the expansion of tertiary education.

2 Basics: structural aspects in comparative perspective

Upon attaining independence, Slovenia expanded its upper secondary level education (making it practically universal), alongside tertiary level education. This was not an exception among countries in transition, or among established western democracies (Kwiek, 2013). Expansion was the result of both policy and objective factors, including cohort size. However, one might argue that the expansion of tertiary level education over this period resulted from the impossibility to offer employment to everyone who finished upper secondary school.

Figure 38 reveals that there has been a small decrease in the relative number of tertiary students in the last year observed, which may be attributed to the declining impact of university degree attainment on employment (Klanjšek and Lavrič, 2011). However, the more notable finding in this research concerns the relative number of tertiary students in Slovenia is well above the European Union average. In fact, Slovenia together with a handful of other post-communist countries was among the highest in the EU-27 with respect to tertiary education.

Unfortunately, this finding cannot be assessed favorably in light of the fact that recent graduates have found it particularly difficult to find employment, especially within the area of their expertise (see chapter on Employment). Further, given the constructs of the present economic situation, Wolfe (2002) convincingly argues that the association of educational and economic growth is in general a “myth”. In spite of the rise in the number of students and of tertiary graduates, Slovenia’s economy is performing poorly. When compared to the EU-27, Slovenia’s GDP has fallen each of the last five years consecutively. Gintis and Bowles (1975) offer an economic justification
for generalized higher education, whereby the expansion of education is useful in diminishing pressure upon the labor market, acting as a further safety valve in the social system.

*Figure 38: Tertiary students as a share of 20-24 age group, Slovenia and EU-27*

![Graph showing the ratio of tertiary students in Slovenia to EU-27 from 2002 to 2011.](image)

*Source: Eurostat*

This issue becomes particularly relevant when one considers the portion allotted to higher education operations and to student welfare (Figure 39).

As seen in Figure 39, the amount of funds Slovenia allots for education is proportionally well above the EU-27 average. However, in terms of higher education, Slovenia is only narrowly above the EU average.

The most important function within the higher education system remains underfinanced, largely because the majority of funds are directed towards student support, including but not limited to generous and expanding stipends. The latter comprise 22.8 percent of the total funds for higher education, in comparison to the EU-27 average of 10.42 percent (data for 2009, Eurostat). Thus,

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21 According to the 2007 Act on Claiming Rights from Public Resources all tertiary students in Slovenia are eligible for state scholarships if their family income in the previous year did not exceed 53 percent of the net national mean salary per family member in the same period (the conditions were lessened this year, which allowed for a larger pool of recipients). This solution has been maintained since austerity measures were introduced in 2012, enabling approximately one-fifth of all tertiary students to be beneficiaries (Smolej, Dremej and Boškič, 2013). There are other public scholarships available, e.g., the Zois scholarship for the gifted and hardworking. The entire number of scholarships does not exceed 30 percent of the total number of students; however, the number of recipients is rising (SURS, 2012). Special benefits are built into the support system for students studying outside their parental homes, as well as for the disabled, and children in single-parent families. In 2013, the average state scholarship, calculated on the basis of family economic status, including property, amounted to 230.50 EUR. Over the past years, the amount has risen significantly. However, costs of living have grown simultaneously.
Slovenia is ranked second in the EU in terms of the share of higher education funds directed towards student welfare (below only Denmark). Critics point out that this comes at the expense of investment into the actual education. Consequently, higher education’s core activity is (in relative terms) underfinanced by EU and OECD averages.

*Figure 39: Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, Slovenia 2001-2010*

The lack of investment into core education facilities reduces the overall qualities of the universities; only one Slovenian university made the 2012 QS list (QS WUR, 2013). Further, the 19.2 student to teach ratio is far behind the OECD average of 15.6 (OECD 2013, 375).

In terms of public discourse, the former Minister of Education, Science, and Culture Žiga Turk has been vocal in promoting the idea that too many students specialize in social sciences, while too few enter engineering and natural science programs (Ivelja, 2012). However, as depicted in Figure 40, Slovenia has long been ahead of the European average in this domain, and yet economic problems remain. *Compared to the EU-27, the share of Slovenian students in engineering and natural sciences has grown, while the share of students in social sciences has declined.* Thus, there appears to be no established link between producing higher numbers of “hard” scientists and expanding employment opportunities.

*Source: Eurostat.*
3 Preferences and experiences

How do young people experience education in Slovenia? Answers to these types of questions of course need context. By comparison, the youth in Slovenia discuss the idea of “friendliness,” particularly when compared to their counterparts in Croatia and Kosovo.

Slovenian education is predominantly public, although there are a growing number of private institutions that also receive public subsidies as their main source of financing. Today, 16.1 percent (SURS, 2012) study in private tertiary institutions.

Students at the secondary and tertiary levels were asked their preference of the type of institution and location of institution that they have attended, both in Slovenia and abroad. The results are presented in Figure 41.

It is interesting to consider that the number of Slovenian respondents that wish to study abroad is substantially larger than the number of existing Slovenian students currently studying abroad (in 2007, this share amounted to 2.1 percent (Komljenovič and Marjetič, 2010)). The motivation for studying abroad is on the rise, when compared to the data from 2005, when 12 percent of tertiary students opted in this direction (Flere et al., 2006). Such aspirations likely have to do both with education and with the potential of expanding the possibilities of employment. By comparison, the number of Croatian respondents indicating a desire to study in their home country is higher, in spite of the recent higher education corruption scandals. The number of Kosovo students seeking to study abroad requires special attention given that their certification and accreditation systems

Source: Eurostat.
are in the process of being developed. As such, the high rate of Slovenians seeking an education abroad appears to do with an authentic wish to attain a quality higher education.

Figure 41: Educational institutions by students’ choice in Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo

If you could choose, where would you prefer to get your education?

- In a public educational institution in home country
- In a private educational institution in home country
- In a public educational institution abroad
- In a private educational institution abroad
- Don’t know / No answer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know / No answer</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


How difficult is education? Respondents in each of the three countries indicate the difficulty and stressful nature of their educational experience. While the majority in each country stated that it was “hard and stressful,” practically none of the respondents in Croatia or Kosovo indicated that it was “very easy and completely stress free”. However, in Slovenia one in twelve students answered that their education was “easy and not particularly stressful.”

Despite the occasional public discourse on how the education system in Slovenia is too strict, unfriendly, and “inimical” towards students (Mencin Čeplak, 2002), the present findings confirm those by Flere and Tavčar Krajnc (2011). Education in Slovenia appears to be a friendly experience for students (their findings pertained to secondary education only, where 60 percent of respondents assessed the subjective experience to be predominantly favorable (Flere and Tavčar Krajnc, 2011, 107). Similar findings were recorded in 2000 (Flere and Tavčar Krajnc, 2011, 107).

Respondents in this study were also asked how much time they devote to their studies. Figure 43 presents these findings.

The data in Figure 43 illustrates clearly that Slovenian young people, regardless of their level of schooling, devote the least amount of time to their studies when compared to Croatia and Kosovo. Almost two-fifths of Slovenians study up to one hour per day, which is half the amount of time young people in Kosovo study. Croatians fall in between these two data sets.

Looking at the data more specifically, it is apparent that the amount of time Slovenians dedicate to their studies depends on the level of study. Slovenian upper secondary school students study on average 1.2 hours per day; in the higher education first cycle students study 1.7 hours...
per day, and in the second cycle 1.6 hours, which would seemingly enable them sufficient time to extracurricular activities.

*Figure 42: Perception of everyday life in school; Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo*

**In your opinion, what is everyday life in your school / university like?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very hard and stressful</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard and stressful to some extent</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard and stressful</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy and not particularly stressful</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very easy and completely stress free</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Only those respondents that are taking part in education, including part time students, are included.*

*Source: FES CEPYUS Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, FES 2012 Croatian Youth Study; FES 2012 Kosovo Youth Study.*

*Figure 43: Average daily number of hours of study in Slovenia, Kosovo and Croatia*

**On average, how many hours a day do you study?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1 hour</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 hours daily on average</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 hours daily on average</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 hours daily on average</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 4 hours daily</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / No answer</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: FES CEPYUS Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, FES 2012 Croatian Youth Study; FES 2012 Kosovo Youth Study.*

More generally, these figures suggest why student perceive their educational experience to be friendly and stress-free.
4 Key findings

- While per capita funding for elementary and secondary education in Slovenia is above the OECD average, financing for the core higher education system is below average.
- Secondary education in Slovenia is perceived to be relatively stress-free.
- Slovenia allots relatively little core funding to higher education, whereby a disproportionately high amount is channeled into student welfare, allowing for a diminution of funding for curricular education over the long-term (OECD, 2013, 169).
- Slovenian secondary and higher education is perceived to be “friendly” and not very demanding by students. Moreover, social benefits are extended to students and tuition is required only in exceptional cases. Further, students have sufficient free time to pursue extracurricular activities, or “casual” work.
- Systemic and structural policy changes are advisable, particularly those that encompass social and employment policy in relation to educational policy, and address the “babysitting” features of higher education, thereby returning higher education its immanent cognitive, intellectual, and applicative nature.

5 References


1 Introduction

In modern societies, leisure time preoccupies a large part of a person’s day. The UK 2000 Time Use Survey found that adults in Great Britain spent 22 percent of their lifetime pursuing leisure activities, with only sleep taking up more time (35 percent). Paid work and study occupy only 13 percent of one’s lifetime (Roberts, 2006, 11). Moreover, leisure is important because of its numerous functions. It can have a positive effect on the quality of life; it also has an important social dimension (i.e., it may bind people together), and it has economic and political implications (Roberts, 2006). Finally, leisure is considered especially important for younger generations, providing a frame within which youth identity is shaped and developed (Hendry et al., 2005; Roberts, 2006).

Leisure has traditionally been defined as a crossover of 1) free time (discretionary time), 2) activity and 3) attitude. Here, free time is defined as time left after other commitments and obligations (e.g., work, school, household and family requirements) have been met. Activities within leisure time may be diverse, yet traditionally they are recreational, entertaining, and/or sports related. Finally, attitude/state of mind as a component of leisure refers to psychological dispositions and expectations (freedom to choose activities, intrinsic motivation for doing them, enjoyment, relaxation, etc.) (Csikszentmihalyi, 1980, in Zuzanek, 2006, 186; also see Deem, 2001, 78–80; Russell, 2009). In sum, leisure can be viewed as an activity, attitude, dimension of time, or all three combined. More eloquently, leisure activities can be understood as “inherently pleasurable activities in which individuals indulge voluntarily in order to amuse themselves, to add to their knowledge or skill levels, or to enhance the life of the community, in the residual time left over after discharging personal, social, and professional duties” (Walmsley and Jenkins, 2005, 279).

Parents, media, and policymakers alike often promote particular ideas of what constitutes “productive” and “healthy” leisure (Furlong, 2013, 147). Specifically, organized (structured) activities are usually regarded as beneficial for youth development and for society as a whole. On the topic of “youth and leisure”, the concept of youth-at-risk is often given prominence, indicating that leisure not only plays an important role in young people’s lives, but as well facilitates both the political and moral implications of leisure research and practice (Caldwell, 2000, 2). Here there is a tremendous body of literature on the benefits of organized, structured activities (leisure, extracurricular, and others), particularly as it relates to different positive youth outcomes (for a short review see Kirbiš, 2011a; also see, Blomfield and Barber, 2010; Fletcher et al., 2003; Fredricks and Eccles, 2006; for long-term effects of different types of leisure and out-of-school activities see Lowe Vandell et al., 2007; Persson, et al., 2007; for positive effects of leisure-time physical activities in diverse populations see, for instance, Nettlefold, 2011; Ortega et al., 2013; Parekh et al., 2012; Park, 2007; Yang et al., 2010; but compare to Ruffin, 2012; Wagnsson et al., 2013). On the oth-
er hand, today’s youth allot a large portion of their leisure time to hanging out with friends, using electronic media, watching television, playing computer games, etc. (Furlong, 2013, 147; also see Kirbiš, 2011a; 2011b).

Questions remain as to whether these are “unproductive” leisure time activities, particularly given that empirical evidence corroborates that they are to a degree “unhealthy”. While structured activities were previously found to be associated with positive psychosocial development and vice versa, unstructured activities often produce negative outcomes and risk behaviors (Bohnert et al., 2009; Busseri and Rose-Krasnor, 2009; Caldwell and Smith, 2006; Denault and Poulin, 2009; McHale, et al., 2009; Osgood et al., 1996; Vazsonyi, 2002; Watts and Caldwell, 2008). However, “unproductive” leisure activities are not necessarily harmful to youth. For example, “hanging out” in public spaces may function “as ‘chilling out’ away from adult surveillance and of absenting themselves from the stresses of modern living” (Abbott-Chapman and Robertson, 2009); of course, very few groups who partake in these types of activities become “gangs”, or engage in anti-social activities.

The concept of lifestyle is often discussed and examined alongside leisure, in the sense that leisure is considered “one of the prime vehicles within which young people develop expressions of lifestyle” (Hendry et al., 2005, 21; also see Blaxter, 2005, 8). Indeed, different lifestyles can also be expressed through leisure activities in the sense that leisure represents a context where different forms of identity can be defined. This is particularly true for the period of youth, when important developmental tasks can be realized and independence from one’s guardians can be negotiated (Hendry et al., 2005, 2,22).

Similarly, Miles (2011, 17) notes that the construction of lifestyles is an interactive process that includes diverse aspects of life, such as fun and pleasure, which are for many young people often synonyms with leisure activities. In other words, lifestyle is an arena of society within which young people adapt and transform the society (Miles, 2011, 19). In this sense, Bellah discusses “lifestyle enclaves” (groups of people with common lifestyles) that “express their identity through shared patterns of appearance, consumption, and leisure activities” (Bellah et al., 1985, 355; cited in Miles, 2011, 24). Finally, youth (and people in general) are concerned with establishing a sense of who they are; in this context, a lifestyle can be understood as an “outward expression of an identity” (Miles, 2011, 26). In sum, leisure and lifestyle are often intrinsically linked and may be analyzed as two interrelated concepts. Here Furlong and Cartmel (2007) understand this as “leisure lifestyles”, indicating that the concepts have a high degree of overlap.

As lifestyle involves values, ideals, and moral and aesthetic judgments (Sulkunen, 2009, 4), this project uses Miles’ (2011, 16) broader definition of youth lifestyle, i.e., “young people’s active expression of a way of life”. In view of the discussion above, the main aim of this chapter is to analyze patterns of leisure and lifestyle of Slovenian youth.

Second, the project analyzes the socio-demographic determinants (life chances) of leisure activities and lifestyle of Slovenian youth, or what Miles (2011, 17) refers to as the structures that shape the lifestyles of young people. This is of particular interest as recent studies confirm that correspondence between social structure (e.g., class) and lifestyles has weakened in recent decades (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007).
Third, as Furlong (2013, 147) notes, youth lifestyles in western societies show great similarities. The aim here has been to examine the degree to which this assumption holds true for youth in post-communist countries, i.e., Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo. One of the key assumptions was that there would be greater similarities between youth in these societies, when compared to the leisure activities and lifestyle of German youth. On the other hand, Roberts (2006, 5) argues that “western” leisure is now becoming more widespread and that the collapse of communism has contributed to the globalization of western leisure, although the latter is far from universal. In this sense, studies of today’s youth (when compared to previous generations) reveal that values across regions are increasingly similar. For example, today’s youth have higher levels of tolerance toward groups seen as different; they are also more open to cultural diversity (Vala and Costa-Lopes, (2010). Moreover, young people’s lifestyles increasingly cut across class and national boundaries (Karvonen et al., 2012); thus, it can be assumed that there will not be a high degree of national variance when it concerns youth leisure and lifestyles patterns.

Finally, as Karvonen et al. (2012) suggest, the (broadly defined) media often present a “narcissistic and pleasure-oriented lifestyles” image of youth (also see Abbott-Chapman and Robertson, 2009, 243; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011a). Thus, this project (using survey data) attempts to confirm whether this image has merit (see also the chapter on youth anxieties and aspirations), although the available lifestyle indicators were far from all-inclusive.

2 Leisure activities

Past studies of Slovenian youth found leisure patterns similar to those mentioned above. Slovenian youth leisure activities most frequently involve hanging out with friends and partners, listening to music, using the computer/Internet, watching TV, and playing sports (for a review, see Kirbiš, 2011a; for patterns of media and information-communication technology use among Slovenian youth, see Kirbiš, 2011b; also see the chapter on media use in the present research report). The most recent representative study of Slovenian youth ranked the frequency of everyday activities in descending order: using the computer, socializing with friends/peers, socializing with partners, watching TV, and shopping. When asked specifically about leisure time activities, activities ranked in the following order: sports, visiting relatives, going to the cinema, theatre, and concerts, engagement with music, theatre, and arts, taking family trips, and involvement with humanitarian activities and others (Kirbiš, 2011a).

This study uses both behavioral indicators, (e.g., lifestyle defined as an integrated set of practices that give a material form to a particular identity; Giddens, 1991, 81; in Miles, 2011, 28) and dispositional/attitudinal indicators. Figure 44 shows the frequency of various youth leisure activities from most to least preferred among Slovenian youth, and indicates the percentage of youth who “frequently” do the listed activities. Listening to music is the most frequently experienced activity (84 percent of Slovenian youth), followed by socializing with friends. Watching TV and shopping. When asked specifically about leisure time activities, activities ranked in the following order: sports, visiting relatives, going to the cinema, theatre, and concerts, engagement with music, theatre, and arts, taking family trips, and involvement with humanitarian activities and others (Kirbiš, 2011a).

Nearly half of Slovenian youth frequently do sports and watch movies, while only one-fifth read newspapers/magazines in their free time. These findings corroborate earlier studies on Slovenian youth leisure time, where listening to music and socializing were also among the most frequent leisure activities (Kirbiš, 2011a).
A cross-national comparison of leisure activities shows similar leisure patterns. **Listening to music is the most preferred activity among youth from all three post-Yugoslav societies**, which could be explained by not only the popularity of the activity, but also by the fact that listening to music can be done in conjunction with other activities (hanging out with friends, playing sports, etc.). Slovenian youth socialize with their friends most frequently, while Kosovo youth socialize least frequently; nevertheless, over one-half of Kosovar youth frequently hang out with their friends. The largest cross-national differences relate to the amount of time spent watching television (Kosovar youth watch TV most frequently) and for reading magazines (again, Kosovar youth read more often than Slovenian and Croatian youth; among Kosovars almost one-half frequently read books and magazines in their leisure time).

In sum, youth from all three countries are rather similar with regard to leisure activities; Slovenian and Croatian youth often listen to music and socialize, while Kosovo youth seem to prefer more solitary activities (e.g., reading and watching TV). Of course, factors other than preferences can influence leisure time use; e.g., parental supervision, developed infrastructure, geographical density of infrastructure for certain leisure activities, etc.

Statistical analyses have also shown that there is some heterogeneity regarding leisure activities among Slovenian youth. **Older youth more frequently read newspapers and magazines** ($\rho = 0.14$, $n = 906$; $p < 0.001$), while **watching movies** ($\rho = -0.10$, $n = 901$; $p < 0.01$), **socializing with friends** ($\rho = -0.09$, $n = 904$; $p < 0.01$) **and listening to music** ($\rho = -0.07$, $n = 905$; $p < 0.05$) are more frequent among younger respondents.

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Note: The figure presents percentage of respondents “frequently” active in listed activities.

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study and IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study.
Gender has a significant impact on three types of leisure activities. Women more frequently listen to music ($\chi^2$ (2, n = 903) = 11.58, $p < 0.01$), and read books and magazines ($\chi^2$ (2, n = 905) = 51.19, $p < 0.001$), while men are more frequently engaged in sports activities ($\chi^2$ (2, n = 899) = 37.28, $p < 0.001$). With regard to the place of residence, there are only two statistically significant differences. Reading books/magazines ($\chi^2$ (8, n = 904) = 28.60, $p < 0.001$) and being active in sports ($\chi^2$ (8, n = 900) = 27.53, $p < 0.001$) are more frequent among young people from urban environments. More educated youth dedicate more time to reading books and magazines ($\rho = 0.17$, n = 906; $p < 0.001$), but spend less time socializing with friends ($\rho = -0.07$, n = 904; $p < 0.05$) and watching movies ($\rho = -0.12$, n = 901; $p < 0.001$). Finally, young people enrolled in school (middle school or tertiary education) on average spend more time socializing with their friends, partaking in sports, and listening to music; however, they watch television less frequently. These socio-demographic correlates also echo the Slovenian Youth 2010 study (Kirbiš, 2011a).

3 Lifestyle – What is “in”?

Turning to the notion of lifestyle, Figures 45 and 46 show preferences and behaviors concerning what Slovenian youth consider to be “in” (i.e., popular and/or trendy) from the most to the least popular (the large number of lifestyle items merited two charts). Once again, the Slovenian data is compared against the findings from Croatia, Kosovo, and Germany. While the indicator (what is “in” (trendy) in society) does not directly measure respondents’ own values and preferences, it nevertheless points toward the youth’s view of predominant/popular social norms and behaviors in Slovenian society.

Slovenian youth believe “having a career” (82 percent), “being independent” (81 percent), “having a college degree” (81 percent) and “looking good” (78 percent) are the trendiest lifestyle items (Figure 45). Interestingly, the first three items are considered problem areas in Slovenia over the past several years given the high levels of youth unemployment, prolonged periods of living with parents, and dependence on family (see Klanjšek and Lavrič, 2011; also see the chapter on employment). The fifth most trendy item, “taking responsibility”, is similar to the first three, and the fourth, “looking good” might be understood as a social indicator that one “has made it” in the social world (perhaps even the adult world). More generally, this could simply be linked to the notion of self-image presentation. Given the above, it is not surprising that youth see these outcomes as most “in”, particularly as they may be in “short supply” (as a result of the economic crisis). “Being loyal”, the next highest ranked lifestyle item, seems to be a part of a more traditional cultural orientation. This is followed by “eating healthy”. In total, more than half of Slovenian youth ranked these seven indicators as “in”.

A number of items fell below the 50 percent threshold, including “wearing designer’s clothes” (40 percent), “getting involved in civil society” (28 percent), “getting married” (26 percent) and “smoking marijuana” (21 percent). In line with previous studies, being active in politics is seen as “in” by only 10 percent of Slovenian youth (for a detailed analysis of youth views on politics, see the chapter on politics; also see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011a). It should be noted that these indicators
were all close-ended questions, which means that other, potentially important lifestyle areas were not provided for respondents to rate. For instance, there were no measures regarding family and social ties, socializing, and other attitudes and values that previously proved important among Slovenian youth (see Musil and Lavrič, 2011).

Figure 45: What is “in” among Slovenian, Croatian, Kosovo and German youth (16–25 years)

Note: Respondents were asked “Which from the listed items are in your opinion fashionable («in») and which are not fashionable («out»)?” on a three-point scale (1 = “in”, 2 = “not quite in” and 3 = “out”). The figure presents percentages of answers “in”.

Sources: CEpyus-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study and Shell 2010 German Youth Study.

In terms of international comparisons, Figures 45 and 46 indicate a host of similarities between youth from the four selected countries. Perhaps even more interesting, there are several key differences. For example, Germany has the smallest share of youth who rank “being independent” as trendy (60 percent). On the other hand, “looking good” and “wearing designer’s clothes” are ranked higher in Germany than they are in the other three countries. Croatian youth consider “being loyal” and “taking responsibilities” as the least trendy lifestyle items. “Eating healthy” and “getting married” are more popular in Kosovo, while “smoking marijuana” is seen as less trendy; all three items could be partly explained by Kosovo’s more traditional cultural-orientation (see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011b). Alongside “smoking marijuana”, “getting involved in politics” is on average considered the least trendy across the four countries.
Before calculating socio-demographic correlates of lifestyle among Slovenian youth, a principal component analysis was conducted as a means to examine the underlying structure of lifestyle indicators. Table 8 shows the results with four factors emerging. Activities regarded as the trendiest (see Figure 45) form Factor 1, which was named independence (it contains the items “being independent”, “taking responsibilities”, “having a career”, etc.). Factor 2 contains the lifestyle items “looking good”, “wearing designer’s clothes”, and “eating healthy”; this was named self-presentation. Factor 3 was named traditionalism (“getting married”, “not smoking marijuana”). Finally, the last factor, activism, contained two items regarding involvement in public life (“being active in politics” and “being active in civil society”). Four factor scores (regression method) were then analyzed for examining socio-demographic correlates.

Age only correlated with self-presentation ($\rho = -0.08, n = 798; p < 0.05$), which indicates that younger respondents see presentation items as more trendy in society. Gender, on the other hand, had a significant effect on three lifestyle factors; females scored higher on independence ($\rho = 0.14, n = 798; p < 0.001$), traditionalism ($\rho = 0.14, n = 798; p < 0.001$) and on self-presentation ($\rho = 0.08, n = 798; p < 0.05$).

More educated youth scored higher on “activism” ($\rho = 0.09, n = 798; p < 0.05$); youth with more educated mothers scored lower on “traditionalism” ($\rho = -0.12, n = 798; p < 0.001$); and

---

23 Factors are latent variables that underlie the scores in the twelve observed lifestyle variables.
youth with more educated fathers scored higher on “activism” (\( \rho = 0.13, n = 798; p < 0.001 \)). Lastly, young people enrolled in school scored higher on self-presentation and activism.

Table 8: Principal component analysis of lifestyle indicators performed on Slovenian youth sample (16–27 years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FACTOR 1 INDEPENDENCE</th>
<th>FACTOR 2 SELF-PRESENTATION</th>
<th>FACTOR 3 TRADITIONALISM</th>
<th>FACTOR 4 ACTIVISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being loyal</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking responsibilities</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being independent</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a college degree</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting involved in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting involved in civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing designer’s clothes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eating healthy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoking marijuana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Extraction method employed was Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method was Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

4 Consumption patterns – “Where does the money go?”

Lifestyle may also be understood as a material form of self-identity, and in late modern societies this is often constituted through the consumption of consumer goods, which in itself may be regarded as “the primary indicator of lifestyles” (Miles, 2011, 28-29). Consumer lifestyle is thus a prominent sphere of a person’s life in modern society and, as Miles (2002, 142) notes, young people “use consumption as a means of establishing lifestyles that make the world a manageable place”. Moreover, young people routinely face social and cultural changes in their daily lives and the “main way in which they deal with this is through the maintenance of consumer lifestyle” (Miles, 2002, 7).

The next part of this chapter examines consumer lifestyles (consumption patterns) of Slovenian youth by analyzing how they spend their money. Respondents were asked, “What is your average monthly expenditure for the following activities/products?” Figure 47 shows the data for Slovenian, Croatian,24 and Kosovar youth.25

24 Monthly expenditures in Croatia were expressed in Croatian kuna (HRK). They were converted to EUR with the exchange rate of 1 HRK = 0.133 Euros (exchange rate valid for August 5th 2013).
25 With regard to each expenditure item, data was only analyzed on those respondents who provided an answer to individual expenditure item, while answers “I don’t know (how much I spend)” were excluded from the analysis.
Figure 47: Structure of average monthly expenditure (in €) of Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)


Figure 47 lists the areas of expenditure of Slovenian youth from highest expenditure (on the left side of the figure) to the smallest. Slovenian youth spend most of their money on clothes, footwear, and fashion accessories (48 EUR per month), and on socializing (going out to cafes, clubs, and restaurants; 41 EUR). Approximately 25 EUR per month is spent on (mobile) phone bills, while watching movies (6 EUR) and buying books (4 EUR) are the smallest monthly expenditures. A quick glance of Figures 45 and 46 indicate that youth tend to prioritize their looks (clothes and accessories; Factor 2 – self-presentation – in Table 8) and socializing (going out with peers and communicating with them (and probably also with family) via the use of information-communication technology). In fact, socializing constitutes the second and third highest expenditures. If these two are added together, it is apparent that young people spend the most money on socializing. Of course, it is not surprising that socializing and self-presentation often go hand in hand.

In terms of cross-national comparisons, the relative positions of expenditure types are practically identical, with youth from all three countries spending the most amount of money on clothes and accessories. Nevertheless, two findings should be noted. As expected, Slovenian youth spend the most money combined (Slovenia has the most developed economy among the three post-Yugoslav states; HDR, 2013; Kosovo Human Development Report, 2012), and the most money on four out of the five items. Curiously, according to self-report data, Kosovar youth outspend Croatian youth on clothes and accessories. In addition, young Kosovars spend more money on books than their Slovenian and Croatian counterparts.

26 The list of items on expenditure was, of course, limited and youth may spend their money on other things as well. In this context let us note that one other answer was provided (“Other expenditure”), which was selected by 15 respondents in Slovenian sample (the average was 117 EUR/monthly), but is not shown in the figure because of small number of respondents.
With regard to socio-demographic correlates of youth expenditure, the results indicate that older Slovenian youth spend more money in four of the five domains: phone bills ($\rho = 0.16, n = 881; p < 0.001$); socializing at cafes/clubs/restaurants ($\rho = 0.14, n = 861; p < 0.001$); watching movies ($\rho = 0.08, n = 826; p < 0.05$); and buying books ($\rho = 0.07, n = 794; p < 0.05$). Men spend more money on going out and socializing ($\rho = 0.17, n = 861; p < 0.001$), while women spend more money on books ($\rho = 0.13, n = 794; p < 0.001$), which is not surprising, considering the fact that the data indicate that women read more frequently than men. Better-educated youth spend more money on all domains with the exception of clothes ($0.09 \leq \rho < 0.15; 0.001 < p < 0.01$); and young people not enrolled in school spend more on socializing, clothes, and phone bills ($0.08 \leq \rho < 0.17; 0.001 < p < 0.05$), but less on buying books ($\rho = -0.09, n = 783; p < 0.05$). Respondents with more educated fathers spend more money on socializing ($\rho = 0.09, n = 828; p < 0.01$) and those with more educated mothers spend more money on books ($\rho = 0.16, n = 735; p < 0.001$). Finally, respondents from urban environments spend more money on buying books ($\rho = 0.07, n = 794; p < 0.05$).

5 Self-image – “Do I look O.K.”?

The following looks at what constitutes self-image among Slovenian youth. Respondents were asked how satisfied they were with their looks. Figure 48 shows the results for the three post-Yugoslav countries.

*Figure 48: Satisfaction with own look among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)*

- SLO: 89% satisfied or very satisfied, 12% satisfied, 0% very satisfied
- CRO: 78% satisfied or very satisfied, 63% satisfied, 15% very satisfied
- KOS: 84% satisfied or very satisfied, 48% satisfied, 36% very satisfied

*Note: The figure presents percentages.*


It should be noted that answers regarding satisfaction with appearance were not equivalent in each of the three country surveys. As such, only the frequency of two equivalent answers were compared (“satisfied” and “very satisfied”). Here, 89 percent of Slovenian youth are “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their looks (77 percent “satisfied” and 12 percent “very satisfied”). Koso-
vo youth are second (84 percent “satisfied” or “very satisfied”), followed by Croatian youth (78 percent “satisfied” and “very satisfied”). Among Slovenian youth, the only socio-demographic correlate of satisfaction with one’s looks was gender, with men being more satisfied with their appearance ($\rho = 0.11, n = 909; p < 0.001$).

In view of the aims of this chapter, some conclusions can be drawn. First, the results of the leisure and lifestyle analysis of Slovenian youth largely corroborate previous studies, which illustrate that media use (listening to music, watching television; also see chapter on media use) and socializing are the most frequent leisure activities of Slovenian youth (Kirbiš, 2011a).

Second, with regard to life chances or structures (Miles, 2011, 17) that shape the lifestyles of young people, age, gender and education (both respondents and parental) most frequently emerged as determinants of youth lifestyles and consumption patterns.

Third, comparing the leisure patterns and lifestyles of Slovenian, Croatian, and Kosovar youth, a number of similarities can be seen between them, (as well, there are commonalities with German youth). The results do seem to corroborate the view that “western” leisure is becoming more widespread in post-communist countries, which is especially evident in terms of consumption patterns. At the same time, the results show that there is some cross-national variance and that social and cultural contexts influence the leisure patterns of Slovenian and post-Yugoslav youth.

Finally, analyzing the perceptions of popular social goals in life, “having a career”, “being independent”, and “having a college degree” are considered the most popular among Slovenian youth. Ironically, this image strays from that which is depicted by the media, where youth are frequently associated with “narcissistic and pleasure-oriented lifestyles”, as Karvonen et al. (2012) note. The survey data taken here does not support this view, as young people described their main life goals as “making it in life”, by means of becoming independent through work and education. Lifestyle patterns of Slovenian youth parallel the processes of individualization (Beck and Beck Gernsheim, 2002). Of course, available lifestyle indicators were, as already noted, far from all-inclusive, which present limitations on drawing firm conclusions. As always, future studies in this field are needed.

6 Key findings

Listening to music is the most preferred leisure activity among youth from all three post-Yugoslav societies; 84 percent of Slovenian youth frequently listen to music and 54 percent frequently watch TV. Nearly one-half of Slovenian youth frequently play sports and watch movies, while only one-fifth read newspapers/magazines in their free time.

Older youth more frequently read newspapers/magazines, while their younger cohorts more frequently socialize with friends and listen to music. Women more frequently listen to music and read books and magazines, while men more frequently engage in sport-related activities. Reading books/magazines and being active in sports is more frequent among young people from urban en-
environments. Better-educated youth spend more time reading books and magazines, but dedicate less time socializing with friends.

