

Harambee

Pooling Together

or

Pulling Apart?



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Foreword

The spirit of Harambee has affected most Kenyans in one way or another. Its name may be invoked to raise some money to assist a family to cope financially with the arrival of a newborn baby. Or to raise funds in order to facilitate the honourable burial of a loved one. Or to raise funds to enable a relative attend school locally or abroad. Likewise, funds have been raised to pay for hefty hospital bills or to buy medicine in the face of serious illness. Harambee is all pervading.

At a national level, Harambee was envisioned as a key strategy to pool resources in a bid to promote development. In this regard, it was seen as a way of strengthening a financial and material basis on which the rights to especially education, health and social security would be vindicated. It was also a rallying platform through which poverty, illiteracy and disease would be fought.

The reason is simple: Harambee is about unity and the strength that can be drawn therefrom. It enables people to come together and pool resources in order to create a firm foundation for progress. It also re-asserts the strength of a people bound by a common goal for one country to take on some responsibility for their own development.

Yet after close to four decades of independence, the only progress that Kenya seems to have made is backwards. There are few sectors that can boast of having escaped the scars of the deteriorating state of the economy. In perilous times like this and in the face of such calamitous and palpable national failure, it is extremely useful to call in the jury as a way of taking stock and interrogating the whole situation.

What has gone wrong and why? It is answers to a broad question such as this that provoked this study. It is important to delve into the question of whether a political and economic methodology such as Harambee has been more of a problem than a solution to Kenya's political, social and economic woes and catastrophes. This report does that in large measure.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) hopes that the reader will constantly ask questions such as:

- where do the large monies contributed in Harambees come from?
- where does the money go after a Harambee?
- what is the co-relation between the realistic earnings of the big Harambee contributors and their expenditures in Harambees?
- in cases where the mathematics does not add up, where do they get the additional money to continue making such contributions.
- are these funds audited?
- are they taxed?
- where are they banked, if at all and in whose name?
- who benefits from the interest accrued?
- what is a legitimate reason for "calling" a Harambee?
- at what times/period is there an increase in Harambee activity

It is clear that Harambee as a tool for development has been grossly abused. For example, why should a poor person on the streets contribute to a public servant's farewell party when they cannot afford a meal for their children? Why should the same person contribute towards a chief's car? And why should they be targeted for victimisation e.g. by way of withdrawing a business license? How far can this Harambee spirit really go?

Defining a problem is the first part of solving it. FES hopes that this report will crystallize a problem that Kenya will have to deal with if it is ever going to escape from its economic and governance doldrums.

Dr. Roland Schwartz
Resident Director
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Nairobi, 2001

Acknowledgement

This study was conducted by a TI-Kenya research team comprising of Anne Waiguru, David Ndii, Gideon Mutiso and John Githongo. Anne Waiguru and David Ndii were the principal researchers. Gideon Mutiso and John Githongo advised the study. Anne Waiguru conducted the fieldwork and primary data analysis, with the assistance of Jansen Kilama and David Muthiani. This report was written by David Ndii and Anne Waiguru. TI-Kenya gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the facilitation of the research by the staff of *The Daily Nation*, *The East African Standard* and *The People* libraries, and the time and candour of all the respondents who provided information. Special thanks go to Prof. Frank Holmquist of Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts, for his invaluable assistance to the researchers.

Preface

Harambee is an uniquely Kenyan institution. The word Harambee is emblazoned on the country's coat of arms; leaders end most major public addresses with its call; and, across the land countless harambees are convened every day for all manner of projects both public and private. Of the billions of Shillings Kenyans spend on education every year, for example, an important proportion is raised via Harambees. As the following report will illustrate the character of public Harambees has gradually changed over the last two decades. Its importance as a political as opposed to a development tool has risen. The implications of this have not been analysed. However, this and other findings of the study throw up some important questions that the following report does not pretend to begin answering. Some of these include:

1. Where does all the money that goes into Harambee donations come from? Does the process of mobilizing these resources undermine important governance institutions and value systems besides putting sometimes unfair pressure on our political class?
2. Has the originally altruistic rationale behind the public Harambee been subsumed by the cynicism that attends to political mobilization in Kenya? Does this in turn undermine the confidence of wananchi in the public Harambee in particular as a 'public good'? What are the long term implications of this? It is often the case, for example, that in many parts of the country big political Harambees are an occasion for ordinary wananchi to watch senior figures literally compete with each other to see who can donate the most. As a result we increasingly see Harambees where sometimes up to 90 percent of the donations come from the chief guest and his or her associates. If this is a widespread trend does it imply that whatever role Harambee may have played in promoting collective action on the part of wananchi where public development efforts in their communities are concerned has declined? If it has this would be unfortunate.

Introduction

3. Considering the apparent linkages this pilot study throws up vis-à-vis Harambee and elections perhaps it begins to beg the question of – who pays for democracy? Democracy is both messy and expensive. The resources needed for political mobilization in a politically plural environment have to come from somewhere. The need to find the resources to donate at Harambees puts an extraordinary strain on our political class and might force some into activities that they might not have originally thought of engaging in, all in the never ending effort to find the money to prove their political worth at Harambees. As a result of this, the issue of Harambee blends into matters that pertain to political financing which is a complex and sometimes controversial issue even in some of the more mature democracies of the world – the recent scandal involving Germany's former Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, being a case in point.

Transparency International-Kenya believes that Harambee is an important and unique Kenyan institution that has played an important part in defining us as a nation. We have a duty to study, protect and improve it.

John Githongo
Executive Director
Transparency International-Kenya
Nairobi, 2001

It is now generally acknowledged, and even accepted, that corruption in Kenya is a "culture", a phenomena that pervades virtually all aspects of economic, social and political life. Combating corruption therefore requires critical appraisal of the entire milieu of institutions and cultural norms, with a view to fundamentally reforming those that predispose the nation to corruption. Transparency International-Kenya presents this study of our unique national institution called *Harambee*.

