The rights-based welfare state
Public budgets and economic and social rights

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The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights commits the States parties to »take steps ... to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant ...«. While this »progressive realization« clause is typically seen as a weakness it can also be turned into a strength: with this provision, the way States mobilize resources and how they define their spending priorities become human rights issues, allowing human rights bodies to scrutinize public budgets.

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has sought to clarify the content of the duty to devote the »maximum available resources« to the progressive realization of the Covenant rights by setting forth four »constitutional background norms«: the duty of non-retrogression, the priority to be given to the fulfillment of core obligations, and the requirements of non-discrimination and of participation. These norms remain insufficient, however, as tools to examine States’ compliance. Instead, the conceptual framework to guide States should allow to consider resource mobilization jointly with spending, and to relate both to outcomes.

Addressing budgetary choices against the requirements of the Covenant means turning to the background causes of the lack of realization of rights by examining the macroeconomic choices, the fiscal policies, or the considerations that guide the public budget. And it means considering how tax policies are set and how budgetary choices are made. The substantive norms that should guide budgetary choices should be combined with strong procedural requirements: it is by strengthening democratic decision-making in budgetary choices that we can overcome the tension between the external supervision of such choices, and democratic self-determination.
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Preface¹

On 11 January 1944, at a time when it was already becoming clear that the United States (US), together with the other Allied Powers, would be emerging victorious from the Second World War, President F.D. Roosevelt delivered the annual State of the Union address. This was his tenth State of the Union, and the last of his third presidential mandate. This time however was different. He spoke not before Congress, but from the White House: exhausted by his recent intercontinental trips and having to cope with the flu, he found it more convenient to deliver the address on the radio and to send a written message to the Congress. But the reason the speech is still celebrated today² is neither because of its timing—announcing the US’s vision for a »lasting peace« after the war shall have been definitively won—nor because of the circumstances in which it was delivered; it was because of its content.

Roosevelt called for the adoption of what he called a »Second Bill of Rights«, which would complement the civil and political freedoms already listed in the American Constitution. »We cannot be content«, he stated, »no matter how high that general standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people—whether it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth—is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill housed, and insecure«. He explained:

This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of certain inalienable political rights—among them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty.

As our Nation has grown in size and stature, however—as our industrial economy expanded—these political rights proved inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.

We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. „Necessitous men are not free men.“ People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.

In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or creed.

Among these are:

- The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation;
- The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
- The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living;
- The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;
- The right of every family to a decent home;
- The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;
- The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;
- The right to a good education.

All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being.

The speech left a considerable legacy. It provided the foundations for the work that the Commission on Human Rights would conduct in 1946–1948 within the newly established United Nations Organisation, when it prepared the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. F.D. Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, and he therefore left the stage too early to see the ripple effects of his advocacy for economic and social rights.

¹ This contribution traces its origins back to a seminar organized in Geneva in February 2016 with Members of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the support of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The author is grateful to the participants in the workshops held at Yale Law School on 29 November 2016 and at the London School of Economics and Political Science (Law and Development Research Group) on 13 January 2017 for the very constructive comments received on those occasions.

But it is his widow, Eleanor Roosevelt, now acting as representative of the US, who chaired the working group which prepared the Declaration, the document which was the departure point of the «great adventure» of human rights within the UN system. When the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shortly before midnight on 10 December 1948, by forty-eight votes in favour and eight abstentions, it listed for the first time economic, social and cultural rights—such as the right to health, the right to food, or the right to education—alongside civil liberties such as freedom of religion or freedom of expression, and political rights such as the right to free elections.

FDR’s Second Bill of Rights may not have been endorsed by the US Congress, but it did have universal appeal.

Social Rights as Investment

The reasons for Roosevelt’s turnaround had to do with the failure of the measures he had initially enacted, and with the success of a «Share Our Wealth» campaign led by a senator from Louisiana, Huey P. Long, which made FDR’s initial reforms look shy in comparison. There were also strictly economic reasons for this shift, however, which prepared the ground for establishing the Welfare State in the US. Today, we would refer to these reasons as «Keynesian». But John Maynard Keynes had barely been heard of at the time at the White House — indeed, Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money only appeared the year following the turn inaugurated with Roosevelt’s «second hundred days» of autumn of 1935. The key policy recommendations that followed from Keynesian macroeconomics had been foreshadowed in the US, however, by authors such as Stuart Chase or John Maurice Clark, who were among the main intellectual influences behind the Second New Deal. Like Keynes, these authors saw inequalities and the lack of purchasing power of the poor as the key obstacle to the economy’s ability to overcome depression, which, again like Keynes, they explained by underinvestment. Thus, Stuart Chase expressed the view in 1932 that «It is not so much overproduction as underconsumption which is the appalling fact… Millions of tons of additional material could readily be marketed if purchasing power were available. Alas, purchasing power is not available.» Clark argued that spending on public works could be an «antidote to oversaving» and could «increase general purchasing power in order to offset the decrease due to industrial contraction». Henceforth, these authors argued in substance, social rights should no longer be seen as a burden on public finance; they should be conceived of as investments that, in the end, would pay back—with interest.

Yet, however much a visionary F.D. Roosevelt may have been, there was one point in respect of which his proposal for a Second Bill of Rights remained cast
in the traditional mould: he did not believe courts were equipped to protect the rights he listed—the right to a home, to healthcare, to «good education», or to food. For these rights to be implemented, the lawmaker had to intervene: though the slogan was for a Second Bill of Rights, the call was addressed to Congress to enact legislation that would allow these rights to become a reality. »I ask the Congress to explore the means for implementing this economic bill of rights«, Roosevelt pleaded in his 1944 State of the Union address, »for it is definitely the responsibility of the Congress so to do«. Courts could intervene, perhaps, to protect people from restrictions to free speech, from unreasonable searches and seizures, or from cruel or unusual punishments; but where rights were seen to require the mobilization of resources, and thus to have budgetary implications, legislative action was required.

Courts and Public Budgets

That was the understanding of the times, and it remains to a large extent the understanding today: though the jurisprudence enforcing economic and social rights through courts has made significant progress in recent years—led, remarkably, by courts in the global South10—there remains a widespread scepticism concerning the ability of courts to adjudicate on rights such as the right to food, the right to housing, or the right to education. The scepticism is based on a number of grounds, including the allegedly indeterminate nature of these rights and, in domestic legal systems, the risks to the principle of separation of powers that would result from judges making choices that should best be left to the Legislature or the Executive.

At the heart of the question of justiciability of economic and social rights, however, are the budgetary consequences of imposing on States (or, within the State, on other branches of government), that they comply with such rights. It is largely due to these budgetary consequences that the so-called multipolarity problem emerges: courts or quasi-judicial bodies generally make decisions on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the interests of the individual litigant, which per definition would make them ill-suited as fora to decide on society-wide issues—such as how to rank priorities in spending between education, health, public housing, or defence, or whether it is more important to save the life of one individual requiring expensive life-saving medical treatment or to free funds for primary healthcare services to reach more people in impoverished areas11. It is also because of these budgetary consequences that the ability of courts to decide on economic and social rights is regularly challenged. Courts cannot decide on budgetary matters, it is alleged, both because they lack the necessary expertise and because they lack legitimacy to assess how trade-offs should be made between various policies that compete for financial support—how much should go, for instance, to education as opposed to healthcare or to national security, and whether a tax system is sufficiently progressive to allow for the fulfillment of economic and social rights.

This is why tools should now be developed to allow independent monitoring bodies, including courts, to assess the budgetary choices made by States. Criteria have increasingly been developed to allow such bodies to examine alleged violations, for instance, of the right to food, the right to health, or the right to social security, considered separately: the normative content of economic and social rights have gradually been clarified, and our understanding of the abstentions and actions required from the State has significantly improved since the 1980s. But


11. See, for example, Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1999), 95: »How can judges, in deciding a single case, take account of annual ceilings on government spending? Unlike a legislature, a court is not vested at any one time to a particular case. Because they cannot survey a broad spectrum of conflicting social needs and then decide how much to allocate to each, judges are institutionally obstructed from considering the potentially serious distributive consequences of their decisions. And they cannot easily decide if the state made an error when concluding, before the fact, that its limited resources were more effectively devoted to cases A, B, and C, rather than to case D (…).«.
it still is tempting for States to argue that they lack the resources required to fully implement such rights, or to argue that they face a number of competing priorities, that cannot all be met simultaneously. As long as monitoring focuses on specific rights, they shall tackle the symptoms rather than the causes: they shall consider the impacts on the right to health, say, of a lack of investment in primary health care centres, or the impacts on the right to food of a failure to adopt a progressive taxation system. But a scrutiny thus conceived shall address neither the wrong ranking of spending priorities as such, nor the failure to mobilize sufficient resources for the fulfillment of economic and social rights in general.

Addressing budgetary choices means turning to the background causes of the lack of realization of rights. It means moving beyond an approach proceeding on a right-by-right basis, towards a more holistic approach—examining the macroeconomic choices, the fiscal policies, or the considerations that guide the preparation of the public budget, as they may affect the realization of all the rights that require support. And it means considering how tax policies are set and how budgetary choices are made, and not only how policies are set in the sectors relevant to the implementation of economic and social rights—employment, education, health, housing or social protection.

What follows, therefore, is an attempt to shift the focus of the efforts to monitor compliance with economic and social rights. While the justiciability of these rights is increasingly acknowledged, the task shall remain unfinished until we also can assess budgetary choices, by which the States create—or fail to create—the conditions allowing for the realization of these rights. This means moving from the impacts, on each right, of fiscal and economic policies, to these policies themselves: from the consequences to the underlying causes.

1. Introduction

Under which conditions can we move to a rights-based approach to welfare? Are independent bodies such as courts equipped to assess how States mobilize resources, in particular through taxation, and how they set their spending priorities? Can economic and social rights, as stipulated in international human rights law, provide a reliable benchmark for such an assessment?

These questions are central to the interpretation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights12. The Covenant was adopted in 1966 in order to protect, in the form of a binding international treaty, the economic and social rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1948, placing the promotion and protection of human rights at the heart of the post-Second World War reconstruction. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights commits the States parties to »take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures13«. This »progressive realization« clause is typically seen as a weakness—as an indication that economic, social and cultural rights are still undervalued in the international human rights regime in comparison to the more »classical« civil and political rights. In the discussion of the Covenant I propose here, I argue that it can instead be a strength. With this provision, how States mobilize resources and how they define their spending priorities become human rights issues. Such decisions cannot be left to the arbitrary and capricious choices of States: they can and must be subject to a searching inquiry by courts and other bodies in charge of enforcing the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Thus, what looks like an infirmity may become a powerful tool, allowing human rights bodies to scrutinize public budgets. For the potential of the progressive realization clause to be fulfilled however, the ambiguities obstructing its use should be dissipated. The Covenant imposes on States that they seek to mobilize resources, both domestically and internationally, and that they dedicate sufficient budgets to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights14. But what, exactly, does this mean? Unless we define more precisely the


14. While the emphasis here is on financial resources, it is acknowledged that other resources, including human and technological, should be mobilized to that effect. See Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the »Maximum Available Resources« to Realizing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 693–714.
implications of this vague wording, allowing domestic actors and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to address issues of taxation and spending in the light of the Covenant’s requirements, we run the risk of this essential contribution of the Covenant remaining a dead letter: the duty of progressive realization—as a duty to design public budgets and to implement macro-economic policies with a view to fulfilling economic, social, and cultural rights—will either be ignored entirely, or considered in a purely ad hoc fashion, raising the suspicion that any such assessment will be biased and the debate politicized. In the absence of a clearer understanding as to the content of this duty, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may be tempted to retreat to safer waters (focusing, say, on the need to combat discrimination or to protect control of indigenous peoples over their lands and territories, rather than on levels of corporate taxes or of investments in the educational system of the State concerned); and any suggestion that independent monitoring bodies, including courts, might have some role to play in assessing budgetary choices, will be dismissed as fantasy.  

This study seeks to fill this gap. It proceeds in five steps. Chapter II considers how the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has sought to clarify the content of the duty to devote the »maximum available resources« to the progressive realization of the Covenant rights. It refers to the four »constitutional background norms« that the Committee has relied on in assessing the budgetary choices of States. It argues that these norms—the duty of non-retrogression, the priority to be given to the fulfillment of core obligations, and the requirements of non-discrimination and of participation—remain insufficient to provide monitoring bodies with the tools allowing them to examine whether the States parties comply with the duty of progressive realization of Covenant rights. Next, Chapter III considers the argument according to which the quest to define the duties of States as regards resource mobilization and allocation choices may be misguided, and may in fact undermine the credibility of economic, social and cultural rights as rights. Two versions of this argument are considered, referred to respectively as the »violations approach« and the »outcomes-based approach«. Both versions have in common that they seek to dispense with the need to measure whether the efforts of States parties to the Covenant to fulfill economic, social and cultural rights, are sufficient to comply with the »progressive realization« clause. These approaches, however, tend to undermine the specificity of the rights protected by the Covenant, and they miss the subversive dimension of the duty to devote the »maximum available resources« to the »progressive realization« of these rights: instead of providing human rights bodies with a sound framework allowing them to inquire into budgetary choices of States, they may result in shielding such choices from any meaningful scrutiny, except in the most extreme cases of misallocation of resources.

If defining this duty is a burden we must accept, how can we hope to do so? Chapter IV proposes a simple conceptual framework to that effect, emphasizing the need to consider resource mobilization jointly with spending, and to relate both dimensions to outcomes—i.e., to the effective levels of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights from the point of view of the beneficiary. Chapters V and VI then develop the implications of the resources-spending-outcomes (R-S-O) framework, examining in turn resource mobilization and the definition of spending priorities. Chapter V focuses on three sources of State revenue in particular: the royalties from the exploitation of natural resources; taxation; and international support through development assistance or financial loans. Chapter VI then examines spending choices, reviewing the various attempts that have been made in the academic literature to define how such choices should be assessed. The ultimate quest of this literature is to identify a methodology through which the budgetary choices of the State and their macro-economic policies—as reflected, for instance, in the levels of social transfers or in the attention paid in public budgets to the health and education sectors—can be assessed in the light of the norms of the Covenant. I conclude,  

15. See, for example, Michael J. Dennis and David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health? American Journal of International Law 98, no. 3 (2004): 462–515.
however, with a plea for combining strong procedural requirements linked to budgetary decision-making, with the substantive norms that should guide budgetary choices: only by strengthening democratic decision-making in budgetary choices can we overcome the tension between the external supervision of such choices, whether by domestic or by international monitoring bodies, and democratic self-determination.

This short volume thus offers to explore the potential of the «progressive realization» clause for introducing public budget analysis in the practice of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, by proposing a conceptual framework to guide the discussion. The reader should be cautioned, however, against the temptation to treat the progressive realization clause as one that excludes any possibility for courts to step in, without having to rely on such public budget analysis, to enforce the rights of the Covenant. This conservatism is the reverse side of the first: just like it would be a missed opportunity not to exercise scrutiny of budgetary choices on the basis of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it would be wrong to dismiss the possibility that the requirement of progressive realization can only be imposed once all the methodological issues and normative contests associated with analysing public budgets in the light of the Covenant are settled. While public budget analysis contains considerable potential, it should not be a precondition for treating the rights of the Covenant as human rights—recognized and fully institutionalized as such, and enforced by accountability mechanisms, including courts. Although the exact scope of the courts’ powers to enforce the rights of the Covenant depends ultimately on the domestic legal system of each State party and how it separates powers between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, courts at the very least should be allowed to intervene to prohibit any discrimination in the enjoyment of Covenant rights; to demand from States that abstain from imposing measures that impose limitations to Covenant rights, unless the conditions set out in Article 4 of the Covenant are complied with, which requires in particular that such limitations are justified by the need to promote public welfare in a democratic society and that they do not affect the nature of the rights of the Covenant; and that any retrogressive step be justified as necessary and proportionate the fulfillment of the full range of rights protected by the Covenant.

