


# The Politics of History – History in Politics

Sources relating to the History Textbook Controversy  
and other debates over history  
and memory in Japan and East Asia

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Tokyo Office

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## **The Politics of History – History in Politics**

### **Sources relating to the History Textbook Controversy and other debates over history in Japan and East Asia**

#### **Introduction (Sven Saaler)**

While the 1990s saw successful efforts at reconciliation between East Asian countries, since 2000 the legacies of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-45) and of Japanese colonial rule in Korea (1910-45) and elsewhere have been the cause of increasing tensions in the region. Despite the fact that successive Japanese governments and a number individual politicians have made sincere efforts to apologize for Japan's war record, war crimes and colonial rule, the past decade has witnessed the rise of a strongly nationalistic view of history in that country which aims at expunging modern Japanese history of its darker stains.

Discussions over the legacy of war and colonial rule intensified with the debate over Japanese history textbooks that erupted in 1982. Accused by China and Korea of giving a nationalist gloss to its treatment of wartime history, the Japanese government revised the textbook examination criteria, a move which put the onus on publishers to produce history texts that would contribute to the process of reconciliation with Japan's neighbors. In the 1990s, apologies for Japan's wartime actions were made by various cabinets and individual politicians.

Much has been written in the mass media and academic publications alike about Japan's struggle "to come to terms with its past." The documents presented here are a selection of the most important milestones in this dynamic and complex process. While coverage in the mass media often gives the impression that Japan is permanently at odds with its past, incapable of "apologizing" and of "overcoming" its wartime history, the documents presented here show that successive Japanese administrations have actively sought to deal with the "history problem," although not always in a consistent manner. While some official responses have been applauded in Korea and China, others have undermined the process of reconciliation and generated further tensions by diminishing the value of previous apologies or by including provocative remarks.

The first section presents a selection of the official documents regulating Japan's history textbook examination process. Although the 1982 "neighboring nations clause" was a milestone in the process of reconciliation in East Asia, as other sources presented in this section show, this provision has been undermined in recent years by a group of politicians who advocate that more "affirmative" views of Japan's modern history should be taught in schools.

The second and third sections include statements by individual politicians, prime ministers and Japanese cabinets on history-related issues. While some are marked by a strong conciliatory tone, others are highly provocative and illustrate why Korea and China have often struggled to accept Japan's apologies for its war record as sincere statements. The most significant Japanese apology for its role in the Asia-Pacific War, the so-called Murayama declaration (1995), has been undermined over the years by comments from a number of powerful politicians.

These obstacles notwithstanding, section 4 presents several bilateral agreements between Japan and its neighbors that show that efforts to achieve reconciliation have not been without effect. They show that China and Korea have accepted a number of apologies issued by Japanese governments and, until the late 1990s, actively engaged in bilateral dialogue aimed at overcoming the bitter legacies of the past. The ending of this successful phase of reconciliation in East Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in a number of international organizations and third-party states putting pressure on Japan, chiefly by passing declarations highly critical of Japan's approach to dealing with its wartime past and the crimes it committed during the war.

As we approach the 70th anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War and World War II in August 2015, it is hoped that this collection of documents will help the reader to better understand the complex processes of reconciliation in East Asia and the tensions that continue to play out in this economically and strategically important region.

## Further readings

Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai (History Educationalist Conference), ed.: *Sukkiri Wakaru Rekishi Ninshiki no Sōten Q&A* (Q&A – The Controversial Points of the History Consciousness Debate Made Easy). Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten, 2014.

Sven Saaler: “Bad War or Good War? History and Politics in Post-war Japan.” in J. Kingston (ed.), *Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan*. New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 137-148.

Sven Saaler: “Could Hosokawa Morihiro’s political comeback restore sanity to Japanese Politics?” *Asia Pacific Journal*, 27 January 2014, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Sven-Saaler/4067>.

## 1. Textbook Examination Standards

*1) Compulsory Education Textbook Examination Standards (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Directive No. 33, March 4, 2009)*

Social Studies (excluding maps)

Selection and treatment, organization and arrangement

- (1) There must not be any definitive statements or presentation of one-sided views concerning events whose interpretation is not agreed upon. Definitive statements should not be made about uncertain topical events and one-sided views should not be included without sufficient consideration.
- (2) When addressing historical events in the modern period relating to [Japan's] Asian neighbours, sufficient consideration should be given to the question of international understanding and international cooperation.
- (3) When books, sources, etc. are being quoted, credible material whose interpretation is not in question must be used, and it must be implemented impartially. When quoting from historical sources and legal documents, the original texts should be respected.
- (4) Regarding the chronology of Japanese history, in the case of significant dates the Japanese regnal year system (gengō) and the Western calendar should both be used..

\* (2) is known as the “neighboring countries clause.” In principle it also applies to high schools. It was introduced as a result of the 1982 history textbook controversy and the following statement by government spokesman Kiichi Miyazawa, the so-called Miyazawa statement.

2) *Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa on History Textbooks, 1982*

August 26, 1982

1. The Japanese Government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact that acts by our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the peoples of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China, and have followed the path of a pacifist state with remorse and determination that such acts must never be repeated. Japan has recognized, in the Japan-ROK Joint Communiqué of 1965, that the "past relations are regrettable, and Japan feels deep remorse," and in the Japan-China Joint Communiqué, that Japan is "keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself." These statements confirm Japan's remorse and determination which I stated above and this recognition has not changed at all to this day.

2. This spirit in the Japan-ROK Joint Communiqué and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué naturally should also be respected in Japan's school education and textbook authorization. Recently, however, the Republic of Korea, China, and others have been criticizing some descriptions in Japanese textbooks. From the perspective of building friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these criticisms and make corrections at the Government's responsibility.

3. To this end, in relation to future authorization of textbooks, the Government will revise the Guideline for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook Authorization and Research Council and give due consideration to the effect mentioned above. Regarding textbooks that have already been authorized, Government will take steps quickly to the same effect. As measures until then, the Minister of Education, Sports, Science and Culture will express his views and make sure that the idea mentioned in 2. Above is duly reflected in the places of education.

4. Japan intends to continue to make efforts to promote mutual understanding and develop friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries and to contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and, in turn, of the world.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)  
(<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/state8208.html>)

3) *Reform of Textbook Examination Screening Guidelines (Kyôka-yô tosho kentei shinsa yôkô), 2001*

\* The Textbook Examination Screening Guidelines (determined by the Textbook Authorization Research Council on January 15, 2001) outline the methods for determining whether textbooks submitted for examination are approved or rejected. In addition to the method based on the number of places in the textbook where “screening opinions” have been stated, the Guidelines provide that textbooks should be rejected if they are considered to have serious defects in their basic composition.

\* This means that, in the screening process of identifying the passages and contents that are inappropriate for a textbook in light of the examination standards, if the faults in the statements of the textbook submitted extend to its basic composition and are deemed serious, such as the failure to include matters indicated in the designated Course of Study or to meet the aim of the course work, the textbook will be rejected even if the number of “screening opinions” does not exceed the number designated for rejection.

\* As previously mentioned, it is stated in the Textbook Examination Standards that screening should be conducted according to the objectives of the reforms to the Basic Act on Education and the School Education Act, as well as the revisions to the Course of Study. Regarding the question of whether there is any serious defect in the judgment of approval or rejection, it is appropriate that, from the viewpoint of demonstrating that this judgment is made within this legal framework, the Textbook Examination Screening Guidelines be reformed and it be stipulated that judgments will be made in light of the stated objectives of the Basic Act on Education, School Education Act, and Course of Study.

*4) Improvements to Textbook Examination (Conclusions of the Textbook Authorization Research Council, December 20, 2013)*

Amendments to Textbook Examination Standards, etc.

(1) Amendments to Textbook Examination Standards

\* To ensure that textbooks enable the teaching of a balanced view, the Textbook Reform Implementation Plan (Kyôkasho kaikaku jikkô puran) indicates that the examination standards for social studies textbooks should be revised so that the following contents are incorporated in them:

(1) When a statement is made regarding a matter on which there is no commonly accepted view, or excessive emphasis is placed on a specific view, a more balanced statement should be made in its place.

(2) In cases where there exists a common view of the government or an established precedent, statements should also be made on the basis of these.

