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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

CURRENT SECURITY CHALLENGES
**FOR THE WESTERN
BALKAN REGION**

ADDRESSED BY MEANS OF JOINT RESPONSIBILITY
AND COOPERATION

SOE



Dialog
Südosteuropa



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Introduction to the Conference Program and Aim

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Militarische Zeitschrift (Austrian Military Journal)

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Lorenzo Vidino, Researcher at ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi
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Introduction Dr Wulf Lapins

Bob Dylan once said: "I only sing what goes through my mind."

I will follow that motto and even just tell you –according to our subject - what is going through my mind as well. Currently Europe is facing the deepest crisis since the end of the Cold War.

Numerous emergencies in the EU's strategic neighborhood challenge its role as a stable anchor in instable world. The EU is not surrounded by a ring of democratic countries. Rather it is faced with an arc of insecurity, instability and threats - stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, including the Middle East and the Caucasus Region - up to the new hybrid security threats in Eastern Europe. The security dimension is comprised of various security areas. These include political, economic, social, ethnic and religious challenges and are time and again interconnected - that often lead to military conflicts.

The common foreign and security policy is the weakest pillar in the European integration project.

In Eastern Europe with a view to Ukraine – where there is partially war in the East of that country - the EU is committed.

In this context, politicians, diplomats, political scientists and observers as well as the intelligence community are trying to figure out whether Russia is willing to return to a stable partnership in Europe. Many experts assert that

Russia will pursue its own geopolitical agenda, objectives and purposes which is difficult to understand. In this way Russia will be an unstable actor in Europe for a long time and cause for concern and perplexity.

We should furthermore not think, even more, it will be illusory to assume, that the conflict in the Ukraine and the related crisis with Russia, will not affect the developments in the Western Balkans. They will do. With other words: A longer period of tension with Russia will have in the medium and longer term an effect on the stability of the Western Balkans as well.

Russia could strengthen its efforts to prevent form Kosovo become in member of the UN in the long run; that the pursuit and striving of Kosovo to become a Member of NATO in the future could be obstructed and prevented particularly by members such as Greece, Slovakia, Romania and possibly Bulgaria, having historical ties to Russia. Furthermore Russia has already or will increase its economic influence in those countries.

Russia will be able to sufficiently develop its interference as well as its political potential. To influence through public diplomacy the public opinion in Serbia and via the so called Republic of Srpska the European Politics of Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina.

In the shades of the Ukraine-Russia conflict we are facing instabilities in the Western Balkans are looming. These uncertainties also have an impact on the European security. With regard to NATO accessions: Here the alliance could decide for security reasons. Spain for example had been a member 1982 for these reasons.

In the preparation for this conference, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation had met with leading NGOs in Kosovo with links to the region to

identify the three most important challenges for stability and security in the Western Balkans. In this respect, concordant, Political Islam, Cyber (in) security and fragile states were indexed as existing or potential threats that are interconnected.

Against this background these three current security issues for the Western Balkans are thus also the thematic priorities for our conference today and tomorrow.

In the south of Europe with a view at the refugee situation in the Mediterranean and the threats of the disintegration of the Middle East and North Africa these upcoming conflicts to Europe range from the failing states – following bad governance - the EU is relatively helpless. In other words: Although the security challenges in Europe are increasing – the majority of the societies in the EU member states reject that military thinking could solve the problems.

Facing the Balkans and Afghanistan – for the EU member states the so called golden or fat years of military security of uncertainty are over.

All western societies are getting tired of interventions. With regard to many atrocities - this is regrettable - but it is a matter of fact. But we also know, military operations can only open short windows of opportunities - not more. Where in the past military operations failed, they did not fail because of the military capabilities - but due to the missing political capacities in the recipient countries.

“To stop political recklessness, to reduce mutual mistrust, to balance unemotional alternatives and to explore compromises – that would have been the task of politics and diplomacy to prevent the First World War. However it did not the tools, but the will.” The German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier who said this in a speech last year about the Failure of Diplomacy: “In many parts

of the world the precarious system of balance of power still applies (...) Today: To the place of the fragile balance of the powers the European legal community has stepped. A war in Europe which has now become unthinkable. But 100 years ago it was this already once.”

Diplomacy today in the Western Balkans must aim to escape, primarily, from the historical ethno nationalistic demons and to prepare the way political win-win.

But it is also true, that diplomacy can only be as good as the politics itself is.
Or expressed differently: Diplomacy cannot substitute politics. Politics must give clearance and margin to diplomacy because diplomacy is only the servant of politics. Bad governance cannot produce good diplomacy, because good diplomacy cannot compensate bad governance.

Now, I will present four scenarios for the relation between Kosovo and its neighborhood in ten year – 2025. Not to predict the future, but to offer different visions of possible and plausible outcomes:

1. After a period of political crises – the entire Western Balkans shares for pragmatically common interests with the region. Balkan region as shared region. As a result the fatigue for new accessions in the EU member decreases.

2. Political crises lead to more democratic and economic reform that clear the way for improved relationships with each other and bound by common values. Balkan region as common region. The EU member states are willing for new accessions.

3. No deep and concrete political and economic transformation take place in the Western Balkans. Improvements seem impossible due to stable corrupt regimes. Each country in the Western Balkan live next door – but apart from each other. The EU member states are not willing for new accessions.

4. The countries in the common neighborhood continue to form an unstable zone. The entire Western Balkans as a region in the upcoming European home lies in remains. The Thessaloniki - Agenda is only history.

I started with Bob Dylan and I want to end with him:
One of his famous songs is titled: *“The times they are a changin”*.
For responsible and rational politics and diplomacy, the title is not a blueprint.
But it is a guiding principle of perspective.

SESSION ONE

Risks from Political Islam
for the Western Balkan
Countries

International Conference:

Current Security
the Western Balk

Challenges for Balkan Region



Addressed by
Means of Joint
Responsibility and Cooperation



KEYNOTE ADDRESSES 1

Udo Steinbach: Locating Islamic extremism

By the end of the 1990 Western experts have forecast the decline of political islam. Obviously, they were wrong. The „war on terrorism“ which was waged after the terror attack of September 11th, 2001, did not only did not bring the phenomenon to an end. On the contrary, religious violence since, has spread to most parts of the „Islamic world“, and even penetrated muslim segments of Western societies. By 2014, a terrorist organization called „Islamic State“ managed to set up a Jihadi state on parts of the territories of Iraq and Syria headed by a self-

declared „caliph“. Waging war against everybody not being seen as a truly sunni believer, it is supported by a bunch of considerably numerous fellow travelers from many parts even of Europe including the Western Balkan countries. So, when dealing with the movement, one has to understand, where are its roots and what were the reasons why it so „successfully“ withstood the efforts of the international community to come to grips with.

Six observations may be put forward:

1). The phenomenon of political Islam is deeply rooted in the ideological and political history not only of the Middle East and the Islamic world at large, but of Europe as well. The 20th century in Europe has been called the „century of ideologies“ referring primarily to fascism, national socialism and communism. In fact, it has an equivalent in the Middle East: islamism (to frame it from a European perception). When the First World War ended, the traditional order legitimized throughout history had been destroyed; new legitimizing frameworks for political orders had to be found. In Europe, nationalism and communism seemed to be most appropriate to give the people a new sense of orientation and the state its legitimacy. While „fascism“ and „national socialism“ (in its German perversion) more appealed to emotions and feelings referring to a vague notion such as „nation“, Karl Marx had managed to give „socialism“ a more scientific appearance. The way towards classless society was marked by a road map according to which one could measure, at which point a respective society would have arrived. Lenin went a step further introducing the notion of the „avantgarde“; belonging to the avantgarde meant to have the

„correct consciousness“. Those who belonged to the avantgarde were legitimized to take action in order to transform the society into its final stage, the classless society. To use violence in order to achieve this was not only legitimate, but necessary in case resistance had to be overcome on this way. The bloody history of Marxism-Leninism from the very first day in Sankt Peterburg (1917) until the death of Stalin (1953) illustrates what it has meant.

The elites in the Middle East and beyond in the Islamic world were not radical to such an extent. Nationalism became a guiding force with respect to the new post-Ottoman order; but the German – racist - version of nationalism has never attracted a great number of followers. When the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 (four years after the caliphate had been abolished by the Turkish Republic) this could be understood as an indication that Islam sooner or later would be considered a resource to be Instrumentalized as a core element in redefining peoples' identity and the state's legitimacy.

Two names stand out as those who, eventually,

managed to transform islam as a religion into a forceful political power: Seyyid Abu l-A'la Moudoodi (1903-1979), an Indo-Pakistani journalist and thinker and Seyyid Qutb (1906-1966) who was of a similar profession as Moudoodi. Among his numerous works „Ma'alim fi-t-tariq“ („Milestones“) is outstanding when one looks for a Muslim parallel to Lenin in terms of ideological consistency and mobilizing force. While using a completely different terminology, the way from ousting an illegitimate government and fighting a sinful (as apostate) society to make it abide by the sovereignty of Allah while guided by a religious avantgarde, very much resembles the way from a bourgeois to the classless society guided by the Communist Party. The „correct consciousness“ in reading historical processes is substituted by the „correct reading of Coran“. This is meant to read the Coran in a way which enables the believer to change the society in order to establish „hakimiyyat Allah“, god's sovereignty. Those who achieve this reading belong to the Islamic Avantgard, the „Party of god“, Hizb Allah.

Thus, Qutb succeeded in turning islamic religion into an ideology. In contrast to Lenin, however, he never experienced the revolutionary political and societal changes he had anticipated. Instead, innumerous followers „refined“ Qutb's general framework into an agenda of revolutionizing their respective societies. The notion of „jihad“ was at its center, not only allowing, but making killing of those who would stand in the way of rendering societies truly „islamic compulsory“. From the beginning, there were different interpretations of the „true“ Islam; this meant that the movement has never been a homogenous one, but split into numerous groups. That was the reason why they not only fought the „infidels“ within their own societies or in the West, but equally each other.

Nevertheless, the stringent logic of the ideological framework provided a solid basis for their activities as long as the preconditions prevailed to which they could apply their „revolutionary“ interpretation. On the other hand, as an agenda it was flexible enough to refer to such different realities existing in the Middle East, North and Subsaharan Africa, Indonesia, Central Asia, the Balkans and, during the last years, even in the Muslim communities within Western countries.

2) Over time the phenomenon has adopted a global dimension. This indicates that there is a widespread perception among numerous Muslim societies that the conditions under which they are living are lacking basic requirements of a societal, political and economic order in accordance with their belief. As in every society the majority of citizens try to come to grips through peaceful channels, but a minority resorts to an ideology which in extremis permits militant struggle. Referring to the first observation above, Islam is being made a resource for change.

Once being asked what the reason is for the upsurge of violence in the Islamic world, former Iranian president Mohammed Khatami answered that it is the feeling of inferiority. Single acts of violence were perpetrated in the 70ies in Egypt by an organization called „at-takfir wa-l-higra“; rapidly violence spread out to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 80ies and to Algeria and Egypt in the 90ies. During this decade it could equally be observed in the Balkans during the Bosnian war and in Chechnya. After September 11th, and in the course of the „war on terrorism“ it

Southeast Asia and again to North Africa, to Sub-Saharan countries and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. Since the Arab uprising, one sees it in former secular Syria and Iraq and of late in Europe. The caliphate of the „Islamic State“ which was established in 2014 constitutes the first State being established by an Jihadist movement attracting Muslim militants from many parts of the globe, among them the Balkans.

Analyzing the root causes of the movement presents a very complex and far from homogeneous picture. Both domestic and external factors must be taken into consideration. An uneasy feeling of Western superiority is a very strong motive. The Muslim world is perceived as being subject to the domination by outside powers which execute their domination according to their own political or economic interests. This may happen directly through the projection of military power as in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Or it may happen indirectly by instrumentalizing the ruling elites as puppets to serve the interests of outside powers. Economically, the widening gap between various social strata and widespread poverty exacerbates the feeling of living in an unjust society. Finally, double standards in political practices seem to confirm that the West sets rules and value systems exclusively to achieve its own purposes. From the policy of Israel to the nuclear issue, there are innumerable cases which are complained about in this respect.

Accordingly, Jihadi action is executed in two directions: Against the West, first and foremost the USA as being charged of masterminding the conspiracy against the Muslim world. And against the ruling circles in many of Muslim societies as, allegedly, they have turned away

from Islam. In order to restore legitimacy, true Islam has to be reinjected into these societies. As there seems to be no other way, it has to be done by violence. The various Jihadi organizations differ over the priorities of their struggle. But looking back over the last decades one easily sees that the frontline is running more within Muslim societies themselves than between the West and the Muslim world. This is also confirmed by the most recent examples of Syria and Iraq.

3) Western policy has been instrumental in allowing the militant Islamic ideology grow to its present strength. Not only in the sense of applying double standards quoted above. But again and again the West (in its widest geographical extension) has instrumentalized Islamic militants for its own political purposes. It probably started in the context of the East-West-conflict. The case of the war in Afghanistan has been mentioned already. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, a notorious ally of the USA, has financed many sorts of Islamic political organizations - officially and unofficially – and thus has contributed to radicalizing believers abusing the mosques and spreading radical Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and, eventually supplying them with money to arm themselves. Other „western“ countries have been supportive to radical Islamic organizations: In the late 1960s Israel supported Hamas against the PLO and after the conflict in Syria had escalated with Bashar al-Asad remaining in power, Turkey for a while has colluded with Islamic militants in order to accelerate the fall of the regime in Damascus.

On the other side, few efforts were made to resort to diplomacy and try to engage those, who were regarded as radicals in a political manner. Military action onesidedly prevailed. The West not only has not been ready to talk to

who are supposed to support such groups. But it missed tremendous chances to engage Islamist states and organizations to bring about political solutions. To give only two examples: After 9/11, in fall 2001, Iran supported the Northern alliance in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban; thus, they were on the same side with the USA and lending indirect support to American troops to drive the Taliban out of Kabul. To the tremendous surprise of the Iranian leadership, by the end of January 2002, in President George W. Bush's „State of the Union“ message they found themselves being put on the „axis of evil“. This made it impossible for President Mohammed Khatami, to continue his course of political liberalization against the resistance of the hardliner fraction within the religious system of the Islamic Republic. So, the ground was prepared for the takeover of a more radical president who sought legitimacy by confronting the West; the more so, as in the following Iran was exclusively dealt with in the framework of the nuclear issue.

The second example is no less telling for the one-sided agenda setting by the West with regard to dealing with „terrorist“ organizations. In January 2006, elections were held for the Palestinian National Council, which were clearly won by Hamas. Therefore, the way was open to establish a broad coalition government which would have had every legitimacy to resume negotiations with Israel to solve the Palestinian question on the basis of a two-state concept. Unfortunately, the international community, pressured by the conservative Israeli government under the leadership of Ariel Sharon did not recognize the result of the elections. The argument was that Hamas is a „terrorist organization“ and not a political party, which could be accepted as a democratic political actor. As a result, Hamas became more radical and grabbed power in Gaza by 2007 with the

consequence of a series of crises and wars since then. The West was not only blamed for disregarding the result of an election; but for monopolizing the principles of democracy to make them serving its own purposes.

As a result of Western domination over the Middle East since the end of the World War I, many people in the Middle East tend to see what is happening in the framework of conspiracy theory. Up to present, Western policy has been doing a lot to keep this perception alive. The entire episode of getting rid of Saddam Husain is a telling story in this respect. The bunch of lies on which the military operation in 2003 was grounded has contributed a lot to the conviction that „Muslims“ are considered pawns of Western interests in the Middle East. This has been refueled by recent developments in Iraq and Syria (fall 2014). Since the inception of the revolt in Syria, Western powers have undertaken close to nothing to make the regime in Damascus feel that is no longer considered Bashar al-Asad the legitimate ruler of the country. More than 200.000 people have been killed; half of the population is displaced either in Syria herself or abroad. As to the use of chemical weapons, president Obama had warned against transgressing the „red line“. But when it happened in August 2013, the American president abstained from taking action; instead he let himself being manoeuvred by Russian president Putin to a side track. When, however, a few Westerners – cruel as it has been – were decapitated by the „Islamic State“ in front of running cameras, he started waging air strikes against the terrorist organization. People in the Middle East had good reason to again raise the question about the American (Western) agenda vis à vis what is going on in the region. „terrorists“ or those Spread to finally, in November/December 2014 methods of brutal torture applied by the American secret service

against prisoners in the framework of the „war on terrorism“ have been disclosed. In the eyes of many people in the Muslim world (and not only there), these crimes only confirmed what previously already have been made public since 2003 in the case of Abu Ghraib prison. Credibility of the West with regard to „values“ of human rights, dignity of man, habeas corpus etc., thus, has further been undermined. In the eyes of Muslims leaning toward an extremist interpretation of Islam, fighting the West (and its „proxies“ in the Muslim world) just means to encounter it with its own methods.

4) While the relationship between the West and large parts of the Muslim world is deeply shattered, Islamic militants remain a small minority. The overwhelming majority refuses Islamist ideology and militant strategies not to talk about terrorism in the name of Islam. This dramatically became obvious in the framework of the Arab Revolt which started in the end of 2010/beginning 2011 in many places in the Arab world. At the beginning of the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and elsewhere, militant Islamic groups were completely absent. The basis of the spontaneous uprisings rooted in the solidarity of the people especially in the middle and lower classes. It was only when the process of change stagnated, that Islamic militants came into play. Islamic political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood committed many mistakes trying to take over the state and claiming the legitimacy of their power after having won elections. This again instigated the militants to try on their part to take over and rule by force. In fact, brutal force in the name of enforcing Shari'a upon the people became the only way to demonstrate „legitimacy“ of the „Islamic State“ over „western“ forms of governance such as constitutions, elections, pluralism and freedom

of the individual.

In addition, outside interference contributed to the chaos developing anyhow. Saudi-Arabia, some of the Gulf States, and Iran supported their respective clients, some of them still in power (the Asad regime supported by Iran) or back to power (the military in Egypt supported by Saudi-Arabia and some Gulf States). What started in the beginning as power politics has adopted to some extent a confessional character. Thus, the Shi'a – Sunna divide has become more acute than at any time during the 20th century. Within the Sunni branch of Islam the Muslim brotherhood plays an ambiguous role: While it is fought by Saudi-Arabia and some Gulf states, it is supported by Turkey and Qatar. And Islamic radicals not only destroyed Sufi holy shrines, but Christian churches and sanctuaries of the Yazidis alike.

5) Nothing is more successful than success. This self-evident wisdom can be applied to Islamic radicalism, too. With the Asad regime leaving parts of Syria outside the control of the state, Islamic radicals have managed to fill the gap. From Syria the movement radiated back into Iraq. Finally, in 2014 an Islamic caliphate was established in territories of both countries. It was not only political military success which made the movement attractive; but it managed to get access to a variety of financial sources which permitted it to buy the hardware for waging war, attracting volunteers to join the ranks of the Jihadis and, to some extent, laying rudimentary basis for administrating their „state“.

In addition to its nature as a stringent ideology talked about at the beginning and to frustration over Western policy, the importance of the material aspect should not be underrated. In large parts of the Muslim world, young people

are suffering from poverty, unemployment and social marginalization. Joining the Jihad, they earn some money while, at the same time, fighting for the valuable ideal of a State in which pure and genuine Islam is to be practiced. As to the Western Balkans militant Jihadi elements became active already in the context of the war in Bosnia in the 1990. With the war in Syria and Iraq and the founding of the „Islamic State“, an opportunity seems to have reopened to synthesize Islamic „idealism“ with material needs which would not have been the case when simply sitting in economically poor places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania etc.

The „success“ of the Islamic project is spread by professionally making use of the media and the internet. From this point of view, the Jihadi groups operate in an absolutely modern way. The intensive presence in the internet is one of the strongest incentives for the decision to join Jihad in Syria or elsewhere. The sense of „success“ is instilled into the mindset of potentially Jihadi youngsters by applying extremely brutal sanctions when dealing with the „enemy“. Decapitation to be made public on the internet is definitely the most brutal, but precisely therefore, the most efficient demonstration of resoluteness to win victory over the „enemies“. The youngsters who had gone lost within their own societies have got the illusion that they found a political and spiritual „order“ which would provide them with guidance.

As a consequence, attempts to explain the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in Western societies, have to address the societies themselves, from which Jihadis originate. In the West, the value system is currently dominated

by a materialistic agenda. Many youths have got a problem to cope with it; a feeling of being lost and frustrated prevails. Neither the political class nor the „christian“ churches seem to offer an alternative. In such a situation even for non-Muslim youngsters Islam in its most „legalistic“ and, for that matter, radical appearance seems to offer an alternative and a way out. Young Muslims who have a problem of acceptance in the Western societies anyhow, but – nota bene – non-Muslims as well, commit themselves to the principles of a religious strand which offers them guidance. By the way, this not only applies to males, but to females as well. Having taken the decision to opt out of the society into which they have been born, they even accept the role of a bride of a guy, who votes to fight in the way of Allah, which means for the founding of an alternate „just“, as grounded on religious rules, society. Serving him is considered to be her specifically female contribution to this warfare.

6) The multi-dimensional complexity of the issue makes it difficult to find an appropriate answer. The regimes in the Islamic world and in the West have refused to look behind the facade and express self-criticism when dealing with it, but have confined themselves to an reaction mostly built on security measures. Muslim violence was seen in the military dimension, which, as has been shown, does not reflect the entire complexity. To meet the challenge and to find a way back to peacefully living together within Muslim societies and between Muslim societies and the West will be a long process which needs action on various levels.

a) Definitely, as parts of the movement go violent themselves, the use of military means to confront them, is requested. But military measures must be clearly defined and transparent. The use of indiscriminate strategies and measures in terms of weapon systems and targets to be hit must be avoided. In the past, the use of drones f.e. has created as many new enemies as it has struck real fighters.

Fighting back by military means, however, must not be seen as an exclusive task to be shouldered by Western powers. The challenge is to the people in the Islamic world themselves. As it has shown, it is them who suffer most; therefore the task to defend themselves has to be accepted by the Muslim societies themselves. Western military may give a cover, support and training. But they have to refrain from operating themselves on the ground.

b) The elites in the West and in the Muslim world have to build their relationship on a completely new basis. A broad alliance of people of good will (and this still is a majority in every society) has to stand together against extremism of every kind everywhere. To achieve this, the mindset has to be changed in Western societies, turning from an exclusive to an inclusive perception of the Islamic neighbourhood. This applies first and foremost to Europe. For many decades, in the West, Islam and Muslims have been seen as „the other“, as more or less alien to modern values. In the future, in Europe one has to realize that the quality of Europe's place in the international system in the 21st century, to a large degree, depends on the quality of its relations with its Muslim neighbourhood. This implies a variety of political, economic and cultural strategies not to be discussed at this place. As to the Muslim societies themselves, theologians (as religion plays such an overwhelming role in individual and public life) have to make greater efforts to re-

interpret Islam in the light of modern values and realities. From this point of view and in terms of intercultural dialogue, Shi'ite ulama seem to be somewhat ahead of their Sunni homologues.

c) Western policy has to give up an attitude of just selective respect of international law and human rights. Examples which demonstrate its behaviour according to double standards abound. The recent scandal of the use of torture by American security forces in the context of „war on terrorism“ points into this direction. And instead of working together with authoritarian regimes, who constantly violate the principles of human and civic rights, in the name of „stability and security“, it has to support those strands in the societies who struggle for pluralism and the rule of law. And the West's tolerating constant violations of human rights and international law by Israel is a case in point which since long undermines the West's credibility particularly vis à vis the Arab world.

Finally, in the West – and this applies to European societies mostly - one has to accept that societies are in a process of deep changes. Islam has become part of Europe. Obviously, this reality seems to be difficult to accept to large portions of people on the old continent. The challenge of integration is on the political, social and cultural agenda. If and when Europe fails organizing peaceful living side by side between non-Muslim majorities and Muslim minorities, radicals and fundamentalists in the Muslim world will take every opportunity to blame „the West“ of waging another crusade against Muslims and will feel justified to respond violently.



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Lorenzo Vidino: Islamism in Europe

The presence of sizeable Muslim communities in Western Europe is a relatively new phenomenon, largely the product of waves of immigration that began after World War II. While size and composition vary significantly from country to country, today virtually all European countries host a Muslim minority and, while no official data is available, most estimates put the number of Muslims living in Western Europe at about 15 million.¹ This new Muslim presence has created some of the problems that often come with any large immigration wave: financial difficulties for the newcomers and tensions with the native population. While some of these issues are common to other immigrant groups in Europe, others are unquestionably peculiar to Muslim communities.

Many of the tensions that have arisen around the Muslim presence in Europe over the last decades have more or less clear religious undertones. Some of them are unquestionably due to the fear, ignorance and intolerance of some Europeans towards Islam or, in many cases, any religion. But another crucial factor generating tensions is the presence of Islamism/political Islam, in all of its different manifestations, within Muslim communities in virtually every European country. Borrowing Peter Mandaville's definition, Islamism can be defined as "forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions and legal system derive directly from the shari'ah."²

"But it must be said that political Islam is a global and highly flexible movement, taking different manifestations in different

environments. It therefore must be taken into consideration that the characteristics, agendas, dimensions and challenges of Islamist movements in Europe are significantly different from those of their counterparts in Muslim-majority areas.

Forewarnings of the existence of this problem had surfaced at the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s. In 1989 the Muslim world's rage against Salman Rushdie had been sparked by protests and a book burning organized by Muslim organizations in the British city of Bradford.³ In 1995 militants linked to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group - many of whom had grown up in France - orchestrated a string of bombings throughout France. In the second half of the 1990s networks of jihadists, mostly linked to outfits in North Africa, were dismantled in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Great Britain. Yet, despite all of these warning signs, few Europeans grasped the magnitude of the problem until the 2000s. Events like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (whose ringleaders had radicalized in Hamburg), the 2004 Madrid train bombings and assassination of Theo van Gogh, the 2005 London bombings and scores of other thwarted attacks and dismantled terrorist networks have revealed the presence of a sizeable number of European-based Muslims who embraced jihadist ideology and are ready to use violence for it.

Yet jihadist terrorism is only the tip of the iceberg, the most visible manifestation of the extremely diverse and ever evolving political movement that is Islamism. Keeping in mind the unavoidable oversimplification of this categorization, one way of differentiating Islamists is according to their *modus operandi*.

