

**Supporting Indonesia's
Democratic Transition:
FES 10 Years after the Political Reform**

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Written by:
Paskal Kleden

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Not for Sale.

Foreword

In 2008 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) looks back on 40 years of cooperation with partner organizations in Indonesia. In particular, we look back on ten years of support for the democratization project known as “Reformasi.” During this period the focal points of FES activity have changed, but the main underlying motivation remains the same: To contribute to international dialogue and understanding, and the development of democracy, based on the social democratic core values of our organization, namely freedom, social justice, and solidarity.

This paper presents and reviews the past and current activities of FES in Indonesia, with a view to laying the foundations for a broader understanding of FES’s motives, aims, and activities. It shows that the historical change which started in Indonesia in 1998 with the beginning of Reformasi has led to a parallel change in the activities of FES Indonesia. While previously these activities were restricted mainly to support for cooperatives and government-controlled trade unions, Reformasi opened up a window of opportunity to add a core aspect of FES’s international portfolio, Democracy Promotion. And while at the beginning of Reformasi the object was democracy itself, FES can now focus more on supporting a socially just and economically prosperous form of democracy: Social Democracy.

In the following pages, all of these changes are illustrated and explained by former FES staff member Paskal Kleden. And this is also part of FES’s identity: A strong reliance on our local staff. Their efforts and motivation build bridges between

our various local partners and FES. We are very grateful for and proud of their long-term commitment.

We would also like to thank our various partners and the Indonesian authorities, whose contributions enable FES to continue to facilitate international dialogue, understanding, and the spread of democracy.

The insights of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of the Weimar Republic, and of Willy Brandt, former German Chancellor and former President of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, still neatly encapsulate FES’s core concerns:

“There is no freedom without democracy.”

and

“International cooperation is far too important to be left to governments alone.”

October 2008

Erwin Schweisshelm and Marius Mueller-Hennig

1. FES in Indonesia: A Short History

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) was founded in 1925 as a legacy of Friedrich Ebert, who started his career as a craftsman and became the first democratically elected German president. The Foundation started its activities in Germany, providing scholarships to students from working-class backgrounds. Having been reestablished after the Second World War, FES continued with the provision of scholarships for students, but also became engaged in political education and consultancy in Germany. Furthermore, it expanded its activities beyond Germany and today the Foundation has programs in more than 100 countries around the world. Like the other political foundations in Germany, FES is almost exclusively funded by the German state through annual allocations by Parliament.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung initiated its activities in Indonesia in 1966 by inviting a delegation of trade unionists to Germany to study industrial relations. In 1967 this program was followed by courses for trade unionists and officials of cooperatives that were conducted in Indonesia. This cooperation was made possible because the then Minister of Manpower and later Indonesian Ambassador to Germany, Professor Djamin Awaloeddin, was interested in FES's political education system and residential colleges in Germany and wanted to replicate this system in Indonesia. In addition, Mr. Awaloeddin developed a friendship with the then head of FES, Dr. Heinz Kühn. The personal relationship between former Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik and former

German Chancellor Willy Brandt also helped to start the FES Indonesia program. These instances of initial cooperation have led to what has become almost half a century of cooperation between the Foundation and its partners in Indonesia.

In July 1968, FES and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoI) signed the first framework agreement, which served as the basis for long-term cooperation. FES started its programs in Indonesia in the 1960s despite the fact that the country was under the authoritarian rule of the Suharto regime. At that time, development cooperation was influenced by Cold War considerations and Suharto seemed to be a promising Third World leader who could prevent the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. Since Germany was part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the anti-communist concern was understandable. FES motivations can also be understood if one remembers how communists and social democrats had competed for influence in the past. All these factors contributed to FES cooperation in Indonesia. Due to this Cold War paradigm FES did not cooperate with opposition forces in Indonesia: preventing the spread of communism was the main priority of cooperation. Only after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 cooperation with pro-democracy actors was significantly increased.



Friedrich Ebert

2. The FES Framework in International Development Cooperation

Despite the public funding they receive and their special relationships with political parties, Germany's political foundations are considered as independent. The German government knows that it is their independence that enables political foundations to fulfill unique functions in the promotion of international understanding compared to government institutions, such as the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Foreign Office (AA). While the main task of political foundations in the international domain is to contribute to democracy promotion, they can also provide forums for second track diplomacy –for official actors to meet in their informal capacities – and for third track diplomacy that involves non-state actors, such as persons from the NGO community. Nevertheless, receipt of public funds also entails certain restrictions on FES activities. It is important that FES's work does not negatively affect relations between the German and the host governments. This is an important consideration when choosing FES partners and activities.

The independence of German political foundations is sometimes also questioned because of their relations with German political parties. However, it should be noted that, despite this close relationship, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) does not and may not determine FES programs. FES is organizationally and financially independent from the SPD. The Foundation shares the party's values and ideologies, but is completely independent in choosing the programs it implements.

FES's independence is also reflected in whether and how FES chooses to operate in a country. FES can open a representative office and start its cooperation activities only after official approval from the host country. Therefore, it is hardly convincing to accuse FES of engaging in a form of foreign "intervention." Other criteria, such as the political importance of a country for Germany and whether it has a likeminded partner structure that includes trade unions, political parties and NGOs, are also considered in the process of opening an office abroad.