"With a coalition of peasants and rural petty bourgeoisie initiating projects, and with President Kenyatta providing political legitimacy, self help took off by the mid-1960s. As time passed, the very character of self-help changed although in very subtle and complex ways. The result has been a shift in the nature of everyday peasant-state relations that has, on balance, favoured the peasantry, although recent negative trends to be discussed below threaten progress..."¹

In the past harambee was one of Kenya's most potent tools for development. Its positive effects were particularly apparent in the rural areas. Over the years, harambee (fund raising for community projects), however, has evolved from its original self-help concept into what can be described as a culture of 'political philanthropy'. Indeed, an elected leader's effectiveness is in many places measured almost exclusively by the number of Harambees he or she conducts for his constituents, and the amount of money he or she contributes. In many ways, development projects have become incidental to harambee, and political contests the real purpose, where the political prominence of the guests at a harambee and the list of those who send them with contributions being the barometer of the "host's" political influence.

This culture, it is argued, predisposes people, particularly politicians, to corruption in two ways. First, that it provides an avenue for people

¹ Frank Holmquist, *Self-Help: The State and Peasant Leverage in Kenya*.

who steal public funds to legitimize themselves to the public. Second, there is no accountability for contributions, and few, if any, benefactors make the effort to see that their contributions were used for the intended purpose. As a result, there is no mechanism for exposing and sanctioning custodians who embezzle the funds and fraudsters who raise money for fictitious Harambees.

This report summarizes the results of a pilot study on harambee conducted by TI-Kenya. TI-Kenya is an autonomous national chapter of the global anti-corruption movement Transparency International (TI). TI-Kenya's mission is to build public awareness, informed by rigorous research, and, following from this, to enjoin all economic and social sectors in a collective national effort of building transparent, accountable institutions.

Study objectives and methodology

The primary objective of the pilot study was to compile definitive data on Harambee activity, and particularly, how it has evolved over time. This was done by compiling data from newspaper archives on reported Harambee activity from 1980-1999. As a secondary objective, the study conducted a preliminary follow up of Harambee projects in three districts (Nakuru, Maragwa and Kajiado).

A preliminary survey established that over 90% of Harambee activity is concentrated in the months of March-September, so data was collected only for these months only due to limitation of time and resources. The data was collected on the following key variables.

- i. Name and type of project (e.g. school, health centre, water etc.)
- ii. District and constituency
- iii. Host personalities (e.g. local MP, councillor, school chairman etc.)
- iv. All individual contributions reported
- v. Total amount raised

The analysis in this report is based on a sample of 1,987 Harambees reported by the two main national dailies (*The Daily Nation* and *The East African Standard*) over the period.

Scope and limitations of the study

Harambee initiatives can be categorized into two broad groups: private and public. Private Harambees typically raise funds for weddings, funerals, college fees, medical bills and so on from family and friends. Public Harambees raise funds for development projects such as schools, health centres, water projects and so on. This study focuses on public Harambees.

Data on Harambee gathered from press reports has certain inherent biases. A Harambee has a higher likelihood of press coverage the more prominent the personalities involved, therefore, the data will have a "VIP" bias. Another limitation of the data is double counting of funds collected in "mini" Harambees which are subsequently donated in "major" Harambees. Newspaper reports do not always provide sufficient information to allow for the necessary corrections in the data. Other inaccuracies include dishonoured pledges and bouncing cheques, and cases of prominent individuals who circulate the same money in several Harambees are not unknown. However, in so far as the reporting is reasonably consistent over time, the data provides a reasonably accurate reflection of broad trends and patterns.

Summary of main findings

The principal finding of our study is that public Harambees in the multi-party era have become a KANU-dominated election campaign-related phenomena. The number of Harambees reported doubled from 97 in 1991, to 203 in 1992, the year of the first multi-party elections. The total amount raised increased seven-fold, from Ksh. 21 million to Ksh. 142 million. Only 73 Harambees are reported in the following year, while the amount raised declined to Ksh. 60 million. Harambee activity picked up again in the run up to the 1997 general elections, from 87 in 1995 to 162 and 205 in 1996 and 1997 respectively. The amount raised increased from Ksh. 227 million

in 1996 to a record Ksh. 1.35 billion in 1997. The amount raised in 1997 constitutes half the decade's reported contributions.

Politicians are the principal donors in public Harambees. Moreover, patronage has become more concentrated. In the 1990s, the 100 principal donors accounted for 16% of the reported contributions, up from just under 5% in the previous decade. In the single party era (1980-91), politicians accounted for 70% of the money contributed by the principal donors. Between 1992 and 1997, KANU politicians accounted for 68% of the money contributed by the principal donors, and opposition politicians 4%.

The president is the principal Harambee patron, and his donations have grown over time. In the 1980s, he is reported as having contributed Ksh. 24.5 million in 187 Harambees, in person and through emissaries, which accounted for just under one percent of total contributions, and 30% of contributions by the principal 100 donors. In the 1990s, he is reported as having contributed over Ksh. 130 million to 448 Harambees, constituting just under 5% of the decade's total contributions, and 30% of the contributions by principal donors.

The project follow-ups revealed a critical lack of transparency and accountability. Many of the beneficiaries could not be traced. They were ad hoc self-help groups formed during the elections which disbanded after sharing the money. The District Social Development Offices which register self-help groups are registered by District Social Development Officers (DSDOs). The DSDOs are supposed to authorize their expenditures. In the three districts visited, the DSDOs did not have any records on the finances of self-help groups. All the beneficiaries visited did not have readily available projects accounts. Although Harambee money consists of donations from the public, the beneficiaries did not expect members of the public to ask for accounts, in other words, they did not expect to be accountable to anyone.

In 1997 in Maragwa district, for example, Ksh. 3.7 million was raised for women groups in Maragwa and Kigumo divisions. Most groups reported that they simply shared the money among the individual member and disbanded. The DSDOs office has no record of this, or any other

Harambee conducted in their area of jurisdiction. The follow up in Kajiado (Ngong and Kajiado town) also sought out self help groups that have benefited from Harambees in the recent past, but the Government officers declined to give information on specific groups, on the grounds that they had been "exploited" by researchers in the past. In Nakuru, a church project was visited. The church had raised Ksh. 1 million to complete its building, finance electrical fittings and buy pews. The pastor in charge indicated that the money had been used for the intended purpose. However, not only were there were no accounts for the project, the pastor was surprised that the church might be expected to make accounts available to its benefactors.