\* Based on this, regarding the particular conditions of examination criteria in the field of social studies, the following reforms have been proposed and are considered appropriate:

(1) When a statement is made about an uncertain topical event, it should be clearly determined that no excessive emphasis is placed on a specific matter.

(2) Regarding modern and contemporary historical events, when a statement is made regarding a matter on which there is no commonly accepted view, such as a numerical figure, it should be clearly indicated that there is no commonly accepted view and it should be expressed in a way that does not cause misunderstanding by pupils or students.

(3) In cases where there exists a common view of the government through a Cabinet decision or other means, or where there exists a Supreme Court precedent, statements should be made on the basis of these.

Regarding (1), as indicated above, regulations concerning “uncertain topical event” have been stipulated in conditions particular to examination standards in the field of social studies. Regarding judgment of whether or not an event is “uncertain,” as in the past this will be determined based on the specialist and academic views received concerning the event in question at the time of screening the textbook submitted for examination.

Regarding (2), although it may be difficult to determine what should be considered a commonly accepted view in terms of its theoretical basis, this clearly should not be done from the standpoint of a specific interpretation of history or the establishment of particular historical facts. In cases where there is no theory that is widely accepted as a “commonly accepted view” in the light of objective theory at the time of screening the textbook submitted for examination, it will be judged from the viewpoint of whether the statement in the textbook concerned may be misunderstood by pupils or students.

Regarding (3), bearing in mind the system’s purpose of encouraging the publication of a wide range of textbooks that make full use of the originality and ingenuity of private-sector authorship and editing, the aim of this is not to reject all statements based on views that differ from those of the government or from Supreme Court rulings, but rather to encourage statements that contribute to study by pupils or students from many different points of view. With regard to the unified view of the government, it is appropriate that this be judged from viewpoints such as whether it is the result of procedures such as a Cabinet decision or has become established to a certain degree.

*5) Amendments in accordance with the Directive for Partial Amendment of the Compulsory Education Textbook Examination Standards and High School Textbook Examination Standards (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Directive No. 2, January 17, 2014)*

(1) Abridged

(2) Definitive statements should not be made about uncertain topical events, specific matters should not be unduly emphasized, and one-sided views should not be included without sufficient consideration.

(Addition of underlined section)

(3) Regarding modern and contemporary historical events, when a statement is made on a matter concerning which there is no commonly accepted view, such as a numerical figure, it should be clearly indicated that there is no commonly accepted view and should not be expressed in a way that might cause misunderstanding by pupils or students.

(Addition)

(4) In cases where there exists a common view of the government by a Cabinet decision or other means, or where there exists a Supreme Court precedent, statements should be made on the basis of these.

(Addition)

\* These amendments will be applied to examination of textbooks to be used from the fiscal year 2016 onwards. In principle the same contents also apply to high schools.

## **2. Statements regarding Japan's wartime past made by individual politicians**

### *1) Statement of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka (Plenary session of the House of Representatives, March 28, 1974)*

“We have just heard a statement about the Imperial Rescript on Education [of 1890]. As you are aware, the Rescript constituted the basic ideals of national education in Japan for about half a century. Amid the reforms implemented after the war, it was officially abolished by a decision of the House of Representatives on June 19, 1948 and was accordingly made invalid by decision of the House of Councillors. Thus, we are not considering its revival. However, it remains a fact that parts of the Imperial Rescript on Education express universal moral principles. As such, it has qualities that transcend its form and are still valid today. Regarding these qualities, I believe we should study public opinion to determine whether they might gain the sympathy of citizens.”

2) *Statement of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa* (Overall interpellation, House of Representatives Budget Committee, February 16, 1993)

“It is an undeniable fact that in the past Japan caused great damage to neighboring countries through war, the most recent example of which is World War II. We must recognize this as a fact and have heartfelt feelings of remorse and apology towards those who experienced such unbearable suffering.”

Q: Do you think that this 15-year war, including the Pacific War, was a war of aggression?

“Successive prime ministers, including myself last year, have replied to that question, and it is a fact that Japan caused great damage to neighboring countries through war. I think that it cannot be denied that there was a fact of aggression.”

Q: But you would not go so far as to say that it was a war of aggression?

“No, I would not put it like that.”

3) *Statements of Justice Minister Shigeto Nagano (Hata Cabinet), 1994*

a) *Interview by Mainichi Shimbun, May 4, 1994*

“I think it is incorrect to define that war as a war of aggression. The aggressive acts, various damage, cruel behavior and other trouble made in war are absolutely wrong, and war itself is an absolute evil. However, was what is known in Japan as the Greater East Asian War fought with the aim of aggression? On the verge of destruction, Japan rose up in order to survive. We were thinking seriously about liberating colonies and establishing the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere. The various foreign powers that created that situation were the problem. The aim of the war itself was basically permissible and correct at that time.”

“I think the Nanjing Incident is a fabrication. I went to Nanjing immediately afterwards. That kind of thing is an evil that accompanies any war, and it is correct to say that it is absolutely wrong. I suppose you could call that an act of aggression, but Japan was not trying to make that Japanese territory and did not occupy it.”

Source: *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 5, 1994

b) *Summary of statement in interview by Kyôdô News Service, May 5, 1994*

“I do not question the aim of the war itself. However, I think the historical sense of the leading countries in imposing their will on their neighbors was mistaken. Regarding the comfort women, although there may be differences in degree, the US and British armed forces did similar things. The comfort women were licensed prostitutes, so this cannot be described by today’s standards as contempt for women or discrimination toward Koreans. “

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, May 7, 1994

4) *Statement of Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe  
(Speech at Federation of Tochigi Prefecture LDP Branches Convention, June 3,  
1995)*

“Japan governed Korea for 36 years, but this was in no sense ‘colonial rule.’ Since the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty was concluded through mutual consent, Japan paid no reparations and instead provided financial assistance for Korea’s recovery. The government’s position is that the annexation of Korea was in accordance with international law. This has been called a ‘colonial policy,’ but that is not the legal position taken by the National Diet. The Annexation Treaty was concluded as an international treaty that was created in peace and harmony. The Netherlands ruled Indonesia for 350 years. Japan never made China a colony. Even though people talk of ‘colonial policy,’ Korea was not a colony of Japan after the annexation and the treaty was concluded peacefully and not by force.”

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 1995

5) *Statements of Education Minister Yoshinobu Shimamura (Murayama Cabinet), 1995*

a) *Inaugural press conference, August 9, 1995*

“Whether or not it was a war of aggression is a matter of perspective.”

b) *Press conference, August 10, 1995*

Q: Do you recognize that it was a “war of aggression”?

“I think it is inevitable that it has been described as such. My intention was to express a positive opinion. It is easy to describe it with those words, but there are more important things than formulations of words.”

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, August 10, 1995, evening edition

6) *Statements of Management and Coordination Agency Director-General Takami Etô (Murayama Cabinet), October 11, 1995*

“Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s statement that the Japan-Korea Annexation was forced is mistaken.”

“If you say that the annexation was invalid (in the colonial period), then international agreements were not valid either. Since it was a period when nations were taken over by others if they were weak, it was unavoidable.”

“Japan set up schools in every municipality, established Keijo Imperial University in Seoul, immediately raised educational standards in Korea where none had existed before, constructed 5,000 kilometers of railroads, developed ports, reclaimed and irrigated land, and planted trees in the mountains.”

“(Forcing the Koreans to change their names to Japanese ones) was not good, but it can hardly be said that it was forced on all citizens. Some lieutenant generals in the army retained their Korean names.”

“The fact that Koreans have been able to become active in Japanese business, entertainment, and all other fields may have been due to the Japan-Korea annexation.”

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, November 8, 1995

7) *Statement of Prime Minister Yoshirô Mori (House of Representatives Budget Committee, April 24, 2000)*

“I think there are various perspectives behind any war depending on the background of the times. Whether or not Japan conducted a war of aggression is something that everyone ought to judge in the process of history. I believe that war between any countries is wrong. In that long history, as I also stated in reply to a question this morning, there were various conflicts in the first fifty years of the past century. However, I believe that overcoming this and creating a new era of peace was another long-term trend in the process of history. You may say that this is not a concrete response, but I believe that war in general, let alone war through aggression, must not happen.”

8) *Statement of LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Tarô Asô (Speech at the University of Tokyo May Festival, May 31, 2003)*

(Concerning the changing of names of Koreans to Japanese names)

“In those days, when Koreans tried to obtain Japanese passports and wrote Kim or An in the name section, they were immediately identified as Koreans. This made it hard for them to get work, so they asked for a Japanese name. That was the beginning of this trend.”