Unlike today, "political" development cooperation in Indonesia could not be freely conducted during the Suharto era. At that time, the Indonesian government preferred political stability in order to achieve economic development and did not allow political pluralism and political debate. The challenge for FES was how to cooperate with the Indonesian state without sacrificing its own principles, namely the promotion of social democracy and social justice, as well as peace and understanding between people. To solve this dilemma, FES opted for a soft approach in fostering liberal and democratic thinking. By supporting "de-officialization" in the Indonesian cooperative movement, FES in its cooperation with the Ministry of Cooperatives tried to contribute to the modernization of the ministry and so reduce government intervention in societal and economic processes, as well as corruption. This cooperation also appealed to the government of Indonesia because "Koperasi," as explained in the constitution, was considered to be one of the backbones of the economy. Programs with non-state actors, such as trade unions, women, and farmers, were conducted only in limited numbers and in ways that would not offend the government. Nevertheless, through its activities FES engaged its partners in dialogues on democracy, and thus indirectly prepared civil society actors for the time after Suharto.

After the fall of Suharto Indonesia's civil society mushroomed, causing FES's partner spectrum to grow tremendously. To respond to the demands from Indonesian civil society, human rights, democratization, independent media, free trade unionism, and electoral reform became the major topics of FES after 1998. The post-1998 era also opened up possibilities for programs in the domain of conflict resolution.

The sections below consist of a description of FES's and its partners' activities during the reform era and the challenges they face. They conclude with some lessons learned about democracy promotion in Indonesia.

3. The Traditional Scope of FES: Trade Union Support

As a social democratic political foundation historically close to the trade union movement in Germany, one of the missions of FES is to support free trade union work. FES carries the explicit mandate of the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) to represent the German trade union movement overseas. This mission is implemented in almost all countries in which FES is currently operating, including Indonesia. The program with trade unions started as early as 1969 with the BINAKOP project in North Sumatra in which FES assisted in the establishment of trade unions among rural laborers.

The political context in Indonesia during the New Order was very much against free trade unionism. For example, General Ali Mortopo explained in 1971 that "the distinction between workers and employers must go; only one class will remain, namely that of the *karyawan*."¹ The harmonious relationship between workers and employers was defined by so-called *Pancasila*² industrial relations, which compared industrial relations to family relations in which the state assumed the role of father to both capital and labor. This doctrine does not recognize the right to strike because strikes would be against the *Pancasila* way of conflict resolution that relied on mutual consultations. Especially in conflicts that



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¹ *Karyawan* means "employee." This terminology blurs the relationship between the working class and the bourgeoisie as used in Marxist terminology and was preferred by the state because it was believed to soften the opposition of workers towards the government.

² The basic philosophy of the Indonesian state consisting of five principles, namely: belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.

involved foreign investors the government always opted to support the entrepreneurs. However, trade unionism has changed after the Reform.

The context of trade union work after 1998 was influenced not only by the increasing political freedom, but also by the Asian economic crisis. Therefore, FES applied three different strategies to deal with these circumstances. First, it was necessary to improve relations between the Indonesian and the international trade union movements. This step was necessary to improve the bargaining position of Indonesian trade unionists, as well as to share some lessons learned from their more established international counterparts. Second, democratic trade unions needed to consider the interests of all members equally, and because the interests of women tend to be underrepresented it was necessary to improve the representation of women within trade unions. To address the shortcomings with regard to women's representation, FES held workshops about how women could present their interests more effectively. Third, the organizational capacity of trade unions needed to be improved so that they could become an independent, democratic, and effective representation of working people. In order to achieve these goals FES conducted workshops, trainings, and seminars.

Consolidation was and remains one of the weaknesses of Indonesian trade unions. Splits within trade unions due to the personal interests of the leadership significantly reduce their bargaining position towards government and employers. Therefore, FES sought to push consolidation by supporting the integration of trade unions into federations.

Another aspect that needed to be considered was the creation of opportunities for companies to outsource their production to developing countries in order to reduce their production costs. However, as is often the case, companies often apply different social standards in their home countries than in

others. Therefore, FES supported moves by trade unions and NGOs to monitor and implement labor standards in companies in the textile and shoe industries that supply German buyers such as Adidas and Karstadt/Quelle. In 2003, FES started the program on monitoring Codes of Conduct (CoC) that large German buyers have adopted for themselves to safeguard workers' rights and a decent level of social standards for workers in their supplying factories in Indonesia. Basically, FES efforts on CoC can be classified into two sorts of activities. First, the socialization of CoC that is conducted by the CoC Network – a network that consists of trade unionists from various federations – in different areas in Indonesia. The socialization of CoC has the purpose of raising workers' awareness of their rights and providing them with comparative knowledge about workers' rights in Germany. Second, FES organized surveys of factories in Indonesia that supply German companies. These surveys were initially conducted with the help of German trade unionists and the German NGO Suedwind e.V., and have the function of informing German consumers about whether or not German companies ensure good social standards in their supply chains in Indonesia. At least half of the participating trade unionists reported that introduction of the CoC and information provided to German consumers about working conditions in Indonesia has helped them to argue plausibly and convincingly for the implementation of better working conditions.

Despite the obvious successes, several challenges remain in strengthening trade union work in Indonesia. Splits within trade unions and low women's representation in leadership positions remain. Efforts to gender-mainstream trade union programs often collide with the traditional culture that prefers men as leaders. This development is disappointing, particularly in view of the fact that women pay their dues more regularly than men.

The contest for influence between trade unions and labor NGOs is also not beneficial for workers. Labor NGOs are more concerned about the socialization of norms and tend to act across social groups, while trade unions are concerned with improving the working situation of their members through training in labor law and improving members' bargaining techniques. Though these different functions can reinforce each other, NGOs and trade unions often compete for influence. International organizations such as FES are able to provide technical support and improve networking between local and international actors, yet success in improving working conditions in Indonesia still largely depends on the efforts of domestic trade unionists to solve their own differences and develop greater solidarity.



