THE SOCIAL CITY: ASPIRATION OF AN URBAN TRANSFORMATION IN ASIA

Discussion Paper

Rita Padawangi
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Foreword

The City should be owned by the citizens and residents!

On that note the conference on “Social City – Aspiration of an Urban Transformation in Asia” which was held from 21st to 22nd November 2017 in Jakarta was concluded. This conference, part of the Economy of Tomorrow (EoT) program, was jointly held by the RUJAK Center for Urban Studies, the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (PMK) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). It had successfully brought together experts, urbanists, grassroot activists and legislators to discuss about the concept of a Social City, on affordable housing and Mobility/Public Transport as well as on Civil Participation.

The conference has been opened among others by the German Ambassador to Indonesia and the Mayor of the city of Jember, who is also a member of the Socdem Asia party Nasdem.

The committed conference discussion has been further illustrated and reflected through an excursion on the second day to the Jakarta Smart City Control Room and two neighbourhoods (kampungs) in Jakarta.

Three main conclusions of the two days exchange on Social city have been; that Social City is a holistic and collaborative urban development concept that strives for affordable housing, affordable mobility and civil participation, while it intends to avoid social and cultural segregation; It promotes to bring citizens and residents back into the governance of city-making;

And in a nutshell, Social city is the promise for inclusion on city level and therefore the antithesis, or alternative to exclusive, individualistic and semi-authoritarian urban development concepts like; the world class city, the competitive city or the Smart City.

This wonderful analysis by Dr. Rita Padawangi, an Indonesian Senior–Lecturer and urbanist, now teaching at Singapore University of Social Sciences – is a reflection paper of the November 2017 RUJAK/PMK/FES Social City Conference by an urban expert who is more than capable to contextualize and compare the urban transformation of cities like Jakarta, Singapore or Seoul from a progressive political-economic perspective.

The urban transformation - together with the digital transformation and the energy transformation - is probably the most important aspect of the ongoing great social transformation in Asia as well as worldwide. The future is sure to bring even more rapid urbanization, of which Asia will have the lion’s share. Hence, the development of Asia’s cities will reveal in microcosm the political course that may be set all around the globe. In this context, integrated, socially responsible and therefore inclusive urban development in Asia would contribute significantly to the achievement of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) within the Agenda 2030. The Economy of Tomorrow network together with its partners will therefore continue to support the joint aspiration that social aspects and social functions in urban development planning gain more attention in city-making.

Particular attention will be paid on affordable and adequate housing. Because we support the assessment by Leilani Farha – UN special rapporteur on the right to adequate housing - that affordable and adequate housing is not simply a political and economic choice, but a human right. Accordingly, the financialization of the housing sector is a counterproductive global trend that will hopefully be soon addressed jointly by responsive governments, investors, civil society and human rights organizations.

Jakarta, 22nd March 2018

Sergio Grassi
Country Director FES Indonesia and EoT Coordinator in Asia
Executive Summary

Based on a regional RUJAK/PMK/FES conference on Social City – Aspiration of an Urban Transformation in Asia held in Jakarta, 21-22 November 2017

- The meaning of the term ‘city’ is inherently social, but contemporary urban developments have veered away from the historical, social and cultural aspects of the city as urban agglomerations pose challenges of scale, spatial dispersions, breadth and diversity of issues.

- The Social City is a participatory and collaborative urban development programme. Collaborative is the antithesis of competitive.

- Innovative technological applications may be potential solutions to partial urban problems but current adoptions of the Smart City in Asia, including in Jakarta, tend to use technology to strengthen the developmental image and political popularity rather than to address pertinent social issues in society.

- There are at least three main challenges to implement the Social City programme in Asia:
  - The Social City's emphasis on infrastructural development may be subjected to path dependency to existing unjust city systems and rigid administrative boundaries.
  - The Social City initiative challenges existing unjust structures and may face obstructions by those whose powers are threatened.
  - Urban visions of exclusive, orderly and semi-authoritarian city governance, such as Jakarta residents’ widespread idealisation of Singapore, may be hegemonic, hence is perhaps the most difficult challenge to the Social City programme.
Why Social City? Why now? Several terms have been embedded to the word ‘city’ to illustrate particular visions of the city. Sustainable city, for example, put forth the combination among environment, economic, and social dimensions of the city, with the emphasis of securing access to resources for future generations. Meanwhile, liveable city has a focus on living conditions and comfort and is increasingly adopted by various media outlets and consulting firms as indices to rank cities in the world. The emergence of these terms was inseparable from urban development impacts after the second World War, with proliferation of manufacturing industries and buildings on large scales that have detrimental impacts on natural environments as well as urban infrastructures.