Some possible reform proposals

Harambee is an important Kenyan institution, and an integral part of the nation's history, development efforts, and associational life. Given its roots in the rise of African nationalism, Harambee has always been political. Since independence, the nature of Harambee politics has undergone a gradual transformation from a "bottom-up" to a "top-down" process.

One of the defining features of this transformation is the gradual erosion of ownership and accountability. Following the adoption of multiparty politics, it can be argued that to an extent Harambee has become a vehicle for literally bribing voters. If the current trend continues, this will become the primary function of public Harambees, that is, the community development objectives could disappear altogether.

Public Harambees must be made transparent and accountable. The fact that so much money is raised and spent in the name of development, and no accountability is expected, raises the question as to whether it is realistic to expect Kenyans to value accountability of public funds. Paradoxically, the lack of accountability in public Harambees seems to co-exist with scrupulous accountability in private Harambees, (e.g. weddings and funeral committees)

Bribing voters is not only a subversion of democracy, but it provides powerful motive for corruption, and undermines public ethics. The use of Harambee to bribe voters is evidently a very critical issue that should be addressed well before the next general elections. We suggest the following proposals for consideration:

- i. Suspension of Harambees during elections.
- ii. Barring contenders for elective office from contributing to Harambees during the elections
- iii. Defining election spending ceilings to include candidates' Harambee contributions for a specified period (6, 9, or 12 months) before elections.

Background

Harambee is a unique Kenyan institution, rooted in the African tradition of mutual social responsibility. The name Harambee is a colloquialism of Indian origin which translates to pooling effort². In traditional communities, people pooled effort in activities which required intensive labour such as hut building, clearing virgin land and bringing in the harvest.

Harambee is an integral element of Kenyan nationalism. One of the first major national "Harambee" efforts, in the 1920s, raised funds to send Jomo Kenyatta to England to petition the British Government for the return of African lands. Following independence, Harambee was integrated into the development strategy, as a form of cost-sharing between Government and project beneficiaries. Initially, the beneficiaries contributed communal labour to Government initiated projects, for example, laying water pipes, and providing labour for rural access roads. The concept evolved quickly as communities began initiating projects - schools, health centres, water projects etc. - which they would finance by public fund-raising on the expectation that the Government would provide the recurrent expenditures.

Communities, as well as local elites, lost the initiative to the provincial administration, who would coerce contributions from the public towards presidential Harambees.

Scholars who have studied the Harambee movement over the years have observed its progressive evolution from a community resource

² The word "Harambee" specifically, however, entered the Kenyan lexicon via members of the Indian community during the colonial period. The origin of the word is actually two words in an Indian language 'Hare' and 'Ambe'. The word 'Hare' said to mean 'Praise', while 'Ambe' on the other hand is the name of one of the Hindu gods associated with wealth and good health. The Hindus are said to have believed that praise offered to this deity during work helped guarantee prosperity. During the construction of the great Uganda Railway the words would be shouted by supervisors during times of collective strenuous effort.

mobilization into a theatre of political contest.³ Shortly after independence there emerged of a rift in Kenyatta's government, which culminated in the departure of a faction led by the country's first vice-president Oginga Odinga, to form the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) 1966. The government saw Harambee as providing a political platform for the rebels. In response, it instituted a licensing regime, administered by the provincial administration, which was used to deny the rebels the political legitimacy that patronizing Harambee projects afforded.⁴

By the early seventies, the Government was becoming alarmed by the proliferation of Harambee projects. Projects were also becoming bigger. The original Harambee initiatives were grassroot projects such as dispensaries, primary schools and village polytechnics. By the early 1970s, local elites were initiating tertiary institutions such as hospitals and post-secondary training institutes. This evolution posed two problems. First, the Government was expected to provide the recurrent costs of projects whose establishment it had no control. Secondly, development patronage had become a very effective tool of political mobilization, which meant that any local notable could challenge establishment politicians. In response, the Government introduced further regulation, which required Harambee projects to be registered with the Ministry of Social Services in order to be eligible for Government assistance.

The evolution of Harambee from the 1980s onwards has not been studied as extensively. However, its politicization has been much more pronounced than before. The 1980s saw the emergence and rise of presidential patronage. Communities, as well as local elites, lost the initiative to the provincial administration, who would coerce contributions from the public towards presidential Harambees. By the turn of the decade, Harambee had become effectively "nationalized".

³ Studies reviewed include: Mbithi and Rasmusson - Self Reliance in Kenya; F. Holmquist - Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, edited by J.D. Barkan; G.C.M. Mutiso & E.M. Godfrey - The Political Economy of Self Help; Gachuki D. - Harambee in Kenya, Ngethe 1979 - op cit, Thomas, 1977, J.D. Barkan & F. Holmquist - World Politics, Peasant State Relations & the Social Base of Self-Help in Kenya (1989); F. Holmquist - Self Help: The State and Peasant Leverage in Kenya (1984).


⁴ Mutiso and Godfrey (1973)

Analysis of Harambee activity 1980-1999

Number of Harambees

The level of Harambee activity increased sharply in the late 1980s. The survey captured 187 Harambees in 1980-1984, an average of 35 per year. There was a sharp increase thereafter, from 28 Harambees in 1986 to 123 in 1987, translating to an average of over 130 Harambees per year.

Chart 1: Number of reported Harambees (1980 - 99)



The Rift Valley Province leads with 663 Harambees (33%), followed by Central Province with 364 (18%), while North Eastern with 27, recorded the lowest level of Harambee activity (1.4%). However, the low number of Harambee activity in North Eastern may reflect a significant under reporting bias on account of inadequate press presence in the province.