This is especially important to recall once we take into account that the formulation of Article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant presupposes a certain understanding of the relationship between the realization of rights and wealth creation within a certain polity. There must be wealth available, it is suggested, before it can be invested in certain social goods and services or redistributed: resources are a precondition for progressive social policies. Keynesian economic thinking, however—which as we saw did not start with the publication of J. Maynard Keynes’ General Theory in 1936—suggests that the reverse logic is at least as equally valid: social expenditures are a condition for sustainable economic growth, and they should be seen therefore, rather than as a burden on the economy, as an investment. Moreover, we now understand much better that it would be a mistake to pursue growth strategies if this is at the expense of social investment or redistributive strategies: James Heckman for instance has illustrated this in his work on investment in early childhood education, and Angus Deaton has noted that countries shifting their focus from social investments to economic growth—i.e., seeing growth as a precondition for social investment rather than as the outcome of investing in populations—were performing less well, not better, on indicators of progress on human

17. See the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Mr. Philip Alston, to the 32nd session of the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/32/31) (28 April 2016), highlighting how, in practice, economic, social and cultural rights have been marginalized in comparison to civil and political rights, and proposing a recognition, institutionalization and accountability (RIA) framework—focusing primary attention on ensuring recognition of the rights, institutional support for their promotion and accountability mechanisms for their implementation—as a means to overcome the neglect of economic, social and cultural rights as human rights.

18. Article 4 of the Covenant reads, «The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society».

19. See above, text corresponding to notes 6-8.

20. James Heckman insisted, in countless publications, on four messages: skills and social abilities such as attentiveness, persistence and an ability to work with others are developed at an early age and are essential for productivity in adult life; early investment in childhood if far more cost-effective than remedial measures taken at a later stage; society as a whole shall face enormous economic and social burdens if disadvantaged families are not provided more support for early childhood development; and such investment provides significant returns to society through increased personal achievement and social productivity. See in particular James J. Heckman, Giving Kids a Fair Chance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).
development21. In other terms, the progressive realization clause of the Covenant, insofar as it suggests that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights should follow wealth creation rather than be seen as a condition for prosperity, embodies an economic philosophy that it is high time we challenge. Courts upholding economic, social and cultural rights would not only be acting in line with the idea that, by doing so, they are taking these rights seriously as human rights that they have a duty to enforce; they are also practising sound economics.

Enforcing economic, social, and cultural rights by classic methods of enforcement is thus essential to their full realization, and it should not wait. This chapter suggests however that, in addition, courts and other human rights mechanisms could do more, by scrutinizing the budgetary choices of States—including at which levels to tax and how to set spending priorities. It should be clear that this should not be interpreted as implying that they can refrain from doing what, minimally, can be expected from them: to protect the rights of the Covenant, using the same tools that are classic in the area of civil and political rights. But that they can and should go beyond those classic tools is what this chapter sets out to explain.

2. Assessing Budgetary Choices of States: The Background Norms

What is meant by the duty to devote the «maximum available resources» to the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights, as stipulated by Article 2, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights? The provision has its source in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which anticipated that the realization of economic and social rights was to be achieved «through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State«: these carefully crafted terms appear in Article 22 of the Declaration, which defines the right to social security as the first of the social rights it lists. The drafting history barely helps, however. When the working group of the Economic and Social Council’s Commission on Human Rights prepared the document that was to be adopted as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its members were concerned that their proposal should be acceptable to a broad range of States, holding very diverging views about the role of the State in the economy2. Since well before Second World War the USSR had been leading an aggressive policy in favour of fast industrialization: top-down, large-scale, and ruthless in its ambition to catch up with the advanced economies of the West. At the other end of the political spectrum that was going to define the geopolitics of the Cold War for two generations, the US was presenting itself as the champion of free enterprise and of free markets, the role of the State being limited to the provision of the economic security required for individuals and companies to be able to cope with the temporary shocks or turns of fortune, that were the inevitable price for liberty. The Declaration said nothing, therefore, about the desirable degree of interference of the State with market mechanisms, and although it did include a strong condemnation of discrimination, it was silent about the need to challenge inequality as such, when it has its source in the blind workings of the economy rather than in overt discrimination. Economic and social rights had to be realized, of course, and all delegates were eager to recognize the importance of seeing all human rights as indivisible and interdependent. But part of the grandeur of the Declaration lay in its modesty. It was meant to unite and it was meant to last. The price to pay, however, was to run the risk of irrelevance in the world of today.

When it entered the scene in 1987, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was acutely aware of the need to provide guidance to States as to how they should go about discharging their obligation to «progressively realize» the rights of the Covenant. The conventional wisdom of the time—reflected in the choice to adopt two separate covenants rather than one single binding instrument implementing the promises of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—was that economic, social and cultural rights were too vague and ill-defined to be justiciable, and that neither independent experts nor courts were in a position to assess whether the efforts of States were sufficient to

21. Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, wealth, and the origins of inequality (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Univ. Press, 2013), 114–15 (noting that in China, «the general pattern [as regards infant mortality rates] is of rapid decline until about 1970, followed by much slower decline after 1970. This is precisely the opposite of what we would expect if the fall in infant deaths had been driven by economic growth, which would be the case if the death of babies were a direct consequence of poverty. What happened in China is no mystery. When the authorities decided to focus on growth, resources were switched to making money and away from everything else, including public health and health care»).

comply with that obligation. It was stated by a law and development scholar writing in 1984 that though the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights »speaks in the language of rights, [it] refers to the realities of programs«23. Brownlie, a leading international law publicist, described the Covenant as »programmatic and promotional« in the third edition of his Principles of Public International Law, published in 197924. Jurists such as the Belgian Mark Bossuyt or the Dutch E.W. Vierdag voiced their scepticism as regards the ability of courts to supervise compliance with economic, social and cultural rights, which they saw as of a fundamentally distinct nature than civil and political rights25.

Sensing the danger, progressive academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sought to clarify the nature of States parties’ obligations under the Covenant, in order to ensure that the work of the Committee would be based on solid ground. An expert meeting convened in Maastricht from 2–6 June 1986 provided the opportunity to further advance the understanding of the legal significance of economic, social and cultural rights, beyond the right to food on which most efforts had been converging until then26. The timing was propitious: it was held after the right to food was officially transmitted to the Commission on Human Rights at the request of the Netherlands27. More or less simultaneously, Philip Alston, a Committee member who was to become its first rapporteur, published an important paper identifying the challenges facing the new committee established by the Economic and Social Council to examine the reports submitted by States parties to the Covenant28. In a contribution written jointly with Gerard Quinn, which provides the most extensive analysis of the understanding of States’ obligations having guided the drafters of the Covenant, even he had to concede, however, that precise benchmarks to assess budgetary efforts by the States were lacking, so that a procedural approach might ultimately be more appropriate:

It is the state of a country’s economy that most vitally determines the level of its obligations as they relate to any of the enumerated rights under the Covenant. From an evaluation of these circumstances flows a picture of a state’s abilities and from this may be determined the thresholds it must meet in discharging its obligations. In ascertaining the quantum of resources to be set aside to promote realization of the rights, the state is of course entitled to a wide measure of discretion. Nevertheless such discretion cannot be entirely open-ended or it would have the de facto effect of nullifying the existence of any real obligation…. While the Covenant itself is, inevitably, devoid of specific allocational benchmarks, there is presumably a process requirement by which states might be requested to show that adequate consideration has been given to the possible resources available to satisfy each of the Covenant’s requirements, even if the effort was ultimately unsuccessful. If a state is unable to do so then it fails to meet its obligation of conduct to ensure a principled policy-making process—one reflecting a sense of the importance of the relevant rights. In summary it may suffice to say that a plea of resource scarcity simpliciter, if substantiated, is entitled to deference especially where a state shows adherence to a regular and principled decision-making process. In the final resort, however, such a plea remains open to some sort of objective scrutiny by the body entrusted with responsibility for supervising states’ compliance with their obligations under the Covenant29.

26. The expert meeting was convened at the invitation of the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University.
29. Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of State Parties’
Though there has been no shortage of goodwill, little has been achieved since to clarify which obligations the Covenant imposes on States in the adoption and implementation of public budgets. The Committee has made it clear that the Covenant … neither requires nor precludes any particular form of government or economic system being used as the vehicle for the steps [to be taken to implement the Covenant rights], provided only that it is democratic and that all human rights are thereby respected. [In] terms of political and economic systems the Covenant is neutral and its principles cannot accurately be described as being predicated exclusively upon the need for, or the desirability of a socialist or a capitalist system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or laissez faire economy, or upon any other particular approach.30

Nevertheless, it added, the Covenant »imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards [the] goal [of the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights]«31. The Committee thereby asserted its willingness to assess both the mobilization of resources and the budgetary priorities the States adopt against this overall objective of the Covenant. For instance, whereas guaranteeing the right to social security may have significant financial implications for States, »the fundamental importance of social security for human dignity and the legal recognition of this right by States parties mean that the right should be given appropriate priority in law and policy«.32

While the principle is well established, the concrete implications are few. Four norms however do enjoy broad support, and clarify to a certain extent what the duty of progressive realization consists in. It follows from this general requirement, first, that »any deliberately retrogressive measures (…) would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources«.33 As regards the right to social security for instance, when faced with retrogressive measures adopted by States, the Committee will examine whether:

(a) there was reasonable justification for the action;
(b) alternatives were comprehensively examined;
(c) there was genuine participation of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives;
(d) the measures were directly or indirectly discriminatory;
(e) the measures will have a sustained impact on the realization of the right to social security, an unreasonable impact on acquired social security rights or whether an individual or group is deprived of access to the minimum essential level of social security;

and (f) whether there was an independent review of the measures at the national level.34

The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted in 1997 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Limburg Principles, express this idea by listing among the acts of commission leading to the violation of Covenant rights »the reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure, when such reduction or diversion results in the non-enjoyment of such rights and is not accompanied by adequate measures to ensure minimum subsistence rights for everyone«.35

A second requirement is that, when facing resource constraints, the State should demonstrate that it has

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31. Ibid., para. 9.
32. General Comment No. 19(2007): The right to social security (art. 9) (E/C.12/GC/19), para. 41.
33. Ibid. See also the letter dated 16 May 2012 addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (noting that, in order to comply with the Covenant, austerity measures or adjustment programmes, as have been adopted by a number of States to face the financial and economic crisis after 2009, must be necessary and proportionate, in the sense that the adoption of any other policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social and cultural rights).34. General Comment No. 19(2007), cited above note 31, para. 42.
36. Maastricht Guidelines, para. 14, g.)
given priority to the «satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights» of the Covenant, which correspond to the core obligations of States under this instrument: the Committee expresses the view that «a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant». 37 The idea was already expressed in 1986 in the Limburg Principles, which stated that «States parties are obligated, regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all». 38 In various general comments and statements, the Committee underlined that the duties to secure freedom from hunger 39, to guarantee access to water to satisfy basic needs 40, access to essential drugs 41 or to education complying with «minimum educational standards» 42, or the enjoyment of a social protection floor 43, form part of such core obligations, which any State, at any level of development, should presumptively be in a position to secure 44.

Thirdly, the States parties to the Covenant have undertaken to «guarantee that the rights enunciated in the (...) Covenant will be exercised without discrimination» 45. This implies not only a duty to remove discriminatory provisions from the States’ constitution, legislation, or policy documents, but also that substantive discrimination be addressed; in the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, priority should therefore be given to improving the situation of groups who have traditionally been marginalized or disadvantaged 46. This implies dedicating greater resources to groups who face systemic discrimination 47. In his letter of 16 May 2012 to the States parties to the Covenant on austerity measures, the Chairperson of the Committee emphasized that fiscal consolidation policies «must not be discriminatory and must comprise all possible measures, including tax measures, to support social transfers to mitigate inequalities that can grow in times of crisis and to ensure that the rights of the disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups are not disproportionately affected». The non-discrimination requirement also implies that the Committee shall be particularly attentive to any budgetary measure that would lower the level of provision of certain public services, such as in the areas of education, water, or electricity provision, or that would diminish the right to social security, including the right to old age pension, since such budgetary choices may have especially severe impacts on women who—in the current division of gender roles that is still dominant in most regions of the world—have traditionally been assuming the burden of caring for infants, children and the elderly, and have been fetching firewood or water to meet the household needs 48.

Fourthly, although the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights itself is silent about such a requirement, the principle of participation is relevant to assessing whether the budgetary choices made by States comply with its prescriptions. Such a right to participation follows from the right to self-determination, defined in both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. This implies that «a State’s population has a right to enjoy a fair share of the financial and social benefits that natural resources can bring. This requires ensuring participation, access to information

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37. General Comment No. 3 (1990), cited above, note 29, para. 10.
38. Para. 25.
39. General Comment No. 12 (2000): The right to adequate food (E/C.12/1999/5), paras. 6, 14 and 17.
42. General Comment No. 13 (2000): The right to education (E/C.12/1999/10), para. 57.
43. The letter addressed on 16 May 2012 by the Chairperson of the Committee to the States parties on austerity measures, similarly notes that the policy adopted «must identify the minimum core content of rights or a social protection floor, as developed by the International Labour Organization, and ensure the protection of this core content at all times».
44. See the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 10 («resource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations in respect of the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights»).
45. See art. 3(2) and 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (requiring that the rights of the Covenant be guaranteed without discrimination, and in particular, that men and women are ensured equal rights in the enjoyment of these rights), and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2) (E/C.12/GC/20) (2009).
46. General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2), cited above note 34, para. 8.
47. Ibid., para. 39.
and high standards of transparency and accountability in decision-making about the use of natural resources.\(^{49}\) The Committee has made it clear that the requirement of participation goes beyond the exploitation of natural resources, however. For instance, where retrogressive measures are adopted in the area of social security, it considers it relevant to ask whether such measures were taken with the «genuine participation of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives»,\(^{50}\) and where a State cannot ensure a minimum level of protection against all risks and contingencies of life, it is recommended that it «select a core group of social risks and contingencies», based on «a wide process of consultation».\(^{51}\)

The duty of non-retrogression, the priority to be given to the fulfillment of core obligations, the requirements of non-discrimination and of participation: these are important norms, all highly relevant to assessing the budgetary choices of States. They are what might be called the «constitutional background norms» that should guide such choices. But they still are expressed at a high level of generality, and they hardly suffice to provide monitoring bodies with a methodology allowing them, except in relatively extreme cases, to decide whether or not, in making these choices, States have complied with the duty of progressive realization of Covenant rights. There is a duty, for instance, to ensure protection of at least the «minimum essential levels» of the rights of the Covenant, and this «core obligation» is presumed to apply to all States, whatever their level of development. But even such a presumption cannot be absolute: «[i]n order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations».\(^{52}\) Moreover, how these different constitutional background norms relate to one another remains unclear. For instance, may retrogressive measures be adopted for the sake of achieving greater equality? May such measures be adopted to ensure inter-generational equity, for instance where they are justified by the need to reduce the weight of the public debt?