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, June 2, 2003

9) *Statements of Tokyo Governor Shintarô Ishihara about Yasukuni Shrine*

a) *to the press corps after worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine, August 15, 2004*

“Ishihara, who is also Governor of Tokyo, has worshipped at the shrine. That (distinction between public and private) is meaningless.”

“(Next year, the 60th anniversary of the end of the war,) I very much want the Emperor to worship at the shrine as a citizen. This is a great responsibility to the nation that only the Emperor can perform.”

b) *At a Tokyo Metropolitan Government press conference after worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine, August 15, 2003*

“Though this cannot be said of everyone, for most Japanese people Yasukuni Shrine is one of the symbols of our spiritual culture. This is not something that the Chinese or Koreans or any other foreigners should be lecturing us about. If we did the same thing to them, their response would really be hysterical. It is disrespect and meddling that goes beyond interference in internal affairs.”

“What kind of treatment did the class-A war criminals (enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine) receive? Not even their bones were returned after they were executed. That one-sided trial like a lynching of the defeated by the victors was unprecedented in history.”

*c) Response to question from a representative of the LDP at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, requesting him to worship at Yasukuni Shrine, June 18, 2002)*

“That (the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal) was a very biased trial.”

“Foreign countries have no grounds for rejecting the legitimacy of worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine because the A-class war criminals are enshrined there.”

*10) Statement of Prime Minister Shinzô Abe (House of Councillors Budget Committee, April 23, 2013)*

(Reply to a question on whether the Murayama Statement is vague and meaningless)

“The points about which Committee Member Maruyama asked may indeed be described as vague. In particular, it may be said that a definition of aggression has not been determined either academically or internationally, and this differs in the relationships between countries depending on the side from which you are viewing the issue. From this perspective, I think such problems can be pointed out in the Murayama Statement.”

11) *Statements of Mayor of Osaka Tôru Hashimoto (May 13, 2013)*

a) *Discussion with press corps on the morning of May 13*

“As Prime Minister Abe rightly points out, there is no precise academic definition of aggression. After World War II, the United Nations certainly established a framework for the Security Council to make a definitive judgment on the definition of aggression. However, Japan was one of the defeated countries, a country that waged war and lost. From the viewpoint of the Allied Powers, the victorious nations in that war, this is an undeniable fact, that assessment is undeniable.

Therefore, since Japan lost the war, I think we must accept that this was aggression, even if an academic definition of aggression has not been determined. Japan certainly caused great suffering and damage to neighboring countries, and we must fully accept that fact. We must reflect on it and apologize. As I have continuously stressed in my interviews with the weekly magazine *Shûkan Asahi* and the newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, the country concerned cannot claim that so much time has passed that the issue is over and done with.

The view that time will solve the problem or that a certain period of time is needed for the other parties to come to accept the situation is also true. So it is not for the country concerned to state that, since sixty or seventy years have passed, we can just forget all about it.

A third-party country such as the United States or other Allied Power—though I understand that the United States also suffered damage—may be able to say we have done enough, but as the country concerned, Japan is not in a position to say such a thing even after sixty or seventy years have passed.

However, when claims are made that differ from the facts, we must clearly state that Japan has been unfairly treated with contempt. As the defeated country we have to accept certain things. Because we lost the war, the leaders of Japan at that time have a grave responsibility.

As the losing side, we have to put up with various accusations. That is what losing means. For that reason, a country should never enter a war that it cannot win and in principle war itself is wrong. We cannot simply brush this defeat under the carpet. We picked a fight and must accept the consequences.

Nevertheless, I think we must also state the facts. Regarding the issue of the comfort women, we should speak kindly to those who served as comfort women and treat them with kindness.

If they took up such work against their will, we should give this due consideration. But why is the world focusing only on Japan's comfort women problem even though the armies of other countries also had similar systems at the time? I am not saying it is a good thing, but that is what it was like back then. In considering why only the issue of Japan's comfort women is raised in the West, the Japanese people have to be aware how Japan is viewed in the world, that it is being condemned as a rapist nation—a country that abducted women against their will and forced them to become comfort women.

I am not saying that the comfort women system did not exist, and there is no doubt that it was administered by the military. It is an undeniable fact that such systems existed in the circumstances of the world as they were back then.

Nevertheless, why does the West accuse only Japan? There were such systems during the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and these were after World War II.

In spite of this, why is it that only Japan's comfort women system has been raised as an issue. Japan has been severely accused of using its army to commit rape as a nation.

Regarding this, I feel we must clearly state that this view is mistaken. At the same time, we have to accept that if women did become comfort women against their will this was a result of the tragedy of war, and that Japan also had responsibility for that war. Accordingly we must understand their feelings and show them kind consideration, but when someone says something that is wrong, we also have to point that out.

Regarding war responsibility, there are many things that Japan has to accept as a defeated nation, but when we consider the situation of the world at the time, we find that the United States and European countries also conducted colonial policies. While I am not trying to justify Japan's behavior, the rest of the world was in a similar situation." (...)

"Let us accept what needs to be accepted and say so when something is mistaken. To understand the situation of the world at that time, we have to study modern and contemporary history in greater depth. When people hear about the comfort women, they may well think that it was a terrible thing, but a closer study of that history shows that not only the Japanese military but also various other armies made use of comfort women systems.

Anyone can understand that the comfort women system was necessary to provide respite for high-strung men living their lives under a storm of bullets.

The fact that Japan is viewed as a rapist nation in western society is the result of propaganda coming from South Korea and various other places. Since this is the biggest issue, we have to point out that it is mistaken. If any evidence were produced for these claims, we would have no choice but to recognize the truth of them, but according to a Cabinet resolution in 2007 such evidence does not exist."

*b) Discussion with press corps on the afternoon of May 13*

"Regardless of whether or not it was against their will, a comfort women system was necessary. At the time it must have been necessary to maintain the army and to maintain discipline in the army."

Q: You mean to say that this is not the case now?

"That could surely not be accepted now. But even if there is no comfort women system, I think a business providing sexual services would be necessary. That is why, when I visited the US Marine base in Futenma in Okinawa, I told the commanding officer that

it would be a good idea to make more use of the sex industry there. The commanding officer's face froze and he smiled wryly.

That kind of thing is off-limits in the US armed forces. They say it's prohibited. But it's because they try to keep up appearances that they end up going off the rails. This is, of course, what is acceptable within the framework of the law.

In Japan we have places where this sexual energy can be expended. I think that if they don't make use of such facilities in a more open manner, the sex drives of those tough guys in the Marines could not be properly controlled.

Rather than trying to keep up appearances I asked the commanding officer to make more use of those kind of facilities, but he cut me off, saying 'We've ordered them not to go to such places. We should change the subject.'

But the sex industry exists here, it's accepted, and it's within the law."

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, online edition, May 14, 2013

12) *Statement of Administrative Reform Minister Tomomi Inada (Abe Cabinet), 2013*

(Regular press conference, May 24, 2013)

“Regarding the Kôno Statement and the comfort women issue, this matter is being investigated under the Chief Cabinet Secretary, so I would prefer not to comment. However, the statement I made before that a comfort women system is a serious infringement of women’s human rights is true regardless of whether it is today or during the war. But it is also true, though a sad fact, that comfort women system was legal during the war.”

Q: In that case, do you still believe that a comfort women system was legal?

“When I say it was legal, I think that might be misunderstood as meaning that it is not an infringement of human rights. I think it is a serious infringement of women’s human rights both during the war and today.” (IWJ <http://iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/81090>)

*13) Statement of Prime Minister Shinzô Abe, 2013*

(Party leaders' debate before the announcement of the official campaign period for the House of Councillors election, July 3, 2013)

“History has many aspects and such judgment and definitions lead to political problems and problems in foreign relations. Basically these matters should be left to historians. I do not say that Japan did not impose colonial rule or commit aggression, but that I am not in a position to define such matters.”

“To pray and express respect for those who fought and gave their lives for the nation: I think that is quite natural and that there are no grounds for criticism. Since a statement as to whether I will or will not go to Yasukuni Shrine will lead to problems in foreign relations, I have no intention on commenting on that now.”

Source: NHK webcast, July 3, 7:06 p.m.