82 percent of Slovenian youth believe “having a career” is “in” (i.e., trendy, popular), followed by “being independent” (81 percent), “having a college degree” (81 percent) and “looking good” (78 percent). Better-educated youth, who have well-educated fathers scored higher on “activism”, and youth with more educated mothers scored lower on “traditionalism”.

Slovenian youth spend most of their money on clothes, footwear, and fashion accessories (on average 48 EUR per month), followed by socializing (going out to cafes, clubs, and restaurants; 41 EUR). Approximately 25 EUR per month is spent on phone bills. Older Slovenian youth spend more money on phone bills, socializing at cafes, clubs, and restaurants, watching movies, and buying books. Men spend more money on going out and socializing, while women spend more money on books. Better-educated youth spend more money on all domains with the exception of clothing.

89 percent of Slovenian youth are “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their looks; men are significantly more satisfied than women.

7 References


PART V
MEDIA USE

1 Introduction

Mass media has a tremendous and burgeoning role within society (Silverstone, 1999; Livingstone, 2002; Devereux, 2007; Buckingham, 2008). Silverstone, in taking a phrase from Isaiah Berlin, describes the media role as providing “the general texture of experience” (1999, 2). In modern societies, characterized as having a “media saturation” (Devereux, 2007), the media play an especially important role in the lives of young people (Livingstone, 2002; Berns et al., 2007; Kirsh, 2010; Mesch and Talmud, 2010; Subrahmanyam and Šmahel, 2010; Brown and Bobkowski, 2011).

In the 21st century, the media can hardly be described as static. Whereas the previous century was marked by the telephone, television, film, radio, newspapers, and magazines, the 21st century has seen an ever-increasing use of the Internet, cell phones, and social networking (Silverstone, 1999, 4; Devereux, 2007, 10; Brown and Bobkowski, 2011, 95). Unlike traditional media, new media have the potential to activate greater audiences (Meikle, 2002; Devereux, 2007, 10; Subrahmanyam and Šmahel, 2010; Garcia-Castañon et al., 2011; Hirzalla et al., 2011).

On media research, several relevant points merit mentioning. First, researchers largely examine media in terms of new and emerging technologies. Like media, technology is constantly changing, particularly in terms of how it affects society (Silverstone, 1999, 19; Harrington, 2009). Second, many previous studies on media have attempted to examine its effect on a variety of subthemes, e.g., education, health, risk behavior, political participation, and communication, among others (Levine et al., 2007; Leung and Kier, 2010; Sharabi and Margalit, 2011; Skoric and Kwan, 2011; Casiano et al., 2012; Quisto et al., 2012; AlGhamdi, 2013; Jung et al., 2013; for Slovenia see Dolničar and Nadoh, 2004; Vreg, 2004; Kink, 2009; Oblak Črnič, 2010; Kirbiš, 2011; Kirbiš and Naterer, 2011; Oblak Črnič, 2011; Praprotnik, 2011; Zagorc and Kirbiš, 2013).

Some authors have emphasized that young people, as active media users, are able to sift through a multitude of media forms (e.g., Berns et al., 2007; Kirsh, 2010) and consequently attach different meanings to specific content, depending on culture and contextual circumstances (Kirmse, 2010; Ahmad et al., 2012). On the other hand, research has shown the negative impacts of media use, which is addressed later in this chapter (Fallahi, 2011; Kirbiš, 2011; Tudor-Locke et al., 2011; Casiano et al., 2012; Coyne et al., 2012; Kowalewska and Mazur, 2012; Krasnova et al., 2013; Kross et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2013) (for a review of media effects, also see Bryant and Oliver, 2009).

This section presents the use of media by Slovenian youth in 2013, and offers comparative cross-national perspectives. Figure 49 illustrates the frequency of different forms of media use.
among youth (aged 16–25) from Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo.\textsuperscript{27} Survey participants reported the frequency of different types of media use on a three-point scale (1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = frequently). It should be noted that only four media use items were provided in the survey. As such, several frequently used media forms are missing; nevertheless, several new ICT technologies are discussed later in the chapter. \textit{Listening to music is the most frequent media use activity among youth in all three countries; it is the most frequent among Slovenian and Croatian youth (84 percent), but closely followed by Kosovo youth (81 percent). As noted in the previous chapter, this in part can be explained by the fact that listening to music is not only a popular activity, but also one that can be done while engaged in other (leisure and non-leisure) activities. In each of the three countries, the least popular activity is reading; 20 percent of Slovenian youth often read books and newspapers, compared to Croatia (25 percent) and Kosovo (43 percent). Overall, Slovenian youth do not spend a great deal of time watching television (42 percent) when compared to Kosovo youth (79 percent).

\textit{Figure 49: Media use among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{media_use.png}
\caption{Media use among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)}
\end{figure}

\textit{Note:} Respondents were asked how often they use specific forms of media (1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often). Percentages represent the answers "often". In the Kosovo survey respondents were not asked about frequency of watching videos, therefore the Kosovo column is missing in the figure.

\textit{Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study.}

An analysis of the correlates of media use among Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) reveals that women more often listen to music (\(\rho = 0.11, n = 905, p < 0.001\)) and read books/newspapers (\(\rho = 0.24, n = 906, p < 0.001\)). Older youth are also more likely to read books (\(\rho = 0.13, n = 906, p < 0.001\)), while younger youth are more likely to watch movies (\(\rho = -0.11, n = 901, p < 0.01\)). Additionally, better-educated youth more often read books (\(\rho = 0.17, n = 906, p < 0.001\)), while the less educated are more likely to watch videos (\(\rho = -0.12, n = 901, p < 0.001\)). Respondents whose mother had a lower educational level (\(\rho = -0.08, n = 869, p < 0.05\)) are more likely to watch TV;

\textsuperscript{27} Media use in the context of leisure time and other free-time activities are analyzed in greater detail in the chapter on leisure in the present research report.
and those with lower monthly incomes are more likely to watch videos ($\rho = -0.11$, $n = 864$, $p < 0.01$). Finally, young people from larger residential communities read books more often ($\rho = 0.15$, $n = 906$, $p < 0.001$).

**Figure 50:** The percentage of Slovenian youth (16–27 years) that “often” read books/newspapers, (total sample, and by gender, respondent’s educational level, age and size of residential settlement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s</td>
<td>Tertiary level</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educational level</td>
<td>Secondary level</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary school or less</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>24-27 years</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-23 years</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-19 years</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of</td>
<td>Ljubljana and Maribor</td>
<td>36 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residential</td>
<td>10,000 and more inhabitants</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>settlement</td>
<td>Up to 10,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>15 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Respondents were asked how often they practice a particular activity (1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often). The percentages represent answers given for “often”.

**Source:** CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

In sum, listening to music is the most popular media use activity among Slovenian youth. Of course, music should not be treated as a homogenous entity, as previous research has indicated. Not only are there multitudes of musical genres, but also different preferences for these genres can be associated with a variety of outcomes. One study, for instance, found that preferences for some music genres (classical music, opera, musicals, new age, easy listening, house, world music, heavy metal, punk, and ska) were associated with political engagement (Leung and Kier, 2008). Another study argued that genre preferences have an associative linked to the tendency to spend money (Leung and Kier, 2010). Past studies have also investigated music preferences in connection with personality characteristics, family language background, mental health status, delinquency (Baker and Bor, 2008; Delsing et al., 2008; Schäfer et al., 2012; Ter Bogt et al., 2013).\(^{28}\)

Overall, reading books/newspapers has the highest number of correlates. Figure 50 presents the frequency of book/newspaper reading by gender, respondent’s educational level, and age. As already noted, reading is more frequent among women, more educated youth, older youth, and youth from larger communities.

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\(^{28}\) Unfortunately, much less research on music genres has been carried out in a specific Slovenian context.
Population studies (including youth) of the United States show a decline in reading frequency (NEA, 2004, 26, 27; NEA, 2007), which is comparable to the findings from a number of other countries, particularly where it concerns youth. Young people more frequently use other types of media (especially the Internet) (Lenhart et al., 2001, 13-14; Parratt Fernández, 2010). The results here indicate a similar trend, i.e., a decline in print media’s popularity among Slovenian youth. This is problematic if one considers previous data noting the many positive effects reading has on youth development and health. For example, reading has been shown to enhance concentration (Levine et al., 2007), reduce prejudice toward immigrants (Vezzali et al., 2012), and produce positive academic outcomes (Walsh et al., 2013). However, reading books does not necessarily have a positive net impact per se. Indeed, behavior outcomes that stem from reading are dependent on the specific content of the book (Udermann et al., 2004; Coyne et al., 2012).

1.1 Media as a source of political information

Young people today obtain information from a variety of different sources. When compared to previous generations, they are far less likely to read print media (although this is less true for older youth). On the other hand, they are more frequent consumers of technology-driven media content (Parratt Fernández, 2010). Using the project’s survey data, this section addresses how young people obtain information about political events (for more on this topic, see the chapter on politics). Focusing on different media as a source of political information, Figure 51 shows that 82 percent of Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) use the Internet as their main source for acquiring information on current political events.

Likewise, 71 percent of Slovenian youth obtain information about politics from television.

Grouped by age (16-27) and by socio-demographic data, Figure 52 shows the percentage of respondents reporting that Internet is their main source of information for political events. Better-educated young people ($\rho = 0.09, n = 909, p < 0.01$), those with more educated fathers ($\rho = 0.10, n = 838, p < 0.01$) and more educated mothers ($\rho = 0.09, n = 871, p < 0.01$), and those from larger residential communities ($\rho = 0.07, n = 909, p < 0.05$) use the Internet more often as a source of information. Interestingly, all four patterns are linear across all three education level measures. For example, 88 percent of respondents with fathers who earned a tertiary level education use the Internet for political information, while only 73 percent of respondents with fathers who only finished or did not finish elementary school use the Internet for political information. The results of this study largely corroborate previous research on information sources. For example, a study of Canadian youth showed that those with higher levels of education were more likely to use the Internet as a source of information for politics (Gidengil, et al., 2003), though the difference between the highest and the lowest educational group was relatively low (12 percentage points).

On the other hand, there are some reservations regarding the extent to which the Internet is actually used as a source of political information. In the case of Russia, Volkov (2012) warned not
to overestimate the size of Internet audiences (in his study on Russian Internet use) and similarly, Zoroja (2011, 128) found that in post-socialist countries there are less overall Internet users.

Figure 51: The use of different media as a source of information about current political events among Slovenian youth (16–27 years)

Note: Respondents were asked to choose one or more sources of information on current political events from the list of provided responses. Provided sources of information were the Internet, television, newspapers, radio, discussions with their family, and discussions with friends/acquaintances. The numbers present percentage of respondents choosing specific media source.

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

This analysis of Internet use patterns among Slovenian youth, on the other hand, indicates that the Internet is the most popular source for acquiring political information. However, it must be taken into account that Slovenian youth are generally not interested in (conventional) politics, have low trust in political and state institution, are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Slovenia (60 percent), and four out of ten would not participate in elections if they were held today. These factors, when combined, indicate that although the Internet is the main source of political information among youth, acquiring information about political events (which respondents most likely understood in the sense of information relating to conventional party politics) is a relatively infrequent activity (also see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). On the other hand, the Internet is often used by Slovenian youth for communicating and online socializing (see below).
2 The internet

Numerous authors highlight the growing importance of new ICT (information and communication technology) for youth, and the widespread access to ICT by large segments of the population in different countries (La Ferle et al., 2000; Mesch, 2003; Subrahmanyam and Lin, 2007; Wan and Gut, 2008; Peng and Zhu, 2010; Fallahi, 2011; Chow et al., 2012; Gaskin et al., 2012; Bernal and Angulo, 2013). Some authors see ICT in a relatively positive light, while others are more pessimistic. In general, the majority agree that new technologies can have both positive implications (e.g., fulfillment of young people’s needs; see La Ferle et al., 2000) and negative implications (Internet addiction and social isolation; see Fallahi, 2011; for a review of studies on the effects of the Internet, see Lin, 2009).

As noted above, many studies corroborate the positive aspects of Internet use. One important finding in the context of democratic states is that online political participation leads to increasing offline participation (García-Castañon et al., 2011; Hirzalla et al., 2011), which was also found in a
In contrast, studies on the negative effects of the Internet have found a positive link between loneliness and Internet use (Matsuba, 2006; Ceyhan and Ceyhan, 2008; Ghassemzadeh et al., 2008; Cotten et al., 2013). Specifically, those who report feelings of loneliness are more likely to use the Internet to communicate with others (Erdoğan, 2008). On the other hand, some forms of Internet use (e.g., communication) are associated with lower levels of loneliness among older adults (Sum et al., 2008; Cotten et al., 2013) and among adolescents (Sharabi and Margalit, 2011). However, the negative aspects should not be understated, as links have been seen between loneliness and problematic Internet use (see Matsuba, 2006; Ceyhan and Ceyhan, 2008; Ghassemzadeh et al., 2008; Odaci and Kalkan, 2010). In sum, the data are mixed, and can be found within a number of individual studies. Ong (2011), for example, found that participants who more frequently used online chatting sites exhibited greater “familial” loneliness because their online time reduced the amount of time they spent with their families. On the other hand, online chatters exhibited less “romantic” loneliness because of the greater ease of maintaining online romantic relationships.

Turning to the more explicitly negative consequences of Internet use, some authors examined problematic Internet use (PIU) among youth. It has been found that boys are more likely to exhibit PIU. Predictors of PIU, interestingly, differ between genders. In one study, predictors of PIU among men were phobic anxiety, wishful thinking, and preoccupation with being overweight; while predictors among women were depression and keeping to oneself (Hetzel-Riggin and Pritchard, 2011). Some authors also discuss the role of the Internet as an initiator for terrorist activities (Lennings et al., 2010).

Besides PIU, several studies have been conducted on the growing problem of Internet addiction (Johansson and Götestam, 2004; Gencer and Koc, 2012). One study highlighted Internet addiction as a pressing problem among youth in Hong Kong (Cheng and Ko, 2010), while a study of Iranian students showed that 13.8 percent of them could be classified as having a “severe Internet addiction” (Nasiri et al., 2011). Studies also found that Internet addiction is often associated with several negative online activities, i.e., watching online pornography and online gaming (Siomos et al., 2012). Internet addiction is also related to insomnia and both are associated with depression (Cheung and Wong, 2011, 315). Positive links between Internet addiction, shyness, and low locus of control were also previously found (Chak and Leung, 2004). One study showed that reading is declining among American youth (NEA, 2004, 26-27; NEA, 2007), while instant messaging (IM) is increasing; and they are both connected to greater difficulties in concentrating (reading predicts lower difficulties, while IM predicts greater difficulties in concentrating; see Levine et al., 2007). One of the key questions related to the above is whether young people are aware of the negative aspects of Internet usage. A study of Danish youth found that young people are mostly aware of how to use Internet chatting safely; however, online harassment was found to be relatively frequent (Helweg-Larsen et al., 2011).

Previous studies have also identified a “technological gap” that exists between youth and adults, indicating a gap in knowledge of new technologies and their use. For example, parents are
less familiar with new technologies and are therefore less likely to protect their children from the potential negative consequences of ICT usage (Mishna et al., 2009, 1226). A study of Chinese and American adolescents showed that only a little more than half of the participants reported that their parents have rules regarding respondents’ media use (Wan and Gut, 2008, 37). Paradoxically, several studies have pointed to the importance of parental control and knowledge of youth media use (Fallahi, 2011; Helweg-Larsen et al., 2011, 537; Ang et al., 2012; Siomos et al., 2012). Most notably, parental bonding correlates with the lower likelihood of Internet addiction. On the other hand, overprotection may also lead to negative effects (Siomos et al., 2012, 216-217). In this context, experts see a solution in preventive education (Wan and Gut, 2008; Cheng and Ko, 2010; Brown and Bobkowski, 2011).

The following describes Internet use patterns among Slovenian youth. In some cases, the results are compared to Croatian, Kosovar, and German youth survey data. The first part looks precisely at Internet access, before proceeding to the subject of youth as Internet users. Two particular factors are analyzed: the amount of time spent online, and the reasons why young people use the Internet.

2.1 Internet access

The importance and popularity of new technologies for young people has been extensively documented (La Ferle et al., 2000; Mesch, 2003; Subrahmanyam and Lin, 2007; Fallahi, 2011; Chow et al., 2012; Bernal and Angulo, 2013). Youth are also accessing ICT at younger ages (Mishna et al., 2009, 1224). Comparing the data across countries, the highest proportion of youth with Internet access is in Slovenia. More specifically, 99.8 percent of Slovenian youth have Internet access (as usual, 16–25 year-olds were compared cross-nationally), though percentages in other countries are also relatively high: 95.6 percent of Germans, 94.9 percent of Croatians, and 91.5 percent of Kosovars reported having Internet access.

It should be noted that the question concerning Internet access has several limitations. For example, respondents may have understood the question in different ways. One possible perception of how respondents understood the meaning “Internet access” was that they had Internet access in their households. Second, respondents may have perceived this question to mean any Internet access, regardless of the locale (for example libraries, friends’ homes, cyber cafes). Because of these possible different perceptions, the survey included questions on the percentage of households with Internet access in countries with accessible data, i.e., the EU-27, Slovenia, and Croatia, according to Eurostat (2013b). As Figure 53 illustrates, the percentage of households with Internet access has increased across Europe from 2004 to 2012. In 2004, 47 percent of Slovenian households had Internet access (6 percentage points more than the EU-27 average). Until 2008, Slovenia had a higher percentage of households with Internet access than the EU-27. From 2007 to 2012, Croatia had lower Internet access than the EU-27 average (from 14-17 percentage points lower in earlier years to 8-10 percentage points lower in 2012). However, over the last year Croatia has approached both the Slovenian and EU-27 average. In 2012, 76 percent of the EU-27, 74 percent of Slovenians, and 66 percent of Croatians had access to the Internet in their households (Eurostat, 2013b).
Figure 53: Percentage of households with Internet access in EU-27, Slovenia and Croatia

Note: The figure presents percentages of Internet access in households.
Source: Eurostat (2013b).

Even though Eurostat data does not specifically examine young people, one could argue that the respondents from the four countries examined here did not perceive the questions about Internet access to be limited to the household. Figure 54 presents Eurostat data regarding households accessing the Internet through mobile phones. The results indicate that for the period 2004-2010 Slovenia had the highest percentage of households accessing the Internet through mobile phones, above both the EU-27 and Croatian average. Interestingly, in 2010 (the last year with available data), Slovenia had the same percentage (32 percent) of households with mobile phone Internet access as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Eurostat, 2013a).30

In sum, the Youth 2013 and Eurostat data indicate that a large majority of Slovenian young people have access to the Internet, whether at home, through their mobile phone, or by other means.

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30 Statistics in this case do not take into account the speed of the Internet connection.
2.2 Time spent on the Internet

As noted above, numerous studies have found that new technology is quite important for youth (La Ferle et al., 2000; Mesch, 2003; Subrahmanyam and Lin, 2007; Fallahi, 2011; Chow et al., 2012; Bernal and Angulo, 2013). Many have examined how much time young people spend on the Internet, particularly where it concerns extensive (i.e. frequent) Internet use (Johansson and Götestam, 2004). When compared to previous studies from a decade ago, the results are staggering. One previous American study (2000), for example, showed that on an average weekday, 72 percent of adolescents spent less than an hour on the Internet at home, and 91 percent spent less than an hour on the Internet at school (La Ferle et al., 2000, 58-59). Johansson and Götestam’s 2004 study found that Norwegian youth (12-18) used the Internet on average 4.3 hours per week.

Figure 55 presents the mean number of hours spent on the Internet by youth (aged 16-25) in four countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Germany). The average time spent on the Internet is as follows: Slovenian youth spend just under 4 hours per day on the Internet (M = 3.94; SD = 2.52; Me = 3); Kosovars just over 3.5 hours (M = 3.62; SD = 2.19; Me = 3); Croatians around 3.5 hours (M = 3.45; SD = 2.11; Me = 3); and Germans around 2 hours per day (M = 2.00; SD = 1.72; Me = 2).

Respondents from Germany answered the question on time spent on the Internet per week (while the other surveys recoded answers on hours per day), which might have had an impact on the German responses, and affect the final results. Analysis of the original item (time spent on the Internet in hours per week) indicated that in 2010, German youth spent on average 14 hours per week (M = 14.05; SD = 12.44) on the Internet.
In sum, Slovenian youth spend more time on the Internet per day than Croatian, Kosovar, and German youth.

Figure 55: Average hours (M) per day spent using the Internet, including standard deviations (SD), among Slovenian, Croatian, Kosovo and German youth (16–25 years)

Note: Respondents were asked, “What is the average amount of time you spend daily using the Internet?” However, German respondents were asked, “What is the average amount of time you spend weekly using the Internet?”, which precludes a full comparability of the results, despite the recoded values. Lines in the columns present standard deviations.

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study and Shell 2010 German Youth Study.

Using the total Slovenian sample (aged 16–27), outcome variables (time spent on the Internet per day) were divided into three categories (1 = up to 3 hours; 2 = from 3 up to 5 hours; 3 = 5 hours and more). Analyzing socio-demographic correlates, it was found that respondents with lower monthly income reported using the Internet more often (rho = -0.08, n = 869, p < 0.05), though the association became insignificant when controlling for age.

The results also showed that 32.5 percent of Slovenian youth spend up to 2 hours per day on the Internet, while 36.7 percent of youth are online between 3 and 5 hours per day, and 30.8 percent are online 5 hours or more per day.

Since the question on Internet use in 2013 did not correspond to that which was asked in the 2010 survey (in 2010 the question related to “average weekday” Internet use; in addition, the 2013 item asked about average Internet use including Internet use on smart phones and tablets),

32 A small number of respondents in these four surveys answered that on average they spend more than 12 hours a day on the Internet. Since these outliers mildly affected the mean value scores, it was decided to recode all values above 12 hours daily into 12 hours (1.5 percent of such cases in Slovenian, 0.5 percent in Croatian, 0.1 percent in Kosovo, and 0.4 percent in Germany).

33 We used “5 hours or more daily” as a cut-off point for the highest recoded value since this is one of the possible values (amount of time of daily Internet use) that have in different studies been defined as “problematic” or “heavy”. 
comparability has been hindered. Moreover, in 2013 respondents may have also had weekends in mind, when Internet use might be higher. Nevertheless, Figure 55 shows a number of interesting results. In 2010, Slovenian youth spent 2.37 hours per day using the Internet, while in 2013 they spend 3.94 hours per day, a substantial increase of 1.75 hours per day. Furthermore, the 2013 survey data indicate that 44.5 percent of Slovenian youth are “heavy” Internet users, using 4 or more hours of Internet use daily as a cut-off point. This is problematic since several studies have found that heavy Internet use is associated with various negative health outcomes (Chou, 2001; Mythily et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2010; Baek and So, 2011; Do et al., 2013; Peltzer et al., 2013).

As noted above, Slovenian youth use the Internet more frequently than Croatian, Kosovar, and German youth, but it is important to question what these results mean in a wider comparative context. In other words, how often do Slovenian youth use the Internet in comparison to youth from other countries? Despite an extensive review of the literature on youth Internet use, no previous studies have been found which have employed representative national youth data samples where daily mean Internet use was higher than 4 hours daily, as it was among Slovenian youth. A study of Thai university students (Peltzer, 2013) found that students spent on average 5.3 hours (SD = 2.6) per day on the Internet, which is more than the current usage rate among Slovenian youth. However, their study examined students’ Internet use, while this survey calculated mean Internet use on a representative sample of Slovenian youth.

In sum, Slovenian youth are frequent Internet users, but questions remain as to the reasons why they use the Internet.

2.3 Purposes of Internet use

Past studies have shown that positive attitudes and feelings toward the Internet are associated with higher Internet use (Al Otaibi, 2012). One of the key elements of Internet use, i.e., (perceived) anonymity, also has an important consequence: youth behave differently online (Mishna et al., 2009). As such, the Internet can be an important social environment, particularly for those who have difficulties integrating in offline communities (Lim et al., 2013; Anderson and McCabe, 2012).

In a 1997 survey-driven study of teenagers (before the Internet was omnipresent), La Ferle et al. found that only 6.5 percent of Internet users used it for leisure and 7 percent for entertainment (2000, 59). A study of Turkish students from 2005 showed that they mostly use Internet for sending e-mails (64 percent), reading news and sports information (61 percent), research for homework (58 percent) and chatting (57 percent) (Ruzgar, 2005, 129). A 2012 study found that the main reason for Internet use was communication (Gencer and Koc, 2012, 28-29).

Figure 56 indicates specific types of Internet activities among Slovenian youth. The majority of youth (aged 16–27) use the Internet for socializing with their friends, acquaintances, and/or relatives. In fact, communication with friends and others is the most frequent Internet activity (86 percent of respondents reported using the Internet for communication). Accessing social networks is the next most frequent online activity (85 %) (e.g., Facebook, My Space, Hi5, etc.), while sending e-mails is the third most frequent activity (84 percent). All three categories relate to different forms of communication. Searching for information, watching videos, listening to music, reading
news, and downloading different forms of data are slightly less frequent, but still popular (all above 70 percent). One-quarter use the Internet for online shopping and paying bills, and a similar proportion of Slovenian youth (35 percent) use the Internet for playing online games. 28 percent use the Internet for work purposes, 22 percent for online baking, and 2 percent reported using the Internet for cybersex.

These results largely corroborate the findings from previous studies carried out in Slovenia (Kirbiš, 2011) and in other countries. For example, many Turkish (Gencer and Koc, 2012, 28-29), Colombian, and Spanish youth (Almansa et al., 2013) as well as other national groups of young people (Thompson and Lougheed, 2012) use the Internet for communication with others, i.e., socializing with friends.

Figure 56: Types of Internet activities among Slovenian youth (16–27 years)

Note: Respondents were asked to choose one or more Internet activities from the list of provided responses. Percentages represent the proportion of respondents choosing a particular response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication with...</td>
<td>86 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networks</td>
<td>85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending e-mails</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searching for information (for...)</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch videos/listen to music</td>
<td>82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading news</td>
<td>76 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downloading movies/books/music</td>
<td>73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online purchasing/paying bills</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing online games</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online banking</td>
<td>22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybersex</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Socio-demographic correlates of Internet activities were also analyzed. Women (rho = 0.07, n = 909, p < 0.05), younger youth (rho = -0.10, n = 909, p < 0.01), and respondents with lower monthly incomes (rho = -0.08, n = 870, p < 0.05) are more likely to use the Internet for communication with friends and others, while younger youth also more frequently use the Internet to access social networks (rho = -0.07, n = 909, p < 0.05). It should be reiterated that the three most frequent online activities essentially represent communication with others. Women (rho = 0.17, n = 909, p < 0.001), respondents from larger size communities (rho = 0.09, n = 909, p < 0.05), and those with higher levels of education (rho = 0.13, n = 909, p < 0.001) are more likely to use the Internet for receiving/sending e-mails.
Online banking users are more frequently older youth (rho = 0.25, n = 909, p < 0.001), with higher monthly incomes (rho = 0.24, n = 870, p < 0.001), and higher educational levels (rho = 0.23, n = 909, p < 0.001). Men (rho = -0.09, n = 909, p < 0.01), older youth (rho = 0.26, n = 909, p < 0.001), those with higher educational levels (rho = 0.27, n = 909, p < 0.001), lower subjective family material status (rho = -0.10, n = 909, p < 0.01) with higher monthly incomes (rho = 0.29, n = 870, p < 0.001) are more likely to use the Internet for work purposes. In addition, men (rho = -0.27, n = 909, p < 0.001) and those with lower educational levels (rho = -0.12, n = 909, p < 0.001) more often use the Internet for playing online games.

Past studies have also shown the existence of gender differences regarding Internet activities. Dowell et al. (2009) found that girls use the Internet more often to send e-mails. According to this same study, girls reported their most frequent online activities as instant messaging and visiting web sites. By contrast, boys indicated that they use the Internet to play online games (as well to instant message others) (Dowell et al., 2009, 549). A study by Thompson and Lougheed (2012) showed some interesting results regarding Facebook usage: women were more likely to be Facebook users, to be addicted to it, to sleep less because of Facebook use, to feel closer to online friends than those offline, to report stress as a result of Facebook use, and to report that Facebook pictures induced a negative self-image. The survey used here indicates that Slovenian young women also more frequently socialize and communicate over the Internet, but it remains to be determined to what extent this usage is problematic.

A number of studies have addressed Internet use and political participation. Several note that social networks are an important, if not main tool, of youth participation (Collin, 2008; David, 2013). Stornaiuolo et al. (2013) argue that the Internet has the potential to expand “community” and that “educationally focused social networks can be designed for, or their uses primed toward, communicative purposes and activities foregrounding reciprocal exchange that is ethically alert and socially aware”. A study of Chilean youth found that news consumption and use of online social networks (e.g., Facebook) positively correlated with a young person’s disposition to vote in future elections (i.e., expected future electoral turnout), while entertainment news consumption negatively correlated with voting dispositions (Scherman and Arriagada, 2012). Spanish youth emphasized the many positive aspects of social networks, namely that they are an important element of youth mobilization, and encourage social and political engagement (García Galera and del Hoyo Hurtado, 2013).

As previously mentioned, young people use social networks mainly to communicate with their friends and others (Gencer and Koc, 2012, 28-29; Thompson and Lougheed, 2012; Almansa et al., 2013), a finding confirmed by the results of this survey. However, this raises questions regarding the influences of online friends. On the one hand, online peer influence can be positive. For example, a study of juvenile delinquents found online social networks to be beneficial for their rehabilitation (Lim et al., 2013). On the other hand, it noted the potential dangers of peer influence, if for example, “youths post their delinquent acts online and receive positive appraisals from Facebook peers, such peer affirmation may offer validation and encourage greater delinquency” (Lim et al., 2013). Yet another line of research found both positive and negative aspects. For instance, acquired social capital can be transmitted offline, which may generate new forms of social capital; however, this could also have a displacing effect (Williams, 2007).
2.4 Conclusion: The Internet

While past research highlights both the positive and negative aspects of new ICT and ICT usage (Suhail and Bargees, 2006; Williams, 2007; Lim, 2013; for Slovenian context, see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011; Kirbiš and Naterer, 2011), several points are clear where it regards Slovenian youth. First, access to the Internet is widely available. Second, they report spending a relatively large amount of time online. Finally, they are involved in different Internet activities, but communication and socializing are the most frequent. In sum, it is worth considering Fallahi’s statement (2011, 397) that “the internet is useful if only used in the correct way”. Of course, there is no true definition of “correct”, and more importantly, this should be defined by further empirical investigation.

3 Television

Despite the increase of Internet use over the last decade, and the fact that Internet use has been found to decrease television use (Liebowitz and Zentner, 2010), television remains not only the dominant medium among the general population, but also among younger media users, e.g., children (Gutnick et al., 2010). In the United States, for example, TV viewing is the third most commonly reported activity, after work and sleep, and consumes more than half of all leisure time (BLS, 2013).

3.1 Time spent watching television

Though a number of different methodologies have been employed to track time and television viewing, a Ball State University study showed that the average American adult is exposed to 5 hours and 9 minutes of live TV each day. Beyond television, the average American spends up to 8.5 hours daily in front of some type of screen (including TVs, cell phones, even G.P.S. devices, etc.) (Stelter, 2009; Barrett, 2010). According to the American Time Use Survey (BLS, 2013), however, daily television use is considerably lower, approximately 2 hours and 50 minutes/daily. Similarly, a study carried out in 13 countries found that watching TV consumes about 40 percent of free time in most countries (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003). As these studies use different methodologies, it is impossible to draw firm time conclusions. However, longitudinal studies using the same methodology nevertheless indicate that over the last decade there has been a marked increase in the time young people devote to computer use (including the Internet), while the time devoted to watching entertainment television has somewhat decreased. Nevertheless, television use was still among the most frequent leisure activities for Slovenian youth in 2010 (Kirbiš, 2011).

A number of studies on television have attempted to undercover its effect on health. The findings show that those who frequently watch TV are generally less healthy and physically active; avid viewers have higher obesity rates, less healthy dietary habits, and higher levels of risk behavior (Dietz and Gortmaker, 1985; Simons and Silveira, 1994; Singer et al., 1998; Marshall, et al., 2004; Feldman et al., 2007; Barr-Anderson et al., 2009; Manios et al., 2009; Richter et al., 2009; Bersamin et al., 2010; Tudor-Locke et al., 2011; Casiano et al., 2012; Kowalewska and Mazur, 2012;
Figure 57 shows the average time youth (aged 16–25) spend watching television and using the Internet daily in three countries. **Slovenian youth spend 2 hours per day** \((M = 1.95, SD = 1.28; Me = 2)\) **watching television**, Croatian youth 2 hours and 25 minutes \((M = 2.42; SD = 1.50; Me = 2)\) and Kosovars 3 hours and 22 minutes \((M = 3.36; SD = 1.88; Me = 3)\). Further analysis indicates that the minimum response in each youth was 0 hours, while the maximum response among Slovenian youth was 10 hours, among Croatian youth 12 hours, and Kosovo 16 hours.

**Figure 57:** Average hours per day spent watching TV and using the Internet, including standard deviations (SD), among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)

As Internet and television use have been analyzed separately in this study, it is worth considering comparisons between the two mediums. Figure 57 indicates that young people from all three countries spend more time using the Internet than they do watching TV. The largest mean difference between Internet and TV use is found in the Slovenian sample. Specifically, Slovenian youth spend approximately two hours more per day using the Internet than they spend watching TV. For Croatia, the difference between the two is approximately one hour; in Kosovo, the difference is less than 30 minutes. In sum, today’s youth are perhaps accurately described as the “Internet generation”, though television remains a popular medium. Interestingly, Figure 57 reveals a clear pattern at the country (mean) level. Namely, the more time youth spend using the Internet, the less time they spend watching television, and vice versa.