Dialog langsung dengan masyarakat lokal.

4. Expanding Programs into New Territories: Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Conflict Prevention

In the past, before the beginning of Reformasi, the Indonesian state often resorted to coercion when dealing with conflicts. FES and its partner organizations tried to address this problematic approach and help to shift the focus of attention to the more underlying causes of conflicts, such as the lack of political representation, as well as the unequal economic distribution between the capital city and the provinces. In a country that experiences a democratic transition such as Indonesia, programs on conflict prevention are crucial because formerly strong state institutions experience significant changes and can no longer legitimately resort to coercion as easily as during the authoritarian regime. At the same time, democratic institutions that ensure peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms are not yet fully embedded. During the transition period conflicts from Aceh to Papua destabilized Indonesia's political situation. FES, together with IDE, IPCOS, PPRP, and YLBHI, tried to develop and socialize mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. The work of PPRP in the Moluccas realized clear successes because the conflict could be settled by peaceful mediation.

FES also contributed to conflict resolution on the international level. In 2003 the Foundation organized a conference, together with the West Papua Network and Watch Indonesia!, on the special autonomy in Papua initiated by MPR Decree No. IV/1999 which promises Special Autonomy to Papua and pledges legal measures to address human rights violations. Although Special Autonomy in Papua has still not been settled, the

conference directed international attention towards Papua. The results of the seminar were publicized in a book titled *Autonomy for Papua: Opportunity or Illusion?*

Security Sector Reform was another important pillar in the process of *reformasi* and led to the implementation of supportive programs by FES in Indonesia. Since the Reform the military's political privileges have been reduced: for example, they no longer have a seat in the parliament; Indonesia now has a civilian Minister of Defense; and the military budget is determined by civilians in the parliament. In addition, MPR Decree No. VI/MPR/2000 stipulates a clear separation of functions between the military and the police force. The military in the reform era should focus on external defense, while the police should be responsible for domestic security. However, when FES started its SSR-related activities in 2000 the military maintained its influence in Indonesia, especially through its territorial command structure which enabled it to conduct business in the provinces and preserved its influence within local politics.

In German development cooperation and foreign affairs, security sector reform at that time was still in the very early stages and not high on the political agenda. Therefore FES first had to create awareness of the necessity of supporting security sector reform in Indonesia and organized a series of seminars in Berlin about the importance of involving the Indonesian military in the democratic transition process. This step was – and still is – regarded as crucial if in the future the military is to be under better civilian democratic oversight. After the workshop, the German government realized that assisting Indonesia in improving its democratic oversight of the military was crucial for the success of the country's democratic transition. Moreover, Germany could share some of the lessons it learned in establishing the civil oversight of the military initiated after the Second World War to prevent military dominance.

This series of workshops led to the approval of the FES SSR program that was initiated in Indonesia in 2001 with a focus on civil–military relations. It was necessary to discuss how a democratic country conducts oversight and control over its military. To strengthen the discourse of civilian oversight, FES invited Professor Thomas Meyer from the University of Dortmund to hold a debate on the rule of law, governance, and democracy with the National Resilience Institute (LEMHANNAS), a government think tank tasked with providing the President with recommendations and analyses on security issues. The cooperation with LEMHANNAS provided FES with the credibility to work with other government institutions in the security field.

Another military reform concerned the takeover of military businesses by the state, which is stipulated by Article 76 of Law No. 34/2004. This is an effort to improve state control over its military apparatus. The RIDeP Institute in cooperation with FES has conducted research in many provinces in Indonesia on military businesses. The results of the research were presented to government agencies and to the parliament to complete the government data on military businesses. The goal of this research is to assist the state in taking over as many military businesses as possible in 2009, regardless of whether they are large corporations or small companies.

Additionally, reform of the territorial command structures which is stipulated by Article 11 of Law No. 34/2006 is also not yet fully implemented. To promote reform in this field FES cooperates with LESPERSSI in discussing the effectiveness of territorial structures in the provinces by involving local government officials, the TNI, NGOs, and academia. The forum provided by LESPERSSI has the benefit of bringing all actors together and thus was able to create a holistic understanding of the effects of the territorial command structure.

Recommendations based on these discussions were handed to the Department of Defense in 2006.

FES and its partners also dealt with other security apparatus, such as the police and intelligence. A publication also produced in cooperation with the RIDeP Institute discussed, for example, the importance of reform within the police force.

Cooperation with the university-based think tank PACIVIS was conducted in the field of intelligence reform. During the New Order, the intelligence service was fully utilized for defending state interest, and civilian oversight was all but impossible, not least because of the lack of an intelligence bill. Against this insufficient legal background it was especially difficult to prevent and prosecute the significant human rights violations committed by the intelligence during that period. The activity with PACIVIS has produced two publications intended to improve the understanding of democratic oversight of the intelligence. The events with PACIVIS also strengthened the coalition of civil society actors concerned with intelligence which is under the coordination of this think tank.