¹The exact number is highly debated and is virtually impossible to establish with certainty. 15 million is the number estimated by the 2004 U.S. Department of State International Religious Freedom Report, as well as by a 2005 study by the Pew Research Center entitled *An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of Europe*.

²Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (London: Routledge, 2007): 57.

³Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 126-46.

This yields three subcategories: violent rejectionists, non-violent rejectionists and participationists. Violent rejectionists, often referred to as jihadists, are individuals and networks that, often linked to or inspired by al Qaeda, reject participation in the democratic system and use violence to advance their goals. Non-violent rejectionists are individuals and groups that openly reject the legitimacy of any system of government not based on Islamic law, but do not, at least publicly and openly, advocate the use of violence to further their goals. Finally, participationists are individuals and groups that adhere to that strand of Islamism that advocates interaction with society at large, both at the micro-level through grassroots activism, and at the macro-level through participation in public life and the democratic process.

Each of these components of radical Islam has a different presence, structure, and modus operandi. Each, consequently, presents a different kind of challenge to Europe. And while

Europeans are finally paying attention to the jihadist threat and have begun to devise new solutions to contain it, they still have only a limited understanding of the other two segments of the movement.

VIOLENT REJECTIONISTS

Individuals that espoused some of the most militant interpretations of Islam began to establish a presence in Europe in the mid-1980s. Their numbers were reinforced at the end of the decade and during the first years of the 1990s, as small groups of so-called “Afghan Arabs” (veterans of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets) and other committed Jihadists who had escaped prosecution in the Middle East and North Africa settled in Europe. Exploiting the freedoms of the West, these violent Islamists continued to support their groups' activities in their countries of origin through propaganda, fundraising, and recruitment.

In the beginning most of these groups limited their interaction to the superficial rhetorical endorsement of their respective struggles but remained divided by nationality, each focused on fighting regimes in their countries of origin. Yet by the second half of the 1990s, several of them began to gravitate toward the orbit of al Qaeda, embracing its message of global jihad. A key role in this cross-pollination of ideas and methods among jihadist groups was played by some of Europe's most radical mosques, such as London's Finsbury Park, Milan's Islamic Cultural Institute, Vienna's Sahaba, or Hamburg's al-Quds, which became popular meeting points for radicals from all countries.⁴

After the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan the core al Qaeda organization struggled to control its cells and affiliates worldwide. While a certain level of coordination still existed, European networks began to operate more autonomously, still loyal to al Qaeda's ideology but virtually independent in their day-to-day operations. As they became more independent, these European

cells progressively began to change their focus. Global conflicts such as Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq continued to attract the attention of European jihadists, many of whom traveled to regions where al Qaeda was battling American forces. Nevertheless, while still perceiving themselves to be part of the global jihadist movement, the networks operating on the ground in Europe started to pay more attention to their immediate environment.

Viewing all Western countries as hostile to Islam, both those that joined American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq and those that did not, they began to focus their wrath on all of them, often placing an equal emphasis on global political affairs and domestic issues involving tensions between local Muslim communities and the native population. Therefore, in the eyes of jihadists operating in Europe, countries such as Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy bore equal guilt for discriminating against their Muslim populations and for having sent troops to Iraq.

And even countries that had distanced themselves from American efforts in the Middle East were now considered enemies, because their media criticized Islam and, more generally, because their societies were not Islamic.

Moreover, European jihadist networks have experienced a generational change over the last few years. Most of today's militants, particularly in northern European countries, are second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe (with a small but significant number of converts). This development brought changes to the worldviews and agendas of the new networks. Even though they feel a strong sense of alienation from the European society into which

⁴Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 2005). Part I.

host European countries than to their ancestral lands, of whose customs and language they are often ignorant. Therefore, while they are concerned about the plight of the global umma, they are equally if not more affected by events that take place in their own backyard. Seeing the world through the lenses of the most radical interpretations of Islam, they believe that Islam is under attack globally and that actions in defense of it can take place with equal justification and effectiveness in the West or in Muslim lands.

Such an attitude has been perfectly summarized by a 2004 report by the AIVD, Dutch domestic intelligence agency, which warned that “within the local networks in particular in the Western world (especially in Europe) al Qaeda's ideology is interpreted in an even more extremist way than by the al Qaeda's leadership itself. Often the actors in the networks are not really driven by strategic tactical considerations; they see themselves as participants in a mythical, apocalyptic final battle with Evil (the Western world) in the context of which, in principle, all exponents of Evil (in fact any Western citizen) should be destroyed.”⁵

From an operational perspective, the current panorama of jihadist networks in Europe is an extremely diverse one and can be visualized as a continuum. At one extreme, we find homegrown groups: small clusters of mostly European-born radicals with no ties to external groups and that act with absolute operational independence. At the opposite end of the spectrum, we see compartmentalized cells contained in a well-structured network and subjected to a hierarchical structure, as was the model of jihadist groups operating in Europe in

the 1990s.

Between these two extremes is a whole spectrum of realities, positioned according to the level of autonomy of the group. The most common model seems to be that of the July 7, 2005, London bombers: a small group of young men, most of whom were born and raised in Europe, who know each other either from the mosque or from the neighborhood and become radicalized in Europe.⁶ Some of these locally groomed jihadist “wannabes” travel abroad to gain from various al Qaeda-affiliated groups the necessary bomb-making expertise that will allow the group to jump from an amateurish cluster of friends to a full-fledged terrorist cell.

Patterns vary from country to country. British authorities, for example, believe that there are around 4,000 terrorist suspects and 200 jihadist networks spread throughout the country.⁷ Countries like France or Spain report smaller yet extremely active jihadist scenes, while in countries like Greece or Portugal the phenomenon is marginal. In some cases, there are opposite trajectories. Dutch authorities, for example, claim to have recently witnessed, after a spike in 2004–2005, a significant decrease in the level of jihadist activity on their territory. German authorities, on the other hand, have monitored over the last five years a worrisome surge in the number of individuals who have radicalized, obtained training in Pakistan, and been involved in terrorist activities.

In substance, jihadist ideology affects a statistically small percentage of European Muslims. Yet terrorism has always been a small numbers' game and the presence of a few thousand individuals ready to use violence

⁵AIVD, *From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order* (The Hague: AIVD, 2004), p. 28.

⁶House of Commons, *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*, May 11, 2006, pp. 13–21.

⁷Kevin Sullivan “At Least 4,000 Suspected of Terrorism-Related Activity in Britain, MI5 Director Says,” *Washington Post*, 6 November 2007.

complete rejection of Western values and a proclaimed desire to establish an Islamic state worldwide are the characteristics not only of jihadist groups, but also of several seemingly non-violent movements and organizations operating in Europe. Many of these groups can be more or less loosely linked to Salafist ideology.⁸ Salafism preaches a return to a mythical Islamic golden era that can only be obtained by referring to the only unadulterated sources: the Quran and the hadith. Salafism is “not only scripturalist but also literalist,” arguing that Muslims should behave exactly how the pious forefathers of Islam behaved according to these sources.⁹

In Europe, as elsewhere, Salafists are not a unified movement. Rather, they are split between various currents due to doctrinal differences and leadership struggles. Some are quietist, isolating themselves from society, while others do advocate involvement in society and politics. Most refute violence, at least in Europe, but some do not and are better categorized as violent rejectionists—the lines are in some cases blurred. Salafism has been able to attract a growing number of European Muslims through its claims of simplicity, meaning and moral superiority. As argued by Dutch scholar Roel Meijer, “in a contentious age, Salafism transforms the humiliated, the downtrodden, disgruntled young people, the discriminated migrant, or the politically repressed into a chosen sect (al-firqa al-najiya) that immediately gains privileged access to the Truth.”¹⁰ Other ideological movements operating in Europe can be put in the category of non-violent

rejectionists. One of the most organized among them is Hizb ut Tahrir (Liberation Party, HT).

Founded in East Jerusalem in the early 1950s, HT has developed into a global movement with branches on virtually all continents.¹¹ HT's worldview is simple: all the solutions to man's political, economic, cultural, and social problems are to be found in Islam, and the only way for humanity to achieve justice is to abandon any man-made system (including democracy) and establish a Caliphate encompassing not only today's Muslim world, but the entire globe.¹²

HT officially aims at disseminating its ideology and challenging the existing status quo without resorting to violence.¹³ Its rhetoric is sophisticated and skillfully tailored to the ears of Western Muslims. HT, in fact, does not simply appeal to the disaffected masses of unassimilated European Muslims. Members of HT tend to be highly educated young professionals who are second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe, and their ranks are buttressed further by a small cadre of converts. The organization's members are active in spreading HT's message through an unrelenting propaganda effort. This includes websites and publications in various European languages, leaflets in Muslim neighborhoods and in front of mainstream mosques, and conferences regularly held throughout the continent and attended by thousands of sympathizers.¹⁴

Salafis and HT generally stop short of expressly advocating violence, at least in the West. Their literature and speeches state that Islam is under

⁸For more on Salafism, see: Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

⁹Roel Meijer, “Introduction,” in Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), Page 4.

¹⁰Roel Meijer, “Introduction,” in Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), Page 13.

¹¹According to the Hizb ut Tahrir Britain website, available at: <http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/prominent-members.html>.

¹²Zeyno Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency*, report published by the Nixon Center, December 2004,

available at: <http://www.nixoncenter.org/Monographs/HizbutahrirIslamsPoliticalInsurgency.pdf>.

¹³Hizb ut Tahrir Britain website, available at: <http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/our-method/our-method.html>.

¹⁴Most European branches of HT run sophisticated and frequently-updated websites. See, e.g., the website of HT Britain (<http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/>), Denmark (<http://www.globalkhilafah.com/>), and Holland (http://www.explicit.nl/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/).

attack, that Muslims have a duty to defend their fellow Muslims worldwide, and that they must establish the Caliphate in order to mount this defense. However, they refrain from specifying exactly how Muslims should do so. Nevertheless it can be argued that, while not openly endorsing violence, they provide powerful ideological tools to radicalize Muslims. The jump from embracing the Salafist or HT's worldview to committing violent acts in order to further its goals is, according to many, a short

one. For this reason, these groups are often identified as a “conveyor belt” to terrorism.¹⁵ represents a major security concern for the Continent. Moreover, there are indications that larger numbers of young European Muslims, while not fully embracing jihadist ideology, adopt some of its frames and ideas.

PARTICIPATIONISTS

At the bottom of the pyramid is the numerically most significant component of political Islam in Europe: the Muslim Brotherhood and other “participationist” Islamist movements such as the South Asian Jamaat-e Islami (whose influence is largely limited to Great Britain) or the Turkish Milli Görüş (headquartered in Germany, but active in all European countries with a sizeable Turkish population). Unlike rejectionists, such organizations have made a conscious decision to avoid unnecessary confrontation and have instead opted for a clever and flexible policy of engagement with the European establishment.

The history of participationist Islamist organizations in Europe began approximately fifty years ago, when many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were often fleeing persecution in their home countries, spent significant amounts of time or permanently settled in various European countries. These “European Brothers” founded some of the first Muslim organizations in the West, which at the time of their foundation were little more than student organizations with a few hundred members. At that point, most of these individuals and organizations simply aimed at spreading the Brotherhood's ideology to the small number of Muslims living in Europe, while focusing their political efforts on influencing their native countries in the Middle East and North Africa.¹⁶

¹⁵Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas,” *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2005).

¹⁶Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe,” *Middle East Quarterly* 12:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 25-34.

Yet by the end of the 1980s, the European Brothers began to view the Muslim presence in the West differently. Top Brotherhood scholars started to redefine some centuries-old religious qualifications, stating that the traditional distinction between dar al Islam (land of Islam) and dar al harb (land of war) did not reflect the current reality. While the West could not be considered dar al Islam because sharia was not enforced there, it could not be considered dar al harb either, because Muslims were allowed to practice Islam freely and were not persecuted. The scholars decided, therefore, that it was possible for them to create a new legal category. They concluded that the West should be considered the dar al dawa (land of preaching), a territory where Muslims live as a minority, are respected, and have the affirmative duty to spread their religion peacefully.¹⁷

The implications of this decision go far beyond the merely theological aspect. By redefining the nature of the Muslim presence in the West, the Brothers also changed the nature of their own role in it. The characteristics of this new role are precisely outlined in the seminal book *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, published in 1990 by the top Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Yusuf al Qaradawi.¹⁸ Qaradawi devotes a large section of his book to the presence of Muslim minorities in Western countries and the unprecedented opportunity that this phenomenon may represent for the Islamist movement, which, in Qaradawi's words, can "play the role of the missing leadership of the Muslim Nation [umma] with all its trends and groups" in guiding and shaping the minds of Muslim immigrants living in the West. While the Islamist movement can exercise only a limited influence in Muslim countries, where hostile regimes keep it in

check, Qaradawi realizes that the Brotherhood can operate freely in Europe where, thanks to its activism and ample financing, it can overshadow other currents of Islam.

Qaradawi has a simple recipe for how the Islamist movement can become the guide of Muslim communities in the West. "Try to have your own small society within the larger society," says Qaradawi, "your own Muslim ghetto." The Egyptian cleric advocates the creation of a web of Islamic centers, think tanks, magazines, mosques, and conferences so that the Islamist movement can spread its politicized version of Islam among Western Muslims. At the same time, Qaradawi advocates moderation and relative openness when dealing with non-Muslims. At least in these early stages, he writes, confrontation can only damage the movement, whereas displaying a moderate façade will allow the Brothers to operate under the radar screen.

From the beginning of the 1990s, the European Brothers began to implement this new strategy specifically designed for the West. The small organizations created by Brotherhood "pioneers" have grown significantly in size and independence. In essence, there is no formal Muslim Brotherhood organization in any European country. Yet it is fair to say that in virtually all European countries operate organizations and networks with historical, financial, personal, organizational and ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic revivalist movements worldwide. What is being termed as the "European Brotherhood" is essentially a fairly small, informal network of activists tied together by marriage, business ties, old friendships, and, most importantly, a shared vision. Each

¹⁷Xavier Ternisien, *Les Frères musulmans* (Paris: Fayard, 2005), pp. 190-2.

¹⁸Yusuf al Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase* (Swansea, UK: Awakening Publications, 2000).

organization belonging to the movement acts independently, adapting its actions to the environment in which it operates, but a foundation of commonly accepted principles and goals unites all of them.

These organizations have gained positions of prominence within their countries' Muslim communities. Even though their conservative and politicized interpretation of Islam is generally not shared by the majority of Muslims residing in Europe, Brotherhood-linked organizations have often managed, through activism and foreign funding, to overshadow other Muslim organizations, become the favorite partners of most European governments and, consequently, often develop into the de facto representatives of local Muslim communities.

Assessments of the European Brothers closely resemble those of the global Islamist movement, with analysts split between optimists and pessimists. More specifically, optimists argue that the European Brothers are simply a socially conservative force that, unlike other movements with which they are often mistakenly grouped, encourages the integration of European Muslim communities, offering a model in which Muslims can live their faith fully and maintain a strong Islamic identity while becoming actively engaged citizens. Pessimists see a much more sinister nature in the European Brotherhood. Thanks to their resources and the naiveté of most Europeans, they argue, the European Brothers are engaged in a slow but steady social engineering program, aimed at Islamising European Muslim populations and ultimately at competing with European governments for their allegiance. The pessimists accuse the Brothers of being modern-day Trojan horses, engaged in a sort of

stealth subversion aimed at weakening European societies from within, patiently laying the foundations for its replacement with an Islamic order. According to pessimists, officials of Brotherhood-linked organizations have astutely realized that their most fruitful approach is to cozy up to European elites and gain their trust. They are taking advantage of the European elites' desperate desire to establish a dialogue with any representatives of the Muslim community and putting themselves forward as the voices of European Muslims, then using the power and legitimacy that comes from such interaction to strengthen their position inside the community.

Government officials and experts are irremediably split on the assessment of the movement, creating a complex, often chaotic situation in which institutions swing erratically between actions that reflect both optimistic and pessimistic views of the movement. In substance, no European country has adopted a cohesive assessment followed by all branches of its government. There is no centrally issued white paper or set of internal guidelines sent to all government officials detailing how European Brotherhood organisations should be identified, assessed, and eventually engaged. This leads to huge inconsistencies in policies, not only from one country to another but also within each country, where positions diverge from ministry to ministry and even from office to office of the same body. It should be noted that there are significant differences from country to country in terms of both presence of Muslim Brotherhood offshoots and attitudes of local governments towards them.

CONCLUSION

This article sought to provide an inevitably simplified and generalized overview of Islamist networks in Western Europe. It goes without saying that dynamics vary significantly from country to country and even from city to city within the same country. There are groups that can only to some degree be considered Islamist¹⁹ and several that fluctuate between the sub-categorizations used in this paper. It must also be noted that Islamism, in all its manifestations, is an extremely dynamic ideological movement. While some of its core ideas and visions are immutable, there is no doubt that many groups in the participationist and, to a lesser degree, the non-violent rejections camp, have radically changed some of their views and tactics over the last thirty years and are even more likely to do so in the future years due to the increasingly central role taken by European born Muslims within them.

It is very difficult to foresee the developments of political Islam in Europe, both in the immediate and, a fortiori, distant future. All the elements of the tripartite Islamist pyramid have contributed to a capillary dissemination of the Islamist message. For example, while only a minority of European Muslims embraces Islamist ideology, whether in its jihadist or in its other forms, Islamist ideas and terms have become mainstream among large segments of European Muslim communities. It seems nonetheless fair to state that the most extreme fringes of the movement, while unquestionably posing a security threat that is unlikely to completely disappear anytime soon, do not seem poised to attract anything more than a tiny fringe of European Muslims.



¹⁹One example would be the Tablighi-i Jamaat, a transnational missionary organization tracing its origin to South Asia that has a significant influence in several European countries. See Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., *Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal* (Leiden: Brill, 2000).



Panel Discussion 1

Esad Hecimovic: Risk from Political Islam for the Western Balkan Countries

There are different forms and contents labeled as “Political Islam”. In invitation to this conference Political Islam was defined as „a point of reference for wide range of political activities, worldwide, leading to unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into secular domain of politics that posits a distortion or corruption of properly religious practice. The consequences of such radicalization of Islam in the region is seen as direct threat to each country alone but also to the regional stability and peace desired since the end of the latest wars and conflicts in the region “.

In my own experience such „unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into secular domain of politics“ happened more than twenty years ago in my hometown of Zenica and elsewhere throughout of Bosnia and Herzegovina after formation of SDA party led by Alija Izetbegović. I have witnessed very different and conflicting periods in development of this party. Now it seems that this is the most important example of transformation of Political Islam in this region through conflict and peace time. It could be told as success story and good model for other regions. One of the main problems today is how we can transform Islamic activism into legal and legitimate political activism. At the end of socialist period and federal Yugoslav state we had group of Islamic activist jailed for their political and religious activism.

This group consisted of two generation . Older generation was led by Salih Behmen and other members of Young Muslims organization, established on the eve of the Second World War. They were born in the first half of the XX century. Second generation was born during fifties and they were raised during the socialist period. Those activists used opportunities after the collapse of socialism and dissolution of Yugoslav state to claim their leadership among Muslims in Bosnia and they won the first democratic elections in December 1990. They changed their nation, collective identity, and society but also they changed themselves. Jailed Islamic activists started to think as politicians and later transformed their party into a member of European People's Party club.

Some of them tried to establish monopoly over religious community or national identity, or simply political and party monopoly but every such attempt failed. Actually such attempts led to different interpretations in Islamic sharia law justifying “different paths to true for believers”. And that is exactly where the current trouble started. It was not easy to control development in closed Islamic community under strict police and political control under socialist government. It is now especially very hard to have effective control over process in free, open society with activism over social networks and with new technology. It is very hard to keep monopoly over Islam, religion, or any other such issue in free, open society.

There is open debate among many different ideological and interest groups about what is proper religious practice. Some important security risks were raised from such debate during previous two decades.

There is no doubt that there are many risks from Political Islam for the Western Balkan countries. We can make analysis through different fields trying to explore specific impact on security field, different states and their relation, societies or relations between different nations, ethnic or religious groups in this region. During previous years I wrote about “explosive mix of nationalism and Islamism”. It was during the period of final years of Rais Mustafa Cerić as leader of Islamic community in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

He has tried to establish single Islamic authority for all Muslims in EU and some kind of Islamic nation. Such attempt was rejected by many influential Islamic thinkers in the Sarajevo and outside Bosnia. He was criticized in Bosnia secular public because of his support for Islamization of society but he gained support from many western governments for his so called moderate views. He left his position of religious leader after election of new Rais and he was just recently defeated in election for Bosniac – Muslim member of Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina. He got only 4,5 percent's of votes or 34 000 votes after he was almost 19 years religious leader of nation with almost 2 million people. It seems that there is important distinction between religious and political authority for majority of Muslims in Bosnia as voters. New leadership of Islamic community in Bosnia with Rais Husein Kavazović declared as their aim return to the original religious mission.

There is internal dynamics within different Islamic communities, organizations; movements

and group. I do not have ambition to present all relevant developments but rather to focus on the most pressing issue.

There is an urgent need to address one the most important problem. It is about the links between development in Balkan and war in Syria and Iraq. How this network of groups and individuals supporting war in Syria and Iraq was formed?

Who are the main recruiters? What is happening in our communities?

In autumn 1993 Sheikh Imad al-Misri published a programmatic booklet called “Attitudes we should change”. In this pamphlet, he advocated radical changes in the interpretation of Islam in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Sheikh Imad was one of the key Islamic missionaries in Bosnia and Hercegovina, where he worked for a decade in humanitarian, non-governmental organizations and in military units. He was deported to Egypt at the beginning of October 2001, but he still has some sort of influence through different channels. There is now a new generation of Islamic preachers in Bosnia who were educated after the war at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and other countries. This debate on what is proper religious practice is still open.

My intention is not to make historical research or presentation, but it is necessary to explain how it all started. New generation of Islamic preachers educated after the war are not talking about Political Islam as separated form. They are debating which interpretation of Islam is most authentic and proper. Their Islam is very politically oriented to state building and nation building. The main line of their division is between the so called “national” or “universal” approach to Islamic interpretation. “Nationalist” are talking about rebuilding of their own nation

as Islamic nation.

“Universalists” are talking just about vreation of one supranational, religious state and global Muslim Ummah as one nation ruled by a single leader. Some of the fighters in Syria from this region are signing about such goal in songs. Volunteers from Bosnia for the war in Syria said they were motivated by the fight for what they describe as a single “Islamic homeland.” Volunteers are talking mostly about Islamic solidarity and the establishment of Khilafet as a religious state based on Sharia law. It was the key motivation of new generation of the Jihad fighters.

Another important part of motivation was presentation of conflict in Syria as sectarian clash between Sunni supporting rebels and Shi'ites supporting regime of the president of Syria Asad. There was such public debate after the last visit of Sheikh Yusuf Qardawi to Sarajevo in June of last year. Official Islamic community in Bosnia strongly opposed to such characterization of war in Syria. Propaganda about Shiites as enemies of Sunnites is very important motivation for many volunteers from Balkan states.

Establishment of Khalifat and Sunnites vs Shiites clash are just two parts of narrative of the new generation of Islamist preachers in this region. Their narrative has some more important messages, based on new and different interpretations of Islam. Just recently it was message about “conquering of Rome” based on interpretation of one hadith. Such message was sent by one preacher recently under investigation in Bosnia and different states in Europe, but also from cover page of ISIS

magazine and spokesperson of this terrorist group. It is not a problem to find such interpretation of this hadith in many different religious textbooks.

We can talk about very different groups in the Islamic scene in Bosnia and the region and their relations. Their debate on takfir issue intensified in 2006. It was a reason for internal clash among different Salafist groups in Bosnia and the region. It is possible to follow such development through years.

After series of clashes among different groups on takfir issue, latest division is about who is supporting Al Nusra or who is supporting ISIS. But it is also possible to follow these clashes between preachers and leaders through division among their followers in the field. Official Islamic community in Bosnia and Hercegovina has denied to members of these Salafist groups in 2007, the right to use official mosques and places for worship. After series of incidents those groups started to move away from official Islamic community and they started to build network of so called "Sunnah masjids" throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina, but also region and diaspora. Leaders of these groups started process of separation of their followers from other Muslims. They have declared others as apostate and kjafrs. Now there is such parallel network of so called "Sunnah masjids" largely unknown to public and without any proper research or evaluation.

There are many non-governmental organizations related to particular "Sunnah masjid" or their leaders. They are very active in public presentation of their views. In some countries like Slovenia this separation leads to the establishment of a new Islamic community. It is a mistake to ignore such development. We have entered a phase in which the national and traditional interpretation of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina and this region is changing under the influence of different Islamic schools and formations.

Actually current danger is coming from clashes within Islamic communities in this region. It is possible to trace the formation of some groups back to clash within specific mosques in that region about what proper religious practice is. Usually at the beginning of local process of formation of new group we are talking about individuals linked to any of the regional groups and his clash with local believers in local mosque. Such individual tried to change their view about proper religious practice and their attitudes about religion, political system or tradition. He has moved away from this local community after the clash and he interrupted his links with the community. That's how radicalization started in many cases. This is a pattern of radicalization in many cases.

Previously we have had one single Islamic community in ex-Yugoslavia. After dissolution of Yugoslavia we have had discussion about different models of organization. There are two main models. One is territorial model of organization of Islamic community. First model has intention to include all Muslims who are residents on territory of one state into single Islamic community. Second model is national model of organization and Islamic community has claimed responsibility for the whole nation - within the border of national state and diaspora. Islamic community of Bosnia and Hercegovina is now using a mix of these two principles - territorial and national.

There is enough evidence of emerging of new Islamic communities in countries of this region and also among countrymen living abroad. I think that this process will have the most important consequences.

The leaders of the Salafi or Wahhabi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Islamic centers for Bosnian Muslims throughout Europe

present their theories as the “universal Islamic view”. There are different interpretations and it is not easy to understand origin or affiliation of particular group.