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34 A small number of respondents in the Kosovo sample answered that they on average spend more than 12 hours a day watching television (0.1 percent of the total Kosovo sample). Since these outliers somewhat affected the mean values, it was decided to recode values above 12 hours daily into 12 hours daily.
The survey began with questions related to the amount of time Slovenian youth spend watching television. Previous studies have used several different cut-off points for “heavy” TV use; e.g., 5 hours or more daily (Barr-Anderson et al., 2009). Because the data collected in this survey found that only 1.5 percent of the respondents indicated that they watch television 5 hours or more daily, “4 hours or more” was considered “heavy TV use” (10.4 percent of respondents). Thus the following groups were constructed (1 = up to 2 hours; 2 = from 2 up to 4 hours; 3 = 4 hours or more daily).

The results indicate that 44.9 percent of Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) watch television up to 2 hours per day; 44.7 percent 2-3 hours daily; and 10.4 percent 4 hours or more daily. This three-point system was then correlated against socio-demographic indicators and found that less educated youth (rho = -0.09, n = 909, p < 0.01), those with less educated mothers (rho = -0.14, n = 871, p < 0.001) and those from smaller residential communities (rho = -0.07, n = 909, p < 0.05) on average watch more hours of television per day.

3.2 What TV contents do young people watch?

Next, TV genres and contents were analyzed according to most and least popular among Slovenian youth (Figure 58). Slovenian young people (16–27) most frequently watch comedies (72 percent), followed by serials/series (63 percent) and foreign action films (61 percent). The least popular genres included religious broadcasts (5 percent), Slovenian folk music broadcasts (9 percent), and Slovenian “pop music” shows (10 percent). Interestingly, serials/series and news programs were among the most frequently chosen by respondents in terms of “daily watching”, with 13 percent of youth watching serials/series and 12 percent of youth watching news every day.

Prior to analyzing socio-demographic correlates of preferred TV genres, a principal component analysis was performed, whereby four factors emerged. Table 9 presents these four factors, which were named according to content: foreign contents (Factor 1), Slovenian contents (Factor 2), entertainment contents (Factor 3), and informative contents (Factor 4). Factor scores were then saved and correlated against socio-demographic data. Foreign contents (F1) are substantially more watched by men (rho = -0.30, n = 880, p < 0.001) and respondents with lower educational levels (rho = -0.09, n = 880, p < 0.05). Slovenian contents (F2) are more often watched by respondents whose fathers have lower educational levels (rho = -0.10, n = 812, p < 0.01). Entertainment contents (F3) are more frequently viewed by women (rho = 0.23, n = 880, p < 0.001), younger youth (rho = -0.11, n = 880, p < 0.01) and those with lower monthly incomes. Watching informative contents (F4) was substantially associated with higher age (rho = 0.21, n = 880, p < 0.001), and higher educational levels (rho = 0.21, n = 880, p < 0.001), males (rho = -0.09, n = 880, p < 0.05), lower subjective family material status (rho = -0.10, n = 880, p < 0.01), higher monthly income (rho = 0.09, n = 846, p < 0.05) and larger residential communities (rho = 0.11, n = 880, p < 0.01).
3.3 Conclusion: Television

Slovenian young people spend more time using the Internet than they do watching TV. One of the main differences between these media forms is interactivity and the possibility for two-way communication, which should be accounted for when examining different uses of media in future studies; however, TV users can also still be regarded as active viewers, especially when combining television and Internet technology. For example, the Nielsen Company (2010, 13) reports that one in five (22 percent) global online consumers own or have a definite interest in buying a television with Internet connection in the next year (note the date the survey was conducted).
Table 9: *Principal component analysis of TV contents, Slovenian youth sample (16–27 years)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F1 FOREIGN CONTENTS</th>
<th>F2 SLOVENIAN CONTENTS</th>
<th>F3 ENTERTAINMENT CONTENTS</th>
<th>F4 INFORMATIVE CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian folk music broadcast</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian pop music broadcast</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign music broadcast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian movies</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign movies with social themes</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign action films</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign thrillers</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentaries-historical/scientific</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serials/series</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News/reports</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political debates</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports programs/live streaming/discussions on sport</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion broadcast</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comedies</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raffle/quizzes</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality shows</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Extraction Method was Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method was Promax with Kaiser Normalization. Factor loadings below 0.4 are not shown.

*Source:* CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

In sum, the analysis indicates that Slovenian youth mostly watch entertainment TV programming. As other studies have shown, watching entertainment TV (or being exposed to other forms of media entertainment) is often associated with unpleasant (e.g., stressful) life events, experiences, and escapism. In a series of studies by Anderson et al. (1996), stressful life events were positively related to scores on a scale of television addiction scale; further, stress was associated with respondents watching more comedies and less news programming. Women with higher stress levels reported watching more game and variety programming, and as well more overall TV, while stressed men watched more action and violent TV programming. (Anderson et al., 1996; for earlier research on entertainment media use, see Pearlin, 1959; Mendelsohn, 1963; for a recent review of research on entertainment media, see Vorderer and Hartman, 2009; also see Meyrowitz; 1985; Giles, 2003; Shrum, 2004; Romer et al., 2009). Similarly, in a study of Slovenian youth, Kirbiš (2011) found that more frequent entertainment media use was associated with decreased satisfaction for life body image, and increased self-reported stress, feelings of anomie and alienation, hedonistic and fatalistic outlooks, authoritarian orientation, narcissistic exploitativeness, deviance, and permissive socialization. Consequently, future studies of Slovenian youth should more closely examine correlates of entertainment media use.
4 Trust in media

Media freedom and autonomy, in part, form the basis for democratic life (Baker, 2006; Hamelink and Nordenstreng, 2006; Makarovič et al., 2008; Amos et al., 2012). In Europe, such freedoms are often taken for granted (Czepek et al., 2009, 9). In this way, legislation has been instrumental in protecting media freedoms, and preventing the formation of monopolies. In addition, media creators have themselves played an equally important role. Their professionalism leads to a countering of pressures, which prevent the potential impact of narrow political interests (Makarovič et al., 2008, 119).

Where it regards Slovenian youth, it is important to outline briefly the Slovenian media space. According to Freedom House’s (2013) Freedom of the Press index, only 14.5 percent of the world’s citizens, including Slovenians, live in countries with a free press. However, Bašić-Hrvatin et al. note that the Slovenian media is densely concentrated, which allows owners to have rather strict control over media content. One examination of supervisory Slovenian media supervisory boards revealed that most are made up of a small circle of individuals that are board members in several different newspaper houses (Bašić-Hrvatin et al., 2004, 89-90; for problems regarding ownership concentration see: Baker, 2006).

There are additional external pressures. An analysis of media subsidies revealed that the Slovenian state supported specific actors without any pre-analysis of the media market. Such practice may lead to “political trade” (Bašić-Hrvatin and Petković, 2007, 179-180). In contrast, Makarovič (2008) argues that there is a difference between an “attempt to influence” (which may be suppressed) and an “effective pressure” (which likely cannot). This study also revealed that the Slovenian media market is often permeated by different political and economic groups (or single actors) intent on shaping news coverage; however, the authors noted that effective pressure is difficult to examine. In sum, Slovenia’s media problems are no different from those found in other developed countries. In view of these characteristics, this study examined Slovenian youth attitudes toward the media, and in particular the extent to which young people trust the media. While a more in-depth analysis of trust in institutions and groups is provided in the chapter on politics, Figure 59 illustrates the level of trust in the media among Slovenian youth (aged 16–25). The results indicate that Slovenian youth, as compared to youth in Croatia and Kosovo, express the lowest level of trust in the media. 36 percent of Slovenian youth have “little” trust in the media, which is slightly less than in Croatia (40 percent). However, the number of Slovenian young people with “no trust at all” outnumbers their Croatian counterparts by 5 percentage points. Kosovars tend to put more faith in the media. Most of the respondents (39 percent) report trusting the media “to some extent,” while an additional 12-13 percent claimed to have “a lot” of trust in the media. It should be noted that the relatively low levels of media trust expressed by Slovenian youth parallel the general criticism of politics, institutions, and democracy over the past several years (Kirbiš, 2013a; 2013b; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). Again, the chapter on politics shows that the media ranks some-

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35 Based on evaluations of the degree of print, broadcast, and Internet freedom in every country in the world, researchers ranked every country’s media as free, partly free or not free.

36 Respondents were asked to rate the level of trust among a list of institutions. Trust in the media was measured on a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = to some extent, 4 = very much).
where in the middle of comparable institutions in term of trust, while political parties, parliament, and government ranked at the bottom.

**Figure 59: Trust in media among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in media</th>
<th>SLO</th>
<th>CRO</th>
<th>KOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figure presents percentages.


The analysis of the total Slovenian sample (aged 16–27) shows that younger youth (rho = -0.07, n = 901, p < 0.05), and those with less educated mothers (rho = -0.09, n = 863, p < 0.01) are more likely to trust the media. Interestingly, there is a significantly higher level of trust in the media among more frequent TV viewers (rho = 0.98, n = 901, p < 0.01), and less frequent Internet users (rho = -0.07, n = 900, p < 0.05). On the basis of these findings, it may be argued that among Slovenian youth the concept of “media” predominantly relates to mainstream media forms, such as television, and media as an institution; while the Internet presents (although not exclusively) alternative media forms.

Comparatively, a study of Russian youth (aged 18–24) examined levels of trust in the different types of media. Seven percent of Russian youth found it difficult to answer such a question, or they were not interested in media, or they did not have trust in any media outlet. Television was found to be the most trusted medium (77 percent), while 19 percent expressed trust in Internet publications (newspapers, magazines, information portals), and 8 percent claimed to trust other Internet sources (Volkov, 2012, 61).

Trust is essential for both the continued operation of media, as well as an important condition for democracy (Coronel, 2001; Barnett, 2003; James, 2005; Bodebjerg and Madsen, 2008; Ladd, 2012). However, democracy in Slovenia is arguably under pressure if one takes into account the almost two-thirds of Slovenian youth who have little or no trust in the media, the continued problems in the Slovenian media market, the high levels of distrust for politicians and political parties, and the general lack of engagement among Slovenian youth in politics. As such, the first step
toward resolving these issues is identifying the problem. Engaging young people seems to be a good place to start.

5 Key findings

- Listening to music is the most frequent media use activity among Slovenian (84 percent), Croatian, and Kosovar youth. The least popular activity is reading; only 20 percent of Slovenian youth frequently read books/newspapers. Reading is more frequent among women, those with higher levels of education, older Slovenian youth, and those from larger residential communities.
- The Internet is the primary source of information on political events for Slovenian youth (82 percent).
- Compared to Croatia and Kosovo, Slovenia has the highest proportion of youth with Internet access (>99 percent).
- In 2012, 76 percent of the EU-27, 74 percent of Slovenian, and 66 percent of Croatian households had Internet access.
- Between 2004 and 2010, Slovenia had a higher percentage of households with access to the Internet via mobile phones than the EU-27 average and Croatia.
- In 2010 Slovenian youth spent 2.37 hours per day using the Internet, while in 2013 they spend 3.94 hours; an increase of 1.75 hours per day. This current survey also indicates that 44.5 percent of Slovenian youth are “heavy” Internet users.
- Slovenian youth spend more time using the Internet per day than Croatian, Kosovar, or German youth.
- Communication with friends and other people is the most frequent Internet activity (86 percent), closely followed by the use of online social networks (85 percent).
- Slovenian youth spend almost 2 hours per day watching television, which is approximately two hours less than using the Internet.
- Slovenian young people most frequently watch comedies (72 percent), followed by serials/series (63 percent) and foreign action films (61 percent).
- For television, women, younger youth, and those with lower monthly income levels more frequently view entertainment programs. Information-based programs are favored by older youth, those with higher educational levels, males, those with lower subjective family material status, those with higher monthly incomes, and those from larger residential communities.
- Compared to Croatia and Kosovo, Slovenian youth express the lowest level of trust in the media, with 36 percent having “little” trust. Relatively low levels of trust in the media parallel the general criticisms of politics, institutions, and democracy seen over the past several years (Kirbiš, 2013a; 2013b; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011).
6 References


Kross, E., et al. (2013). Facebook Use Predicts Declines in Subjective Well-Being in Young Adults. PLoS ONE, 8 (8).


Lavrič, Miran et al. (2011). Youth 2010: Social profile of youth in Slovenia [data file]. Slovenia, Maribor: Univerza v Mariboru = University of Maribor, Filozofska fakulteta = Faculty of Arts [production], 2010. Slovenia, Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani = University of Ljubljana, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov = Social Science Data Archive [distribution].


PART VI
HEALTH, HEALTH RISK BEHAVIORS AND LIFESTYLE

1 Introduction

Within the scope of this study, there are three primary reasons to study health and health behaviors among youth. First, numerous studies have shown that childhood, adolescence, and youth health and risk behaviors are predictive, meaning that they identify health conditions occurring later in life (Larson et al., 2012; Sanchez et al., 2013). Second, health is considered one of the most important societal values, and as this study indicates, this is also true among Slovenian youth (Musil and Lavrič, 2011). Third, at the aggregate country level, health is a widely accepted indicator of a country’s socioeconomic development. For example, the Human Development Index, an indicator of socioeconomic development published annually in the United Nations’ Human Development Report (HDR, 2013), consists of three elements: gross national income, educational levels, and life-expectancy at birth; the latter is of course an important indicator of a population’s health.

With regard to research, scholars often focus on health outcomes and health behaviors (e.g., healthy lifestyles). Although the concept of lifestyle has previously been discussed in the chapter on leisure, it should be noted that the notion of lifestyle has also played a prominent role within youth studies, and especially in health studies (e.g., Annandale, 1998; Cockerham, 1997; Nettleton, 2006). For the purposes of this report, health lifestyles are defined as “collective patterns of health-related behavior based on choices from options available to people according to their life chances” (Cockerham et al., 1997, 338). The emphasis on the constraint and determinants of lifestyle largely stem from sociological literature. Indeed, Hansen and Easthope (2006, 38) note that the sociological position on lifestyle is often attributed to Weber (1978):

“...who considered that while choice is ‘the major factor in the operationalization of a lifestyle’, ‘the actualization of choices is influenced by life chances’ (Cockerham et al., 1997, 325). Life chances are the chances that people have because of their position in life. This includes factors such as gender, age, education, employment, income and property as well as rights, norms and social relationships. ‘Hence, lifestyles are not random behaviours unrelated to structure but are typically deliberate choices influenced by life chances’ (Cockerham et al., 1997, 325).

Hansen and Easthope further emphasize this point: “…lifestyle approach has a tendency to blame the victim and is thus moralistic and potentially discriminatory” (2006, 52). Here this study
attempts to avoid conceptual and methodological individualism that emerged in the 1950s, which emphasized the role in chronic disease of individual lifestyle choices (particularly the “big four” of smoking, drinking, diet, and exercise), rather than the structural and environmental conditions that influence patterns of health and behaviors (Gabe et al., 2004, 25). When considering socio-structural determinants of health lifestyle, it is important to investigate not only socio-structural and behavioral (lifestyle) determinants of health, but also the socio-structural determinants of health lifestyles themselves – healthy behaviors or, specifically, health risk behaviors.

This chapter begins by examining the self-reported health status of Slovenian youth. Subsequently, risk behaviors and the link between the three types of health “risk behaviors” – smoking (tobacco use), alcohol use and attitudes toward alcohol use, and obesity/overweight – are examined, particularly as they are most frequently discussed in the scientific literature (Bonino et. al, 2005; Hurrelmann and Richter, 2006; Richter, 2010; Sutton, 2004). The final part of the chapter assesses the link between the three risk behaviors and self-rated health. Risk behaviors refer to “behaviors that can, directly or indirectly, compromise the well-being, the health, and even the life course of young people” (Jessor, 1998, 1); in other words, behaviors that can compromise psychosocial aspects of development, which are negatively associated with health and well-being (Richter, 2010, 26).

2 Self-rated health

Self-rated health (SRH) is one of the most common methods of measurement in survey-based studies. A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that SRH is a powerful predictor of future morbidity, mortality, functional (dis)ability, and other quality of life indicators, even after controlling for objective health status and other physical, socio-demographic, and psychosocial health indicators (Idler and Angel, 1990; Idler and Kasl, 1995; Idler, Russell and Davis, 2000; Kaplan and Camacho, 1983; for a meta-analysis see DeSalvo et al., 2006; for review of longitudinal studies on SRH predicting future mortality see Idler and Benyamini, 1997). As well, SRH has been previously found to be a valid measure of a variety of physical and emotional dimensions of adolescent well-being (Fosse and Haas, 2009). Past studies have identified multiple determinants of SRH in western and post-communist countries (e.g., Baubinas et al., 2009), including in Slovenia (see, for example, EHIS, 2009; Farkas et al., 2009; Farkas and Zaletel-Kragelj, 2011; Jeriček Klanšček and Žiberna, 2012; Kamin, Kolar and Steiner, 2013; Tomsič and Orožen, 2012; Ule and Kudrja, 2013), and cross-national studies in post-communist countries also exist (Pikhart, 2002).

Analysis of the Slovenian data from the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS, 2009) shows that 61.7 percent of respondents (aged 15+) rated their health as “good” or “very good”. The same data also indicate that the highest levels of self-rated health are among youth (aged 15–29) with 87.1 percent rating their health as “good” or “very good” (Božič and Zupanič, 2009). Similar results were presented in a CINDI study of Slovenian adults aged 25 and older (Tomšič and Orožen, 2012), with the youngest age group (25–39) reporting the highest levels of self-rated health. In addition, data from the 2001–2008 indicate that self-rated health increased during the observed years among all three age groups.
On the other hand, there are far fewer studies examining self-rated health among Slovenian youth, particular for the 15-29 age group (studies have tended to focus on adolescents). For example, HBSC studies have examined self-rated health of Slovene adolescents (aged 11, 13, and 15). The 2010 Slovenian HBSC study found that one-half of adolescents (50.2 percent) rated their health as “excellent”, while 39.5 percent considered it “good”, 8.5 percent “fair”, and 1.8 percent “poor” (Jeriček Klanšček, 2011, 73). As expected, the youngest respondents had the highest self-rated health scores: 58.0 percent of 11 year-olds rated their health as “excellent”, compared to 50.7 percent of 13 year-olds, and 42.1 percent of 15 year-olds (Jeriček Klanšček, 2011, 288).

A longitudinal analysis of the Slovenian HBSC 2002, 2006 and 2010 data indicates that there was a statistically significant decrease in the proportion of adolescents rating their health as “poor” or “fair”. The analysis also shows that the decrease of adolescents with poor/fair self-rating between 2002 and 2010 health was detected only among girls. On the other hand, boys rated their health significantly higher than girls in each of the observed years (Jeriček Klanšček and Žiberna, 2012). Higher levels of self-rated health were also reported by adolescents from families with higher SES, and those who reported having more friends (Jeriček Klanšček, 2011).

**Figure 60: Self-rated health of Slovenian youth (16–27 years) (in percent)**

![Bar chart showing self-rated health of Slovenian youth](Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.)

Self-rated health can be measured with a single item, and usually five answers are provided. The WHO recommended version ranges from 1 (“very good”) to 5 (“very bad”), while the US version ranges from 1 (“excellent”) to 5 (“poor”). Since both scales showed similar associations with both demographic and health indicators, and the same relative pattern of international variation (Jürges et al., 2008), it was decided to use the US version upon the recommendation of Jürges et al. (2008; for limitations of single-item of SRH see Van Ginneken and Groenewold, 2012). In sum, and regardless of the version of the item, studies indicate that different single-item measures represent parallel assessments of subjective health (Eriksson et al., 2001).
Figure 60 presents self-rated health measurements among Slovenian youth in 2013. 16.8 percent of respondents rated their health as “excellent”, 36.1 percent “very good” and 35.5 percent “good”. On the other side of the spectrum, only 0.4 percent of respondents rated their health as “poor” and 11.1 percent as “fair”.

The responses were then dichotomized to the self-rated health question: “fair/poor” and “good/very good/excellent” and compared the percentage of respondents with “fair/poor” SRH in the samples of Slovenian youth with other studies. 11.5 percent of Slovenian youth people reported “fair” or “poor” SRH. Chaney et al. (2007) found that among American adults, 16.2 percent of respondents reported “fair/poor” SRH. The lower percentage of respondents with “fair/poor” SRH in the Slovenian sample is not surprising since young people are generally healthier than adults.

Perhaps a better comparison is with the results of Foti and Eaton’s study (2010), which analyzed SRH among American high school students (9th-12th grade; aged approximately 14–18) and found that 15.0 percent reported “fair/poor” SRH (13.4 percent among non-Hispanic whites). Ismail (2013) analyzed SRH in Egypt among 15–29 year-olds, where 13.8 percent of men and 11.6 percent of women reported “fair/poor” SRH. Both studies report a higher percentage of people with “fair/poor” SRH compared to Slovenian youth.

On the other hand, Vingilis et al. (2002) studied SRH among Canadians aged 12–19, and found that 4.20 percent reported “fair/poor” health. In a different study of American adolescents (aged 12–18), Fosse and Haas (2009) found 5.1 percent reported “fair/poor” health. Both studies indicate that the proportion of youth reporting “poor/fair” health among Canadian and American youth was lower than in Slovenia. Taking into account that older respondents tend to report lower SRH (Vingilis et al., 2002), it seems that Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) report similar SRH levels when compared to youth in other developed countries.

Analyses of socio-demographic SRH correlates indicate that only two variables are statistically significant: men (rho = 0.16, n = 909; p < 0.001) and those with higher educated mothers (rho = 0.11, n = 838; p < 0.01) reported higher SRH levels. Interestingly, SES as measured by parental education, proved significant only for mother’s education, and even here the association was small, which indicates that SRH among Slovenian youth does not largely depend on family SES. Similar findings were presented in international HBSC reports of adolescents, where Slovenia had the smallest and least significant link between self-rated health and family affluence (Currie et al., 2010, 67). Nevertheless, the results from this survey are consistent with other youth studies that show males and those with higher SES have better SRH (e.g. Page et al., 2009; Spein et al., 2013; Vingilis et al., 2002; for Slovenia see Buzeti et al., 2011; EHIS, 2009; Jeriček Klanšček and Žiberna, 2012). Interestingly, other socio-demographic variables that were previously found to be associated with SRH proved insignificant among Slovenian youth.

3 Alcohol use and attitudes toward alcohol

According to a 2002 WHO report, alcohol use is among the top ten risks, globally and regionally, related to disease. Together these diseases account for more than one-third of all deaths world-
Global alcohol consumption has increased in recent decades, particularly in developed countries. According to the 2002 report, alcohol caused 1.8 million deaths (3.2 percent) worldwide, which was equal to 4 percent of the global disease burden; the highest proportions of which were in the Americas and Europe. Causal relationships have been found between average volume of alcohol consumption and more than 60 types of disease and injury. Most (though not all) of these relationships are detrimental to health (WHO, 2002, 7, 10, 66).

Young people and adults who frequently consume alcohol are also more often involved in other types of risky behavior, e.g., tobacco use, drug use, low physical activity, sedentary behavior, risky sexual behavior, obesity, and victimization (Monti et al., 2004; Nikula et al., 2009; Santelli et al., 2001; Torrente and Vazsonyi, 2012; Vazsonyi et al., 2003; Zalk et al., 2011; Windle, 1994). Nevertheless, most alcohol related (health) problems affecting young people do not result from chronic heavy drinking but from occasional heavy drinking and intoxication (Ahlström and Österberg, 2004), and from co-occurring risk activities (e.g., drunk driving, consuming alcohol prior to sexual intercourse, etc.) (Windle, 2003).

The European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD, 2011) collected comparable data on substance use among 15–16 year-old European students as a means to monitor trends within and between countries. Data for 2011 show that among 36 participating countries, at least 70 percent of adolescents in all countries but Iceland have drunk alcohol at least once during their lifetime; the average was 87 percent. For the preceding 12 months, the study showed that 79 percent of adolescents had consumed alcohol; 57 percent had over the preceding 30 days.

Similarly, there are some worrisome trends in the Slovenian data. Between 1995 and 2011, there was an increase in the proportion of adolescent respondents reporting the consumption of any alcoholic beverage during the past 12 months (87 percent in 2011; 5th highest among participating countries), the use of any alcoholic beverage during the past 30 days (65 percent), and an increase in the proportion reporting having had five or more drinks on one occasion during the past 30 days (53 percent; 5th highest among participant countries in 2011). Between 2007 and 2011 there was an increase in estimated average alcohol consumption among those who reported to use alcohol (ESPAD, 2011, 127–131).

Results from the Slovenian Youth 2010 study show similar results: 89.5 percent of youth reported occasional alcohol consumption (Musil, 2011, 340). Comparing national data on youth (aged 15-19) from 1993 and 2010, Musil found that the proportion of young people that do not consume alcohol.

37 According to the WHO 2002 Health Report, the ten leading health risk factors globally are: underweight, unsafe sex, high blood pressure, tobacco consumption, alcohol consumption, unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene, iron deficiency, indoor smoke from solid fuels, high cholesterol, and obesity (WHO, 2002, 7).

38 There are some studies that indicate that moderate alcohol use may be more beneficial for health outcomes than abstention. Holahan et al. (2010), for example, examined the association between alcohol consumption and all-cause mortality over 20 years among 1,824 older adults, controlling for a wide range of potential confounding factors associated with abstention and found abstainers and heavy drinkers had increased mortality risks of 51 and 45 percent, respectively, compared to moderate drinkers. In other words, moderate drinker had the lowest rates of mortality.
alcohol (non-drinkers) fell from 28.6 percent to 10.1 percent. This decrease was highest among women, consequentially the gender differences in alcohol use in 2010 were rather small (11.4 percent of female non-drinkers; and 8.8 percent male).

According to the HBSC study, alcohol trends among Slovenian adolescents for the period 2002–2010 were rather stable. There were no significant changes detected with regard to the proportion of adolescents who drank alcohol weekly (12.1 percent in 2010) and those who reported being drunk two or more times in their lives (17.5 percent). There was a significant increase in the proportion of 15 year-olds who reported having consumed their first alcoholic beverage at the age of 13 or earlier (28.5 percent in 2002; to 40.7 percent in 2006; and 45.1 percent in 2010). Although boys reported drinking alcohol more frequently than girls, trends from the observed period indicate that girls are beginning to drink as frequently as boys (Zorko and Bajt, 2012).

Figure 61: Frequency of alcohol use among Slovenian youth (16–27 years) in 2010 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly (every day)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times per week</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only on weekends</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely or never</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figure presents percentages.

Sources: Youth 2010 and CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Widespread alcohol use among Slovenian youth is likely a consequence of the ubiquity of alcohol in Slovenian society. Slovenia is rather tolerant of the practice and adults tend to consume alcohol frequently. Among adults, 28 percent (as reported in 1994) drank wine at least several times per week (15 percent daily) and 20 percent drank beer at least several times per week (7 percent daily) (SJM, 1994/1). Comparing these results with data from 1996 indicate that 23 percent drank wine at least several times per week (11 percent daily) and 30 percent drank beer at least several times per week.
times per week (13 percent daily) (SJM, 1996/2). 40 As such, between 1994 and 1996, adults consumed less wine and more beer (for results of other studies on alcohol use among Slovenian adult population see, Tomšič et al., 2009). In short, most studies verify that Slovenia ranks high globally in alcohol consumption, which presents an important public health issue (Tomšič et al., 2009, 22).

Figure 61 compares alcohol use among Slovenian youth in 2010 and 2013. Not all of the provided answers on this question were identical in both studies; therefore, only equivalent answers were compared (“regularly/every day” and “rarely or never”), shown in the left and right column of Figure 61 for 2010 and 2013, while the two middle columns show data only for 2013. In 2013, 2 percent of Slovenian youth reported consuming alcohol daily, which is a slight decrease from 2010 (4 percent). Additionally, 50 percent of youth reported rarely or never drinking alcohol in 2010, which is a 3 percent increase over 2010 (47 percent). Despite these positive trends, the two middle columns reveal a somewhat different picture. 10 percent of youth drink alcohol several times per week and almost 40 percent drink alcohol on the weekends. When combining these responses, more than half (51 percent) of Slovenian youth drink alcohol at least once a week. Although this survey did not ask questions on the amount of alcohol consumed, the data indicate that alcohol use is widespread among Slovenian youth.

Figure 62: Attitudes toward alcohol among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16-25 years)

Note: The figure presents percentages.

Sources: CEPUUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study and IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study.

These findings are also in accordance with Figure 62, which indicates attitudes toward alcohol among Slovenian, Croatian, and Kosovar youth (aged 16-25). Three-quarters (74 percent) of Slovenian youth indicated that alcohol is acceptable and needed to belong in society, while only 14 percent found it unacceptable. In Croatia, 56 percent found alcohol acceptable and needed to belong in society, with 16 percent finding it unacceptable. In Kosovo, 22 percent found alcohol acceptable and needed to belong in society, and 67 percent found it unacceptable.

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nian youth believe alcohol is “acceptable”, compared to 56 percent in Croatia and only 22 percent in Kosovo. 14 percent of Slovenian youth believe alcohol is “needed for belonging in society”, while only 12 percent see it as “unacceptable”. In Croatia a much larger proportion (29 percent), and especially in Kosovo (two-thirds of respondents), consider alcohol “unacceptable”. It is not surprising that 8.7 percent of “non-drinkers” are among those who believe alcoholic is “acceptable”, while among those who say alcohol is “unacceptable”, 50 percent are “non-drinkers”. Figure 63 shows a cross-national comparison of alcohol consumption, which illustrates that Slovenian youth are the most frequent consumers of alcohol.

**Figure 63:** Frequency of alcohol use among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)

- Regularly (every day)
- Several times per week
- Only on weekends
- Rarely
- No, almost never

![Graph showing alcohol usage frequency among Slovenian, Croatian, and Kosovan youth](image)

**Note:** The figure presents percentages.

**Sources:** CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study and IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study.

In sum, this survey data corroborates the findings from previous studies (Musil, 2011; Zorko and Bajt, 2012; ESPAD, 2011), which show that Slovenian youth frequently consume alcohol and are rather tolerant of the practice. Unfortunately, there were no data available to test this against the hypothesis that national/societal tolerance and use of alcohol among Slovenian adults are the likely reasons that Slovenian youth consume alcohol frequently. Previous studies in other countries have found that higher rates of alcohol use among adolescents and youth is associated with several factors, including higher parental consumption, the perception of incurring little or no punishment, the lack of parental monitoring, discipline, and involvement, and the availability of alcohol to young people (Foley et al., 2004; Hawkins et al., 1992; Latendresse et al., 2008; Ryan, Jorm and Lubman, 2010; Sanchez et al., 2013). As the HBSC report indicates that many Slovenian young people consume their first glass of alcohol before the age of 13 (Zorko and Bajt, 2012), it is possible that parents are allowing their children to drink alcohol under their supervision. Research refers to this as “harm-minimization setting”, whereby the allowance of the practice at home will reduce...
the development of adolescent alcohol problems. However, studies have shown that this strategy has proved ineffective in other western countries (Gilligan and Kypri, 2012; McMorris et al., 2011). McMorris et al. (2011) therefore suggest parents adopt a “no-use” standard to reduce harmful alcohol use among their children. Yet given the frequency and tolerance toward alcohol among Slovenian adults, this seems an undesired and unlikely strategy among parents.

An examination of socio-demographic correlates of alcohol consumption showed gender had the highest effect; men drink alcohol more frequently \( (\rho = 0.23, n = 906; p < 0.01) \), a result consistent with other Slovenian youth studies (Tomšič et al., 2009; Musil, 2011). As with smoking (see results below), youth who have more educated parents drink alcohol somewhat more frequently \( (\rho = 0.08, n = 868; p < 0.05) \), higher levels of mother’s education \( (\rho = 0.11, n = 835; p < 0.001) \), while other standard socio-demographic correlates proved insignificant.

4 Tobacco use

Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable death, and kills more than 5 million people each year worldwide, with most of these deaths occurring in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2009, 8). Smoking, however, is also a problem in high-income countries. According to data from 2000 tobacco use is the leading cause of death in the United States (18.1 percent of total deaths), followed by poor diet and physical inactivity (365,000 deaths; 15.2 percent), and by alcohol consumption (85,000 deaths; 3.5 percent) (Mokdad et al., 2004). Further, more than three-quarters of cardiovascular disease—the world’s leading cause of death—results from tobacco use, high blood pressure or cholesterol, or a combination of the three (WHO, 2002, 8). Experimenting with smoking and the onset of regular smoking usually occur in the early teenage years and adolescence (Conrad et al., 1992; Jarvis, 2004; Prokhorov et al., 2006) and early nicotine exposure directly increases the level of later nicotine dependence. By age 20, 80 percent of smokers regret having started to smoke, and in general, less than 3 percent of attempts to quit smoking result in sustained (12 month) cessation (Jarvis, 2004).

The results of the Youth 2010 study revealed that 44.5 percent of Slovenian youth occasionally smoke tobacco (Musil, 2011, 340). Comparing national data on youth smoking (aged 15–19) from 1993 and 2010, Musil (2011) found that there was an increase in the proportion of young non-smokers, among both males and females. Slovenian HBSC data from 2002 to 2010 indicated that there was a decrease in the proportion of adolescents who have tried smoking (29.2 percent in 2010); of those who smoked at the time of the survey (10.9 percent in 2010); those who smoke weekly (7.6 percent in 2010) and those who smoke daily (5.2 percent) (Koprivnikar, 2012). Similar declining tobacco use trends have been reported in the Slovenian Global Youth Tobacco Survey (Juričič, 2008).