*14) Statement of Deputy Prime Minister Tarô Asô (Abe Cabinet), 2013*

(at a symposium in Tokyo, July 29, 2013)

“There has been a lot of discussion about two-thirds (of members of the two Diet chambers, whose support is required to propose a constitutional revision). In Germany, Adolf Hitler came to power after securing a majority in a functioning parliament under democracy. People think he took control using military power. That is completely wrong. Hitler was chosen in an election. The Germans chose him. Do not make that mistake.

Hitler emerged under the Weimar Constitution, the most advanced in Europe at the time. This means that such a thing could happen even under a good Constitution, and we must bear this in mind. We have kept saying that the Constitution should be revised in an appropriate manner. But how the Constitution is put into practice will be determined by the actions, wisdom and dignity of the Diet members you vote for.

As we are aware that we have been placed in a very severe situation, we are trying to campaign using the budget, and judging by the results of the latest questionnaire survey, the response of people in their twenties and thirties has been very positive. The least positive response has come from those in their fifties and sixties. This group contains the most people (opposed to constitutional revision) and is the biggest problem as far as we are concerned. They are a generation with good memories, who might have done well during the years of the economic bubble. People in their twenties and thirties now have no memory of the bubble years. For as long as they can remember, it has been difficult to find employment and Japan has been in a recession.

Judging from my conversations with them, the younger generation are realistic, while we can expect least support from those in their fifties and sixties. My generation remembers the economic depression before and immediately after the war and we often talk about that, but the people of that generation do not.

I ask you once again to think about constitutional revisions calmly to see where there are problems. We (the Liberal Democratic Party) compiled draft revisions after dozens of hours of discussions, arguing and expressing all kinds of opinions.

We had fierce debates then. But we responded very calmly even when there were 30 or 40 people taking part. No one shouted at each other in the LDP panel. When one said: 'Please wait a moment. I think it is wrong,' another said, 'I see.' A senior member said: 'Wait a moment, you may say that but I want to make a point.' A prestigious former Cabinet minister told a thirty something lawmaker who had been elected to the Diet only a couple of times: 'I see, you have shown me a different way of looking at it.' Such exchanges are something we can be proud of in the LDP. That is how I felt after taking part several times.

We strongly hope that the discussions about the Constitution will not be held in an environment where everyone is shouting at the same time.

Regarding Yasukuni Shrine, too, visits should be made calmly. It is strange to make a fuss about it. It is only natural to express a sense of respect and gratitude for those who sacrificed their lives for our nation. Visits should be made calmly and properly.

You do not have to go only on the day of Japan's surrender. There are many other occasions, such as the shrine's annual festivals. Things become complicated when you visit the shrine only on August 15. You could go, for example, on the anniversary of Japan's victory in the war against Russia, although it caused considerable controversy when I said so.

I was taken to Yasukuni Shrine on April 28, 1952, because I was told it was the day Japan regained its independence. That was the first time I remember paying my respects at the shrine. Since then I have made a point of going there once every year. I wonder when it was that people started making such a fuss about it.

People used to be able to go there without any problem. Prime ministers would also go there. But at some point in the past, the mass media began kicking up a fuss. When they did, China had no choice but to complain, and then South Korea complained too. That is why (discussions on constitutional revision) should be conducted calmly. One day, they (the Germans) found that the Weimar Constitution had been changed to the Nazi Constitution. It was changed without anyone realizing it. Why don't we learn from that sort of tactic?

Let us keep calm. Everyone thought it was a good constitution and it was changed with everyone's consent. It is not my intention at all to reject democracy, but let me repeat that we do not want it to be decided amid an uproar."

Source: *Asahi Shimbun*, online edition on August 1, 2013, 2:18 p.m.

### 3. Declarations by the government or the prime minister of Japan

1) *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yôhei Kôno on the result of the study on the issue of “comfort women” (Kôno statement), 1993*

August 4, 1993

The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime “comfort women” since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study.

As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and

remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment.

We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.

As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)  
(<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html>)

2) *“Letter from Prime Minister to the Former Comfort Women”, 1996*

The Year of 1996

Dear Madam,

On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the Government and the people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the former wartime comfort women, I wish to express my personal feelings as well.

The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.

As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our responsibilities for the future.

I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.

Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and other forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women.

Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of you will find peace for the rest of your lives.

Respectfully yours,

Ryûtarô Hashimoto, Prime Minister of Japan

(Subsequent Prime Ministers who signed the letter are: Keizô Obuchi, Yoshirô Mori and Junichirô Koizumi)

Source: Asian Women's Fund website (<http://www.awf.or.jp/e6/statement-12.html>)

3) *Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end” (15 August 1995) (Murayama Declaration)*

The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions.

The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the countries of Europe.

Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the Asia-Pacific region -indeed, in the entire world- it is necessary, more than anything else, that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries.

Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end, we should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future.

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.

Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of those who perished.

It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow.

Source: MOFA (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html>)

4) *Statement by Prime Minister Abe - Pledge for everlasting peace, 2013*

December 26, 2013

Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine and expressed my sincere condolences, paid my respects and prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and made ultimate sacrifices. I also visited Chinreisha, a remembrance memorial to pray for the souls of all the people regardless of nationalities who lost their lives in the war, but not enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine.

While praying for the souls of the war dead, the preciousness of peace Japan enjoys today really came home to me.

The peace and prosperity Japan enjoys today is not created only by those who are living today. The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious sacrifices of numerous people who perished on the field wishing for the happiness of their loving wives and children, and thinking about their fathers and mothers who had raised them.

Today, I have contemplated on this, and paid my deepest respects and gratitudes on my visit.

Japan must never wage a war again. This is my conviction based on the severe remorse for the past. I have renewed my determination before the souls of the war dead to firmly uphold the pledge never to wage a war again.

I have also made a pledge that we must build an age which is free from the sufferings by the devastation of war; Japan must be a country which joins hands with friends in Asia and friends around the world to realize peace of the entire world.

For 68 years after the war, Japan created a free and democratic country, and consistently walked the path of peace. There is no doubt whatsoever that we will continue to pursue this path. Under the spirit of international cooperation, Japan will discharge its responsibilities for the peace, stability and prosperity of the world.

Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become a political and diplomatic issue. Some people criticize the visit to Yasukuni as paying homage to war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today, on the anniversary of my administration's taking office, is to report before the souls of the war dead how my administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan must never wage a war again.

It is not my intension at all to hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people. It is my wish to respect each other's character, protect freedom and democracy, and build friendship with China and Korea with respect, as did all the previous Prime Ministers who visited Yasukuni Shrine.

I would like to ask for the kind understanding of all of you.

Source: MOFA ([http://www.mofa.go.jp/a\\_o/rp/page24e\\_000021.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page24e_000021.html))

#### 4. Bilateral agreements

1) *Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China*, 1972

September 29, 1972

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ôhira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ôhira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communiqué of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighbouring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communiqué is issued.
2. The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.
4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.
5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

Done at Peking, September 29, 1972

Prime Minister of Japan

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

Source: MOFA (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>)

2) *Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century, 1998*

8 October 1998

(Provisional Translation by the Japanese Government)

1. President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea and Mrs. Kim paid an official visit to Japan as State Guests from 7 October 1998 to 10 October 1998. During his stay in Japan, President Kim Dae Jung held a meeting with Prime Minister Keizô Obuchi of Japan. The two leaders conducted an overall review of past relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, reaffirmed the current friendly and cooperative relations, and exchanged views on how the relations between the two countries should be in the future.

As a result of the meeting, the two leaders declared their common determination to raise to a higher dimension the close, friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea which have been built since the normalization of their relations in 1965 so as to build a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership towards the twenty-first century.

2. The two leaders shared the view that in order for Japan and the Republic of Korea to build solid, good-neighborly and friendly relations in the twenty-first century, it was important that both countries squarely face the past and develop relations based on mutual understanding and trust.

Looking back on the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea during this century, Prime Minister Obuchi regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact.

President Kim accepted with sincerity this statement of Prime Minister Obuchi's recognition of history and expressed his appreciation for it. He also expressed his view that the present calls upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.

Further, both leaders shared the view that it was important that the peoples of both countries, the young generation in particular, deepen their understanding of history, and stressed the need to devote much attention and effort to that end.