Activities in the field of SSR advanced significantly in 2004 when the German government (at that time a coalition of the German Social Democratic Party and the Green Party) decided to boost its efforts in civil crisis prevention. The corresponding action plan on "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Consolidation" listed security sector reform abroad as one crucial aspect of civil crisis prevention and significant amounts of money have been earmarked since then for the support of SSR. As an interdepartmental initiative, involving different ministries, the lead lies with the German Federal Foreign Office. Indonesia was even chosen to be a model lighthouse partner country for the support of security sector reform. From this program, the German government provided funds to the Geneva

Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). DCAF is a Swiss-based international organization whose constituents are 49 governments, including Indonesia and Germany, and which specializes in SSR, with experience of working mainly in Eastern Europe and Africa. The Organization has at its disposal a vast network of experts consisting of academics, government officials, and members of parliament who are able to provide best practices of SSR from around the world. DCAF has chosen FES as its implementing partner organization in Indonesia. With this cooperation and the additional resources provided by DCAF, FES has been able to broaden the scope of its SSR programs.

The biggest challenge for SSR programs in Indonesia is the currently decreasing attention paid to SSR by donors. Many donors consider the SSR process to be completed, assuming that civilian supremacy over the military is already established. FES is one of the remaining organizations continuing its work in this domain, arguing that the SSR process is not yet over. Some important challenges still need to be addressed. One important domain in this regard is the strengthening and deepening of the parliament's capacity to meet the challenges of legislative oversight over the security forces. The recent timely and reasonable expansion of parliamentary support staff for Commission 1, which is concerned with these issues, provides a good opportunity for FES to continue and extend its efforts in the facilitation of capacity-building in this domain. Civil society actors that specialize in SSR are also still limited in number. Despite their significant contribution in terms of draft laws or research the impact of their work depends on the political situation, which at the moment is unlikely to move beyond the status quo. SSR is also of secondary interest for the media these days. Natural disasters, corruption, or violent crime tend to be more compelling topics to cover. The only thing that FES could do to

cope with this lack of interest is to keep journalists informed about developments in SSR. Without continued attention to SSR issues, the ongoing reform process in the security sector would lack a valuable and substantive source of constructive feedback. Therefore, it is crucial that, despite all the challenges, FES continues its work in keeping the SSR discourse in the public sphere.

5. Democracy Promotion since 2006: From Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Electoral Reform to Building Structures for Social Democratic Policy Making

After the fall of Suharto new opportunities arose for civil society to play a central role in Indonesian democracy, and topics that were considered as taboo under Suharto – such as how to address human rights violations, how to make political parties more accountable, and how to implement decentralization – could be discussed. For instance, FES instigated a discussion on Indonesia's decentralization, referring to Germany's federal system as an example. On this basis FES tried to promote a more equal political and economic distribution between the central government and the provinces.

Moreover, in order to cope with the challenges of the Reform era, in 1998 FES invited Professor Amien Rais, at that time leader of the National Mandate Party (PAN), together with six NGO representatives, to Germany to explain the course of the new reform movement to the FES leadership and Members of Parliament. The meeting provided input concerning how FES in particular and German cooperation in general could contribute to dealing constructively with the challenges and opportunities of post-Suharto Indonesia.

The general framework for assisting the reform movement was defined in two of three FES objectives, namely to contribute to the consolidation of the democratization process and to support the reform movement so that it can become a determining element in politics, economics, and society. These two objectives, embedded in FES's 1998 annual planning, were especially devoted to

addressing democracy promotion at that time and provided a framework for projects to support human rights, the rule of law, and electoral reform.

In 2000, FES organized a seminar with the youth branch of PAN and a seminar with the National Awakening Party (PKB) about openness and pluralism inside political parties. It is important to note that cooperation between FES and political parties in Indonesia is subject to certain crucial restrictions. So while the activities conducted by FES, such as seminars and trainings, are permissible, international organizations in general and FES in particular should not be involved in supporting institutional costs, election campaigns, or day-to-day internal party activities.

All in all, the activities of FES have focused on improving the “formal aspect of democracy” in Indonesia. However, reform has not progressed as far as many people hoped it would. Suharto's children are still in possession of their businesses, and corruption is still too often taken for granted in many areas. In other words, despite the fact that the political reform after the New Order has brought political freedom, social and economic reform have not been properly conducted. In recognition of this problem and in order to address these democratic shortcomings, FES realized that it needs to fine-tune its strategy.

In today's Indonesia democratic assistance by international organizations in general can be categorized into supporting the electoral process (for example, assisting in free and fair elections, and contributing to the creation of strong and democratic political parties), supporting state institutions (a competent legislature or a military under democratic oversight), and supporting civil society (for instance, strong trade unions, independent media, and active NGOs). All FES work falls into this scheme. However, in its democracy promotion program FES

recently decided to focus more intensively on the promotion of *social* democracy, in line with the Foundation's spirit. This new approach has been applied since 2006 and implemented through programs on social and economic reform and programs of political relevance for social democratic actors. Since 2007 FES has been supporting a network of social democratic movements. One avenue of support is the new quarterly *Jurnal Demokrasi Sosial* that organizes discussions and is edited by a team consisting of activists and academics with social democratic values.

Another pillar of democracy promotion is support for free and independent media. Press freedom enjoyed widely after the reform era still faces further challenges which derive mainly from the media themselves. First, instead of focusing on the provision of accurate information to the public, many media companies are simply established to reap profits. This leads to insufficient salaries for journalists, resulting in a culture of bribery that influences the accuracy and objectivity of the news being reported. Second, journalists in Indonesia come from various backgrounds, not necessarily related to journalism. Especially in the provinces journalistic skills such as reporting and investigating are still insufficient. These two issues need to be dealt with because otherwise it might reduce media credibility in the long run.