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, these background norms betray a bias towards the preservation of the status quo: perhaps because the doctrine of the Committee has developed in order to provide courts with guidance as to how they could apply the Covenant rights, they favour the protection of the existing entitlements, which courts are better equipped to ensure, above the need to design and implement redistributive policies. In contrast to the preservation of existing levels of rights enjoyment, which the limitation clause of Article 4 of the Covenant or the non-retrogression doctrine are designed to ensure, redistributive policies require that trade-offs be made between the better-off and the worse-off within society. Here judges feel less comfortable. Indeed, much as it is difficult for courts to impose that a State discharges «positive duties» towards its population where such obligations are based only on certain vague provisions of the constitution or found in international law, it is more easily accepted that they intervene to protect existing entitlements, or that they impose «negative duties» to refrain from diminishing existing levels of enjoyment of rights. However, it is precisely then—when they act to preserve the droits acquis or the entitlements that individuals already enjoy, as it were—that the courts contribute the least to strengthening the position of the most powerless, because the poorest among the poor simply have no entitlements to be protected.\(^{53}\)

There we must go further. But can we? May we equip courts and other human rights mechanisms with the tools they need to assess macroeconomic policies, resource mobilization, and spending choices, so that the economic, social and cultural rights of the poor are finally prioritized? It is tempting to answer that we need not. The next chapter examines two arguments according to which the quest to define the duties of States as regards resource mobilization and spending is, in effect, a distraction—unnecessary at best, and at worst undermining

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50. General Comment No. 19 (2007): The right to social security (E/C.12/GC/19), para. 42.
51. Ibid., para. 59.
53. See, for a similar critique in the domestic constitutional context, David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, Harvard International Law Journal vol. 53, no. 1 (2012): 189–247 (noting the paradox that it is precisely where the courts intervene with the greatest legitimacy, by preserving existing entitlements or prohibiting steps backwards in the realization of economic and social rights, that they are least able to bring about the kind of social change that would truly benefit the disempowered and the marginalized).
the credibility of economic, social, and cultural rights as rights. One argument is that we need to model the supervision of compliance with economic, social, and cultural rights on that of the more classic civil and political rights, adopting what has been called a »violations approach« to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Another argument is that outcomes are all that matter: we should focus all our attention on the level of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, and waste no time considering whether that level is reached thanks to the efforts deployed by the State, or through the workings of the market and other actors’ initiatives. The two arguments are examined in turn.

3. Can We Escape the Burden of Assessing the Duty of Progressive Realization?

3.1 The »Violations Approach« to the Covenant

In an influential article published twenty years ago, Audrey Chapman takes the view that human rights lawyers should abandon the quest for a benchmark by which to assess »progressive realization«. This search, ultimately, risks undermining the task of monitoring itself, distracting us from the more urgent task of addressing the most egregious violations of economic and social rights. Instead, a »more feasible and effective alternative« would consist in focusing on »three types of violations: (1) violations resulting from actions and policies on the part of governments; (2) violations related to patterns of discrimination; and (3) violations taking place due to a state’s failure to fulfill the minimum core obligations contained in the Covenant«. In later publications, Chapman insisted that this focus did not mean lowering the bar for States. Quite to the contrary, in her view:

[If] states actually did fulfill their core obligations, it would in most cases represent significant progress. The purpose of the minimum state obligations approach is not to give states an escape hatch for avoiding their responsibilities under the Covenant. It is in fact the opposite: a way to accommodate the reality that many economic, social and cultural rights (and often civil and political rights as well) require resources that are simply not available in poor countries. The minimum state obligations approach affirms that even in highly strained circumstances, a state has irreducible obligations that it is assumed to be able to meet. If it cannot, the burden of proof shifts to the state to justify its claim of the need to cut back. By definition, minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the availability of resources or any other factors and difficulties.

The intention behind the proposal is clear: it is to strengthen the credibility of the monitoring of the Covenant, by adopting a position of restraint that would allow the Committee to tackle only the most obvious cases, where the conduct of the government is clearly below the standards of acceptability.

The idea that the monitoring of the Covenant would be facilitated by the identification, within each of the rights, of an »essential content«, corresponding to a set of »core obligations« imposed on all States, has a strong pedigree. It already took centre stage during the discussions that led to the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted in 1986. The experts who developed the Principles agreed that, though resources available to each State matter to assess the scope of that State’s obligations to realize economic, social, and cultural rights, each State should »ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all«, »regardless of the level of economic development«. The expression of »minimum subsistence rights« found support in particular with Philip Alston, a member of the Committee who, writing in his academic capacity, also urged that the Committee should »find a way of conveying to states the fact that priority must be accorded to the satisfaction of minimum subsistence levels of enjoyment of the relevant rights by all individuals«. Unsurprisingly, the views expressed by the Limburg Principles soon found their way into the

56. Ibid.
doctrine elaborated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, after Alston convinced his colleagues about the need to clarify the content of the obligations the Covenant imposed on States.61 It is this effort which resulted in the adoption by the Committee of General Comment No. 3, which as we have seen details the nature of States’ obligations under Article 2(1) of the Covenant:62 The Committee expresses the view in this general comment that »a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party«.63

The doctrine presents two major infirmities, however, which significantly limit its usefulness as a guide in the jurisprudence of the Committee. First, as already noted,64 the identification of the »minimum essential content« does not imply that the question of resources simply becomes irrelevant: even a State that fails to guarantee that minimum level of enjoyment may argue that such failure is attributable to a lack of available resources, provided it demonstrates that »every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations«.65

The identification of the »minimum essential content« of rights: see General Comment No. 12 (1999): The right to food, para. 17. »When grouped together«, the Committee added, »the core obligations establish an international minimum threshold that all developmental policies should be designed to respect (…) [The duty of international assistance and cooperation] is particularly incumbent on all [the States] who can assist, to help developing countries respect this international minimum threshold. If a national or international anti-poverty strategy does not reflect this minimum threshold, it is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party« (Ibid., para. 17). On international duties of assistance and cooperation, see further below, text corresponding to notes 161–73.

Secondly, how this »minimum essential content« of the Covenant rights is to be determined remains contested. Because article 11 of the Covenant refers in paragraph 2 to »the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger«, in addition to its more general reference in paragraph 1 to »the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions«, the Committee could identifying certain core components does serve to shift the burden of proof: it imposes on the State that it makes a convincing case that, even by calling upon international support, it is unable to finance what it would take to deliver even that »essential content« of the right. Should be State fail to make that case, it will be presumed that it has not been complying with its obligations to prioritize the fulfillment of economic and social rights under its jurisdiction. In that sense, reliance on the »core content« of a right introduces a baseline that is less dependent on the degree of realization of the right that is already attained in any particular State.66 It also helps defining priorities both for domestic efforts towards the fulfillment of human rights obligations, and for international assistance and cooperation.67 It does not, however, allow dispensing completely with considerations related to resource availability: the presumption that is established is relative, not absolute.

62. General Comment No. 3 (1990), cited above note 41.
63. Ibid., para. 10.
64. See above, text corresponding to note 41.
65. General Comment No. 3 (1990), cited above note 41, para. 3. In 1997, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that the minimum core obligations referred to in General Comment No. 3 »apply irrespective of the availability of resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties« (para. 9; emphasis added). This is not an precise reading of the Committee’s own position. Although it is true that (as correctly stated by the Maastricht Guidelines) »resource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations in respect of the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights« (para. 10; emphasis added), this does not imply that resource availability is irrelevant in assessing whether the duty to guarantee at least the minimum essential content of rights is complied with: the position of the Committee, rather, is that the burden shall be on the State to prove that it has done everything in its capacity to ensure at least that level of guarantee. Audrey Chapman took part in the expert meeting held in Maastricht in January 1997, but she overstates her case where she suggests that the meeting took up the approach she advocated (see Chapman, The Status of Efforts to Monitor Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 155). More recently, the Committee confirmed its view that resource availability remains relevant even as regards the satisfaction of the »core content« of rights: see General Comment No. 12 (1999): The right to food, para. 17. »Should a State party argue that resource constraints make it impossible to provide access to food for those who are unable by themselves to secure such access, the State has to demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations«: or Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on an Evaluation of Obligations to Take «Maximum Available Resources» under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant (Thirty-eighth session, 2007) (E/C.12/2007/1), para. 6. »As regards the core obligations of States parties in relation to each of the Covenant rights, General Comment No. 3 states that, in order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet its core obligations to a lack of available resources, it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those core obligations.«
66. As noted by Robertson: »[…] there is an assumption, though a rebuttable one in the eyes of the Committee, that every state possesses sufficient resources for subsistence purposes if they define resources broadly enough and are sufficiently aggressive in resource acquisition« (Robertson, Measuring State Compliance, 702).
67. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has referred to an obligation to prioritize the core obligations aimed at ensuring the minimum essential levels of rights in the context of international cooperation, stating that »[C]ore human rights obligations create national obligations for all States, and international responsibilities for developed States, as well as others that are in a position to assist« (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2001) (E/C.12/2001/10), para. 16). »When grouped together«, the Committee added, »the core obligations establish an international minimum threshold that all developmental policies should be designed to respect (…) [The duty of international assistance and cooperation] is particularly incumbent on all [the States] who can assist, to help developing countries respect this international minimum threshold. If a national or international anti-poverty strategy does not reflect this minimum threshold, it is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party« (Ibid., para. 17). On international duties of assistance and cooperation, see further below, text corresponding to notes 161–73.
easily define the core obligation corresponding to the right to food as an obligation to «take the necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger». 68 Perhaps this underestimated the complexity of the task; but it had the advantage, at least, of being clearly linked to the text of the Covenant itself. Not all rights allow for such an easy identification of the «core content», however. As regards the right to education guaranteed under article 13 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that

... this core includes an obligation: to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes on a non-discriminatory basis; to ensure that education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13 (1); to provide primary education for all in accordance with article 13 (2) (a) [which provides that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all]; to adopt and implement a national educational strategy which includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education; and to ensure free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties, subject to conformity with «minimum educational standards» (art. 13 (3) and (4)).

In its General Comment No. 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the Committee provides the following description of «core obligations» corresponding to this right:

(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups;

(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone;

(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water;

(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs;

(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services;

(f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of the whole population; the strategy and plan of action shall be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent process; they shall include methods, such as right to health indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all vulnerable or marginalized groups.

A similar list is provided in the Committee’s discussions of the right to water 71 and the right to work, where it consists in an elaborate description of the requirements of non-discrimination and equal protection of employment. 72

The «core content» of the rights stipulated in the Covenant, it appears from these examples, includes three components: (i) a basic needs requirement, ensuring that each individual is not deprived of essential goods or services that keep him/her safe, physically and emotionally, and protect him from permanent social exclusion (this would include basic shelter, adequate food, water and sanitation, and essential drugs, but also access to primary education); (ii) a non-discrimination requirement,

70. General Comment No. 14 (2000), cited above note 40, para. 43. In para. 44, the Committee adds a list of five obligations of «comparable priority».


72. General Comment No. 18 (2005): The right to work (art. 6) (E/C.12/ GC/18), para. 31.

73. In 1982, the International Labour Organisation identified as «basic needs» the following: (i) a certain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption: adequate food, shelter and clothing, as well as certain household equipment and furniture. Second, they include essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport and health, educational and cultural facilities (International Labour Organisation (ILO), Target Setting for Basic Needs, Geneva: ILO, 1982, 1). See also Trubek, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Third World, 206 (referring to the core rights linked to subsistence as «what is most basic and universal (...) Behind all the specific rights enshrined in international documents and supported by international activity lies a social view of individual welfare»).
ensuring that any progress made in the realization of the right in question benefit all without discrimination, and that where distribution issues arise, priority be given to the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups; and (iii) a procedural obligation, requiring from the State that, having identified the key challenges associated with the realization of each right, it designs and implements a strategy that will put it on track of moving towards the full realization of the right for all.

It follows from these attempts at circumscribing the core content of rights that the fulfillment of the corresponding obligations is neither costless—particularly not the duties corresponding to the »basic needs« component, which requires States, for instance, to set up primary health care centres and to ensure that all have access to primary schools at a reasonable distance from the home—nor even finite: this is why the question of which resources are available to the State still matters, even for the satisfaction of this minimum, and why we can hardly pretend that the »maximum available resources« vanishes once a definition of the core content is agreed.

Referring to the immediate obligations that would follow from a ratification of the Covenant by the US, which the Carter administration had transmitted to the Senate in 1978 accompanied by a statement according to which, in the understanding of the US, the Covenant describes »goals to be achieved progressively rather than through immediate implementation«, Philip Alston, a member at the time of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, writes that this view is incorrect, since there is an immediate requirement to take steps towards full realization of the right of the Covenant: »The starting point for a program to implement economic and social rights is to ascertain, as precisely as possible, the nature of the existing situation with respect to each right, so as to identify more clearly the problems that need to be addressed and provide a basis for principled policy making« (Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an entirely New Strategy, American Journal of International Law vol. 84 (1990): 379).

This is true even for the requirement of non-discrimination. As illustrated by General Comment No. 20 adopted in 2009 by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the prohibition of discrimination in international human rights law includes a) a prohibition of differential treatment that is based on any ground such as race, colour, disability, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms; b) a prohibition of any action or omission that, whether intended or not, disproportionately affects members of a particular group, in the absence of a reasonable and objective justification, thus constituting de facto discrimination; c) a duty to adopt special measures to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination in order to eliminate de facto discrimination; such measures are considered legitimate to the extent that they represent reasonable, objective and proportionate means to redress de facto discrimination and are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably achieved. Thus, equality of treatment calls for an ongoing process of addressing inequalities.

Another concern is that the definition of such core content may appear arbitrary, even if we limit ourselves to the first, »needs-based« requirement listed above. Katharine Young notes that the core content of economic and social rights listed in the Covenant is identified, alternatively, through four pathways, to which different justifications correspond. While the core content often is described as a »needs-based core«, in which the »core« is derived from the basic needs of the individual, and particularly his or her survival needs, in line with the theories of development en vogue in the 1970s, other approaches also permeate the doctrine of the Committee. The core content is sometimes defined as a »value-based core«, in which its contours are based on what is required by certain basic values such as the dignity of the individual, equality or freedom. Or, following a third approach, the core content may be seen as the result of a consensus that gradually takes shape across jurisdictions, across States (as expressed in international declarations in which governments profess their attachment to certain core dimensions of economic and social rights), or across experts of the concerned fields—such as public health, education or housing—that correspond to the rights of the Covenant. Finally, a fourth approach would be to define the core content taking as a departure point the corresponding obligations, and asking what can reasonably be demanded from the State immediately, rather than being left to be subject to progressive realization: by paying attention to the remedial dimension associated with the core content, we would be able to define the core based on what can practically be achieved. Young concludes that none of these approaches is convincing, and that taken together, they result in a doctrine that is neither principled nor, for that matter, legitimate. She finds that the various functions the core content approach to economic and social rights is meant to fulfill would be better served by abandoning the approach altogether. Instead, she suggests, we should rely on indicators and benchmarks (to track progress in the realization of the rights) and on classic notions of responsibility and causality (where violations are alleged to result from certain measures being adopted by States that infringe on the enjoyment of economic and social rights).