“Social city” is a curious term, as it embodies a sense of redundancy. The term “city” comes from “civitas”, a Latin word that stands for a community with its civilisations in a particular geographical area. As such, the city is more than the human settlement, although settlement forms the geographical entity. Social science scholars have further interpreted the term with emphases on social and economic relationships in the city. The understanding of “city” encompasses its social life. Jane Jacobs’ “The Death and Life of Great American Cities” (1961) lamented the loss of social rhythms as city neighbourhoods were disappearing under the expansion of America’s modern planning paradigm. A metropolis, is where individuals can live as strangers, but also places where ideas are formed in public spaces and where strangers meet to exchange those ideas.1 Thus, “the city” is inherently social, and even if the centre of it is the market and the economy, these are entrenched in the civitas’ social institutions and political structures.2

If the word “city” on its own is inherently social, then why do we use the term “social city” that is redundant? One main concern is the urbanisation processes that increasingly carve the city away from its social life. Large-scale industrial city-regions rapidly grew and consolidated worldwide, demographically absorbing populations from non-industrial economies to be part of the labour market. These “new scales of urbanisation” are extremely large and are spread across the globe, whether it is Boston-Washington DC in the U.S., the Pearl River Delta, Lagos conurbation in West Africa, or Jabodetabek in Jakarta, among others.3 Entering the end of the twentieth century, the race to achieve global city status and competitiveness becomes more mainstream in formal urban visions, with city business districts becoming prime real estate as centres of finance capital and technological advancements and lifestyles intertwine with leisure and consumption.4

The urban agglomerations that form city-regions and global city-regions provide a challenge for city governance that encompasses the scale, spatial dispersions, breadth and diversity of issues. Understanding the city as civitas is further complicated with multiple geographies, communities and civilisations within one territorial governance, for which the administrative boundaries may or may not match the socio-cultural identities’ nor environmental configurations. Based on his study of Los Angeles, Edward Soja coined the term ‘synekism’ as the shaping of “political governance, economic development, social order, and cultural identity” as a result of cohabitation in a particular geographical area that lead to economic and ecological interdependencies.5 These governance systems, however, are subjected to material and power inequalities that result in particular adoptions of visions of the city that may favour some groups more than others.
With the rapid growth that resulted in those new scales of urbanisation, cities in Southeast Asia have seen various social, economic, and environmental problems. Transportation is often one of the main problems of cities, as the lack of public provisions and spatial capacities often result in choked traffic, which eventually become economically costly and socially exhausting. Affordable housing is another issue that comes up, as the housing needs of the cities’ exponential population growth after national independence from colonial occupations are often left to the private sector that saw housing as the real estate market. As a result, entrepreneurial governance of city spaces ensued, with private developers growing into business empires with access to influence spatial plans.

Furthermore, structures of city governments are influenced by decades of undemocratic regimes that provide little room for non-technocratic approaches to solve urbanisation-induced problems. In spite of waves of political reforms – Philippines’ People Power in the 1980s and 1990s, and Indonesia’s Reformasi in the late 1990s – obsession with technocratic solutions to urban problems remain. Marginalised groups, particularly the landless working poor, often become collaterals in the name of progress that are widely accepted by policy makers and popularly internalised by city residents who have experienced the brunt of the environmental and mobility issues but are not adversely affected by the technocratic solutions. Some of the forces that sustain top-down urban planning processes include development ideologies of financing institutions that prescribe material images of progress that ideologically deprioritise understanding cities as civitas but promote the escalation of cities as engines of economic growth.