Table 1: Total funds raised in reported harambees 1980-99

Year	Actual amount		Inflation adjusted (1999 prices)	
	Ksh.	% change	Ksh.	% change
1980	30 724 807	..	353 657 569	..
1981	36 756 803	20%	375 744 929	6%
1982	9 837 452	-73%	82 428 652	-78%
1983	34 659 953	252%	253 640 178	208%
1984	99 082 977	186%	664 606 183	162%
1985	10 891 019	-89%	65 991 229	-90%
1986	21 853 184	101%	125 391 621	90%
1987	109 114 233	399%	584 582 389	366%
1988	39 079 108	-64%	189 130 400	-68%
1989	669 781 543	1614%	2 930 857 817	1450%
1990	223 905 511	-67%	870 137 663	-70%
1991	26 041 108	-88%	84 615 800	-90%
1992	141 782 681	444%	361 898 501	328%
1993	60 336 280	-57%	105 484 653	-71%
1994	88 560 492	47%	120 208 423	14%
1995	106 408 944	20%	142 300 679	18%
1996	227 824 138	114%	279 513 042	96%
1997	1 347 081 815	491%	1 486 248 838	432%
1998	86 947 538	-94%	89 990 702	-94%
1999	454 647 588	423%	454 647 588	405%
1980-99	3 825 317 173	188%	9 621 076 856	159%
1980-89	1 061 781 078	261%	5 626 030 966	227%
1990-99	2 763 536 095	123%	3 995 045 889	97%

Types of projects

Education projects, including schools, other training institutions and bursary funds account for 58 % of all Harambees, that is, 3 out of every five Harambees. The next largest beneficiary is individuals with 12% share. A significant proportion of individual beneficiaries is for education, which means that the overall education share is substantially over 60%. Next is income generating self-help groups, and religious (mostly church) based welfare projects with 11% percent each. However, self help groups are evidently a creature of the 1997 general elections: 60% of the reported self help group Harambees were conducted in 1996 and 1997. Interestingly, water and health projects, which were very important in the 60s and 70s, come in at a distant fifth and sixth, accounting for 3% and 2% of the number of Harambees respectively.

Chart 2: Composition of harambee projects (1980 - 99)



Funds raised

The Harambees surveyed collected a total of Ksh. 3.8 billion. When inflation is taken into account, this is equivalent to Ksh. 10 billion at current prices, or about US\$ 135 million. The volume of money raised grew by an average of 188% per year in nominal terms, and 158% in real (inflation adjusted) terms. Four years, 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1997 account

for about half of the growth rate. Excluding these years, the average annual growth rate reduces to a less phenomenal but still remarkable 102% in nominal terms and 74% in real terms. The year 1989 registered the highest increase in the amount of money raised, from Ksh. 40 million in 1987 to Ksh. 670 million. When inflation is taken into account, this amount is the highest raised in a single year. It accounts for well over half the total amount raised in the 1980s, and close to a third of the period total.

Chart 3: Total funds raised in reported Harambees (1980 - 99)






Chart 4: Total funds raised in reported Harambees inflation adjusted to 1999 prices.



In terms of distribution, Nairobi accounts for the largest share of funds raised with 35%, followed by Rift Valley and Central Province with 22.5% and 20.5% respectively. In effect, the three provinces account for just under 80 % of the total funds raised. Western (6.5%), Eastern (5.4%) and Nyanza (4.8%) are within the same range, while North Eastern accounts for a negligible 1.7%. However, Nairobi's large share reflects two earlier years, 1990 and 1997. In both years, Nairobi accounts for 64% of the funds raised. In these are excluded, Nairobi falls to third place behind Rift Valley and Central with a share of 14.7%. The provincial shares have changed significantly over time. Central Province's share falls from 40% in the eighties to 13% in the nineties and Rift Valley's from 30% to 20%. Nairobi's share increased from 18% to 42%, but as noted above, this is on account of unusually large shares in 1990 and 1997. If these are excluded, Nairobi's share also falls from 18% to 12%.

Chart 5: Number of Harambees by Province (1980 - 99)



Provincial shares of harambee funds raised, 1980 - 99




Table 2: Provincial breakdown of funds raised in reported harambees 1980-99, Ksh. Million

Year	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	1980-99
Central	99.0	321.4	62.7	301.4	784.5
Coast	6.1	13.9	65.8	48.0	133.8
Eastern	17.8	29.3	22.2	137.2	206.6
Nairobi	34.3	155.4	172.1	984.5	1346.3
North Eastern	0.5	3.4	0.4	59.4	63.7
Nyanza	14.5	39.6	44.3	85.1	183.5
Rift Valley	33.7	277.5	129.0	419.1	859.2
Western	5.2	10.2	44.1	188.1	247.6
Total	211.1	850.7	540.6	2222.9	3825.3

Size of Harambees

The amount of money raised in one Harambee fluctuates widely from year to year, ranging between Ksh. 270 000 in 1991 and Ksh. 6 million in 1997, with an average of Ksh. 1.4 million. Harambees held in Nairobi raised the most money, over Ksh. 5.8 million per Harambee, followed by Central Province with Ksh. 1.7 million, and North Eastern in third place with Ksh. 1.4 million. Rift Valley, Nyanza and Eastern averaged Ksh. 1 million, and Coast and Western about Ksh. 800,000 per Harambee.

When collections are adjusted for inflation, it becomes evident that the amount raised per Harambee has been declining steadily. In real terms, the national average per Harambee in the 1990s was only 35% of the average raised in the eighties. The average collections have declined in all provinces except Nairobi, where it increased, and North Eastern, where it remained the same. However, when the unusually large figures for Nairobi in 1987 are excluded, it also registers a decline, although a significantly smaller one than the other provinces.

Chart 7: Change in provincial distribution of harambee funds




Chart 8: Funds raised per harambee (1980 - 99)





Chart 9: Funds raised per harambee 1980 - 99, inflation adjusted



Harambee Participation

Politicians are the leading donors in public Harambees. The president is the principal Harambee patron, and his patronage has grown over time. In the 1980s, he is reported as having contributed Ksh. 24.5 million in 187 Harambees, in person and through emissaries, which accounted for

just under one percent of total contributions, and 30% of contributions by the principal 100 donors. In the 1990s, he is reported as having contributed over Ksh. 130 million to 448 Harambees, constituting just under 5% of the decade's total contributions, and 30% of the contributions by principal donors. The top ten individuals, in terms of contributions are President Moi, Vice President Saitoti, Joseph Kamotho, Simeon Nyachae, Nicholas Biwott, Musalia Mudavadi, Kuria Kanyingi, Hosea Kiplagat and Mwai Kibaki, in that order. In terms of number of Harambees, Moi, Saitoti, Kamotho, Mark Too, Biwott, Kibaki, Mudavadi, Nyachae, Njenga Karume and Kuria Kanyingi.