According to the ESPAd report, 54 percent of adolescents in 36 participating European countries reported that they had smoked cigarettes at least once in their lifetime; 28 percent reported that they had smoked during the past 30 days. 2 percent of all the respondents had smoked at least one pack of cigarettes per day during the past 30 days. According to ESPAD data, the proportion
of Slovenian adolescents who reported smoking during the past 30 days increased between 1995 and 2011 (from 26 percent to 32 percent), but decreased from 2003 to 2007 (ESPAD, 2011, 125, 341).

Figure 64 shows the frequency of tobacco use among Slovenian youth in 2010 and 2013. Since the answers provided to the respondents on this question were not identical in both years, data were only compared when identical answers were available. In 2013 every fourth young person reported smoking daily and 40 percent of Slovenian youth smoke at least occasionally (regularly or occasionally). On the other hand, 60 percent of youth are “non-smokers”. Comparing the two answers with the Youth 2010 study, the proportion of regular smokers increased (although minimally) in 2013, while at the same time, the percentage of non-smokers also increased (from 54 percent to 60 percent).

Since smoking has remained popular among one-quarter of Slovenian youth, policies should be implemented to help them break the habit. Equally worrying is the fact that 4 out of 10 young Slovenians smoke at least occasionally, particularly as it has been found that occasional tobacco use has a negative impact on health and should be discouraged. The increasing number of non-smokers among Slovenian youth, on the other hand, is a positive trend. However, this might also indicate that there is an increasing polarization toward smoking attitudes among young people.

Figure 64: Frequency of tobacco use among Slovenian youth (16–27 years) in 2010 and 2013

Note: The figure presents percentages.
Sources: Youth 2010 and CEPIYS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Figure 65’s cross-national perspective shows that out of four countries, Slovenia has the second lowest proportion of regular smokers (25 percent), while Croatia has the most regular smokers (31 percent).
percent of youth). Slovenia also has the second highest proportion of non-smokers (60 percent), while Kosovo has the most non-smokers (three-quarters of youth).

Figure 65: Frequency of tobacco use among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)

Note: The figure presents percentages.

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study and Shell 2010 German Youth Study.

An examination of socio-demographic correlates of smoking among Slovenian youth (aged 16-27) shows that older age (rho = 0.08, n = 901; p < 0.01), having a better-educated father (rho = 0.10, n = 830; p < 0.01), and not being enrolled in school (rho = 0.10, n = 830; p < 0.01) increase the likelihood of more frequent smoking. When controlling for age, school enrollment still had a significant negative impact, which indicates that school environments might discourage smoking, though this hypothesis requires further testing.

5 Body-mass index

Research shows that obesity significantly impacts upon mortality levels in western countries (Bouchard and Katzmarzyk, 2010; Flegal et al., 2013; Masters et al., 2013) and that obesity rates have increased in recent decades in developed and developing countries to epidemic proportions. The most recent studies covering the US have found that these increases have made obesity an equal, if not greater, contributor to disease than smoking (Jia and Lubetkin, 2010; Hennekens and Andreotti, 2013).

In Slovenia, Djomba’s (2010) analysis of the CINDI Health Monitor Slovenia data found that obesity has increased from 2001 to 2008 among the adult population (aged 25–75). Eurostat data from an EHIS study (EHIS, 2008) of adults 18 and older shows that Slovenia has the fourth highest proportion of overweight and obese people in Europe (the average number of overweight/obese
women and men is 56.6 percent according to EHIS data), behind Malta, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic. The high average rates of overweight/obesity in Slovenia are due primarily to higher rates among men (66.2 percent) than among women (47.0 percent). In fact, Slovenia has the second highest overweight/obesity rate among men in Europe (EHIS, 2008).

In a study of Slovenian children and adolescents, Avbelj et al. (2005) analyzed the prevalence of overweight/obese children (aged 5). 18.4 percent of boys and 20.9 percent of Slovenian girls were overweight, while 9.0 percent of boys and 7.9 of girls were obese. Among adolescents, 17.1 percent of boys and 15.4 percent of girls were overweight, while 6.2 percent of boys and 3.8 percent of girls were obese. Avbelj concluded that the prevalence of obesity among Slovenian youth was similar to other developed European countries. The latest data on youth obesity, however, shows even more worrying results. Among young males (aged 18–24), Slovenia has the third highest proportion of overweight/obese men (35.1 percent) (EHIS, 2008). This is especially problematic given that previous studies have shown that early life (youth) obesity (body mass index (BMI) 30 or above) predicts adult obesity (Trudeau, 2010).

Past research also suggests that the proportion of overweight and obese youth is on the rise in Slovenia. Kovač et al. (2008) compared body-mass index of young boys (aged 7–18) for 1991 and 2006 and found that the proportion of overweight boys increased by 40 percent (from 13.5 percent to 18.8 percent), whereas the proportion of obese boys more than doubled (from 2.8 percent to 6.1 percent). The prevalence of overweight/obesity was found to be highest in childhood and early adolescence; more than double the number of those aged 18. The international HBSC data (where mostly European and North American countries participate) indicate that Slovenia ranks seventh, ninth, and fifth with regard to the highest proportion of overweight/obese 11, 13, and 15-year-olds, respectively. For example, among those aged 15, 23 percent of Slovenian boys and 13 percent of Slovenian girls are overweight/obese (Currie et al., 2010, 91). In analyzing available Slovenian data of older youth BMI index rates, Musil (2011, 337) reported an increase in the proportion of youth being weight/obese from 2001 to 2010, although the increase was rather minimal.

This study compared youth study data from 2010 and 2013. As is customary, BMI was calculated with the formula: Weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared (weight (kg) / [height (m)²]). In addition, this study used classified BMI using the same criteria as the World Health Organization with the following general categories; “underweight” (BMI below 18.5 kg/m²), “normal weight/range” (BMI between 18.5 and 24.99 kg/m²), “overweight” (BMI between 25 and 29.99 kg/m²) and “obese” (BMI 30 kg/m² or over).

Figure 66 shows the average body max indices of Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) in 2010 and 2013 (note: this is a relatively short period of time). As Figure 66 indicates, the proportion of obese youth remained practically the same in this window, while the proportion of overweight young people increased minimally by 1.3 percent. The difference between the percentage of overweight/obese youth between 2010 (22.1 percent) and 2013 (23.4 percent) was not statistically significant (p > 0.05), which means that no trend has been detected. On the other hand, the proportion of youth within the “normal” range fell from 74.1 percent to 71.6 percent, which is largely due to the increase of underweight youth from 3.8 percent to 5.0 percent. Future research is needed to deter-

41 EUROSTAT notes that data on Malta has low reliability.
mine the factors contributing to the increase in underweight youth, particularly as it may concern the impact of the “ideal” body image advertised in mass media, poor nutrition (economic crisis might have a negative effect on nutrition patterns), or other related factors.

Figure 66: Body mass index of Slovenian youth (16–27 years) in 2010 and 2013

Note: The figure presents percentages.
Sources: Youth 2010 and CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Figure 67 shows the proportion of overweight and obese Slovenian youth (aged 16-27) by major socio-demographic groups. The proportion of overweight/obese youth is higher among men (rho = 0.20, n = 901; p < 0.001), older youth (rho = 0.14, n = 901; p < 0.001), and those not enrolled in school (rho = 0.11, n = 888; p < 0.001). Similarly, the Youth 2010 study found women and younger youth to have a lower likelihood of being overweight/obese (Musil, 2011), as did other cross-national studies (e.g., Currie et al., 2010). Educational levels also play a role. Young people with less educated mothers and fathers are more frequently overweight/obese; however, the association was not significant. Interestingly, those with higher levels of education were disproportionally more overweight/obese, but the association became insignificant when controlling for age.

6 An unhealthy lifestyle and self-rated health

Past research consistently shows that unhealthy (i.e. risk) behaviors are frequently associated. Moreover, the findings indicate positive associations between different behaviors, such as higher body-mass index, more frequent sedentary behavior (e.g., watching television), less physical activity, and unhealthy dietary habits (e.g., less frequent consumption of fruit and vegetables) (see, among others, Al-Hazzaa et al., 2012; Al-Nakeeb et al., 2012; Crowe et al., 2011; Isasi et al., 2006; Kruger et al., 2013; Mensink, Loose and Oomen, 1997; Sandercock et al., 2012; Sisson et al., 2010; also see Cockerham, 2010). In their study of fifteen-year olds, Alamian and Paradis (2009; 2012) found that 26 percent of the study participants reported three or more risk behaviors, while 30 percent reported two. As such, this study explored the extent to which three examined risk be-
behaviors (alcohol use, smoking, and overweight/obesity) among Slovenian youth contribute to an unhealthy lifestyle. In other words, are these behaviors (positively) interrelated, which can be understood as forming a risk behavior pattern? Second, how are these behaviors associated with the health of Slovenian youth?

Figure 67: Proportion of overweight and obese Slovenian youth (16–27 years), by major socio-demographic groups

![Graph showing proportions](image)

Note: The figure presents percentages.

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

As illustrated above, statistical analyses indicate that the anticipated social gradient, which would indicate more unhealthy/risky behaviors among youth who are worse off, did not generally emerge, at least when measured by respondents’ and parental educational levels. In fact, the opposite was found to be true in terms of the effect of parental education on the frequency of drinking and smoking. On the other hand, socio-demographic characteristics (especially gender and age) were found to influence lifestyle (risk behaviors). For this reason, a partial correlation analysis of body-mass index (BMI), alcohol use and tobacco use, controlling for age, sex, and respondents’ and maternal and paternal educational levels was performed.

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42 BMI was re-coded into two categories for the purpose of these analyses (1 = underweight and normal range weight; 2 = overweight/obesity).
Controlling for socio-demographic correlates, smoking was found to be significantly associated with alcohol use ($\rho = 0.21$, $p < 0.001$), indicating that *those who reported a higher frequency of smoking also consume alcohol more frequently. Smoking was not significantly associated with BMI, while BMI was associated with alcohol use* ($\rho = 0.08$, $p < 0.05$).

Finally, associations between the three risk behaviors and self-rated health (SRH) were examined, controlling for the same standard socio-demographic variables. Interestingly, *alcohol use was not significantly associated with SRH*, while *more frequent tobacco use* ($r = 0.16$, $p < 0.01$) and *higher body-mass index* ($r = 0.13$, $p < 0.01$) *were associated with poorer self-health ratings*. In other words, the healthiest youth (as measured by SRH) were non-smokers and those within the normal range weight, as expected.

In conclusion, the data indicate that men and young people with more educated mothers report better SRH. Two of the analyzed health risk behaviors, tobacco use and obesity/overweight, cluster together into an “unhealthy lifestyle”. Further, tobacco use and obesity/overweight also seem to affect significantly the health of Slovenian youth. Future studies should also examine other indicators of health and health risk behaviors (e.g., using more fine-tuned measurements of alcohol use).

### 7 Key findings

Self-rated health (SRH) levels among Slovenian youth are similar to youth populations from other countries. 16.8 percent of Slovenian young people rate their health as “excellent”, 36.1 percent as “very good”, and 35.5 percent as “good”. Only 0.4 percent of respondents rated their health as “poor” and 11.1 percent as “fair”.

SRH is significantly higher among men. Socioeconomic status (SES) as measured by parental education proved to be a significant correlate of SRH only for mother’s education (though the correlation was small), indicating that SRH among Slovenian youth does not strongly depend on family SES. These findings echo the results of previous studies on Slovenian youth (see Currie et al., 2010, 67). Nevertheless, future studies should examine other structural determinants, such as living conditions, employment status, socialization patterns, etc. (see Cockerham, 2010) and other measures of health, lifestyles, and risk behaviors.

In 2013, 2 percent of Slovenian youth report consuming alcohol “regularly/daily”, which is a decrease over 2010, when 4 percent reported being “daily” drinkers. 50 percent “rarely” or “never” drank alcohol in 2013, which shows an increase in the non-drinking population from 2010 (47 percent). Almost three-quarters (74 percent) of Slovenian youth believe alcohol is “acceptable”, compared to 56 percent in Croatia and 22 percent in Kosovo. Men and those with higher educated parents more frequently consume alcohol.

Compared to 2010 the proportion of “regular” smokers remained rather stable in 2013, while the percentage of “non-smokers” increased (from 54 percent to 60 percent). 40 percent of young Slovenians smoke tobacco at least “occasionally” or more frequently. Men, young people not enrolled in school, and those with higher parental education levels (father’s education) are more frequent tobacco smokers.
Between 2010 and 2013, the proportion of obese youth remained stable, while the proportion of overweight youth increased by only 1.3 percentage points (19.1 percent). The proportion of underweight youth increased by 1.2 percentage points (from 3.8 to 5.0 percent).

Youth who smoke also consume alcohol more frequently. Smoking is not significantly associated with the risk of being overweight/obese, while being overweight/obese is associated with alcohol use.

The healthiest youth in Slovenia (as measured by self-rated health) are non-smokers and those within the normal weight range.

8 References


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1 Introduction

As a means to understand contemporary family dynamics, one must look to wider societal changes. A branch of sociologists have over the past decade argued that major social notions and phenomena are in a state of flux, liquidity, and uncertainty (Bauman 2000, Beck, 2006, 78-82), which disputes early positivistic claims that the development of the field is through greater discoveries of “laws” and “determinisms”. More contemporary sociologists have begun to examine “the liquid” nature of modern social life (Bauman, 2000), which includes uncertainty, ambivalence, and fluidity. Such notions can be applied to the family, particularly in Europe. The liquidizing powers have moved from the “system” to “society”, from “politics” to “life-policies”, or have descended from the “macro” to the “micro” level of habitation (Bauman, 2000, 7), i.e., the family. Here, liquidizing processes refer to the idea that the individual is forced to choose his own life course, constantly “reflexing” on his changing situation. Some may hail this as emancipation and liberation from entrenched traditional patterns, while more sober thinkers criticize the inherent anomie: “the absence, or mere inclarity of norms – anomie – is the worst lot which may occur to people” (Bauman, 2000, 21).

As such, it is difficult to question whether the European family is undergoing rapid and fundamental change. Daly summarizes several of these changes: on family forms, living alone has increased sharply, particularly over the second half of the 20th century; on fertility, a downward trend has been noticeable, particularly in the recent context of Europe; and on marriage, a similar decline has been apparent, particularly how it relates to parenthood outside wedlock. These three major changes have brought about “an increasing variation in the composition of households and families” (2005, 282). As to family organization, she finds “the two income family is now the dominant form in most EU 15 states” (2005, 383), although the two incomes are not typically equal (a trend which is not limited to EU-15 countries). She further claims that household chores are not yet equally distributed (2005, 384). Daly also observes that this change is purely economic and that the Parsonian model of breadwinner-homemaker is no longer (if it ever had been) the dominant pattern of family organization. Finally, as to family relations and values, Daly finds a troubling uncoiling between “coupledom (partnership) and parenthood”. “Partnership demands mobility and is typically not founded in a long-term commitment, whereas the increasingly child-centered family of today requires immobility and stability” (2005, 386), which would amount to an internal contradiction within the structure of daily relations. Of course, these trends vary throughout Europe. However, as Flere and Klanjšek (2011) have established, inter-country variations between family patterns are diminishing in favor of some basic general trends.
Another observed feature concerns the so-called decline of the family institution, namely that it exerts less influence over its members (Popenoe 1993, 537). Popenoe’s concern relates to the family as a societal component: “Breaking up the nucleus of anything is a serious matter” (1993, 539). This contradicts the logic noted above, namely that individuals are finding new spaces of liberty in choice and open-endedness (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).

This picture of the European family is based on empirical data. Theoretical interpretations, however, diverge significantly. As early as 1992, Giddens argued in favor of “pure relationships” (1992, 88-9) amongst partners, i.e., previous institutionalization, heteronomy, and imposition were all waived, ceasing to being a “social fact” in Durkheim’s terms; relationships were no longer coerced, patterned, and uniform. “Pure relationships” are entered into consensually, for their own sake and the partners’ enjoyment, extracting their maintenance solely from their satisfaction, i.e., the tightly molded conventional life plan did not apply. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim follow this line of reasoning, concluding that society has reached a point where “individuals have to invent or find their own social setting, love become[ing] the central meaning to their lives” (1995, 170). Thus, Giddens finds the family to be “a shell institution” (“emptied of content”, 1999, 19), while Beck and Beck-Gernsheim consider it “a zombie institution” (2002, 203). More traditional sociologists have been less vocal in their dissent, although the family remains a ubiquitous part of any standard sociology textbook, statistical studies, and data collection. Gilding (2010) is among the few authors who have attempted to reaffirm the institutional nature of the family. He finds three indicators supporting a diagnosis of its enduring institutional nature: paternity matching (where he documents the rarity and exceptionality of mismatching); and inheritance, referring to historical-comparative findings on the stability of estate succession by descendants and family businesses, which have “an enduring role”, even “at the commanding heights of capitalism” (2010, 769). The endurance of family businesses across cultures runs in the face of simplistic rational choice explanations and can be attributed only to the immanence of the family linking at different generations, not only in succession, but also in operation.

According to Beck and Beck Gernsheim, if the family exists at all it is increasingly subjugated to the logic of individually designed lives. “The family is becoming more of an elective relationship, an association of individual persons, who each bring to it their own interests, experiences, and plans and who are each subjected to different controls, risks and constraints” (2002, 98). This means that the founding of one’s own family is often extended to later points in life. It may be reorganized by remarriage, or some other partnership, or even without partnership. Internal relations are adjusted to the individual wants and desires of its members, and these take precedence over family pattern. Medically assisted fertilization also fundamentally alters the course of family relations (Beck and Beck Gernsheim, 2002).

Given the above, this study seeks out the underlying question of whether individualism is present amongst Slovenian youth, and if so, how does it manifest, and to what degree.
2 Family structure

Over a long period, family size has been diminishing in conjunction with the processes of modernization, and the heightened relevance of individualism. In this respect, family size is often measured by household as a proxy (Burić, 1976).

The same holds true for Slovenian households, although young people on average live with their parents for longer periods of time (Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011).

Where it concerns living alone, Slovenia ranks very low in Europe. Data collected for this study revealed that living alone is much more frequent among German youth, with 13 percent of those aged 16-25 living alone (compared to less than 1 percent of Slovenians in the same age group). In fact, living alone appears to divide along Europe’s north-south axis, where youth in the south tend to remain in their parental house for longer periods (Chorosewitz and Wolff, 2010). This trend is confirmed by the data collected for Slovenia, where, according to 2011 Eurostat data, 62 percent of young adults (aged 18-34) still live with their parents, well above the EU-27 average of 45 percent.

These numbers are clearly not indicative of individualization. However, even residing within the parental home, it is possible to organize life in an individualized manner. According to the data, this appears to be the case for Slovenian youth, particularly where it concerns the responses given for relations with parents and partners (see further analyses in this text and also Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011, 362).

Figure 68: Average household size, by country

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Survey

Data in the figure above, although originating in sample studies, are reliable as far as relative relations between the countries in question. Although in Kosovo, the family is usually larger in size, the country is no longer dominated by extended family units residing in rural areas, which was the case until the dissolution of Yugoslavia (in 1986, the average household sizes in the 3 envi-
Family relations combine a complex set of variables, including emotionality, household chores, finance, child upbringing, etc. Each involves some level of decision-making. The contemporary family has been under stress due to the changes in basic patterns, from the Parsonian model to other models and model-free relations, as underscored by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002). Thus, in light of these rapidly occurring changes, relations among family members may be under stress. This issue is given further illumination by the responses found in this report’s survey.

Figure 69: Perceptions of relationship with parents

Which of the following statements best describes your relationship with your parents?

- We get along very well
- We get along, although sometimes we have differences in opinion
- In general, we do not get along, we often argue
- Very conflictual relationship
- My parents are not alive
- Don’t know / No answer

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In the above figure showing harmony/disharmony in the family, the Kosovo sample indicates an almost idyllic situation. This could be the result of the influence of social desirability, in view of the exceedingly rapid family changes found in this environment. Social desirability may be absent in the other two national samples, though the Slovenian data indicate the presence of a more harmonious and amicable situation than what is found in Croatia. Taking into account the more permissive family patterns observed already in the 19th century in Slovenia, this variance is perhaps not surprising (LePlay, see Flere and Klanjšek, 2011). The two answers indicating a negative situation comprise only 7 percent of the total for Slovenia. The youngest group reports having the best relations with their parents (M = 1.82), whereas this seems to decrease as young people age (M = 1.72 in both age groups). Good relations are related positively with authoritative parenting (.250** - a very high magnitude, considering that these are separate phenomena), future orientation (.152**), and negatively with authoritarian parenting (-.182**).
3.1 Decision making by young people

Respondents were asked how family members influence their decisions, not specifying subject, nor whether they are minor or major decisions (Figure 70).

*Figure 70: Perceived influence of parents on young people’s decisions*

*How do you take important decisions?*

- [ ] My parents decide about everything
- [ ] My parents and I take decisions jointly
- [ ] I decide independently
- [ ] DK / NA


*In spite of Slovenian young people living predominantly in the parental home, the data indicate a prevalence of individualized decision-making.* The absolute majority make decisions independently, which counters the data found in Croatia and Kosovo. It should be noted that “decisions” remains unspecified, and could run the gamut of purchasing new stockings, going out in the evening, or continuing education. Nonetheless, independent decision-making appears prevalent in Slovenia, whereas it is only a minority phenomenon in the other two case studies (although Croatians young people are not significantly behind).

Figure 71 compares the three samples with regard to who influences young people’s decisions.

Figure 71 shows that *mothers are typically the central unit within the Slovenian families, and the most important decision-making figures*, even when young people claim to make decisions “independently”. On average, this is also the case for Croatia, although respondents indicated a slightly larger parental influence and authority. The closeness of the Slovenian and Croatian distribution helps to dismiss recent claims that there is an emerging pattern of absent fathers as a “national peculiarity” in Slovenia. Moreover, it has been well established that there is greater maternal physical and emotional care, even in contemporary conditions (Johnson, Shulman and Collins, 1991, Brand and Climes Dougan, 2010), which contrasts several national Slovenian studies (Godina-Vuk, 2012).
The Kosovo distribution clearly indicates a more established paternal presence. Other studies, however, illustrate the closeness between father and child is lower than the closeness between mother and child (Flouri, 2004, as would follow from the Parsonian model).

In this Slovenian sample, dependence upon mother for decision-making is substantially more frequent among girls than among boys (p<0.01). However, this association is dependent on the level of education (more educated mothers exert more authority, which is also true for fathers). In other words, reliance is dependent on a parent’s level of education. Differences in parenting styles, observed in this type of reliance analysis, are not radical among those who claim to rely on their mother versus their father; however, authoritative parenting is indicated somewhat more frequently among those when relied on their mother (10.6 percent compared to 10.3 percent). Authoritarian parenting is more frequent when young people rely on their father (7.3 percent compared to 6.3 percent, the largest difference found in this analysis). Future orientation is mentioned somewhat more frequently among respondents who rely more on their mother (11.4 percent compared to 11.0 percent); narcissism of both types show no significant difference; average grades are higher among respondents who rely upon their father (3.20 vs. 3.00); however, there are higher rates of deviance reported (17.2 percent compared to 16.9 percent). Of course, further research is needed to understand the full effects of authoritarian father figures.

4 Coupledom

Daly (2005) considers the major structural problem of the contemporary family in how it relates to coupledom. Whereas the upbringing of children demands stability, contemporary coupledom is on average unstable. Religious, customary, and even legal norms no longer regulate the relationships of partners, and this gap is often filled by emotionality and ending, as Beck-Gernsheim
states “the normal chaos of love”. This is, of course, in contrast to traditional society, where coupledom was strictly patterned and seemingly unchangeable (“until death do you part”).

Coupledom is destabilized by the institutionalization of divorce, employment patterns of the husband, and in particular the wife (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), the advancement of extramarital, factual unions and even of LAT (Living Apart Together).

In the 2010 investigation of Slovenian youth, Lavrič found LAT to fit particularly well within the Slovenian context (2011, 362). As such, this requires consideration, alongside the decreasing nuptial rates in Slovenia.

4.1 Preferred status as to coupledom

In this investigation, respondents were asked on their preferred form of future coupledom (or absence thereof).

*Figure 72: Visions of future partnership*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married, with own family</th>
<th>In unmarried relationship</th>
<th>Without partner and family</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 72 illustrates cross-national levels of individualization in both personal and private lives. In Slovenia, marriage is no longer a socially imposed institution, (i.e., something deemed mandatory). Less than two-thirds of Slovenian respondents specified a future interest in marriage; however, a large number of respondents reported no interest. *Almost one-quarter of Slovenian youth prefer an unmarried relationship, which is four times more than the Croatian sample.* This does not mean that Slovenians are necessarily more “progressive”. Informal units have been understood to heighten many partnership disputes, considering the precariousness of its existence. Although the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) usually considers extramarital unions equal to marriage, in one case it held that “the absence of (such) a legally binding agreement between the applicant and Mr. A. renders their relationship, however defined, fundamentally different from that of a married couple or a couple in a registered partnership” (*Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands*, 42857/05, delivered in 2012). As such, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that individualization *is well under way in Slovenia* and more so than in the other two countries.
Figure 73: Importance of factors in choosing husband or wife (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family approval</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collegial interest</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic standing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family approval</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family approval</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common interests</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family approval</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional origin</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This, of course, does not mean that marriage in Slovenia is a remnant of the past; however, Slovenia does have a comparative low nuptial rate when compared to other EU countries (according to Eurostat, Slovenia was second lowest in 2012, and lowest in 2011).

In the Slovenian sample, those with better-educated parents claim to be less interested in marriage (1.38 among those with post-graduate studies completed, compared to 1.22 among those with incomplete elementary education (p < 0.01) (1 being marriage, 2 being other answers, where “do not know” also indicates marriage is not mandatory). This is also more frequent (although rather insignificantly) when taking into account the individual youth’s level of education. In addition, women visualize marriage significantly more frequently than men (1.26 compared to 1.32).

4.2 Characteristics important for prospective spouse

Respondents were also asked about the characteristics they seek in a future spouse (Figure 73).

The survey included possible characteristics of future spouses for each of the three countries. Even taking into consideration social desirability, the differences among the samples are rather convincing in terms of progress toward individualization. However, the personality of the future spouse does not offer much in the way of data given that it is generally accepted as an important criterion (the survey did not ask respondents to rank the criteria). Physical appearance is considered most important in the Croatian sample. Common interests, although considered in earlier studies as very important in maintaining a marriage, is considered less frequently among the Slovenian sample, which speaks to the previous discussion on “pure relationships”, where each partner is not only individualized in his/her own interests, but as well free to pursue those particular interests.

Education is considered least important in the Slovenian sample, rejecting traditional criteria (on partners needing to fit culturally), along with economic standing, which opens the door toward the individualization of choosing one’s spouse from a variety of different backgrounds. The same holds true for family approval, where there is a major difference between the Slovenian sample and the other two countries. It is relevant in Slovenia on in exceptional circumstances, whereas in Kosovo it is almost a rule.

The regional belonging of the partner may be affected by the size of the respective countries, although even in Slovenia regional differences and social distances exist. The magnitude of these answers is remarkably small amongst the Slovenia sample, which again is evidence of individualization. The much greater magnitude of this answer in Kosovo is perhaps due to ethnicity, which was not directly addressed in the survey.

In sum, Slovenia appears to foster as environment of individualization in personal life, where notions of marriage may be deemed progressive.

Youth that are more future oriented (and perhaps by nature, more self-controlled and cautious) consider most spousal characteristics as important for marriage. This is evident when one compares youth who rate themselves as less future oriented. As well, females usually attain higher average scores on the spousal candidate features, which indicate that they are on average more
serious about marriage than men. The only exceptions are virginity and appearance, where they score significantly lower than males.

Figure 74: Mean values on relevance of potential spouse characteristics, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common interests</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family approval</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic standing</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional affiliation</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginity</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.3 Age appropriate for marriage

The respondents were asked what they consider an appropriate age for marriage. The later one enters into marriage is usually indicative of heightened individualization, i.e., allowing sufficient time for other relationships beforehand. Nevertheless, the question has been worded impersonally, which allows for a general statement on the proper of age.

The major decision in coupledom (aside from bearing children) concerns whether or not to marry. In Eastern Europe, the longstanding rule was for couples to marry young, as brides were regarded as a benefit for the family. This contrasted Western European norms, where marriage was associated with the groom’s disposal of the estate, however small (acquired from his father). Thus, in Western Europe, most people entered into marriage at later periods in life, and in some cases, including Slovenia, much later (Flere and Klanjšek, 2011).

Today, marriage decisions appear to be a product of environmental expectations and rules, and the desire to establish one’s own household. Increasingly, however, marriage is taking on a more individualized context. Respondents were asked what they consider the proper age for young peo-
people to enter into a marriage (leaving aside the issue of whether marriage should be entered into in the traditional manner).

Figure 75: The average perceived best age for marriage

What, in your opinion, is the best marriage age for men and for women?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For men</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For women</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The best perceived age for marriage in Slovenia is the highest among the samples observed, leaving time for other forms of partnerships, relationships, and economic conditions to mature. Croatian respondents indicate a slightly lower appropriate age, whereas young Kosovars indicate a significantly lower age. Of course, the results can be taken as further indicators of individualization, as more time is allowed the “normal chaos of love”, a sentiment championed by Slovenians.

The above notwithstanding, there is empirical evidence showing that individualization processes are more stagnant. It is worth reiterating Lavrič and Klanjšek’s (2011) finding that “living apart together” befits the Slovenian young, particularly given the precarious work situation, extended education, generous family households, and good relations with parents.

Thus, cohabitation in Slovenia is low when compared to other EU countries (second only to Greece; Chorosewitz and Wolff, 2010). A 2010 study showed this to be decreasing (when compared to Chorosewitz’s 2008 results) for those aged 25-29: 40 percent of men and 58 percent of women cohabitated with their spouse. The results in this study show that for those aged 23-27, the average number of young people who cohabitated with their partner was 23.4 percent in 2013; in 2010, the average was 28.5 percent.

5 Key findings/Final remarks

- Slovenian youth reside with their parents for longer periods, where good relations and generous dwelling situations predominate, allowing for LAT situations.
- Young Slovenians report predominantly good relations with their parents.
LAT befits Slovenian youth due to the precarious work situation, extended education, generous family households, and predominantly harmonious relations with parents.

The individualization of personal life has progressed in Slovenia, whereby two-fifths of respondents either do not wish to marry in the future, or want to wait until they are much older before getting married. Further, the share of those living with a partner has been declining at least since 2008.

Slovenian young people tend to rate themselves as independent in their decision-making (i.e., emancipated from their parents), which is also indicative of individualization of personal and private life. Upon closer inspection, however, it appears as though mothers tend to influence decision-making.

However, given conflicting evidence, individualization does not entirely dominate the private lives of young Slovenians. The majority still envisage marriage in the future. It can be concluded though that Slovenian young people believe marriage should allow for individualization in some aspects of life.

6 References


Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands (42857/05, delivered in 2012). Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{“documentcollectionidz”:[“GRANDCHAMBER”,“CHAMBER”]} (Aug., 2013).
PART VIII
ANXIETIES AND ASPIRATIONS

1 Introduction

Youth is widely considered a time of development toward future life plans, and the commencement of “navigation”, which is to bring young people into a “port”, or instead temporary situations of work, settlement, and intimacy. In the contemporary situation, the trend favors the latter, which subsequently becomes the basis of both anxieties and aspirations.

2 Psychological foundations: narcissism and time orientation

Many psychological constructs and traits are known to be strong predictors of behavior and attitudes. This study, however, ignores authoritarianism, a trait which has been examined in previous studies (Flere and Musil, 2011), and which is known to produce socially undesirable behavior, like dogmatism. Instead, this study focuses on other significant psychological traits as possible predictors of anxieties, aspirations, and behavior.

2.1 Narcissism

Narcissism is a widely used term, originally introduced by Freud to indicate the feeling of grandiosity, and inflated self-esteem, among others, and is presumably the product of internal conflict within the personality. In contemporary personality studies, narcissism has been widely expanded into a multidimensional construct. Lasch (1991) asserts that narcissistic grandiosity is typical of contemporary times, related to mass consumption, and the attention paid to “beautification”, and “remaining young”. Other maladaptive traits and attitudes have also been mentioned, e.g., being manipulative and callous; having disregard for others; lacking empathy, etc. On the other hand, some types and degrees of narcissism are necessary and positive in the era of individualism and individualization. Within Slovenian public discourse, it has been widely noted that Slovenian young people are narcissistic and that this phenomenon is related to negative features in their behavior and attitudes (Godina Vuk, 2011). It should be noted that these sentiments lack empirical proof.

This study (Flere and Musil, 2011, 427-9) intends to shed light on this phenomenon. Using Margolis and Thomas’ (1980) conceptualization, two dimensions of grandiose narcissism were examined: exploitative and non-exploitative. Non-exploitative, i.e., (pure) grandiose narcissism, was found to be a common trait among a slight majority of respondents. It was often associated with
education attainment and an absence of deviance. To the contrary, exploitative narcissism was a minority phenomenon adversely related to education attainment, and positively related to deviance. The correlations were not strong. The same types of correlations were found present as those of time orientations.