The radicals in this debate describe themselves as being even more universal and more Islamic. At the same time they criticize Bosnian preachers who place stronger emphasis on the practice of local religious traditions for spreading nationalist ideas. It is still open debate about what universal interpretation is; what traditional Islam is; what national tradition is; what moderate Islam is and what radical practice is. Outcome of such debate will make new definition of proper religious practice. Four our debate most important question is how this new definition of proper religious practice will affect Muslim's attitude toward definition of Nation; Democracy; beliefs of other ethnic and religious group.

Because of cultural relativity theory major Western think-thanks, NGO's, foundations or institutes are not dealing with these issues at all. From my point of view, it is a mistake to discuss about Islam from the point of view of cultural relativity. We should try to find political, social and cultural preconditions for moderate or radical interpretation of Islam. And we should try to act in order to avoid and prevent unwanted consequences.

Vladimir Ajzenhamer: The Western Balkans and the Islamic Schisms The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

INTRODUCTION

Religious divisions are significant historical heritage of the Islamic world, which is still, to a large extent, heavy burden for mutual relations between the "countries of Prophet Muhammad". These divisions determine not only the nature of relations between Islamic countries, and the rules of the foreign affairs "game" in the Islamic world, but they also determine their internal political turmoil. The "Earthquake" of Arab spring which, for two years now, shakes the Middle East, is one of the latest examples, in a long series of examples, of how the divisions among Muslims create, not only a reality, but also the future of this region.

Without understanding the Islamic schism it is impossible to understand uprising against Assad in Syria, or give an answer to the question why Arab countries such as Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia supports the rebels in this country, and at the same time violently suppress the revolution in Bahrain. Without an understanding of these issues it is impossible to understand the complex relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two Middle Eastern states which both claim the right to be considered as the guardians of "true" Islam. Through the lens of Middle Eastern version of the "Cold War", an expression which can most suitably describe relationship between these two countries in the past few decades, best reflects the depth and significance of the religious divisions in the Islamic world²⁰, and above all, the importance of the Sunni-Shiitas divisions.

However, it is important to emphasize that the Sunni-Shiitas division, and diverse consequences which this rift carries, is

something which is primarily connected with the Middle East. This region represents both cradle of the Islamic faith and the root of its division. On the other hand, Balkan Muslims, as authentic and "autochthonous" European Muslim populations, have never, until recently, faced this kind of division.

After the Turkish conquest of this part of Europe, under Ottoman rule a significant number of Christians converted to Islam. One part of the local Slavic population has embraced new Islamic religion, and life in this region was getting, slowly but surely, completely new and different physiognomy, marked by the spirit of Sunni Islam. Due to centuries of stability of Ottoman Empire, and lack of religious reform movements in this part of the "Islamic" world, Balkan Muslims remain mainly aware of Sunni Islamic teaching and practice. The other interpretation of Islam remained remote and exotic to them.

But before we deal with the problem of encounter of Balkan Muslims with Sunni-Shiitas divisions, it is necessary to first illuminate the key features of the oldest divisions between the followers of the Prophet Muhammad.

²⁰Frequent public concerns made by Saudi Arabia on growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East strongly support this remark. At the donor conference for the reconstruction of Gaza, held in early March 2009, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Saud alFaisal called for Arab unity in suppressing the growing Iranian influence in the region. Saudi calls for anti-Iranian and anti-Shiites mobilization in particular have gained in strength during the current "Arab Spring", when Gulf Arab monarchies faced the danger of strengthening of the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon (Hezbollah) Shi'as axis.

ISLAMIC SCHISM – THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS

The divisions in the Muslim community began shortly after the death of Muhammad, in the early period of the caliphate. During his lifetime Muhammad did not appoint his successor, and after his death Muslims were forced to choose a new leader among them by consensus. Widely accepted that Muhammad can't be inherited as a prophet of God, the question of succession came down to the question of further management over the Muslim community.²¹

The first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and Omar, have enjoyed the support of majority among the faithful, but the selection of Uthman ibn Affan to the position of the third caliph became very controversial.²² Turning a large number of Muslims against himself, Uthman ibn Affan ended up as the victim of a conspiracy, which was a prelude to the bloody civil war which will sow the seeds of discord that would soon permanently divide the Islamic community in to three major branches of this religion - Sunni, Shiitas and Kharijites.

Even during the election of Abu Bakr for the first Caliph, there was a large number of faithful who believed that the title of successor must remain within the Muhammad's family. Given that Muhammad did not leave male descendants, this group of believers gathered around Mohammed's nephew and son in law Ali ibn Abi Talib. They believed that he has the right of Mohammed's spiritual and secular heritage. However, Ali has been forced to accept the appointments of the first two caliphs, but when he was bypassed for the third time, his party Shi'atu Ali began to confront the newly elected caliph more openly.

Uthman's rule has led to a general

dissatisfaction which culminated in an open rebellion. The rebellion erupted in Medina in 656. and the caliph was killed in the urban riots. After his death, the Muslim community started to slide into anarchy. Ali and Uthman's cousin Muawiyah stepped as two most powerful pretenders for the title of the new caliph. Ali's followers in Medina proclaimed him as the new caliph, but Muawiyah's supporters didn't accept this choice, and war among these fractions became inevitable. Ali came out as "virtual" winner from this conflict.

He became the fourth caliph, but he gambled away the opportunity to completely defeat his main rival Muawiyah. Wanting to avoid bloodshed among Muslims, Ali agreed to negotiate. Even though, during these negotiations he was eventually recognized as Caliph, the decision to negotiate was fatal for him for several reasons. Firstly, because of this decision he lost part of his followers, which will form a separate party, since then known as Kharijites. Secondly, Muawiyah proved to be much more skilled politician than Ali, and by skillful fraud and intrigue, he soon significantly weakened the political influence of newly elected caliph, and once again started to threaten him militarily. However, Ali remained caliph until the end of his life. He was assassinated, not by his bitter opponent Muawiyah, but by the hand of his former supporters. He felt as a victim of Kharijites revenge, who accused him of being too merciful toward Muawiyah and his followers.

After his death, Muawiyah will take power and establish Umaayyad caliphate in Damascus. This led to the first and most important division in the history of Islam. Muawiyah followers will

²¹Muslims believe that Muhammad is the last in a series of prophets. Therefore the revelation that he brought (the Quran) is also God's last and final revelation.

²²Controversy was most likely caused by the fact that Uthman ibn Affan was from a family of Umayyads, whose members initially opposed Muhammad's preaching of the Allah's truth. However, there are also different opinions on this subject. Some authors argue that dissatisfaction was provoked by much more practical reasons, primarily corruption, nepotism and greed of the third caliph. For more see text Fred M. Donner, "Muhammad and the Caliphate," in Oxford History of Islam (edited by John L. Esposito), Clio, Belgrade, 2002.

doctrine as follows: "According to the initial Sunni stance, the caliph may be elected or appointed, he must originate from the tribe of Quraish,²³ and his subjects owe him unconditional obedience even when he is wrong."²⁴ Ali's followers will form another important branch of Islam-Shi'ism or Shia Islam, and they remained consistent in belief that Muhammad's blood must run through the veins of Islamic rulers. For their rulers they will choose only direct descendants of Muhammad.

Conflict of Shiites and Sunnis, the fight that started in the "early childhood" of this great faith, remain to this day one of the main sources of instability in Islam. If we analyze the main characteristics of this schism, it can be noted that, in its nature, this was primarily political division. In simple terms it was a struggle for the succession of Mohammed, which clearly can be characterized as a struggle for power. However, another dimension of this schism is very important. It is a genealogy dimensions. Muslim rulers have always tried to connect their origin with Quraish bloodline (Sunni), or with direct descendants of Muhammad (Shiites).

Theological context of this schism will appear later on, through further development of the Islamic thought. With the further development of Shiism, the division will be deepened with significant theological differences, primarily with the learning of the mystical meaning of the Qur'an, in which Ali was initiated by the prophet Muhammad. Also, the belief in divine providence behind the words and actions of Shiite Imams inherited through the bloodline,²⁵ emerged over time as one of the main specifics of Shia Islam.

After the first schism, the Islamic community

continued to split on the multitude of sects, religious schools and movements. As Tanasković noted "...unique tree of faith

branched in the wide treetop."²⁶ Analyzing the reasons and motives for further divisions in Islam, Oliver Potežica concludes that these schisms were caused primarily by theological disagreements, differences in religious and legal doctrines, different attitude towards mysticism in Islam, and demands for restoration of the "original" or "fundamental" Islamic teachings.²⁷ For our topic, two lines of this latter division are relevant: theological and reform-fundamentalist one.²⁸ Wahhabism, the official "version" of Islam in Saudi Arabia, is a religious movement that emerged exactly on these lines of division.

Wahhabism is often described as both radical fundamentalist and traditionalistic flavor reform movement within Sunni Islam. This movement was founded by Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab in the 18th century. It is important to emphasize that this is one of the first reform movements in the Islamic world. The birth of Wahhabism was significantly contributed by dissatisfaction with theological innovation, revision of faith and other deviations of the mainstream Sunni Islam. Even today this movement actively aims to "return" the Muslims to the "path" of Salaf al Salih - pious predecessors from the first three generations of Muslims. Therefore, there are some opinions which exclude Wahhabism from the scope of Sunni Islam. Such position is reinforced by the fact that the Wahabi does not recognize the authority of any of the four Sunni madhhabs (legal-religious Islamic schools). They also prohibit many of the religious traditions that are practiced throughout the Sunni Islamic world.

²³Tribe of the Prophet Muhammad.

²⁴Darko Tanasković, *Islam - dogma i život*, Srpska književna zadruga, Belgrade, 2008, p. 162.

²⁵This doctrine is known as Ma'sum, which indicates infallibility of the Imam, who is inspired by Allah.

²⁶Darko Tanasković, *Islam - dogma i život*, Srpska književna zadruga, Belgrade, 2008, p.160.

²⁷Oliver Potežica, *Vehabije između istine i predrasude*, „Filip Višnjić“, Belgrade, 2007.

²⁸It should be stressed that these two lines of division are deeply intertwined, and that it is impossible to make a strict distinction between them.

ISLAMIC “RE-CONQUEST” OF THE BALKANS

For centuries, Western Balkans Muslims have tied their religious identity to the Ottoman Empire and for Hanafi school of Islam, which was the dominant interpretation of Islamic religious teaching in the European territory of the Ottoman Empire. With the war events that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the other interpretations of Islamic teachings found their way to this region. The situation that emerged in Bosnia during, and after war in 1992-95. greatly increased and opened up new political, religious and security challenges for the Western Balkans region.

One of the major challenges is the increased influence of the leading Islamic, Middle Eastern states on the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the total Muslim population in the region, particularly the Muslims at the territory of the Republic of Serbia (Sandžak, Kosovo). But it should be emphasize that the same phenomena can be noticed in Macedonia and Albania.

Three leading Muslim states in particular are interested in the Muslim question in this region. Those are Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Since the end of the 80's these countries showed continued interest in the Balkans. With the war events that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, begins the arrival of the Muslim Jihadists from the Middle Eastern countries, which came to help their Bosnian "brothers" at war with Christians (Serbs and Croats). As John L. Esposito noted, they came inspired by the new global Jihadist sentiment that was conceived on the Afghan battlefield. The sense of solidarity and global Jihad sentiment was born among Arab-Afghans fighters (Arabs and other Muslims who had fought in Afghanistan

during the Russian occupation) which "...subsequently brought Muslims from various parts of the world to participate in Jihads in Bosnia, Kosovo..."²⁹ Evan F. Kohlmann gives the following description of true nature of this solidarity "It would not be long before a much more serious effort was made by distant Islamic extremists to aid the suffering Bosnian Muslims. These young men, galvanized by hateful religious and political ideologies, were determined to turn the global tide against the 'infidel' regimes, even those outside the traditional boundaries of the Middle East."³⁰

This way the Saudi's and Iranian interpretations of Islamic teachings found their way to the Balkans region, which had a significant impact on the change in religious consciousness and understanding of Islam among the local Muslim population. Under the mask of Islamic solidarity and through political, military and humanitarian aid, Salafi teachings, as well as the Shia interpretation of Islam, arrived to this region from the Muslim states of the Middle East. In this way traditional Ottoman Islamic heritage has ceased to be the only form of practicing Islam, and space was created for different Islamic religious teachings which originating from Middle Eastern countries.

States such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have thus made considerable religious and political influence over the Balkan Muslims, thereby becoming, besides Turkey (which has a traditional presence and influence among Muslims of this region) another "external" determinant of their internal religious and political relations.

²⁹John L. Esposito, *Unholy war -Terror in the Name of Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2002., p.116.

³⁰Evan Kohlmann, *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe-The Afghan-Bosnian Network*, Berg, Oxford, 2004., p.16.

ISLAMIC “RE-CONQUEST” OF THE BALKANS

The issue of emerging division between Bosnian Muslims was opened transparently in 2006. with provocative text about Wahhabism published in the Bosnian daily newspaper "Oslobođenje" ("Liberation"). The author of this text was Professor Rešid Hafizović, who is among the most respected and most prominent contemporary Bosnian intellectuals. As a Professor of Faculty of Islamic Studies, and a great expert in the field of Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism, he is very present in the social and public life of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

His comments on current social, religious and political issues are often used by the media in this country. Hafizović shocked Bosnian public for the first time in 1996. when he gave an interview to the Bosnian magazine "Dani" ("Days"), in which he sharply criticized the policy of former Saudi King Fahd. Interview provoked a strong response of the leadership of the Islamic community in the form of statement of Riyasat,³¹ which stood in the protection of "proven Bosniak friends and benefactor" King Fahd. Hafizović was already then, among the intellectuals in Bosnia, in those circles which were not satisfied with the politics of the Riyasat (notably a number of professors from The University of Sarajevo) became known as one of the fiercest opponents of "wahhabisation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This reputation Hafizović will confirm ten years later, when he wrote his article "They're coming for our children" published in the daily newspaper "Liberation"³². In this article Hafizović without hesitation attacks not only the Wahhabi community in Bosnia, but the very validity of the Wahhabi teaching itself. He also wrote that Wahhabism is the greatest tragedy in the history of Islam, and the fatal virus which will soon dissolve the very substance of Bosnian

Muslims. Those charges will again provoke very sharp response of the Riyasat and Bosnian Reis ul Ulema Mustafa Cerić. In the new statement from the Riyasat, Bosnian Islamic Community condemned "inappropriate qualifications of Professor Rešid Hafizović at the expense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has been immensely helpful to our country and our people, when it was most difficult"³³ The Statement of Riyasat regarding Hafizović article will then cause division in the Bosnian public and provoke a large debate in Bosnia about the Saudi influence.

On this occasion, in a new interview given to the magazine "Dani", Hafizović more openly talks about Saudi influence on the current leadership of the Islamic community. He said "...I must honestly admit that I have never imagined how far reaches the hand of the mentioned monarch. To the point where he begins to prescribe our academic standards and patterns of thinking and speaking. So things seem to have gone much further than we thought"³⁴

Hafizović without hesitation indicates a problem of Wahhabism as a key issue for the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the problem that must be solved, otherwise "again a river of blood will start to flow through Bosnia"³⁵ In a few places in the text, Hafizović again predicts the possibility of bloodshed among Muslims.

The other professors from the Faculty of Islamic Studies have also taken part in this debate. For example Esad Duraković and Adnan Silajdžić. Professor Silajdžić also strongly opposed the trend of the increasing Wahhabi influence. He said that Wahhabis in Bosnia are not able to articulate the ways of Muslim modernity. He pointed out that they are not able to do that neither for themselves, neither for the others

³¹Highest Islamic religious and administrative body of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³²Rešid Hafizović, "Oni dolaze po našu decu", Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, 25th November, 2006.

³³Statement of Riyasat from November 26th 2006. <http://www.bosnjaci.net/prilog.php?pid=19911> (accessed on December 20th 2013.)

³⁴Interview given to the magazine Dani, Sarajevo, 1st December, 2006.

³⁵Dani, Sarajevo, December 1st, 2006.

Muslims. Silajdžić warned about the danger of Wahhabis in terms of the dissolution of the essence of Bosnian traditional Islam. "Wahhabism in Bosnia is installed as a distinctive religious, cultural and social phenomenon and as such it affects the social practice of Bosnian Muslims and other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seriously divided parents and children, spiritual leaders and imams, teachers and students etc."³⁶

During this debate, public began to talk about how Wahhabists penetrated deep in the Bosnian institutions - secular and those of the Islamic community. It became clear that Wahhabists already operate institutionally, through Islamic pedagogical academies, run by people who were prepared for their school work at the very source of this uncompromising Islamic movement, at Wahhabi universities of Mecca and Medina. The Bosnian public has found out that at the University of Zenica and Bihać students do not learn anything about Islamic philosophy or Sufism, because the Wahhabi teachings marked them as deviations or "infidel" learning.

On the other side, representatives and supporters of Wahhabi circles also joined the debate. Infamous Abu Hamza, one of the founders of the Wahhabi community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has strongly responded to these attacks, but he has also gone a step further. He said that Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not live authentic Islam, authentic Islam was introduced only after "their" arrival, and that the Muslims in Bosnia live a form of communist, reduced Islam!³⁷ Pro-salafi journal Saff also joined the debate, attacking the mentioned professors, but in articles this journal also opens many questions about the orthodoxy of certain religious practices such as the practice of Dovište which is a traditional Bosnian "pilgrimage site"³⁸. In this way, the public debate

has moved away from the problem of harmful impacts of Wahhabi teachings on the Bosnian Islamic Community, to the question of orthodoxy of the Bosnian Muslim religious practices.

Tragicomic part of this story is that this debate took place in the shadow of the "Resolution on the constitutional changes and the interpretation of Islam" of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, written only few months earlier. Item II/4 of this Resolution underlines that "Riyasat believes that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are no extremist individuals or groups that may undermine the unity of Muslims!"³⁹

As we saw, with their engagement in the field of anti-Wahhabi action professors from the Faculty of Islamic Studies provoked the rage of the members and supporters of the radical Islamic movement, and the highest levels of the Bosnian Islamic Community. And in that particular moment this story becomes more complex. Division will not any more be simply based on "black and white" distinction (Bosnian muslim vs. Wahhabis), because Wahhabis pulled the Shi'as card from the deck and accused Hafizović to be a Shia Islam promoter. And with this counterattack the hole public debate began to slide in the area of gray...

In further verbal clashes and accusations, Professor Hafizović was marked as Iran's insider in the Bosnian Islamic community. He was accused to be an enthusiastic missionary and agitator of Iranian Shiism. These charges will again revive rumors from the nineties about pro-Iranian subversive activities of his close colleague Enes Karić and Adnan Silajdžić. Yet it seemed that some of these rumors have ground in reality.

³⁶Interview given to daily newspaper Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, November 11th, 2006.

³⁷For more information, see the interview with Professor Silajdžić in Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, November 11th, 2006.

³⁸Traditional prayer in the open, usually on the site of former pagan temples.

³⁹http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195:rezolucija-o-ustavnim-promjenama-i-tumaju-islama&catid=235&Itemid=223 (accessed on December 20th 2013.)

Professor Hafizović involvement in the work of scientific research Institute "Ibn Sina", a non-governmental organization which is financed by Iran, could be easily characterized as an "effort" on bringing Shiism closer to the Bosnian Muslims. For this purpose Hafizović wrote and translated a number of articles of similar topic, seeking to awaken the interest of Bosnian public about this form of confession and practice of Islam.⁴⁰ Although he never explicitly declared himself as supporter and advocate of political system introduced by Khomeini in Iran, he has repeatedly expressed open sympathy for the political organization of the Islamic republic. However, these views could still be considered relatively benign that Hafizović, according to the opinion of his opponents, in certain public events haven't crossed the line of sympathy and entered into open invocation of spreading achievements of the Islamic revolution beyond the borders of Iran.⁴¹

It is also very indicative that his fiercest attack on the Bosnian Wahhabis and on the policy of Saudi Arabia (his article in "Oslobođenje"), came less than a month after he officially became a member of the Iranian Academy of Philosophy in Tehran. In October 2006. he became the second non- Iranian member in the entire history of this famous academy. Also in the late 2009. Hafizović went to Iran, where he was given the "Al Farabi" award for the best scientific research in the field of Islamic studies.

If we put aside the rumors of subversive involvement of Professor and Academic Rašid Hafizović (rumors of him being an Iranian "agent" and "insider") and if we take into consideration only the presented facts, it is clear that his professional and social "engagement" may be, with a considerable degree of certainty, denoted as missionary activity. It is necessary

to clearly point out that Hafizović and his colleagues from the Institute "Ibn Sina" and the Foundation "Mulla Sadra" among which some of them are Iranians by nationality, does not directly promote Shi'ism. However, in the part of Bosnian public their actions were for a long time perceived as "selling Shiism under the mask of Sufism". Although, Sufism (a mystical form of Islam) is not unknown to Sunni Islamic tradition, the fact is that Sufism is very compatible with Shiism and that it is very easy to sell Shiism under the mask of mystical teachings. So, the awakening of interest in Sufism among Bosniaks, can easily serve as a first step towards the awakening of interest in Shi'ism. That is why this activity can be seen as preparation of the ground for conversion of the interested ones into Shi'ism.

All these reasons have made it possible for Bosnian Wahhabis to draw attention from themselves towards, until then, almost imperceptible Shiite missionary activity. From that moment public debate is not only addressing to the Wahhabi community, but also to the community of Shia converts which according to some unofficial data today has 2500-3000 followers. Bosnian public has focused on the activity of a wide range of institutions and associations which were associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Besides the mentioned "Ibn Sina" Institute and "Mulla Sadra" foundation, Iranian Cultural Center, "Zehra" association, and Persian-Bosnian College in Iljaš, were marked as main centers of Shiite missionary. Dr. Šukrija Ramić, professor at Bosnian Islamic Pedagogical Faculty, emphasizes a number of effects of their actions "We already have the Bosnian Muslims who have converted to Shiite Islam. According to some estimates, there are about three thousand of them (Shia converts).

They don't pray Friday prayers and Tarawih prayers, they don't pray daily prayers with our priests, they do not recognize Reis ul Ulema as their leader, they do not pay Zakat to Islamic community, but a fifth of their income they send to Iran to their spiritual leader."⁴²

After a lot of mutual accusations, which eventually caught up media representatives too,⁴³ Bosnian public debate on "foreign" influences in local Islamic community ended suddenly as it began. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, in order to promote Turkey's new foreign policy doctrine, came to Sarajevo in 2009. and in front of Sarajevo's central mosque he delivered a speech about "big comeback" of Turkey to the Western Balkan region. In this way, he openly marked Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Turkish sphere of influence. After that, Bosnian media became less and less interested in the problem of Saudi and Iranian influence, and all the "lights" were pointed (and still they are) at new "Turkish March" toward the Balkans. Problem of Bosnian Muslim division was "pushed under the carpet".

But it's still far from being solved. That is why the Riyaset of Islamic Community recently established an "Institute for the Study of the tradition of Bosniaks" in order to determine what is, and what is not, traditional Bosnian Islam. But this institution has failed to provide answers to the key questions. So the problem remains unsolved.

⁴²Interview with Šukrija Ramić published in the magazine SAFF, Zenica, 25th October, 2008.

⁴³For example, at 16th Decembar 2009, Riyaset issued a statement which criticizes Duška Jurisić, host and editor of the TV show "Pošteno" ("Honestly"), for the topic about Wahhabism in Bosnia. In this statement Riyaset expressed "surprise that Federal Television, as a public service broadcaster, for the topic of its show takes a narrower doctrinal issues in the field of specialist discussions of Islamic experts." http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5526:saopenje-rijaseta-u-povodu-emisije-ftv&catid=203:mina-vijesti-kat&Itemid=459 (accessed on December 20th 2013.)

CONCLUSION

It is clear that confessional "reconstruction" of Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the progress, and that consequences of this process can not yet be accurately predicted. We must be objective and admit that "new" or "imported" Islamic teachings can not seriously jeopardize the primacy of traditional Hanafi Islam in this region. Turkish foreign policy offensive in this region additionally reducing chances for success of Shiite and Wahhabi teachings. But their very presence brings confusion among the Balkan Muslims. Bosnian public debate clearly pointed that out.

This kind of confusion can have serious consequences. In theological terms unity of the Muslim community could be seriously threatened. And to some extent it already is. Members of the Wahhabi community have already shown hostility and animosity of towards religious heritage of Balkan Muslims.

Their mentors from Saudi Arabia assist this intolerance by all means "Saudi aid agencies have been responsible for the destruction or reconstruction of many historic mosques, libraries, Quran schools, and cemeteries in Bosnia and in Kosovo because their Ottoman architecture, decorations, frescoes, and tombstones did not conform to Wahhabi iconoclastic aesthetics that regard statues, tombstones, or artwork with human representations as idolatry and polytheism."⁴⁴ But, architecture and other material historical heritage is not only Islamic legacy which is threatened. Certain traditional religious practices are also "under fire". For example, already mentioned Dovište - traditional prayer in the open, or local Ramadan tradition of eating plums

for iftar meal.

No matter how ridiculous it may sound, these and similar religious practices represent thorn in the eye of the local Wahhabis, and may in the future provoke some security incidents.⁴⁵ And when we take into consideration the fact that among the local Muslims we now have Shia minority too, it is not difficult to imagine that the traditional Islamic rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites, especially Wahhabi and Iranian Shi'ites, may also, in the near future, come to life in this region. Professor Ramić stresses this concern "I'm afraid that, in Bosnia, in the near future, we will have a conflicts of radical Bosnian Sunnis and radical Bosnian Shiites, in a similar way that we have them today among the Arabs in Iraq, and Pakistanis and Afghans in Pakistan in Afghanistan."⁴⁶

Therefore, it is necessary to closely monitor further developments: the potential growth of Wahhabi and Shiite community in Bosnia, their mutual confrontation and rivalry, and engagement of non-governmental organizations which are associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

⁴⁴John L. Esposito, *Unholy war -Terror in the Name of Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2002., p.108.

⁴⁵Some incidents of this kind have already happened. For example, a bomb attack on a police station in Bugojno in 2010., conducted on the jubilee of five hundredth Ajvatovica, which is the largest Dovište site in Bosnia.

⁴⁶Interview with Sukrija Ramić published in the magazine SAFF, Zenica, 25th October, 2008.

THE ORIGIN

Xhabir Hamiti: Political Islam – El-Islam Es-Sijasij

The term Political Islam does not originate or has no direct support in the Muslim holy book – the Quran, and is not part of the dictionary of the first generation which was led by Muhammad a.s who was messenger of God.