74. See above, text corresponding to notes 44–47.
75. Referring to the immediate obligations that would follow from a ratification of the Covenant by the US, which the Carter administration had transmitted to the Senate in 1978 accompanied by a statement according to which, in the understanding of the US, the Covenant describes »goals to be achieved progressively rather than through immediate implementation«, Philip Alston, a member at the time of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, writes that this view is incorrect, since there is an immediate requirement to take steps towards full realization of the right of the Covenant: »The starting point for a program to implement economic and social rights is to ascertain, as precisely as possible, the nature of the existing situation with respect to each right, so as to identify more clearly the problems that need to be addressed and provide a basis for principled policy making« (Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an entirely New Strategy, American Journal of International Law vol. 84 (1990): 379).
76. This is true even for the requirement of non-discrimination. As illustrated by General Comment No. 20 adopted in 2009 by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the prohibition of discrimination in international human rights law includes a) a prohibition of differential treatment that is based on any ground such as race, colour, disability, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms; b) a prohibition of any action or omission that, whether intended or not, disproportionately affects members of a particular group, in the absence of a reasonable and objective justification, thus constituting de facto discrimination; c) a duty to adopt special measures to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination in order to eliminate de facto discrimination; such measures are considered legitimate to the extent that they represent reasonable, objective and proportionate means to redress de facto discrimination and are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably achieved. Thus, equality of treatment calls for an ongoing process of addressing inequalities.
78. Ibid., 165.
The inconsistency of current definitions of the core content may be simply an indication of the impasse we encounter when we try to bracket away the progressive realization clause of the Covenant, ignoring both its novelty and its subversive potential. Indeed, it shall come as no surprise that many commentators considered that the proposal made by Audrey Chapman might represent a step backwards, not forward—in her own words «weaken[ing] the calls for a full implementation of the rights of the Covenant by concentrating on the most flagrant abuses».

For instance, writing the right to health, Brigit Toebes notes that clarifying the core content of that right may encourage States to «put the elements not contained by the core into an ›indefinite‹». Young makes a similar critique in her article already cited, though with a more ideological spin. She writes that «the minimalist focus within the core may well legitimize neoliberalism, especially if the claim for the minimum core is made in order to increase the bundles of commodities or consumption share of the disadvantaged, while failing to challenge the underlying economic institutions which have produced the disadvantage in the first place». Indeed, by focusing on the core content of economic and social rights—providing the poor and marginalized with the essential minimum that they require to live healthy lives in dignity—while neglecting the other requirements associated with the progressive realization of the promises of the Covenant, we do not question the structures that cause the poverty and marginalization of the victims in the first place: we leave them untouched, while guaranteeing a «floor» to the individual that avoids him or her falling permanently into extreme poverty.


80. Birgit Toebes, The Right to Health, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, eds. Asbjorn Eide, Catharina Krause and Alan Rosas, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed. 2001), 176 («in addition to the core to be realized immediately, there is the remainder of a right which is to be realized progressively»).

81. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights, 174.

82. There is a troubling analogy between the «core content» approach to economic and social rights and the «negative income tax» proposed by Milton Friedman, as the measure that would be best suited to combat poverty without distorting the market and creating the wrong incentives; see M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2002 (originally published in 1962), chapter XII. Young does not draw this analogy, however. Rather, she refers on this point to the work of Philip Harvey, who argues that economic and social rights challenge the utility maximization norm that is at the core of neo-classical economics and utilitarianism more generally. See Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Human Rights Seriously, Columbia Human Rights Law Review vol. 33 (2002): 363; and Philip Harvey, Aspirational Law, Buffalo Law Review vol. 52 (2004): 705.


Whatever the approach, it is clear that the subversive dimension of economic and social rights is that they are more than simply a relief measure, making tolerable the exclusion otherwise produced by the market mechanisms; it is this dimension that might be lost if we content ourselves with an approach focused on the core content.
To answer, we must understand how outcomes cannot be fully separated from how, and by whom, the goods and services essential to the enjoyment of such rights are delivered. It is true of course that States are recognized broad discretion as to how they should discharge their duties under the Convention. Except for certain provisions that define which steps States should take, the Covenant refrains from imposing specific obligations of conduct (except for the elementary but at the same time vague obligation to take active steps towards the realization of Covenant rights), and provided other human rights norms are complied with (in particular, requirements of participation and accountability), it should not matter whether the outcomes required are achieved by supporting initiatives in the private sector or by public services. Indeed, that would seem to follow from the professed neutrality of the Covenant vis-à-vis different conceptions of the role of the State in the economy.

Such a conclusion should be treated with caution, however. Privatization —broadly understood as the choice to ensure that private actors shall provide the services and deliver the goods required for the enjoyment of social, economic, and cultural rights, rather than such services or goods being provided by the State—may be problematic for three, analytically distinct reasons.

87. See Alston and Quinn, The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 185 (stating that the Covenant obligations «can best be understood as hybrids between obligations of result and obligations of conduct. They are obligations of result in the sense that states must match their performance with their objective capabilities. They are loose obligations of conduct in the sense that states are obliged to take active, though largely unspecified, steps toward their satisfaction. This hybrid mixture of obligation types is due to the fact that the concept of progressive achievement mandates the existence of an ongoing process of development the adequacy of which is loosely controlled by norms deduced from a state’s objective capabilities»).


89. The «adequate house», in the view of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is one that, in particular, ensures access to «safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities» and is «in a location which allows access to employment options, health-care services, schools, child-care centres and other social facilities» (in particular since the temporal and financial costs of getting to and from the place of work can place excessive demands upon the budgets of poor households» (General Comment No. 4, The right to adequate housing (Sixth session, 1991), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114 (1991), para. 8, and (f)).


92. In the area of housing, excessive borrowing by households has in effect become a substitute for redistributive social policies and subsidies to support access to housing: on the links between the retreat of the State from the housing sector and the 2008–2009 financial crisis, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living to the 10th session of the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/10/7) (4 Feb. 2009).
b) Quality Monitoring

The second risk is that even when the poor have access to the services concerned, the services provided may be of sub-standard quality. This may be true particularly in areas such as healthcare or education where quality matters as much as volume and may be more difficult to assess by the average user, so that private service providers may be tempted to sacrifice quality for profitability. The risk is particularly high since the possibilities for the users to hold private service providers accountable are generally rather weak. Indeed, whereas in democratic States poor performance of public services may be challenged by voters, such accountability mechanisms are generally absent where private actors provide services: although the government could still be held accountable for its failure to control adequately such provision of services by the private sector, such a form of accountability is more indirect and generally less effective.

Privatization therefore may result in the richest segments of society receiving a better service, worsening the impacts of income inequality on the enjoyment of basic rights: even where the poorest groups do have access to goods or services provided by the private sector, such services may be of sub-standard quality, without any effective means for the poor to challenge this situation or even without them being aware of how much this is penalizing them. Therefore, whereas privatization is not per se prohibited by the Covenant even in areas such as the provision of water or electricity, education or healthcare where the role of the public sector has traditionally been strong, private providers at the very least should be subject to strict regulations, imposing on them so-called public service obligations: in the provision of water or electricity, this may include requirements concerning universality of coverage and the continuity of the service, pricing policies, quality requirements, and user participation; it may concern the qualifications of teachers and the pupil/teacher ratio, or the quality of educational materials, in the provision of education.

Whether appropriate regulation of that sort is always a substitute to the provision of such services by the State remains an open question. For non-governmental watchdogs and human rights bodies seeking to assess whether public budgets are effectively designed in accordance with the requirements of human rights, however, this uncertainty is vexing: should they focus, as a measure of whether the State invests enough in health, education, or housing, on the level of investments in these respective sectors as a percentage of the country’s GDP, combining private and public investment, or should they focus instead on the level of governmental expenditure, as indicated for instance by the share of the public budget that goes to such sectors?

In low-income countries, where a large part of the population has a very low purchasing power—and one, certainly, too low for them to be an attractive market for private service providers, except at the expense of quality—it does seem sensible to require from governments that they make up for this massive market failure: however efficient (indeed, precisely because they are

94. Specific difficulties arise where foreign actors are tasked with the provision of services that contribute to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights: in addition to the often strong bargaining power they have in their relationship with the host government, their rights as investors are generally protected under customary international law or through investment treaties, weakening the possibilities for host States in which they operate to sanction any violation of economic, social and cultural rights that they may commit. See, for example, Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement and Realization, in Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, ed. O. De Schutter, 73–160 (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2006).

95. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Resolution 15/9: Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, A/HRC/RES/15/9, of 6 October 2010 (noting that »the delegation of the delivery of safe drinking water and/or sanitation services to a third party does not exempt the State from its human rights obligations«).

96. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Resolution 32/L.33: The right to education, A/HRC/RES/32/L.33, of 26 June 2016, para. 2, (urging Sta- tes to comply with their obligations »to respect, protect and fulfill the right to education by all appropriate means, including by (…) putting in place a regulatory framework for education providers, including those operating independently or in partnership with States, guided by inter- national human rights obligations, that establishes, inter alia, minimum norms and standards for the creation and operation of educational ser- vices, addresses any negative impacts of the commercialization of educa- tion, and strengthens access to appropriate remedies and reparation for victims of violations of the right to education«).
efficiency-driven), markets shall not, and could not, compensate for widespread poverty. In such contexts, setting as a benchmark a minimum level of intervention of the government in meeting the costs of healthcare, education, electricity, or transport appears as the only reasonable option. In order to ensure that the basic needs of the population are met in all countries, but that the availability, accessibility and adequacy of the services gradually increase as the ability for the government to deliver such services improves, two separate indicators may be designed, referring respectively to the minimum public expenditure per capita and to the expected public expenditure in the sector concerned as a percentage of the country’s wealth.

Thus, when experts convened in Chatham House to define the appropriate level of governmental spending in healthcare, they settled on two targets, one representing the absolute governmental spending per capita per year that should go to healthcare (86 USD), and the other representing the percentage of the total GDP of the country that should go to healthcare (5 per cent); this latter indicator, since it is clearly insufficient to meet all important health needs, and GHE (governmental health expenditure) therefore needs to be progressively increased [in line with the overall growth of the country’s economy]; the former indicator however is equally important to maintain, since GHE/GDP of 5 per cent may be insufficient to ensure priority services in poor countries, and therefore it is justified, in these poor countries, to set a minimum benchmark corresponding to what would seem to cover at least basic health needs. As to the 5 per cent figure itself as a measure of the government health expenditure to the GDP, it is seen as the percentage that is generally required for limiting the proportion of [out-of-pocket payments] to 20 per cent of [Total Health Expenditure (THE)], which in turn is generally needed for achieving low rates of catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditure. It is noteworthy that these targets express a minimum level of public expenditure in healthcare: unless governments invest enough in healthcare, poor families risk having to pay beyond their means, leading to a spiral of indebtedness and poverty from which many may be unable to escape. Therefore, setting targets of governmental spending, rather than targets of total health expenditures (including both public and private spending), seemed the most appropriate route.

c) Positional Goods

That is not all, however. Indeed, privatization also poses a third challenge, which cannot be answered simply by the strengthening of the regulatory framework applicable to the private sector. Even in situations where low-income groups do have access to the good or service concerned and where appropriate supervision ensures that compliance with essential quality standards, can there be a risk that, while the needs of the poor are met, the rich still have access to much better services thanks to the coexistence of different channels through which one can have access to healthcare, housing or education? If there is such a risk, should this be a concern? A distinction should be made in this regard between rights that, to be effectively enjoyed, should be distributed in conditions of relative equality, and rights to some amount of a good or some level of provision of a service, however much better the situation of others. For instance, education is a positional good in ways in which housing is not: for the right to housing to be satisfied, it matters whether each household has access to adequate housing, but it does not matter whether some households can afford far more luxurious housing than others; in contrast, even if a pupil receives the minimum quality education that satisfies certain basic requirements, her situation is significantly less favourable if, in the same society, her peers have access to much better quality education thanks to their more affluent background, because the existence of such a gap shall reduce the value of the kind of education she received. Human rights law pays particular attention to the situation of the worse off in society, but it also ought to pay attention to the gaps between the worse off and the better off, even in situations where all individuals have attained a


certain level of enjoyment of the right concerned: the balance between the two preoccupations shall depend on the nature of the right considered.

Though the vocabulary of positional goods is not invoked as such, this idea explains the concerns raised by the growing trend towards the privatization of education, which, as noted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, may be in the process of supplanting public education rather than complementing it. The diversion of public funds to support private schools at the expense of the public education sector may in particular lead to higher levels of socio-economic segregation in education, or to the emergence of low-cost, poor-quality private schools, as a substitute for adequate investment in the public educational system: the Committee of the Rights of the Child for instance has urged Brazil to phase-out the transfer of public funds to the private education sector and review its policies with regard to fiscal and tax incentives for enrolment in private education institutions in order to ensure access to free quality education at all levels, in particular nurseries and pre-schools, for all children by strictly prioritizing the public education sector in the distribution of public funds. Similarly, when it examined the vouchers system introduced in Chile to support children from low-income families to have access to private schools, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed its concern that the lack of resources and, occasionally, the poor quality of public education continues to result in high levels of segregation and discrimination along socioeconomic lines, which has the effect of limiting social mobility in the State party, and it urged Chile to take the necessary measures to eliminate the sharp disparities in quality of education that currently exist between private, subsidized and public schools and to ensure that all schools have adequate infrastructure and suitably trained teaching staff.

Such statements cannot be fully understood unless we see that the value of education to the worse-off pupils depends not only on them having access to an educational system complying with certain basic quality standards, but also on them being able to compete, in future life, with others, in conditions of relative equality. It is generally thought, in the utilitarian framework, that although it may be rational to have a preference for equality, it is irrational to prefer an equal distribution of a certain good to an unequal distribution in which the smallest portion received is still larger than the portion that would be received by each in an equal distribution system. But positional goods are specific precisely insofar as the value of the good to the individual depends on others not having significantly more of the good: my master’s degree is of much lesser value to me if I am in a society in which the vast majority have doctorates, and not just master’s degrees. The role of the State with respect to the allocation of such goods may be not just to ensure to each the enjoyment of minimum levels of satisfaction, but to ensure a certain equality of distribution across all members of society. To the extent that privatization—or the co-existence of a public system with a private system, as is often the case in the education sector—creates an obstacle to such equality of distribution, it should therefore be treated as suspect; and the non-discrimination requirement of Article 2, para. 2 of the Covenant should address this impact.

The violations approach and the outcomes approach have in common that they seek to spare us the burden of having to define the level of efforts States parties to the Covenant must invest in the fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights, to comply with the progressive realization clause. But this is a burden we must accept. Going beyond a core obligations approach requires that we equip ourselves to assess progress in the realization of human rights. This is turn calls for the development of indicators (measuring not only outcomes but also the normative framework adopted by the State and its efforts in moving towards such outcomes), and agreement on

99. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education to the 69th session of the General Assembly (A/69/402) (24 September 2014). At its 32nd session (13 June to 1 July 2016), the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution urging all States to address any negative impacts of the commercialization of education: see above, note 85.

100. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Brazil (CRC/C/OPAC/RBA/CO/1), paras. 75-76 (28 October 2015).

101. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Chile (E/C.12/CHL/CO/4), para. 30 (19 June 2015): Similar concerns were expressed a few months later by the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Concluding Observations: Chile (CRC/C/CHL/CO/4-5), paras. 67-70.


103. For a discussion of some of the difficulties associated with the use of indicators to measure compliance with human rights, see Maria Green, What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement, Human Rights Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2001), 1062–97; Todd Landman, Measuring Human Rights, Practice and Policy, Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2004) 906-931; or, more
clear criteria to assess whether the degree of realization of rights, in any particular State, is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Covenant. Which conceptual framework can be used to that effect?