The president is the principal Harambee patron, and his patronage has grown over time. In the 1980s, he is reported as having contributed Ksh. 24.5 million in 187 Harambees.

Table 3: Principal donors' share of harambee contributions 1980-99

	% of total contributions		% of top 100 contributors	
	1980-89	1990-99	1980-89	1990-99
President	0.3%	4.7%	6.3%	32.2%
Top 10 donors	1.1%	7.6%	24.6%	51.7%
Top 20 donors	1.4%	8.8%	30.9%	60.1%
Top 50 donors	2.3%	11.5%	51.7%	78.4%
Top 100 donors	4.5%	14.7%	100%	100%
Total	100%	100%		

Concentration of participation

Harambee participation has become more concentrated, that is, fewer and fewer individuals account for a larger and larger share of money raised. In the 1990s, the 100 principal donors accounted for 16% of the reported contributions, up from just under 5% in the previous decade. In the single party era (1980-91), politicians accounted for 70% of the money contributed by the principal donors. Between 1992 and 1997, KANU politicians accounted for 68% of the money contributed by the principal donors, and opposition politicians 4%.

Harambee has become an election driven activity. In the 1980s, the elections years (1983 and 1988) accounted for only 7% of the decades total fund raising. In the multiparty 90s, the two election years (1992 and 1997) account for 60% of the decade's total. The year 1992 accounts for 26% of the funds raised in the first half of the decade (1990-94), and 1997 for 60% of the funds raised in the second half (1995-99). In the first half of the nineties, 19 of the 100 principal donors in the survey gave more than 25% of their total contributions in the 1992, on average, three and half times more than non-election years. In the second half, this number doubled to 38, and the contributions were on average, 5 times more than non-election years.

In the first half of the nineties, 19 of the 100 principal donors in the survey gave more than 25% of their total contributions in the 1992, on average, three and half times more than non-election years.

Table 4: Principal contributors to harambees 1980-99

1990-1999				
Pos.	Person	Total contributions	No. of harambees	Av. contribution
1.	President Moi	130 594 285	448	291 505
2.	Prof. George Saitoti	19 605 158	134	146 307
3.	Joseph Kamotho	17 403 098	116	150 027
4.	Simeon Nyachae	11 449 206	49	233 657
5.	Nicholas Biwott	9 478 054	67	141 463
6.	Mark Too	7 549 400	74	102 019
7.	Musalisa Mudavadi	7 353 100	58	126 778
8.	Luka Chepketony	7 200 000	2	3 600 000
9.	Hosea Kiplagat	6 358 640	34	187 019
10.	Kuria Kanyingi	5 619 900	30	187 330

1980-1989				
1.	President Moi	24 587 246	187	131 483
2.	Oloo Aringo	6 539 947	6	1 089 991
3.	Arthur Magugu	5 952 547	35	170 073
4.	Mwai Kibaki	3 218 726	69	46 648
5.	Moody Awori	3 092 123	8	386 515
6.	Bishop Stephen Kewasis	3 000 055	1	3 000 055
7.	Prof. George Saitoti	2 408 261	55	43 787
8.	Eliakim Masale	2 285 734	2	1 142 867
9.	Kuria Kanyingi	2 093 060	25	83 722
10.	Mark Sogoro	2 066 046	1	2 066 046

1980-1999				
1.	President Moi	155 181 531	635	244 380
2.	Prof. George Saitoti	22 013 419	189	116 473
3.	Joseph Kamotho	19 001 535	158	120 263
4.	Simeon Nyachae	12 489 935	62	201 451
5.	Nicholas Biwott	10 917 761	116	94 119
6.	Mark Too	9 266 373	119	77 869
7.	Musalisa Mudavadi	7 775 394	67	116 051
8.	Kuria Kanyingi	7 712 960	55	140 236
9.	Hosea Kiplagat	7 398 733	48	154 140
10.	Mwai Kibaki	7 360 454	113	65 137

Table 5: Contributors giving 25% or more of 5-year total and % given in 1992 and 1997

1992			
Pos.	Name	Ksh.	Share
1	Cyrus Jirongo	4 290 000	99%
2	President Moi	4 179 000	26%
3	Ndegwa Ndirangu	4 000 000	100%
4	Simeon Nyachae	1 264 006	27%
5	Elijah Mwangale	936 000	72%
6	Mwai Kibaki	828 803	42%
7	Matu Wamae	800 000	100%
8	Clement Gachanja	319 254	48%
9	Sharif Nassir	300 000	30%
10	Darius Mbela	228 470	42%
11	Francis Nyenze	124 000	100%
12	Dalmas Otieno	103 000	57%
13	Njenga Karume	73 120	25%
14	Johnstone Makau	61 000	37%
15	Mulu Mutisya	34 000	28%
16	Jonathan Ng'eno	30 000	46%
17	Moody Awori	12 000	92%
18	Nderitu Githua	10 000	100%
19	Agnes Ndeti	2 000	69%
1992 Average		879 832	60%

1997

Pos.	Name	Ksh.	Share
1	President Moi	66 444 555	58%
2	Joseph Kamotho	6 267 087	48%
3	Prof. George Saitoti	4 075 000	30%
4	A.T Kamincha	3 039 806	100%
5	Alex Leteipan	2 807 551	100%
6	Simeon Nyachae	2 695 000	40%
7	Brig. Wilson Boinet	2 600 000	100%
8	Nicholas Biwott	2 527 500	41%
9	Mark Too	2 032 000	36%
10	Musalia Mudavadi	1 854 000	31%
11	Wakarimas Family	1 400 000	100%
12	Mwai Kibaki	1 302 250	60%
13	Jonathan Ng'eno	1 219 000	67%
14	Hussein Maalim	1 214 000	74%
15	Hosea Kiplagat	1 212 000	27%
16	Mureithi Muruthi	1 111 426	100%
17	Reuben Rotich	1 046 000	60%
18	Francis Nyenze	1 038 899	92%
19	Johnston Muthama	1 000 000	96%
20	Henry Kosgei	662 000	48%
21	Clement Gachanja	597 370	60%
22	Moody Awori	519 000	34%
23	Kalonzo Musyoka	510 000	43%
24	Johnstone Makau	500 000	47%
25	Darius Mbela	349 000	64%
26	Mulu Mutisya	335 000	40%
27	Nduati Kariuki	325 000	52%
28	Nicholas Mberia	300 000	51%
29	Kipkalia Kones	292 000	32%
30	Kipruto Kirwa	260 100	47%