3. The two leaders shared the recognition that Japan and the Republic of Korea, which have maintained exchanges and cooperation throughout a long history, have developed close, friendly and cooperative relations in various areas since the normalization of their relations in 1965, and that such cooperative relations have contributed to the development of both countries. Prime Minister Obuchi expressed his admiration for the Republic of Korea which, through the untiring efforts of its people, has achieved dramatic development and democratization and has grown into a prosperous and mature democratic state. President Kim highly appreciated the role that Japan has played for the peace and prosperity of the international community through its security policies, foremost its exclusively defense-oriented policy and three non-nuclear principles under the postwar Japanese Peace Constitution, its contributions to the global economy and its economic assistance to developing countries, and other means. Both leaders expressed their determination that Japan and the Republic of Korea further develop their cooperative relationship founded on such universal principles as freedom, democracy and the market economy, based on broad exchanges and mutual understanding between their peoples.

4. The two leaders shared the view that there was a need to enhance the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in a wide range of areas to a balanced cooperative relationship of a higher dimension, including in the political, security and economic areas as well as in personnel and cultural exchanges. They also shared the view that it was extremely important to advance the partnership between the two countries, not only in the bilateral dimension but also for the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the international community as a whole, and in exploring in

various ways to achieve a society in which individual human rights are better respected, and a more comfortable global environment.

In order to bring the relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the twentieth century to a fitting conclusion as well as to build and develop the partnership between the two countries as a common goal based on true mutual understanding and cooperation, the two leaders therefore concurred on the following. They formulated the action plan annexed to this Joint Declaration in order to give concrete form to this partnership.

The two leaders decided that the Ministers for Foreign of Affairs of their countries would serve as the overall supervisors of this Japan-Republic of Korea partnership and that their Governments would review regularly the state of progress in the cooperation based on it and strengthen the cooperation as necessary.

5. Both leaders shared the view that consultations and dialogue between the two countries should be further promoted in order to develop the present Japan-Republic of Korea relationship to a higher dimension.

Based on this view, the two leaders decided to maintain and strengthen the mutual visits and the close consultations between them, to conduct these visits and consultations regularly and to further enhance Minister-level consultations in various areas, in particular those between their Foreign Ministers. They also decided that a gathering of Ministers of the two countries would be held as soon as possible to provide an occasion for a free exchange of views among the concerned Ministers responsible for policy implementation. In addition, the two leaders expressed appreciation for the positive results of exchanges among parliamentarians of Japan and the Republic of Korea, and welcomed the positions of the Japan-Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea-Japan parliamentary friendship leagues to expand their activities, and decided that they would encourage increased exchanges among young parliamentarians who will play a prominent role in the twenty-first century.

6. The two leaders shared the view that it was important for Japan and the Republic of Korea to cooperate on and to participate actively in international efforts to build a more peaceful and safer international order in the post-Cold War world. They

shared the view that the role of the United Nations should be strengthened in order to respond more effectively to the challenges and tasks in the twenty-first century and that this could be achieved through strengthening the functions of the Security Council, increasing the efficiency of the United Nations Secretariat, ensuring a stable financial base, strengthening United Nations peace-keeping operations, cooperation for economic and social development in developing countries and other means.

Bearing these views in mind, President Kim Dae Jung expressed appreciation for Japan's contributions to and the Japanese role in the international community, including the United Nations, and expressed the expectation that these kinds of contributions and role will be increased in the future.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation. In particular, they emphasized that all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation posed a threat to the peace and security of the international community, and decided to further strengthen cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea in this field.

The two leaders welcomed the security dialogue as well as the defense exchanges at various levels between the two countries and decided to further strengthen them. The leaders also shared the view on the importance of both countries to steadfastly maintain their security arrangements with the United States while at the same time further strengthen efforts on multilateral dialogue for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

7. The two leaders shared the view that in order to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, it was extremely important that North Korea pursue reform and openness and take through dialogue a more constructive attitude. Prime Minister Obuchi expressed support for the policies of President Kim Dae Jung regarding North Korea under which the Republic of Korea is actively promoting reconciliation and cooperation while maintaining a solid security system. In this regard, both leaders shared the view that the implementation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North, which entered into force in February 1992, and the smooth progress of the Four-Party Talks are desirable. Furthermore, both leaders confirmed the importance of maintaining the

Agreed Framework signed in October 1994 between the United States of America and North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as the most realistic and effective mechanisms for preventing North Korea from advancing its nuclear program. In this connection, the two leaders shared the concern and regret expressed by the President of the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the Security Council over the recent missile launch by North Korea, as well as the view that, North Korea's missile development, if unchecked, would adversely affect the peace and security of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the entire Northeast Asian region.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of close coordination between the two countries in conducting their policies on North Korea, and shared the view that policy consultations at various levels should be strengthened.

8. The two leaders agreed that in order to maintain and develop the free and open international economic system and revive the Asian economy which is facing structural problems, it is important that Japan and the Republic of Korea further strengthen their mutual cooperative relations in the economic field in a balanced manner while each overcomes its respective economic difficulties. For this end, the two leaders shared the view that they would further strengthen bilateral economic policy consultations as well as to further promote policy coordination between the two countries at such multilateral fora as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

President Kim appreciated the economic assistance to the Republic of Korea from Japan in the past in a wide range of areas including finance, investment and technological transfer, and explained the efforts of the Republic of Korea to resolve its economic problems. Prime Minister Obuchi explained the various measures for reviving the Japanese economy and the economic assistance which Japan is providing to assist in overcoming the difficulties faced by Asian economies, and expressed Japan's intention to continue support for the efforts being made by the Republic of Korea to overcome its economic difficulties. Both leaders welcomed that a basic agreement was reached on loans from the Export-Import Bank of Japan to the Republic of Korea which properly utilizes the fiscal investment and loan program.

The two leaders sincerely welcomed that the negotiations on the new Japan-Republic of Korea fisheries agreement, which had been a major outstanding issue between the two countries, had reached basic agreement, and expressed the hope that under the new fishing order based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the area of fisheries would develop smoothly.

The two leaders also welcomed the signing of the new Japan-Republic of Korea Tax Convention.

They shared the common view that they would enhance cooperation and exchanges in various areas including trade and investment, industrial technology, science and technology, telecommunications and exchanges between governments, employers and workers, and to exchange information and views on their respective social welfare systems at an appropriate time in the future, bearing in mind the probable conclusion of a Japan-Republic of Korea Agreement on Social Security.

9. The two leaders shared the view that both Governments would cooperate closely on resolving various global issues which transcend national borders and which are becoming new threats to the security and welfare of the international community. They also shared the view that both countries would promote Japan-Republic of Korea environmental policy dialogue in order to strengthen their cooperation on various issues concerning the global environment, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions and countermeasures against acid rain. They further shared the determination to promote bilateral coordination further on overseas assistance so as to strengthen their support for developing countries. In addition, the two leaders shared the view that both Governments would commence talks on concluding a Japan-Republic of Korea Extradition Treaty and further strengthen cooperation on countermeasures against international organized crime such as on illicit narcotics and stimulants.

10. Recognizing that the foundation for effectively advancing cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the areas mentioned above lies not only in intergovernmental exchanges but also in profound mutual understanding and diverse exchanges among the peoples of the two countries, the two leaders shared the view that they would expand cultural and personnel exchanges between the two countries.

The two leaders shared their determination to support cooperation between the peoples of Japan and the Republic of Korea for the success of the 2002 Soccer World Cup and to use the occasion of this event to further promote cultural and sports exchanges.

The two leaders decided to promote exchanges among various groups and region at various levels in the two societies, inter alia, researchers, teachers, journalists, civic circles and other diverse groups.

The two leaders decided to continue the ongoing measures to simplify visa requirements as a means to create a foundation on which to promote such exchanges and mutual understanding. The two leaders agreed that, in order to contribute to the expansion of exchanges and to the furthering of mutual understanding between Japan and the Republic of Korea, efforts would be made to enhance governmental programs for the exchange of students and youths including the introduction of such programs for junior and senior high school students, and that both Governments would introduce a working holiday program for youths of both countries from April 1999. Recognizing that Korean nationals residing in Japan could serve as a bridge for mutual exchanges and understanding between the peoples of Japan and the Republic of Korea, the two leaders also shared the determination to continue ongoing consultations between the two countries for the enhancement of their social status.