It is in this context that the term “social city”, albeit redundant, makes sense as an effort to propagate the social agenda of the city. This discussion paper is based on the topics discussed in the conference and site visits of “Social City: Aspiration of an Urban Transformation in Asia” in Jakarta, 21-22 November 2017.
The Social City as a Collaborative Project, in Asia

The Social City initiative in Germany began in 1999, “not as a social programme, but as an urban development investment programme” in response to the need to “prevent a social downward spiral of poverty, neglect and infrastructure decay”. Nevertheless, neighbourhoods that were targeted by the Social City programme were disadvantaged neighbourhoods with their specific social and environmental problems. As a result, the solution to these problems were formulated as “an urban construction investment programme” rather than as social funding, although it does include the expenses to develop a “coordination centre” in the neighbourhood that functions to provide advice and support to those involved. Furthermore, by law, the programme also requires citizen participation and neighbourhood management in the development project.

The Social City in this context specifically refers to a particular participatory urban development programme. In its implementation, the kinds of urban development associated with the Social City are mostly infrastructure, such as housing and transportation that are categorised within development sectors as usually structured in national and local governments. In the German experience, Social City programmes that tend to lag behind are schools and education, integration of immigrants and employment in the local economy. These are fields that, although would benefit from infrastructure development, would require much cross-sectoral coordination, particularly in socio-cultural dimensions.

René Bormann “Social Quarter” concept as a strategy for social change countered the over emphasis on infrastructure development. The social quarter is defined by its residents and is therefore immediately relevant to their everyday life. The quarter is independent of the administrative boundaries and is “generally without official or political boundaries”, which resembles how urban kampungs in Indonesia are socially constructed. However, independence from administrative boundaries also challenges the authority of existing bureaucracies, and social change initiatives from these social quarters may encounter blockages from path-dependent mechanisms, such as the bureaucratic obstacles faced in participatory housing proposals from 2012 to 2017 in Jakarta.

Implementing the Social City programme in Southeast Asia and in Asia in general encounters serious challenges. Urban landscapes of Asia and Southeast Asia are places where the “new scales of urbanisation” and uneven developments gave rise to primate cities and various urban agglomerations as concentrations of political and economic powers. As previously discussed, technocratic solutions that are delivered through entrepreneurial city governance that work in tandem with profit-making private sector entities become the aspirational progress of various cities in the region, in order to achieve economic competitiveness in the global market. As such, development and infrastructural issues such as affordable housing and transportation are mostly separated from collective participation in decision-making.

Jakarta, Indonesia is a case in point, in which the previous governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama – known as ‘Ahok’ – who was popularly credited for infrastructural developments – applied heavy-handed top-down approach in infrastructure projects, evicting thousands of families and businesses during his short two-year reign. In 2016 alone, Ahok’s administration evicted 5,726 families and 5,379 businesses. In one of the most contested forced evictions, Kampung Aquarium, affected residents have filed lawsuits and rebuilt their houses albeit in less permanent structures (Photo 1). The labelling of the kampung as a place of tuberculosis and ungrateful stealers of land, without any opening for discussion, made the evictees upset and frustrated. Much of their livelihoods were destroyed because of the eviction, and the first groups to provide aid were (radical) religious groups and parties.
Yet Ahok was still widely praised for his perceived infrastructural achievements such as the mass rapid transit project, river concretisation, expansion of bus rapid transit system and armies of city street cleaners. He was later persecuted and incarcerated, not because of his oppressive regime, but because of a religious blasphemy case. This case was telling that the importance of participatory-collaborative development was not only missing in the government under Ahok’s regime but was also not a priority in Ahok’s political opponents’ perspective. Furthermore, it embodies a darker notion of Soja’s synekism – governing the city due to cohabitation of several communities that are economically, socially and ecologically interdependent, but the unequal power and class status of different communities may result in predatory relations.

City-making concerns spatial developments as a tandem with civilisation, which entails social and cultural relationships in the city. In democratic contexts, local governments are bearers of the social contract with the citizens to govern these social, cultural and spatial configurations. In increasingly large, diverse and multicultural cities, focus on infrastructure developments, public services and public good often becomes the common ground for the welfare of the citizens. It is common to find claims that public participation in city decision-making takes a lot of time and is therefore not efficient, particularly when city societies become more diverse in their

Photo 1. Kampung Akuarium in November 2017, during Social City site visit
Photo © Rita Padawangi