31	Joash wa Mangoli	195 000	58%
32	Katana Ngala	175 730	33%
33	Joshua Angatia	91 800	77%
34	Elijah Mwangale	40 000	80%
35	Nderitu Githua	37 000	100%
36	Philip Masinde	30 000	100%
37	Agnes Ndeti	15 000	48%
38	Joseph Leting	5 000	100%
1997 Average		2 898 028	63%
Average (excl. 1997)		602 450	

Findings from project follow-ups

The purpose of the project follow-ups was to find out how transparent and accountable Harambee projects are. Information was sought from the beneficiaries, and from the District Social Development Office (DSDOs) which is the Government office responsible for community development projects. Three districts, Nakuru, Maragwa and Kajiado were visited.

All community project groups are supposed to register with the DSDOs. The basic requirement is that the group should have at least 25 members. There are typically three types of groups namely, project groups (e.g. a water project, cattle dip, school etc), women groups and youth groups. In general, women and youth groups are formed with the objective of engaging in one or more income generating activity, such as poultry keeping, posho mills, or other trading activity.

Once registered, the DSDO is supposed to ensure that the group opens a bank account with three signatories typically, the chairperson, treasurer and secretary. Withdrawal of the funds requires the DSDOs approval. The approval should be given on the basis of minutes of a meeting in which at least half the project's registered members are present.

Each division has a Social Development Assistant who is supposed to monitor community projects, and ensure that community projects prepare and submit quarterly reports to the DSDO.

Project monitoring

Community groups do register with DSDOs. There are no financial records in any form, and groups do not submit quarterly reports as required. The only readily available information is a list of registered groups.

The DSDOs do very little fieldwork if any, for instance, monitoring Harambees and project implementation. The reason cited is lack of funds. At the time of the research (December 2000), the Social Development Assistants in two of the districts had not been paid for six months.

DSDOs arbitrate disputes in community projects. Over half of the disputes they deal with relate to embezzlement of funds.

Project visits

In Maragwa district, the DSDOs office had a record of 316 self help groups, comprising of 151 women and 60 youth groups. Most of these groups were formed in anticipation of benefiting from the president's Harambee initiative for women and youth in 1997. Only 10 of the 60 registered youth groups are still active.

In 1997, Ksh. 3.7 was raised for women groups in Maragwa and Kigumo divisions. To participate in the Harambee, each group had to contribute Ksh. 3,000. After the Harambee, each group was given Ksh. 8,000, that is, a net gain of Ksh. 5,000 of each group. Most groups reported that they simply shared the money among the individual member and disbanded. The DSDOs office has no record of this, or any other Harambee conducted in their area of jurisdiction.

The follow up in Kajiado (Ngong and Kajiado town) also sought out self help groups that have benefited from Harambees in the recent past, but the Government officers declined to give information on specific groups, on the grounds that they had been "exploited" by researchers in the past.

In Nakuru, a church project was visited. The church had raised Ksh. 1 million to complete its building, finance electrical fittings and buy pews. The pastor in charge indicated that the money had been used for the intended purpose. However, not only were there were no accounts for the project, the pastor was surprised that the church might be expected to make accounts available to its benefactors.

Conclusion

Harambee is an important Kenyan institution, and an integral part of the nation's history, development efforts, and associational life. Given its roots in the rise of African nationalism, Harambee has always been political. Since independence, the nature of Harambee politics has undergone a gradual transformation from a "bottom-up" to a "top-down" process.

One of the defining features of this transformation is the gradual erosion of ownership and accountability. Following the adoption of multiparty politics, Harambee, it can be argued, has become a vehicle for bribing voters. If the current trend continues, this will become the primary function of public Harambees, that is, the community development objectives could disappear altogether.

Public Harambees must be made transparent and accountable. The fact that so much money is raised and spent in the name of development, and no accountability is expected, raises the question as to whether it is realistic to expect Kenyans to value accountability of public funds. Paradoxically, the lack of accountability in public Harambees seems to co-exist with scrupulous accountability in private Harambees, (e.g. wedding and funeral committees)

Bribing voters is not only a subversion of democracy, but it provides powerful motive for corruption, and undermines public ethics. The use of Harambee to bribe voters is evidently a very critical issue that should be addressed well before the next general elections. We suggest the following proposals for consideration,

- Suspension of Harambees during elections.
- Barring contenders for elective office from contributing to Harambees during the elections
- Defining election spending ceilings to include candidates' Harambee contributions for a specified period (6, 9, or 12 months) before elections.

A key question that this research does not pretend to answer but which arises out of the data is: where does all the money that goes into Harambee donations come from? Does the process of mobilizing these resources undermine important governance institutions and value systems besides putting sometimes unfair pressure on our political class?

Appendices

Table I: Number of reported Harambees by province and year, 1980-99

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Central	5	15	2	12	21	7	9	35	26
Coast		1	2	3	3	1	1	6	8
Eastern	2	2	1	6	9	4	2	9	4
Nairobi	7	5	2	10	7	4	3	15	9
N. Eastern					2	1		1	1
Nyanza	1	2		5	5	3	4	14	3
Rift Valley	7	12	3	17	10	14	9	34	21
Western		2		4	2	2		9	8
Total	22	39	10	57	59	36	28	123	80

1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
49	14	17	30	5	12	12	24	38	6	25	364
11	6	4	16	5	4	3	17	8	10	7	116
23	6	10	13	5	11	9	12	31	17	21	197
14	8	22	14	3	11	6	17	15	8	21	201
2			1			2	2	5	3	7	27
17	5	4	32	8	15	6	16	27	5	25	197
75	48	33	63	34	41	33	59	79	27	44	663
14	16	7	34	14	6	16	15	20	13	40	222
205	103	97	203	74	100	87	162	223	89	190	

Table II: Total contributions in reported by Harambees by province and year 1980-99, KShs.