4. The Conceptual Framework: Resources-Spending-Outcomes

In order to assess whether a State party to the Covenant is discharging its duty to progressively implement Covenant rights to the maximum of its available resources, it is important to consider resource mobilization jointly with spending, and to relate both dimensions to outcomes—i.e., to the effective levels of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Unsatisfactory outcomes—for instance, a large number of homeless persons in the State concerned or an inability for all to have access to adequate healthcare—will only be an infringement of the Covenant if such outcomes reflect not simply an inability of the State to improve the situation, but an unwillingness to do. This implies showing that resource mobilization could have been improved, or that spending priorities could have been defined differently, or both, in order to achieve better outcomes.

In this equation, resource mobilization and spending choices complement each other, to produce the required outcomes. However, it would be incorrect to imply from this that weaknesses concerning one part of the equation may be compensated by sound policies concerning another part of the equation—for instance, that a failure to mobilize domestic resources effectively may be excused by sound choices being made in spending. A State that would be increasing spending on social policies (for social security, food, health, education and housing), but that would be doing so relying on a highly regressive taxation policy, may be found in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. To illustrate, consider the assessment this author made in his official capacity as the Special Rapporteur on the right to food following his mission to Brazil in 2009. While praising the country for having consistently increased spending on social priority areas, the assessment added the following cautionary note:

The tax structure in Brazil remains highly regressive. Tax rates are high for goods and services and low for income and property, bringing about very inequitable outcomes. According to one estimate, families with an income amounting to less than two minimum wages pay an average of 46 per cent of their income in indirect taxes, while families earning over 30 times the minimum wage pay around 16 per cent in indirect taxes. A recent report by the Tax Services confirms the very low levels of property taxes. In particular, the rural territorial tax collected, in 2008, a mere R$ 416 million (US$ 239 million) nationwide. As a percentage of GDP, this amounts to 0.01 per cent and, as a percentage of total taxation, the tax accounts for only 0.04 per cent. Given the very high level of land concentration and the large incomes generated by the agricultural sector, this is highly regressive. In contrast, taxes on goods and services, as well as social contributions to pensions and social security accounted for the lion’s share of Government income: over 70 per cent in 2008 [see the figure below]. The Special Rapporteur concludes that, while the social programmes developed under the »Zero Hunger« strategy are impressive in scope, they are essentially funded by the very persons whom they seek to benefit, as the regressive system of taxation seriously limits the redistributive impact of the programmes. Only by introducing a tax reform that would reverse the current situation could Brazil claim to be seeking to realize the right to adequate food by taking steps to the maximum of its available resources.104

The opposite is equally true, of course: a State that would have a highly progressive tax structure, but that would nevertheless maintain a low level of social spending, would not be acting consistent with its duties under the Covenant. Dedicating the »maximum available resources« to the realization of the rights of the Covenant means both mobilizing sufficient resources and using such resources as effectively as possible, in order to maximize the contribution of public investment to the fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights. It may be tempting to think that a State making a smart use of its resources could be excused for maintaining a regressive tax structure or, conversely, that a State efficiently mobilizing resources could be allowed to squander (within reasonable limits) some of these resources in unwise spending choices. Such an approach, however, would not do justice to the norm of progressive realization embodied in Article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant, which requires that States do everything they can to realize the Covenant rights, both at the collecting and at the spending sides of the equation.

We may provisionally conclude that, while the three elements of the equation—resource mobilization, public spending and outcomes—are interdependent, they are only imperfect substitutes for one another. Poor resource mobilization is a problem even if the State is highly efficient in using the scarce resources it does manage to mobilize, and an inadequate definition of spending priorities is a problem even if the resources available are plentiful and allow the State to meet the basic needs of the population: in both instances indeed, the State could, and therefore should, do more. And where outcomes are achieved in areas such as housing, education, or healthcare without much public resources being invested, the results may be considered as fragile, and the risks of discrimination on grounds of wealth and segregation in many cases real: where allocation of scarce goods is left to the market, the poorest may be priced out from access, and even if mechanisms such as subsidies, education vouchers or maximum fees are introduced to reduce that risk, serious problems of accountability towards the public remain. It is within the broad conceptual framework that we can examine its different elements. For the question remains entirely open: how much should States do, and how to measure whether they are doing enough? The following sections attempt to provide an answer.

5. Mobilizing Resources for the Realization of Economic and Social Rights

States require resources to invest in health, education, housing, social protection, electricity and water provision, or transport infrastructure, all of which are indispensable for the enjoyment of the rights of the Covenant. The provision by the State of such services, in addition to responding directly to the needs of the population, shall alleviate the burden that women shoulder. If they did not have the ability to mobilize revenues domestically or internationally, States would have to cut down...
on the provision of these services, and women would be particularly affected since—in the current division of gender roles that remains dominant in most regions of the world—it is still they who take care of the infants, children and the elderly, and fetch the firewood or water to meet the household needs.  

The resources needed for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights may be mobilized both domestically and internationally. The most important sources of domestic revenues include trade tariffs (on imports and on exports), taxation, the royalty fees obtained from companies (both domestic and foreign) exploiting natural resources, as well as fees that may be imposed on the users of public services such as schools or hospitals. States may also seek international assistance and cooperation in meeting their obligations towards the population. Finally, States may benefit from development aid or borrow to finance their policies. Although taking loans may come at the risk of increasing their annual public deficit and, ultimately, their public debt, it may be justified particularly in times of economic downturn and insofar as the debt finances policies that may be seen as investments rather than merely as a stop-gap to meet current expenditures.

While it would not be possible to review all the possible sources of public revenue in relation to the Covenant, it may be relevant to comment on three sources in particular, due to their specific relationship to the Covenant and to their importance: these are the royalties from the exploitation of natural resources, taxation and request for international support through development assistance or financial loans. They are examined in turn.

5.1 Exploitation of Natural Resources

As mentioned above, consistent with the right to self-determination, revenues from the exploitation of natural resources—such as minerals, oil and gas, but also agriculture—should benefit the local population. But we again must take into consideration the complementarity between resource mobilization and spending: if the local population is to benefit, that presupposes that the royalties are set at a high enough level, allowing the appropriate social investments.

A reading of the requirement of progressive realization under Article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant as imposing such duties concerning the definition of the royalties to be paid and the use of revenues accruing from the exploitation of the resource may find support in the right to development, which the General Assembly defined in 1986 as «an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized». The Declaration on the right to development expects States to «formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom», which implies that States ensure the adequate participation of the local communities concerned by investment projects, and that the decision-making process is fully transparent.

The revenues gained from the agreements concluded between host States and investors for the exploitation of natural resources should thus serve to fulfill the rights of the population, consistent with the duty of States to «ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in  

106. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepulveda Carmona, presented at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, A/68/293 (9 August 2013); E. Heinemann, B. Prato, and A. Shepherd, Rural Poverty Report 2011 (Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2011) (noting that the unpaid caregiving provided by women, including running the household and providing food for family members, typically require a 16-hour workday for rural women in developing countries, with «important consequences for women’s time-poverty and health»).


108. See above, text corresponding to note 48.

109. UN General Assembly, resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986 (adopted with only one negative vote (United States), and eight abstentions) (GA res A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986, annex 41 UN GAOR Supplement. (no 53) 186 (A/RES/41/53) (1986)). For an excellent and well-informed account of the attempts done, since the Declaration, to clarify the implications of the right to development, authored by one key actor in this process, see Stephen P. Marks, The Politics of the Possible: The Way Ahead for the Right to Development (Dialogue on Globalization, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2011).

110. Art. 2.3.

111. Preambule, para. 2. See also Art. 6.3. and 8.2.
their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income.  

The conclusion was drawn by the Working Group on the Right to Development when it noted that the right to development had a direct impact on how foreign direct investment should support the fulfillment of the 8th Millennium Development Goal to develop a global partnership for development: that right, it stated, implies that foreign direct investment (FDI) should contribute to local and national development in a responsible manner, that is, in ways that are conducive to social development, protect the environment, and respect the rule of law and fiscal obligations in the host countries. The principles underlying the right to development (…) further imply that all parties involved, i.e. investors and recipient countries, have responsibilities to ensure that profit considerations do not result in crowding out human rights protection. The impact of FDI should, therefore, be taken into account when evaluating progress in Goal 8 in the context of the right to development.  

Both bad practices and good practices can be identified in this regard. Bad practices consist in granting »tax holidays« or specific privileges to companies exploiting the subsoil, a tendency which is particularly suspect in the absence of transparency and accountability of the public officials negotiating the agreement—and that is especially damaging where investors’ rights are protected by specific provisions of investment treaties or free trade agreements, locking host governments into choices that may not benefit the population. Unfortunately, such bad practices are a frequent occurrence. This is largely to be explained by the very nature of the resources concerned and of the means of exploiting them. The exploitation of mineral resources typically takes the form of large-scale projects in which a small number of individuals control vast amounts of wealth. The capture of the benefits can therefore be highly unequal, unless affirmative measures are taken to ensure that they will be fairly distributed across a large number. Moreover, natural resources are non-renewable: they are »assets in the ground« whose value depends on technology, market prices, and political risk. The exploitation of mineral resources thus should be seen as the consumption of capital, rather than only of a stream of incomes. The temptation is thus huge for those in power both to exploit those resources in order to create as much wealth as possible within the shortest possible time (for they do not know for how long they will stay in power), and to sell off the right to exploit resources to the highest bidder (in order to cash in immediately the equivalent of all future income streams that could result from exploiting the resource), but sometimes with scant attention being paid to the long-term impacts or to the interests of the local communities. Awareness has grown about the potential human rights implications of agreements concluded between investors and host governments for the exploitation of natural resources. How the level of royalties should be set and how the revenues accruing to the State should be spent has only rarely been considered, however.  

Good practices, in contrast, are found in instances where a procedure is set up to ensure that the exploitation of the natural resources shall bring about important benefits to the local population. For instance, Peru’s auctioning of public land is designed to ensure favourable contract terms and, by »eliminating direct negotiations between private buyers and public officials«, to reduce the risks of corruption. During the auction process, the Government makes public the investment commitment, the bid value of the land, data on the land size, and

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115. It is telling, for instance, that none of the ten principles listed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights in the guidance he set out in 2011, refers to either of these two key questions (see Addendum to the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie – »Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators«, 25 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/51/Add.3).

116. Global Witness, Dealing with Disclosure: Improving Transparency in Decision-Making Over Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Allocations and Investments (April 2012), at 34. Peru’s land auctioning process entails the following steps: (1) the government reviews all rights and claims to the land and determines what rights can be transferred; (2) auction announcements, including bidding terms, are published on the government’s website, in the government gazette, and in the media for 90 days; (3) to be eligible, bidders are then required to prequalify by posting a bond equal to »at least 60% of the minimum bid price, plus the intended amount of investment«, and (4) all bids are ranked according to price offered and the project investment amount.
business plans. Furthermore, if the land is not used for its intended business plan within one year of it being transferred, it will revert back to the original owner. Public auctioning of exploitation rights can be a highly effective way to raise the levels of royalties: after Cameroon introduced a public tendering system for awarding logging rights, thus introducing competition between potential investors, payments from companies wishing to gain the access to forests (forest royalties, in particular) increased from a baseline of 0.6 USD per hectare per year in 1990 (a level set at the time by the authorities) to 5.6 USD per hectare per year for forest management units in 2006, and 13.7 USD per hectare for timber sales in 2005.117

Attempts have also been made to ensure the redistribution of revenues to the local population. They have rarely been successful. Cameroon, for instance, adopted a regulatory framework on forest, wildlife and fisheries that requires logging companies to pay an Area Fee (AF), which is intended to benefit the communities neighbouring the logging concessions.118 Between 1998 and 2009, 50 per cent of royalties went to the Treasury, 40 per cent to municipal councils and 10 per cent to village committees that manage forest royalties.119 Following the adoption of Act No. 2009/019 of 15 December 2009 on local tax systems, a share of revenue could henceforth be allocated to non-forest communities: 50 per cent of the revenues from forest exploitation now go to the Treasury, 20 per cent to FEICOM—the community mutual assistance fund—20 per cent to municipal councils and 10 per cent to local committees. An assessment of the system, ten years after it was launched and after the equivalent of 85 million USD had been redistributed across about 50 village councils, showed mixed results at best: the mayors, who play a key role in the management of AF resources, have often been accused of embezzlement; accountability mechanisms proved hardly effective, as even mayors who had poorly managed funds were generally re-elected; moreover, the system did not secure the possibility of long-term planning: in addition to a smaller proportion of the funds going to the local village councils after the 2009 reform, the levels of royalties to be paid by the logging companies were in fact reduced at the time, as the central government sought to soften the impact of the global financial crisis on the companies.120

Probably the best-known international effort of that sort is the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project. Initiated in 2001, the project was launched with significant support from the World Bank, which provided loans both through the International Finance Corporation and through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Bank, however, made its support conditional on the use of a portion of the revenues generated by the project to social development objectives, in the areas of health and education in particular. A monitoring mechanism was established—the Petroleum Revenue Oversight Committee, including members of both the Chadian government and civil society—to ensure that the oil revenues given to Chad would benefit the population. A Future Generations Fund—tasked with funding health, education, and other development projects—and a fund to compensate the communities living in the region where the oil was extracted were also set up to that effect. In 2006 however, Chad unilaterally announced its intention to amend the Petroleum Revenue Management Program (PRMP), which was meant to ensure that the oil revenues would serve poverty reduction, leading the Bank to freeze the funding to Chad. Though subsequent negotiations allowed the collaboration with the World Bank to be prolonged, after the Future Generations Fund was replaced in 2008 by a general stabilization fund, it had become clear that Chad was unwilling to comply with the monitoring scheme: the Bank announced its retreat from what had been portrayed, in 2001, as the most significant investment ever on the African continent, and as setting a precedent for the use of natural resource exploitation revenue for positive change.121 The failure was due

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117. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Addendum: Mission to Cameroon (16–23 July 2012) (A/HRC/22/50/Add.2), para. 61 (citing World Bank and PROFOR, Forêts tropicales humides du Cameroun. Une décennie de réformes (by Giuseppe Topa, Alain Karsenty, Carole Megevand and Laurent Debroux) (Washington D.C., 2010), 232 pages, at 44; it is unclear from the study whether these figures refer to real or nominal amounts).

118. See ibid., para. 57.

119. This followed the adoption of Act No. 94-01 of 20 January 1994, on forests, wildlife and fishing.


121. The statement of the World Bank read, «Over the years, Chad failed to comply with key requirements of [the] agreement. A new agreement was signed in 2006, but once again the government did not allocate adequate resources critical for poverty reduction. ... Regrettably, it became evident that the arrangements that had underpinned the Bank’s involvement in the Chad/Cameroon pipeline project were not working» (World Bank
The lesson is not that such attempts to ensure that revenues from the exploitation of natural resources are channelled towards human development objectives are doomed to fail. Appropriate procedural safeguards should be put in place, however, to ensure that the redistribution of the revenues will effectively take place, and that the authorities shall be held accountable to the population if the revenues do not support the right to development of the population. Moreover, any arrangement should strike the right balance between the requirement of stability (allowing for the planning of social investment) and the requirement of flexibility (allowing for adaptations ensuring that the arrangement remains economically viable and that incentives to deviate shall be minimized).