Bringing Citizens back into City-Making Governance: Participation and Collaboration
social backgrounds, cultural affiliations and political leanings. However, the impacts of infrastructure developments and prioritisation of certain public services in these new urban scales are subjected to existing social inequalities, which makes those that are seemingly good for the majority of the city residents – who are voters of democratically-elected city leaders – potentially repressive for the minority or the marginalised. Marginalisation and discrimination against the minority are not limited to identity-based groups but are also applicable in terms of economic class and gender. Social justice and spatial justice discourses in academia have discussed in great lengths the importance of just distribution of resources as well as just procedures in city-making governance. Although the separation between infrastructure developments and public participation remain rampant in many different cities in Asia, there have been explorations and experiments in bringing and facilitating citizens back into city-making governance. In contemporary Indonesia, some cities and localities have attempted to bring new approaches to urban development decision-making after gaining autonomy through decentralisation. The city of Solo, for example, has undergone participatory mapping, community profiling and identification of problems and potentials for more than five years. In South Korea, the City of Seoul under Mayor Park Won Soon has rolled out various initiatives that involve local communities, support small-medium enterprises through “minority shareholders’ movement” to boost their capacity amidst the domination of the big four chaebols that account for 50% of South Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP). Also, in Seoul, the city government launched a programme to reduce the city’s energy consumption by 2 million tons of oil equivalent per year, under the slogan “One Less Nuclear Power Plant”, a year after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.

Relative autonomy of Indonesia’s local governments after decentralisation to make decisions with regards to development planning have also seen leaders of regencies – local government areas with significant roles of non-urban economy – emerge through their images of bringing people into the planning systems. For example, the current regent of Jember (East Java), Hj. Faida, explained that she focused on healthcare services, which was also inseparable from her professional training as a medical doctor before joining politics. As a medical doctor, she earned two awards from the national government in 2014 for increasing healthcare services. Nevertheless, the rising profiles of local city and regency leaders, exemplified best by the current president Joko Widodo who rose from being a city mayor to becoming the country’s number one, also opens possibilities of superficial image-making to propel popularity in wider geographies in the pursuit of higher political offices. Combined with the proliferation of media outlets and widening social media penetration in urban centres, local autonomy is also a platform for populist policies and projects that are visually appealing to be spread beyond the locality’s boundaries with infusions of a glorified sense of achievements. Meanwhile, the sustainability of these policies and projects and the validity of public participation that they claim to conduct remain to be seen.

According to Marco Kusumawijaya, co-founder of Rujak Center for Urban Studies in Jakarta, the term participation is insufficient to explain the role of citizens in city-making. Rather, he prefers to use the term ‘collaboration’ to represent the relationship among actors in city-making and planning, which consist of the citizens as civil society, the government, and sometimes also the private sector. Collaborative governance is the antithesis of cities’ pursuit of competitiveness that too often neglects the social and cultural dimensions of cities for the sake of economic, financial and technological achievements. Collaboration was also the emphasis that Gugun Muhammad, the coordinator of Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) in Jakarta, highlighted in his presentation about the 2017 political contract between the urban poor and one of Jakarta’s gubernatorial candidates. During Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 2017, many analysts – Indonesianists from academia and journalists alike – bemoaned the religion-infused political campaign by the challenger Anies Baswedan (newly elected governor of Jakarta). However, the
social city perspective provides an additional nuance to the heated election. Given the former governors’ developmental achievements that paid little attention to participation, especially the urban poor, let alone collaboration, the election campaign also became a platform for the urban poor to renegotiate their stance, to learn from the broken campaign promises of former governor Ahok, and to strategise their way into pushing for collaborative governance through a new political contract. In the meantime, during uncollaborative government regimes, organised kampung residents could proceed on to form other collaborations among themselves, academia, and activists, such as what Kampung Tongkol, where Gugun resides, has done by greening the riverbank and maintaining public spaces along the river-canal of their neighbourhood (Photo 2).

The lesson from Indonesia’s cases and Jakarta in particular is that for local governments it is important to bring citizens back into the governance of city-making. However, it is also important to remember that claims to bringing citizens back into city-making governance need to be scrutinised with a critical lens: Who are making these claims? Are these claims of inclusivity, participation, and collaboration made by government actors, or are they corroborated by citizens from marginalised groups? Rather than focusing on claims that development interventions bring particular benefits for the city, it is pertinent to ask the question: How do these participatory or collaborative governance projects and initiatives empower the most disenfranchised groups in the city to have more negotiating power in development decisions?
The Smart City Solution?