This study attempts to expand the study of narcissism. In addition to Margolis and Thomas’s two-dimensional method (which both comprised of 3 items), another dimension was introduced: narcissistic exploitative entitlement (3 items; Lessard et al., 2011), which was hypothesized to be negatively related to fulfilling difficult tasks. Lessard et al. (2011) found it to be related to manipulative, callous, and irresponsible attitudes, and “impression management”.

The results from this study indicate that grandiose narcissism was again a majority phenomenon ($M = 3.13; SD = 0.80$ – same magnitude as in 2010), whereas exploitative narcissism was a minority phenomenon ($M = 2.12; SD = 0.75$). Entitlement narcissism was in between at $M = 2.53$ ($SD = 0.77$).

These findings, in spite of the sample size, seem rather reliable, but it would be premature to judge the rise in exploitative narcissism based on this sample alone. While it seems apparent that social conditions have deteriorated to some extent, it would be improper to associate them with the noted rise in exploitative narcissism. Both of these constructs point toward socially undesirable behaviors and attitudes. Both correlate significantly and positively with deviance and the two present time orientations, and negatively with the level of authoritative parenting (and positively with the other two types of parenting, considering, of course, that parenting generally precedes these traits). Exploitative narcissism always attains higher correlation magnitudes with the above named constructs. Only exploitative narcissism demonstrates a significant (negative) correlation with educational attainment in the age group up to 22. In sum, the main finding is that grandiose narcissism is not just an adaptive form of individualism, but also it contains a potential for malignance (although in this realm it is still far lower than exploitative narcissism (see Table 10).

Table 10: Correlation coefficients on association between narcissism dimensions, deviance, time orientations and parenting styles, 19-27 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deviance</th>
<th>Present Fatalism</th>
<th>Present Hedonism</th>
<th>Future Orientation</th>
<th>Permissive Parenting</th>
<th>Authoritarian Parenting</th>
<th>Authoritative Parenting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploitative narcissism</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>-0.11**</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandiose narcissism</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $n = 649$; ** = Significant at 0.01 level. Exploitative narcissism: the sum of the answers to questions D.8.13-15; Grandiose narcissism: the sum of D.8.10-12; Deviance: the sum of A2.1.-10; Present fatalism: the sum D.8.7-8; Present hedonism: the sum of D.8.4-6; Future orientation: the sum of D.8.1-3; Authoritative parenting: the sum of C.17.4-6; Authoritarian parenting: the sum of C.17.7-9, Permissive parenting: the sum of C.17.10-12.
2.2 Time orientation

Time orientation, originally conceived by Zimbardo and Boyd (1999; 2009), is one of the major innovations in socio-psychological studies of personality, behavior, and attitudes. It builds on previously reliable constructs such as self-control. It has proven very predictive in studies of behavior. The study does not apply all of the dimensions of time orientation, only the present hedonistic, present fatalistic, and future oriented. A mean analysis of the data indicate that future orientation prevailed (M = 3.67 on a 1-5 scale, followed by the hedonistic present orientation of M = 3.13, and fatalistic present orientation M = 3.12; see Figure 76).

Figure 76: Mean presence of three time orientations, Slovenian youth, 16-27 years, 2010 and 2013

Results from the mean analysis show that the picture remained relatively stable across the last few years; no statistically significant change has occurred in any dimension during this period. Future time orientation still prevails over the other two dimensions, although all are above the normal mean level. The results also indicate that constructs confirmed their predictive validity, which corroborates findings from other studies. Future orientation correlated positively with scholastic attainment (r = 0.14; p < 0.001) in the group aged up to 22 (the other two orientations did not provide results at the level of significance). In general, the more future orientated a respondent, the less inclined he/she is toward problem behavior (r = -0.13; p < 0.001), while just the opposite held true for the other two time dimensions (r = 0.27; p < 0.001 for present-fatalistic; r = 0.15; p < 0.001 for present-hedonistic). More in depth analysis indicated that time orientations were significantly associated with the three types of parenting styles (Robinson and Mandleco, 1995). Specifically, while future orientation was associated positively with authoritative parenting styles (rho = 0.26; p < 0.001), both present hedonistic and present fatalistic were positively associated with authoritarian (rho = 0.12; p < 0.001; rho = 0.17; p < 0.001) and permissive parenting styles (rho = 0.15; p < 0.001; rho = 0.22; p < 0.001). However, it is important to note that within the 23 and over age group,
there were no findings that provided support for time orientation being a predictor of income, which indicate that societal factors were more prominent.

2.3 Xenophobia and social distance

Social distance and xenophobia are nearly universal traits that enable the disambiguation of group identity, as well as life inside structured societies. However, a darker side prevails. In general, there is a significant association between these two phenomena and prejudice and persecution. In contemporary Europe, combating and suppressing prejudice and persecution (primarily directed against minorities, weak and marginal groups) is highly relevant. Here it bears noting that the social status and protection of Roma people, an ethnic group present throughout Europe (ethnicity is a prime target of prejudice and persecution in general) have received major attention from the Council of Europe and the European Union (see for e.g., EC, 2011). Even the Roman Catholic Church has recently changed its position on homosexuality, opting for “integration”, although this came long after the European Court of Human Rights recognized homosexuality as a form of legitimate “private” life (Hodson, 2012).

In this study, respondents were asked to express their opinions about situations where families belonging to a certain minority or foreign group would move into their neighborhood.

Table 11: Feelings about hypothetical situation where families belonging to a certain minority or foreign group would move in youth’s neighborhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Type</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma family</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual/lesbian family</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of students</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired couple</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family from other part of Slovenia</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family from Western Europe (France, etc.)</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family from the USA</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family from some Balkan country (Albania, Bosnia, etc.)</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1=it would be very bad, 5=it would be very good.
Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

The following results were found:

- Although overall, positive feelings prevail, there is a relative lack of acceptance of “aliens” and those considered “different”. In some cases, not even those from other parts of Slovenia would be welcomed at a level of average “good feelings” (4; no group attains such a welcome). Although one may interpret these findings within an environmental perspective (i.e., a form of protection for one’s own neighborhood), the respondents also indicated that there is a level of social distance. Namely, the method
of measuring social distance by this item is established by the very construction of this notion (Bogardus, 1926).

- The results show that Roma families would be the least welcome. Roma problems in Slovenia are widespread. Physical conflicts have been reported and the Roma are only beginning to be integrated into Slovenian society, although active policies are underway. This finding corresponds to the actual problematic nature of the Roma population in Slovenia, namely their stigmatization and failure to integrate (MZŠŠ, 2011).

- A homosexual-lesbian family would be accepted at the normative mean level, which suggests that youth are inclined toward recognizing this group as a form of “family life”, as expressed by the European Court of Human Rights (Schalk and Falke v. Austria, 30141/04, pronounced in 2010). This falls in contrast to the results of a 2012 referendum that would have allowed gay couples to adopt children in Slovenia. 55 percent of those taking part in the referendum voted against it. In this context, it seems that the youth are slightly more inclined toward accepting same sex families than are older generations.

- Families from other parts of Slovenia would receive wide acceptance; however, this indicates an articulate social distance. In fact, this parallels the data from other Western European countries (though it should be noted that many of these are much larger and more varied).

- While a group of students hardly meets the criteria of family (even if defined by “liking each other”), but for the purposes of this study, it does constitute a household. The introduction of a student household would be most welcomed by those aged 19-21 (although never reaching an average of 4); the relative number sharply drops with the age of respondents.

In general, the respondents noted a favorable reaction to families from other Balkan countries, which could indicate that the wars in the 1990s have less relevance among Slovenian youth, particularly where it concerns social distance.

It is well documented that this type of social distance can be explained by authoritarian personalities (Adorno et al., 1950; Flere and Molnar, 1992). In this sample, distance (the two major forms observed jointly) is largely demonstrated by those with lower educational levels ($\rho = 0.11; p < 0.05$, among those aged 19 and over) and by male respondents ($\rho = 0.26; p < 0.001$). As could be expected, total social distance is significantly predicted by grandiose narcissism and by future orientation: distances rise alongside exploitative narcissism ($\rho = 0.9; p < 0.01$).

By comparison, distance towards Roma is smaller in Croatia ($M=2.66, SD = 1.10$), whereas distance towards homosexuals is higher ($M=2.87, SD = 1.00$), which may be attributed to the specific problems of Roma in Slovenia, and to the general tolerance (among all populations) towards homosexuals in Slovenia. Moreover, Slovenians on average have little regard for traditional Catholic prescripts. The differences found in this study replicate the data in the European Values Survey 2008-10, where Slovenians (general population sample) expressed a dislike of Roma (as neighbors)
at a frequency mean level of 0.39, whereas Croatians were at a level of 0.25 (0-1 scale); the corresponding figures for homosexuals are 0.34 and 0.51, respectively (EVS, 2011).

3 Experience of discrimination

The experience of discrimination contributes to the problems referred to in the previous question. Thus, respondents were asked whether they themselves experienced any form of discrimination. The question was worded: “Have you ever experienced being discriminated against?” The factors are enumerated in Table 12.

Table 12: Means of experiencing discrimination, by category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your gender (male/female)</td>
<td>1.28 (0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your economic background (poor/wealthy)</td>
<td>1.65 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your religion (Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, etc.)</td>
<td>1.39 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your ethnic origin</td>
<td>1.43 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your education level (eight-year primary school, secondary school etc.)</td>
<td>1.51 (0.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your political party affiliation</td>
<td>1.41 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your regional origin</td>
<td>1.48 (0.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your country/city origin (settlement type)</td>
<td>1.50 (0.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 = never, 5 = very frequently.

Source: FES CEpyUS Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

The results indicate that the perception of discrimination is always a minority phenomenon. However, discrimination is still apparent. The highest level of discrimination was found in two stratification dimensions: economic background, which may be expected to be ascriptive, and educational level attained, which is an achieved trait (although it is often determined by parental status and activity). The results also indicate that female respondents perceived higher levels of discrimination than males, which may be due to the general lower social status of females as well to greater sensitivity.

Higher levels of perceived discrimination were also found among respondents coming from what may be called the lower-middle class, which possibly suggests that the lowest and higher classes are socially separate as cultural and network environments, or it may well be that political correctness does not allow those segments to be targeted.

On the issue of religion, with denomination being the subject of discrimination, it is discernible that a cultural conflict exists between the religious and non-religious: those declared Catholics also declared the largest number of instances of being discriminated against. Approximately one-fourth of Catholics and those declaring having no confession declared being discriminated against on religious grounds with a frequency of “periodically” or “rarely”. These differences could depict a certain “cultural battle” between pro-Church and “anti-clericalist”, which is a relatively well
know phenomenon in Slovenia (Smrke, 1996). Even among those declaring being discriminated against “frequently”, Catholics are by a wide margin the largest group. The true religious minorities are not very discernible, although they appear (similar to ethnicity). Related to these findings, discrimination on political grounds is somewhat more frequently perceived by those declaring themselves rightists, although the relationship is not linear.

Discrimination within regional contexts is found more frequently among those in Maribor, Ljubljana, and Novo Mesto, indicating the relevance of region on identity, although not to a level indicating discrimination per se. The data concerning the type of settlement may indicate an existing social distance; however, in general there is no sharp difference between rural and urban settlements in Slovenia (Flere et al., 2010).

4 Value orientations

Values are considered relatively stable dimensions of culture that carry societal, group, and individual status. Values form hierarchic systems can be divided between final and instrumental (Kluckhohn, 1951). A number of studies have shown that they influence immensely on behavior, as well as provide meaning to it and the entire social environment. Though most of these value correlations are beyond the scope of this study, as a means to provide some form of comparability, a relatively simple instrument was used. Nevertheless, the selected items still offer interesting insight into the value system of young people.

The respondents were asked to pick among a number of objects containing value orientations, which could be considered as values in contemporary conditions. They were asked to choose three (out of eight) items that were most relevant to them in order of hierarchy. For the purposes of this analysis, percentages of only those who selected the listed value as being the most important are presented.

Table 13: First rated values, by share of youth (in percent), by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO EXPRESSED THAT LISTED VALUE IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR THEM (AMONG ALL OFFERED)</th>
<th>SLOVENIAN YOUTH</th>
<th>CROATIAN YOUTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personal dignity (identity)</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social prestige (social status, social standing)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Altruism (commitment, helping others)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Material wealth</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tolerance (acceptance and respect for different opinions)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fighting spirit (fighting to achieve a goal)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Correctness</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Innovativeness of spirit (creating ideas, acceptance of ideas of others)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know / No answer</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDIZ-FES Croatian Youth 2012 Study; CEPYUS-FES Slovenian Youth 2013 Study.
In both samples, personal dignity was chosen as being the most important, although the percentage is lower among Slovenian youth. This value corresponds to the individualization of society, i.e., the emancipation of the individual from traditional groups (Beck and Beck Gernsheim, 2002). Opting for this as the first value in the Slovenian sample, personal dignity was marginally related to grandiose and exploitative narcissism, which is not coincidental. The biggest difference among the samples could be observed in relation to the status of “correctness”, which “attracted” a significantly higher share of youth in Slovenia than in Croatia. Allowing for somewhat different understandings of “correctness”, one can hypothesize that Slovenians are more accepting of current, i.e., post-modern, understandings of values. This may also confirm a more limited understanding of values as setting limits on behavior without expressly searching for what is good, beautiful, and true. It is also possible that Slovenians are more acquainted with the prohibitions contained within “political correctness”, i.e., to not express bigotry and prejudice towards minorities of race, class, sex, religion, orientation, and other contemporary faux pas (Perry, 1992). However, this value does not correlate significantly with the other psychological predictors used in this study.

Slovenians rank correspondingly lower on all other indicators. A relative exception is “tolerance”, which is supported at roughly the same rate between young Slovenians and Croatians. This contrasts with “material wealth” and “social prestige”, which add up to approximately one-half of what is found among Croatians. These two values are also positively (and significantly) related to narcissistic variables, in contrast to altruism tolerance, which are negatively related. At this stage of study, this study can corroborate Ilišin’s findings, which indicate that the distribution show “a combination of (values) in relation of others towards oneself and of oneself towards others” (Ilišin et al., 2013, 97).

5 Life satisfaction, wellbeing, and happiness

Issues related to the questions above are important given that they summarize much of the anxieties and aspirations among Slovenian youth. An empirical study of well-being may provide further insight on the major social issues raised by Marx (alienation at work) and Durkheim (satisfaction from work proceeding from “social attachments formed in the occupational sphere”) (Khattab and Fenton, 2009, 12). On the other hand, happiness also “becomes a major policy goal in nations ranging from the United Kingdom and France to Japan and China” (Oishi et al., 2013, 574).

Thus, this raises a major theoretical, practical (policy), and research issue. Here, several points must be kept in mind. First, happiness is a multifaceted concept that attaches different meanings at different times and among cultures and even nations. Thus, in previous historical periods, happiness was associated more with external forces of luck, chance, fortune, even the action of external forces as deities and fate. The modern understanding is more “agential”; happiness has to do with activities of the subject. Certainly, St. Augustine’s understanding of the “earthly quest of happiness being doomed” and “unattainable in present life” (Oishi et al., 2013, 560) have become irrelevant. Yet even in present times, there are differences in how people comprehend happiness. For example, where happiness is understood as luck and fortune, it tends to be perceived rarer than in environments where it is comprehended agentially (or rather, attainable) (Oishi et al. 2013, 563). Attainable happiness is commonly understood to be associated with economic wealth, which
scholars note is an American cultural contribution (Oishi et al., 2013, 561). Thus, per capita GDP is associated positively with perceptions of happiness at the level of inter-state analysis (Oishi et al., 2013, 573). Oishi et al. contend that even within Europe there are basic differences in understanding happiness, where the Germans and Norwegians tend to understand luck as bringing about happiness, while the Spanish do not (2013, 573), which leads to the second point.

Not only is happiness usually perceived as something within reach, it can also be operationalized. Differences in the understanding of happiness abound. Some question whether it is individual or collective in nature (Triandis, 1995); the importance of certain referents (i.e., the welfare system of a country, at the individual level of analysis, work) (and what is the direction of work’s impact); the relevance of health, types of dwellings, social embeddedness (political participation, voluntary activities, trust, income) (Pichler, 2006; Khattab and Fenton, 2009).

Third, the use of the term “happiness” has been under criticism for denoting only the emotional component in reaction to one’s objective position in society and “life”, whereas “life satisfaction” is more objective in denoting the “cognitive aspect” of satisfaction with life (Pichler, 2006, 425). However, the terms are close, and scholars often use them interchangeably.

Fourth, as this study is primarily concerned with youth, these issues are pronounced and articulated differently, as subjective well-being generally decreases with age. However, in the particular here and now of this study, this question is relevant given that many social statuses of youth have been deteriorating at least since the beginning of the 1990s, with the global economic crisis adding an even harsher dimension (Pichler, 2006). Pichler even questions how youth can possibly be satisfied with their lives when so many socially adverse factors are working against them.

5.1 The presence and correlates of life satisfaction

The respondents in this study were asked to express themselves on the basis of “life satisfaction” given the uncertain current perspective (“these days”). They were asked to express themselves on a 10-point scale from “completely dissatisfied” to “completely satisfied”. The preliminary findings indicated that only 0.6 percent of respondents fell in the first two grades, while the entire distribution tilted toward favorable evaluations (M=7.33, SD = 1.58), which mirrors the findings from 2010 (Kirbiš, 2011, 316). It is interesting that in view of the detrimental societal changes, life satisfaction did not fall. This is in keeping with Pichler’s findings (2006) that employment among youth does not have a substantial detrimental effect, as long as (young) individuals remain socially embedded, i.e., neither isolated nor lonely.

5.1.1 Welfare system

Slovenia had an elaborate welfare system prior to the imposed austerity measures of 2012. However, many protective measures, particularly with respect to tertiary level students, including dwellings, catering, scholarships, and transportation are still in effect and even opulent, e.g., students may eat meals in regular restaurants, paying with subsidized coupons (ŠOS, 2012). This most likely does not influence the general situation at the point of evaluation, bearing in mind that this
A study was conducted after the enforcement of the austerity measures. Particular forms of social benefits were not observed, as stipends are generally made available to (and taken by) Slovenian youth in tertiary education, where the majority find themselves (Flere and Lavrič, 2011).

5.1.2 Age

It is well documented that life satisfaction drops significantly with age. The study observed similar results when observing the means by age groups; however, a noticeable decline was only observed among the oldest group, which could be termed “emerging adult”.

5.1.3 Gender

Males, as confirmed by other such studies (EVS 2008-10, for all countries), are significantly more likely to state that they are more satisfied with their lives. This is also true for the current study. In view of these differences being confirmed by larger data sets, they may be considered to parallel contemporary European circumstances. Furlong extends an array of explanations that require further research (2013, 35-37), which unfortunately are beyond the scope of this study (see Figure 77).

**Figure 77:** Subjective well-being, by age group and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SWB Total</th>
<th>SWB Males</th>
<th>SWB Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>7,40</td>
<td>7,45</td>
<td>7,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-23</td>
<td>7,30</td>
<td>7,35</td>
<td>7,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-27</td>
<td>7,20</td>
<td>7,25</td>
<td>7,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1=very dissatisfied, 10=very satisfied.

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.
5.1.4 Psychological correlates

Respondents were divided into three groups regarding attitude distances (low, medium, and high presence of respective attitude/trait/orientation), with respect to the distributions among the three dimensions of narcissism and time orientation. Within these dimensions, significant linear differences appeared for overall life satisfaction:

- Life satisfaction rises along with narcissistic grandiosity: inflated images of one’s ego also indicate greater satisfaction, which is understandable (the rise is from 7.11 to 7.50) \( (r = 0.08; p < 0.05) \).

- Life satisfaction minutely, but with regularity, decreases with a rise in narcissistic entitlement: those feeling entitled will tend to be dissatisfied with what life presents them (continuous decrease from 7.39 to 7.21) \( (r = -0.03) \).

- The predictive dimension of future time orientation shows a rise in life satisfaction: those who work on controlling themselves, planning (and implementing) their activities over the long-term, are also more satisfied with their life. The rise is from 6.01 among low future-oriented to 7.55 among highly future-oriented \( (r = 0.22; p < 0.001) \). The other two time orientation dimensions were not associated with subjective well-being.

Overall, no other trends were observable, but these findings are relevant, particularly as they confirm the validity of future orientation constructs, and their operation in contemporary surroundings, where much depends on one’s own initiative and psychological make-up.

5.1.5 Schooling

It is likely that the level of educational attainment brings about a certain general life satisfaction. Viewing only those respondents aged up to 23 (i.e., the age when most students complete a bachelor-level education), and omitting those not enrolled in any kind of schooling, the mean subjective well-being score for those failing or barely passing was 6.39. This rose to 7.40 for those who passed with the highest grades (this was true regardless of the type of studies undertaken; \( r = 0.10; p < 0.05 \)).

5.1.6 Work and unemployment

As is well documented, unemployment is a major problem for today’s youth and even the focus of an EU-wide policy (the European Commission in 2012 and 2013 adopted a series of measures; EC, 2013) to remedy the problem. Observing only the group aged 23 and over, i.e., those likely to be seeking employment, those considering themselves unemployed rank their life satisfaction at the mean level of 6.93. For those employed part time, the mean level was 7.28, whereas those employed regularly were at the level 7.39. Whether it is employment that brings about greater satisfaction (or factors bringing about employment) has yet to be answered empirically. Although it is worth noting that the future oriented tend to be more satisfied. The test of reliability of correlation
by regression analysis indicated that future orientation and proper (authoritative) parenting are the only factors more relevant and significant (employment loses significance). This indicates a relatively low relevance of employment as a direct source of happiness; however, the issue needs to be considered in a wider psychological and social context. Nevertheless, when controlled for occupational status, income was significantly associated with well-being, although the association was surprisingly low ($r = 0.07; p < 0.05$).

These differences accrue primarily from male responses, extending some support for the thesis that males are more career-oriented. For females, whether they are employed or not, this produces no difference in life satisfaction (Khattab and Fenton, 2009).

However, the absence of significant differences and correlations between employment and satisfaction indirectly supports the thesis that emerging adults (24-27) in Slovenia have “internalized some uncertainties of the labor market” (Khattab and Fenton, 2009, 14). Further, this has little “bearing on life satisfaction”, which is exactly the question raised by the authors (with respect to England in 2008).

5.1.7 Family and friends

As Pichler argues, social setting and the absence of loneliness are decisive for youth happiness, even in the presence of other adverse circumstances (2006). Since family and friends/peers play an important role in the lives of every (young) individual, it is reasonable to expect that the nature of relations with (in) these primary social groups is closely associated with well-being. For example, many studies suggest that attachments to parents and peers can predict life satisfaction (see for e.g., Nickerson and Nagle, 2004; Raja, McGee and Stanton, 1992).

Previous studies indicate that youth in Slovenia maintain strong connections with their family of origin. Although these connections could be of an imposed nature, (i.e., related to scarce employment opportunities, and the difficulty in attaining one’s own dwelling), previous research has indicated that Slovenian youth, woven into the life of family of origin, are satisfied with this arrangement (Klanjšek, 2011, 356). Building on these findings, the results from the current study indicate that subjective well-being positively correlates with the following:

- having good relations with parents ($r = 0.17; p < 0.001$);
- being a part of a larger group of friends (i.e., having friends: $r = 0.10; p < 0.05$); and
- satisfaction with friends ($r = 0.25; p < 0.001$).

Further, the results also indicate that subjective well-being is significantly and positively associated with the following:

- authoritative parenting ($r = 0.31; p < 0.01$), and permissive parenting (only minimally: $r = -0.09; r < 0.05$); the relationships between subjective well-being and authoritarian parenting style also proved to be significant, but negative ($r = -0.14; p < 0.01$); and
- measures of paternal closeness ($r = 0.15; p < 0.01$), support ($r = 0.25; p < 0.01$), and control ($r = 0.18; p < 0.01$).
In sum, life satisfaction rises with proper (authoritative) parenting, upbringing where fathers exert sufficient closeness, support, and control over youth. This leads to good relations with parents, which further facilitates subjective well-being. This is also true if a young person belongs to a peer group, and is satisfied with his/her friends. However, it should be noted that neither of the two are related to what is happening inside the family unit. In other words, the effect of family and friends/peers seem to be separated, possibly indicating what has been previously suggested by Steinberg and Silverberg (1986).

5.1.8 Economic conditions

Figure 78: Subjective well-being and material well-being of respondent’s family

Note: 1=very dissatisfied, 10=very satisfied.
Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Previous research has indicated that subjective well-being, income (security), and economic stability go hand in hand (Lima and Novo, 2006; Diener, Tay and Oishi, 2013). Declining economic conditions do not seem to have a clear impact on subjective well being. The results of this analysis indicate that life satisfaction varies with respect to the self-appraised economic well-being of the family of origin, and as well with the income level of the respondent. The subjective well-being (SWB) and self-appraised material well-being of respondents’ families rise jointly, as demonstrated in Figure 78.

43 The relationship between subjective well-being and permissive parenting style loses significance when controlled for age, while the relationships for the other two parenting styles remain stable (and significant).
5.1.9 Political influence

Studies show that youth are generally privatized in their interests, and their thoughts are rarely directed to the societal level (particularly where it concerns political articulation). Miheljak was among the first to note this within the Slovenian context (2001, 129-130). Thus, this study analyzed only one political issue in this context: whether respondents of legal age perceive themselves able to exert electoral influence at the national and local levels. Here, one could see a difference in the level of life satisfaction: those who perceived having an impact, also experience greater life satisfaction. The difference is greater among males, rising from 7.09 to 7.86 (among those perceiving to have a strong level of influence).

5.1.10 Institutional trust

The survey’s list of institutions (both state and non-governmental) proved to be one-dimensional where it regards levels of trust; however, no significant relationship with life satisfaction was found.

5.1.11 Discrimination

A summation of the discrimination experience items reveals no relationship with life satisfaction. Although this may be attributed to the small amount of respondents who reported being discriminated against, it runs similar to Pichler’s findings, i.e., that young people are not particularly sensitive to discrimination (Pichler, 2006, 440).

5.1.12 Voluntary activities

Many young people take part in voluntary activities. Such activities, in keeping with other findings (Pichler, 2006), raise general life satisfaction (7.22 among those who have not taken part during the last year, compared to 7.51 for those who have).

5.2.13 Partnership

Bearing in mind the changing nature of intimacy (Beck and Beck Gernsheim, 2002), this study considered that those in the oldest group (aged 24 years and above), living in a joint household with their partner, might raise total life satisfaction. The mean was 7.15 among those living in other arrangements and 7.51 among those living with their partner; however, an association analysis did not produce any real significance.
5.2 Explanation of life satisfaction among Slovenian youth

In Slovenia, young people tend to be content despite current social circumstances. They are provided favorable, even opulent conditions for schooling, and benefit from caring and historically permissive families. Moreover, their housing needs are well taken care of within the parental home. However, their chances of employment, typical of “first modernity”, are small. Health and intimacy circumstances add to their overall level of well-being. In other words, it seems that youth have downplayed the relevance of employment and adjusted to the fragmentation of work. Such levels of happiness conflict with the concerns of Marx (on alienated work) and Durkheim (on the association of work producing satisfaction). In the end, it seems that for Slovenian youth, Khattab and Fenton’s assertion holds: “private contentment becomes the focus of life satisfaction … displacing employment” (2009, 23).

6 Vision of personal future

Respondents were asked how they envision their personal future over the next 10 years. A comparable question was asked in the 2010 survey, but without a precise designation of time. The results are almost identical, whereby respondents report being very optimistic with regard to their individual futures.

Figure 79: Self-appraisal of own future, by age and country

Note: 1 = worse than present, 3 = better than present.

Sources: Slovenian Youth Study 2010, CEPYUS-FES 2013 Slovenian Youth Study, IDIZ-FES 2012 Croatian Youth Study.

However, the respondents in this survey are somewhat less optimistic about their future when compared to their Croatian counterparts (surveyed in 2012, who indicated a better future by a mean of 2.78 compared to 2.62 for Slovenia in 2013). Yet if the respondents are divided by age
groups, a somewhat different picture appears. In Croatia the most pessimistic group are those aged 16-19, while in Slovenia this is true for the middle group aged 20-23. This may be attributable to the oldest coming to terms with the casualization of work, working part time, and changing jobs, whereas the youngest have not yet grasped problems of emerging adulthood. The central group, however, is likely facing more uncertainty, particularly as the once generous Slovenian social welfare system has come to an end.

7 Key findings and final remarks

- The findings indicate that both forms of narcissism have a malignant nature in terms of attitudes and behavior, which shows a variance with previous findings, when only narcissistic exploitativeness was found to be malignant. Exploitativeness, a minority phenomenon, is found to be more malignant of the two. Further studies on this subject are needed.

- Time orientations prove relatively stable when compared to 2010, although there is a slight decrease in the future oriented group. The predominance of the latter is necessary for successful integration into adult life. Further research should assess whether a change has come about and how it correlates with social conditions.

- Value orientations parallel the processes of individualization, as much as could be discerned from the indicators applied, although less so when compared to Croatian youth.

- As of 2013, Slovenian youth are satisfied in life and optimistic; worries and frustrations are rather rare. This is to be expected in view of other findings, indicating youth to be satisfied as long as they are not lonely (nor afflicted by a scarcity of resources). Specific economic conditions have little influence on life satisfaction. The societal difficulties in integrating youth into adulthood, particularly where it regards employment, also seem to have little effect. It is possible that youth have accepted the problematic employment within their otherwise relatively opulent living conditions. Experiences of discrimination are relatively rare, whereas social distance is notable only with respect to the Roma. The possible effects of an unfavorable societal situation can be seen in the diminishing levels of future orientation (when compared to 2010).

- Adverse social conditions, particularly in terms of employment possibilities, have not had a dominant effect upon young people’s attitudes and orientations.

- The presence of negative attitudes towards the Roma demands special action as a means to eradicate misconceptions and foster joint life.
8 References


PART IX
TRUST AND BELONGING

1 Social trust

Social trust is widely accepted as an essential “synthetic force” in modern society (Simmel, 1950). As Mechanic and Meyer (2000, 657) note, social trust is “fundamental to effective interpersonal relationships and community living”. Ward and Meyer (2009) convincingly argue that social trust underpins a number of social systems that play an important role in the development and maintenance of social quality.

According to Delhey and Newton (2004), there are three main approaches to the explanation of social trust. Proponents of the social-psychological school (e.g. Erikson, 1950; Rosenberg, 1956) argue that social trust is an integral part of personality that is mainly developed by early childhood socialization. A second group of authors (e.g., Patterson, 1999; Newton, 1999) explains social trust as a function of individual characteristics and circumstances associated with such factors as class, income, education, gender, ethnicity, and age. A third school sees trust as a collective characteristic of social groups or systems, rather than individuals (e.g., Luhmann, 1979, Giddens, 1990).

According to several studies (e.g., Mechanic and Meyer, 2000; Russell, 2005) many modern societies suffer from a substantial erosion of interpersonal and institutional trust. Regardless of the reasons for such a decline, there is broad consensus among scholars that the erosion of trust leads to severe social consequences, including a “culture of anxiety” (Crawford, 2004), or an “era of insecurity” (Bauman, 1999).

Putnam (2000) offered one possible solution to these problems, namely that social trust might be promoted by integrating individuals into different social institutions. This idea ensues from the simple proposition that trust depends (mostly) on how much contact people have with others. Thus, people who belong to such associations tend to become more trusting.

However, a study by Hajdeja Iglič (2004) revealed that in the Slovenian context, integration in institutions and social networks has not proven to be a significant casual factor of generalized trust. While membership in such networks bolsters trust at the local level, it has no significant effect on generalized social trust. The latter appears to be mainly a function of the quality of public institutions and individual characteristics, including achieved educational level, life satisfaction, and post-materialist values (Iglič, 2004, 149).
1.1 Level of trust in social groups is relatively low

In this survey, respondents were asked to indicate their level of trust towards different social groups on a 1 to 10 scale (1 = do not trust at all, 10 = trust a lot). Not surprisingly, family is the most trusted among the listed groups. In Slovenia (and Croatia), family is closely followed by friends, which is in line with previous findings. According to the Youth 2010 study, relations with friends and leisure time are the two values that gained the most importance over the period 1992-2008. Further, in 2010, true friendship and family life ranked second and third among Slovenian youth values; health ranked first (Musil and Lavrič, 2011, 420-421).

In this respect, Kosovo differs from Slovenia and Croatia as relatives and religious leaders rank higher than friends. This can be partially understood in terms of the generally less modernized state of Kosovo society. Namely, the declining role of expanded family and religious institutions are generally considered important elements of modernization (e.g. Goode, 1963; Inglehart and Norris, 2004).

*Figure 80: Trust toward main social groups; average on a 1 to 10 scale*

Flere (2013) notes that Slovenia, as the most modernized country of the former Yugoslavia, has expectedly less confidence in the extended family. In a similar manner, Lavrič (2013) identifies Slovenia as the most secularized among post-Yugoslav society. In the Slovenian context, the low level of trust allotted to relatives and religious leaders among the three samples (and probably among all the post-Yugoslav societies) could be, at least partially explained through modernization theory. This kind of explanation can further be supported by the fact that, for Slovenian youth, trust in religious leaders is substantially less present among young people from larger (more urban) residential communities ($\rho = -0.15; p < 0.01$).