The two leaders highly appreciated the significance of intellectual exchanges between Japan and the Republic of Korea being conducted by the concerned individuals and groups such as the Japan-Republic of Korea Forum and the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Committee to Promote Historical Research, and decided to continue support for such efforts.

President Kim Dae Jung conveyed his policy of opening the Republic of Korea to Japanese culture. Prime Minister Obuchi welcomed this policy as contributing to true, mutual understanding between the peoples of Japan and the Republic of Korea.

11. Prime Minister Obuchi and President Kim Dae Jung expressed their shared faith that the new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership towards the twenty-first century can be enhanced to an even higher dimension through the broad-based participation and

untiring efforts of the peoples of the two countries. The two leaders called on the peoples of both countries to share the spirit of this Joint Declaration and to participate in joint efforts to build and develop a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership.

Prime Minister of Japan

President of the Republic of Korea

Tokyo, 8 October 1998

Source: MOFA (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html>)

*3) Japan-China Joint Declaration. On Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, 1998*

26 November 1998

In response to an invitation extended by the Government of Japan, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China made an official visit to Japan as a State Guest from 25 to 30 November 1998. On the occasion of this historically significant first visit to Japan by a President of the People's Republic of China, President Jiang met with His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and held an intensive exchange of views with Prime Minister Keizô Obuchi on the international situation, regional issues and the overall Japan-China relationship. They attained a broad common view and, based on the success of this visit, declared as follows:

I

Both sides shared the view that as the world in the post-Cold War era continues to undergo great changes toward the creation of a new international order, further economic globalization is deepening interdependence and security dialogue and cooperation are making constant progress. Peace and development remain major issues facing the human society. It is therefore the common wish of the international community to build a new international political and economic order which is fair and rational, and to strive for a peaceful international environment in the twenty-first century that is even more firmly rooted.

Both sides reaffirmed that the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, as well as the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, are the basic norms for relations between states.

Both sides positively evaluate the efforts made by the United Nations to preserve world peace and to promote the economic and social development of the world, and believe that the United Nations should play an important role in building and maintaining a new international order. Both sides express support for the reforms of the United Nations including the reform of the Security Council, in order for the United Nations to further embody the common wish and collective will of all Members in its activities and policy decision making process.

Both sides stress the importance of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, and furthermore, strongly call upon the nations concerned to cease all nuclear testing and nuclear arms race, in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the Asian region and the world.

Both sides believe that both Japan and China, as nations influential in the Asian region and the world, bear an important responsibility for preserving peace and promoting development. Both sides will strengthen coordination and cooperation in the areas such as international politics, international economy, and global issues, thus positively contributing to the endeavor for the peace and development of the world aimed at the progress of humanity.

## II

Both sides believe that, after the Cold War, the Asian region has continued to move toward stability and the regional cooperation has deepened further. In addition, both sides are convinced that this region will exert greater influence on international politics, economics and security and will continue to play an important role in the coming century.

Both sides reiterate that it is the unshakable fundamental policy of the two countries to maintain the peace of this region and to promote its development, and that they will not seek hegemony in the Asian region and settle all disputes by peaceful means, without recourse to the use or threat of force.

Both sides expressed their great interest in the current financial crisis in East Asia and the ensuing difficulties for the Asian economy. At the same time, both sides recognize that the economic foundation of this region is sound, and firmly believe that by advancing rational adjustment and reform based on experiences, as well as by enhancing regional and international coordination and cooperation, the economy of Asia will definitely overcome its difficulties and continue to develop. Both sides affirmed that they would positively meet the various challenges that they faced, and would respectively make their utmost efforts toward promoting the economic development of the region.

Both sides believe that stable relations among the major nations of the Asia-Pacific region are extremely important for the peace and stability of this region. Both sides shared the view that they would actively participate in all multilateral activities in this region, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, promote coordination and cooperation, and support all measures for enhancing understanding and strengthening confidence.

### III

Both sides reviewed the bilateral relationship since the normalization of relations between Japan and China, and expressed satisfaction with the remarkable development in all areas, including politics, economics, culture and personnel exchanges. Further, both sides shared the view that under the current situation cooperation between the two countries is growing in importance, and that further strengthening and developing the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries not only serve the fundamental interests of their peoples, but also positively contribute to the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. Both sides reaffirmed that the Japan-China relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships for the respective country, deeply recognized the role and responsibility of both countries in achieving peace and development, and expressed their resolve to establish a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development toward the twenty-first century.

Both sides restated that they will observe the principles of the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, issued on 29 September 1972 and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, signed on 12 August 1978, and reaffirmed that the above-mentioned documents will continue to be the most important foundation for the bilateral relations.

Both sides are of the view that Japan and China share a history of friendly exchanges spanning more than 2,000 years, as well as a common cultural background, and that it is the common desire of the peoples of the two countries to continue this tradition of friendship and to further develop mutually beneficial cooperation.

Both sides believe that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history are the important foundation for further developing relations between Japan and China. The Japanese side observes the 1972 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 15 August 1995 Statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this. The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from the history and adhere to the path of peace and development. Based on this, both sides will develop long-standing relations of friendship.

Both sides shared the view that expanding personnel exchanges between the two countries is extremely important for advancing mutual understanding and enhancing mutual trust.

Both sides confirmed an annual visit by a leader of either country to the other, the establishment of a Tokyo-Beijing hot line between the two Governments, and the further enhancement of personnel exchanges at all levels, in particular among the younger generation who will shoulder the heavy burden of the future development of the two countries.

Both sides shared the view that, based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, they will formulate long-term, stable, cooperative economic and trade relations, and will further expand cooperation in such areas as high technology, information, environmental protection, agriculture and infrastructure. The Japanese side reiterated that a stable, open and developing China is significant for the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world, and restated its policy of continuing cooperation and assistance for the economic development of China. The Chinese side expressed its gratitude for the economic cooperation extended by Japan to China. The Japanese side reiterated that it will continue to support China's efforts for the early accession to the WTO.

Both sides positively evaluated the beneficial role played by their bilateral security dialogue in increasing mutual understanding, and shared the view that they would further strengthen this dialogue mechanism.

The Japanese side continues to maintain its stand on the Taiwan issue which was set forth in the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and reiterates its understanding that there is one China. Japan will continue to maintain its exchanges of private and regional nature with Taiwan.

Both sides affirmed that, based on the principles of the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, and following the spirit of seeking common major benefits while setting aside minor differences, they would work to maximize their common interests and minimize their differences, and, through friendly consultations, appropriately handle the issues, differences of opinion and disputes which currently exist and may arise in the future, thereby avoiding any restraint or obstacle to development of friendly relations between the two countries.

Both sides believe that through establishment of a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development, the bilateral relations will enter a new level of development. To this end, a wide range of participation and sustained effort not only of both Governments, but also of the peoples of both countries, is essential. Both sides

firmly believe that, if the peoples of both countries, hand-in-hand, thoroughly demonstrate the spirit shown in this Declaration, it will not only contribute to the friendship of the peoples of both countries for generations to come, but also make an important contribution to the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region and of the world.

Source: MOFA (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html>)

*4) Japan-Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang Declaration, 2002*

September 17, 2002

Japanese Prime Minister Junichirô Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission met and had talks in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002.

Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK through the settlement of unfortunate past between them and the outstanding issues of concern would be consistent with the fundamental interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

1. Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations, and decided that they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002.

Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving the normalization.

2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.

Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term

loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the normalization talks.

Both sides, pursuant to the basic principle that when the bilateral relationship is normalized both Japan and the DPRK would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945, decided that they would discuss this issue of property and claims concretely in the normalization talks.

Both sides decided that they would sincerely discuss the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan and the issue of cultural property.

3. Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side. With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.

4. Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia.

Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized.

Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned.

The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.

Both sides decided that they would discuss issues relating to security.

Prime Minister of Japan

Junichirô Koizumi

Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission

Kim Jong-Il

September 17, 2002

Pyongyang

Source: MOFA ([http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n\\_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html))

#### **4. Third-party documents relating to the Asia-Pacific War**

*1) Concluding observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2008  
(CCPR/C/JPN/5)*

22. The Committee notes with concern that the State party [Japan] has still not accepted its responsibility for the “comfort women” system during the Second World War, that perpetrators have not been prosecuted, that the compensation provided to victims is financed by private donations rather than public funds and is insufficient, that few history textbooks contain references to the “comfort women” issue, and that some politicians and mass media continue to defame victims or to deny the events (art. 7 and 8).