Perhaps the most challenging issue in promoting collaborative city governance is not about citizens’ readiness or capacities as classically defined in many readings on participatory projects. Rather, it is the ideological visions of the city that are also influenced by other institutions and geographies that assume authority in prescribing what is a good city and what are needed to achieve the idealised visions of the good city. These ideological authorities are constructed not only through international financing institutions that give restrictions and directions on how development projects should be conducted, as previously mentioned in the introduction. They are also perpetuated through the exchange of ideas among government actors and consenting voices from others, such as private sector developers and members of the civil society whose interests are accommodated in such idealised visions of the good city.25

One such idealised vision is technological innovation aimed at solving problems in the city. The Smart City, which focuses on creativity and entrepreneurship26, is increasingly interpreted as the ability to exploit technological advancement to manage the city. In the case of Jakarta, its smart city agenda adopts the focus on technologies and innovative use of social media. However, the focus on “real-time” information gathering and surveillance through smartphone application and CCTV cameras in Jakarta’s smart city system overlooks the “diverse potentials of bottom-up creativities” as the conceptual understanding of a real smart city with and for smart people.27

The categorisation of problems in the crowdsourced problem reporting in Jakarta’s smart city portal also reflects further marginalisation and discrimination of disenfranchised groups, rather than empowering them. For example, “unregulated street vendors” is one of the problems in the smart city portal28, but in fact there is an absence of street vendor regulation in Jakarta while there is the Public Order rule of 2007 (Perda Tibum) that outlaw’s street vending in various places that have become the public enemy of those that rely on low-wage informal sector vending businesses to make a living. As a result, the provision of reporting “unregulated street vendors” on the smart city portal, without clear criteria of what is regulated and what is not, is a representation of discriminatory policies rather than collaborative, participatory solutions that the Social City programme would promote. When asked about it in a visit to the Control Room of Jakarta Smart City during the Social City conference, the representative gave a general answer that the smart city is just a portal and all the information will be given to the ‘authorities’ to be handled. In this case, for reporting “potential terrorism”, also a criterion in the smart city portal that -without further elaboration and specificity of what it entails- may also potentially nurture discrimination and stereotyping in justifying accusing a neighbour as a potential terrorist, the information would be sent to the police, a separate authority from the Jakarta government. But for street vending, the authority is the Jakarta government itself through the city security forces (Satpol PP), so the vague answer from the representative perpetuates the discriminative and marginalizing effect of Jakarta’s smart city system.
In spite of the contradictions in the Smart City adoption by the city government, the control room is one of the prided parts of the City Hall (Photo 3). The room’s sleek design features all-glass meeting room with degrees of transparency that can be controlled according to what the meeting leader wishes to show. One side shows the employees of Jakarta Smart City, working on their computers, while the other side shows a large screen as a combination of multiple smaller flat screens. The screens can display CCTV images from various corners of Jakarta, as well as presentation slides of the meeting leader. This particular display of technological advancement is not only exclusively done in Jakarta but is a common aspirational pattern across many cities in Southeast Asia, including Bandung, Surabaya, and Metro Manila.

On technological innovations and government programmes, the neighbouring city-state Singapore is often cited in aspired development visions of city governments, including Jakarta’s. Singapore also has its Smart Nation initiative, which the state defines as “one where people are empowered by technology to lead meaningful and fulfilled lives”. Empowerment by technology is defined as “harnessing the power of networks, data and info-comm technologies” to “improve living, create economic opportunity and build a closer community”. Encompassing five key domains of transport, home and environment, business productivity, health and enabled ageing, and public-sector services, the Smart Nation initiative calls for citizens and businesses to “co-create” solutions to current problems, for which the government promises to develop innovation-encouraging infrastructures and policies. “Co-creation”, in this case, is not the same as the “collaboration” mentioned earlier in the previous sub-chapter but is rather defined through opportunities that are associated to it in the Smart Nation initiative. This includes the Smart Nation Fellowship programme for data scientists, technologists, programmers or engineers; solicitation of partners for Smart Health solutions and call for proposals for Smart Shower Devices to reduce water consumption.
With the proliferation of technological advancements that potentially improves living conditions and public services in cities, Singapore further establishes itself as the aspired model of city development in the region, and in the world. Although in the liveable city ranking by the Economist Intelligence Unit marked it only as rank 46th out of 140 cities in 2016, it is still marked highly in providing a safe and stable habitat and still scores a high 88.7 average of a possible 100 marks for the index. Singapore’s achievement is inseparable from its widely recognised public housing programme that houses more than 80% of the resident population. The Housing and Development Board (HDB), a government statutory board that oversees public housing development, allocations and sales, is practically the largest developer in the city. This situation paves the way for Singapore’s Smart Nation initiatives with regards to home and living, such as the implementation of “smart technologies” and “smart home solutions” into HDB towns and estates. The government also maintains high control of land allocation and has the capacity of keeping records of all land parcels.