5.2 Taxation

Taxation constitutes a second, major source of revenue for the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights. Three key considerations could guide the assessment of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in assessing the tax structure adopted by States parties to the Covenant. First, there is a need to expand the tax base in order to ensure that taxation, combined with other sources of public revenue, can fund public policies that support the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights—including access to healthcare, education, housing, and social security. Second, there is a need to speed up the reduction of poverty, and thus ensure effective enjoyment of economic and social rights for each individual, by ensuring that the tax structure is sufficiently progressive. Third, finally, there is a need to step up efforts to combat tax evasion: increasing tax levels without also addressing tax evasion would be like pouring water into a leaking bucket. These components of a human rights-compliant tax policy are reviewed in turn.

a) Widening the Tax Base to Ensure Adequate Funding for the Realization of Social Rights

In 2009, based on data from 2000–2005, Martin Ravallion famously arrived at the conclusion that only by imposing prohibitive tax rates (of 60 per cent and above, and often beyond 100 per cent) on the relatively rich—i.e., on those whose incomes exceed 13USD per day in 2005 PPP, which corresponds to the level of consumption defining the poverty line in rich countries—would it be possible for low-income countries to effectively end poverty. In other terms: although various other measures might be relied on to reduce poverty in these countries, poverty was considered to be so widespread, and wealth creation so woefully insufficient, that taxation was not a promising way to achieve this objective. The implication was that, for these poor countries, redistribution of wealth was not a substitute for economic growth and international support: before wealth could be redistributed, there needed to be wealth to share.

Ten years have passed, however, during which economic growth has been strong for most of the countries of this group: more recent research, using a methodology very similar to that of Ravallion, has come to the conclusion that most developing countries [now] have the financial

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122. Though they were less publicized, similar issues arose with respect to Cameroon, also a party to the project. Cameroon failed in its bid to have modifications made to the initial contract, though its conditions (negotiated on the basis of the low price per barrel at the time) had become extremely disadvantageous to the country by the late 2000s, with transit costs of only 0.41 USD per barrel.

123. For instance, following his mission to Cameroon in July 2012 as the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, this author recommended as regards revenues from forest exploitation: (a) guaranteeing the transparency of transfers, for example by requiring councils and local committees to publish figures on the royalties paid to villages, informing citizens in radio broadcasts about how the money has been used and publishing a list of expenditures at the end of the budget year; (b) building the capacities of local communities, especially women and indigenous communities, to participate in taking decisions about the use of tax revenue; (c) encouraging investment of this revenue; and (d) strengthening monitoring, appeals and sanctions mechanisms. [Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Addendum: Mission to Cameroon (16–23 July 2012), cited above note 104, para. 59].

124. The argument summarized here is developed at greater length in a companion chapter by this author, which appears in »Human Rights and Tax in an Unequal World« (forthcoming at Oxford University Press).

scope to dramatically speed up the end of poverty based on national capacities at the global poverty lines of $1.90 or the $2.50 line. 126 That means an untapped potential. In many countries, particularly developing countries, the tax base is very low and does not allow the States concerned to mobilize sufficient resources for the fulfillment of the rights of the Covenant. 127 Inter-regional differences are huge in this area: in developed countries, revenue from personal income tax is 8.4 per cent of GDP, whereas in Latin American countries for instance, this tax generates only 1.4 per cent of GDP. 128 It has been noted that «if all developing countries were able to raise 15 per cent of their national income in tax, a commonly accepted minimum figure (the OECD average is 37 per cent), they could realize at least an additional $198 billion per year, more than all foreign development assistance combined.» 129

A specific area in which action could be taken to widen the tax base in order to fund the realization of social rights is by reducing, or eliminating entirely, favourable protections granted to foreign investors in order to attract capital. There is in fact ample evidence that such «tax holidays» or even, more generally, legal protections granted to investors, have little or no impact on the ability of the country to attract investment. 130 The major determinants of FDI are economic factors, such as market size and trade openness, as measured by exports and imports in relation to total GDP. 131 For other variables there is less consensus in the literature. In general, the studies find that the political and economic factors—such as market size, skilled labour, and trade policies—are more important for the locational decision of foreign investment than the legal structure for protection of investors’ rights and the ability to avoid double taxation by double-taxation treaties. 132 In other terms, if there is one means through which revenues from taxation could increase rather painlessly (and at a relatively low administrative cost), it is by raising the taxes owed by foreign corporations operating in the country, or by closing loopholes, such as price transfer mechanisms, allowing such corporations to escape local taxes, if not entirely, at least to a very large extent.

b) Implementing Progressive Tax Policies

The former Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights argued that States should be encouraged to set up a progressive tax system with real redistributive capacity that preserves, and progressively increases, the income of poorer households. [Affirmative action measures aimed at assisting the most disadvantaged individuals and groups that have suffered from historical or persistent discrimination, such as well-designed subsidies or tax exemptions, would not be discriminatory. In contrast, a flat tax whereby}

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128. Ana Corbacho, Vicente Frebes Cibils and Eduardo Lora (eds.), More than Revenue: Taxation as a development tool (Inter-American Development Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 115. This discrepancy, as a measure of the degree of progressivity of the tax system (i.e., of its ability to reduce inequalities) is hardly attenuated by taking into account the proportion the personal income tax represented in the total tax burden: in OECD countries, the total tax burden represents 34.8 per cent of the GDP and it is 23.4 per cent in Latin America. Therefore, the personal income tax represents about one quarter of the tax burden in OECD countries, but only 5.98 per cent of the tax burden in Latin American countries.
130. For a more systematic treatment, see Olivier De Schutter, Johan F. Swinnen and Jan Wouters, Introduction: Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development, in Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development. The Law and Economics of International Investment Agreements, eds. O. De Schutter et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 1-24. See also World Bank, Results of Investor Motivation Survey Conducted in the EAC (East African Community), presentation made to the Tax Compact in Lusaka, Zambia (Global Tax Simplification Team, 2013), cited in OECD, Development Co-Operation Report 2014: Mobilising Re
all people are required to pay an equal proportion of their income would not be conducive in achieving substantive equality, as it limits the redistributive function of taxation. 133

Her successor in the mandate, Philip Alston, emphasized this point further, regretting that we are still far from »recognizing the fact that tax policy is, in many respects, human rights policy«, despite the obvious contribution taxation makes to the fulfillment of human rights: »The regressive or progressive nature of a State’s tax structure, and the groups and purposes for which it gives exemptions or deductions, shapes the allocation of income and assets across the population, and thereby affects levels of inequality and human rights enjoyment«.134 It is time that these calls be heeded.

Progressivity of Taxation as a Human Rights Requirement

Redistributive fiscal policies and social spending, particularly on social security, have had a major role to play in reducing the levels of inequality that would result from market incomes for different groups of the population. In OECD countries, public cash transfers, together with income taxes and social security contributions, were estimated to reduce inequality among the working-age population (measured by the Gini coefficient) by an average of about one-quarter across OECD countries during the period from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s.135 Few graphs illustrate this contribution of redistributive public policies better than a graph presented by the OECD in 2011, which contrasts the levels of inequality resulting from market incomes alone with the levels of inequality resulting from net incomes—i.e., after taxation and redistribution are taken into account. Combining progressive taxation schemes with subsidies to various forms of social protection, it appears, reduced inequality within the working-age population by about one-quarter, on average, in OECD countries, and the impacts are even larger in Nordic countries, Belgium, or Germany. The following figure illustrates this impact:

Fig. 3. Impacts on inequality (measured as Gini coefficient) of the difference between market incomes and net (disposable) incomes following taxation and social security transfers, OECD countries, late 2000s (data from 2006 to 2009, depending on the data available for each country).

Both by reducing the weight of pre-tax income inequalities and by increasing the fiscal capacity of the State, a progressive tax system has an important role to play in the fulfillment of social rights. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has therefore regularly expressed its concern at reforms of the taxation system that would make it less progressive (for instance, by shifting the burden from corporations to the families, or by increasing VAT rates on essential items): in Concluding Observations addressed to the United Kingdom (UK), it deplored «the adverse impact that recent changes to the fiscal policy in the State party, such as the increase in the threshold for the payment of inheritance tax and the increase of the value added tax, as well as the gradual reduction of the tax on corporate incomes, are having on the ability of the State party to address persistent social inequality and to collect sufficient resources to achieve the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights for the benefit of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups».

Progressivity Properly Understood

Three remarks are in order, however. First, it is important to relate progressivity in taxation schemes with the scope and content of the redistributive policies adopted within each country. A progressive tax system only can have an impact on the reduction of inequalities if the revenue from the taxes collected is redistributed through social policies that benefit the poor, rather than being spent on investments that shall only allow the rich to become richer. For the effective realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, it is the combination of revenue mobilization and of spending choices that matters, and neither of these two elements alone shall in itself suffice to assess whether the efforts of the State are sufficient: just like one can easily imagine a State with generous social policies addressed at tackling poverty, but in which such policies are essentially financed by the poor themselves, it is possible to have a State tax the rich but not use the revenues collected in ways that have a significant impact on the reduction of inequalities.

Secondly, the ability for even a progressive tax system to reduce inequalities depends not only on the contribution of the richest part of the population to public revenue in percentage terms, but also on the absolute levels of such contributions: if, for example, the richest decile of the population pays 90 per cent of the total income taxes collected in the country, the taxation system may be said to be progressive according to the most common measure of tax progressivity known as the Kakwani index. But if those richest 10 per cent are taxed at very low rates, the redistributive capacity of the taxation remains very limited: such a redistributive capacity is captured by another index, known as the Reynolds-Smolensky index, which measures the difference in income distribution before and after the tax is imposed. One important consequence of this distinction is that a tax reform that may at first appear as regressive because the proportion of the total tax revenue paid by the richest part of the population will decrease—leading, in other terms, the effort to be spread across a larger part of the population—nevertheless may have progressive consequences, if the overall tax rates and thus the revenue the State may mobilize are increased.

Thirdly, the introduction of a progressive taxation scheme could have counterproductive impacts if it resulted in choking the economy and significantly slowing down economic activity, thus, in the medium to long term, destroying the very revenue base the State may be able to count on in order to finance its

137. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, to the thirteenth session of the Human Rights Council, Addendum: Mission to Brazil (12-18 October 2009) (A/HRC/13/33/Add.6), para. 36. «The tax structure in Brazil remains highly regressive. Tax rates are high for goods and services and low for income and property, bringing about very inequitable outcomes. (…) While the social programmes developed under the Zero Hunger strategy are impressive in scope, they are essentially funded by the very persons whom they seek to benefit, as the regressive system of taxation seriously limits the redistributive impact of the programmes. Only by introducing a tax reform that would reverse the current situation could Brazil claim to be seeking to realize the right to adequate food by taking steps to the maximum of its available resources».
social policies. This however is an area in which the persistence of certain myths often has made a disservice to public debate. One assumption in particular, popularized as the «Kuznets curve», is that the growth of inequality is an inevitable price to pay for economic growth, so that the introduction of policies to combat inequalities, if it occurs too early, might damage the prospects for development. However, quite apart from the fact that the original reasoning of Simon Kuznets, which applied to fast-growing nations going through rapid processes of industrialization and urbanization, could not be transposed to advanced industrial economies in which these processes are completed, the ideological uses made of his work does not correspond to the actual findings of Kuznets: whereas there may have been, historically, a correlation between the structural transformation linked to industrialization and the increase of inequality, it does not follow that such increase should be treated as a condition for industrialization—indeed, one may suspect that industrialization would have been far less damaging to social cohesion, and thus far more sustainable, with robust redistributive schemes compensating the losers by transferring resources from the gainers. Nor indeed, do such ideological uses have any (other) solid data to rely on. Quite the contrary in fact, there is now a consensus that high levels of taxation, allowing the State to adopt robust redistributive policies and provide high-quality public services, far from being an obstacle to economic growth, are an indispensable ingredient thereof: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that «the combined direct and indirect effects of redistribution, including the growth effects of the resulting lower inequality, are on average pro-growth». Indeed, more recent research has generalized findings initially focused on OECD countries, which concluded that the concentration of incomes at the top impeded growth, whereas growth in contrast was stimulated by increasing the portion of total wealth going to the lowest quintile of the population or to the middle class: researchers from the IMF thus found «an inverse relationship between the income share accruing to the rich (top 20 per cent) and economic growth»:

If the income share of the top 20 per cent increases by 1 percentage point, GDP growth is actually 0.08 percentage point lower in the following five years, suggesting that the benefits do not trickle down. Instead, a similar increase in the income share of the bottom 20 per cent (the poor) is associated with 0.38 percentage point higher growth. This positive relationship between disposable income shares and higher growth continues to hold for the second and third quintiles (the middle class).

There is no trade-off, therefore, between the understandable desire of low-income countries to grow their economy, and the reduction of inequality within these countries by progressive taxation and redistribution schemes.

There are hence strong reasons to define the adoption of strongly progressive taxation schemes as a condition for the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, and thus as a duty for the States parties to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Yet, for many governments, progressive taxation with powerful inequality-reducing impacts may be difficult to achieve. Indirect taxes (such as VAT) are easier to collect, and therefore, despite their regressive impacts (since poor households spend a higher proportion of their incomes on consumer goods), they may be the preferred way for governments with a weak administrative capacity to collect revenue. Moreover, because capital is more mobile than labour and households, it is tempting to


141. IMF Staff Discussion Note, Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective (Era Dabla-Norris, Kalpana Kochhar, Nujin Suphaphiphat, Frantisek Ricka, Evdiki Toumpa), June 2015, 7.

142. Diane Elson, Radhika Balakrishnan and James Heintz, Public Finance, Maximum Available Resources and Human Rights, in Nolan et al., Human Rights and Public Finance, 28, and in the same volume, Ignacio Salz, Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax Injustice from a Human Rights Perspective, 84. It is important to note, however, that although VAT taxes are regressive when calculations are made on income (the poorest households contribute more as a proportion of their income), this regressivity either disappears or is significantly attenuated when calculated on the basis of consumption (that is, the higher levels of consumption of the rich and the high VAT rates on luxury items that are only affordable to the rich), leading to a situation in which the rich contribute more to the revenues collected through VAT than the poor). See Corbacho et al., More than Revenue, 167–68.
reduce the levels of taxation of capital, particularly by lowering the corporate tax and the personal income tax for the highest income earners,\(^\text{143}\) and to compensate this by increasing the taxation of wage earners and households.

It has been demonstrated time and again that the level of taxes paid by corporations plays only a minor role in the decisions of investors concerning the location of their investment.\(^\text{144}\) Yet, the myth persists that attracting investors by lowering the corporate tax base is a sustainable strategy. The implication however, is that countries are incentivized to seek their comparative advantage in denying their population improved levels of education, well-functioning public services, and better quality of life: this is what fiscal competition means. It is stimulated by indicators such as the Doing Business ranking from the World Bank, which—contrary to findings of organizations such as the OECD or IMF—still suggests that the lowering of corporate taxes is a valid means to attract investment, since countries that reduce tax rates, raise the threshold for taxable income, or provide for a larger set of exemptions, get approval.