After Muhammad a.s parted from this world, among Muslims various opposing voices were heard about who from his followers was more meritorious to continue leading the Muslims, this due to the fact that Mohammed did not initially appoint one.

The wish and competition, as well as the appearance of the meritocracy to lead the Muslims after Mohammed's departure to eternity, brought also diversities in commenting of certain matters of religion, whereby each and every one made comments according to the sides and the direction of the contenders for power.

The first and greatest political division of Muslim leaders happened in the Battle of Siffin, in 659, fought between the followers of Ali, the Caliph of the four Muslims and the Governor of Mu'awiyah, who was the first leader of the State of Mu'awiyah 661-680. The two did not recognize each other's authority. The beginnings of first divisions are those during the time of the Caliph Othman III against whom an assassination was prepared in 658, as well as the other fight known as 'Case of Jamal-Camel)', which led to riots and continued during the entire rule of Caliph Ali IV.

The above events are considered as the first cases of use of religion 14 Centuries ago, as a means for political solutions, whereas the most famous case was the moment of the rise of the

holy book of Quran, as the best form of correct thinking for termination of disagreements and of the fights between Ali and Mu'awiyah. Following this action, the so-called Hawarixh emerged, known as renegades with their symbol: "There is no other Judgment, but the Judgment of God"!

These fights for power continued until the great division of Muslims in two major directions: Sunni and Shia. Regardless of this, one can say that the politicizing of religion and the use of latter for reaching of intentions of this world, is a wound old as the history of Islam itself.

Islam movements in general are divided in two main groups:

A. Religious Islam Movements - mainly proclaim religion, based on the readings and specific interpretation of religious texts and their main aim is to establish a sound and accurate faith in God, and all the others who do not obey their call and interpretation based on their special and specific school, are considered as the limping in religion, or are judged as non-true believer.⁴⁷

B. Political Social Movements - are based on the program of Islam, which today dominate in the Arab and Islam world, in general.

⁴⁷Among these movements, with particular interpretations of Islam, namely of rigid and conservative forms also is "The Movement of Takfir and Hijrah". The leaders of this movement believe that the believer when unable to change the state and the society where he lives, is obligated to emigrate – to make Hijrah, even to the desert or even live in a solitude, as a way of distancing and expressing of dissatisfaction against the environment that is not practicing Islam. In this spirit of perception is included also the "Violent jihadist movement, which seeks to terminate and remove governmental systems, which are founded based on human rule and organization and replace them with those of divine.

ISLAM POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AS A MODERN⁴⁸ CONCEPT

Islam Political Movements according to the modern concept started mainly with the beginning and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, whereas their greatest expansion happened after 1960. The second increase occurred after 11 Sep 2001 (nine/eleven) and the peak and their most dense activity was reached after the Arab Spring, starting first in Tunisia on 17 December 2010.⁴⁹

Islam Political Movements according to understanding and the modern concept are movements and organizations which exercise their political activity using Islamic symbols, and their goal is the forming of the Islamic state in which the Sharia Law is enforced.

Otherwise, the term "Political Islam", has recently become a term for academic information, which is used to qualify different political movements that believe and aspire to have the Islam as a complete governance of life, in which religion and state is one and indivisible.

The causes of birth of the Political Islam movements: Islam movements with a political program, in general, have emerged as a result of social, geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances the Islamic society was faced with throughout the history.

They have been used for the purposes and agendas which can be defined as follows:

- 1 A way for consolidation and fighting of the Western colonialists, who dominated in the Islamic world, especially during the XVIII-th and XIX-th Century.
- 2 A form of opposition and resistance against the Western military, political, social and cultural influence, for which they believed that the system is not compatible with Islam and its teaching and the Muslim societies' tradition in general.
- 3 A form of resistance and the fighting of secular systems created in the Arab and Islamic world, post-colonial and post World War II period.
- 4 A way for the collapse of the totalitarian and dictatorship systems of modern times.
- 5 A way of displaying contempt against the failure of governments to regulate and improve social, economic and political welfare among Muslim societies
- 6 A counter-reaction against Western provocations, as was the case of the portrayal of the figure of Muhammad through cartoons, which caused an increase in islamophobia in the Western world and a growing hatred in the Islamic world.
- 7 A form of war and opposition against the US invasion in Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan and recently in Syria.
- 8 A way of achieving an easier and faster way to come to power.

⁴⁸The Arab publicist and analyst Riyadh Abdullah Zahrani states that: "The history of Islamic political movements and organizations is full of revealing truths. Islamic political movements for decades have disoriented masses in the name of religion and the medh-hebi, a certain religious law school. These movements, whether Sunni or Shia have been key factors for the spread of extremism, political tyranny, violence, corruption, ignorance among societies, and the sectarianisation of hatred. Likewise, they are the main cause of death of communities from ignorance that they have planted among them, causing riots for the killing of certain category of people, who belonged to the same society.

Zahrani thinks that the same history of these movements is happening even today after the Arab Spring, which, according to him have drawn lessons from earlier political Islam movements and organizations; therefore this is exactly the reason why they have not succeeded. Hence, the Arab Spring shall not win, until its players are free of any politicization of religion. Islamic movements, Sunni and Shia, despite their big differences coming from their various schools they follow, have anathematized the human reason and are legitimizing the spilling of their blood as their means for the proclamation of the Hilalet, or the return of Mahdi the Awaited one, as well as setting of the time of cataclysm-Hour Event. Such theories resemble the illusionist movies, in which no one believes in, but an ignorant person and a fool!" (www.shbabmisr.com)

⁴⁹Text missing here

Definitions of today's leaders and those with knowledge about Islam political movements:

Rashid Ghannushi, the main leader of the Reformist Movement حركة النهضة in Tunisia. In relation to the nature of Islamic movements he says as follows: "With Islamic movements we aim for all the activities arising from motives of Islam in order to realize its goals and the continuous reform of its teaching, starting from the current origin and towards the permanent continuity. This because Islam is suitable for any time period and any place, and as such is intended for its message to be reiterated and reformed in conformity to changing circumstances of time and place. With the development of science, knowledge and various arts, the purpose and strategy of the Islamic movements will change, but also their methods of work."⁵⁰

Dr. Abdullah Abu Izzah says that:

"With Islamic movements we intend a different group of organizations, which are based on Islam and which engage in activities, as follows:

- a.** working in the area of Islam activity, within the structure and comprehensive view of human life, so that (human life) is adjusted to the guidelines of Islam,
- b.** aimed at causing revival and comprehensive reforms, for all Muslim peoples, divided or united, based on Islamic perspective,
- c.** trying to influence all areas of life and society, in order to improve and practice their coming back to the principles of Islam".⁵¹

Mahmud Abu Seuud thinks that:

"In general, the goal of Islamic movements, wherever they operate, is the unification of Muslim members under the umbrella of one organization, with a system and a particular kind of work, with those who believe in Islam as a religion, in its laws and system, and that engage in practicing Islam in their daily lives, within the limits and boundaries of knowledge they possess. In other words, the Islamic movement is a commitment of a group from among the Muslims, whose symbol is the Islam Sharia, as a motivating force, by leading their life in accordance with Islamic teaching which are realized through structures that they establish, and according to the needs and the circumstances of a given environment".⁵²

According to the Western author **Bjor Olav Utvik** (1993: p.201), Islamic movements can be defined by three features:

- a.** Their reference that they belong to a certain Islamic movement,
 - b.** Their call for the establishment of the Islamic state in conformity with Sharia law,
 - c.** Their organization, with the aim of achieving the above mentioned goals,
- Berman Sher** thinks that political Islam can be defined as a group of ideologies believing that Islam should be the leader of the social, political as well as of personal-individual life.⁵³
- Bernard Lewis**, "he calls the characters of political Islamic movements as Islamic activists."⁵⁴

⁵⁰ واحد القبول، الحركة الإسلامية ومساءلة التغيير - العرض المغربي للحوار، لوزن، 2003، ص 11

⁵¹ عبد الله أبو عزة، دور نهضة إسلامية علمية و سلمية، في نهضة عبد الله القوي، ص 179

محمد أبو مويج، مشقة المدلولات والقيادات، نهضة عبد الله القوي، ص 345

⁵² Berman, Sheri (2003), "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society". Perspectives on Politics 1 (2): 258

⁵⁴ Islamic republic by Bernard Lewis

SOME TYPES OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS WITH POLITICAL CONNOTATIONS

Islamic movements with political agendas and goals are different and diverse in the Muslim world and are primarily identified with their founders. These movements are divided into movements from the very base and branches that are detached from their mother cell.

Following the great division of the Muslim community into **Sunni**⁵⁵ and **Shia**⁵⁶ by the end of the VI-th Century and the beginning of the VII-th Century, for the purpose of supremacy, meritocracy and politics, with time passing, several religious groups and sects have been formed on the basis of their founders.

Below are several main basic Islamic movements established for political reasons, which have their place in Muslim societies in general, across different periods of time, which in one way or another are active even today, somewhere more and somewhere less.

Wahhabi movement is religious political movement founded and led by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabi. Its founder claimed that Muslims of his time had deviated from the path of faith in God, therefore according to him it was necessary to take steps aimed at the preserving of the sound faith that should be based only on three main sources:

This movement is named after its founder, in 1703, at a place called Najd, which is located in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula. In order to

- a. in the Quran,
- b. the sayings of Muhammad,
- c. and the legacy of the first generation of Muslims identified as “Es-selef es-Salih”.⁵⁷

achieve their goals, the Wahhabi followers declared war to all those who opposed the doctrine of Abdul Wahhabi, considering them to be as the only group that will escape the fires of hell, and as the only true practitioner of ranks of Ehl- Sunnah.

From the Wahhabi doctrine, today groupings and sects have derived, such as: the Jamaat "Salafiyyah", "takfiri", "Rabi-ronment" etc., and their presence in recent decades have significantly extended in many different countries of the world, including countries inhabited by Albanians, but also in Balkans and Europe. This spreading was achieved thanks to the oil⁵⁸ that was explored in the beginning of the XX-th Century, which enabled for a great financial support. Wahhabi activities outside its origin where it emerged are developed mainly through operating with associations having different names, as well as their representative individuals.

Wahhabists refuse to follow religious law schools that are accepted by consensus from Muslim scholars. They call to follow only certain Muslim scholars, who represent and cultivate their rigid and puritanical doctrine, whereas scholars that stand outside this idea are labeled with different names such as: renegades, lame in faith, not true followers of the Akida – the knot of the faith in God, the ones that have quit religion, sinners, etc.

Djubandij Movement in India: The Djubandi Islamic Movement in India was born as a reaction against the rule of the Great Britain. It was led by Ahmed Han (1817-1892), and was founded in Djubandi, some 150 km away from the capital of New Delhi.

⁵⁵Sunnis are the largest group of Muslims who believe in the revealed book of Quran, the accurate sayings of Muhammad, the four law schools established after the death of Mohammed, and the four caliphs after Muhammad. They are all considered legitimate and reliable.

⁵⁶Shias are the second group in the Muslim World, which at the beginning of their establishment have been known as a follower or followers of Ali, the fourth Caliph after the death of Muhammad. Their largest group is the followers of their 12 Imams who are heir to Ali.

⁵⁷Selef es-Salih, are considered as fair and trustful followers of the original practice of Muhammad a.s.

⁵⁸Until the exploration of black gold in the Arabian Peninsula, the primacy of Islamic religious thoughts was with the other academic centers of the Arab world and Islamic university of Al-Az-har in Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Istanbul, India, Pakistan, etc. Even now the greatest thinkers and most famous Islamic thoughts are outside the Arabian Peninsula, but many of them have remained in shadow due to the difficult economic situation of the countries where they live, as well as the financial support which they do not enjoy in their academic institutions in which they operate.

After being formed it spread to south of Asia. This movement was also known by its school called "Darul-ulumi", in 1866, based on which, it is believed, that today's state of Pakistan was raised, and later on based on its principles the Taliban movement in Afghanistan was established.

The Movement of Ebu el-Ala el-Mevdudi

1903/1979: Mevdudi who lived in Pakistan was affected by Ahmed Hani schools of India. He appealed for the establishment of the Islamic state which will apply the principles of Islamic Sharia. In 1941 Mevdudi formed his group called "Islamic Jamaat", which today has over 53 seats in the Parliament of Pakistan of total 272 seats.

Muslim Brotherhood Movement: The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood organization is Hasen el-Benna, in 1928.⁵⁹ The movement of the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest political opposition in many Arab countries, with significant domination in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria and Palestine. According to analysts it is spread over 72 countries worldwide.⁶⁰

According to the chart of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is obvious that their goal is the political, social and economic reform of the state based on the comprehensive views of Islam. The aim of such a reformist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood is not only Egypt, but also other Arab and Islamic countries with presence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Jamaat of Muslim Brotherhood has had an impact on some jihadist armed movements which were considered as a resistance against all types of occupation and foreign interventions such as: Hamas Movement in Palestine, Iraq,

Algeria, Lebanon etc. The first step of the Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood is the formation of the Muslim individual, then of the Muslim family, Muslim society and ultimately the formation of the Islamic state. The symbol of the Muslim brotherhood is:

*"Allah is our goal, our ideal is Muhammad, the Quran is our constitution, Jihad is our way, and death for the sake of God is our aspiration."*⁶¹

Islamic Jihad Movement: It is a detached movement from the parent Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, which believes that the realization of the goal for the establishing of Islamic rule is achieved with war. It was established in 1970 in Egypt, not long following the capital punishment with hanging of Sayyid Qutb, in 1966. The Islamic Jihadist movement took the responsibility over the assassination of Amvar el Sadat, the then President of Egypt.

This movement is also considered to be responsible for bombing attacks against the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan, in 1995, and the US Embassy in Albania, in 1988. The leader of this movement in Egypt was Eymen Edh-Dhevahirij.

Hizbu Tahrir: The Tahrir- party of liberation is the only one which works for the re-continuation of Islamic life in the state of the Islamic caliphate, where Islam will be the first principle of regulating the political, economic and social system, and is the only party or movement which has not changed its principles since its founding in 1953. "Hizbu Tahrir" does not accept gradualness in Islam, but the direct establishment of the Islamic state, as a first step.

⁵⁹The founder of the organization Hasan el-Benna named the organization the "Islamic Movement"

⁶⁰Some countries like Russia, Kazakhstan, consider the Muslim Brotherhood movement as terrorist. After military revolution in Egypt, in 2013 the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt was declared a terrorist organization, most recently it is also the case in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

⁶¹According to many analysts, the majority of Islamic groups are separated according to the nature of their activity. They are either a continuation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement founded in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and countries of the Arabian Peninsula, or are detached from their base of the organization, such as "Jihadist movement" in Egypt and Palestine, or other movements, which are influenced by their teaching and experiences such as: "The Front of the Islamic Salvation" in Algeria, then in Sudan, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia etc.

and is known for the war it waged against Israel in 1982, 2000 and 2006. Many Arab and Western countries consider this organization to be a terrorist organization. Muhammad Husain Fadlullah, had the leading role in the establishment of this organization, which gained the greatest support after the revolution in Iran in 1979. Shia members form the majority and are led by their spiritual leader Hasan Nasrallah, who exercises the function of the Secretary General and of the legal representative of Ali Khamenei in Iran. This organization is committed to the liberation of Palestine, considering it as an occupied country, while considers Israel as occupier and illegitimate state in the Middle East.

KOSOVO VIS-A-VIS POLITICAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

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1. Due to the geographic position of Kosovo, and its position with the surrounding neighboring countries.
2. Due to the specific mentality, customs and culture of our people, unlike those of the Middle East.
3. Because of the Kosovo state structure, as a multi-ethnic and multicultural country.

4. Because of the determination of the people of Kosovo to build a state with democratic and a secular system of government.
5. Due to the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of Kosovo, short and long term ones, in the Balkans and in Europe.

The people of Kosovo and Albanians in general ought to enjoy full rights and religious freedoms, as in any other democratic country, maintain mutual respect between different religious communities, as well as cultivate the culture of coexistence with all, without any differences and based on human and humane principles, and in advanced democratic systems.

One can be a believer of God and a devoted one, even without belonging to any parts of any religious ideology and doctrine with political orientation.

The concept of faith in God, must be such, that it develops and cultivates love, harmony, solidarity and unity of the people and society, and not that of exclusion or exclusiveness.
Fighting others in the name of God, because they do not believe and think like us, is an action against the concept and principles of our common Creator. Albanian religious leaders, according to the French author Nathalie Clayer for centuries have developed the religious non-fanatic and non-fundamentalist culture, with minor exceptions and some isolated cases. Therefore, this should be the road with no alternatives, which should be followed in the future as well. For all societies in the World, and for us in particular, religious tolerance and coexistence are like the Alpha and Omega, or as air and water without which we cannot survive.

Arijan Durmishi argues in his discussion paper that Albania, as a country with a large Muslim majority is being affected by the discussion about Islam and politics inevitably. However the scholarly and public debate on Islam and politics is lacking in Albania or it is limited to, and rather confused with, Islamic terrorism as a security issue.

The shorthand answer to such an approach can be found in the thick discourse about the Albanian religious tolerance and the confusion that often is made between religious freedom and the separation of politics and religious spheres. He argues that religious tolerance is an institutional construct rather than a providential feature of the Albanian people. It has been an elite driven approach, stemming from the concerns of the founding fathers of the Albanian state that the Muslim majority had to be liberal in order for Albania to be unacceptable in Europe.

Given that the originating conditions have changed it is likely that this change will be accompanied with conceptual shifts on the role of Islam in the Albanian society. Evidence shows that although no political parties with Islamic background exist in Albania there is evidence that an important part of the population may support the idea. He also argues on the need for a serious and thorough discussion on the role of Islam and the repercussions of the political Islam in Albania is necessary.

Ramadan Ramadani in his discussion paper examines the situation of Muslims in Macedonia, especially Albanians, which are not only representing 25% of all population in this country but also 75% of all Muslims in Macedonia. The challenge for the Macedonian-Albanians therefore is to find the balance between defending the state's religious neutrality and improving the situation of the Muslim community in Macedonia. Due to their political and cultural influence and also reserve, Ramadani refers to them as "silent rams".

In his paper he discusses the model of democracy Promotion versus "Political Islam" – from the Middle East Experience. He argues that defining "Political Islam" and the impact of Arab Spring on Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist parties requires a holistic approach of translating the universal principles of political rights and civil liberties in predominantly Islamic culture. Egypt, Tunis, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan confirm that national and regional security must be aspired through incremental but meaningful political and democratic reform.



Prof. Dr. Udo Steinbach

studied history, languages, religion, culture and literature of Persian-, Turkish- and Arabian-Speaking Islamic countries as well as classical philology in Freiburg i.Br. and Basel from 1965 to 1970. He received his PhD in the same year. From 1971 to 1974 Steinbach was director of the Middle East department of German government's Think-Tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. After one year as the head of the Turkish Department of German radio station Deutsche Welle, Steinbach became director of German Institute for Middle East Studies until 2006. The last year before his retirement Udo Steinbach was director of GIGA Institute

of Middle East Studies. Since 2012 he is head of Governance Center Middle East/North Africa at Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance in Berlin. Steinbach published numerous books and articles about Islam and the Middle East.



Lorenzo Vidino, Ph.D.,

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Journal, The Washington Post, The Boston Globe...) and academic journals (such as Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, The Washington Quarterly, Terrorism and Political Violence...). He has testified before the U.S. Congress and consults with governments, law firms, think tanks and media in several countries. A native of Milan, Italy, he holds a law degree from the University of Milan Law School and a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.



Esad Hecimovic

studied philosophy and sociology at the University of Sarajevo. He worked as correspondent for "Evening News", a Belgrade based newspaper with the highest circulation in ex-Yugoslavia, as analyst in "Muslim's voice", a Sarajevo based weekly, in the chief of Press office of "Territorial defense" for central Bosnia, as political analyst in the central office and main board of the SDA party. He was political analyst in "Lillian", the leading national weekly at that time, and since then is journalist for "BH Days", the most influential weekly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He reported from several international conferences,

among these the 8th Summit of Organization of Islamic countries in Teheran in 1997, the conference on "Islamism and European security", in Aarhus, Denmark, in June 2006, and made a study travel to London and Manchester about British Muslims in 2006. He wrote several books, articles, and essays, and gives interviews on a regular basis.



Vladimir Ajzenhamer

graduated at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade (2008), where he defended his master thesis "The Three Faces of Islam - comparative analysis of the political system of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran" (2010). He is writing his doctoral dissertation on the subject of Turkish foreign policy. Since 2009 he was engaged as an associate of the Center for Asian and Far East Studies, at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. Since 2010, he started working as assistant-demonstrator on the Regional studies of Asia MA program, at the same faculty. For the past two years he is working as assistant at Faculty of Security Studies.

His main fields of interest are Geopolitics of the Middle East and the Balkans, Islamic studies, Oriental studies, Religious extremism etc. He is the author of numerous scientific papers, and co-author of a book on modern geopolitical perspectives.



Prof. Dr. Xhabir Hamiti,

is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic studies in Prishtina is a researcher and analyst of Islam studies, referring in many local and International conferences on this topic. He is author of numerous books and articles on Islam culture and Islam studies in general. He is known as an active intellectual calling for civic harmony, tolerance and joint cooperation between all religious communities. Since 2003 Hamiti is, while during the period 2008-2013, he has been an acting President of the Assembly at the Kosovo Islamic Union (BIK). He is a co-editor of the scientific islam journal "Hikma" published by the University of Osnabruck in Germany.



Arjan Dyrmishi

is a senior researcher and the head of the Center for European and Security Studies in the Institute for Democracy and Mediation in Tirana, Albania. Before joining the Institute he held different positions in Albanian government, including the Prime Minister's office, the Ministry of Defence and the National Intelligence Service. Arjan holds a Master in Political Sciences from the University of Siena, Italy. His research interests include security, international relations, democratisation, political parties and European Union.



Shpend Kursani, *is an External Senior Researcher at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies – KCSS and a Member of Assembly at the Prishtina Council on Foreign Relations – PCFR. He is a Founder and Member of the Steering Committee at the Balkan Think Tank - BTT. He is also an adjunct lecturer in the field of International Relations at the University College Universum. Shpend has previously (2011-2013) been a Senior Researcher at the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development - KIPRED, where he published a number of policy analysis on political development of Kosovo and Kosovo's relations with Serbia and other international actors. Shpend has pursued his Masters degree at the University of Cambridge (2010-2011) where he earned*

his M.Phil. degree in International Relations with distinctions on his thesis topic "Using Soft Power: The EU's Ability to Influence the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the States of the Western Balkans. Shpend is doing a research study on this topic for KCSS, and will present some issues at the conference.



Ramadan Ramadani

is a analyst at Skopje based Institute for Free Thinking “Nisma” from 2011 and is a regular columnist for the Macedonian-language weekly, Fokus, and the Albanian-language newspapers, Lobi and Lajm. He was a project manager at the Forum Center for Strategic Research and Documentation in Skopje from 2005-2007. He has written widely on religion and Islam and was a member of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian Association of Journalists, the Association of Albanian Publishers, and is vice-president of JADRO—the Association of the Independent Cultural

Scene and member board at Foundation Open Society–Macedonia. Ramadani graduated with a degree in theology in 1997 from the University of Marmara in Istanbul, Turkey. In 2010, he earned an MA and in 2014 PhD in history at the Saints Cyril and Methodius University in Macedonia.



Arianit Shehu

Lectures at the Al Bayt University and Philadelphia University in Jordan and holds an honorary PhD from the University of Philadelphia. He currently works as NDI's Senior Country Director in Jordan. designing, managing and supporting successful and innovative election and democracy support projects with NDI for the past 15 years in more than 16 different countries in Central Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East and North Africa. Mr. Shehu has managed the Institute's civil society strengthening programs in Egypt, Kazakhstan and Kosovo. In addition, Mr. Shehu has served as a lead trainer and consultant for

NDI programs in Bahrain, Lebanon, Macedonia, Turkey and the West Bank/Gaza. On behalf of the Institute, Mr. Shehu has coordinated international election observation missions to Albania, Egypt and Lebanon, and participated in international missions to Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Yemen.

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SESSION TWO

Cyber (In) Security as a threat for Western Balkan Countries-is there a joint cooperation initiative to address this new global threat?

International Conference:

Current Security the Western Balk

Challenges for Balkan Region



Addressed by
Means of Joint
Responsibility and Cooperation



KEYNOTE ADDRESSES 2

Oberst dG Mag. Walter Unger: Cyber Attacks and the Protection of Strategic Infrastructure

INTRODUCTION

Cyber attacks are new and serious forms of threat for states whose infrastructure is based on modern information and communication technologies (ICT). It is therefore imperative for such states to extend their security awareness

by analysing their vital infrastructures with regard to potential threats, develop relevant strategic security concepts, as well as to establish counter measures against possible attacks.

VULNERABLE INFORMATION SOCIETY

The functioning of strategically relevant infrastructures to maintain vital societal functions is critical for any state. Disruptions or the elimination of these infrastructures have serious consequences for the health, security, or economic and social wellbeing of a state's population as well as for the effective functioning of state institutions.

The traditional industrial society of the twentieth century is clearly on the way to becoming an "information society". While (still) dependent on industrial production, an information society also becomes considerably dependent on functioning information and communication flows. With that shift has also come a growing vulnerability to any disruption of these flows. The information society's increasing dependence on information and communication

systems on the one hand, and the vulnerability of these systems on the other, creates weak points which can be exploited by an adversary or intentionally used to weaken or even destroy an information society.

Therefore, a massive and coordinated attack against the ICT systems of a state or a society may, under certain circumstances, have similar consequences as an attack against the industrial base itself. For example, the large-scale cyber attacks against the national ICT infrastructures in Estonia during the spring of 2007, and again during the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, demonstrate significance of this dimension of security and the urgent need for states to act to protect their national strategic infrastructure.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ATTACKS AGAINST ESTONIA AND GEORGIA

The cyber attacks against Estonia must be viewed as part of the overall political context between Estonia and Russia, especially the extant tensions between the two countries. Primary targets were not the websites of governmental agencies and the industry, but the strategic Estonian ICT infrastructure.