FES deals with these two issues in parallel. It addresses the low salaries of journalists by supporting the Alliance for Independent Journalists (AJI) that advocates better welfare for journalists, and conducts training to improve journalistic skills in the provinces. So far, such trainings have been conducted in Bali, Aceh, and Papua.

6. Securing Gender Balance – Gender Mainstreaming of FES Programs

Since FES is a social democratic political foundation gender mainstreaming and gender balance have been implemented at FES headquarters for a long time and have influenced FES internal policies, such as recruitment procedures: for instance, if a man and a woman apply for a position, and both have the same qualifications, FES would hire the woman, as long as underrepresentation of women persists.

Additionally, FES tried to contribute to gender balancing and mainstreaming in and via its offices abroad, and as a result of the FES coordination meeting in Hanoi in October 2006, all FES offices worldwide are now obliged to gender-mainstream their programs in order to enhance gender equity. It is considered important to improve the practice of democracy through a more balanced political representation in society, and to overcome poverty through more equal participation of men and women in the distribution of resources. Gender mainstreaming itself is considered only as a tool to achieve gender equality. In its strategy, besides gender mainstreaming, FES uses other tools, namely anti-discrimination and women's empowerment. Overall, FES programs on gender are based on the implementation of these three strategies.

It is important to note that gender has been an FES concern since 1995. To name a few examples, FES supported women's influence in trade unions, and tried to inform the public about women's working conditions through the magazine *Halo*, which was published in cooperation with Bupera in 2001.

FES also supported women committees in trade unions, such as ASPEK, that open up possibilities for women's participation. Furthermore, before the election in 2004 FES worked with many NGOs in socializing the importance of reaching the 30 percent women's quota in parliament, a target that has not yet been reached, but is laid down in the law concerning the upcoming elections in 2009. The representation of women in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD) remains off target, at 11 percent and 22 percent, respectively.

What is really new since 2006 is the effort to ensure that gender balance and gender mainstreaming are properly achieved and implemented, not only in Germany but also in all FES programs worldwide. Because this endeavor has some policy as well as administrative consequences, FES conducted a training with gender consultants from FES headquarters for its staffs in Asia in 2006. While in the past the number of men and women participants was considered as a sufficient indicator of gender balance, nowadays FES program officers also have to consider how their programs could have an equal impact on men and women. In addition, since 2006 gender analysis is applied in defining the overall objective (*Oberziel*) and the project objective (*Projektziel*) of FES programs around the world, so that programs can have a gender-balanced impact.

Indonesia has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) through Law No. 7/1984, but so far there have been no clear consequences for those who contravene this law, not least because the complex legal issue is still not sufficiently introduced and appreciated in Indonesian institutions. Research by *Jurnal Perempuan*, Indonesia's leading publication on gender issues, shows that in the provinces the budget for organizing sports competitions at district level is much

higher than the budget for women's education. Moreover, cultural barriers, such as the preference for sending sons instead of daughters to school, make gender equality in Indonesia especially difficult to achieve. However, it must be admitted that to gender-mainstream all programs can be complex. Especially in the SSR program gender mainstreaming still faces some significant challenges, not least because the number of women engaged in discussions on SSR issues is still limited.

Since 2006, the FES office in Jakarta has also had the special responsibility of coordinating gender activities in Southeast Asia with activities involving participants from all over the region and carried out by different FES offices. The forums created by FES are intended to share lessons learned between the different countries. For example, a regional conference in Bangkok in 2007 discussed how to get the women's quota inserted in legislation. Participants from Indonesia could share how it had been implemented in their country with participants from countries that do not yet have a women's quota.

Gender mainstreaming is a top-down approach and critics have considered it as undemocratic. However, FES realized that in order to guarantee more equal distribution of economic resources and greater political representation for women, gender mainstreaming is crucial.

7. The Aceh Experience: From Humanitarian and Material Assistance to Peace Building

The conflict in Aceh dates back to 1953 and several attempts had been made to find sustainable solutions for peace.

In recent years the peace process in Aceh has failed twice. The first talks, labeled the "Humanitarian Pause," were conducted in 2000 between the government of Abdurrahman Wahid and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). However, they soon broke down because they were not accepted by the Indonesian security forces, as well as the GAM, and thus resulted in behavior that exhibited no trust in the peace process. The second round of talks under the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri was initiated in 2002 and resulted in a document widely known as the Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (COHA) that stipulates the disclosure of GAM "placement sites," where they have concealed their weapons, and the "phased relocation" of TNI forces from Aceh. Nevertheless, because many crucial points in the COHA – for instance, concerning the common understanding of the NAD law (the former Special Autonomy Law for Aceh) that was fundamental to the GAM as starting point for the discussions – were unclear, the peace talks lost their legitimacy and soon the GAM and TNI started accusing each other of major violations, causing the peace talks to falter in 2003.

Development of the peace process after the tsunami was influenced by at least two important factors that have contributed to the current state of peace in Aceh. First, the human suffering and international presence in Aceh created an opportunity for the GAM to engage the Indonesian government in

dialogue. With the international presence in Aceh, it was unlikely that the government would use force against the GAM and risk its international credibility. Moreover, the GAM also had strong incentives to act peacefully and not to disrupt the humanitarian assistance provided to their fellow Acehnese. Second, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was elected in September 2004, a few months before the tsunami, and his Vice-President Jussuf Kalla were committed to creating peace in Aceh and had initiated secret negotiations already before the tsunami struck Aceh. Therefore, the tsunami provided only a window of opportunity for both the GAM and the government of Indonesia to resume negotiations and settle the conflict. In sum, developments in domestic politics bolstered by international attention stimulated and facilitated a new approach to conflict settlement in Aceh. In this political context, FES started its work in Aceh.