The State party should accept legal responsibility and apologize unreservedly for the “comfort women” system in a way that is acceptable to the majority of victims and restores their dignity, prosecute perpetrators who are still alive, take immediate and effective legislative and administrative measures to compensate adequately all survivors as a matter of right, educate students and the general public about the issue, and refute and sanction any attempt to defame victims or to deny the events.

Source: CCPR Centre [http://ccprcentre.org/doc/HRC/Japan/CCPR\\_C\\_JPN\\_CO\\_5.pdf](http://ccprcentre.org/doc/HRC/Japan/CCPR_C_JPN_CO_5.pdf)

2) *Concluding comment of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2001 (E/C.12/1/Add.67)*

26. The Committee expresses its concern that the compensation offered to wartime “comfort women” by the Asian Women's Fund, which is primarily financed through private funding, has not been deemed an acceptable measure by the women concerned.

53. The Committee strongly recommends that the State party find an appropriate arrangement, in consultation with the organizations representing the “comfort women”, on ways and means to compensate the victims in a manner that will meet their expectations, before it is too late to do so.

Source: SIM The Netherlands Institute of Human Rights

<http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/uncom.nsf/fe005fcb50d8277cc12569d5003e4aaa/90d940bfcf3ba976c1256ac4002cad7a?OpenDocument>

3) *Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Japan, adopted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at its fiftieth session, C-26 (29 April-17 May 2013)*

C-26

The Committee is concerned about the lasting negative effects of the exploitation to which ‘comfort women’ were subjected on their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and their entitlement to reparation. (art. 11, 3)

The Committee recommends that the State party take all necessary measures to address the lasting effects of the exploitation and to guarantee the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by ‘comfort women’. The Committee also recommends that the State party educate the public on the exploitation of ‘comfort women’ so as to prevent hate speech and other manifestations that stigmatize them.

Source: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/cescrs50.htm>

4) *Report of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1994 (A/50/38).*

633. The Committee expressed its disappointment that the Japanese report contained no serious reflection on issues concerning the sexual exploitation of women from other countries in Asia and during the Second World War. It noted that Japan's commitment to the Convention required it to ensure the protection of the full human rights of all women, including foreign and immigrant women.

635. To enable the Committee to have a better understanding of commercial sexual exploitation or prostitution of immigrant women in Japan, more detailed information should be provided on the sex industry in Japan. The Committee requests the Government of Japan to undertake a study of the sex industry in Japan and to provide information on the findings in its next report. The Committee also encourages the Government to take specific and effective measures to address these current issues as well as war-related crimes and to inform the Committee about such measures in the next report.

Source: United Nations (<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-38.htm>)

5) *Report of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 2003 (A/58/38)*

361. While appreciating the federal Government's efforts to combat discrimination against aboriginal women, including the pending amendment to the Canadian Human Rights Act, and to achieve substantive equality for them, the Committee is seriously concerned about the persistent systematic discrimination faced by aboriginal women in all aspects of their lives. The Committee is concerned that aboriginal women, among other highly vulnerable groups of women in Canada, are over-concentrated in lower-skill and lower-paying occupations, they constitute a high percentage of those women who have not completed secondary education, they constitute a high percentage of women serving prison sentences and they suffer high rates of domestic violence. The Committee is further concerned that the First Nations Governance Act currently under discussion does not address remaining discriminatory legal provisions under other Acts, including matrimonial property rights, status and band membership questions which are incompatible with the Convention.

362. The Committee urges the State party to accelerate its efforts to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination against aboriginal women both in society at large and in their communities, particularly with respect to the remaining discriminatory legal provisions and the equal enjoyment of their human rights to education, employment and physical and psychological well-being. It urges the State party to take effective and proactive measures, including awareness-raising programs, to sensitize aboriginal communities about women's human rights and to combat patriarchal attitudes, practices and stereotyping of roles. It also recommends to the State party to ensure that aboriginal women receive sufficient funding in order to be able to participate in the necessary governance and legislative processes that address issues which impede their legal and substantive equality. It also requests the State party to provide comprehensive information on the situation of aboriginal women in its next report.

Source: United Nations

(<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/468/20/PDF/N0346820.pdf?OpenElement>)

6) *Concluding observations of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2009 (CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/6)*

37. The Committee notes that some steps were taken by the State party to address the situation of “comfort women” but regrets the State party’s failure to find a lasting solution for the situation of “comfort women” victimized during the Second World War and expresses concern at the deletion of references to this issue in school textbooks.

38. The Committee reiterates its recommendation that the State party urgently endeavour to find a lasting solution for the situation of “comfort women” which would include the compensation of victims, the prosecution of perpetrators and the education of the public about these crimes.

Source: United Nations (<http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/509934.946894646.html>)

7) *Conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations Committee against Torture, 2007 (CAT/C/JPN/CO/1)*

Statute of limitations

12. The Committee notes with concern that acts amounting to torture and ill-treatment are subject to a statute of limitations. The Committee is concerned that the statute of limitations for acts amounting to torture and ill-treatment may prevent investigation, prosecution and punishment of these grave crimes. In particular, the Committee regrets the dismissal of cases filed by victims of military sexual slavery during the Second World War, the so-called “comfort women”, for reasons related to statutory limitations.

The State Party should review its rules and provisions on the statute of limitations and bring them fully in line with its obligations under the Convention, so that acts amounting to torture and ill-treatment, including attempts to commit torture and acts by any person which constitute complicity or participation in torture, can be investigated, prosecuted and punished without time limitations.

Compensation and rehabilitation

23. The Committee is concerned over reports of difficulties faced by victims of abuse in obtaining redress and adequate compensation. The Committee is also concerned over restrictions on the right to compensation, such as statutory limitations and reciprocity rules for immigrants. The Committee regrets the lack of information on compensation requested and awarded to victims of torture or ill-treatment.

The State party should take all necessary measure to ensure that all victims of acts of torture or ill-treatment can exercise fully their right to redress, including compensation and rehabilitation. The State party should take measures to establish rehabilitation services in the country. The State party should furnish the Committee with information on any compensation or rehabilitation provided to the victims.

Source: UNHCR (<http://www.refworld.org/docid/46cee6ac2.html>)

8) *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Japan, adopted by the United Nations Committee against Torture at its fiftieth session (6-31 May 2013)*

Victims of military sexual slavery

19. Notwithstanding the information provided by the State party concerning some steps taken to acknowledge the abuses against victims of Japan's military sexual slavery practices during the Second World War, the so-called "comfort women", the Committee remains deeply concerned at the State party's failure to meet its obligations under the Convention while addressing this matter, in particular in relation to:

- (a) Failure to provide adequate redress and rehabilitation to the victims. The Committee regrets that the compensation, financed by private donations rather than public funds, was insufficient and inadequate;
- (b) Failure to prosecute perpetrators of such acts of torture and bring them to justice. The Committee recalls that on account of the continuous nature of the effects of torture, statutes of limitations should not be applicable as these deprive victims of the redress, compensation, and rehabilitation due to them;
- (c) Concealment or failure to disclose related facts and materials;
- (d) Continuing official denial of the facts and retraumatization of the victims by high-level national and local officials and politicians, including several diet members;
- (e) Failure to carry out effective educational measures to prevent gender-based breaches of the Convention, as illustrated, inter alia, by a decrease in references to this issue in school history textbooks;
- (f) The State party's rejection of several recommendations relevant to this issue, made in the context of the universal periodic review (A/HRC/22/14/Add.1, paras.147.145 ff.), which are akin to recommendations made by the Committee (para. 24) and many other United Nations human rights mechanisms, inter alia, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5, para. 22), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/6, para. 38), the Committee on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/JPN/CO/3, para. 26) and several special procedures mandate holders of the Human Rights Council (arts. 1, 2, 4, 10, 14 and 16).

Recalling its general comment No. 3 (2012), the Committee urges the State party to take immediate and effective legislative and administrative measures to find a victim-centered resolution for the issues of “comfort women”, in particular, by:

- (a) Publicly acknowledging legal responsibility for the crimes of sexual slavery , and prosecuting and punishing perpetrators with appropriate penalties;
- (b) Refuting attempts to deny the facts by government authorities and public figures and to re - traumatize the victims through such repeated denials;
- (c) Disclosing related materials, and investigating the facts thoroughly;
- (d) Recognizing the victim’s right to redress, and accordingly providing them full and effective redress and reparation, including compensation, satisfaction and the means for as full rehabilitation as possible;
- (e) Educating the general public about the issue and include the events in all history textbooks, as a means of preventing further violations of the State party’s obligations under the Convention .