The structured and well-aimed cyber attacks against Georgia can similarly be interpreted as a military operation in cyberspace that occurred parallel to the Russian air and land operations - although there is no evidence that official Russian authorities were involved.

Both cases reveal the security-political relevance of this new form of threat to national security. A revision and adaptation of national and international defence policies is therefore urgently needed. Cyber attacks are real and current threats to strategic ICT-dependent infrastructure and can in fact be debilitating. In this environment, crises, tensions, and defence scenarios assume a very different character when compared to the time of the Cold War. Significantly, national cooperation between government, the private sector, and

academia—as well as international support—were instrumental in confining the damage caused by cyber warfare and quickly restoring regular service. In particular, the case of Estonia as a model for a state that is in transition to a highly developed information society nevertheless underscores the increasing dependence of information societies upon strategic infrastructures for functioning information and communication technologies; moreover, and it reveals weak points that invite attacks from adversaries.

THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF CYBER ATTACKS

Likely targets of cyber attacks are the basic values and functions of the strategic ICT-based infrastructures of a state: availability, confidentiality and integrity. Due to the worldwide web, a Cyber-attack can be launched from any place on earth, making it considerably harder to trace and identify than conventional military threats. The low costs of carrying out a Cyber-attack greatly extends the scope of potential perpetrators, where not only states but terrorist groups and even individuals can be attackers and the motives can be political, ideological, religious, ethnic as well as economic, anarchic or merely personal. Finally, given their potential for causing damage, attacks against ICT should be categorized as the equivalent of an “armed attack” in the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charta or as a political or general “criminal act”.

Among the most widespread methods of carrying out cyber attacks are the deployment of botnets, malicious and damage-inflicting software, and the introduction of faulty hardware as well as methods to disrupt or paralyze ICT. Essential advantages for any attacker include: (a) the inexpensive means; (b) the low probability of being discovered; and (c) being independent of the time and place of the actual attack. Importantly, the preparation of a

Cyber-attack is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Targets of an attack can be hit within an extremely short period of time and, possibly with the goals of encouraging the subsequent use of the affected hardware or software, the extent of the physical damage of targets can be intentionally limited by the attacker. In addition, other common means and methods of electronic attack can be employed simultaneously, such as physical attacks against critical ICT structures with incendiary attacks, bombs, and EMP, microwave and laser technology. Thus, the actual extent of a state's vulnerability can only be assessed after a detailed analysis, especially since the extent of networking and the balance of dependency on strategic ICT resources must be initially determined..

Targets of the partly coordinated attacks in Estonia and Georgia were the networks of the government, political parties, and banks. If additional attacks were launched against energy supply installations (especially electricity supply), centres of telecommunication providers, security agencies for internal and external security (i.e. the police and the military) and against television and radio stations a full-blown

Coordinated cyber attacks in combination with traditional methods of warfare could paralyze a country not just for hours, but for weeks. All technically advanced states therefore have to take strategic and operational precautions to protect themselves against such potential threats.

Cyber attacks already present a substantial unconventional risk for national security and potentially affected government agencies and

business enterprises have to provide for self-protection - whether through military or legal means. In fact, the type and extent of potential criminal cyber attacks could overwhelm existing governmental capacity and require special capabilities and forces. In many countries defending against externally-inspired cyber attacks on national security have consequently become a new task of national defence establishments.

A STRATEGY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL CYBERSPACE

Strategy means translating power into politics, while the nature of the power factors is of secondary importance. The aim of every strategy is to fulfil the tasks set by politics with the best possible use of the available means. The decision sought in battle is to make the opponent accept the conditions imposed on him. In this dialectic of wills, the decision becomes a psychological reaction to be instilled in the opponent: He should become convinced that it is useless to take up battle or continue it.

If cyber attacks are used as an offensive strategic concept, potentially threatened states

(i.e., all those who, to a substantial degree, depend on a functioning critical information and communication technology-based infrastructure) have to develop and implement strategic protection concepts. The core of these concepts must be the optimal protection of the relevant ICT basic values and core functions. What is of primary importance in this regard is ensured constant and uninterrupted access, appropriate confidentiality, and the inviolable integrity of desired information services and communication lines of critical ICT - in particular, the reliable availability of truly critical ICT infrastructure.

STRATEGIC OPTION

In principle, small states like Austria have only one strategic option for the protection against cyber Attacks: They must do everything to prevent the attacker from reaching his political goals by permanently guarding the critical infrastructure and taking precautions for emergencies and crises.

The chances for the success of this option depend primarily mainly on the private owners

and operators of critical infrastructures, since the bulk of these are in their hands. The state also has the responsibility of protecting society in cyberspace. By creating the prerequisites, framework conditions, and through the provision of the necessary resources resolutely, it can do so. In this context, the objects of protection are the country's critical ICT-dependent infrastructures. Cyber War scenario would emerge.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

Critical Infrastructures are those infrastructures, or parts thereof, which are of substantial relevance in maintaining important societal functions. Their disruption or destruction has serious effects on the health, security or the economic and social wellbeing of the population or on the effective functioning of government. Plans for protecting such infrastructures should be cognizant of their importance and comprehensive in their approach.

For example, on the basis of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection, a national master plan was elaborated for Austria, called - the Austrian Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (APCIP). APCIP describes the principles of the program, including listings of priority sectors; definitions

of criteria for rating critical infrastructures; identifying risk factors and relevant actors; listing measures for the protection of critical infrastructures; and developing an action plan with detailed sub-goals.

The Europe-wide program lists 11 sectors of critical infrastructures: energy, nuclear industry, ICT, water, victuals, health, finances, transport, chemical industry, and space travel and research institutions. The centres, communication nodes and steering systems of these critical infrastructures at the disposal of a modern society are based on information and communication technology or are of considerable importance for the ICT and can only be operated in certain locations.

CONSEQUENCES AND NECESSARY MEASURES

The state should maintain national capabilities for protecting strategic ICT infrastructure against cyber attacks. It can do so mainly by engaging in permanently available and up-to-date estimates of the security environment on the basis of regular analyses and assessments of the security risks, an early warning system complemented by emergency/incident functionalities and by developing the ability to react appropriately when warranted. Moreover, intensive cooperation between industry, science, government, and citizens is indispensable and must be initiated and promoted by the state. On the international level, states would have to cooperate effectively among themselves as well, particularly regarding prevention, threat identification and defense.

The private owners and operators of critical infrastructures, in turn, have to create the necessary preconditions for secure operation via comprehensive protection measures against cyber attacks, exchanging information and cooperation with one another, maintaining high security standards, and providing certified training for their personnel. Some approaches that promise success are developing and using "intrusion-tolerant" systems, redundant design, and automated critical processes with super-imposed manual steering. For security-critical areas one should exclusively use accredited or certified hardware and software, organizations, procedures, and personnel. Protection-worthy data and locations need to be protected in conformity with the law according to the criticality of the ICT and the extent of the threat.

Critical infrastructures require permanent basic protection with active and passive measures, personnel, and material. The protection has to be set up in a way that in the event of danger through natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or war operations it can be quickly reinforced as needed. Similarly, national emergency plans must be kept up-to-date through periodic

exercises and all actors involved must maintain high security awareness regarding possible vulnerabilities and the necessary countermeasures. Finally, as a general principle, all security measures are to be established according to the motto “protect, identify, react” and be divided into defensive and offensive measures.

CONCLUSIONS

The state has to provide adequate resources in developing a national means of analysing, assessing and predicting developments in strategic ICT - including risk assessment, a permanent situation centre for observation, estimates of the threat environment and, if necessary, for early warning, alert, and the activation of reactions and emergency organizations (such as CERT/CSIRT, or Computer Emergency Response Team/Computer Security Incident Response Team).

Thus, what any state with a high degree of dependence on ICT today needs is a central body to collect, analyse, and assess all pertinent information from government

agencies at all levels as well as from private parties. This organization should also have the authority to take the necessary reconnaissance, prevention, defense, and reaction measures, or at least obligate other assets to do so. This authority would also ensure underpin the effective steering and coordination of national and international cooperation regarding cyber war. Clearly however, the necessary legal preconditions for such a body would have to be established and tailored in each national context and the manner in which this is accomplished may well affect the way in which individual states can defend themselves against cyber war threats in the future.

THE AUSTRIAN WAY

The milestones of the Austrian way to cope with these new threats are a result of the strategic analysis. In the last years Austria developed 4 main documents:

1. The Austrian Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (2008)
2. The Austrian security Strategy (2013)
3. The Austrian Cyber Security Strategy (2013)
4. The Austrian Military Policy Strategy (2014)

The Austrian Strategic Goals are similar to the other EU states:

- 1 Availability, reliability, confidentiality, and integrity are guaranteed only in a secure, resilient and reliable cyber space (Cyberspace must be capable of resisting risks, absorbing shocks and adjusting to a changed environment. ICT systems should be as redundant as possible).
- 2 A national approach of the competent federal ministries and partnerships with the private sector, which protects their own ICT on a high level, is necessary.
- 3 Austria is building a "culture of cyber security" through a number of awareness measures.
- 4 Austria will act as a pioneer in implementing measures to secure the digital society.
- 5 Austria will play an active role in international cooperation at European and global level.
- 6 Finally, the Austrian population should be aware of the individual's personal responsibility in cyber space.

The Cyber Strategy rules the responsibilities as follows:

Overall the Chancellery is responsible for the National Cyber Security. The Ministry of Interior has to fight against cyber crime, Cyber Defence is the Task of the MoD and the international Cooperation has to be done by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

How to deal with the private sector is one of the challenging points on the way to a concrete concept. It is intended to cooperate on a voluntarily base. But maybe it is necessary to rule the cooperation by law.

Cyber Defence

The term "cyber defence" refers to all measures for defending the cyber space with military and other appropriate means in order to achieve military-strategic goals. Cyber defence is an integrated system, including the implementation of all measures relating to ICT and information security, the capabilities of milCERT and CNO (Computer Network Operations) as well as the support of the physical capabilities of the army.

Military Cyber Emergency Readiness Team (milCERT)

milCERT shall be the fundamental base of the Austrian Cyber Defence capabilities. We have established our milCERT in a cluster organization with one Center for the Coordination and Situation and one Technical Center

The Cyber mission of the Austrian MoD contains the following goals:

- ◆ The protection of own networks.
- ◆ milCERT has to create operational capabilities for Cyber Defence.
- ◆ Production of an Enhanced Cyber Security Common Operating Picture for strategic consultation.
- ◆ Handling of security incidents.
- ◆ Warning against security threats and weaknesses.
- ◆ Recommending solutions to enhance IT-Security.
- ◆ National and international networking.
- ◆ milCERT is a member of government-CERTs and has to participate in and support the build-up of the Austrian national CERT cooperation.
- ◆ Cyber Security Knowledge Base.
- ◆ Awareness building.

The milCERT provides reactive, proactive and knowledge management services. Reactive services are response to incidents, response to vulnerabilities, analysis of artefacts, and emergency recovery. Proactive services are the provision of a cyber common operation picture, alarm and warning services, risk analysis,

information gathering, national and international networking, and awareness. The knowledge management services are knowledge management cyber defence, the provision of a cyber defence knowledge base, the support and improvement of all processes, and a product evaluation.

CYBER DEFENCE – THE WAY FORWARD

Because of the positive evaluation of the milCERTs capabilities during the exercise Cyber Coalition 2013 the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was reached by the end of 2013.

The results drawn from the evaluation of the exercise shape the further long term capability development planning which describes the way forward to milCERT Full Operation Capability (FOC) in 2015. The focus is on the capability development in the areas incident handling,

common operating picture and knowledge management. In addition, a stronger integration of the AUT forces in the cyber incident process is planned.

Until the end of this year a working group has to analyse the needs of a Cyber Defence Centre. I think we will see a decision of the Ministry of Defence in 2014, so that we can start with the transformation from milCERT to a Cyber Defence Centre in 2015.

Marcel Dickow

The community needs a different approach, a multi stakeholder approach towards this problem.

We have developed some mechanisms to do that in the past, because most of the time technical problems have to be solved even though obviously, technical problems always or often have a political dimension too. In the way we are dealing with that, this particularly political dimension has been neglected most of the time.

What we have now is zoom of formats and forums where we talk about Internet Governance and Cyberspace Governance, like the "ITU" the International Telecommunication Union that's a part to United Nations but there is also "ICAN" and the "IETF" the Internet Engineering Task Force and there is a process that called "WSIS" World Summit on the Information Society. Another was Net Modial this year in Brazil and also the Internet Government forum six weeks ago in Istanbul.

So there are a lot of places to talk but few places where decisions are made. The question of using Multinational vs Multi stakeholder approach it's a question of what needs to be governed in a political way what can be solved by technical solutions, on which background we have to solve the problems here. This brings me back to the question to the title of the session today. Is cyber security something that can be dealt within internet and cyber governance, and my answer is yes. But on the other hand we have to be careful not to securitize the cyber governance and the governance of the internet. We need to find technical and political solutions to cope with insecurities but its only one

question and its not the main question. We have to keep in mind that there is a role for internet and cyber governance and we have to keep in mind that there are partners, properly in some settings we have to find new partners.

I'm pretty sure we have to build new regional cooperation so the attempt of let us say for example Brazil and Germany to talk about privacy in the internet is certainly something assessing of new partners here and there might be a role for the Balkan regions as well properly involvement in this topic.

To conclude, it is not only a question of let us say traditional versus untraditional challenges but it is also a question of having the right and proper new partners to deal with these problems.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

CURRENT SECURITY CHALLENGES

**FOR THE WESTERN
BALKAN REGION**

ADDRESSED BY MEANS OF JOINT RESPONSIBILITY

AND COOPERATION

PANEL DISCUSSION 2

Kenneth Geers: Kosovo, Cyber Security, and Conflict Resolution

INTRODUCTION: CYBER SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Just as Vietnam was the world's first "TV War", the Kosovo war in 1999 was the world's first "Internet War". A pro-Serbian hacker group called the "Black Hand" subjected the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)⁶², the United States, and the United Kingdom to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and over twenty-five different strains of virus-infected email.⁶³ They took the NATO Public Affairs website (where NATO sought to portray its side of the conflict) offline for days. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea cited "line saturation" caused by "hackers in Belgrade." As NATO tried to upgrade nearly all of its computer servers, the location of the attacking computers shifted from Belgrade to other countries around the world.⁶⁴ In the U.S., the Secret Service investigated a White House website defacement; in the UK, the government admitted the loss of "some" database information.⁶⁵ The World Wide Web was only created in 1991,⁶⁶ but by the turn of the century, it was clear that warfare – like everything else – would find a new home in this new cyber "domain". In 1948, Hans Morgenthau wrote that national security depends on the integrity of a nation's borders and its institutions,⁶⁷ but today, national institutions have been connected to the Internet – to include everything from elections to electricity plants. A cyber attack is best understood not as an end in itself, but as a means to a wide variety of ends, some of which can have serious political and/or military consequences. And on this new battlefield, anyone with an Internet-connected computer – irrespective of his or her physical proximity to a conflict – can join the fight.

Following the war over Kosovo, the use of cyber attacks in international conflicts has evolved. In Israel, pro-Palestine hackers have hit economic targets such as the Bank of Israel and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.⁶⁸ In Estonia, in retaliation for moving a Soviet World War II memorial from the center of Tallinn, pro-Russia hackers downed a wide range of Internet domains.⁶⁹ In Syria, analysts believe the Israeli military used a cyber attack to cripple the Syrian air defense system during an Israeli air force strike on an alleged nuclear reactor.⁷⁰ In Georgia, Russia is said to have employed cyber attacks to facilitate a military invasion.⁷¹ In Kyrgyzstan, a DoS attack knocked the entire nation offline during a domestic political crisis.⁷² In Iran, the Stuxnet computer worm reportedly destroyed nuclear centrifuges.^{73,74} In this geopolitical cyber context, it is unsurprising that the U.S. – whose example is now being followed by many other nations – has already created a military command devoted exclusively to cyber warfare.⁷⁵ Most recently, Kosovo has again appeared on Planet Earth's short but growing list of international cyber incidents. In October 2014, during a football match between Serbia and Albania, a small drone trailing a nationalist Albanian flag (which included Kosovo on a map of "Greater Albania") was flown through the stadium, sparking ethnic tensions in the region and a diplomatic row between the two countries. Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic said "the only thing missing ... was an explosive device in the craft."⁷⁶ Cyber attacks by both pro-Serbia and pro-Albania hackers followed the drone incident.^{77,78}

⁶²"Yugoslavia: Serb Hackers Reportedly Disrupt U.S. Military Computer," (28 Mar 1999) Bosnian Serb News Agency SRNA (reported by BBC Monitoring Service, 30 Mar 1999).

⁶³"Evidence Mounts of Pro-Serbian Internet Attack on NATO Countries," (17 Apr 1999) mi2g: www.mi2g.com.

⁶⁴Verton, D. (4 Apr 1999) "Serbs Launch Cyberattack on NATO," Federal Computer Week.

⁶⁵Geers, K. "Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare," SC Magazine (2008).

⁶⁶At CERN: <http://home.web.cern.ch/>.

⁶⁷Morgenthau, H.J. (1948) Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (A. A. Knopf) 440.

⁶⁸Stoll, R.A. & Goldstein, J. (28 Jun 2006) "One if by Land, Two if by Modem," The Jerusalem Post.

⁶⁹Davis, J.J. (21 Aug 2007) "Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe", WIRED.

⁷⁰Fulghum, D.A., Wall, R. & Butler, A. (26 Nov 2007) "Cyber-Combat's First Shot," Aviation Week & Space Technology 167(21) 28.

⁷¹Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign against Georgia in August of 2008," (Aug 2009) U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit.

⁷²Keizer, G. (28 Jan 2009) "Russian 'cyber militia' knocks Kyrgyzstan offline," Computerworld.

⁷³Broad, W.J., Markoff, J. & Sanger, D.E. (15 Jan 2011) "Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay," New York Times.

⁷⁴Falkenrath, R.A. (26 Jan 2011) "From Bullets to Megabytes," The New York Times.

⁷⁵Pellerin, C. (18 Oct 2010) "Lynn: Cyberspace is the New Domain of Warfare," American Forces Press Service.

⁷⁶Bilefsky, D. (17 Oct 2014) "Drone Stunt at Belgrade Soccer Match Stirs Ethnic Tensions," The New York Times.

⁷⁷Walker, M. (18 Nov 2014) The Cyber-Attacks And Fears Of Cyber-War To Come, InSerbia Network Foundation.

⁷⁸Jovanovic, J. (18 Oct 2014) "Serbian hackers Deface the Website of the Albanian State Television", Tech Worm.

IN CYBERSPACE, TRADITIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES ARE INSUFFICIENT

In the future, cyber security will grow increasingly synonymous with national security. Today, national security decision makers are already responsible for the security of not one computer or even thousands, but millions, including the cyberspace around them.

How will nations prepare for the cyber wars to come? First, by investing in new technologies such as Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), which ends the world's current shortage of computer addresses and offers improved security features such as mandatory support for Internet Protocol Security (IPSec). This is a logical approach – the best way to fix a technical problem is with a technical solution. However, the dynamic nature of the Internet marketplace, and political tension between data privacy, law enforcement, and human rights, will ensure that there is no silver bullet, at least in a purely technical sense.⁷⁹

Second, nations will incorporate cyber attack and defense into everything they do. In terms of military doctrine, the dream of winning international conflicts without fighting is as old as Sun Tzu's Art of War. However, no one currently knows whether cyber tactics and strategies will be a positive or negative development on warfare. If cyber attacks play a lead role in future wars, and a sizable portion of the fight is over IT infrastructure, future wars could be shorter and cost fewer lives, with quicker economic recovery and post-war diplomacy – but only time will tell.

Many aspects of “cyber conflict”, however, are revolutionary, and may be hard to square with traditional law enforcement principles and military doctrine. First, the proximity of adversaries is determined by connectivity and

bandwidth, not terrestrial geography. Second, the blinding proliferation of technology and hacker tools makes it impossible to be familiar with all of them – especially “zero-day” attacks, against which there is no defense (or knowledge). Third, cyber attacks are flexible enough to be effective for propaganda, espionage, and even the destruction of critical infrastructure. And fourth, there are currently few moral inhibitions to cyber attacks because they relate primarily to the use and abuse of data and computer code – so far, there is little perceived human suffering.⁸⁰

What about traditional military deterrence? At least three factors diminish its credibility: acquisition, attribution, and asymmetry. First, cyber tools and tactics are relatively easy to acquire. There is no readily apparent difference between expertise in computer network defense and computer network offense – they are essentially one and the same discipline. Second, “attribution”, or the anonymous hacker problem (e.g. an attacker's ability to operate quietly and to disguise their true location) decreases the chances of deterrence via retaliation for an attack.⁸¹ Finally, there is no better example of cyber asymmetry than “MafiaBoy”, who as a teenager in 2001 caused over \$1 billion in corporate losses during a successful DoS attack.⁸²

At some point in the future, world leaders may decide to negotiate a cyber arms control treaty or a non-aggression pact for cyberspace. However, the nature of a “cyber weapon” poses a unique challenge to any such regime. How do you prohibit something that is inherently hard to define, such as “malicious” code? How do you inspect something as big as cyberspace, when a single USB Flash drive can hold trillions of

⁷⁹Geers, K. “IPv6: World Update,” coauthored with Alexander Eisen, ICIW 2007: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Information Warfare and Security 85-94 (2007).

⁸⁰Geers, K. (9 Feb 2011) “Sun Tzu and Cyber War,” Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 1-23.

⁸¹Geers, K. (2010) “The Challenge of Cyber Attack Deterrence,” Computer Law and Security Review 26(3) 298-303.

⁸²Verton, D. (2002) *The Hacker Diaries: Confessions of Teenage Hackers* (NY: McGraw-Hill/Osborne).

(ISP) level, but such regimes are already commonplace, such as China's Golden Shield Project, the European Convention on Cybercrime, Russia's SORM,⁸³ and the USA PATRIOT Act. Each is unique in terms of guidelines and enforcement, but all face the same problem of overwhelming traffic volume – not to mention political disagreements over data privacy and human rights issues.

Despite all of this, cyber arms control may be in our future, because in cyberspace, we all live in

glass houses. One possible model is the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which compels signatories to destroy CW stockpiles, forbids them from producing any more, and gives practical aid to its members in the form of advocacy and the peaceful advancement of science. In a similar fashion, a cyber weapons convention could create an internationally staffed institution to help signatories improve cyber defenses, recover from attacks, and promote peaceful uses for computer science.⁸⁴

THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Governments today are confronted with a paradox: disconnecting from the global Internet is folly, and yet network connectivity can provide adversaries with a medium through which to commit cyber crime,⁸⁵ cyber espionage, or even cyber war. And there is only so much they can do about it, because law enforcement jurisdiction ends every time a network cable crosses an international border. Over the past twenty years, cyber investigators have spent countless hours staring blankly at long lists of foreign Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, with virtually no clue about how to see behind them.

Cyberspace is bigger than any country. Therefore, cyber security is an international problem that requires an international solution. One of the most vexing characteristics of cyber attacks is that they are normally routed through unwitting third parties, in which “middle man” proxy computers are successfully attacked along the way in order to cover the trail of the attacker. Unfortunately, this dynamic not only facilitates short-term cyber attacks, but also has a corrosive effect on the long-term integrity of the Internet as a whole, and suggests that a cyber attack against anyone is a cyber attack

against everyone. Progress in strategic cyber security will be difficult, however, due to legacies of conflict, poor technical skills, and fears of losing national sovereignty. However, in the end, we have no choice. Nations will remain technically, legally, and morally responsible for their own network infrastructure, but forced to reach out to international partners for help on a regular basis.

At a technical level, international institutions already lie at the heart of Internet management. Since 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)⁸⁶ has managed the communication protocols that once belonged to the U.S. Department of Defense. In theory, the U.S. government has the right to veto fundamental changes to the system, but in practice ICANN operates independently.⁸⁷ That said, ICANN only makes sure that information – in the form of data “packets” – gets from point A to point B on the Internet; it does not control access, police Internet content, or stop cyber attacks.

The task of making sure that information sent across the Internet does not break national or international law falls to national-level law

⁸³Система Оперативно-Розыскных Мероприятий or “System for Operative Investigative Activities.”
⁸⁴Geers, K. (2010) “Cyber Weapons Convention,” *Computer Law and Security Review* 26(5) 547-551.

⁸⁵E.g. Internet fraud, credit card fraud, bank card skimming, the dissemination of child pornography, etc.
⁸⁶www.icann.org.

⁸⁷McCullagh, Declan. “ICANN rejects US domain-name veto proposal,” *CNET News*, (01 Mar 11).

enforcement and counterintelligence organizations. Toward this end, the most important international legislation to date is the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, issued in 2001 and now signed by 51 nations (acceded by 44) from around the world. This treaty, supplemented by the Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism Committed through Computer Systems, is the only binding international agreement related to cyber security, and is considered an archetypal template for countries to use domestically.⁸⁸

A successful cyber crime treaty is a good start, but what happens when cyber attacks cross the threshold of terrorism – or even warfare? The Russian government has long argued that an agreement similar to those that have been signed for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could be helpful in securing the Internet.⁸⁹ In 1998, Russia successfully sponsored United Nations (UN) Resolution 53/70, "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security,"⁹⁰ which states that while modern information and communication technology (ICT) offers civilization the "broadest positive opportunities", it was nonetheless vulnerable to misuse by criminals and terrorists.⁹¹ In 2010, this resolution was co-sponsored by the U.S. There are currently two streams of ongoing cyber dialogue at the UN: one relative to cyber crime and another on cyber warfare. One concrete achievement has been the UN's sponsorship of a conference series called the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).⁹² Despite these achievements, however, the UN's enormous size can also be an obstacle to progress, as there are numerous antagonistic political and military alliances within the organization, and a great disparity among Member States in terms of ICT infrastructure, law, policy, and threat

perception.

Therefore, quicker and more tangible progress on strategic cyber security may come within the context of regional political and military alliances. The European Union (EU), with the highest GDP in the world,⁹³ already has a legal and policy framework that includes robust support for electronic signatures, online services, spam filtering, consumer protection, individual privacy and digital copyrights. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 strengthened the EU's security credentials by increasing the Council's authority to define a common approach to foreign and security challenges, and by encouraging Member States to act in closer security cooperation with one another. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – a 56-nation group that extends from North America to Central Asia – has sponsored many cyber security "Expert Workshops," including in both Serbia and Croatia.