Another characteristic of Slovenian youth is the relatively low level of trust in (almost) all the listed social groups. This finding can hardly be explained by modernization theory. First, the highest levels of social trust in the world are found in highly modernized countries (i.e., Western Europe, and in particular northern Europe) (Delhey and Newton, 2004). Second, tolerance toward different worldviews and marginal groups, as an integral part of universalism, is generally considered part of the (post-)modern worldview. As discernible from Figure 80, Slovenian youth express relatively low levels of trust in people from different religious faiths and with different political orientations.

Thus, an alternative explanation is needed. The most obvious explanation for the generally low levels of social trust among Slovenian youth appears rooted in the traditionally low levels of generalized trust among all Slovenians (e.g. Iglič, 2004). Further, over the past five years, there has been a substantial breakdown of trust in institutions (a result of the economic and more general social crisis) (CJM, 2013, 14).

Another important finding is that all eight items used to measure social trust are highly inter-correlated (Cronbach alpha = 0.81). This enabled the creation of an empirically validated measure of generalized social trust, whereby the strongest and most interesting correlates could be identified.

Interestingly, subjective family material status is the only socio-demographic characteristic that correlates ($\rho = 0.16; p < 0.01$) with generalized social trust. In addition, perceived levels of stress also correlate significantly ($\rho = -0.13; p < 0.01$). Thus, social trust tends to be higher among young people from wealthier families and with lower levels of psychological stress. Therefore, it can be concluded that perceived existential security is an important factor of social trust among Slovenian youth. This finding is in line with those of Ronald Inglehart, who identified a strong correlation between existential security and social trust at the societal level (Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, 2001, 10).

Another personal characteristic playing an important role in social trust among youth in Slovenia is religiosity. Young people who report higher levels of the importance of God in their lives tend to express higher levels of social trust ($\rho = 0.23; p < 0.01$). As can be expected, a larger portion of this correlation ensues from the higher levels of trust religious individuals place on religious leaders. Thus, if trust in religious leaders is excluded from the measure of generalized social trust, the correlation drops significantly ($\rho = 0.13; p < 0.01$). Yet even in this case, it remains statistically significant and moderately strong, which means that religiosity tends to have a positive effect on social trust. On the other hand, one should not be tempted to generalize these findings
too broadly. For example, a recent study by Berggren and Bjørnskov (2009) revealed that there is a negative relationship between religiosity and trust at the societal level, both internationally and within the US. Further, Richard Traunmüller (2010, 346) found that, at the German regional level, there is a strong positive effect of Protestantism, while social trust is less developed in the more Catholic-dominated regions, although it is also true that Catholic individuals tend to be more trusting than non-religious individuals. Thus, in the case of Slovenian youth, Catholicism might even be a factor that hinders social trust at the macro-level, despite the fact that religiosity amongst individuals tends to play a positive role in developing social trust.

1.2 Future orientation and expectations as a dimension of social trust

As noted above, this study incorporated part of Zimbardo and Boyd’s time orientation measurement (1999), which identifies whether people are focused mostly on the past, present, or future. If, for instance, someone is focused on the future, he/she makes long-term plans and subordinates his/her actions to the fulfillment of these goals and plans. This focus is mostly regarded as having positive effects upon individual success, as it motivates young people to focus their efforts towards the achievement of long-term goals, such as education, or employment.

According to Zimbardo and Boyd (2009, 100), political and economic instability generally leads people to trust only what they can hold in their hands, thus making them fatalistically or hedonistically present-oriented. Future time orientation thus presupposes stability and consistency of the social context, allowing for individuals to make rational judgments about the consequences of their actions.

In this way, there is a close connection between future orientation and social trust, whereas the latter is an important condition for the development of the former. One could also argue that future orientation makes individual's behavior more predictable and therefore contributes to general levels of social trust in society. Social crisis, such as the one Slovenia has been experiencing over the past five years, hinders an individual’s ability to focus on the future, which is especially important during youth when it is necessary to prepare for life as an adult (Flere and Musil, 2011, 449-450).

In this light, Italian sociologist Carmen Leccardi has identified “presentification” (2005, 141) as the prevailing response of young people to the increasing uncertainties regarding their future. Presentification is understood as the absence (or low presence) of long-term planning, and the self-placement of young people within a logical continuum between the present and the future, which leaves the present as the dominating reference period of time. Needless to say, presentification represents an obstacle in young peoples’ paths to successful adulthood, while on the other hand future orientation increases the likelihood of successful social integration over the long-term.
1.3 Presentification does not seem to be a prevalent trend among Slovenian Youth

The present study followed a similar approach to the Youth 2010 study, which used one part of Zimbardo and Boyd's time orientation instrument (1999), including three statements about focus on the future, and five statements referring to focus on the present (Flere and Musil, 2011, 450). The included statements and factor loadings are presented in Table 14.

Table 14: *Factor matrix of time perspectives*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Perspective</th>
<th>Future</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By working hard I always see the tasks I set myself through to the end.</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whenever I want to achieve something I set myself clear objectives and specific paths to achieving those objectives.</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know how to avoid temptation when I know that work has to be completed.</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is more important to enjoy the moment than to get everything done on time.</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to live life from day to day, without looking into the future.</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I often get so excited in the moment that I forget everything else.</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I enjoy taking major risks in order to experience something exciting.</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I often make spur-of-the-moment decisions and think what will be will be.</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach alpha</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.*

Based on these results, a single variable for each of the two types of time perspective were computed by averaging the items included in each dimension. On this basis, the 2013 results could be compared to those found in 2010, when Flere found that Slovenian youth were substantially more future oriented as compared to Serbian and Spanish youth.

A t-test analysis revealed that there were no significant changes in the presence of either future or present time perspectives during the period 2010 and 2013. This result is not entirely surprising, since time perspectives are considered a relatively stable personal trait or, as Zimbardo and Boyd state, “*a relatively stable individual-differences process*” (1999: 1271). On the other hand, Zimbardo and Boyd point out that situational factors also play an important role in time perspectives. In this regard, one could infer that the growing uncertainties of the current crisis have apparently not (yet) affected the relatively high levels of future time orientation among Slovenian youth.

Similar to the results of the Youth 2010 study, focus on the present is more highly expressed among males (\( \rho = 0.12; p < 0.01 \)), while future perspective is more pronounced among the more educated (\( \rho = 0.15; p < 0.01 \)), and those coming from families with higher material status (\( \rho = 0.07; p < 0.05 \)).
Another important finding is that there is a statistically significant correlation ($\rho = 0.11; p < 0.01$) between future time perspective and social trust, confirming the study’s hypothesis of future time perspective as an important factor of trust.

2 Religiosity of young people in Slovenia

Evidence has shown that religion plays a relatively unimportant role in the lives of individuals, at least when compared to other countries in the region (Flere and Klanjšek, 2007; Toš, 2012; Lavrič, 2013). Further, the Youth 2010 study revealed a long-term trend of gradual decline in youth religiousness (Flere and Musil, 2011, 471).

2.1 Losing my religion: pronounced secularization among Slovenian youth

Within the present survey, respondents were first asked which religion they belong to. As seen in Figure 81, traditional Catholic identification remains prevalent and relatively stable with about two-thirds of young people declaring their belonging to the Roman Catholic Church. The proportion of youth not practicing any religion has slightly increased between 2000 and 2013, which is most likely an indication of increased secularization.

*Figure 81: Self declared religious affiliation, Slovenian youth*

In terms of religious pluralism, Slovenian youth resemble their counterparts in Croatia and Kosovo, but differ significantly from German youth, who are characteristically more religiously diverse (according to the results of a similar survey in 2010). On the other hand, where it regards religiously unaffiliated, Slovenian youth are much more similar to German youth (Figure 82).
The second question on religion asked respondents to rate the importance of God in their lives (1 = not at all important, 10 = very important). According to Rodney Stark (2004, 145-146), this can be considered a central indicator of religiosity, especially where it impacts upon moral behavior, social values, and political orientations. Figure 83 shows the combined results of the present study, the World Values Survey and the Youth 2010 study.

**Figure 82:** Self declared religious affiliation; youth from Slovenia, Germany, Croatia and Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Orthodox</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another religion</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not belong to any religion</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** In order to ensure comparability, young people between 16 and 25 years of age were analyzed in all samples.

**Sources:** CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study.

**Figure 83:** Importance of God, Youth 2000, Youth 2010 and Youth 2013

**How important is God in your life?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** World Values Survey, Youth 2010 and CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.
As seen in Figure 83, between 2005 and 2013, the importance of God has declined quite substantially. Further, only one-third of declared young Catholics report that God is important in their lives (by choosing an answer 6 or more on a 1 to 10 scale). This is in line with Flere and Klanjšek’s (2007) claim that the religiosity of Slovenians is mainly an expression of religious identification based on traditional grounds.

The respondents were further asked how often they attend church or other places of worship (1 = never, 6 = regularly, several times a week). Public worship is undoubtedly one of the central elements of religiousness. It represents the fulfillment of religious duty, and both a public and private confirmation of one’s religiousness.

Between 2000 and 2013, the percentage of youth who never attended church or other places of worship increased by 5 percentage points (Figure 84). More importantly, during the last three years the proportion of young people who attended church at least several times a year fell from 37 percent to only 23 percent. This indicates an increasing trend toward secularization among Slovenian youth. However, others note a slightly more specific interpretation of this enormous change. According to Smrke (2012), the sharp decline of confidence of young Slovenians in the church is mostly a result of the financial scandals of the Catholic church, which exploded in 2010; the media referred to this as the “holy mess”.

Figure 84 also reveals a substantial increase in the share of Slovenian youth who attend religious rituals only on rare occasions, such as religious holidays. Again, this can be understood in terms of secularization, i.e., religion remains mainly at the level of tradition, while a deep faith in God and the moral influence of religion appear to decline.

Figure 84: Frequency of church attendance, Youth 2000, Youth 2010 and Youth 2013

How often do you visit religious ceremonies in a church or other religious institution?

Source: Youth 2000, Youth 2010 and CEYPUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Low levels of religiosity among Slovenian youth are also reflected at the level of prayer, particularly when compared to Croatian youth. As discernible from Figure 85, the proportion of those who
never pray in Slovenia is relatively high. When compared against the results for Croatia, more than twice as many young Slovenians report never praying.

*Figure 85: Frequency of prayer among youth from Slovenia and Croatia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often do you pray?</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study and IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study.*

More evidence of the declining role of religion in the lives of young people in Slovenia can be seen in the extremely small proportion of youth who use religion as a mechanism to deal with the difficulties of life (Figure 86).

*Figure 86: Presence of religious coping among Slovenian youth*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When I’m faced with greater difficulties in life, my life is many times seen as part of a larger spiritual force</th>
<th>When I’m faced with greater difficulties in life, I often address God for strength, support and guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.*
For the purposes of correlation analysis, the study created a common variable “Religiosity”, which consists of five highly inter-correlated (Cronbach alpha = 0.79) variables (Importance of God; Frequency of Church Attendance; Frequency of Prayer; and the two measures of religious coping). This enabled the creation of an empirically validated measure of general religiosity, which illustrates the strongest and most interesting correlates.

Consistent with many other studies in predominantly Christian settings (e.g., Francis, 1997; Stark, 2002), the results show that religiousness is significantly ($t(852)=-4.56; p < 0.01$) higher among women ($M=2.53, SD=1.26$) than men ($M=2.16, SD=1.13$) (Figure 87). Further, there is a relatively strong correlation between religiosity and parent education levels ($\rho = -0.12; p < 0.01$ for father, and $\rho = -0.12; p < 0.01$ for mother) and residential community size ($\rho = -0.17; p < 0.01$).

Figure 87: Religiosity of Slovenian youth, by major socio-demographic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother’s education</th>
<th>Tertiary level</th>
<th>2.24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary level</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary level</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of residential settlement</td>
<td>Ljubljana</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maribor</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 10,000</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,001 to 10,000</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 2,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

To conclude, the data clearly show that young people in Slovenia are moving away from religion, at least with regards to religion in the traditional sense. This finding can best be understood in terms of secularization theory, which presupposes modernization as the key element undermining religion. This explanation is further supported by the fact that, among Slovenian youth, religiosity is substantially less present among young people from more modernized environments, such as larger residential communities and families with more educated parents.

3 Key findings

3.1 Trust

- Slovenian youth express relatively low levels of trust toward different social groups.
The most obvious explanation for the generally low levels of social trust among Slovenian youth appears to be rooted in the traditionally low levels of general trust throughout Slovenia.

Perceived existential security is an important factor of social trust among Slovenian youth.

Young people who rank highly the importance of God in their lives tend to express higher levels of social trust.

The growing uncertainties of the current crisis have apparently not (yet) affected the relatively high levels of future time orientation among Slovenian youth.

3.2 Belonging and religion

About two-thirds of young people declare their belonging to the Roman Catholic faith. Yet only about one-third of the declared young Catholics report that God is important in their lives.

In only three years, the proportion of young people who attend church at least several times a year fell from 37 percent to only 23 percent.

The fact that young people in Slovenia are moving away from religion can best be understood in terms of secularization theory.

4 References


1 Politics and democracy

For many politics is what they see on television, read in newspapers, or discuss with other people. More eloquently stated, politics is “a passing parade of abstract symbols” (Edelman, 1985, 5). Politics can also be more precisely defined as “the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live” (Heywood, 2002, 4; 2011, 2). This chapter examines politics in a broader sense, and in particular youth perceptions of politics and their political participation. This active part of politics, i.e., the inclusion of the masses in the decision-making through means of political participation, is a critical component of democracy (Young, 2000, 52).

Although democracy may refer to “rule by the people” (Banfield, 1991, 311; Parry et al., 1992, 3; Sruk, 1995, 58), the majority of decisions in democratic countries are de facto made by a small group of elite. In the case of today’s representative democracy (Urbinati, 2006; Young, 2000, 121), where people’s participation is to some extent limited (Parry et al., 1992, 5), democracy is better described as “a political system in which ordinary citizens exercise control over elites; and such control is legitimate” (Almond and Verba, 1989, 136). Nevertheless, classical theorists like Aristotle, Rousseau, de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, and as well contemporary authors have in one way or another emphasized the importance of citizen participation (see Almond and Verba, 1989; Barnes, 2004; Dahl, 1972; Dalton, 1996; Lipset, 1959). Indeed, both proponents of participatory democracy (Barber, 2003; Pateman, 1970) and of democratic realism (Sartori, 1987; Schumpeter, 1943) agree that political participation is an integral condition of democracy (Parry and Moyser, 1994, 46; also see Almond and Verba, 1989; Easton, 1975; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2002). In other words, whether talking about strong democracy (Barber, 2003), deliberative democracy (Bohman, 1996; Elster, 1998), participatory-deliberative democracy (Fung, 2004), deep democracy (Young, 2000) or cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 1995), authors generally emphasize that publicly active and engaged citizens play a vital role in effective democracy (Schlozman, 2002, 433; Verba et al., 1995, 1). In sum, for a democracy to work, citizens need to participate politically (Almond and Verba, 1989; Norris, 2002; Parry and Moyser, 1994; Pateman, 1970). Citizen participation is so valuable that “any book about political participation is also a book about democracy” (Parry et al., 1992, 3).

44 Of course, the actions of political elites are just as important; for instance, their levels of political integrity (or the opposite, the levels of corruption of political elites). Yet research has shown that mass participation from democratically-oriented public who exerts pressure on political elites is one of the main factors of an effective democracy (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2007).
Within this context, youth political participation has become a prominent research issue in the social sciences for several reasons. First, scholars have argued that political participation and attitudes developed in childhood, adolescence, and youth impact one’s level of political engagement in adulthood (Flanagan and Levine, 2010; Obradović and Masten, 2007; Pacheco, 2008; Plutzer, 2002; Van Hamel, 2011). In this same vein, many have noted that youth political participation has a positive impact on the formation of young people’s identities (Flanagan and Levine, 2010, 160; Youniss, 2009; also see Brezovšek, 1995, 199–200), and on the overall functioning of democracy (Flanagan and Levine, 2010, 160; Ilišin, 2003, 55).

Second, researchers of late have detected low levels of youth political participation in established democracies (see, for example, Cherry, 2012; Dostie-Goulet, 2009; Edwards, 2007; Edwards, 2009; Print, 2007). Young people from Slovenia (Kirbiš et al., 2010; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011) and other post-socialist countries (Ilišin, 2003; Ilišin et al., 2012, 118; Pasha et al., 2012, 46; Tworzecki, 2008) show participation patterns similar to their western peers. Across different countries, youth also express low levels of interest in politics (Gauthier, 2003; Ilišin, 2003, 49; Ilišin et al., 2012, 111; Pasha et al., 2012, 46; Ward, 2008; Zarycki, 2009, 5; Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013), and are distrustful of political leaders and of politics in general (Bay and Blekesaune, 2002; Ilišin et al., 2012, 121; Mitton, 2009; Pasha et al., 2012, 51; Tworzecki, 2008, 58). Young people are more and more disengaged from formal politics, even though they support the broader “democratic process”. More specifically, young people express scepticism towards and feel alienated from political institutions and political elites (Henn et al., 2005; Schwirtz, 2007). Livingston even speaks of an “undoubted irony”, given that the general decline in youth political participation exists alongside omnipresent discussions of youth participative rights (2008, 561).

When discussing the declining levels of youth political engagement, one must be careful to distinguish between conventional (i.e., formal) and unconventional (civic/social, protest, and individualized) political participation. Though research has shown that youth are less politically motivated and engaged, there has been a slight reversal of this trend over recent decades, with young people increasingly engaged in unconventional types of political participation (Gauthier, 2003; Gidengil, 2003; Henn et al., 2005; Ilišin, 2003; Ødegård and Berglund, 2008; Quintelier, 2007a; Russell, 2004; Schwirtz, 2007; Ward, 2008).

Nevertheless, declining levels of political participation present challenges to the “participatory” element of democracy (Brezovšek, 1995, 199-200). Barber, for instance, argues that “without participating in the common life that defines them and in the decision-making that shapes their social habitat, women and men cannot become individuals” (2003, XXXV). Since declining levels of political participation are rather universal in both consolidated and newer democracies, researchers, policymakers, and the media have long asked the big question: How can we get young people to participate in politics? The majority here concede the importance of education (Li, 2009; Print, 2007; Youniss et al., 2002, 130-131); however a number of studies have also shown other factors in play: parents (Diemer and Li, 2011; Dostie-Goulet, 2009, 416-418; Quintelier et al., 2007b; Wong and Tseng, 2008; Youniss et al., 2002, 129-130), teachers and friends (Diemer and Li, 2011; Dostie-Goulet, 2009, 418; Lopes et al., 2009), and the media (Bennett, 2008, 9; Buckingham, 1999; Hoffman and Thomson, 2009; Scherman and Arriagada, 2012; Youniss et al., 2002, 137–139). Of course, the wider political context and political environment (competitive vs. uncompetitive) can also play
an important role (i.e., higher levels of party competition in the political arena increases political participation; Pacheco, 2008). As well, some have argued that the benefits of participation are an important determinant (Lopes et al., 2009, 11).

Within the fields of youth and politics, many scholars have researched and debated the issue of early involvement in conventional political participation (Chan and Clayton, 2006; Matthews et al., 1999; Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013), and also on the expansion of new technology’s impact on political activity (Bae et al., 2013; Buckingham, 1999; Volkov, 2012; Vreg, 2004; Ward, 2008). As noted above, it has been shown that political participation can have an important effect on the formation of youth identity; and debating politics with others impacts the crystallization of one’s opinions and beliefs (Flanagan and Levine, 2010, 160–161).

Still, scholars disagree on a number of different issues where it concerns youth and politics (Matthews et al., 1999). In terms of minimum age requirements for political participation, one study found an increased interest among young people when the voting age was lowered (Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013). On the other side, many emphasize the lack of political competence and the immaturity of younger youth (e.g., lower political interest, lower political knowledge; see Chan and Clayton, 2006).

With regard to expanding opportunities to participate, more recent literature has focused on the role of information-communication technologies (ICT) (Buckingham, 1999; Norris, 2002, 212; Oblak, 2003b; Vreg, 2004), particularly given that young people use new technologies most often (see Kirbiš and Naterer, 2011; Van Hamel, 2013, 3). Moreover, youth commonly have a high level of self-efficacy in their Internet use, and often favorably regard the quality and usefulness of the Internet (Chung et al., 2010). It is therefore not surprising that researchers emphasize the importance of new technologies in the context of political participation (see Harris, 2008).

Nevertheless, some authors have pointed to several potential limitations (and the importance of context) of ICT use, and in particular the Internet. Here research has shown that although some post-socialist countries have become EU members, and more generally made progress in the development and use of ICT, their citizens are still less frequent Internet users (including less frequent users of e-government) (Zoroja, 2011, 122, 126), and have more limited access to the Internet, including broadband (Seybert, 2011; see also Wallsten, 2005). In sum, although ICT in general and the Internet in particular are a promising venue for participation, in numerous countries these opportunities are not necessarily realized (see Gibson et al., 2003; Oblak, 2003a; Ward, 2005; Zagorc and Kirbiš, 2013).

This chapter assesses youth attitude towards politics, beginning with general images regarding the popularity of political participation. Next, questions on specific political attitudes and behaviours are addressed, including whether young Slovenians are interested in politics, their ideological orientation, and their self-reported levels of electoral participation. The chapter then analyzes political attitudes (satisfaction with democracy, representation by young people active in politics, belief in political influence, institutional trust, etc.) that are often characterized in the literature as providing a dispositional/attitudinal basis toward the functioning of democracy. This is followed by an analysis of the sources of potential influence on youth political perceptions, at-
titudes, and participation. Finally, the chapter concludes with some of the more noteworthy data implications and recommendations for the future.

2 Political attitudes and participation

2.1 The (un)popularity of political participation

First this study presents the “popularity” of political engagement among Slovenian youth (aged 16–25) in 2013, particularly in how it compares to Croatian, Kosovar, and German youth. This survey included questions about the general popularity of various life areas in society. Specifically, respondents from the four countries indicated what they believe is currently “in” (i.e., popular). Although the indicator (what is “in”) does not directly measure respondents’ own personal attitudes or values, it does indicate youth views on popular life areas, social norms, and behaviors in their societies. Using this framework, respondents answered questions on the popularity of loyalty, independence, political activity, etc. (1 = “out”, 2 = “not quite in”, 3 = “in”). Figure 88 illustrates the popularity of “being active in politics” and “participating in civic action/initiatives” among youth in the four countries. Politics is most popular in Croatia, where 36 percent of youth believe that “being active in politics” is “in”; by comparison, a mere 10 percent of Slovenian youth answered the same. 46 percent of Kosovo youth believe that “participating in civic actions/initiatives” is “in”, while only 26 percent of German youth, and 28 percent of Slovenian youth agreed.

Figure 88: Popularity of political and civic participation among Slovenian, Croatian, Kosovo and German youth (aged 16–25)

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES Croatian 2012 Youth Study, IDRA-FES Kosovo 2012 Youth Study and Shell 2010 German Youth Study.

Note: The respondents were asked whether specific life area is “in”, “out” or “not quite in”. The figure presents percentages of answers “in” for political and civic actions.

45 The chapter on leisure and lifestyle analyzes popularity across a broader spectrum of life areas.
An analysis of socio-demographic correlates of political participation among Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) indicates that having a well educated father (rho = 0.13, n = 810, p < 0.001), having a high level of education (rho = 0.10, n = 877, p < 0.01) and being female (rho = 0.08, n = 877, p < 0.05) increase the likelihood of agreeing with the statement “being active in politics is ‘in’”. As well, youth from larger residential communities (rho = 0.08, n = 864, p < 0.05) and those with better-educated mothers (rho = 0.07, n = 831, p < 0.05) are more likely to agree that “participating in civic actions/initiatives is ‘in’”. Young people who think that politics is “in” are more likely (rho = 0.25, n = 854, p < 0.001) to think that civic action is “in”, corroborating previous studies that found a positive association between conventional and unconventional (e.g., civic) political participation (McFarland and Thomas, 2006; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). While it is interesting that women feel stronger about political participation, this does not necessarily indicate that they themselves are more inclined to participate (this hypothesis will be tested at the end of the chapter when the resulted are presented for individual respondents’ political engagement). In sum, 28 percent of Slovenian youth believe participating in civic actions or initiatives is popular, but only 10 percent believe being active in politics is “in”. Previous studies of Belgian and Canadian youth, for example, showed that young people perceive the term politics very narrowly. Its meaning generally does not extend beyond “formal politics”, i.e., conventional politics (Quintelier, 2007a, 177). Therefore, one could reasonably conclude that the respondents in this study understood the concept of politics in the first item (i.e., being active in politics) as a conventional form of political participation, whereas the second item (civic actions) clearly represents unconventional political participation. These findings corroborate the results of the Youth 2010 study, where Slovenian youth also indicated that they participate more frequently in social and unconventional – e.g., protest and individualized – forms of political participation (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 214-215). The protest movements against political corruption that took place in Slovenia in 2012 and 2013 (see below), which included young people, can be seen as an expression of the general dissatisfaction with politics, political elites, and the state of democracy in Slovenia.

Past studies of Slovenian adult and youth populations have shown that politics does not play an important role in people’s everyday lives (at least according to their opinion; see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). Further these studies incidate an overall negative view of politics since Slovenia gained independence in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Slovenians perceived politics mostly as a “struggle for power” and as a “dirty matter”. Bibič (1997, 194–197), a Slovenian author, has recounted some explanations for these largely negative views: Slovenian people had previously never had their own state and therefore perceived politics and the state throughout history as a foreign supremacy; the negative impact of political scandals; and the low level of political culture among Slovenian politicians, among others (also see Rus and Toš, 2005, 283).46

2.2. Political interest

A wide body of research has been conducted on the level of political interest among young people in established democracies (e.g., Gauthier, 2003; Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013) and in

46 On the other hand, political party life has existed in Slovenia at least since the second half of the 19th century (see, among others, Kržišnik, 1994; Perovšek, 2005).
post-socialist countries (see Ilišin, 2003; Zarycki, 2009). This section analyzes the more concrete political orientations and political engagement of Slovenian youth. Figure 89 shows the percentages of Slovenian young people’s (aged 16 to 27) interest in world politics, EU politics, politics in the Balkans, and politics in Slovenia. The Youth 2010 study (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 198-199) showed that young people have a low interest in politics; therefore, this study did not expect the results to change drastically. Indeed, as Figure 89 indicates, a minimal percentage of respondents are “very interested” in politics, regardless of whether it was for the Balkans, the EU, world politics, or national politics. Over 50 percent of respondents are “absolutely not interested” or “not interested” in Balkan, EU, and world politics, while national politics attracts the highest proportion of “interested” and “very interested” youth (25 percent). This is followed by EU politics, with 16 percent “interested/very interested”.

*Figure 89: Interest in world politics, EU politics, politics in the Balkans and Slovenian politics among Slovenian youth (aged 16–27)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Absolutely not interested</th>
<th>Not interested</th>
<th>Neither interested nor disinterested</th>
<th>Interested</th>
<th>Very interested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World politics</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU politics</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics in the Balkans</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics in Slovenia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

The general picture is as expected: **Slovenian youth are not interested in politics.** As already argued, Slovenian youth probably understand the term politics as conventional politics, similar to youth in other countries (see Quintelier, 2007a).

Figure 90 indicates the percentage of youth “interested” or “very interested” in different areas of politics in Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The least interested in all areas of politics are Slovenian youth, while Kosovars are the most interested.\(^{47}\) Not surprisingly, **Slovenian, Croatian, and Kosovar youth are most interested in politics in their own country.** What separates the three countries is the following: after national politics, **Kosovar youth are interested in politics in the Balkans, whereas Croatian and Slovenian youth favor EU politics.** This is not surprising given that Slovenia and Croatia are EU members, while Kosovo is not.

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\(^{47}\) Kosovo youth were not asked about their interest in EU politics, so this item could not be included in the comparative analysis.
Figure 90: Percentages of “interested/very interested” in national politics, EU politics, world politics and politics in the Balkans among Slovenian, Croatian and Kosovo youth (16–25 years)

Note: Political interest items were scored on a five point scale. Percentages for each country represent the sum of “interested” and “very interested” youth.


All four political interest items were found to be associated (p < 0.001), indicating that those who are interested in one area of politics are also more likely to be interested in other areas. Because the analysis of socio-demographic correlates provided similar results for all four items, they were added together on a political interest scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91).

An analysis of socio-demographic correlates within the political interest scale indicate that there is no statistically significant correlation with gender, which was already found in the Youth 2010 study (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 216). However, there is a statistically significant correlation between respondent’s educational level (rho = 0.21, n = 905, p < 0.001), age (rho = 0.17, n = 905, p < 0.001), father’s educational level (rho = 0.15, n = 834, p < 0.001), mother’s educational level (rho = 0.09, n = 867, p < 0.01), size of residential community (rho = 0.10, n = 905, p < 0.01), and political interest. In sum, more educated, older young people, who come from larger communities and have more well educated fathers and mothers are more interested in politics.48

These results, showing low levels of political interest among socio-demographic correlates, are largely in accordance with the findings of previous studies on Slovenian youth (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 199, 216) and youth from other countries; for example, Russia and Poland (Zarycki, 2009, 5), Croatia (Ilišin, 2003, 49), Austria (Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013), and Canada (Gauthier, 2003). Previous studies have also found that social class, educational career, and qualifications signifi-

48 These results also largely hold true for individual areas of political interest.
2.3 Ideology no more?

The following section analyzes the ideological orientations of Slovenian youth. One frequently used measure of ideological orientation is the left-right distinction, which has been extensively researched over the last decade (see, among others, Ho et al., 2003; Jou, 2011; Laufer et al., 2009). In this study’s questionnaire, respondents were asked to position themselves as “left” or “right” on a 1-10 point scale (in 2000 and 2010, a 0-10 point scale was used). The 2013 mean was only slightly off center, a value of 5.5 (M = 5.06, SD = 1.63). To enable a longitudinal comparison, both original scales were re-recorded in the following way: values 1–3 (or 0–3 for 2010 and 2000) were coded as “left”, values 4–7 (or 4–6) as “center” and 8–10 (or 7–10) as “right”. The results are shown in the figure below; note that due to the different scales, the longitudinal results are not completely comparable.

**Figure 91:** Percentages of left, right and centrist political-ideological orientations of Slovenian youth (16-27 years) in 2000, 2010 and 2013, including “don’t knows”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents were asked to position themselves on a 1–10 left-right scale (in 2013) and 0–10 left-right scale (in 2010 and 2000). For the purpose of comparison, both original scales were re-recorded into three categories; 1–3 (0–3 in 2000 and 2010) as “left”, 4–7 (4–6 in 2000 and 2010) as “center” and 8–10 (7–10) as “right”. The percentages for each category are shown in the figure.

Sources: Youth 2000, Youth 2010 and CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

The majority of youth in 2013 (55 percent) identified themselves as centrists; there are slightly more left-oriented (a difference of 4 percentage points) than right-oriented youth. Interestingly, 29 percent of respondents claimed they are not familiar with the meaning of the left-right distinction. Between 2000 and 2013, there has been an increase in center-oriented youth, as well as an increase in the incomprehension of the left-right distinction. Adding together the percentages of
centrist youth with those who claimed they “don’t know”, the percentages increase from 70 percent in 2000, to 73 percent in 2010, and up to 84 percent in 2013.

After that, the “don’t knows” were excluded, which showed an increase in center-oriented youth; from 61 percent in 2000 to 78 percent in 2013. In 2000, 25 percent of youth claimed to be left-oriented, whereas only 14 percent did the same in 2013. Similarly, 14 percent claimed to be right-oriented youth in 2000, 11 percent in 2010, and 8 percent in 2013. Consequently, and after taking into account the methodological issues, the longitudinal analysis indicates that the proportion of left- and right-oriented youth is declining; overall, youth are increasingly becoming more center-oriented.

On the other hand, it would be premature to conclude that ideological self-positioning reflects only upon political ideology. It is likely that they also reflect the general disinterest in formal politics, distrust of political institutions, and especially political parties, and the perceived unresponsiveness of political institutions to citizen demands (see the latter part of this chapter; also see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). In other words, if youth are distrustful of established left and right political parties, it is possible to speculate that as a consequence, they position themselves more to the center (or, as 29 percent of respondents indicated, they do not understand the meaning of left and right, which might also be understood as youth separation from formal (“old school”) politics). In this context, it is worth reiterating that a wave of mass protests have taken place over 2012 and 2013 in Slovenia, whereby the common current was a general belief that all political parties (over the entire left-right spectrum) are basically “the same”. In short, politicians, regardless of the ideological stance, do not care about citizens and are overwhelmingly corrupt. Such attitudes echo a deep distrust in politics, which had already been detected in the Youth 2010 study (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011).

In perusing the 2013 sample, there appear to be significant associations (rho = -0.17, n = 651, p < 0.001) between the size of one’s residential community and left-right orientation, e.g., youth in Ljubljana and Maribor tend to be more left-oriented. Also, by a margin of 10 percentage points, young people from smaller-size residential communities do not know what left-right signifies. In addition, the more right-oriented tend to be men (rho = -0.08, n = 651, p < 0.05), youth with less educated mothers (rho = -0.12, n = 633, p < 0.01) and less educated fathers (rho = -0.08, n = 609, p < 0.05). In sum, the results indicate that Slovenian youth are not a homogeneous group in terms of ideological political orientations. Different factors impact upon and individual’s left-right orientation, including the size of one’s residential community, gender, and his/her level of education.