In such context, Singapore distances itself from other cities in the region, such as Jakarta or Metro Manila, that are still facing affordable housing issues. Furthermore, the government of Jakarta, no matter how it portrays its aspiration to be like Singapore in its official presentations about high-rise rental flats, does not have the capacity to be the biggest developer of the city, and urban development is still in the hands of oligarchies with spatial plans that can change through lobbying of the economically and politically powerful, such as what is now unveiled in the case of the Jakarta Bay reclamation projects.

The Urban Bias

The idealisation of Singapore as a model is also inseparable from the more general urban bias. The framing of cities as engines of economic growth have propelled more city-focused investments by multilateral development financing institutions. Most cities depend on energy, water and food supplies from the hinterlands and agricultural producers, but city dependency for these primary needs is often taken for granted. A question posed during the discussion in the Social City conference, which asks how cities should deal with the rural people’s dependency for subsidies, reflects this trend. Cities and urbanisation are favoured in development decisions because of its perceived contribution to the national GDP, for which primate cities of Southeast Asia often dominate. The city’s venerated position in the hierarchy of economic capabilities obscure the fact that it is based on flawed economic systems, in which the environment and hinterlands are insufficiently valued. For example, land is priced higher with a building on it compared to if it hosts a paddy field. Water catchment areas increase in market value if they become housing estates rather than remaining green areas to retain water.

The urban bias is probably one of the most challenging situations in the Social City programme. With its focus on development infrastructures, the operation of the programme may still be constrained within cities’ administrative boundaries, which are most likely incoherent with environmental and natural systems. Furthermore, participatory or collaborative developments within the city’s administrative boundaries are not guaranteed to break the urban bias for more sustainable environment. Unless the understanding of the Social City includes urban-rural spectrums and connections as integral parts of the city systems, and promotes transboundary collaborations, the programme will perpetuate the disconnect. This challenge is inherently political, and overcoming it requires holistic thoughts as well as commitment to social, environmental and spatial justice.

Conclusion: Participation, Collaboration and Inclusion

In promoting collaboration and public participation, the Social City programme has much potential to bring citizens back to city-making governance, and possibly retrofit the social understanding of the city into current ways of political and economic governance. However, in the implementation, the Social City programme needs to consistently maintain itself as the antithesis, or at least as an alternative, to
exclusive, individualistic and semi-authoritarian urban development concepts such as the technocratic and neoliberal Smart City or the Competitive City. The challenges faced in maintaining this consistency are at least three-fold.

First, the Social City programme pegs itself to development projects, and clearly indicates that it is not a social funding programme. The pegging to development projects can be a blessing, as it potentially brings back the focus on urban social visions with technology as a means rather than as an end in infrastructure projects. However, this potential can also be a curse, as infrastructure projects may already be subjected to path dependency to existing mechanisms, including the urban bias that marginalises rural hinterlands. Although ideally the Social City is trans-sectoral, some projects may already be attached to certain government sectors and administrative boundaries, and some sectors are more welcoming than others towards participatory, collaborative governance.

Secondly, there are powerful city actors whose interests may be challenged by collaborative and participatory governance approaches, as the programme potentially questions status quo to bring a more just allocation of space and resources. These actors may wield negative influence to obstruct the Social City initiative to maintain their reign. These may include, but are not limited to, big and powerful real estate developers that are focusing on mega projects, construction companies that are consistently getting government projects, or consultants and service providers whose profits may be cut with the change in development processes. As they are also part of the same city, the Social City programme also needs to take into account their existence and be prepared to encounter these interests.