Year	Central	Coast	Eastern	Nairobi
1980	5 850 633		3 875 225	5 219 865
1981	17 383 290	100 000	331 817	8 935 440
1982	767 905	1 539 801	5 736 060	1 461 704
1983	13 481 220	387 000	2 448 799	3 225 211
1984	61 550 742	4 037 654	5 442 293	15 442 457
1985	4 542 016	110 965	1 226 732	1 946 597
1986	4 409 061	207 084	1 424 872	2 369 583
1987	57 527 382	2 167 470	3 704 078	5 620 326
1988	17 783 315	3 013 909	1 083 250	1 208 125
1989	237 121 700	8 420 932	21 893 481	144 279 540
1990	21 687 894	7 319 098	1 549 146	144 737 880
1991	3 217 274	2 410 132	1 429 900	6 890 875
1992	16 077 656	50 844 968	6 502 520	12 125 141
1993	7 225 234	2 338 734	2 162 910	2 326 633
1994	14 454 987	2 933 566	10 548 912	6 050 603
1995	29 589 592	2 818 000	8 582 216	4 981 694
1996	41 607 866	18 338 383	5 738 990	41 143 523
1997	113 226 522	10 513 622	81 307 740	870 673 735
1998	10 524 314	11 004 695	12 877 503	12 209 373
1999	106 482 199	5 342 830	28 728 575	55 467 101
Total	784 510 803	133 848 843	206 595 017	1 346 315 404

North Eastern	Nyanza	Rift Valley	Western	Total
	415 816	15 363 268		30 724 807
	6 018 015	2 917 844	1 070 397	36 756 803
		331 982		9 837 452
	2 146 708	9 293 396	3 677 617	34 659 953
483 995	5 924 546	5 764 182	437 109	99 082 977
96 000	287 572	2 435 441	245 694	10 891 019
	9 213 412	4 229 172		21 853 184
707 268	2 293 945	34 430 345	2 663 420	109 114 233
302 122	247 640	14 205 502	1 235 246	39 079 108
2 275 974	27 565 662	222 152 563	6 071 691	669 781 543
	7 208 499	27 382 242	14 020 753	223 905 511
	147 288	9 856 168	2 089 472	26 041 108
440 000	11 937 325	28 304 202	15 550 870	141 782 681
	7 847 139	31 653 309	6 782 323	60 336 280
	17 143 575	31 783 930	5 644 919	88 560 492
4 312 800	7 336 610	39 651 210	9 136 821	106 408 944
4 300 000	12 708 350	63 764 876	40 222 150	227 824 138
7 641 526	32 356 557	205 963 906	25 398 207	1 347 081 815
2 112 640	5 391 000	24 935 878	7 892 135	86 947 538
41 041 373	27 344 455	84 819 581	105 421 475	454 647 588
63 713 698	183 534 112	859 238 996	247 560 299	3 825 317 173

Table IIIa: Principal donors, amounts contributed and number of Harambees donated to, 1980-99

Pos	Name	Amount, Kshs.	No. of Harambees	Average, Kshs.
1	President Moi	155 181 531	635	244 380
2	Prof. George Saitoti	22 013 419	189	116 473
3	Joseph Kamotho	19 001 535	158	120 263
4	Simeon Nyachae	12 489 935	62	201 451
5	Nicholas Biwott	10 917 761	116	94 119
6	Mark Too	9 266 373	119	77 869
7	Musalia Mudavadi	7 775 394	67	116 051
8	Kuria Kanyingi	7 712 960	55	140 236
9	Hosea Kiplagat	7 398 733	48	154 140
10	Mwai Kibaki	7 360 454	113	65 137
11	Luka Chepketony	7 200 000	2	3 600 000
12	Oloo Aringo	6 957 747	11	632 522
13	Arthur Magugu	6 392 547	46	138 968
14	Cyrus Jirongo	5 408 075	26	208 003
15	Maina Wanjigi	4 651 118	15	310 075
16	Moody Awori	4 635 123	22	210 687
17	Ndegwa Ndirangu	4 000 000	1	4 000 000
18	Peter Kavisi	3 640 035	5	728 007
19	Sharif Nassir	3 604 296	43	83 821
20	Prof Odidi Okidi	3 323 126	1	3 323 126
21	Amos Wako	3 083 800	26	118 608
22	A.T.Kamincha	3 039 806	1	3 039 806
23	Stephen Kewasis	3 000 055	1	3 000 055
24	Alex Leteipan	2 807 551	1	2 807 551

25	Njenga Karume	2 666 703	58	45 978
26	Stanley Githunguri	2 649 000	11	240 818
27	Aggrey Shitsama	2 606 229	2	1 303 115
28	Brig. Wilson Boinet	2 600 000	1	2 600 000
29	Raila Odinga	2 508 000	19	132 000
30	Henry Kosgei	2 369 491	51	46 461
31	Kalonzo Musyoka	2 342 470	32	73 202
32	Moses Keino	2 292 440	11	208 404
33	Eliakim Masale	2 285 734	2	1 142 867
34	Burudi Mabwera	2 251 134	27	83 375
35	Paul Titi	2 125 340	12	177 112
36	Nderitu Githua	2 092 500	5	418 500
37	Mark Sogoro	2 066 046	1	2 066 046
38	Edward Karuga	2 010 000	2	1 005 000
39	Elijah Mwangale	1 995 316	43	46 403
40	Katana Ngala	1 964 440	19	103 392
41	Kipkalia Kones	1 905 784	23	82 860
42	Francis Wainaina	1 900 000	1	1 900 000
43	Jonathan Ng'eno	1 897 000	19	99 842
44	Kipruto Kirwa	1 868 707	33	56 627
45	Reuben Rotich	1 829 496	13	140 730
46	William Ntinana	1 768 216	24	73 676
47	Clement Gachanja	1 727 014	19	90 895
48	Kip'ngeno Ng'eny	1 703 900	14	121 707
49	Onesmus Mburu	1 646 407	1	1 646 407
50	Hussein Maalim	1 646 000	9	182 889