2.4 Participation in elections

Previous studies of electoral participation have shown that young people are less likely to vote, whereas the middle-aged are most likely (see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011; Norris, 2002, 90; Quintelier,

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49  Corruption by Slovenian elites as perceived by the public is not necessarily in accordance with the more widely used corruption indices. For instance, in 2012 Slovenia ranked 37 out of 174 world countries regarding corruption in the public sector (Transparency International, 2013). Slovenia has a similar position in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (2013).
This trend is evident in almost every included country, with the rare exception of countries like Australia, where voting is compulsory (Norris, 2002, 90).

Figure 92 shows electoral participation among Slovenian youth of legal age (aged 18 to 27)\(^{50}\); the total sample, and by the three educational levels: young people who only finished or did not finish elementary school, secondary educational level, and tertiary level. Looking at the total sample data, the majority of respondents (37 percent) have voted in “a few elections”, followed by “voted in most elections” (31 percent). Curiously, only 15 percent have voted in all elections. Further, there is a positive correlation (\(\text{rho} = 0.21, n = 787, p < 0.001\)) between electoral participation and respondents’ educational levels. More specifically, 60 percent of respondents with tertiary education participated in “most” or “all elections”, while 49 percent of respondents with secondary education, and only 27 percent of respondents with primary education or less participated in “most” or “all elections”, indicating that the frequency of voting in past elections increases with respondents’ levels of education.

Figure 92: Frequency of voting in past elections since turning eligible to vote among Slovenian youth (18–27 years), total sample and by respondent’s education level

How many times have you voted since since turning eligible to vote?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent’s educational level</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Tertiary education</th>
<th>Secondary education</th>
<th>Elementary education or less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a few elections</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In most elections</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In all elections since I’ve obtained the right to vote</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Analysis includes only those respondents who already turned eligible to vote at the time of the survey (18 years or older).

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

It was also found that older youth (\(\text{rho} = 0.13, n = 787, p < 0.001\)) and those with better-educated fathers (\(\text{rho} = 0.11, n = 728, p < 0.01\)) are more likely to attend elections.

These findings support the data from previous research of Slovenian youth (e.g., Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 217) and youth in other countries (Caprara, 2008; Gidengil et al., 2003; Lopes et al.,

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\(^{50}\) In Slovenia, the voting age is 18. Thus, the data includes only those aged 18+. 
2009). It has further been found that political participation does not depend as much on age cohort, as it does on the level of one’s education (Quintelier, 2007a, 176). Interestingly, a study by Kam and Palmer (2008) has shown that higher education by itself does not necessarily contribute to greater participation. Instead, they conclude that pre-adult characteristics seem to be the cause of political participation, and higher education a proxy of pre-adult experiences and influences (Kam and Palmer, 2008, 613).

Various studies have shown that young people perceive elections as inefficient. For example, a study of British youth concluded that they view elections as a limited option of political participation. In short, they disagree that participation in elections can impact society. Curiously, these same youth still believe in the idea of democracy (Henn et al., 2005). In post-socialist Poland, the basic values of the people (i.e., cultural causes) and the self-perceptions of the representativeness of political institutions (i.e., institutional cause) are important factors that affect political participation (Tworzecki, 2008). Finally, the 2010 Youth study also found (via both quantitative methods and via interviews) that voting and elections are seen as ineffective and unable to bring about meaningful political change (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 201).

Of course, political parties are one of the key actors in the electoral process. As Bibič noted (1997, 133, 135), they are “the main condition of (political) democracy”. Thus, it can be argued that without parties there is no modern democracy, yet with parties, and without the participation of the masses, partitocracy can occur. As the results at the end of this section indicate, Slovenian youth are highly distrustful of political parties, which is perhaps the strongest reason in favor of their low electoral turnout.

The respondents were next asked which party they “would vote for if elections were held tomorrow”. Below are the results for all answers including “don’t know” and “I wouldn’t participate in the elections” for the group aged 18–27.

As Figure 93 illustrates, the majority of respondents indicated that they would not participate in elections (41.8 percent of those aged 18–27) and 26 percent “do not know” which party they would vote. Only 32.2 percent of Slovenian youth (aged 18-27) would attend elections, which presents a serious problem for democracy as a system of government, as it presupposes citizen participation (Almond and Verba, 1989; Arendt, 1998; Brezovšek, 1995, 199; Norris, 2002).

Regarding socio-demographic determinants, gender was the primary correlate ($\chi^2 (9, n = 807) = 23.94, p < 0.01, C = 0.17$), with more women than men (by a difference of 8 percentage points) reporting they do not know which party they would vote for.

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51 Partitocracy can be defined as “party-rule or rule of the parties” (García-Trevijano, 2009, 9). In other words, it is “a form of government in which influential personages within the political parties, rather than an executive accountable to parliament, are the primary basis of rule, determining the use of public resources, the allocation of important posts and ultimately the development of policy” (Partridge, 1998, 69).
2.5 Satisfaction with democracy

This survey also questioned youth satisfaction with democracy, which may shed light on their attitude toward the overall functioning of the democratic system in Slovenia, rather than the broader question of democracy as a political system. Longitudinal observations (see Figure 94) indicate that satisfaction with democracy is decreasing among Slovenian youth (as well, the opposite also holds true, dissatisfaction with democracy is increasing). More specifically, when adding together the two extreme scores on both sides of the continuum, one can see that 23 percent of youth were “satisfied/very satisfied” with democracy in 2000. In 2010, this figure decreased to 14 percent, and by 2013, only 8 percent of respondents claimed to be satisfied with democracy. On the other hand, 21 percent of young people were very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with democracy in 2000 (compared to 47 percent in 2010 and a staggering 60 percent in 2013).

Higher self-assessed family material status (rho = 0.13, n = 909, p < 0.001), lower age (rho = -0.13, n = 909, p < 0.001) and lower monthly income (rho = -0.11, n = 870, p < 0.001) are all associated with higher satisfaction with democracy.

In the 2010 Youth study (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 218-219), it was found that youth who are not satisfied with democracy are less politically active. In contrast, the 2013 data (among those aged 18-27) show that there is no significant correlation (p > 0.05) between satisfaction with democracy
and frequency of past electoral participation. Feeling represented and being satisfied with democracy (\( \rho = 0.24, n = 747, p < 0.001 \)), on the other hand, do correlate.

Figure 94: Satisfaction with democracy of Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) in 2000, 2010, and 2013

An analysis of the older age group (aged 20 to 27) reveals an interesting finding: satisfaction with democracy and frequency of past electoral participation (\( \rho = 0.11, n = 651, p < 0.01 \)) are positively associated. Similar positive associations can be found between “feeling represented by young politicians” and frequency of past electoral participation (\( \rho = 0.13, n = 730, p < 0.01 \)), and satisfaction with democracy and feeling represented (\( \rho = 0.24, n = 618, p < 0.001 \)). These findings were expected, since older youth tend to have more experience with the political process. Of course, it is still unclear which mechanisms are at work, i.e., do past experiences with the democratic process increase satisfaction with democracy and feelings of being represented? In sum, young people (aged 20-27) participate more frequently in elections when they are satisfied with democracy.

Interestingly, one recent study of post-socialist countries (including Slovenia) found that socialist socialization does not affect levels of satisfaction with democracy if the economic situation is considered stable (Neundorf, 2010, 1106-1107).

2.6 Youth do not feel represented by young politicians

As noted above, respondents were asked if they feel represented by other young people who are active in politics. One-half of the respondents do “not feel represented at all” by young people active in politics. Another 35 percent feel only a little represented and 15 percent feel represented “to some extent”, while only 1 percent feel “very much” represented. The feeling of being rep-

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52 Respondents were asked about their past participation in elections. The answers provided were: “never”, “in a few elections”, “in most elections”, and “in all elections (since I have obtained the right to vote)”.

53 Respondents were asked “to what extent do you feel represented by young people active in politics?”. The answers provided were: “not at all”, “a little”, “to some extent”, and “very much”.

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resented by politically active youth correlates only with those who have better-educated fathers (\( \rho = 0.08, n = 771, p < 0.05 \)).

These results corroborate data found in other countries, including the U.K. (Henn et al., 2005) and Croatia (Ilišin, 2003). Young people across Europe do not feel represented by politically active young people, which can negatively affect the likelihood of youth turnout on election day.

As mentioned, in the sample of 18–27 year-olds there is a positive link between feeling represented and electoral participation (\( \rho = 0.13, n = 730, p < 0.001 \)). As well, feeling represented and satisfaction with democracy (\( \rho = 0.24, n = 747, p < 0.001 \)) also correlate. In sum, **young people who feel less represented by politically active peers are less likely to attend elections and are less satisfied with democracy.**

2.7 (Dis)belief in political influence and its consequences

Numerous authors (e.g., Burns et al., 2001, 33) have noted that one of the key psychological determiners facilitating political participation is the feeling that one can influence the political scene (i.e., external political efficacy/competence), which in this context refers to the sense of perceived responsiveness by political institutions to citizen demands. This has been corroborated in numerous empirical studies on (conventional) political participation (Burns et al., 2001, 268; Schulz, 2005; Mannarini et al., 2008; among Slovenian youth (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 218). External political efficacy is also associated with other motivational variables, such as political interest (Kenski and Stroud, 2006). Further, a panel study conducted by Finkel (1985) found that political participation positively affects external political efficacy.

This study used external political efficacy measures for perceived political influence on national institutions, and perceived influence on local institutions (i.e., their perceived responsiveness to citizen demands). In general, more young people (aged 16–27) have higher self-perceived influence on local institutions than on national institutions (Figure 95). In fact, by a margin of 10 percentage points, young people (25 percent) believe they are able to influence local institutions more than national institutions. **Only 15 percent of youth believe that they have “a lot/some” influence on national institutions, while 25 percent believe that they have “a lot/some” influence on local institutions.** These results are in accordance with other studies; for example, a study of Britain’s youth showed that they feel unable to influence political institutions (Henn et al., 2005, 566).

54 Respondents were asked about their past participation in elections. The provided answers were: “never”, “in a few elections”, “in most elections”, and “in all elections (since I have obtained the right to vote)”.
55 Satisfaction with democracy was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = dissatisfied, 3 = moderately satisfied, 4 = satisfied, 5 = very satisfied).
56 Interestingly, according to some studies people with a high degree of internal political efficacy (feeling competent to participate and understand politics) and a low degree of external political efficacy are more likely to engage in protest activities (see Chang and Chyi, 2009).
Correlates emerged for both external political efficacy items. Youth from smaller residential communities are more likely to think they can influence local institutions (rho = -0.07, n = 871, p < 0.05). Not surprisingly, those who believe they are able to influence local institutions are also more likely to think that they can influence national institutions (rho = 0.78, n = 869, p < 0.001). Finally, young people (aged 18 to 27) are more likely to attend elections if they believe that they have more influence on national institutions (rho = 0.19, n = 769, p < 0.001) or on local institutions (rho = 0.19, n = 768, p < 0.001).

### 2.8 Political/institutional trust

Trust in institutions (e.g., political trust) is another important psychological orientation, particularly as it has been extensively shown that trust has a positive impact on political participation (Diuk, 2013; Mishler and Rose, 2005; Torney-Purta et al., 2004, 22-23). Figure 96 shows young people’s trust in particular institutions and groups. First, the majority of Slovenian youth (70 percent of those aged 16-27) trust the school/educational system (answers “very much” or “to some extent” were combined for the purpose of analysis). 49 percent of youth trust the police and 45 percent trust non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, young people have very low levels of trust in government (13 percent), parliament (12 percent), and political parties (8 percent). In fact, 0 percent of youth trust the political parties “very much”.

*Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.*
Figure 96: Trust in institutions among Slovenian youth (16–27 years)

Note: Respondents were asked how much they trust particular institution or group. Trust items were scored on a four-point scale (1 = do not trust at all, 2 = trust a little, 3 = trust to some extent, 4 = trust very much). The figure presents percentages for answers “very much” and “to some extent”.

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Those more likely to express trust towards the educational system are respondents with higher educational levels (rho = 0.08, n = 902, p < 0.05), less educated mothers (rho = -0.08, n = 864, p < 0.05), higher self-assessed family material position (rho = 0.08, n = 902, p < 0.05) and from smaller residential communities (rho = -0.08, n= 902, p < 0.05). Trust in political parties is positively associated with self-assessed family material status (rho = 0.08, n = 900, p < 0.05).

Not surprisingly, among young eligible voters (aged 18-27) there is a positive correlation between trust in political parties and electoral participation (rho = 0.13, n = 780, p < 0.001). In other words, young people who are more trustful of political parties are more likely to participate in elections; in Slovenia 0 percent of young people claim they trust political parties “very much”.

Trust, especially in political parties, is important for a working democracy (Bibič 1997, 135). Indeed, there is little sense in participating in elections if one does not trust the main political actors/groups. In the Youth 2010 study (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 200-201), it was found that young people have a largely negative opinion of political parties and politicians. In 2013, it was found that 60 percent of youth do not trust political parties at all. Similar patterns can be observed across both western and post-communist countries; for example, young people in Britain (Henn et al., 2005) and Russia (Schwirtz, 2007) also have low levels of trust in political institutions. The same holds true for Poland, whereby young people claim that politicians care only about their own interests,
that their policies do not represent ordinary people, and that they are not to be trusted because they are in general dishonest (77 percent of respondents agree with these views) (Tworzecki, 2008; also see Kirbiš and Flere, 2011).

The low levels of trust in political institutions across western and post-communist democracies are worrisome. Aside from the purely negative effect on political participation, distrust in political institutions has also been linked to “permissiveness to law breaking behavior” (Marien and Hooghe, 2011).

3 Sources and influences of political attitudes and participation

This section analyzes youth sources of information about politics. Where relevant, the results were compared to data from Croatia, Kosovo, and Germany. Parental influence on youth political participation was also investigated.

3.1 Sources of information about politics

A number of recent studies have analyzed the levels and consequences of information about politics among democratic publics. In general, research confirms the positive impact of information on political participation (Lewis, 2011; Rekklang, 2012; but compare to Levendusky, 2011). As such, this study focused on the main sources of political information for young people in Slovenia.

Figure 97 shows that 81 percent of Slovenian youth (aged 16–25) acquire information about politics from the Internet, and 71 percent from television. Among the provided answers, only 26 percent claimed their source of information derived from conversations with family (for friends, 30 percent). By and large, Slovenian youth acquire information from the Internet more so than in other countries. While TV is the second most important source of political information for Slovenian youth, it is nevertheless the lowest among comparable countries. Interestingly, twice as many Germans acquire information from newspapers than youth from other countries. In addition, a rather high proportion (20 percent) of Kosovars said that they gain information about politics from “other sources”.

Among Slovenians aged 16-27, several correlates of sources of information about politics emerged. The Internet as a political source correlates with higher education levels ($\chi^2 (2, n = 907) = 6.82, p < 0.05, C = 0.09$), better-educated fathers ($\chi^2 (2, n = 835) = 9.25, p < 0.01, C = 0.11$) and better-educated mothers ($\chi^2 (2, n = 869) = 6.55, p < 0.05, C = 0.09$). TV as a source correlates with living in smaller size residential communities ($\chi^2 (2, n = 907) = 11.76, p < 0.01, C = 0.11$).

57 Watching political debates on television is analyzed more in depth in the following sections.
These results are consistent with data found in other countries (e.g., Canada). Specifically, the Internet as a source of information about politics was found to increase among young people with higher levels of education (Gidengil et al., 2003). The results in this survey also corroborate Zoroja’s (2011) study, which found that in post-socialist countries there are less Internet users, though the rates of Internet use in Estonia and Slovenia are comparable to more well-developed European countries.

Studies have also shown that Internet usage can mobilize youth political participation within certain limits (e.g., Hirzalla et al., 2011). Here the results indicate that the Internet has the potential to encourage political participation among Slovenian youth (similar to other countries). In Chile, for example, a positive correlation was found between news consumption, Facebook use, and political participation. On the other hand, entertainment media consumption had a negative impact on political participation (Scherman and Arriagada, 2012). The positive effects of Internet use were also found in Kirbiš and Naterer’s youth study (2011), whereby several types of online political/civic activities (use of social media sites, writing opinions on forums and/or blogs, signing electronic petitions, and writing or forwarding emails with political content) were positively associated with offline conventional and unconventional political participation. They also found a strong positive association between online and offline political participation (r = 0.45; p < 0.001). The authors concluded that since the use of new technologies, and especially the Internet, has been increasing in
recent years among youth and adults in Slovenia (and other advanced modern societies), “steps should be taken to include new technologies into the channels of decision-making within representative democracy” (Kirbiš and Naterer, 2011).

3.2 Who watches televised political debates?

The following addresses whether youth typically watch political discussions on television. As presented in the chapter on leisure and lifestyle, Slovenian youth (aged 16–27) do not frequently watch televised political debates. Specifically, 62 percent of the respondents said that they have never watched a political debate on television. Furthermore, only 14 percent of youth watch political debates once per week or more often. However, the frequency of watching political debates on TV increases with age (see Figure 98).

**Figure 98:** Percentages of Slovenian youth’s (16–27 years) watching political debates on TV, total sample and by age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Age 16-19</th>
<th>Age 20-23</th>
<th>Age 24-27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a week</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 times per week</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figure presents percentages.
Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

Several socio-demographic correlates also emerged: televised political debates are more often watched by men (rho = 0.09, n = 905, p < 0.01), older youth (rho = 0.16, n = 905, p < 0.001) and more educated youth (rho = 0.18, n = 905, p < 0.001), those with higher monthly incomes (rho = 0.08, n = 867, p < 0.05), and those from larger residential communities (rho = 0.12, n = 905, p < 0.001). Though this study did not delve into other possible determinants, it should be noted that Fein’s study pointed toward the importance of social context when watching political debates in pre-election periods. Different contexts (for example, peers and other audience) can change viewers’ judgments about the debate performances of politicians. In short, exposure to the judgments of others can strongly influence participant evaluations (Fein et al., 2007, 186).
3.3 Parental influence

The beginning of this chapter mentioned the impact of parents on youth participation (Diemer and Li, 2011; Quintelier et al., 2007b), or youth’s general interest in politics (Dostie-Goulet, 2009) and other political orientations. This study asked respondents (aged 16–27) to assess the extent to which their political views and beliefs aligned with those of their parents (Figure 99).

In general, half of the surveyed young people (49 percent) think that their political beliefs are to some extent in accordance with their parents. If the total sample is separated into three educational groups (respondents with primary school level or less, secondary level, and tertiary level), the alignment of parental and youth views increases alongside levels of education (rho = 0.10, n = 737, p < 0.01). Adding together the percentages of “to some degree” and “very much” indicates that 60 percent of respondents with the lowest educational level, 66 percent of respondents with secondary level, and 75 percent of respondents with tertiary level believe that their political beliefs match those of their parents.

**Figure 99: Self-perceived match between respondents’ political beliefs and their parents’ beliefs among Slovenian youth (16–27 years), total sample and by educational levels**

To what extent are your political views and beliefs aligned with those of your parents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>To some degree</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s educational level</td>
<td>Tertiary level</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary level</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school or less</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

As indicated in the table above, shared parental and youth political beliefs were associated among respondents with better-educated fathers (rho = 0.11, n = 683, p < 0.01). Those perceiving their beliefs more in accordance with their parents also more frequently watched televised political debates (rho = 0.11, n = 733, p < 0.01). Therefore, one could argue that when young people watch TV with their parents, it is more likely that they also discuss politics at the same time. It should be noted that young people tend to have less consistent and stable attitudes (Chan and Clayton, 2006). The implication of this is that young people would more readily change their attitudes that would be similar (or match) the attitudes of their parents if they, for instance, watch political TV programs together. As already noted, empirical studies have shown that parental influence does
matter for youth’s political participation (Diemer and Li, 2011; Quintelier et al., 2007b), political attitudes (Quintelier et al., 2007b) and political interest (Dostie-Goulet, 2009). Interestingly, parents with higher socio-economic statuses are more effective in transmitting their attitudes and behaviors onto their children, and intergenerational transmission has been found to be more pronounced in stable democracies than in post-communist countries (Quintelier et al., 2007b, 24-25).

Respondents were next asked to assess the extent to which their parents are interested in politics (Figure 100). Most respondents (45 percent) reported that their parents are “slightly interested” in “political events/politics in general”, while only 6 percent are “strongly interested” in politics. Since mother’s educational level emerged as the only substantial (though still weak) socio-demographic correlate (see below), the responses “very interested” and “interested” were added together, while mother’s education level was separated into three groups. Figure 100 shows that parents’ interest in politics increases with mother’s higher educational level. Specifically, 26 percent of respondents with only elementary school educated mothers, 30 percent with secondary levels, and 38 percent with tertiary levels have parents that are “interested” or “strongly interested” in politics. Of course, this might indicate that respondents mostly had their mothers’ political interest in mind when answering this particular question.

Figure 100: Parents’ interest in politics (as assessed by respondents) among Slovenian youth (16–27 years)

To what extent are your parents interested in political events/politics in general?
- Not interested at all
- Not interested
- Slightly interested
- Interested
- Strongly interested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Mother’s educational level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not interested at all</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly interested</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

As noted above, assessments of parental political interest correlate with mother’s educational levels ($\rho = 0.11$, $n = 827$, $p < 0.01$). In addition, respondents who assessed their parents as more interested in politics are more likely to watch political debates on TV ($\rho = 0.10$, $n = 851$, $p < 0.01$). The last finding can be an indication of parental influence on respondents’ interest in politics, which has been established in previous studies (Dostie-Goulet, 2009).
The results in this study point toward the importance of family in the process of political socialization, defined as “the process by which the individual acquires attitudes, beliefs, and values relating to the political system of which he is a member and to his own role as citizen within that political system” (Greenberg, 2009, 3), and which begins in an individual’s early years (Nesbitt-Larking, 2007). Indeed, authors generally attribute the family to be important, if not the central role in the political socialization process (Davies, 1965; George, 2013; Quintelier, 2007b). Interestingly, evidence suggests that those able to participate in family decisions in their earlier years score higher on the scale of subjective political competence (Almond and Verba, 1989, 284–286). The results in this study indicate that family has a direct (via concordance of political attitudes, discussions about politics, paternal political interest, following political news, etc.) and indirect (paternal education, family socioeconomic status) effect on Slovenian youth political engagement.

4 Recommendations for the future: youth’s input

The final section of the chapter presents youth views on the actions that should be taken by the state or areas that the state/government should focus on in terms of political engagement. First, however, it is important to note some findings in the recent report by UMAR; the link between both positions is discussed at the end of this section.

In June 2005, the government issued a Strategy of Development for Slovenia (SRS 2005–2013). As well, the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (UMAR, 2013) recently reviewed the realization of SRS priorities (economic growth and competitive economy; the use of knowledge for economic development; efficiency of the state; labor market and welfare state; and sustainable development) in their Report on Development 2013. Based on UMAR’s methodology, the report’s authors have evaluated development within each of the selected indicators (priorities) over recent years. Economic development indicators fared worst compared to other priorities. The labor market was found especially problematic in 2011 and 2012, with high unemployment rates, particularly among youth, which have been increasing since 2008 and are highest among those aged 15-24 (UMAR, 2013, 159; see also the chapter on youth employment).

Turning the focus to what Slovenian young people (aged 16-27) think about priorities or problems that should be dealt with, Figure 101 indicates several objectives (listed by level of importance) the Slovenian government should undertake. Each item was scored on a four-point scale of importance (1 = not important at all, 4 = very important). The most important objectives the Slovenian government should focus on according to Slovenian youth are employment, economic growth and development, social justice and security, and crime and corruption. Among the least important goals are spiritual renewal, the strengthening of military power and national security, and fostering population growth. In sum, 86 percent of young people believe that the reduction of unemployment is a “very important” objective that the Slovenian government should focus on.
The findings also show some socio-demographic correlates regarding objectives that should be addressed by the Slovenian government. Respondents with lower subjective family material status (rho = -0.09, n = 909, p < 0.01), mother’s lower (rho = -0.07, n = 871, p < 0.05) and father’s lower (rho = -0.07, n = 838, p < 0.05) educational level are more likely to see reduction of unemployment as an important goal. Economic growth and development is important among better-educated young people (rho = 0.10, n = 909, p < 0.01), respondents from smaller residential communities (rho = -0.08, n = 909, p < 0.05) and older youth (rho = 0.07, n = 909, p < 0.05).

On the other side, spiritual renewal was more endorsed by older youth (rho = 0.08, n = 909, p < 0.05) and those with higher education levels (rho = 0.07, n = 909, p < 0.05). Young people from smaller residential communities (rho = -0.15, n = 909, p < 0.001), less educated (rho = -0.12, n = 909, p < 0.001), younger (rho = -0.08, n = 909, p < 0.05) and those with lower monthly incomes (rho = -0.08, n = 870, p < 0.05) were more likely to believe that strengthening military power and national security should be an important government goal. In terms of the implications of these results, previous studies have shown that youth unemployment pressures decrease political involvement (Lorenzini and Giugni, 2012; also see Kuhar, 2005, 53). Since youth unemployment is increasing (UMAR, 2013; Klanišek and Lavrič, 2011; also see chapter on youth employment) and young people (understandably) perceive it as a problem, then it is not surprising that conventional youth...
political participation is low. In addition, unemployed youth are also more distrustful of politics (Bay and Blekesaune, 2002), and trusting political leaders and politics in general is an important element of effective democracy (Almond and Verba, 1989; Putnam et al., 1993; Bibič, 1997, 135; Györffy, 2006). In sum, youth unemployment rates, together with their perception that reducing unemployment should be the top governmental priority, should provoke political decision-makers to action.

Beginning with some findings on the fulfillment of conditions which lead to a functioning (i.e., effective) democracy, one may conclude that much more can be done in Slovenia, especially where it regards youth political engagement. First, of course, political elites should send a clear message whether high(er) levels of youth conventional political participation is also their priority. Further, it can be argued that future youth political engagement (with or without the aid of new technologies, and within or outside the realm of conventional forms) will be similar to what Rizman (2010, 389) concluded about globalization – it is what people are willing to make of it. Further, Bennett’s question is particularly relevant in this context: “Are politicians, parents, educators, policymakers, and curriculum developers willing to allow young citizens to more fully explore, experience, and expand democracy, or will they continue to force them to just read all about it?” (Bennett, 2008, 21).

5 Key findings

- 28 percent of Slovenian youth believe participating in civic actions and initiatives is popular; however, only 10 percent claim that being active in politics is popular.
- Slovenian youth are generally not interested in politics. When they are, they tend to focus on domestic political issues. Better-educated, older youth, with educated fathers and mothers, and who live in larger sized communities are more interested in politics.
- 29 percent of Slovenian youth are not familiar with the left-right ideological distinction, which is a substantial increase since 2000. In addition, the proportions of left- and right-oriented Slovenian youth are declining. Youth in Slovenia are increasingly center-oriented.
- The frequency of participating in elections increases with levels of education.
- Only 32.2 percent of Slovenian youth (aged 18-27) would attend parliamentary elections if they were held tomorrow, which presents a serious problem for democracy, especially with regard to legitimacy.
- Satisfaction with democracy has been decreasing since 2000. Young people (aged 20-27) who are more satisfied with democracy participate in elections more frequently.
- Half of Slovenian youth “do not feel represented at all” by young people who are active in politics.
- Only 15 percent of youth claim that they have “a lot/some” influence on national institutions, and 25 percent of youth believe that they have “a lot/some” influence on
local institutions. Slovenian youth will more likely vote if they believe that they have more influence on national or local institutions.

- Youth who are more trustful of political parties are more likely to participate in elections; in Slovenia, 0 percent of young people expressed having “very much” trust in political parties.

- 81 percent of Slovenian youth (aged 16–25) acquire information about politics from the Internet.

- 62 percent of youth never watch political debates on television, though the frequency of watching televised political debates increases with age.

- Almost half (49 percent) say that their political beliefs to some extent match those of their parents.

- Youth who assess their parents as more interested in politics, are more likely to watch televised political debates.

- 86 percent of Slovenian youth believe that reduction of unemployment is a “very important” objective for the Slovenian government, followed by economic growth and development, and social justice and security.

6 References


Lavrič, Miran et al. (2011). Youth 2010: Social profile of youth in Slovenia [data file]. Slovenia, Maribor: Univerza v Mariboru = University of Maribor, Filozofska fakulteta = Faculty of Arts [production], 2010. Slovenia, Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani = University of Ljubljana, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov = Social Science Data Archive [distribution].


PART XI
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

1 Introduction

The concept of governance is undoubtedly one of the central issues in the social sciences, particularly as it relates to the issues of managing and organizing a social group in order to maintain stability and enable improvement to living conditions. On the latter, concepts like development (or progress) initially seem easy to define and understand; however, in reality they are much more complex. One body of literature in particular portrays the wealth of issues surrounding the concept of development and progress (see for e.g., Ryan, 1969; Sklair, 1970; Nisbet, 1980; Lauer, 1991; Sztompka, 1994), asking questions like what it really means to improve living conditions and move forward.

For example, is increasing food production by pesticides and herbicides that have an adverse effect on drinking water and the environment an improvement? Is being “connected” (and thus traceable) all the time a step forward? Does the infinite selection of goods heighten an individual’s inclination toward that which is unattainable? As expressed by Durkheim (1951; cf. Traub and Little, 1999, 132), a society that nourishes the idea that “the sky is the limit” continuously generates insatiability and thus dissatisfaction and misery. While many similar examples could be given, some suggest that these types of questions are irrelevant as concepts (both historically and theoretically). In short, there is no such thing as development or progress. Rather, there is only “an incessant variation of the main recurrent themes” (Sorokin, 1957, 671). These types of ideas, however, are very much alien to social evolutionism, which serves as the theoretical foundation to (neo)modernization theory, equating economic development, modernization, and progress.

Although doubts regarding the question of whether economic growth/development (considered core processes of modernization) actually means development or even progress can be traced back to Rousseau’s *Discourse on Arts and Sciences/ Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750/2004). Today economic growth is often seen as the central pillar of social development (Welzel, Inglehart, and Kligemann, 2003), and thus the belief in a better future. With the falling of the Berlin Wall, symbolizing the collapse of “a tragically flawed experiment”, as Lenski and Nolan (1999, 365) call efforts to build a communist society, it was also clarified how to achieve this better future (i.e., which is the best way for modern societies to develop). By following in the footsteps of those who had already achieved Fukuyama’s “The End of History” (1992), i.e., by embracing a market economy, economic liberalism, and capitalist globalization. Or, as was eloquently expressed by Margaret Thatcher in the 80s, “There Is No Alternative” (Berlinski, 2008).
The same “no true alternative” arguments can be heard in a debate over political systems, what form of governance functions best in terms of ensuring socially desirable goals (e.g., freedom, equality of rights and opportunities, order and stability, and general-well being, etc.). Ignoring the abundance of literature that suggests that democracy is nowhere to be found, even in societies that see themselves as a “beacon of democracy and freedom” (see for e.g., Mills, 1956), Plato (2007) offers a number of reminders of why democracy as a political system is far from being the only alternative. That many feel that democracy often enables “bronze souled” (i.e., unfit to rule) people to rise to power, who then primarily cater to their own desires, is supported by longitudinal research that indicates significant changes in terms of patterns and forms of political participation in western and post-transition democracies. Specifically, Kirbiš and Flere (2011, 187), after reviewing more than ten different studies, found an overall decline in the following: electoral participation, membership, and frequency of political party activities, affiliation to political parties, and confidence in politics and state institutions. In other words, data suggests that people in many democracies feel increasingly alienated from the “best” political system, and from the institutions and authorities that run them. This holds even more for young people.

2 Youth not satisfied with the functioning of democracy

Alienation, distrust in political institutions, and declining rates of electoral participation can be found among all age cohorts in Slovenia (CJMMK, 2013). Most recently, antagonism toward political institutions has been manifested in mass protests in Slovenia over the last two years. The dominant message was distrust, with one banner reading “We are not right and we are not left but we are the people who are sick of you.” (Novak, 2013).

Further, the results from the Youth 2010 study (Lavrič et al., 2011) indicate that young people in Slovenia are on average less active in conventional political terms and less interested in politics compared to young people in the EU-27. As elsewhere, there is a declining trend in conventional political participation among young people and among those who think that elites respond to the wishes of citizens (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 194-203; see also Part X of this study). Not surprisingly, only one out of eight young Slovenians (aged 15-25) was satisfied/very satisfied with the state of democracy in Slovenia in 2010 (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 204).

Given that evaluations of democratic performance often take into account the current economic climate (Klingemann, 2013, 10), and that Slovenia is still suffering from an elongated economic crisis and political corruption, it is not surprising that young people perceive democracy to be failing (see Figure 102).

In 2013, only one out of twelve Slovenian youth are satisfied/very satisfied with the current state of democracy in Slovenia. The percentage of youth who are very satisfied thus dropped eightfold in just three years and is more than 40 times lower that the percentage of youth in Germany. Although past pan-European studies find lower levels of support in Eastern Europe (e.g., Andreson, 1998; Klingemann, 2013), the levels of satisfaction are also well below those found in Croatia or Kosovo. In Croatia, 22 percent of youth (aged 16-25) are dissatisfied/extremely dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy (Kosovo, 22 percent; Germany, 34 percent), while in Slovenia
this share reaches almost 60 percent (up from around 45 percent in 2010) and rises with age (\(\rho = 0.14, p < 0.01\)). It is thus not surprising that the results from the national study “Politbarometer” indicated that in January 2013 the share of the general population dissatisfied was higher than among youth. Almost 90 percent of Slovenians were not satisfied with the functioning of democracy (up from around 60 percent in 2010; CJJMK, 2013) (the Western Europe average as of 2008 was 41.1 percent, while the Eastern Europe average in 2008 was 59.2 percent; Klingemann, 2013, 10).