Thus for instance, Paying Taxes 2017: The Global Picture, a background study to the Doing Business ranking jointly authored by the World Bank and by PwC, concludes following a review of 190 countries’ tax regimes that the Total Tax Rate (the cost of all taxes borne, as a percentage of commercial profit) decreased by 0.1 per cent in 2015, to reach 40.6 per cent—a result of 38 jurisdictions decreasing taxes, while 44 raised taxes (but doing so to a lesser extent).\(^\text{145}\) The World Bank’s commentary included in the study acknowledges that "Taxes are important to the proper functioning of an economy. They are the main source of federal, state and local government revenues used to fund health care, education, public transport, unemployment benefits and pensions, among others."\(^\text{146}\) Yet, the ranking at least implicitly sends the exact opposite message, as the better ranked countries are those where the costs of doing business go down: among the eleven factors according to which countries are ranked in the most recent edition (the fourteenth of its kind) Doing Business report are «payments, time and total tax rate for a firm to comply with all tax regulations as well as post-filing processes»\(^\text{147}\). Moreover, the report suggests that the shift from direct taxes—such as those, in particular, on corporate incomes—to indirect taxes are a rather positive trend:

Consumption taxes, primarily in the form of value-added tax, goods and services tax (GST) as well as sales and use tax (SUT), have grown to be a major source of tax revenues for governments across the globe as they begin to appreciate that taxing consumption provides a more certain tax revenue stream than taxing income or profit. Governments worldwide are looking to raise more of their taxes from indirect taxes, which from a business perspective should be more neutral than direct taxes.\(^\text{148}\)

The result of such pressures is that we have fiscal policies that, instead of shifting more of the tax burden on to the wealthiest corporations and the richest individuals, as both economic common sense and human rights would require, end up taxing wage earners and consumers through VAT and the imposition of users’ fees in sectors such as health or education. According to calculations by the World Bank, the average total tax rate payable by businesses on their commercial profits decreased from 53.5 per cent to 40.8 per cent between 2005 and 2015.\(^\text{149}\) Although some countries moved in the opposite direction, it is clear that the tax burden on individuals has increased. See Jomo Kwame Sundar,

\(^{143}\) International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper: Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality, January 22, 2014 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund), 37 (estimating that top personal income taxes were lowered by about 30 per cent on average since 1980).

\(^{144}\) See note 129.

\(^{145}\) World Bank and PwC, Paying Taxes 2017: The Global Picture (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2017). Rather awkwardly, this total is obtained by including in the calculation of the total tax rate the sum of all the different taxes and contributions payable after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions, which fall five categories: «profit or corporate income tax, social contributions and labour taxes paid by the employer (in respect of which all mandatory contributions are included, even if paid to a private entity such as a requited pension fund), property taxes, turnover taxes and other taxes (such as municipal fees and vehicle and fuel taxes)» (ibid., 91 – in Appendix 1 concerning the methodology). This deviates from standard practice; for instance, from the recommendation so the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics Manual, which treat levies for the collection of waste or environmental contributions to employees’ health or pension funds as distinct from general taxes: the methodology followed results in a misleadingly high estimate of the tax burden, which increases the pressure on governments to reduce the costs for businesses in all the areas covered. See Jomo Kwame Sundar,


\(^{148}\) World Bank and PwC, Paying Taxes 2017, 82.

\(^{149}\) This is a non-weighted average: small economies count as much as large ones in the calculation of the average. The total tax rate, for
The period 1970–2008. These outflows have amounted to a total of 854 billion USD for Africa alone, a conservative estimate is that illicit financial flows have exceeded between 859 billion and 1.06 trillion USD on a yearly basis. For Africa alone, a conservative estimate is that illicit financial flows have amounted to a total of 854 billion USD for the period 1970–2008. These outflows have been steadily growing throughout the period at an average rate of 12.1 per cent per year, with peaks reached in oil-producing countries such as Nigeria and Soudan linked to increases in the price of oil. The impacts are considerable: by the end of 2008, the same study notes, the cumulative impact of these outflows meant that each African woman, man or child lost 989 USD to illicit financial outflows. In fact, the total financial flows for 1970–2008 represent a sum far in excess of the external debt of all African countries (279 billion USD in 2008): in other terms, taking into account illicit financial flows, Africa is a net creditor to the world, and by tackling such illicit financial flows, about 600 billion USD could have been mobilized for the fight against poverty on the continent. 60 to 65 per cent of the total illicit financial flows come from commercial tax evasion, which results from overpricing imports and underpricing exports on customs documents, and thereby illegally transferring money abroad. Although the situation in Africa is particularly troubling, the continent is not alone in this regard. For instance, according to the Inter-American Development Bank, evasion rates of personal and corporate income taxes average 50 per cent in ten representative Latin American countries, with Guatemala topping the league with an evasion rate of 70 per cent.

Effectively Combating Tax Evasion and Illicit Financial Flows

The fight against tax evasion is the third channel through which tax policies can be made to contribute better to the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights. Tax evasion represents a huge loss to countries, and it is of particular consequence (as a percentage of their public budgets) in low- and middle-income countries. In 2008, Global Financial Integrity estimated that, during the 2002–2006 period, illicit financial flows represented an average of between 859 billion and 1.06 trillion USD on a yearly basis. For Africa alone, a conservative estimate is that illicit financial flows have amounted to a total of 854 billion USD for the period 1970–2008. These outflows have been steadily growing throughout the period at an average rate of 12.1 per cent per year, with peaks reached in oil-producing countries such as Nigeria and Soudan linked to increases in the price of oil. The impacts are considerable: by the end of 2008, the same study notes, the cumulative impact of these outflows meant that each African woman, man or child lost 989 USD to illicit financial outflows. In fact, the total financial flows for 1970–2008 represent a sum far in excess of the external debt of all African countries (279 billion USD in 2008): in other terms, taking into account illicit financial flows, Africa is a net creditor to the world, and by tackling such illicit financial flows, about 600 billion USD could have been mobilized for the fight against poverty on the continent. 60 to 65 per cent of the total illicit financial flows come from commercial tax evasion, which results from overpricing imports and underpricing exports on customs documents, and thereby illegally transferring money abroad. Although the situation in Africa is particularly troubling, the continent is not alone in this regard. For instance, according to the Inter-American Development Bank, evasion rates of personal and corporate income taxes average 50 per cent in ten representative Latin American countries, with Guatemala topping the league with an evasion rate of 70 per cent.

This is now described to be a priority in various international outcome documents. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in July 2015, the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives recognize[d] that significant additional domestic public resources, supplemented by international assistance as appropriate, will be critical to realizing sustainable development and achieving the sustainable development goals, and they committed to enhancing revenue administration through modernized, progressive tax systems, improved tax policy and more efficient tax collection. They pledged to work to improve the

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150. For a useful assessment, see OECD, Development Co-Operation Report 2014, chapter II.13.


154. This was also the conclusion reached by Léonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce, New Estimates of Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: Linkages with External Borrowing and Policy Options (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, ril 2008).

155. Ana Corbacho, et al. (eds), More than Revenue, 127 (fig. 7.4). These estimates are based on data from the period 2003–2010, with different years for the different countries (for Guatemala for instance, the reference year in 2006). They should therefore be treated with caution as a source of cross-country comparisons. They do provide, however, an idea of the magnitude of the problem.

fairness, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of our tax systems, including by broadening the tax base and continuing efforts to integrate the informal sector into the formal economy in line with country circumstances.\(^\text{157}\) Though not explicitly defined as a human rights requirement, these commitments should be seen as a component of the duty of progressive realization.

**Strengthening the Ability to Collect Taxes**

To effectively combat tax evasion, a strengthening of tax administration (by dedicating sufficient personnel and resources to combating tax evasion) would be required.\(^\text{158}\) The High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa established under the auspices of the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa recommended in this regard, in particular, «developing the required capacities, establishing or strengthening necessary institutions including transfer pricing units, and providing resources for the effective functioning of these institutions», and «holding multinationals accountable for fraudulent practices by setting up requirements for their transfer of funds and business practices».\(^\text{159}\) This should also be treated as a priority since the failure to effectively address tax evasion has regressive impacts, disproportionately affecting the poor:

High net-worth individuals and large corporations (...) have a far greater ability to evade taxes as they are able to pay tax advisers, lawyers and accountants (who may sometimes provide inappropriate advice and assistance) and to open undeclared foreign bank accounts in low-tax jurisdictions. Tax abuse by corporations and high net-worth individuals forces Governments to raise revenue from other sources: often regressive taxes, the burden of which falls hardest on the poor. Therefore, if States do not tackle tax abuse, they are likely to be disproportionately benefiting wealthy individuals to the detriment of the most disadvantaged. Monitoring, preventing and punishing abuse is therefore essential in order to comply with human rights principles and improve the distributive effects of tax systems.\(^\text{160}\)

Combating illicit financial flows are therefore a human rights issue. Indeed, recognizing that «illicit capital flight undermines the capacity of State Parties to implement the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and to attain the Millennium Development Goals», the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has called upon States parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights «to examine their national tax laws and policies towards preventing illicit capital flight in Africa».\(^\text{161}\)

**The Role of International Cooperation in Combating Tax Evasion**

Strengthening domestic institutions tasked with combating tax evasion will not suffice, however. This is one area in which such efforts shall only be fully effective if supported by international cooperation, requiring that all countries comply with their extraterritorial human rights obligations.\(^\text{162}\) Though classic forms of international cooperation have a role to play in this regard, «aid for tax» strategies—by supporting local institutions in charge of tax collection—will remain insufficient unless complemented by reforms in the countries which receive illicit financial flows from tax evasion or other forms of economic crime such as corruption. This concerns in particular the countries under whose jurisdiction tax havens are currently left unaddressed, or whose bank secrecy laws facilitate tax evasion. As noted by the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, «individual countries, in particular low-income countries, are severely constrained in the

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157. Id.


162. The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, seek to bring together the rather disparate contributions from judicial and non-judicial bodies to this fast-developing area of human rights law. They were endorsed on 28 September 2011 by a range of non-governmental organisations and human rights experts, including mandate-holders within the Special Procedures established by the Human Rights Council. See Olivier De Schutter, et al., „Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 34 (2012), pp. 1084-1171.

measures that they alone can take against tax abuse. Illicit financial flows are international in nature and therefore beyond the capacity of one State alone to tackle. The availability of offshore financial centres (tax havens) that offer low or no taxes and secrecy is a major factor. 164

There are signs that governments are finally taking these issues more seriously. In 2010, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, initially the result of a joint effort of the OECD and the Council of Europe in 1988, was amended in order to allow for the participation of developing countries. The new text was opened for signature on 1 June 2011. It now covers 109 jurisdictions, including 15 jurisdictions covered by extension. 165 It provides for various forms of administrative cooperation between States in the assessment and collection of taxes, facilitating the exchange of information and the recovery of foreign tax claims with a view to supporting States’ efforts to combat tax avoidance and evasion. At the same time, the G20 has identified base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) as a major concern for tax justice worldwide: the ability for States to raise public revenue is undermined as multinational companies are taking advantage of differences between tax rates by artificially shifting profits across borders, rather than declaring such profits—and paying the corresponding taxes—where their productive activities take place. The OECD adopted a 15-point action plan in 2013 in order to address this, to be progressively implemented in the next few years. 166

That these efforts are essential for the fulfillment of human rights is made increasingly explicit by United Nations human rights treaty bodies. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted in Concluding Observations related to the UK that financial secrecy legislation [allowing its Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies to prosper as tax havens] and permissive rules on corporate tax are affecting the ability of the State party, as well other States, to meet their obligation to mobilize the maximum available resources for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, and it recommended that it intensify its efforts, in coordination with its Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, to address global tax abuse. 167

Nor is the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights isolated in this regard. A few months after the cited recommendation was addressed to the UK, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women recommended that Switzerland undertake independent, participatory and periodic impact assessments of the extraterritorial effects of its financial secrecy and corporate tax policies on women’s rights and substantive equality, and ensure that such assessments are conducted in an impartial manner with public disclosure of the methodology and finding. 168 The recommendation was prompted by a report presented by a coalition of NGOs and a human rights clinic, showing how cross-border tax abuse by corporations and individuals—in various forms including controversial profit-shifting, fraudulent under-reporting of the value of taxable transactions, and the use of off-shore accounts to hide taxable income—have an impact on the ability for developing countries to protect and fulfill women’s rights. As the report explained:

The loss of revenues to cross-border tax abuse contributes to the underfunding of essential services, institutions, and infrastructure on which women depend, from health care and education to public courts and transportation systems, as well as programs designed specifically to protect and promote women’s rights. Inadequate spending on social services often takes a heavy toll on women in particular, as they typically bear the burden of care-giving and performing unpaid work when public institutions fall short. 169


165. Thus, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands are covered by extension from the UK; Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten, the latter two formerly part of the Netherlands Antilles, are covered by extension from the Netherlands; the Faroe Islands are covered by extension of Denmark.

In addition, development cooperation may support efforts at the domestic level to combat illicit financial flows. In 2011, development aid contributing to such efforts—by programmes strengthening the judiciary or anti-corruption authorities, for instance—represented 11 per cent of total official development assistance (ODA) from OECD countries. Such interventions can be highly effective: in Kenya, a 20,000 USD support programme led to a 33 million USD increase in tax revenue during a one-year period (2012–2013), which represents a rate of return of 1,650 USD for each dollar spent. Here again, however, such efforts could go further. Staff within the relevant public sector authorities could be trained to facilitate investigations in economic crimes and asset recovery. Developing countries could be encouraged to make this a top political priority. Support to local civil society organizations acting as watchdogs to denounce corruption or tax evasion could be increased.

The Role of the Private Sector: Financial Institutions

Although the main responsibility in tackling illicit financial flows lies with governments, the private sector—banks and other financial institutions—also have a role to play in this regard. Indeed, it could be argued that a failure to discharge their responsibilities to contribute to this objective is a violation, by these entities, of their commitments in the area of human rights. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights set out a requirement that business enterprises respect human rights, which includes an expectation that companies act with due diligence: corporations, the Guiding Principles state, should «act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved». This means that they should put in place «a human rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights». The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, following their revision in 2011 to insert a human rights chapter (chapter IV), also include due diligence in the definition of the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights.

Such due diligence obligations require from companies that they take measures to ensure that their clients do not evade their duties to pay taxes in the jurisdictions in which they reside. This interpretation is confirmed by Principle 17 of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which provides that human rights due diligence should cover «adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships». Similarly, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises provide that business enterprises domiciled in OECD should «seek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their business operations, products or services by a business relationship, even if they do not contribute to those impacts». As explained in the Commentary to these Guidelines (in para. 43), this implies an expectation that

«... an enterprise, acting alone or in co-operation with other entities, as appropriate, ... use its leverage to influence the entity causing the adverse human rights impact to prevent or mitigate that impact. »Business relationships« include relationships with business partners, entities in its supply chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services. Among the factors that will enter into the determination of the appropriate action in such situations are the enterprise’s leverage over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the impact, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse human rights impacts.»

173. Ibid., 162–63.
175. Ibid., 162–63.
177. See, for a more detailed description of what this entails, Principle 17 of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises also provide that companies «encourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers and sub-contractors, to apply principles of responsible business conduct compatible with the Guidelines». 178

The responsibilities of banks and other financial institutions to ensure that they support, rather than undermine, the efforts of governments to combat tax evasion, follows from the simple fact that without a mechanism to launder the money, economic actors will be less tempted to violate their tax obligations. Yet, Global Witness and others have warned that many regulations aimed at combating laundering were ignored or circumvented by financial actors. 179 This comes at a considerable price for developing countries: in 2015, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that the amount of the money laundered each year was the equivalent of 2–5 per cent of total GDP, or 800 billion to 2 trillion USD. 180

Some attempts have been made to make private financial actors aware of their responsibilities. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an independent intergovernmental body established in 1989 to support the fight against money laundering, adopted a set of recommendations addressed to its Member States. Known as the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (AML/CFT standards), the recommendations were initially drawn up in 1990; they were most recently updated in 2012, and have been endorsed by 180 countries. 181 While it is not possible here to describe in detail the full set of recommendations, it may be relevant to note that they include imposing on financial institutions that they undertake customer due diligence (CDD) upon establishing business relationships with new clients or for occasional transactions, whether because they reach a certain level or because there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing. CDD means identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity; identifying the «beneficial owner» and «taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner, such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is». Where the client is a corporation, this means understanding the corporate structure to see who is «behind» the corporate structure; «understanding and, … obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship»; «conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds». 182

The FATF recommendations on the need to seek information about beneficial owners are of particular importance. Indeed, a major obstacle to the effective enforcement of money laundering regulations is that the identity of the real owners of corporate structures may remain hidden, or can only be known to the authorities in country A (where the company is domiciled and regulated) by seeking information from country B (from where the company is administered). Noting that in many cases financial institutions did not seek to identify the beneficial owner when establishing a business relationship, the authors of a World Bank 2011 study on the laundering of the products of economic crime highlight the importance of imposing due diligence obligations on banks and other financial intermediaries such as trust and company service providers. 183 This, the study noted, would oblige service providers to «collect information and conduct due diligence on matters about which they might prefer to remain ignorant»: «If a service provider is obligated to gather full due diligence information, it becomes impossible for the intermediary to legitimately plead ignorance regarding the background of a client or the source of his or her funds». 184 Moreover, the collection of such information by the financial intermediaries facilitates inquiries, providing investigators with an adequate source of information.