In terms of international military might, however, no organization today can match NATO, whose *raison d'être* since 1949 has been the collective defense of its Member States. NATO links Europe with North America, and has a formal dialogue with dozens of additional nations in its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and Contact Countries. All told, these partnerships span the globe. According to Suleyman Anil, Head of Cyber Defence in NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division, the 2007 crisis in Estonia transformed the organization's perspective on cyber security: "Estonia was the first time ... [we saw] possible involvement of state agencies; that the cyber attack can bring down a complete national service, banking, media..."⁹⁴ NATO's latest Strategic Concept describes cyber attacks

⁸⁸The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (www.coe.int).

⁸⁹Markoff, J. & Kramer, A.E. (27 Jun 2009) "U.S. and Russia Differ on a Treaty for Cyberspace," *The New York Times*.

⁹⁰53/70: Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security," (4 Jan 1999) United Nations General Assembly Resolution: Fifty-Third Session, Agenda Item 63.

⁹¹*Ibid.*

⁹²WSIS is co-sponsored by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).

⁹³In 2010, the European Union had a GDP of nearly \$15 trillion USD (www.cia.gov).

⁹⁴Gardner, Frank. (3 Feb 2009) "NATO's cyber defence warriors," *BBC News*.

⁹⁵"Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation," (2010) NATO website: www.nato.int.

as threatening “Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability,”⁹⁵ and most recently NATO announced that cyber attacks could lead to an invocation of Article 5, which declares that “an armed attack against one ... shall be considered an attack against them all,”⁹⁶ and is the Alliance's core organizing principle of collective defense.⁹⁷

To the east of NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization⁹⁸ – a group composed of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and

Uzbekistan – signed an agreement on “Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security” in 2009;⁹⁹ and in 2011, Russia and China proposed an “International Code of Conduct for Information Security”.¹⁰⁰ Thus, there are some hints of emerging cyber alliances in the world today. Hopefully, this trend will tend not toward greater conflict in cyberspace, but greater international security and stability.

CONCLUSION: A REGIONAL CYBER CENTER IN THE BALKANS

The way to make real progress on strategic cyber security, especially for small nations, is via international partnerships. In this light, the Balkan countries would be wise to create a regional center of computer security expertise, with a future-oriented mission of conflict resolution in cyberspace.

At a tactical, technical level, the center should focus on defending the region's computer networks from attacks. Proactively, it should offer cyber security education in “best practices” as well as more advanced technical training. Reactively, it should employ a multi-national forensics team that can deploy in the event of a crisis, with the authority to openly publish the results of an investigation. At the strategic level, the center would become a magnet for economic investment in international efforts to promote information technology and cyber security.

Cyber conflicts do not occur in a vacuum; they are reflections of the traditional conflicts that have always plagued humans, even before the rise of nation-states. Of course, objective technical expertise will be the foundation of any such project, but a good understanding of the

regional geopolitical context is also necessary, and only local experts can provide that. There should be no fear of being “behind” in cyber security expertise or experience. All nations are just now beginning to address strategic cyber security issues. The Balkans are a microcosm of the wider world, and could easily become a role model in the global cyber security domain. Small countries such as Estonia, Israel, Iceland, and Finland have proven that small nations can make large contributions in this dynamic field, where everything is by nature asymmetric.

The center's staff should hail from every country in the Balkans. However, the center could have a virtual “home” in cyberspace – thus keeping overhead costs to a minimum. Its training program should be shared, open, objective, and rigorous. A strong, internationally based core of subjects and certifications could help to unify the personnel and program. One of the center's primary goals should be to develop trust, both within the institution and from the perspective of the outside world. During times of crisis, the personal and professional relationships developed at the center over time would become invaluable assets.

⁹⁵“The North Atlantic Treaty,” (4 April 1949) Washington D.C., NATO website: www.nato.int.

⁹⁶Freedberg, S. (7 Nov 2014) “NATO Hews To Strategic Ambiguity On Cyber Deterrence,” Breaking Defense.

⁹⁷Nurgaliyev urges common SCO approaches to cyber crime,” Voice of Russia (28 Apr 11).

⁹⁸Cheng, Gracye, Cohen, Morgan, Green, Josh, Oliveira, Carlos & Stadnyk, Mark. “Responses to Questions Posed by CNAS on International Law & Internet Freedom,” The Harvard Law National Security Research Group www.law.harvard.edu.

⁹⁹“An International Code of Conduct for Information Security – China's perspective on building a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace,” (10 Feb 2014) <http://www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/a-cyber-code-of-conduct-the-best-vehicle-for-progress-en-1-963.pdf>

There is no doubt that the center, from its first day, would be busy. For new legislation, it could help to write basic definitions. For disaster planning, it could classify and help to protect critical infrastructures. For law enforcement, it could teach computer forensics, and raise vis-à-vis intellectual property and data privacy. For decision makers, it could translate technical jargon.

One existing model for the center is the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia, where multinational personnel engage in research and development, and offer technical training to both computer scientists and senior-level decision makers. Since its founding in 2008, the CCDCOE has established an annual

conference examining the nature of cyber conflict, a hands-on cyber defense exercise (CDX) called “Locked Shields”, and it has published numerous legal studies such as the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.

The new center's overall goal should not be perfection, but a proactive, methodical reduction in the potential fallout from future cyber attacks. Information technology and cyber security are new disciplines in the world, and the exact formula for success has yet to be written. The countries of the Balkans can make a significant impact in this field, while simultaneously making investments in their economic development.



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Diana Lekaj: Cyber Risks in Kosovo

ABSTRACT

Cybersecurity is indeed a complex international issue that requires not only regional but also global collaboration and attention to ensure internet's safety. While many developed countries have shown a significant progress towards building cyber defense measures, Kosovo and most of the Western Balkan countries fall behind in this field. A number of joint regional security initiatives and efforts among the Balkan countries is a must for building such measures. Besides, Kosovo must also build and increase its capacity and capability to mitigate and prevent cyber-related incidents as well as implement measures to improve cyber resilience across its critical information infrastructure.

INTRODUCTION: KOSOVO IS NOT IMMUNE TO CYBER THREATS

The advent of information technology and cyber revolution contributed to increased opportunities in numerous fields. People all over the world depend on technology to communicate, exchange information, manage their accounts, move from one place to another to get things done, enjoy economic opportunities and so on. The modern world economic prosperity and social well-being rely on technology to the point where it is almost impossible to function without it. The days of paper chronicles and invoices, documents and for that matter telegraphs and cables, disappeared with the past century. If the modern world were unexpectedly unplugged from the Internet, the result would be chaos.

While this development has led to remarkable amounts of innovation and extensive flexibility, it has generated vulnerabilities and dangers as well. The threats that we face today are no longer only traditional threats (natural hazards, manmade errors, physical attacks). The new threats come in a virtual form presenting a progressively challenging concern for any nation's domestic security and economic competitiveness. Kosovo is no exception to immunity against these types of threats as well. Recent trend of identity theft, credit card fraud and forgery, attacks on the government websites and e-mail threats directed to security agencies are just a proof that Kosovo is also

becoming vulnerable to cyber threats. At present, there is a dispute among professionals about the extent of cyber risks that challenge Kosovo's security mainly because businesses and public institutions are still largely operated by paper but that will most likely change in the future considering country's aspirations toward European Union integration. Besides, few security officials fear that Kosovo computer systems may become a source for attacking other countries and this has happened in the past.

An attack, no matter how it appears, affects us all. The use of Internet to carry such attacks, disregards national borders, intensifying the potential impact on victims. Geographic isolation does not provide protection any longer. Cyber criminals, hackers and terrorists do not have to physically be in country to attack systems and networks, in fact, they can launch viruses from anywhere in the world. For this reason, and because our society's dependence on technology intensifies, cybercrime becomes a question of economic, social and other national interests as well as national security. Thus, it is important that Kosovo builds and increases its capacity and capability to mitigate and prevent cyber-related incidents as well as implement measures to improve cyber resilience across its critical information infrastructure.

CYBERSECURITY/INSECURITY IN KOSOVO

We need to keep reminding ourselves that all of this technology development is relatively new. It began in the 1970s and 1980s and suddenly blossomed in the 1990s, along with the simultaneous advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web.¹⁰¹ Thus, cyber-related issues are also new and emerging threats even in developed countries.

While in developed countries cybersecurity has

been a hot topic for discussion and considered as high priority in their national security strategies, the same received little or no attention in Kosovo. This is probably because the security over cyber space is just emerging as a concern in the country. Regardless, the truth is that Kosovo is no exception to immunity against cyber risks as well and it is time that we start giving it some priority for the sake of our own safety.

Terrorism and Internet

Although to this date, no single incident of cyberterrorism has been evidenced, according to field experts, chances that attacks of this nature might occur in the future are quite high. Few even argue that cyberterrorism attacks have probably happened but were kept “confidential due to the security threat to important infrastructures that would evolve from details becoming publicly known”.¹⁰²

One of the cyber related dangers that falls under this category is the use of Internet by various extremist groups as a way to propagate terrorism, recruit and train jihadists, spread propaganda, raise funds and launder money, communicate and conspire, collect intelligence on targets, encourage, project and launch cyber-attacks.¹⁰³ For example, it is assumed although not publicly recognized that online radicalization has played a major role with recent trend of Kosovo citizen's joining terrorist groups to fight against the current regime in Syria. It has also been reported that many of the ISIS members have used their own websites and social media to persuade Muslim population from the Balkan regions to join them and fight against what they call infidels.¹⁰⁴

Another reason why Internet is used for terrorism purposes is because this method proves to be more cost-effective than traditional terrorism. It is much cheaper and easier for a terrorist to obtain computers, telephones or use internet to plan and launch an attack than traditional weapons such as explosives or other combat devices. Additionally, internet also reduces time in operational communications while same time increasing the amount of information sharing among geographically disbursed terrorist groups. The reality is that today, one platform connects many of them.¹⁰⁵ While many local experts do not see Kosovo being vulnerable to cyberterrorism mainly because it is not an attractive target for such groups as they are looking to cause a wide-scale effect (Kosovo is too small in size) probabilities that various terrorist groups use Kosovo computer systems as a source to launch terrorist attacks against other countries (most probably western ones) are high. This is probably true considering that Kosovo is still in its development phase in this specific area. The understanding is that it lacks the compulsory skills and capacities to prevent, detect and even counter cyber-terrorism acts.

¹⁰¹ Miller, R. (2012). Cyber risk: Critical infrastructure. Retrieved from: <http://www.umuc.edu>

¹⁰² Brunst, P. (n.d.). Terrorism and the Internet: new threats posed by cyberterrorism and terrorist use of the Internet. Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law. Ch2. P. 51-78. Retrieved from: www.springer.com/.../9780387892900.

¹⁰³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (2012). The use of Internet for terrorist purposes, p. 1-141. Retrieved from: www.unodc.org

¹⁰⁴ Scott, A. & Christie-Miller, A. (2014). Exclusive: ISIS starts recruiting in Istanbul's vulnerable suburbs. Newsweek. Retrieved from: <http://www.newsweek.com/2014/09/19/exclusive-how-istanbul-became-recruiting-ground-islamic-state-269247.html>

¹⁰⁵ Che, E. (2007). Securing a network society cyber-terrorism, international cooperation and transitional surveillance. Research Institute for European and American Studies. p.1-31. Retrieved from: <http://www.rieas.gr>

In addition, the like attacks do not endanger the attackers' lives as is the case with traditional attack methods (suicide bomber in this case). What is more important, this form of terrorism provides to a certain level some anonymity which is rarely found in traditional methods of terrorism making it very difficult for security authorities to detect and detain them. Further, cyberterrorism will most likely have a more direct effect on a large number of people than traditional methods of terrorism, thus creating prevalent effects and increasing alertness of certain causes (via greater media coverage).

Cyber crimes

One of the risks includes attacking the data contents such as identity theft usually executed by cyber criminals or simply taking the data for someone's own use. The second is usually a province of highly-skilled criminals and nation-states. However, it is an increasing threat. Altering datasets is also a realistic possibility and of real concern for those who worry about cyber risks.¹⁰⁷ A highly-skilled hacker can penetrate into a nation's critical infrastructure networks and cause significant damages to their system or it can enter government or military computers and steal confidential data compromising of which may lead to large scope conflicts among the states.

The frequency and complexity of attacks against critical infrastructures worldwide seems to be growing, as is their potential to cause significant damage to their system. However, this might be a more important matter for the developed countries. Because Kosovo is still in the early stages of development, threats of this nature are not alarming yet mainly because neither the government nor private businesses use highly sophisticated systems to operate-a compromise of which would cause wide-scale effects.

While a suicide bomber may abolish a building or a bridge killing tens or hundred people, a cyberterrorism attack against nation's critical infrastructure such as power grid, water or transportation systems would not only cripple country's economy but potentially kill and harm thousands or even millions of people.¹⁰⁶

Besides, an attack of this nature would also instill panic and fear within a population causing social instability and that is exactly what terrorists aim to accomplish. But there are other dangers as well.

In terms of data breach, according to security officials responsible for countering these crimes, there are at least three cases (two against well-known highly profitable companies and one against a government department) currently under investigation where hackers were able to penetrate their systems and obtain a large amount of company data. Other cybercrime cases involve payment transactions among local businesses and international firms involving third-party processors.

These third parties serve as a bridge (middle men) between banks and traders. Because these systems do not have the same sophisticated levels of security as the banks do, they automatically become attractive targets for online thieves. Once hackers identify a weak spot or an open port in these systems, they immediately strike by breaking the encryption of data that travels from the trader to the payment process. A successful decryption of this data means access to a large amount of people's account information.¹⁰⁸ Kosovo businesses have fallen victims to these crimes numerous times according to the same source.

¹⁰⁶ibid.

¹⁰⁷Miller, R. (2012). Cyber risk: Critical infrastructure. Retrieved from: <http://www.umuc.edu>

¹⁰⁸Silver-Greenberg, J. & Schwartz, N. (2012). MasterCard and Visa Investigate data breach. The New York Times. Retrieved from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/31/business/mastercard-and-visa-look-into-possible-attack.html>

The finance sector remains the top cybercrime target in Kosovo as there were already a number of frequent and reported attacks against their systems. Credit card fraud, skimming devices and cash trapping methods are some of the methods that cybercriminals used on the local bank's ATM machines and were successful at stealing couple thousand Euros. The number of similar incidents range between 12 and 18 in the last two years. In reality, the number of incidents is low to be concerned but it is a fact that should not be undermined.

Plus, very often, bank owners/operators tend to not report cyber related incidents. This is usually due to the following reasons: A great number of private companies refuse to share threat information because their primary concern is privacy. They fear that this information may reach competitors or costumers and that of course would damage their reputation. However, as cyber-threats increase, information sharing among the authorities and private sector about potential cyber threats and vulnerabilities is crucial to build cyber defenses and response measures.

As essential as the cyber infrastructure is today, the continuous advancement of technology and economic actualities as well as human safety will make it even more essential in the future. As an illustration, many economic sectors in Kosovo are still largely operated by paper but that will most likely change in the future considering country's aspirations to become a part of the European Union and other international organizations (NATO, UN) in the future. For this reason, Kosovo is poised for rapid transformations over the next decade or so. As we progress towards joining these

organizations, the exchange of records and information, become the norm, disruptions in information exchange or doubts about the accuracy and safety of records will steadily become more vital.

Conversely, if we continue pursuing their EU integration aspirations, we must understand the importance of applying and enforcing measures that meet the EU cybersecurity standards to prevent and control potential cyber-attacks. Ensuring cybersecurity means protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and networks to create resilient, robust and secure systems.

However, this requires a number of technical, procedural and institutional measures designed to protect against, mitigate and recover from any deliberate or non-deliberate cyber-attacks affecting in particular critical information infrastructure.

CYBERSECURITY/INSECURITY IN KOSOVO

First, Kosovo must develop and strengthen its national criminal justice system to the level where it is capable of implementing the provisions of the international legal instruments against such attacks that is in compliance with the doctrines of rule of law and international human right standards.

Second, a special department comprised of highly-skilled and trained judges and prosecutors in the field is mandatory to be able to deal with cybercrimes and handle electronic evidence. To date, Kosovo has not yet established a similar department and there is very limited specialized training available on the legal and practical aspects of the investigation and prosecution of cases involving the use of computer and internet for malevolent purposes. Kosovo Police has taken some initiatives in this aspect in 2011 when they founded a specialized unit responsible for investigating cybercrimes.

The unit operates under the directives of the Directorate for Investigation of Organized Crime. This unit consists of law enforcement police officer specializing in crime investigations and experts in the field of information technology. However, the suggestion is to perhaps consider creating a special unit that deals with forensic functions. This unit should be responsible for collecting and analyzing electronic evidence and for providing additional technical support to the other investigative units. Currently, electronic evidence collection/analyzing is handled by the IT forensics section. In regards to the special equipment and resources needed to prevent and counter cyber-attacks, there is no public record proving that these specific requirements have been met.

Education and awareness related to cyber threats is fundamental to counter cyber-attack

efforts. This again is another area where Kosovo government and responsible departments should intensify their efforts. Kosovo citizens have minimal or zero awareness on the causes and consequences of cyber threats and this is not because they were not exposed to such threats.

According to the Kosovo's law enforcement public relations office, Kosovo citizens have been exposed to identity theft/fraudulent activities numerous times and it is an increasing issue. Only one that experienced identity theft will understand the complex consequences a victim will face. Opening bank accounts, ordering online products, take over their bank accounts are just few of the cyber incidents that our citizens had to face. Lack of awareness is a result of lack of communication between law enforcement, government security agencies and local community in Kosovo.

Up until recently, no such activities were initiated by either party. However, a recent Community Safety Awareness Program has been initiated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This project aims to raise the level of awareness in the field of community safety by undertaking a joint project led by the Kosovo Police coordinated with the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST). The project is still in a development phase and its implementation has just started as a pilot project in middle schools in Fushë Kosovë.

It must be noted that the project is designed to increase awareness about other crimes as well such as domestic violence, human trafficking, and juvenile delinquency and so on but Internet Safety and Cyber Bullying are also a part of it.

What is special about this project is that local police from specialized units are the ones delivering this program. This helps strengthen and enhance communication among the students, educators and local law enforcement. It is worth mentioning that this program was accepted very well by all the students, educators and parents as it aims to increase awareness of various threats through supporting security at schools. The program performance assessment will be conducted in 2016 to measure the success.⁵

Next, a collaborative partnership among the government and the private sector (business, civil society, and academia) is a must to improve the cyber security. A proper information sharing mechanism should be in place to allow for the delivery of threat information to the industry owners and operators who need it and vice versa. However, determining which companies should be authorized to accept and share sensitive threat information is a complex issue, but it is one that legislators will have to overcome to successfully fight against increasing cyber threats.

Moreover, companies should also invest more time, energy, and money in their own systems' security. Running necessary tests on their systems, identifying and eliminating anomalies, proper hardware and software installation and risk awareness and management is a must to keep their cyber system safe and secured. Finally, as cyber-crimes are transnational in nature, regional and international cooperation among security and intelligence agencies and a number of military and political cooperation such as joint security initiatives is necessary to address these emerging threats. For Kosovo, this will be challenging as the country is not yet a member of regional or international security initiatives even though such cooperation is considered crucial to successfully counter and prevent prospective cyber-crimes. However, according to the Kosovo Police office of public communication, there are cases when Kosovo networks/computers are used as a source to

launch cyber-attacks against another state. This fact is based on the international legal assistance that a number of countries seek from them. The same office reports that Kosovo Police cooperates with all regional countries excluding the Republic of Serbia. This cooperation to a certain level includes cooperation against cyber-crimes as well. However, no official cybersecurity agreements among Kosovo and other countries have been established yet. The current cooperation agreements with regional countries are more general in nature. Those are usually signed amid the particular ministries or department directorates representing each country. As an intermediate solution, Kosovo could consider signing bilateral cyber security agreements with Western Balkan countries that are willing to cooperate. Besides sharing cyber threat related information among each other, the agreement should also provide exchanging of cyber expertise among the signing countries in the form of experience sharing, education, training and so on.

Lastly, even though there is some disparity among professionals about the current extent of the cyber risk, there is no doubt that cybersecurity is a growing concern amongst national, regional and international security officials. Three decades ago, few in the computer industry bothered about information security, but it has become a big business and a major apprehension. Unless technical breakthroughs should allow the creation of an integrally more secure cyber space, this worry is likely to increase rather than weaken in the future.

Creating widespread damage or disruption remains challenging and somewhat "out of the way" for all but the most skilled operators working under foreign governments' or terrorist organizations' sponsorships. These capacities, however, could diffuse to others in the future and it is possible that a fairly unsophisticated attack could have a huge impact caused by unanticipated spillover effects.

INTRODUCTION

What does the term “cybersecurity” refer to?

Vesna Popova: Why does cyber (in)security matters for the Western Balkan?

It is commonly concluded that working online has set up the most of individuals “offline“. This is especially the case for the Western Balkan Countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) that have, for example, Facebook penetration rate of around 50% each.¹⁰⁹ And it's not just the social media- it is the banking, energy supply systems, production, traffic and almost each aspect of everyday life that is somehow connected to or dependant by “cyber“. This is what makes cyber a fact: Cyber is real, because all the effects of its (mis)use are real. So, in that context, it is not the extended definition of cybersecurity the only thing that matters, but also the utilization of the cyberspace for “ordinary” crimes, such as for example the hate speech, an issue that can easily light up a fire in a region as the Balkan is. One example is the recent incident in a soccer match played in Belgrade, provoked by the pretty extracurricular usage of a drone.

Still, the idea of cyber security is a pretty new concept considered in the region as a whole. The definition of cybersecurity is broad and, when transposed into the real world, it gets different dimensions. There is a general notion of distinction between cybercrimes, cyber terrorism and recognition of the cyber both as a separate space for action and as a channel for influencing the existing, material space within society, but however, this is far away from enough in order to be able to speak about cyber security awareness in the region of

Western Balkan. The protection of critical infrastructure is another point for the cohesion of the region as well as a key notifier for the protection and resilience of the society. For the most of the cases, it does represent quite new concept both for the institutions and academia. This paper aims to touch upon all those issues, as a screening of the current trends, situations and challenges, and hopefully as a provocation for increased activism by the above mentioned actors.

¹⁰⁹Source: Internet World Stats, available at <http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa2.htm#al>

Overall cybersecurity understanding in the region

According to ENISA database, only Montenegro is in a phase of preparation of cybersecurity strategy. Albania has started building its cybersecurity program upon the initiative and support of the USAID lately. Publication of the International Telecommunication Union labeled as “Cyberwelfare profile” refers that Bosnia and Herzegovina have established CERT and cyber strategy, but in the same, it refers that there are

not available information on the key implementing focal points. The overall conclusion is that both countries and citizens are lacking data and awareness about cyber security. Institutions and governments also do not put too much effort into this subject. General understanding of cyber security in the region is low.

Why this matters?

All of the countries of the Western Balkan region deal up with the same problems, challenges and aspirations for the most of the time. Due to this fact, they are sharing the same risks and same needs: internally and externally.

All countries of the Western Balkan region are NATO and/or EU aspiration countries. Macedonia is the best example: as one of the main troop contributors in ISAF from the region, with permanent international military presence abroad, it is directly affected as a potential target, being labeled as a strategic partner in the so called war on terror. Albania is already NATO member, and is completely under the joint shield of protection. Internally, the region has a long history of inner conflicts and international presence and interference. The long period of democratic transition was exhausting for the economies and the people that also led to ethnicizing of social conflicts. Presence of fundamental radical Islam on the Balkan has also been invoked during the last decade.

“Growing concern over the rise of Wahhabism

in the Balkans have dictated that the issue has shifted from the margins to the mainstream, fast becoming recognized as one the key political-security issues in the Western Balkan region.”¹¹⁰ Although Islamic religious leaders on a Balkan conference in Skopje in 2011 have claimed that there is not danger of radicalization in the region,¹¹¹ academia does not fully agree with that statement.¹¹² As time passes, this issue transforms into growing problem. Islamic Religious Community admitted that there is a presence of Wahabi Islam in Macedonia in 2010,¹¹³ and that they are lacking control over some of the mosques in the country. Additionally, in the meanwhile, the problem of foreign fighters had occurred. One of the latest media articles from October 2014 states “It is assumed that on the battlefields in Syria there are hundreds of citizens of the Balkan countries, mostly from Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latest figures approximate that dozen people have been killed on the battlefield only from Macedonia so far.”¹¹⁴ The presence of illegal migrants coming from the Middle East has also increased, that is

¹¹⁰Morrison, Kenneth Wahhabism in the Balkans (2008) Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

¹¹¹Article available at <http://www.dw.de/%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%B5-%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%BD/a-14951859>

¹¹²Article available at <http://www.alfa.mk/News.aspx?id=62305>

¹¹³Article available at <http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=72101025291&id=9&setlzdanie=22023>

¹¹⁴Article available at <http://telma.com.mk/vesti/sad-i-makedonija-zagrizheni-za-zaminuvanjeto-borci-vo-sirija>

another factor of rising insecurity.¹¹⁵ It is about the numbers and intensity of such cases revealed by the security officers, indicating engagement of the local population, which is criminalized by Macedonian legislation. Additional problem connected to migration is the problem of false asylum seekers that has opened the gates for introduction of the idea for reimposing the visas by the EU.

A highly respected magazine "The Economist" analysis show that Balkan national economies are mostly considered miserable.¹¹⁶ This represents a potential security risk by itself. Interethnic tensions are still remaining as an open dispute. The last reason of escalation was the "drone attack" on a football match in Belgrade that was supposed to be the flame of hope for improvement of the bilateral relations between Albania and Serbia, due to the fact that it was the first official visit by an Albanian government leader in 70 years.