FES's Aceh program started as a response to the tsunami that hit this westernmost province of Indonesia on December 26, 2004. The program started with modest medical assistance to a humanitarian NGO, the People's Crisis Center (PCC).

As more funds became available, FES had the objective of assisting NGOs such as LBH Banda Aceh and KontraS Aceh in rebuilding their offices and of establishing a media center in cooperation with the Association of Independent Journalists in Banda Aceh (AJI Banda Aceh). The objective was not only to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, but also to strengthen civil society so that civil society actors would be able to contribute to and monitor the reconstruction process. Additionally, the Trade Union Care Center (TUCC)- Banda Aceh was established in cooperation with ASPEK in Jakarta to strengthen the still weak trade union movement in Aceh. Funds for TUCC were obtained from the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), which was truly

committed to supporting the colleagues in Aceh. In short, FES used three sources of funds to kick start its Aceh program: FES's own budget, private donations, and funds from DGB. Unlike the typical FES programs on civic education, this initial stage of activities in Aceh included mainly humanitarian and material assistance, and was conducted with a very limited budget.

However, the Aceh program soon developed into a long-term program of FES Indonesia, ranging from trade union, gender, and security sector reform to democracy promotion and the support of free media. These programs were made possible mainly by additional funding from Germany earmarked for post-tsunami support in Aceh. In March 2006 FES started its cooperation with GeRaK and ICW, two anti-corruption NGOs, to monitor the implementation of aid. By implementing this program FES assisted not only the Acehnese, but also the foreign donors who were interested in knowing how well their funds were being spent on the ground. GeRaK's findings, for instance, included houses that were not built according to the initial plan for which a budget was pledged.

In order to assess the conflict situation in Aceh and plan its future programs accordingly, FES conducted the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). This research was conducted with the cooperation of German researchers. One of the landmarks of FES programs in Aceh – democracy training for former GAM combatants – derives from the recommendations of this study. It acknowledged that there were insufficient efforts to include the GAM in the peace process on the part of foreign donors. Nonetheless, their involvement in the development efforts is crucial to prevent future conflicts. Furthermore, the study also identified that, due to the long duration of the conflict, democracy in Aceh has not yet been sufficiently introduced and popularized. Questions such as the origin of democracy,

the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and voters' rights need to be addressed if a long-term peace based on democratic values and practices is to be achieved. For this reason democracy trainings have to be conducted in order to tackle this lack of understanding of democratic politics.

FES was one of the first organizations to include former GAM fighters in their activities. The cooperation was conducted through an NGO related to the GAM called the Association for Peace and Democracy Aceh (PPDA). The Olof Palme International Center, a Sweden-based organization that works on international and security issues, started to cooperate with FES in 2007 in supporting democracy trainings. Teaching materials include the theoretical aspects of democracy, such as the role of political parties in a democracy, as well as practical skills such as time management, moderation, presentation, and leadership, as well as teamwork and communication. The trainings are meant for trainers who are supposed to pass on the knowledge to others in their areas. In 2007, the trainings included around 500 participants from various districts in Aceh.

Based on the Helsinki MoU signed between the GAM and the Government of Indonesia, the way in which Aceh should be governed in the future should be based on the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) which will replace the Special Autonomy Law for Aceh implemented since 2001. This law was passed by parliament on July 11, 2006, and stipulates among other things how independent candidates could run for local executive positions. FES assisted in socializing this new law and provided, in cooperation with the NGOs DEMOS and IPCOS, capacity-building related to how civil society could demand more transparency and accountability from their local governments.

One of the remaining challenges for Aceh is the issue of how the province should continue its development once foreign aid is

no longer available; also, it remains to be seen how gender equality and other aspects which are considered as "Western" can come to be widely accepted by Acehnese society. Furthermore, in comparison to post-tsunami Aceh in 2005 international attention has fallen away dramatically. Whether with the Syariah Law Aceh will be able to attract foreign investment is another issue to be solved. However, so far the case of Aceh can be considered as one of the most successful stories of peaceful conflict resolution both domestically and internationally.

8. Lessons Learned from Supporting Indonesia's Democratic Transition

This last section discusses FES strategy in implementing its projects in Indonesia. Overall, this strategy is a result of FES's working ethos and objectives, the Indonesian political environment and culture, the available budget, and the office's administrative capacity.

- Bridging Different Levels of Interests in Development Cooperation

Mutual consultations among all parties are of the utmost importance in development cooperation. Otherwise, foreign organizations can easily be accused of having a "hidden agenda," using development mechanisms to promote their own purposes. Experiences from the Cold War era when developed countries utilized development cooperation simply to achieve their own political goals remain a problem, and the question of why international organizations such as FES are willing to spend public funds in other countries for "good purposes" still linger in nationalist circles. Therefore, it is critical to confirm the cooperative character of development support, meaning that the mutual interests of all parties are accounted for. In the era of globalization turmoil in one country can lead to turmoil in other countries, while on the other hand opportunities in one country can also become opportunities for other countries.

It is clear that developed countries want to achieve certain objectives with the public funds they provide to organizations such as FES which are engaged in international development cooperation. There are practical as well as idealist motivations. First, developed

countries consider it important that developing countries share certain core values which are crucial with regard to democracy and human rights. It is widely believed that countries with democratic values and systems tend not to go to war with each other, and thus better cooperation can be achieved. Second, it is in the interest of donor countries to ensure that universal rights are achieved not only within their own borders, but also in other countries. This is the rationale behind programs that support human rights, or programs that support the socialization of ratified international conventions such as the CEDAW. Third, development cooperation is conducted according to demands and priorities of the corresponding organization's domestic constituency. For example, FES support of the trade union movement in Indonesia derives from the solidarity of German trade unions with trade union movements in Indonesia and worldwide.