Thirdly, the urban visions that are exclusive and semi-authoritarian may be hegemonic. As observed in the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017, Ahok still maintained popularity not only because he was painted as a victimised ethnic and religious minority, but also because of his campaign that offered Jakarta to be like Singapore. The idealisation of Singapore went as far as promoting design visualisations during one of the gubernatorial debates that portray Jakarta as a clean city with sparkling lights and Taman Kalijodo – site of eviction of hundreds of families in 2016 – as a clean and paved space. Ahok also kept display boards at the City Hall that highlighted evictions during his reign as achievements in making the city orderly. Not only are these Ahok’s campaign promises, they are also ideal visions of the good city for his voters. Pre-election surveys consistently showed that the majority of Jakarta residents were satisfied by his performance, which was associated with heavy-handed clearing of obstructions to his plans, even when those obstructions were also residents of the same city. The aspiration to have a strong but authoritarian leader is not just prominent in Jakarta, but also in other parts of Indonesia and in the region.

The hegemony of exclusive, orderly and semi-authoritarian city governance might be the hardest challenge that the Social City programme will face in the region, as leadership alternatives may not be up to the task to deliver the collaborative development projects or may have their own political stance that are also counter to the Social City’s inclusive vision. Claims to bring citizens back into city-making governance need to be critically analysed and question whether the initiatives empower the most disenfranchised groups in the city to have more negotiating power in development decisions or not. Gugun Muhammad remarked at the Social City conference, “You, the middle class and above, can afford to not vote. But we, the urban poor, cannot afford to not vote [in the gubernatorial election]. We had to change the governor, and our choices were very limited, but our livelihoods are really threatened if the incumbent wins (means the former Governor of Jakarta).”

As the legendary Pakistani architect, planner, activist, social researcher, writer and Social City conference speaker Arif Hasan shared about his more than 20 years’ experience as a housing activist in Karachi; the situation may change but may not get better, but the civil society just has to keep the struggle alive.
Notes


11 Runkel and Kiepe 2016, 2.

12 Ibid., 9.


14 Ibid., 4.

15 There had been several attempts to propose participatory, collaborative and inclusive housing developments during the governorships of Joko Widodo (2012-2014) and Ahok (2014-2017), such as the *Kampung Susun* proposals for Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo and the Muara Baru resettlement project. However, all were subjected to the path-dependent mechanisms of government-administered housing provision, ranging from unfulfilled promises (Bukit Duri), accusations of being illegal and labelling of community facilitators as trouble-making provokers (Kampung Pulo), and dismissal of participatory processes to favour the existing *rusunawa* (rental flat) policy and design template.

16 Rimmer and Dick 2009.


23 Lim 2017

Political contract was also one of the urban poor’s strategy in organising to negotiate political candidates’ agenda in the 2012 gubernatorial race, but the 2017 contract was drafted as a legally-binding personal contract with Baswedan. The more detailed contract was a result of their disappointment to the incumbent Ahok, whom they felt had violated the 2012 political contract because it was not legally binding.


Ibid.

Pow 2014.

Smartnation.sg


In April 2016, a Jakarta City Council member, Sanusi, was caught by the Corruption Eradication Commission of accepting bribe from developer Agung Podomoro Land to smoothen the approval of Jakarta’s offshore reclamation spatial plan. The reclamation project involves big developers in Jakarta, and the project is resisted by a coalition of activists and fisherfolk communities because of its adverse impact on the coastal communities’ livelihoods and environment.

Rimmer and Dick 2009.
About the author

Rita Padawangi is a Senior Lecturer at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS). She received her Doctoral Degree in Sociology from Loyola University Chicago in 2008. Her research interests span the sociology of architecture, participatory urban development, social movements, and public spaces. She is currently the Regional Facilitator for the Southeast Asia Neighborhoods Network (SEANNET), a research and pedagogical program with the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) funded by the Henry Luce Foundation. Her paper “Water, Water Everywhere: Toward Participatory Solutions to Chronic Urban Flooding in Jakarta” (with Mike Douglass) won the Holland Prize for best paper (2015) from Pacific Affairs Journal. She is the editor of Routledge Handbook of Urbanization in Southeast Asia (2018) and Cities by and for the People in Asia (with Yves Cabannes and Mike Douglass, Amsterdam University Press, 2018).

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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Indonesia Office
Jl. Kemang Selatan II No. 2A Jakarta 12730
Indonesia

Responsible:
Sergio Grassi | Country Director

Phone: +62 21 719 37 11
Fax: +62 21 717 913 58
Email: info@fes.or.id
Website: www.fes-indonesia.org

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