Neighboring bilateral relations are highly complicated and sensitive. Macedonia is just the most obvious example, facing up the so called name dispute for the last 20 years, labeled as the main inhibitor on the path of euro-atlantic integration of the country. Summarily speaking, Balkan is still far from stable, safe and secure region. Increased vulnerability offline, makes space for increased vulnerability online and vice versa. This is especially the case due to the fact that cyber security is lacking systematic institutional approach, and cyber awareness is lacking in general. What the author finds encouraging is the response of the academia: rising involvement of Macedonian professors and experts on different academic events dedicated to cyber security, development of joint platforms, launching of educational projects and academic curricula in that area is an immense promising with a great chance of delivering long term results. Macedonian Military Academy in

the spring 2014 has launched the idea of starting PhD studies and institute for cyber terrorism. If those intensions get realization, Macedonia gets a chance to be the pioneer and a leader in this field.

¹¹⁵ Article available at <http://kajgana.com/vo-kukja-vo-selo-morani-pronajdeni-29-migranti-od-bliskiot-istok>

¹¹⁶ Article available at <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/06/balkan-economies?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07>

The specific structure of cyber-related domain

Cyberspace is probably the most accessible space for “troublemakers”. Since he beginning it was intended to be highly achievable and client oriented. It has a great potential for the creation of a cascade effect in different areas of society. Protection of the critical infrastructure is another crucial element that is lacking. Excessive part of

the critical infrastructure is in private ownership- the push for privatization and economic and democratic transition through capitalism was an influential factor over those issues and relations, making them even more complicated to some extent.

Need for centralized domestic approach

Lack of effective and comprehensive cyber strategies on a national level within the region leads to the decreased understanding of the issues of cyber security as well as lack of centralized body (on a national level) that would deal up with cyber security in general. Although all of the western Balkan countries are put on ITU list of established national CIRT (except Kosovo),¹¹⁷ there is a great discrepancy between theory and practice. Macedonia is lacking CERT (or CIRT) unit, as well as the national coordinating body responsible for cyber security. Different institutions deal up with different aspects of the issue, but unfortunately, none of them is going deeply through the problematic. Single legal and policy framework is lacking;

different stakeholders are engaged and it is sometimes tricky to allocate responsibility. That's why, there is an imminent need for preparation of effective and reliable cybersecurity strategy, and this is not the case for Macedonia only. The first step for effective cybersecurity is readiness to deal up both with the consequences of potential attack, but also prevention and understanding of the problem. The ministry of interior and related institutions already have a lot of practice in dealing up with some sort of cybercrimes, or child protection in the cyber sphere but this is hardly far from enough. In the autumn 2014, first SEENSA¹¹⁸ meeting occurred in Belgrade that is also some promise for future cooperation.

Need for coordinated efforts regionally

For the Western Balkan, shared responsibility usually means shared security. And shared security goes in two directions: first, learning about relying on each other and building mutual trust, through transfer of part of the responsibilities for the common good as a compensation for the greater good (or better to say, greater security) of all, and secondly, through factual increased security and resilience of the systems and societies. Although Western Balkan states lag behind in regard to issues of cyber security, although they have serious cause for concern, perhaps the advantage should be sought in the similarity of the concerning situations in each of those states: the ability to

use them as a platform for building cooperation and mutual trust. Cyber threats are generally considered exempt from national, ethnic or religious inclinations, and this makes them a great challenge to be resolved jointly, by cooperative efforts. The countries of the Western Balkans are more or less confronted with the same challenges and the same questions: that's why the best way is jointly to come to some answers, and to overcome the effects of the century long conflicts by working together on a field as cybersecurity, which is equally important for all of them, and at the same time is gender, religious and ethnic neutral.

¹¹⁷ITU, National CIRTs established worldwide, available at <http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/CIRT_Status.pdf>

¹¹⁸SEENSA, new regional format of advanced protection of classified information, information available at <http://www.rcc.int/articles/79/seensa-new-regional-format-of-advanced-protection-of-classified-information>



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that she developed interest in the security field. Her research areas of interest are: Defense and National Security, International Security, Emergence Preparedness and Response, Cyber Security and Post Conflict Issues and Development. Her discussion paper focuses on the need of Kosovo Government to build and increase its capacities and capabilities to mitigate and prevent cyber-related incidents as well as implement measures to improve cyber resilience across its critical information infrastructure.

Radunovic gives an overview over crucial terms (cybercrime, cyber conflicts and protection of critical information infrastructure) and actors, non-governmental as well as governmental, in the field of cyber security. Furthermore he explains the connections between the different stakeholders, their roles and responsibilities, and examines the different levels concerning cyber security.

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languages and technologies: SQL Server 2000-2008, MySQL, ASP.NET, VB.NET, C#, COM+, ANSI SQL, Transact-SQL, ASP.net, XML, DML, Java, PHP, Apache on Unix Platform, HTML, middle tier design and programming with COM. Currently he is a Team Leader of the EU funded transregional Project “Enhancing Cyber Security”. Besnik Limaj presents the EU-funded project “Instrument for Stability - Enhancing Cyber Security: protecting information and communication networks”, which shall improve the capacities of chosen partner countries to protect their critical infrastructure. For South East Europe and the Western Balkans Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo and Moldova are principal partner target countries. The project contains three main components, Cyber security strategies and awareness raising, Computer Emergency Response Teams capacity building and the enhancement of cooperation.

**Vladimir Radunovic**

is a coordinator of e-diplomacy educational and training programmes of DiploFoundation. Prior to this, he has coordinated the Internet governance and policy programmes since 2005. Vladimir also serves as a Member of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) of the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) since 2012, and is a member of the Steering Committee of /1Net. He has actively participated in the global process since World Summit on Information Society in 2003, and has been a lecturer and a speaker in number of online and in-situ professional educations and trainings in Internet governance worldwide. His professional focus is on capacity development and online learning, broadband and access policy, cybersecurity and Internet safety, network

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**FRIEDRICH
EBERT 
STIFTUNG**

SESSION THREE

Fragile States and EU Integration
Uncertainty/Delay as a security threat
for Western Balkan Countries and a source for
radicalization

International Conference:

Current Security of the Western Balkans

Challenges for Balkan Region



Addressed by
Means of Joint
Responsibility and Cooperation



Economic security challenges in the **Western Balkans**

Valbona Zeneli, PhD

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

“ **Current Security challenges
for the Western Balkan region
Taking responsibility for
preventing and combating joint threats** ”

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Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Conference
19-21 November 2014


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Security challenges in the WB

- Economic (in)security
- Unemployment and poverty
- Corruption and Organized crime
- Weak Rule of Law
- Lack of “qualitative” education
- Weak regional integration


Economic growth rates



Source: World Bank Database and EIU. 2013 and 2014 are projections of Economist Intelligence Unit


Income convergence?

GDP per capita in US dollars, current prices 2013



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2014

Unemployment in 2013




Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

5

Lack of competitiveness

Competitiveness

Ranking based on 148 researched




- Low productivity
- Efficiency- based economies
- Unfavorable starting position
- Regional conflicts
- Lack of real structural reforms
- Unfriendly business environment
- Corruption and OC

Source: Global Competitiveness Index, World Economic Forum database. Kosovo is not included in the data.

Corruption: CPI 2013, Transparency International

Rank 2013	Country
43	Slovenia
55	Georgia
57	Croatia
67	Montenegro
67	Macedonia
69	Italy
69	Romania
72	B & H
72	Serbia
77	Bulgaria
80	Greece
111	Kosovo
116	Albania



New Growth Model

- **Drivers of growth**
 - Innovation
 - Skills
 - Trade integration
- **Focus**
 - Export oriented
 - FDI driven
- **EU 2020 Growth Strategy**
 - Integrated
 - Smart
 - Sustainable
 - Inclusive
 - Governance

KEYNOTE ADDRESSES 2

Dejan Guzina

In an interview that Ulrich Beck, a famous German sociologist, gave to Pescanik only a few days ago, he nicely summarized what is at the heart of the Western Balkans' dilemma:

One of the greatest success stories of the European Union is in making enemies into neighbours... This idea has yet to succeed in your region. Russian aggression in Ukraine has shown that there are still two types of nationalism. On the one side, we have a cosmopolitan nationalism that makes one's national identity open towards the other. As such, it contributes to the security in Europe. On the other side, there is an ethnic type of nationalism that is focused on territory, and by its nature is aggressive (Pescanik, November 15 2014).

Even though one may disagree with Beck's characterization of the non-aggressive nature of cosmopolitanism, he is certainly right that all states, particularly in this region, have to make decision as to what type of future they want for themselves – the one based on cosmopolitan nationalism or the one based on ethnic nationalism.

After almost twenty years of experimenting with the Europeanization model in the region, the hour of Europe (Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003) has yet to come for the Western Balkan states. The region is dominated not so much by the politically stable liberal democracies but by a hybrid form of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010). This system relies on certain elements of democratic governance (parliament, multiparty system, relatively free media), while in fact these democratic forms are only secondary to the informal power

networks between the political establishment (incorporating both the government of the day and its opposition) and the business elites. Here it suffices to say that despite the region's substantial progress in the past ten years, what unites the entire region is not so much a strong and vibrant civil society and institutes of democratic governance, but a systemic corruption, sham parliamentarianism, polarized political space and a fusion of interests between political parties and the so-called business tycoons. This necessitates two questions:

- Can the current EU's case-by-case approach to integration offer enough incentives that is capable of undermining the very structure of the Western Balkan's style of crony capitalism?
- And, what if the EU's approach to reconciling fundamental individual liberties and communal claims cannot work in each and every case in the Western Balkans?

As to the last question, already in 1970, Dankwart Rustow wrote that transition to democracy might be a futile exercise without the so-called “background condition.” In Rustow's words, “[I]t [background condition] simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy to be must have no doubts or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to (350).” Thus, the background condition represents the level of achieved national unity in any given state beyond which the very boundaries and identities of the state and political community will not be challenged. A cursory look at the Western Balkan's map clearly shows that this background condition is not met in Bosnia,

Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, while Albania and Montenegro remain vulnerable to the developments in the rest of the region. From this perspective, it is debatable whether the current EU approach can fully resolve the tensions between institution and nation-building practices in the essentially contested states in the Western Balkans, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. What do I mean by this? In the context of the Western Balkans, a democratic polity requires not only that there is a mutually agreed upon consensus between the states on the territorial framework of the Western Balkans, but also that citizens accept political community they belong to. But, most of Western Balkan states are, in the words of Vetton Suroi (cp 2011), unfinished states. The 2011 EU Institute For Security Studies Report nicely encapsulates their “unfinishness,” and it is worth quoting its author (Jacques Rupnik) at length: Kosovo [is] in search of sovereignty and recognition; Bosnia and Herzegovina in search of a post-Dayton constitution (replacing a constitution designed to end the war with one for a functioning democratic polity); Serbia in search of accepted/acceptable borders with both above mentioned states (an equation complicated by its non-recognition of Kosovo and the ambivalence of its relations with Republika Srpska); Macedonia/FYROM in search of an identity and a name. For the first time the European Union, a project conceived in order to relativize states' sovereignty, has become involved in the formation of new nation-states that also aspire to become members of the Union.

Until now the EU's transformative power has proved effective in integrating established states; now it is confronted with the challenge of

integrating contested states (2011, 24). We are approaching 2015, and this statement is as valid today as it was when it was written more than three years ago. In the remaining part of my presentation, I will further explore the underlining reasons for the “unfinished” business of the EU involvement in the region.

THE CURRENT APPROACH

Perhaps the best way to explain the EU involvement in the region is by relying on the metaphor of the doctor and the patient. In that context, the right question to ask is

whether the recommended treatment helped or the patient was treated with the wrong cocktail of medications. Thus far we can identify two types of treatment, one perhaps more geared towards dealing with the question of national integration, and is related to direct political pressures on the states to change their behaviour in accordance to the European integration model. In order to deal with these challenges, particularly in situation of conflict between the policies designed to address national grievances and those fostering certain European standards of behavior, the international community initially opted for the so-called “bureaucratic meddling” (Chandler, 2004) into local actors' affairs against the “nationality” principle. Eventually, these types of bureaucratic meddling had the exact opposite effect instead of the intended one, for the EU's direct intrusions into states' local affairs has undermined the very rationale of the EU involvement in the region – democracy building. Lately, however, we are witnessing the revamping of this model, and it is fair to ask the question why we think that this time the approach might yield better results.

The other approach is functionalist/administrative in its character and is linked to encouraging the reforms in the political, social and economic sectors. Thus, in the past ten years, the EU's policy of direct interference was accompanied by a case-by-case approach to European enlargement of the remaining Western Balkan states (Balkans in

Europe Policy Advisory Group, 6). This so-called regatta approach to the European enlargement is a system that encourages candidate states to compete with each other in a race where the lucky winner becomes a full-fledged member of the EU. It was partly designed for its convenience and thus far it has worked only in case of Croatia.

The pressure to succeed is completely put on the candidate states, while the EU bureaucrats emerge solely in the role of an arbiter or an umpire whose job is to make sure that the players follow the rules of the game. In that role, individual countries can prove to be better at the game from their neighbours, but it is the prerogative of an umpire to change or add new rules to the existing ones. Thus the number of hurdles to jump over in the accession talks constantly grew in the past few years (Greece needed to fulfill the requirements that were divided into nine chapters; nowadays, the candidates will have to respond to the myriad requests divided into 35 chapters). Imagine an athlete starting 110 metres hurdles race only to realize at the end of the race that this is in fact 400 metres hurdles race! Yet another reason for this approach is that it allows the EU officials, in the climate of rising scepticism towards further enlargement in the EU countries, to keep the promise of membership alive while constantly shifting the target for some better time in the future.

Nowadays, in the context of Serbia, we are witnessing a certain fusion between the two logics, for Serbia's progress in talks with Kosovo will be evaluated as part of the chapter 35. Thus, what is usually a less important chapter in bilateral negotiations between the candidate state and the EU that deal with the so-

I can only assume that the EU will apply the same scenario in relationship with other candidate states where finding the solution to the issues of unresolved territorial conflict are part and parcel of the European integration process (Bosnia-Herzegovina; Macedonia; Kosovo).

BUSINESS AS USUAL?

The key unfinished business of the European Union is in changing the very ideal, model and practices of the Balkan nation-state towards embracing the European model of pooled sovereignty, open borders and societal integration (on the region's experiences with Europeanization, see Table 2). And, the central challenge for the EU in the next period is to continue pulling away moderate nationalists from the region's traditional practices of nation building. Two crucial tests for the EU's attractiveness and broader European appeal in the eyes of moderate nationalists will be the level of readiness among Serbian and Kosovar politicians to follow through the Brussels Agreement, on the one side, and Bosnian and Macedonian politicians finally to move their countries forward, on the other. However, I am afraid that there is not a clear formula or understanding as how to achieve the required change.

In situation of an increasing international uncertainty, it is doubtful that the EU's approach of slowly "normalizing" Balkan states into the European standards will work. If only three years ago, the EU Institute For Security Studies Report could boldly proclaim that the EU is unchallenged international actor in the region, nowadays no one can deny the significant presence of two strong competitors for the region's influence – Turkey and Russia. Even

though Turkey (Bosniak dominated parts of Bosnia, Albanian parts of Macedonia, Kosovo) and Russia (Serbia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia, Macedonia) target different client states, their role as potential "patrons" in the region revolves around the model that is already firmly established in the region: political system of competitive authoritarianism, trade and economic deals oiled through the shady contracts, and the strong presence of the populist leaders (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro). Thus, the EU is currently not only facing the challenges of problematic state and nation building in the region, but also increasingly less friendly competition with Turkey and open conflict with Russia. How these conflicts are going to play out with each other will to a great extent decide the outcomes of the European integration in the region as well. On top of this list of the EU challenges is what Ivan Krastev has identified as a problem of the societal acceptance of the EU norms and values in the region. Twenty years of a direct engagement in the Western Balkans have taught the European officials two lessons (at least, I am hoping that they learned those lessons):

1. Transforming the elites is not the same as transforming the society, and
2. EU power of attraction is inversely proportional to the EU power of transformation, the latter being the weaker one.

Under those conditions, a slowpoke, case-by-case approach can only continue to strengthen the process of simulated Europeanization in the region. This process is based on local leaders' appropriation of the Europeanization discourse in the external affairs, on the one side, and the continuation of old practices of keeping informal networks of power untouched while doing little to address the Internal, domestic issues of failed economies

and endemic corruption at the systemic level, on the other. Any inability on their part to show progress either on the domestic front or in talks with the EU will, I am afraid, increase the attractiveness of emerging alternatives in the region. After all, the public disenchantment with the European Union is not just a prerogative of the EU member states but also of the EU candidate states. In addition, public opinion polls across the region have already shown that the love affair with the European Union is long gone. At least, in the past, the European Union was able to be more direct in its requests. If local leaders (and population) are not yet democratic, they will become so through the gubernatorial decrees of the UN/EU representatives in Bosnia and Kosovo in the early stages of the game, or through the 110/400 meters hurdles race, as is currently the case. However, I am doubtful that this Rousseauldian solution of forcing someone to become free by enforcing upon them the “right” democratic choices can work on its own. So, what are the alternatives to the current EU approach?

The apparently most favourite scenario is what Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group calls the Balkans big bang (May 2014). According to this model, the EU should accelerate the accession process in the Western Balkan states by imitating a 2004 EU enlargement scenario. Despite its obvious appeal, this approach is deeply unrealistic and borderline impossible for the myriad of reasons. First, each and every EU member state has a veto power over the final decision as to who is in and who is out of the EU. Thus, we should not underestimate the negative “blackmailing” bilateral capacity of some EU members bordering the region (Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece) in order to

gain certain “favours/accommodations” from Serbia, Macedonia and other candidate states. This is nothing new for both Slovenia and Greece have already exercised their respective veto powers over Croatia and Macedonia. Second, neither the EU public opinion nor the current economic situation in the Union works towards such a scenario. Third, Kosovo's problem is not only its non-recognition by Serbia, but also by five EU member states. Finally, rather than speeding up the process of reforms in the region, it will slow them down in countries that already achieved official candidate status for accession to the EU (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia), for their progress will have to be realigned with the progress of the so-called problem states such as Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia. More so, under the current European conditions of stalled growth, unresolved financial crisis, enlargement fatigue, attack on multiculturalism and the rise of European far right, one wonders how much enthusiasm is left in the European Union for a more coherent regional approach to the Western Balkans that is capable of addressing the remaining persistent twin issues of stalled political reforms and regional integration. The question is even more pressing in light of the current Ukrainian crisis that has almost by default pushed the Western Balkan question at the European backburner. I am afraid, or at least, I cannot think of any, constructive alternative to the big bang scenario.

A far more realistic scenario is a EU's simulation of a Big Bang model. In light of an ongoing Ukrainian crisis the EU and major European states simply don't have luxury any more fully to abandon the process of enlargement in the Western Balkans. But let us not be naïve and expect the repeat of the Thessaloniki summit in

Council declared, “the future of the Balkans is within the European Union”. The business as usual scenarios will rather be supplemented with some major short-term political initiatives in the region (for example, the current German/British proposal for Bosnia; German support for both bilateral and multilateral meetings of the Western Balkan leaders, and so on). These initiatives, as I already mentioned, are emerging when the Western Balkans are under severe economic strain. In addition, they are competing with the equally increasing Turkish and Russian economic and political influences in the region. The extent of this competition is still hard to predict, but the so-called Greek Scenario (that is, total economic meltdown) in one or two Western Balkan states will seriously delegitimize the European project in the Western Balkans. The re-emergence of the security concerns in Europe may have one, albeit very important, unintended consequence. Both, economic and social uncertainties, in combination with the unresolved territorial disputes, have great potential to alienate some Western Balkan countries from the EU. In his opinion piece on EU enlargement that was written for a Serbian weekly Vreme (November 2014), Dejan Jovic has rightly observed that accession to the EU is ultimately a political decision. Once it is made, it really doesn't matter if a candidate state is fully ready to join the club or not. After all, nobody can seriously claim that Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary or Croatia fulfilled all the necessary requirements when they were accepted into the EU. In other words, not only that those countries simulated the success of the needed reforms to be accepted in the ranks of the EU, but also the EU pretended that these countries were ready.

This time, however, is different. As the result of the rising corruption within the EU and the newly emerging perceived security threats from Russia, it would seem that this type of simulated success is closed for the remaining Western Balkan countries. The new thinking seems to be that the remaining Western Balkans countries should all be straight A students before joining the EU ranks. By making those countries go through all the hoops and loops the very political decision is being handed to the European bureaucrats to decide if the “students” are ready or not, and thus it can be indefinitely postponed for the next “exam” period. I am afraid that this kind of approach will make those countries weaker rather than stronger, and this is the paradox and the current dilemma of the Western Balkans' European integration. The very approach to make Western Balkan states fully ready for the EU membership can ultimately undermine their chances to become strong liberal democratic states for they cannot on their own resolve the conflict between nation building and democratization. In the worst-case scenario, the rhetoric of reforms will be replaced with the reality of populist nationalism, as the only remaining legitimizing principle to stay on power once economic and political reforms fail. This does not necessarily mean the emergence of new hot conflicts, but freezing of the unresolved territorial disputes, full entrenchment of an illiberal style of democracy and eventual positioning of the Western Balkan states (or, perhaps some of them) on the wrong side of the European Union's border. If this scenario prevails, then the role of the EU will be more evaluated through the security lenses as to how to prevent and/or contain the Western Balkan uncertainties rather than from the perspective of integrating and reforming the region's contested

Arben Qirezi: Fragile States and EU Integration Uncertainty / Delay as a Security Threat to the Western Balkans Countries and a Source of Radicalization

The Post-war reconstruction in the Western Balkans was the most expensive international investment in re-building war-torn societies. The wars that accompanied the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia have taken a high toll both in human life, economy as well as in the fabric of the societies affected by military aggression during the 1990s. In this sense, the international intervention has failed to help these societies to create sustainable democracy. As Mesquita and Downes argue, international interveners, rarely, if ever, are even interested to help the growth of democracy within their client countries. Indeed, the external interveners view these places as clients, rather than as places where democratic development is sought.

intervention in internal security and stability of these places. For the purpose of this study, stability is defined as regular and peaceful rotation of government, absence of inter-group violence, legitimacy of the system as well as effectiveness and validity of institutions and decision-making.

However, there are three principles in which international intervention in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina relied its efforts: first, dialogue and peace between ethnic communities; second, the build-up of multi-party system; and third, rule of law and free market economy. These three principles were thought to stabilize these countries in their path to European integration. In the next paragraphs, I will review the progress made and see whether the external intervention has managed to create sustainable democracies capable of grasping the challenges of transition towards the EU integration, or whether they still remain fragile democracies. Following this, I will review the effects of the EU intervention in terms of setting the parameters of the integration of these countries in the EU and the effects of this

SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

BiH's ethnic composition is based on the plurality of its main ethnic groups: 45.9% are Bosniak Muslims, 33.6% Serbs 19.8% Croats and 1% others. Its institutional design is based on ethno-federalism of the three constituent peoples, the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS), and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) dominated by Bosniaks and Croats as well as the Brcko District. These ethno-territorial autonomies form the basis and supersede power-sharing arrangements at the central level resulting in weak state institutions. These include a rotational collective presidency, a rump council of ministers (formerly headed by rotation) and a two-chamber parliamentary assembly. Representation in these institutions is based on the ratio 2:1 in favour of the Federation, or on the formula one Bosniak, one Serb and one Croat who have unconditional veto right to all decisions at the central level.

The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) ended the secessionist war of Serbs and Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina with the help of their kin states. From 1995 to date this country remains hardly functional due to the flaws in the institutional design of the DPA. The DPA strengthened ethno-territorial autonomy at the expense of the weak central institutions and created a highly interventionist international presence reluctant to implement integrationist elements of the DPA from the outset. The lack of political process has immobilized cooperative tendencies in local politics. Hence, the risk of international disengagement is a high-risk possibility threatening the disintegration and collapse of the country. This has trapped both internationals and domestic players in the orbit of a closed circuit of political stalemate while BiH's future continues to remain uncertain. Hence, BiH is a country in limbo which owes its existence to international determination to keep the country together.

On the other side, this institutional design has strengthened divisive tendencies by empowering nationalistic elites whose political platforms are based on adversarial nationalism rather than on offers for entity and state-wide effective government. Permanent obstruction of decision-making at the central institutions has made the functioning of BiH dependent on international interventionism. Thus, corporate power-sharing based on ethno-territorial autonomy, mutual vetoes, adverse ethnic politics as well as extensive powers of international community together with weak central institutions are primarily responsible for the dysfunctionality of BiH. Hence, with a view to the effect of ethno-federalism almost two decades later, the current 'stability' in BiH can be attributed to the 'absence of violence' as the basic concept of political stability, as defined by Hurwitz (1973), rather than to normal functioning of state institutions. Similarly to Kosovo, BiH has seen a de facto partition while the existence of the state is owed to the IC, whose main motivation to negotiate the was to stop the bloodshed. Thus, segregation, not integration was viewed as the only solution. However, while such an approach resulted in successfully halting the armed conflict, the institutional flaws continue to hamper the functioning of the state.

The frequent usage of extraordinary powers has not only failed to create a cooperative culture among BiH elites, it has impeded transition to local ownership by way of fostering external regulation which made international actors the dominating element of BiH's political system. The consequences of these interventionist policies are far-reaching: they have not allowed for the development of internal political processes, they have truncated democratization, thwarted attempts to create bargaining processes and, not least, damaged the sustainability of the BiH by creating dependency on international interventionism.

SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Kosovo's consociation has been a creation of international diplomats in charge of its administration. Thus, international concerns dominated the choices for Kosovo's institutional evolution. This proposition implies that an international relations perspective could provide valid explanations about external intervention and the viability of consociationalism. For example, evidence in this thesis suggests that the evolution of Kosovo's institutional design and features reflect international actors' desire to avoid a possible regime change in Serbia after 2000, repartition and change of borders, resumption of large scale conflict in the region, and also reflect, in particular, a worry about the Serbian and Russian response to Kosovo's evolution towards full, independent statehood. It is worth noting that NATO's military intervention in Kosovo occurred at a very particular geopolitical moment when Russia was in the throes of yet another domestic crisis formed by their 1998 debt default, exhaustion after a second Chechnyan war, and the end of the Yeltsin regime and the rise of Putin. Russia was thus unable to protest or assert its opposition, other than a few dramatic gestures at the close of the conflict, evidenced by the seizure of Prishtina airport.