At the same time, local partners have their own interests that they want to achieve through cooperation with foreign organizations. Instead of being the implementers of foreign objectives, local organizations try to identify common goals and opportunities to achieve their own interests. In considering their cooperation with a foreign actor, funds are not the only consideration. Local organizations also consider how much control their international partners require, and the possibility of mission drift. The interests of local organizations are as follows. First, they can gain financial support for their activities. In Indonesia, it is still very seldom the case that NGOs can fund their programs through domestic sources, thus reliance on international support is still substantial. Second, local partners can gain access to international resources and thus improve their network of advocacy abroad. Networking has always been a motivation for attending international conferences and forums. Third, local organizations can learn the management

systems of their international partners and so improve their own internal management.

In the course of its work in Indonesia FES must consider how to cope with these different interests. The overall development objectives for every country, the *Oberziele*, are redefined every three years. These redefinitions take place in close coordination between the Department for International Development Cooperation at FES headquarters and each Resident Country Director. FES can have several *Oberziele* that determine the framework of its projects in Indonesia. The role of the FES Resident Director is crucial in ensuring that discussions with partner organizations and the priorities of the host country are reflected in the overall objective. The overall development goal is a broad target – for example, “the democratization process is consolidated” – and its achievement is supported by many project objectives. In addition, projects should always operate within the framework provided by FES headquarters for the Foundation's international activities, namely the promotion of democracy, social justice, and international cooperation.

This consultation mechanism bridges the goals of FES and its local partners. To ensure their ownership of the project FES encourages its partners to develop and adapt their own strategies in achieving the goals which are jointly decided upon. Very seldom do the FES Resident Director or Program Officers intervene in partners' strategies. Usually adjustments are made only on the basis of financial and administrative considerations.

- Creating Trust with State and Non-State Actors

FES needs to work with civil society as well as government actors for at least two reasons. First, its purpose of facilitating mutual understanding cannot be achieved without the involvement of different actors. Without all parties coming to the table it would be

impossible to obtain a holistic understanding of an issue. A complete understanding can be achieved only by reflecting different points of view, and thus the involvement of different parties is imperative. Second, working with some government agencies can increase the Foundation's credibility when dealing with other government agencies that are not familiar with the work of a foreign organization that cooperates with Indonesian civil society. They often assume that foreign development agencies could undermine Indonesia's national interest, namely the country's security. FES is widely known among the Departments of Manpower and Foreign Affairs, and the National Resilience Institute. FES's reputation is also well known among civil society actors. Thus, it is usually relatively easy to cooperate with NGOs, even those not familiar with FES's work. However, the Foundation's work and reputation are widely unfamiliar to state apparatuses in the provinces, such as the Indonesian military (TNI) working in territorial commands in Indonesia.

Some of the middle ranking officers invited to participate in discussions so far have had little exposure to foreign cooperation and are sometimes skeptical of the role of foreigners in democracy promotion. To gain their trust FES is applying a two-pronged approach. First, the Foundation works with local partner organizations which are well connected among policy circles in Jakarta. Members of these organizations come from academia or NGOs and have developed a reputation among the military for their expertise, and are often requested to provide input to the Department of Defense. By this means it is often possible to involve the security forces themselves, even in public events at which their concerns and reservations can be addressed and eased in the course of constructive discussions. In that way, cooperation with international actors becomes a more common and less suspect thing. There are numerous forms of bilateral

cooperation today, and cooperation with non-state actors can be compared to cooperation with state actors. Second, FES can establish its credentials by explaining its cooperation with government institutions such as the National Resilience Institute or the Department of Manpower. Reference to activities that involve members of parliament or in which FES facilitates a forum between government officials in Indonesia and Germany can also be useful. Having the backing of the German government in its work is therefore beneficial for FES. Third, especially in the field of security, program officers are often accused of "selling out" their country to foreigners by providing sensitive information. Therefore, it is important to assure all concerned actors and institutions that the information made available through FES work, such as research, is delivered publicly to interested domestic as well as international constituents, and that there is no information that is secretly used for purposes that could endanger Indonesian national security.

Another important domain of possible misunderstanding is rooted in FES's identity, namely social democracy. This political orientation is often misunderstood as something close to the ideology of Communism, and thus is sometimes considered as a potential threat. Remembering the conflict between the New Order government and the Communist Party (PKI) in the past, this suspicion is understandable, even though Social Democracy and Communism in fact are mutually exclusive concepts. Therefore, whenever necessary this fundamental difference needs to be explained in order to avoid history and culture based misunderstandings.

One means of avoiding these and other misunderstandings is the transparent conception of FES activities. Therefore, a timely report on annual activities to the State Secretariat (Setneg), which functions as the

umbrella partner organization for all German political foundations in Indonesia, is one of the most important requirements that the Foundation has to comply with. All activities and their impacts have to be explained in detail. Providing comprehensive information about FES activities prevents the development of distrust among state institutions.



FES Indonesia *all staf.*

9. Achievements

In ten years of Reformasi in Indonesia, FES has achieved results that are both tangible and intangible. Some of the tangible results are plain, such as the establishment of new organizations, publications, and draft laws.