Figure 102: Percentage of those who are completely satisfied with the state of democracy, youth (16-25), by country

Dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in Slovenia is thus rising and reaching levels that could be seen as problematic. Although Klingemann (2013) suggests that dissatisfaction with the regime is analytically different from regime preference (i.e., that large proportions of “dissatisfied democrats” are not necessarily problematic for the survival of democracy), it should still be acknowledged that low levels of citizen support can pose serious challenges to democracy (see for e.g., Lipset 1959; Easton, 1975). As noted by Anderson (1998, 1) “both the functioning and the

maintenance of democratic polities are intimately linked with what and how citizens think about democratic governance".  

Table 15: Youth’s (16-27) perception of problems, Slovenia and Croatia (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOW ALARMING/PRESSING ARE THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS FOR SLOVENIAN/CROATIAN SOCIETY?</th>
<th>NOT ALARMING AT ALL</th>
<th>MODERATELY/SLIGHTLY ALARMING</th>
<th>VERY ALARMING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>- SI</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- CRO</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment pollution</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS /HIV threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidence of chronic diseases</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws not implemented properly</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job insecurity</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workplace safety</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street crime</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Means having different superscript letters are significantly different at the p<0.001 based on Independent samples Mann-Whitney U Test.

Sources: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study, IDIZ-FES 2012 Croatian Youth Study.

As indicated, the potential factors that can help explain democratic performance evaluation are numerous59 (see Anderson, 1998; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011; Klingemann, 2013; but also Part X of the current study). One of the more interesting factors, although it was not evaluated in the current study, is that although Kirbiš (2011, 205) found that in 2010, 42.3 percent of youth (aged 15-25) in Slovenia thought that democracy in general is not a good political system, only 8 percent thought the same in what used to be the former “West” Germany (Shell, 2010). It should be noted that the same population scored low on measures of authoritarianism, potentially indicating that respondents again evaluated democracy in terms of general system performance. Specifically, less than 15 percent of those who said that democracy is not a good system thought that Slovenia needs a strong single leader/party (85 percent opted for other options).

58 Although Kirbiš (2011, 205) found that in 2010, 42.3 percent of youth (aged 15-25) in Slovenia thought that democracy in general is not a good political system, only 8 percent thought the same in what used to be the former “West” Germany (Shell, 2010). It should be noted that the same population scored low on measures of authoritarianism, potentially indicating that respondents again evaluated democracy in terms of general system performance. Specifically, less than 15 percent of those who said that democracy is not a good system thought that Slovenia needs a strong single leader/party (85 percent opted for other options).

59 Usually they are grouped into two categories: while the first includes cultural factors (e.g., democratic history, political culture, values, etc.), the second includes factors that are associated with general system performance (Anderson, 1998).
study, is the idea that high levels of dissatisfaction in Slovenian politics are a result of “a collective memory” of the past (regime), which is commonly used as a reference point when evaluating the current state of affairs. This was previously suggested by Kirbiš and Flere (2011; see also Flere and Kirbiš, 2011), who pointed out that criticism of democracy in Slovenia should be understood in the context of nostalgia for Yugoslavia.

Results from the Youth 2010 study (Lavrič et al., 2011) indicated that nostalgia for Yugoslavia, although a relatively minor phenomenon (15 percent), was greater than the nostalgia East Germans had for the GDR. Further, among those who thought that democracy in general is not a good system (42.3 percent; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011, 205), 38.3 percent expressed that a “socialist system similar to the former Yugoslavia” would be better. This longing for a socialism-type regime increased with the sample’s dissatisfaction with democracy. In addition, results from the current study also indicate a strong affinity towards other parts of the former Yugoslavia; 42 percent thought that Slovenian diplomacy (and policy-makers in general) should invest and do more to strengthen ties with the other former Yugoslav republics.

As indicated by Klanišek (2012), this should be understood in the context of what the former regime represented, and not simply that it was a centrally-planned, single-party regime. Such representations include the collective fight against fascism and Nazism during World War II. Moreover, the old regime championed (youth) employability, stability, and (social) security (whereby, it differed from other non-democratic systems in Eastern Europe).

In sum, while the declining trend in the country’s democratic performance could be explained by the deteriorating economic situation, high levels of dissatisfaction can be better understood in the context of how Slovenians perceive the previous regime.

However, as indicated in Table 15, the views presented above are not sufficient when trying to understand levels and trends of democratic performance evaluation. Namely, Table 15, which compares the most troubling issues as perceived by Slovenian and Croatian youth, indicates that youth in Croatia perceives their country as a more problem-ridden (yet they are still more satisfied with the state of democracy). This is important from both “system performance” and “nostalgia” perspectives.

Almost all of the averages listed in Table 15 are significantly (p < 0.001) higher in Croatia. There are only two exceptions: “job insecurity”, which has no significant difference, and “laws not being implemented properly”, which was significantly higher in Slovenia. This subjective perception of system performance in Croatia is not without merit. Namely, a quick overview of the basic macro socio-economic indicators reveals that Slovenia enjoys higher levels of GDP per capita (2012: 20,900 vs. 15,600, in PPP EUR per inhabitant), lower poverty rates (2011: 13.6 percent vs. 21.1 percent, cut-off point: 60 percent of median equivocal income after social transfers), lower inequality (2011: 23.8 vs. 31 Gini coefficient) (Eurostat, 2013), lower unemployment rates (Jun./Jul 2013: 12.8 percent vs. 18.5 percent, registered unemployment rates) (National Labor Bureau of Slovenia/ZRSZ and Croatia/HZZ, 2013), higher HDI rank (22 vs. 47, UNDP, 2013), and higher Freedom House rating

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60 This is also true for Kosovo, but since measures listed in Table 15 were not asked in the Kosovo survey, this section is only able to compare Croatia and Slovenia.
In sum, it seems that system performance is subjectively and objectively better in Slovenia than in Croatia, yet still Slovenians are more dissatisfied with the current state of the political system \((p < 0.001)\). There are at least four possible explanations for these results. First, as indicated by Anderson (1998), besides system performance explanations, there are also views that try to explain cross-national differences in satisfaction with democratic performance via cultural factors (length of democratic rule, democratic history, political culture, etc.). Yet as noted above, both Slovenia and Croatia were part of the same political entity, both are predominately Catholic, both gained independence at the beginning of the 1990s (when both also transformed their political system). Thus, at least some reservations can be expressed towards the "cultural" hypothesis.

Second, it might be argued that the Slovenian public suffers from some sort of collective shock as the picture of a “success story”\(^{61}\) (i.e., “the best among post-socialist countries”, “honest and hardworking”) \(^{62}\) has been continuously shattered since the onset of the financial crisis. In other words, it is possible that disappointment stems from the fact that many previously held ideas of what Slovenia is and where it will go, are suddenly lost. This consequently transforms reactions from shock to identity crisis.\(^{62}\) In addition, this disappointment has been fueled by the realization that the end is nowhere to be seen, and that Slovenia is becoming increasingly (and objectively) poorer and less equal (see Part I of this study), with pressures to adopt more neoliberal policies (i.e., to thin the social security net, overhaul the public sector, the retirement scheme, and labor market; to privatize publicly owned companies; to lower public expenses, etc.), which would probably increase inequality further. That this does not bode well with the Slovenian voter is evident from the fact that despite being the most egalitarian society in the EU-27 \((p < 0.001)\), public opinion polls in 2009 indicated that 95 percent agreed with the statement that income inequality in Slovenia is too big, and 90 percent agreed with the idea that income inequality should be reduced, and the government is responsible to reform these issues \(^{63}\).

Third, and paralleling the above, the results could also indicate that Slovenian youth (and the general public) ties all economic issues and problems to what they consider a disfunctioning political system. If true, this would suggest two scenarios: first, a lack of understanding of what it

\(^{61}\) From 1994 to 2009 the annual growth rate in Slovenia stood at 4.6 percent, a fact which, together with other reform efforts, enabled Slovenia to be the first of the former Yugoslav republics to be accepted into the European Union (May 2004) and first among all post-socialist countries to be accepted into the European Monetary Union (EMU; Slovenia joined the third stage of the EMU in 2007, when the national currency, the Slovenian tolar, was replaced by the euro). According to Eurostat, in 2008 Slovenian GDP \textit{per capita} (using Purchasing Power Parity/Standard – PPP/PPS) reached around 91 percent of the EU-27 average GDP \textit{per capita}, exceeding even the “old” member state of Portugal, whose GDP \textit{per capita} stood at 78 percent of the EU-27 average (in 2012 this figure fell to 82 percent in Slovenia). Slovenia also enjoyed the highest HDI rank among all post-socialist countries \(^{62}\).

\(^{62}\) In this regard, Croatia shares a somewhat different picture. Besides having experienced war, Croatia also “walked” a long way before it was finally formally recognized as a full member of the European community. This fact alone undoubtedly contributed to the sentiment that “Croatia is moving in the right way” and thus to a more positive evaluation of system performance.

\(^{63}\) According to the Eurostat data for 2011, Slovenia was the most egalitarian society in the EU-28, with the Gini coefficient of 23.8 \(\text{EU-28} = 30.7\).
means to have a market economy (legacy of “old regime”); and second, a lack of understanding of what national governments can really do in the context of the global economy, which is “driven by a culture of competitive individualism at whose fringe is a resurrected social Darwinism in which norms and values of collective survival have all but disappeared” (Robinson, 2001, 171). However, this explanation is also problematic because it implies that youth in Croatia are more aware of these dilemmas.

Finally, these answers could be summarized within the so-called “critical citizen” hypothesis (Kirbiš and Flere, 2011; Klingemann, 2013). This refers to “the increasing cognitive mobilization and rising levels of expectation among modern mass publics” (Klingemann, 2013, 2), which means that the discrepancies indicated in Table 15 show that Slovenian youth are more critical than youth in Croatia. Again, due to the limits of the current study, this assumption cannot be adequately tested.

3 Youth not satisfied with the results of the European integration

Many expected that Slovenian accession to the EU would bring about economic prosperity and political stability. As indicated by Bučar and Brinar this was believed true because the “EU, by facilitating democracy and rule of law, helps potential member states with the transformation of their political and economic systems so they will become functioning market economies and democracies” (2002, 655).

Although one could question the definition of “functioning”, results from previous studies suggest that the majority of Slovenians evaluate accession through this lens. Namely, in March 2003, roughly one year before Slovenia became a member of the EU, 81 percent of Slovenians (aged 18-30) thought that joining “will benefit Slovenia as a whole” (Toš et al., 2003). Ten years later, almost half (45 percent) of the youth (aged 16-27) surveyed think that Slovenia should drop the euro and leave the EU altogether (only 30 percent oppose this idea, while the remaining are undecided).

As indicated by the following figure, Euroscepticism can largely be attributed to the fact that young people in Slovenia are not very enthusiastic in terms of what “the end of history” has brought to their lives.

More than 65 percent see European integration as something that has a largely negative effect on both the economic climate (66 percent) and political system (67 percent). This is in stark contrast to what youth expected from the integration process in 2000. At that point, only 19 percent thought that the economic condition would be worse if Slovenia joined the EU (40 percent expected no change, 26 percent expected positive developments; no comparable question about the political situation was asked) (Miheljak et al., 2001).

Unsurprisingly, the results from a simple correlation analysis indicate that there is a significant associative relationship between (dis)satisfaction with the results of EU membership and the de-
sire to leave the EU altogether, i.e., being more dissatisfied with the results of integration is significantly (rho > 0.25; p < 0.001) related to the stronger desire to leave behind the integration process (where the latter is significantly correlated with the wish that Slovenian politics would be more oriented to the “south”, i.e., the states of the former-Yugoslavia; p < 0.001).

Figure 103: Evaluating the results of “Euro project” - How Slovenian youth (16-27) sees the effects of Slovenia’s integration into the European Union in terms of economic and political system (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic system</th>
<th>Political system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive/Economic development</td>
<td>No Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,2</td>
<td>14,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPYUS-FES Slovenian 2013 Youth Study.

The results also indicate that dissatisfaction with EU integration is significantly (rho > 0.18; p < 0.001) associated with dissatisfaction of the functioning of democracy in Slovenia. Interestingly, dissatisfaction with EU integration was positively associated with respondents income (even when controlled for employment status; rho > 0.08; p < 0.05).

Further, the belief that Slovenia should leave behind the integration process was significantly (p < 0.05) associated with the position that European integration does \emph{not} represent what is often understood as one of the main legitimizing pillars of European integration: the free movement of people and goods, which leads to better living conditions for all. Concerning the latter, only around 38 percent thought that this is the case.

In other words, those who do not support European integration are largely disappointed with what the integration process has brought into their lives and think that integration does not represent what it stands for.

In sum, it seems that youth in Slovenia are extremely dissatisfied, not only with the institutional framework in Slovenia, but also with the European Union. Although it may well be that expectations from becoming an independent state and a full member of the European community
might have been too high, the data still point to the fact that youth believe the current institutional framework (i.e., the current form of democracy and market economy) does not offer or generate enough income/material/social security and justice. In other words, the fact that the current “sensate” (Sorokin, 1957) model of development does not offer any real possibility for the individual to “ever be completely satisfied” (Bauman, 2002, 38), various data and trends, including those shown in Part I and Part X of this study, do not mean that youth dissatisfaction has no objective component. It rather seems that despite the auspicious claims of reaching the end of history, the current phase of human history, with its capacity to connect globally and generate extreme wealth, creates immense uncertainty, risk, and imbalances, and continues to spawn numerous reservations about the current path to “heaven on earth”.

4 Key findings

- The perception of youth, in terms of how democracy functions in Slovenia, continues to deteriorate (from already high levels recorded in 2010). Much of this can be explained by poor system performance (which makes the past regime more appealing) and pessimistic outlooks of the future.
- The most alarming problems according to Slovenian youth are poverty, unemployment, job (in)security, and laws not being implemented properly. Issues related to the environment, physical security, and well-being are mainly perceived as not alarming/slightly alarming.
- Although in 2003, 81 percent of Slovenians (aged 18-30) thought that joining the EU “will benefit Slovenia as a whole” (Toš et al., 2003), ten years later, almost half (45 percent) (aged 16-27) think that Slovenia should drop the euro and leave the EU altogether.
- More than 65 percent consider European integration to have an overall negative effect on both the economic climate (66 percent) and the political system (67 percent). This is in sharp contrast to what the youth expected from the integration processes in 2000, when only 19 percent thought that the economic conditions would be worse if Slovenia joined the EU.

5 References


1. Is the social situation of Slovenian young people one of a “cushioned precariat”?

Various youth studies have underscored the change in the social position and overall nature of youth. Over time, a number of perceptions and ideas have faded, including the linear depiction of youth transition from childhood to adulthood, the one-time issues surrounding a so-called “youth identity crisis”, and the image of it being a time of “storm and stress”. Instead, focus has shifted to the difficulties and blockages that prolong entry into adulthood. Initially, this was understood as a multidimensionality of the transitional nature of youth (transition into adulthood achieved at different paces in various dimensions). However, this proved insufficient when the nature of work was taken into consideration. It is not simply employment at a later stage, but the very permanent and stable nature of inclusion into the societal work process that has become questionable, uncertain, and fragmented; this is often referred to as “precarity”.

The “precariat” social class to which the young disproportionately belong, has advanced (Standing, 2011), and come to be known as the “brazilianisation” process, referring to the country where insecurity and unforeseeable work climates permeate society (Furlong and Kelly, 2005).

This current study comes at a unique time as Slovenia enters its sixth straight year of economic recession. Government austerity measures did not arrive until it was perhaps too late. On the contrary, some welfare and social protection rights were expanded between 2008 and 2010, including state scholarships, which became available to a larger minority of tertiary students. Later, austerity measures began to marginally affect tertiary students, too (who account for almost half of all youth), particularly with respect to their special privileged (low-taxed) position as part-time workers (i.e., “student services”). However, as indicated in Part II, the extended economic recession has stymied youth employment programs. This could also be understood as the fundamental feature of the social and economic situation at the time this study was carried out.

A brief perusal of the relevant indicators of youth employment in Slovenia, suggests that young people fit into this recent historical pattern of work casualization and precarity (Furlong and Kelly, 2005; Furlong, 2013). “Permanent employment” as an option, has decreased since at least 1991. This trend has recently escalated, affecting females and including tertiary graduates, who had previously been almost exempt from unemployment.
However, as indicated in Part I, the social position of young Slovenians can not be characterized as poor or deteriorating. While some aspects of their social position have worsened, others have improved.

- Slovenian youth have progressively been included into the education system, and in particular into tertiary education programs. Slovenia even ranks first in some EU education comparisons (see Part III). Not only has tertiary education been expanded, but also the economic and social conditions of this process have continued to be relatively kind to youth. The general absence of tuition fees at all levels of study should be noted (with some exceptions). This absence has been complemented by a series of social benefits to students at all levels of schooling, including subsidized meals, and the expansion of scholarships under the Pahor government.

- In their private lives, Slovenian youth do not encounter many particular burdens and obstacles. Families are understanding and supportive, which is perhaps one reason why young people remain at home longer. Although Slovenia is experiencing an elongated economic recession, family support builds on decades of progressive family housing construction. Parental relations are not usually burdened by old-fashioned limitations, creating conditions for relatively obstacle-free relations with peers and partners alike.

- Youth economic conditions remain relatively favorable (poverty-wise), showing less deterioration than for other societal groups (for older youth, this more or less only holds for students).

- However, some trends are increasingly negative among youth, including rising unemployment, and declining or stagnating income, which most often derives from part-time or fixed-time employment. Further, the positive effect of education on employment is weakening, and the Slovenian labor market is still heavily segmented.

- In spite of this relatively favorable situation (especially when considering the troublesome macroeconomic condition), young Slovenians demonstrate a high degree of political dissatisfaction and pessimism toward the future. The overall negative assessment of politics and democracy is part of the general Slovenian picture, which culminated in the “uprising movement” of 2012 and 2013 that illustrated the basic delegitimation of the political system (see Parts X and XI).

- Although politically dissatisfied and disenchanted, Slovenian young people are not without political influence when it comes to defending their social position. The tax privileges for youth work were only partly cut in 2012, and the government has yet to approach the issue of tuition (which is particularly rare in tertiary education programs), as was recommended by a 2011 OECD study (Eris, 2011). The Slovenian Student Organization, as a representative organization, is very active in defending these interests.

- In contrast to their assessments of the political situation and the general state of democracy, young people are still predominantly satisfied with their life conditions (as depicted in Part I and VIII), which stems from their relatively comfortable position within
the social hierarchy (they are taken care of largely within the state welfare system, education system, and by their families). They also seem increasingly accepting of the casual and fragmented employment conditions, as indicated in Part II.

- Modes of communication and the ubiquity of modern media suggest that Slovenian young people make constant use of these novel technological frontiers. These subsequently impact other matters in the lives, i.e., the level of individualization, and the position of “having a career” and “being independent” as top values. Individualization is indicated by other phenomena described in Part VII & VIII. Thus, young Slovenians opt more frequently (in comparison to young Croatians) for less committing forms of coupledom, although marriage is still preferred.

- Slovenian youth are stratified; and inequalities are ever-present. Inequality in general has been rising in Slovenia, as indicated in Part I, although comparatively it is still rather low. Most importantly, social inequality among Slovenian youth has been hidden by the expansion and stimulation of higher education programs, and by social support measures. Thus, during youth, these inequalities are not as explicit as they are in perhaps later years.

Table 16: Main activity and status of youth (24-27), 2000-2013, in percent of sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000 (N=364)</th>
<th>2010 (N=379)</th>
<th>2013 (N=354)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full time employed</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part time employed</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>7.5/8.1*</td>
<td>10.7/15.3*</td>
<td>10.3/18.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary student</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a) Full time regular employment relationship; b) Including both employed for a definite or indefinite period; c) Self-reported; d) All types of student status (full time, part time, “dormant”, temporarily not active); e) Including agriculturists, a minute number in total; * The figure denotes percent in this sample, whereas the number to the right approximates the percent in the economically active population.


To summarize the above, the social position and living conditions of Slovenian young people have not been poor. However, entry into adulthood by way of employment (or some other form of reliable entry into the work market) is deteriorating, as has been indicated in Part I and II, and which is in line with the features of insecurity, the absence of reliability, and of “precarity”. Pre-carity does not seem to be only a feature of the young, but rather extends into adulthood. Young people seem to accept it. Thus, adulthood itself changes, where there is lack of reliability in the overall living conditions, particularly at work, but in private life as well. Here casualization has becoming a basic feature. As Bauman (2000) notes, “liquidity” is the basic feature of life in the
second modernity. This is largely supported by the results in Table 16, which indicate the changes in the main activity structure of Slovenian young people (aged 24-27) (“young adults”).

Over the observed period, one can easily see the most radical changes concern those who are fully employed (the figure has radically dropped) and tertiary students (the figure has risen fivefold). Evidently, the lack of employment possibilities was rarely registered as unemployment; young adults were instead channeled into various forms and types of tertiary study (as well as part-time work). However, as can be seen in Table 16, two figures are indicative of self-perceived unemployed: as part of the total sample (rising slowly), and as part of the economically active population, for which the figure has more than doubled over the past 13 years.

If one accepts that entry into the workforce is the best indicator of a successfully completed transition into adulthood, the issue of (un)employment becomes even more important. In other words, finding one’s place in the labor market aids in the consolidation of other transitions (child rearing, supporting a home, being “independent”)65. Therefore, it is very important to analyze the data centering on this domain. It is thus even more interesting to see who, under these evermore stringent conditions, is able to obtain the status of full- and part-time employment.

1.1 Who succeeds among young adults (24-27)?

1.1.1 Gender

Male respondents from this age group are significantly more likely to be fully employed in 2013 (40.0 percent compared to 30.3 percent of females); however, the relationship inverts when taking into account student status (50.8 percent of females, compared to 35.8 percent of males). This is quite different from 2000 (Miheljak et al., 2000), when the number of females employed in this age group was 70 percent, compared to 65 percent of males, which indicates that the current crisis is afflicting young women disproportionately.

1.1.2 Schooling

In this age group, having a tertiary degree is still a somewhat wider conduit to employment than an upper secondary degree. Among tertiary degree holders, 25 percent are employed, compared to 20 percent of upper secondary degree holders. However, the number of fully employed tertiary degree holders is one-third of what it was in 2000, when 74.5 percent were fully employed (Miheljak et al., 2000).

65 It is important to note that many do not share this view. For example, Arnett, in his study of the United States, writes of parenthood as the most critical transition (2000, 473). However, in an age of low birth in Europe, this may not have the same indicative value as it does in the US (EU birth rates are mainly within the 1.3-1.5 range, Slovenia 1.3, whereas the US rate amounts to 2.01 (CIA, 2013). Even Furlong, who in his most recent book (2013) writes of the transition to employment as one of the two foci in youth studies (the other being youth identity, 2013, 9), shies away from giving his own judgment. Heinz, another authority in the field, would also not state directly that the transition to the world of work is the most critical. Specifically, he admits only that “a more down to earth explanation would take into account the labour markets and social policies… which have restructured youth transitions” (2010, 3), thus also avoiding a clear position on the matter.
In terms of unemployment, tertiary degree holders were in a somewhat better position (7.4 percent compared to 9.9 percent of those who hold secondary degrees. By comparison, 5.5 percent of those who had completed higher education were unemployed (though the scale of degrees has changed). However, a stark change can be seen when taking into account the number of tertiary students. Among those with a higher education degree, 33.8 percent declared themselves to be students again (in 2000 this share stood at 5.2 percent). The main finding that can be deduced from the observed vertical and horizontal expansion of tertiary education is that it now functions as a “parallel social system”. In other words, it may be argued that tertiary schooling in Slovenia operates increasingly as a “safety valve” in the social system, and less as something that leads to better employment opportunities, as viewed by human capital proponents of the past (Becker, 1964).66 Whereas gender disparities have increased with regards to who will be employed, the value of education has sharply diminished (although it still enhances the possibility of employment).

1.1.3 In depth predictors

There are a number of sociological and psychological predictors capable of discerning who will truly succeed, finish school, and find employment. Among the best-known predictors are intelligence quotients (not accounted for in this study; see Flere et al., 2010), parental cultural capital, parental economic capital, parental social capital, and time orientations, as conceptualized and operationalized by Zimbardo and Boyd (2006). This study also considered narcissistic exploitativeness, particularly as exploitativeness presumes a will to achieve instrumental ends at the illegitimate expense of others (Margolis and Thomas, 1980).

Parental cultural capital, operationalized by Bourdieu, works in such a manner as to inculcate offspring with knowledge, values, and abilities. These are allegedly common to the family and the social system, whereby the social system recognizes them as appropriate for recruitment into higher social positions, after having gratified the child scholastically. The association has been confirmed numerous times in various settings, although the precise contents of cultural capital have varied. Cultural capital is more frequently operationalized via parental education levels. This association has been confirmed in Slovenia as well (Flere et al., 2010).

Family economic status needs no particular explanation: it works both through schooling, enabling offspring additional economic support in their education, and independent of school, sometimes making even schooling itself irrelevant due to the family’s economic resources.

Time orientation is a relatively new construct, built mainly from concepts known in psychology, but re-established by Zimbardo and Boyd (2006) into a framework that is able to channel various types of attitudes to the past, present, and future. For the purposes of this study, future time orientation was of particular interest. It points to the presence of long-term planning and subjecting one’s behavior to such plans. This is the subjugation of one’s present behavior with a view toward future gratification. Most of the content of the construct has been previously known within

66 Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that expanding tertiary education has other, non-material effects that are positive for both the individual and the society as a whole (e.g., being more tolerant and more open-minded) (Bobo and Licari, 1989).
Hirschi’s “self-control”/“self-regulation”. Zimbardo and Boyd explicitly state that future-orientation is not only associated with the psychological necessities of work, but also that “being future-oriented can get you a job in the first place” (2006, 142). Moreover, “because they have more education, they get better jobs” (2006, 150). In contrast, present hedonist- and present fatalist-orientations were hypothesized to have a negative impact on schooling.

Taking into account both that narcissism manifestations are time dependent, and that the current situation is marked by a scarcity of employment, exploitative narcissism could be expected to manifest itself by higher employment. As Hill and Roberts (2011) suggest, narcissism may lead to the “better achievement of occupational goals”. Exploitative narcissism is also characterized by the quality of being manipulative, which could in present conditions lead to employment if viewed as an ego gratifying “reward”.

The following table offers a summarized view on the differences between those employed and those unemployed (aged 24-27) with regard to the variables noted above.67

Table 17: Mean differences between employed and unemployed for “success” relevant variables, 24-27 age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed (N=163)</th>
<th>Unemployed (N=71)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family economic status</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal education</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternal education</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future orientation</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present hedonist orientation</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present fatalist orientation</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissistic exploitativeness</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational achievement</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>2.99*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < 0.05.

Family economic status was measured by self-appraisal, on a 1-10 scale, in the pro-trait direction. Future orientation, Present hedonist orientation, Present fatalist orientation and Narcissistic exploitativeness were measured on a 1-5 scale, in the pro-trait direction. Maternal, paternal, and respondent’s education (achievement) was measured on a 1 (less than completed elementary school) to 5 (completed some form of post-graduate studies) scale.

Source: CEPYUS-FES 2013 Slovenian Youth Study.

Although family economic status and parental educational attainment indicate some social reproduction among the privileged, no variable can adequately explain the absence of employment

67 Students will not be taken into consideration, as many are students only formally, i.e., to relieve and mask their true unemployed status. Thus, they could be composed of true and “fictitious” students. However, the findings would not be different.
among those aged 24-27. The only significant difference between the employed and unemployed could be found in their own educational achievement. Specifically, looking at the structure of the employed and unemployed by educational attainment, the results indicate that among the employed, 37 percent completed higher education, whereas 68 percent completed only secondary education. Among the unemployed, 70 percent completed secondary education, whereas 13 percent had completed higher education. Those with higher levels of education would thus be more likely to find themselves among the employed, although this was “no insurance”.

Nevertheless, the entire picture seems far less clear than what was expected by the validity of the variables applied. In particular, there is no confirmation that psychological variables are of any explanatory value, which largely supports the findings from the Youth 2010 study (Lavrič et al., 2011). Overall, the impression is that the main culprit is systemic in nature. Specifically, the diminution of the national product by 8.5 percent since 2008 has obviously afflicted all groups and frustrated the effects of factors that should lead to a differentiation among those who succeed and those who do not. It could be argued that crisis conditions have muddled the effects of most predictors, with the exception of gender, which became an even stronger predictor. As such, there seems to be no “reflexion” and no “navigation” (Beck, 2007) on the part of young adults when there are so few jobs. It is not possible to navigate towards new economic niches, outside manufacturing, if there are none. However, there is another point, which was not directly disconfirmed by this study. Although according to Beck and Bauman, all institutions and entities are melting in liquid society, including class, religion, and family, and each individual is forced to undertake his life project, this is also “the beginning of radicalized inequalities” (Beck, 2007, 680). One cannot expect that out of individual choice and navigation, meritocracy or social equity would arise. Rather, inequalities perpetuate because the risks are concentrated at the bottom of the social scale, as Beck argues. Only the mode of status attainment has changed, including individual judgment and striving on the part of the young recently emancipated from direct parental guidance. Yet basic determinisms of class inequality remain, or are even more acute. Social inequality in Slovenia is on the rise, although cushioned for youth by the instruments depicted above.

The relatively low explanatory potency of otherwise reliable predictive constructs cannot yet be taken as confirmation of Beck’s notion of individualization, according to which the individual acting reflexively creates his/her own “life trajectory” and is relatively independent of social determinisms (see Farrugia, 2013). Rather than finding indications of trajectory passing by individual plans, and predictors indicative of planning achievement, this study found that trajectory passing and arrival are mainly arrested. For those who have made such a passage, the input of individual specific factors is low. This can be acutely seen by the absence of future orientation among those aged 24-27. At this age, orientation should at least impart a partial psychological basis of reflexive thinking and action, containing time deferment and calculation, not to mention, instrumental rationality.

In sum, there is little knowledge on how individual “navigation” towards adulthood takes place. In the entire sample, 62 percent of respondents claim that they make their major decisions independently. Among the oldest group in this sample, the percentage rises to 80 percent.
Nearly half of the 24+ age group have taken part in courses over the past year as a means of attaining new and relevant skills. This is significantly higher than in previous years, but it seems that even more will be demanded from them. Moreover, this by itself cannot raise the number of jobs, even casual ones. Future research should focus on how friends and partners act as social capital by means of helping others attain work, particularly as it is well known that Slovenian families often give their children sound economic and emotional backing, which is one of the conditions where Slovenian youth are predominantly satisfied (life satisfaction among those aged 24-27 is at 7.3 on a 1-10 scale and is positively related to good family relations).

Yet some inequalities are present and the absence of future orientation suggests that young people in general lack “navigation”, and stand an even less chance of bringing the subject into a safe haven.

In terms of the general population’s perceptions, acquaintances, i.e., social capital, are considered the best means in finding employment. In the oldest age group, half of the respondents favored social capital, whereas only 7 percent believe that political associations are the best job-hunting mechanism. However, generalities in these matters may be questionable, as they are often associated with hearsay.

As indicated in Part VIII, Slovenian youth tend to accept the “casualization” of work, and are adjusting well to the flexibility needed on the labor market. Slovenia also has one of the lowest nuptial rates in the EU (Eurostat, 2013), particularly as young people maintain relatively good housing conditions in their parents’ dwellings. Unemployment among those aged 24-27 claim an average “income” of only 271 EUR, but their life satisfaction is not radically below those employed full-time (6.68 vs. 7.40). In both cases, the magnitude is well above the EU average. One could say that the absence of employment is not a cause of general dissatisfaction, although it seems to diminish general life satisfaction. Gender and age are not significant explanatory variables behind these findings (it has been indicated that women and older youth designate lower values for life satisfaction).

Another way of observing the employment problem is assessing whether the unemployed are significantly more willing to leave Slovenia. However, one should bear in mind that Slovenia is a small country and that such willingness should be expected less than in larger systems. On a 1-4 scale (1 and 2 = leaning toward staying, 3 and 4 = indicating a wish to emigrate), there is no difference in the willingness to move out among those who employed full-time (M = 2.00) and those unemployed (1.99). Despite the inconclusiveness of this data, it should not be disposed of entirely. Interestingly, these figures have risen in comparison to data fielded in the first decade of the century. Nevertheless, the majority of young Slovenians claim to be most comfortable in Slovenia. As such, these are indirect indicators that young Slovenians have come to terms with the absence of permanent employment. Nevertheless, young Slovenians are generally satisfied with life, irrespective of their employment status, and even if they are older than 24.

68 In 2006, 44 percent of higher education students were prepared to look for work outside Slovenia (Flere et al., 2006), whereas in our study (2013) 33 percent of higher education students would like to go abroad to live for reasons unspecified. However, the question was worded too differently in the studies to make an accurate comparison.
One could ponder on their happiness not being related to Marxian labor emancipation, or Durkheim’s networking, i.e., achieving sociality through labor. Their networking and social relations seem to be loosely related to work. One could say they take work “casually”. Their sociality is mainly outside work.

In sum, the entry into adulthood is becoming more protracted and less orderly, riddled with uncertainty and fluidity, where “everything melts” and nothing remains solid (Bauman, 2000). This includes the trend of casualization and precarity of work, where employment, especially that which is permanent, has been an ever-rarer phenomenon, not only in Slovenia, but also elsewhere.

2 References


Living in times of disillusionment, risk and precarity

SLOVENIAN YOUTH 2013

First CEPYUS – Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Youth Survey

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