By the middle of the last decade Russia under Putin was, and remains, a much more assertive, active and belligerent great regional power in the vicinity, which includes the Balkans and her traditional allies such as Serbia. And as this thesis argues, the main flaws in Kosovo's institutional design and its implementation stem from the problem of the lack of statehood and conflict over Kosovo's status between Kosovo Albanian majority and Belgrade. In this regard, external concerns over Belgrade's

stability had as much weight as the concerns about the stability of Kosovo.

Belgrade's informal intervention was condoned by the international community, although it operated akin to de facto partition, in a way that has corroded Kosovo's evolution within a consociational framework. This intervention was never officially recognized, but in a way, as I describe here, it was facilitated by UNMIK itself and has arguably prevented a more workable form of consociationalism emerging.

Whereas Kosovo is one of many cases of external interventions in the last decades, the difference between Kosovo and other recent cases lies in both its internal and external context; albeit similar to BiH, Afghanistan and Iraq, Kosovo continues to be under heavy international supervision, while its consociational governance has not yielded the results desired. Second, consociationalism in Kosovo was imposed and enforced by UNMIK in the context of an unaddressed self-determination dispute between Kosovo's majority Albanian population and Belgrade as a former sovereign, whose influence in the region continues to be decisive for the stability of Kosovo. Third, as of the end of 2012, Kosovo continues to be under international control with deeply divided polities and the partitionist presence of its former sovereign.

EU INTEGRATION OF BiH AND KOSOVO

Whereas the DPA was meant to halt the conflict within the BiH, it effectively became an obstacle in the EU integration of this country. The problem was that the EU criteria required more integrationist institutional set up which was practically impossible due to the DPA provisions. Therefore, BiH's ethnic leaders simply abstained from any decision-making, leaving difficult decisions to the High Representative. This in fact deprived BiH from any internal political process, or as described by Chandler, created a situation of 'Peace without politics.'

On the other side, Kosovo remained under international supervision until the end of 2012, four years after the declaration of independence in 2008. After the declaration of independence, the EU required the accomplishment of internal

criteria, but the most relevant issue remained dialogue with Belgrade, which effectively overshadowed all other criteria, which to this date remain far from being fulfilled. Both countries are left out of Visa Liberalization process, even-though other Western Balkan countries have successfully embarked upon this important step towards the EU integration. The truth is that Kosovo's independence has not yet been recognized by 5 EU member states. Nevertheless, these countries have pledged not to create obstacles for Kosovo's EU integration process, nor the relations between the Council and the Commission with Kosovo. On the other side, both among Kosovo's civil society as well as among foreign observers, it is estimated that the 'EU has raised the bar too high' for Kosovo, which creates difficulties in Kosovo's path towards EU integration.

SECURITY RISKS

So far, this discussion paper has argued that BiH and Kosovo are fragile states and that their fragility is caused in the large part by inconsistencies of peace-building policies by the international community. Therefore, the delay in their path to EU integration is paradoxical: the EU requires them to change what it forces them to approve on one hand, and on the other, especially in the case of Kosovo, it creates fragility through own dialogue which results in weak institutional set up, which it requires to overcome. This closed circuit then results in political effects that create serious security threats for these countries.

To name just a few, the influence of Belgrade as a malign regional power creates inherent instability both in BiH and in Bosnia. The first,

and foremost security threat for both countries is the lack of effective exercise of jurisdiction of the central government in the whole part of the territory as well as weakening of the state structure due to the veto exercised by Belgrade regarding institutional development both in Kosovo and in BiH.

Second, is the lack of political reform. In Kosovo, after two years of negotiations, political forces were not able to undertake electoral reform due to objections by Kosovo Serb representatives, who are for most part, controlled by the government in Belgrade. This has serious consequences for the functioning of the governing institutions, as proven by the 6-month institutional deadlock after June 2014 elections.

Third, is the increasing influence of political and social alienation of young people, whose political orientation is increasing shifting from the mainstream. This shift is re-oriented either towards nationalistic aspirations, or even extreme religious agendas.

In relation to the latter, Kosovo has been witnessing an increasing influence of extremist Islamic clerics. As a consequence, it is reported that hundreds of youths have joined ISIS and

that extremist Islamic cells exist and are active within the territory of Kosovo. Such popularization of transcendental agendas within Kosovo are directly linked to the lack of personal and social/political perspective. In this sense, the EU is viewed as a power which forces Kosovo to accept solutions against its own interest, rather than as a perspective which could create long-term peace and economic prosperity to the country.

In conclusion, this discussion paper contends that the EU integration for the most affected societies of the former Yugoslavia has not only delayed, it has rather stalled due to inadequate international approach to reconstruction which has created fragile states that have not been capable of grasping with the challenges of transition efficiently. Secondly, these societies are forced to change the systems and policies which they were forced to accept as a condition for the EU integration. This has created a number of security challenges ranging from institutional instability to the risks of global security, the most dangerous of which is political Islam, which has directly affected these societies as a consequence of the lack of any other perspective for political, economic and social

change, embedded in the perspective for European integration. Otherwise, they are trapped in the closed circuit from which there seems to be no way out unless a true European integration perspective is opened.

There is a broad consensus that for the foreign policy of a particular country to reach its objectives and be successful overall, that country needs to firstly retain credibility before other international actors. This is done by advancing democratic principles in governing with the state budget in order to ensure the people's interest are at stake. Secondly, the government needs to tackle the shortfalls of

rule of law. And thirdly, that government has to pursue a strong and effective economic development. These steps are cornerstone for that country to be conceived enough credible to pursue its goals in the international scene. Western Balkan Countries current situation in relation to the pillars aforementioned face serious shortcomings. This inevitably contributes to the fragility of their security. Taking into account the current radicalization, the countries have to ensure the pillars are further strengthened. This can be only done by strong civil society engagement in the process, by ensuring a reliable reformation process of first and foremost: political parties. These subjects, according to various international surveys, are considered the most corrupt in the state system. Their reformation and democratization will undoubtedly move the process of realization of aforementioned reforms as a precondition to secure a lasting peace and security. Organized crime syndicates are strongly organized and have an enormous influence in decision-making. This makes the realization of reforms pretty difficult.

The coordination and cooperation among western Balkan countries is crucial in dealing with tough security challenges. Because of the shortfalls of the pillars mentioned above, the strong cooperation and coordination is facing challenges as well. As we know, the radicalization does not recognize borders. The fight against it does not recognize border, either.

DISCUSSIONS

Odeta Barbullushi

In her discussion, Barbullushi talked about the process of EU integration and public perceptions in Albania. After 1997, Albania focused more on regional issues, trying to set an example of an example for Euro-Atlantic integration and stabilization.

In the public discourse, the EU integration is commensurate with stabilization and economic development. However, the elites in Albania have adopted EU discourse without really embracing EU rules and practices.

Unless rule of law is enforced unselectively and is accompanied by local development initiatives, the integration process is not viewed with sympathy and the problem is that there is no consensus of what rule of law is-the concept as such, because of inconsistent application is viewed with mistrust. If this is combined with economic crisis, the problem becomes even bigger. There is no clear linkage between law enforcement and EU conditionality. This has

been used for political agendas of political parties. EU is seen as external source of legitimacy for elites.

Regional cooperation, is one of the main priorities of Albanian government. Since 2013, this government has pursued partnership with Turkey, Kosovo as well as one visit to Serbia. There is a discourse that EU integration is the opposite of nationalism and radicalism. In fact, none of these options are affordable scenarios. Nationalism trajectory in Albania is very specific and it does not leave much space for ethnic politics. Nationalist card was not paid off to those party which tried to use it. Radicalization of religion can be observed in small clusters, mainly manifesting in social media. It mainly comes from young people from unprivileged background for whom EU discourse is very distant.

In conclusion, Barbullushi does not expect any protest to delay of EU integration. However, there is higher level of apathy and alienation.

Arben Qirezi

Qirezi focused his discussion on the functionality of post-conflict, internationally administered countries of the Western Balkans, that is BiH and Kosovo. He argued that there are three principles in which international intervention in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina relied its efforts: first, dialogue and peace between ethnic communities; second, the build-up of multi-party system; and third, rule of law and free market economy. These three principles were thought to stabilize these countries in their path to European integration. However, there was a contradiction between the

proclaimed aims and practices of international interveners. As Mesquita and Downs argue, international interveners, rarely, if ever, are even interested to help the growth of democracy within their client countries. Indeed, the external interveners view these places as clients, rather than as places where democratic development is sought. Both cases of BiH and Kosovo confirm this proposition.

The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) ended the secessionist war of Serbs and Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina with the help of their kin states.

From 1995 to date this country remains hardly functional due to the flaws in the institutional design of the DPA. The DPA strengthened ethno-territorial autonomy at the expense of the weak central institutions and created a highly interventionist international presence reluctant to implement integrationist elements of the DPA from the outset. The lack of political process has immobilized cooperative tendencies in local politics.

Kosovo's political system has been a creation of international diplomats in charge of its administration. Thus, international concerns dominated the choices for Kosovo's institutional evolution. The evolution of Kosovo's institutional design and features reflect international actors' desire to avoid a possible regime change in Serbia after 2000, repartition and change of borders, resumption of large scale conflict in the region, and also reflect, in particular, a worry about the Serbian and Russian response to Kosovo's evolution towards full, independent statehood. In this regard, external concerns over Belgrade's stability had as much weight as the concerns about the stability of Kosovo.

Whereas the DPA was meant to halt the conflict within the BiH, it effectively became an obstacle in the EU integration of this country because the EU criteria required more integrationist institutional set up which was practically impossible due to the DPA provisions. In Kosovo, after the declaration of independence, the EU required the accomplishment of internal criteria, but the most relevant issue remained dialogue with Belgrade, which effectively overshadowed all other criteria, which to this date remain far from being fulfilled. In this sense, the EU is viewed as a power which forces Kosovo to accept solutions against its

own interest, rather than as a perspective which could create long-term peace and economic prosperity to the country.

So far, this discussion paper has argued that BiH and Kosovo fragility is caused in the large part by inconsistencies of peace-building policies by the international community. Therefore, the delay in their path to EU integration is paradoxical: the EU requires them to change what it forces them to approve on one hand, and on the other, especially in the case of Kosovo, it creates fragility through own dialogue which results in weak institutional set up dependent upon good will from Belgrade as a regional power which opposes Kosovo's institutional development.

In conclusion, this discussion paper contends that the EU integration for the most affected societies of the former Yugoslavia has not only delayed, it has rather stalled due to inadequate international approach to reconstruction which has created fragile states that have not been capable of grasping with the challenges of transition efficiently. Secondly, these societies are forced to change the systems and policies which they were forced to accept as a condition for the EU integration. This has created a number of security challenges ranging from institutional instability to the risks of global security, the most dangerous of which is political Islam, which has directly affected these societies as a consequence of the lack of any other perspective for political, economic and social change, embedded in the perspective for European integration. Otherwise, they are trapped in the closed circuit from which there seems to be no way out unless a true European integration perspective is opened.

Mladen Nakic

Mladen Nakic disagreed with the term 'fragile state,' arguing that in the Western Balkans there are partially or completely dysfunctional states. A lot of progress has been achieved in the last 20 years and Croatia's integration in the EU is a sign of that progress. The main cause of the failure of some countries to adhere to EU criteria lies with political elites of those countries. Thus, the causes are internal, rather than external.

As far as the next round of enlargement is concerned, in this mandate, unfortunately, there will be no enlargement with a lengthy process expecting Montenegro and Albania as candidate countries. A new wave cannot be expected before 10-15 years.

As someone from Croatia, two countries are in focus: Serbia and BiH. Serbia has good administrative capacity to implement the negotiation process in a good way. However, apart from public statements, Serbia needs to show in practice that it is oriented towards EU integrations. Croatia will not use bilateral issues towards Serbia, like Slovenia did to Croatia during the negotiating process. These issues can be resolved somewhere in the stage of pre-accession of Serbia. Of course this depends a lot from the policy of Serbia, not only towards Croatia, but towards the region-especially Chapter 35, which will be open among the first and be closed among the last, and this will have to do in the first place with the normalization of relations with Kosovo. It is in Croatia's interests that all countries become part of EU and NATO (those who want). However, these countries need to face their past, especially Serbia.

If we talk about Kosovo, it has to be brought to

the situation where it can consume its independence completely. We know that Serbia continues to lobby against that, we know Russia' stand in the UNSC. As a consequence, Kosovo will not be able to become UN member in the foreseeable future, which also influences internally in the situation in Kosovo.

Macedonia on the other side is the key to regional stability, even more important than BiH, especially when we take into account the Albanian minority and what preceded the Ohrid Agreement. Macedonia was unjustly stopped in its Euro-Atlantic integration. Greece has to show more pragmatism and wisdom, if we are talking about regional stability, and Greece is responsible. However, in Macedonia they have to be more pragmatic regarding the name and eliminate the Greek veto.

Krenar Shala, KIPRED

The Western Balkans is in institutional vacuum due to relative absence of the EU in the region. EU is in a difficult EU situation and in some years to come, it will continue to be in crisis. As a result, there is more skepticism. The Ukrainian crisis is the second problem. The UE efforts are oriented towards Ukraine crisis and less energy is invested in the Balkan reform agenda. EU neighborhood policy has been limited. There is no enlargement in the next five years. Candidate countries will be in a difficult situation. For countries in the region, it is difficult to undertake reforms without the EU 'soft diplomacy.' The internal context, there is a consensus within academics and researchers, that in order to fight nationalism effectively, there needs to be advancement in economic development, rule of law, and democratization. Rule of Law is the other thing. Justice system is very weak in the context of galloping corruption and lack of accountability and democratization. If we combine these internal and external contexts, we see there is no likelihood that the Western Balkans countries will integrate in the EU in short to medium term. Let us take BiH as an example as a dysfunctional state. It will not have the needed institutional reform, the RS is trying to be independent, and Serbia has the problem of Kosovo. Then we have Kosovo as a captured state. Montenegro is more likely to become EU member, and Macedonia is very reluctant to resolve the name issue, while Greece remains in its old position. On the other side, Albania has started implementation of reforms. However, it will face the problem with Greece like Macedonia. As you, know, there is a Law on War of Greece with Albania. So formally, now we have only a ceasefire between Albania and Greece and a solution needs to be found in

Albania for an issue which is very sensitive for the public.

Finally, in this EU institutional vacuum, we have stronger presence of Russia diplomacy in the region. Russia's say that they are not going to allow the Slavic states to become NATO or EU members. There is enormous investment of Russia in Serbia. One-third of total investment in Montenegro are coming from Russia and it will be very hard for Montenegro to pursue its own agenda. In conclusion, I do not see very good future for the Western Balkans.

Marko Prelec

Marko Prelec focused his discussion on economic development. An essay written by WB expert, which talks about post-communist countries. There is a chocking conclusion that most post-communist countries did not perform well and that if we look at Western Balkans economies from 2000 when the statistics about Kosovo were introduced, having in mind that we lack the 1990's statistics and that a comparison is difficult to make. One thing is clear, however, there are only 2 countries in the Balkans, which are catching up with the poorest countries in EU, that is Romania and Bulgaria. Other countries are also growing economically, but they are lagging behind. This has been the reality the last 14 years. As one of the Copenhagen criteria relates to the free market economy and albeit there are no fix criteria, it would be an exaggeration to say that catching up with Bulgaria is a good accomplishment.

The problem is that this level will never be achieved. One optimistic view is that the region is catching up with the EU average, in the next to fifteen years, the states in the region will achieve the minimum and will become the poorest EU

well in terms of its failure to perform well in comparison to the countries that have a history of performing less well than the former Yugoslavia.

If you add to this Slovenia and Croatia as former Yugoslav countries that are EU members, they are performing less well, converging with Romania and Bulgaria. In 2000, Slovenia, had two and a half times better standard of living in purchasing terms than Bulgaria and now that is 1.6-7 times. Croatia has also been falling in recession for the last five years, non-stop. One would expect that with the fulfillment of criteria and joining the EU and receiving more money that the country would do better, but it has not gone well.

If you add to this some countries of the wider region that are doing pretty well, there is a country that has managed to surpass Bulgarian level and that is Belarus, which has done none of the right things it was supposed to do, no benefits, a low level of economic assistance; Armenia is also doing very well. There seems to be, just looking at eh hard numbers, there is something distinctive about former Yugoslavia. There is something, to speculate, there is something about the Yugoslav legacy of political economy, the Yugoslav way of doing things, which is poorly suited to the modern world. If this is true, it is worrying because the entire system needs to change. This system can survive integration into Europe, so the European medicine is not sufficient to work the kind of changes that need to be worked.

It is difficult to talk of comprehensive examples of systemic change. Poland and the Czech Republic went through the shock therapy after the fall of communism, but that was after the

complete discrediting of the communist system. That has not happened here. There is still nostalgia about 1970s and 1980s throughout the region, probably except Kosovo and Albania. One of the frequent sayings is that you have EU reforms, but you need rule of law reforms to crush down on organized crime and corruption. The system of clientelism and rent-seeking is something what political elites are expected to do and this is difficult to tackle through rule of law reforms because clients are a very large group of people. The second thing is the idiosyncratic set of nation-building issues that are currently in the pipeline of the EU accession, that are unlike anything that has been dealt with in the accession process before. Serbia-Kosovo dispute is unique, BiH is highly idiosyncratic constitutional system is unique. Until recently Albania has struggled with holding a clean election.

Kosovo right now showing that it does not have a capacity to execute a peaceful change of government without international intervention and arm twisting. There are unique kinds of weaknesses with which the EU is inexperienced. These two profound challenges, the nation-state issues, and political economy issues are going to dominate next period and need to be resolved successfully in order for the Western Balkans to have a future and a decent life in which one does not think 'how do I get out of here and move somewhere else where I can make it.'

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Brigadier Wolfgang Peischel

Kant stated that social changes only create a new culture if they are supported by a moral value system and meet the categorical imperative. This means that radicalised forms of religions cannot expect tolerance if they violate fundamental human rights which correspond to an enlightened idea of man. If – and this was one of the core hypotheses of the conference – the integration of the states of the Western Balkans in the EU, and with it their incorporation in its common envelope of responsibilities, is identified as the strategic direction best suited to tackle the region's current security risks, then, following this logic, the EU should take steps to protect Muslims in their home countries from extremist forms of Islam. This demand was one of the core findings of Panel 1.

If moving closer to the EU is regarded as an option that promises success in combating security risks, then it must be understood that the EU has democracy as its functional principle. This means that any power the state has over its citizens can only be exercised on the basis of laws legitimised through democratic, direct or indirect majority decisions. The point of Islam becoming a problem as states move closer to the EU is therefore not a question of tolerance vis-à-vis other religions; it is clearly impossible for a democracy to accept that religions can define norms which would enfeeble citizens – simply because the religions' leadership is not legitimated through elections. This discussion must lead to the conclusion that political Islam is not compatible with a western-style, democratic system, as it conflicts with the democratic principle of the separation of church and state. It is, however, exactly this democratic compatibility which is one of the prerequisites for an integration of states in the EU.

To begin with, the panel discussion on cyber security tried to counter the assumption that

cyber terrorism is the weapon of small, radical groups, with which they – similar to David and Goliath – can attack and blackmail larger states without said state being able to protect itself effectively. This would only be true if the potential target states did not invest in protective measures. There are, in fact, technical possibilities available to larger states and regional cooperations which, given the necessary financial commitments, offer protection against attacks, make it possible, following an attack, to restore IT infrastructure speedily, so that any damage is kept to a minimum, and to localise the attackers and to identify them to such a degree that counterattacks are made possible. What must be regarded critically, however, are developments which, by 2020, would make it possible for large states to 'switch off' states expected to carry out cyber attacks. The electronic paralysis of a state representing a cyber threat is not the biggest problem – the concurrent electronic elimination of the attacker's neighbouring states is. Such an event could be considered if the attack is started from neighbouring territories, in order to deflect suspicion or to circumvent the paralysis of the logistic infrastructure of the attacking state by organising supplies from surrounding states. This could mean that especially smaller states, which have nothing to do with the cyber attack, get pushed into the role of a buffer due to their proximity to the potential attackers, and become the focus of cyber countermeasures. The discussion came to the conclusion that cyber terrorism can only contribute effectively to the long-term expansion of radical movements if the community of western states underestimates the threat and invests too little in electronic countermeasures.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The question discussed in Panel 3 - to what extent fragile states delay the EU integration of states of the Western Balkans and represent a source for radicalisation movements - brought the hypothesis insinuated in the conference subject full circle. By separating religion and the national decision-making process while, at the same time, recognising all religious denominations, protecting believers from extremist developments in their own religion, and by achieving a democratic quality which is the prerequisite for EU integration, tendencies towards disintegration can be rolled back and radical movements robbed of their breeding grounds. A realistic threat perception and sufficient investments in cyber counterstrategies would contribute to the timetable for EU integration of states of the Western Balkans not being disturbed by radicalisation movements, which use the cyber medium to move their opposition to the international level.

The conference and the thought-out, far-reaching approaches which were in evidence in the discussions of all three Panels, depended both on the exceptional quality of the lecturers as well as on the participants' ability to take criticism and on their visionary far-sightedness. This way the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (which organised the event) and Professor Wulf Lapins, the inspirational spirit of the conference, again lived up to their reputation of being able to find forward-looking diplomatic and strategic approaches which can make the Balkans, and with them all of Europe, safer. Strategic thinkers in EU bodies would certainly have been interested in the results of the conference.

Madame de Stael is said to have stated that "There are but two powers in the world, the

sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind." It was the latter which carried the conference and this can be seen as a hopeful sign for the future development of the region and of Europe as a

**Valbona Zeneli**

(Ph.D) is a professor of security studies and deputy director of the Central and Southeast European Program at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. As deputy, she helps oversee work in eight resident courses and up to 200 outreach and alumni activities per year affecting 700 resident participants and 2,000 others in the region, affecting defense and security professionals in both regional and transnational programs. Her current research and teaching interests include international economics, transatlantic relations,

institutional development in the transition economies, corruption, and Southeast European security issues. Before joining Marshall Center in 2011, Dr. Zeneli served as a professor of international economics at the European University of Tirana from 2009-2011 and associate professor at the New York University of Tirana from 2005-2010. Dr. Zeneli has previously served as chief of protocol and later economic adviser to the Albanian prime minister from 2003-2005. Prior to that, she worked as adviser to the minister of economy of Albania from 2002-2003. Dr. Zeneli has published numerous papers and book chapter in most well-respected journal and is a frequent contributor to Southeast European newspapers and other international leading magazines. She shares her expertise around the world lecturing in many countries and institutions. She is fluent in English, Albanian and Italian and has good knowledge of German. Valbona Zeneli's presentation focuses on economic challenges for state stability in the Western Balkans.

**Prof. Dejan Guzina**

is associate professor in the Political Science Department at Wilfrid Laurier University. An expert in comparative democratization and ethnic politics, his work has been published in several international journals. His current research is on state and nation building in the Western Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia). His research intersects comparative democratization, ethnic conflict management, and external state and nation building in post-conflict states. It is mainly concerned with the evaluation of

political institutions in divided political systems. He is particularly interested in power-sharing institutions, federalism, and citizenship and minority rights in the context of the Western Balkans.

**Arben Qirezi**

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international interveners. As Mesquita and Downs argue, international interveners, rarely, if ever, are even interested to help the growth of democracy within their client countries. Indeed, the external interveners view these places as clients, rather than as places where democratic development is sought. Both cases of BiH and Kosovo confirm this proposition.

**Mladen Nakić (Ph.D)**

is a director at Center for International Studies, Director, Croatia. He graduated at the University of Zagreb for International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences. He has a Ph.D in International Relations and National Security studies. He has served also as a diplomat in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Croatia and took part in study visits through European Security Issues of U.S. State Department. He also completed specialization at the European Center for Security Studies „George C. Marshall“ in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He is an author of numerous publications in international relations and foreign policy, also

author of the book “USA and global surrounding”. He has presented in many scientific events, conferences locally and internationally especially on the topic of security challenges for the SEE, Euro integration policies. Mr Nakić is also a lecturer at the Military-Diplomatic Academy of Croatia and at several faculties on foreign policy. He was decorated by US President with the Merit of Legion.

**Odeta Barbullushi**

received her PhD from the University of Birmingham, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, in 2010. Her research interests include nationalism and state formation in Southeast Europe, the role of the EU and other external actors in the Western Balkans, critical security studies and post-structuralism in International Relations. She is currently involved as both practitioner and scholar in the transition of social sciences in the Western Balkans, with particular emphasis on new methodologies. She is currently full time Lecturer of International relations and Vice-Rector for Research and Methodology at the European University of Tirana, and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Roehampton, London.



At the focus of his work are international relations and policy analysis and development. **Krenar Shala** is a research assistant at the KIPRED (Institute). Krenar has a various experience with his work in civil society and business sector. He was part of GAP a research think-tank (2009-2012). Separately from Civil society work, he has also worked as a researcher at MDA, local consultancy company. He has complete Bachelor studies in American University (2005-2009). He is completing his master studies for International Relations. He has completed several academic programs offered by American University in Kosovo, Prishtina School for Political Studies, etc.



Marko Prelec

is Crisis Group's Senior Analyst in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He graduated with a degree in history from Harvard College, and received a Ph.D. in modern Yugoslav history at Yale University in 1997. In 1998 and 1999 he taught history at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. From 1999 to 2005, he was a Research Officer in the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, where he worked on cases throughout the former Yugoslavia. In 2005, he established the Research and Analysis Section of the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and served as its leader, supervising research into crimes committed against each of the communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is fluent in English and Serbo-Croatian, and conversational in French.



BrigGen MMag. Wolfgang Peischel

finished Military Academy in Vienna in 1985 and continued his education at National Defense Academy in the same city. At the same time he started his Political Science studies at University of Vienna, which he finished in 1997 with a Master's Degree. Peischel served in the Department of Military Strategy in the Austrian Ministry of Defense from 1994 to 1999 and was Director of Force Planning in the General Staff of the Austrian Armed Forces for seven years until 2008. Since 2009 Wolfgang Peischel is Editor in Chief of Austrian Military Journal (Österreichische Militärische Zeitung). Besides he lectures at the Univeristy of Applied Sciences in Wiener Neustadt about theory and doctrine of the concept of leadership. Peischel is also the author of several articles about the topics of security, leadership and military.

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