Nevertheless, working in the field of democracy promotion, FES's most important achievements are rather intangible. The problem with these intangible results is not only that they are not visible, but also that many other factors, such as the activities conducted by other organizations and domestic political progress, contribute to them. Moreover, some people tend to see the achievements of a program only in terms of its concrete and final results. For instance, a program on gender balance in the parliament is considered to be successful only if the targeted women's quota is achieved. However, in democracy promotion it is not just the final result that matters, but rather how the program contributes to the process as a whole. This is important because some of the impacts of a program can be observed only with the passage of time. But it can already be stated that the activities of FES and other organizations in democracy promotion have definitely made some modest contributions to the successful process of democracy in Indonesia.

The abovementioned problems can be overcome by looking at three different types of achievement. The first is creating awareness of a certain issue. When a new idea of democratic universal value becomes a need for certain groups, this can already be considered as an achievement, despite the

fact that a more concrete final goal has not yet been achieved. For example, in Indonesia gender balance is now a topic of serious discussion. Though the 30 percent quota has not yet been reached, this can already be considered as a success on the part of the groups involved in the process.

Through its programs FES has contributed significantly to the understanding and spread of democratic values. Books on the role of the military in a democracy, or on how democratic political parties should be managed, as well as other publications and seminars, have undoubtedly contributed to the development of democratic discourse in Indonesia, which is as important as the establishment of formal democratic institutions.

The second type of achievement is the delivery of targeted output. A draft law created through an FGD is already an achievement, even though the final version passed by the parliament might include only a few points from this draft law. FES work also has contributed to the socialization of international conventions such as the CEDAW, and local laws such as the LoGA. This work is important to ensure that what has been achieved in the legal domain at both the international and the domestic levels is put into practice.

The third type of achievement is an activity's concrete positive impact. In development cooperation it can be argued that this is the most difficult kind of achievement. However, international organizations must ensure that they not only produce certain "outcomes" but also have a visible and sustainable impact such as the creation of a trade union network in Aceh for the first time.

In general, FES contributions to Indonesia within the last ten years can be categorized as follows:

Tangible Achievements

1. Publications on social democracy, trade union issues, conflict studies, media freedom, security sector reform, local governance, and gender.
2. The establishment of the Trade Union Care Center in Banda Aceh that consolidates trade unions in Aceh province.
3. Delivery of draft laws in the fields of labor and security sector reform. These draft laws are made available through the contribution of FES's local partner organizations. Draft laws are presented to certain commissions in the House of Parliament or government agencies, or are distributed to universities and think tanks to stimulate further discussions.

Intangible Achievements

1. Establishing a network among social democratic actors through seminars and focus group discussions.
2. Training for trainers which enhances the skills and knowledge of participants concerning how to contribute to democratic governance.
3. Building awareness of universal democratic values through its publications, seminars, and workshops.
4. Contributing to peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms through dialogue.
5. Improving journalists' reporting and investigating skills.
6. Providing a forum of interaction for state and non-state actors.
7. Sharing of Indonesian and international lessons with other countries through participation in international forums.
8. Improving mutual understanding between Indonesia and Germany.

cooperation, and these possibilities have led to significant results, which are documented within these pages. Hopefully this report is able to capture the spirit and achievements of FES in Indonesia, and at the same time responds to some unanswered questions about the Foundation's strategies, funding, and relations to the various actors of democracy.

The ten years after the Reform constitute only a short period of time. Nevertheless, the Reform opened up new possibilities for

Annex Abbreviations

AA : Auswaertiges Amt (German Federal Foreign Office)	dan Studi Strategis Indonesia
AJI : Aliansi Jurnalis Independen	LoGA : Law on Governing of Aceh
ASPEK : Asosiasi Pekerja	Setneg : Sekretariat Negara (State Secretary)
BINAKOP : Pembinaan Koperasi	MoU : Memorandum of Understanding
BMZ : Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)	MPR : (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat – People's Consultative
CEDAW : Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women	NAD : Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
COHA : Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement	NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CoC : Code of Conduct	NGO : Nongovernmental Organisation
DCAF : Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces	PACIVIS : Center for Global Civil Society Studies
DEMOS : Lembaga Kajian Demokrasi dan Hak Asasi (Center for Democracy and Human Right Studies)	PAN : Partai Amanat Nasional
DGB : Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund	PKB : Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Nation Awakening Party ?)
DPD : Dewan Perwakilan Daerah	PCC : People's Crisis Centre
DPR : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat	PCIA : Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
FES : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung	PPDA : Perhimpunan Perdamaian dan Demokrasi Aceh
FGD : Focus Group Discussion	PPRP : Pusat Pemberdayaan untuk Rekonsiliasi dan Perdamaian (Centre for Empowerment of Peace and Reconciliation)
GAM : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – The Free Aceh Movement	PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia (The Indonesia Communist Party)
GeRaK : Gerakan Anti Korupsi (NGO in Aceh – Anti Corruption Movement)	RIDeP : Research Institute for Democracy and Peace
Gol : Government of Indonesia	SWP : Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
ICW : NGO- Indonesian Corruption Watch	SPD : Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Socialdemocratic Party)
IDE : Indonesian Institute for Democracy Education	SSR : Security Sector Reform
IPCOS : Institute for Policy and Community Development Studies	TNI : Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military)
LBH : Lembaga Bantuan Hukum – Legal Aid Institution)	TUCC : Trade Union Care Centre
LEMHANNAS : (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional- National Resilience Institute)	YLBHI : Yayasan Lembaga Bnantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)
LESPERSSI : (Lembaga Studi Pertahanan	