Source: UNHCR (<http://www.refworld.org/publisher,CAT,,JPN,51dfe6614,0.html>)

- 9) *United States House of Representatives, House Res. 121, Engrossed in House (EH):*  
*“A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as ‘comfort women’, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II”, 31 July 2007*

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

July 30, 2007.

Whereas the Government of Japan, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II, officially commissioned the acquisition of young women for the sole purpose of sexual servitude to its Imperial Armed Forces, who became known to the world as ianfu or “comfort women”;

Whereas the “comfort women” system of forced military prostitution by the Government of Japan, considered unprecedented in its cruelty and magnitude, included gang rape, forced abortions, humiliation, and sexual violence resulting in mutilation, death, or eventual suicide in one of the largest cases of human trafficking in the 20th century;

Whereas some new textbooks used in Japanese schools seek to downplay the “comfort women” tragedy and other Japanese war crimes during World War II;

Whereas Japanese public and private officials have recently expressed a desire to dilute or rescind the 1993 statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yôhei Kôno on the “comfort women”, which expressed the Government's sincere apologies and remorse for their ordeal;

Whereas the Government of Japan did sign the 1921 International Convention for the

Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children and supported the 2000 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security which recognized the unique impact on women of armed conflict;

Whereas the House of Representatives commends Japan's efforts to promote human security, human rights, democratic values, and rule of law, as well as for being a supporter of Security Council Resolution 1325;

Whereas the United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of United States security interests in Asia and the Pacific and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity;

Whereas, despite the changes in the post-cold war strategic landscape, the United States-Japan alliance continues to be based on shared vital interests and values in the Asia-Pacific region, including the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, and the securing of prosperity for the people of both countries and the international community;

Whereas the House of Representatives commends those Japanese officials and private citizens whose hard work and compassion resulted in the establishment in 1995 of Japan's private Asian Women's Fund;

Whereas the Asian Women's Fund has raised \$5,700,000 to extend "atonement" from the Japanese people to the comfort women; and

Whereas the mandate of the Asian Women's Fund, a government-initiated and largely government-funded private foundation whose purpose was the carrying out of programs and projects with the aim of atonement for the maltreatment and suffering of the "comfort women", came to an end on March 31, 2007, and the Fund has been disbanded as of that date: Now, therefore, be it Resolved,

That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan--

(1) should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as "comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration

of World War II;

(2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as a public statement in his official capacity;

(3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual enslavement and trafficking of the “comfort women” for the Japanese Imperial Armed Forces never occurred; and

(4) should educate current and future generations about this horrible crime while following the recommendations of the international community with respect to the “comfort women”.

Source: Congress.gov (<https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/121/text>)

10) *European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2007 on Justice for the “Comfort Women” (sex slaves in Asia before and during World War II)*

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the 200th anniversary of the abolition of the slave trade in 2007,
- having regard to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (1921), to which Japan is a signatory,
- having regard to ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour (1930), ratified by Japan,
- having regard to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security,
- having regard to the report by Gay McDougall, UN Special Rapporteur on Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slave-like Practices during Armed Conflict (22 June 1998),
- having regard to the conclusions and recommendations of the 38th session of the UN Committee Against Torture (9-10 May 2007),
- having regard to the Report of a Study of Dutch Government Documents on the Forced Prostitution of Dutch Women in the Dutch East Indies During the Japanese Occupation, The Hague (2004),
- having regard to the resolutions on the comfort women adopted by the US Congress on 30 July 2007, and by the Canadian Parliament on 29 November 2007,
- having regard to Rule 115(5) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the government of Japan, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s until the end of World War II, officially ordered the acquisition of young women, who became known to the world as ianfu or “comfort women”, for the sole purpose of sexual servitude to its Imperial Armed Forces,

B. whereas the “comfort women” system included gang rape, forced abortions,

humiliation, and sexual violence resulting in mutilation, death or eventual suicide, in one of the largest cases of human trafficking in the 20th century,

C. whereas the dozens of “comfort women” cases brought before Japanese courts have all ended in the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for compensation, despite court judgments acknowledging the Imperial Armed Forces' direct and indirect involvement, and the State's responsibility,

D. whereas most of the victims of the “comfort women” system have passed away, and the remaining survivors are 80 or more years of age;

E. whereas over the past years numerous high-ranking members and officials of the Japanese Government have made apologetic statements on the “comfort women” system, while some Japanese officials have recently expressed a regrettable desire to dilute or rescind those statements,

F. whereas the full extent of the sexual slavery system has never been fully disclosed by the government of Japan and some new required readings used in Japanese schools try to minimise the tragedy of the “comfort women” and other Japanese war crimes during World War II,

G. whereas the mandate of the Asian Women's Fund, a government-initiated private foundation whose aim was the implementation of programmes and projects to compensate for the abuse and suffering of the “comfort women”, came to an end on 31 March 2007,

1. Welcomes the excellent relationship between the European Union and Japan based on the mutually shared values of a multi-party democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights;

2. Expresses its solidarity with the women who were victims of the “comfort women” system for the duration of World War II;

3. Welcomes the statements by Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yôhei Kôno in 1993 and by the then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 on the “comfort women”, as well as the resolutions of the Japanese parliament (the Diet) of 1995 and 2005

expressing apologies for wartime victims, including victims of the “comfort women” system;

4. Welcomes the Japanese Government's initiative to establish, in 1995, the now-dissolved Asian Women's Fund, a largely government-funded private foundation, which distributed some "atonement money" to several hundred “comfort women”, but considers that this humanitarian initiative cannot satisfy the victims' claims of legal recognition and reparation under public international law, as stated by the UN Special Rapporteur Gay McDougall in her above-mentioned report of 1998;

5. Calls on the Japanese Government formally to acknowledge, apologise, and accept historical and legal responsibility, in a clear and unequivocal manner, for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as “comfort women”, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s until the end of World War II;

6. Calls on the Japanese Government to implement effective administrative mechanisms to provide reparations to all surviving victims of the “comfort women” system and the families of its deceased victims;

7. Calls on the Japanese parliament (the Diet) to take legal measures to remove existing obstacles to obtaining reparations before Japanese courts; in particular, the right of individuals to claim reparations from the government should be expressly recognised in national law, and cases for reparations for the survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law, should be prioritised, taking into account the age of the survivors;

8. Calls on the government of Japan to refute publicly any claims that the subjugation and enslavement of “comfort women” never occurred;

9. Encourages the Japanese people and government to take further steps to recognise the full history of their nation, as is the moral duty of all countries, and to foster awareness in Japan of its actions in the 1930s and 1940s, including in relation to “comfort women”; calls on the government of Japan to educate current and future generations about those events;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Japanese Government and Parliament, the UN Human Rights Council, the governments of the ASEAN States, to the governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Timor-Leste.

Source: European Parliament

(<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2007-0632&format=XML&language=EN>)



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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung  
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Responsible:  
Sven Saaler,  
FES Representative in Japan

### FES Office Tokyo / Japan

Japan is an important partner for Germany in Asia. The two countries are key actors in the international arena and face similar political, social, economic and environmental challenges.

The FES Tokyo Office promotes Japanese-German dialogue, encourages multilateral discussions involving participants from East Asia, Europe and North America and helps to maintain and expand Euro-Japanese networks in politics, civil society and academia. The activities of the Tokyo office involve a broad spectrum of representatives from politics and civil society and it seeks to encourage academic exchange by organizing symposia and workshops.

Our activities focus primarily on security, climate and energy policy, but also extend to societal issues such as demographic trends in Japan and Germany and the high budget deficits in the industrialized world, including related economic issues such as recent developments in Japan's labor market and questions of consumer protection. Debates about historical legacies and history education in Europe and East Asia are also part of our program..

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung  
7-5-56 Akasaka  
Minato-ku  
Tokyo, 107-0052  
Japan  
Tel: (03)-6277-7551  
Fax: (03) 3-3588-6035  
E-Mail: [office@fes-japan.org](mailto:office@fes-japan.org)  
[www.fes-japan.org](http://www.fes-japan.org)

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