Table IIIb: Principal donors, amounts contributed and number of Harambees donated to, 1990-99

Pos	Name	Amount, Kshs.	No. of Harambees	Average, Kshs.
1	President Moi	130 594 285	448	291 505
2	Prof. George Saitoti	19 605 158	134	146 307
3	Joseph Kamotho	17 403 098	116	150 027
4	Simeon Nyachae	11 449 206	49	233 657
5	Nicholas Biwott	9 478 054	67	141 463
6	Mark Too	7 549 400	74	102 019
7	Musalia Mudavadi	7 353 100	58	126 778
8	Luka Chepketony	7 200 000	2	3 600 000
9	Hosea Kiplagat	6 358 640	34	187 019
10	Kuria Kanyingi	5 619 900	30	187 330
11	Cyrus Jirongo	5 285 000	24	220 208
12	Maina Wanjigi	4 543 300	9	504 811
13	Mwai Kibaki	4 141 728	44	94 130
14	Ndegwa Ndirangu	4 000 000	1	4 000 000
15	Peter Kavisi	3 638 035	4	909 509
16	Prof Odidi Okidi	3 323 126	1	3 323 126
17	A.T.Kamincha	3 039 806	1	3 039 806
18	Sharif Nassir	2 963 296	33	89 797
19	Alex Leteipan	2 807 551	1	2 807 551
20	Brig. Wilson Boinet	2 600 000	1	2 600 000
21	Stanley Githunguri	2 548 000	9	283 111
22	Raila Odinga	2 498 000	18	138 778
23	Amos Wako	2 303 800	21	109 705
24	Moses Keino	2 269 700	9	252 189

25	Burudi Nabwera	2 189 134	24	91 214
26	Kalonzo Musyoka	2 136 720	22	97 124
27	Paul Titi	2 125 340	12	177 112
28	Henry Kosgei	2 092 500	39	53 654
29	Edward Karuga	2 000 000	1	2 000 000
30	Francis Wainaina	1 900 000	1	1 900 000
31	Jonathan Ng'eno	1 897 000	19	99 842
32	Katana Ngala	1 868 010	12	155 668
33	Reuben Rotich	1 828 200	11	166 200
34	Njenga Karume	1 778 110	25	71 124
35	Kipngeno Ng'eny	1 703 900	14	121 707
36	Clement Gachanja	1 657 053	12	138 088
37	Hussein Maalim	1 634 000	7	233 429
38	William Ntimama	1 592 716	16	99 545
39	Kipkalia Kones	1 578 935	12	131 578
40	Moody Awori	1 543 000	14	110 214
41	Wakarimas Family	1 400 000	1	1 400 000
42	Crispus Mutitu	1 370 000	5	274 000
43	Abdul Kanji	1 360 995	1	1 360 995
44	Samuel Limo	1 360 000	3	453 333
45	Elijah Mwangale	1 346 000	26	51 769
46	Joseph Kaguthi	1 284 000	8	160 500
47	Wilson Gachanja	1 250 000	2	625 000
48	Francis Nyenze	1 247 899	6	207 983
49	Joshua Angatia	1 241 100	11	112 827
50	Matu Wamae	1 231 720	9	136 858

Table IIIc: Principal donors, amounts contributed and number of Harambees donated to, 1980-89

Pos	Name	Amount, Kshs.	No. of Harambees	Average, Kshs.
1	President Moi	24 587 246	187	131 483
2	Oloo Aringo	6 539 947	6	1 089 991
3	Arthur Magugu	5 952 547	35	170 073
4	Mwai Kibaki	3 218 726	69	46 648
5	Moody Awori	3 092 123	8	386 515
6	Prof. George Saitoti	2 408 261	55	43 787
7	Eliakim Masale	2 285 734	2	1 142 867
8	Kuria Kanyingi	2 093 060	25	83 722
9	Nderitu Githua	2 045 500	3	681 833
10	Mark Too	1 716 973	45	38 155
11	Agnes Ndeti	1 604 538	3	534 846
12	Joseph Kamotho	1 598 437	42	38 058
13	Nicholas Biwott	1 439 707	49	29 382
14	Joseph Leting	1 131 234	9	125 693
15	Kipruto Kirwa	1 094 307	6	182 385
16	Simeon Nyachae	1 040 729	13	80 056
17	Hosea Kiplagat	1 040 093	14	74 292
18	Josephat Karanja	951 259	16	59 454
19	Njenga Karume	888 593	33	26 927
20	Kabibi Kinyanjui	847 000	3	282 333
21	Joash Wa Mangoli	799 612	3	266 537
22	Amos Wako	780 000	5	156 000
23	Njenga Mungai	756 271	9	84 030
24	Atebe Marita	714 500	5	142 900

25	Charles Njonjo	709 580	19	37 346
26	Dalmas Otieno	675 201	4	168 800
27	Nduati Kairuki	656 894	3	218 965
28	Elijah Mwangale	649 316	17	38 195
29	Sharif Nasir	641 000	10	64 100
30	Fred Waiganjo	621 657	5	124 331
31	George Mwicigi	613 030	4	153 258
32	Paul Ngei	580 528	5	116 106
33	Kenneth Matiba	525 123	19	27 638
34	Kariuki Chotara	519 480	3	173 160
35	Kyale Mwendwa	480 000	3	160 000
36	Philomen Chetlagat	463 683	2	231 842
37	Gen.M.Mohamed	442 201	5	88 440
38	Kennedy Kiliku	436 963	3	145 654
39	Milton Njoroge	424 667	3	141 556
40	Musalia Mudavadi	422 294	9	46 922
41	Victor Mugosa	410 045	5	82 009
42	Mathias Keah	392 281	7	56 040
43	Moses Wetangula	386 000	5	77 200
44	John Koech	371 376	7	53 054
45	Philip Masinde	360 396	6	60 066
46	Kipkalia Kones	326 849	11	29 714
47	George Muhoho	306 940	17	18 055
48	Nicholas Mberia	294 800	5	58 960
49	Henry Kosgei	276 991	12	23 083
50	Said Hemed	270 000	6	45 000