184. Ibid., 5.
Even apart from the fact that they are not, by any means, fully implemented in the participating countries, the AML/CFT standards remain insufficient to effectively combat the widespread practice of tax evasion. Gaps remain, for instance, in enforcing the duty of financial institutions to ensure that they identify the beneficial owner. First, where investigators seek to have access to information detained by an attorney, the attorney-client privilege is invoked to oppose this and shield information from scrutiny. Such a barrier should be lifted where circumstances allow for this: the 2011 World Bank study referred to above notes that many jurisdictions have introduced exceptions to the legal professional privilege in cases in which the attorney is acting as a financial intermediary or in some other strictly fiduciary or transactional capacity, rather than as a legal advocate. Secondly, international cooperation is essential to the success of the provisions concerning the need to identify the beneficial owner: in order to save the considerable costs involved in having to seek information concerning the »real owners« of companies from authorities of another country than the country where the company is registered, countries should be encouraged to adopt regulations to ensure that information concerning beneficial ownership of any entity incorporated under its laws is available with a person who is resident in that country.

In order for the AML/CFT standards to be truly effective, the incentives of bankers should be aligned with the legal duties imposed on the financial institutions themselves. This is not currently the case. Global Witness rightly notes that, as long as prosecuting authorities remain hesitant to impose sanctions on the bank executives themselves, as individuals, these executives will remain tempted to treat the risk of their institution being fined for lack of due diligence in dealing with funds of suspect origin as a mere »business risk«, which may be worth taking as long as the benefits outweigh the potential costs to the institution. It is encouraging to note, however, that in recent years prosecuting authorities (particularly in the US) have appeared more willing to impose sanctions not only on financial institutions, but also on individuals working within such institutions—although more frequently on middle-level employees than on the »directing minds«, such as CEOs and members of the board.

5.3 International Support

When domestic resources are insufficient to allow a State party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to meet its obligations, it should seek to attract support from outside the country. Among the external resources that could be mobilized are the resources from FDI—which the government could seek to attract to the country, as a means to create employment, transfer technologies, and raise the standards of living—and the resources that the international community could contribute through development cooperation or through the provision of loans. Indeed, in its interpretation of Article 2 para. 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights...
considers that «the phrase ›to the maximum of its available resources‹ was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a State and those available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance», noting in this regard «the essential role of such cooperation in facilitating the full realization of the relevant rights is further underlined by the specific provisions contained in articles 11, 15, 22 and 23 which refer to international cooperation». It also has repeatedly called on States to seek assistance where needed to realize economic, social, and cultural rights. Indeed, when it sought the clarify the meaning of the »maximum available resources« clause in the context of the Optional Protocol opening a right to victims to file individual communications, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights informed the States parties that »should a State party use ›resource constraints‹ as an explanation for any retrogressive steps taken, the Committee would consider such information on a country-by-country basis [in particular] in the light of (…) whether the State party had sought cooperation and assistance or rejected offers of resources from the international community for the purposes of implementing the provisions of the Covenant without sufficient reason«.

The duty of States to seek international support loses much of its significance in the absence of clear duties of other States, or of international agencies, to provide such support as may be requested. Such obligations however still remain »imperfect«, in the sense that they are too diffuse and general: both the duty-bearers and the content remain vague and contested, making such obligations unenforceable unless and until they are further clarified. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has repeatedly affirmed that international assistance and cooperation for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is »particularly incumbent on those States in a position to assist«, as well as »other actors in a position to assist«. That seems hardly sufficient to allow a State in need of obtaining support to be able to claim such support from any State to which it turns for assistance. I argue, however, that the statement has three important implications. First, the obstacle that the debt burden constitutes for the ability of poor countries to realize economic and social rights should be addressed by debt relief. Second, foreign aid should be provided, in ways that support such efforts. Third, finally, loans may have to be granted to the States in need of financial support, under conditions that will facilitate, rather than impede, the attainment of that objective. Each of these implications is considered in turn.

a) Alleviating the Burden of Foreign Debt

In reviewing the human rights records of States parties to the various United Nations human rights treaties, expert human rights treaty bodies have regularly been confronted with the argument that the burden of foreign debt or the macroeconomic adjustment programmes imposed by international financial institutions as a condition for the continued receipt of loans constituted a major obstacle.
to the ability of States to comply with their human rights obligations, particularly as regards the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights.196 Conversely, some countries reported an improvement after they managed to reimburse their debt197 or benefited from debt relief measures, for instance under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, allowing them to increase the budgets dedicated to social sectors.198

This has led the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to express its view that, while «adjustment programmes [imposed on indebted countries as a condition for receiving further loans] will often be unavoidable and that these will frequently involve a major element of austerity», where such programmes are adopted, «endeavours to protect the most basic economic, social and cultural rights become more, rather than less, urgent. States parties to the Covenant, as well as the relevant United Nations agencies, should thus make a particular effort to ensure that such protection is, to the maximum extent possible, built-in to programmes and policies designed to promote adjustment. Such an approach, which is sometimes referred to as «adjustment with a human face» or as promoting «the human dimension of development» requires that the goal of protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable should become a basic objective of economic adjustment. Similarly, international measures to deal with the debt crisis should take full account of the need to protect economic, social and cultural rights through, inter alia, international cooperation. In many situations, this might point to the need for major debt relief initiatives.199

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as other human rights treaty bodies, have regularly noted that the burden of the reimbursement of foreign debt, as well as the implementation of structural adjustment programmes—poverty reduction strategy papers premised on similar macro-economic considerations—might seriously impede the ability of the States concerned to realize economic, social and cultural rights.200 In a typical formulation, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that the efforts of Honduras to comply with its obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are impeded by the fact that

196. See, for example, the reports submitted to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in chronological order, by the Central African Republic (CRC/C/1/Add.18 (1998)), by Honduras (CRC/C/65/Add.2 (1998), paras. 35–36 and 124) «the economic contraction resulting from reforms of the economic system and the payment of a crushing external debt, considerably reduces the possibilities for priority attention to human development»), by Suriname (CRC/C/28/Add.11 (1998)), by Mozambique (CRC/C/4/Add.11 (2001), para. 8) «a heavy foreign debt service burden, which has delayed much-needed investment in the social area to provide the majority of Mozambicans», by Madagascar (CRC/C/70/Add.18 (2003), para. 67), by Zambia (CRC/C/11/Add.25 (2002), para. 16) «the burden of servicing a huge external debt has taken a heavy toll on the national budget, and severely shrunk resources available for development»), by Sri Lanka (CRC/C/70/Add.17 (2002), paras. 128 and 144), by Nepal (CRC/C/65/Add.30 (2004), paras. 36 and 37) «debt servicing already claims about 14 per cent of the total budget and its impact adversely affects public investments and expenditure in the social sector, and, in particular, the provision of basic social services»), by Ecuador (CRC/C/65/Add.28 (2004), para. 53), by Kenya (CRC/C/KEN/2 (2006), para. 30) «large allocations for debt servicing, salaries and other recurrent costs in the Government budget have crowded out spending on social services»), by the reports submitted to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by Sudan (E/1990/5/Add.41 (1998), para. 64), by Morocco (E/1990/6/Add.20 (1999), para. 209), by Algeria (E/1990/6/Add.26) (2000), paras. 59–61), by Benin (E/1990/5/Add.48), para. 35), by Ecuador (E/1990/6/Add.36) (2002), para. 309 «the constraints imposed by the adjustment policies implemented by Governments in order to achieve a balanced budget have had an impact on the lowest income groups. In recent years, they have accelerated demographic changes in Ecuador in the shape of migration from the countryside to the cities, resulting in extremely fast growth of marginal urban areas forming belts of poverty»), by Kenya (E/C.12/KEN/1 (2007), para. 90 «although the structural adjustment programmes were presented as the panacea to underdevelopment and poverty in the country, the cut in public expenditure in key social sectors have had a devastating effect on the enjoyment of socio-economic rights in general and the right to adequate standard of living in particular»).


198. See, for instance, the combined third to fifth reports of States parties due in 2012 submitted by the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2016 (CRC/C/COD/2016 (24 June 2016), para. 25) «in 2010, external debt relief for the Democratic Republic of the Congo was approved to the level of US$ 13 billion, that is to say approximately 50 per cent. This has made it possible to redirect the resources earmarked for debt payment to social welfare measures and stabilization of the macroeconomic framework».


200. See, for instance, the Concluding Observations adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Tanzania in 2001 (CRC/C/15/Add.156) (2001), para. 9 (noting «the impact of the structural adjustment programme, high external debt payments, and increasing levels of unemployment and poverty within the State party»), on Niger in 2002 (CRC/C/15/Add.179 (2002), para. 8 (recommending that Niger «ensure the effective implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, paying special attention to the possible negative short-term impact of structural adjustment on the social rights of children»), on Burkina Faso in 2002 (CRC/C/15/Add.193) (2002), para. 16 (recommending that Burkina Faso «undertake a study on the impact of structural adjustment programmes on the right of children to social services»), or the concluding Observations adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on Zambia in 2005 (E/C.12/ZAF/2 (2005), para. 48); CRC/C/ADD.207 (Sri Lanka); CRC/C/SRL/Add.197 (Republic of Korea); CRC/C/15/Add.193 (Burkina Faso); CRC/C/15/Add.190 (Sweden); CRC/C/15/Add.186 (Netherlands/Netherlands Antilles); CRC/C/15/Add.179 (Niger); CRC/C/15/Add.174 (Malawi); CRC/C/15/Add.172 (Zimbabwe); CRC/C/15/Add.160 (Kenya); CRC/C/15/Add.152 (Turkey); CRC/C/15/Add.138 (Central African Republic); CRC/C/15/Add.130 (Suriname); CRC/C/15/Add.124 (Georgia); and CRC/C/15/Add.115 (India). See also Human Rights Council, Consolidation of findings of the high-level task force on the implementation of the right to development, 25 March 2010, A/HRC/15/29/2/Add.1, para. 54.
it is classified as a highly indebted poor country and that up to 40 per cent of its annual national budget is allocated to foreign debt servicing, and it acknowledged that the structural adjustment policies in the State party have negatively affected the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by the population, especially the vulnerable and marginalized groups of society. On 24 June 2016, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted a Statement titled «Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights». The statement examines in particular the duties under the Covenant of States parties as lenders. The Committee remarked that States parties to the Covenant would be acting in violation of their obligations if they were to delegate powers to [international organisations providing loans] and to allow such powers to be exercised without ensuring that they do not infringe on human rights. Similarly, they would be acting in breach of their obligations if they were to exercise their voting rights within such agencies without taking such rights into account. The position expressed by the Committee in this recent statement was largely foreshadowed in earlier statements by the Committee, in particular in the General Comment No. 18: The right to work (E/C.12/GC/186 (2005), where it had already made it clear that »States parties to the Covenant would be acting in breach of their obligations under the Covenant«. Therefore, the Committee concluded, «Both as Lenders in bilateral loans and as members of international organisations providing financial assistance, all States should (...) ensure that they do not impose on borrowing States obligations that would lead the latter to adopt retrogressive measures in violation of their obligations under the Covenant». The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted on 25 June 1993 by the World Conference on Human Rights calls upon the international community to «make all efforts to help alleviate the external debt burden of developing countries, in order to supplement the efforts of the Governments of such countries to attain the full realization of the economic, social and cultural rights of their people». In 2000, the Millennium Declaration also included a call on industrialized countries to «implement the enhanced programme of debt relief for the heavily indebted poor countries without further delay and to agree to cancel all official bilateral debts of those countries in return for their making demonstrable commitments to poverty reduction», and it included a pledge to «deal comprehensively and effectively with the debt problems of low- and middle-income developing countries, through various national and international measures designed to make their debt sustainable in the long term». Building on the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and the 2008 Doha Declaration, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda recognizes «the need to assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief, debt restructuring and sound debt management, as appropriate», and includes a pledge to «continue to support the remaining HIPC-eligible countries that are working to complete the HIPC process» and, «on a case-by-case basis» to «explore initiatives to support non–HIPC countries with sound economic policies to enable them to address the issue of debt sustainability». It acknowledges that, while «maintaining sustainable debt levels is the responsibility of the borrowing countries», «lenders also have a responsibility to lend in a way that does not undermine a country’s debt sustainability». 201

203. Ibid., para. 9.
205. Ibid., para. 11. The position expressed by the Committee in this recent statement was largely foreshadowed in earlier statements by the same body, in particular in the General Comment No. 18: The right to work (E/C.12/GC/186 (2005), where it had already made it clear that «To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 6, States parties should endeavour to promote the right to work in other countries as well as in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In negotiations with international financial institutions, States parties should ensure protection of the right to work of their population. States parties that are members of international financial institutions, in particular the Interna-
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda also notes «the importance of debt restructurings being timely, orderly, effective, fair and negotiated in good faith», and that «successful debt restructurings enhance the ability of countries to achieve sustainable development and the sustainable development goals». However, in a clear reference to so-called vulture funds, it expresses its concern at «the ability of non-cooperative minority bondholders to disrupt the will of the large majority of bondholders who accept a restructuring of a debt-crisis country’s obligations», and encourages Governments to adopt legislation to counter such actions.

Fortunately, the international community has made progress on both issues. On 10 September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 69/319, declaring that sovereign debt restructuring processes should be guided by nine Basic Principles, including the right to sovereign debt restructuring, good faith, transparency, equitable treatment, sovereign immunity, legitimacy, sustainability and the principle of majority restructuring. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 136 in favour and 6 against, with 41 abstentions. The Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and human rights expressed the view that the nine Basic Principles «reflect customary law and general principles of international law to a large extent and, as such, are legally binding».

In parallel, some creditor States, including the EU Member States and the Members of the Club of Paris, pledged not to sell their claims on highly-indebted poor countries (HIPCs) to creditors unwilling to provide debt relief, and two countries—the UK and Belgium—adopted legislation specifically aimed at combating the abusive practices of vulture funds. The Advisory Committee of the Human Rights Council, in a report requested by resolution 27/30 of the Human Rights Council, recommends that States enact legislation aimed at curtailing the predatory activities of vulture funds within their jurisdiction: (i) covering both HIPCs and other countries; (ii) applying to commercial creditors that refuse to negotiate any restructuring of the debt; (iii) prohibiting the filing of claims that are manifestly disproportionate to the amount initially paid to purchase the sovereign debt. It also recommends that States refuse to «give effect to foreign judgments or conduct enforcement procedures in favour of vulture funds that are pursuing a disproportionate profit»—i.e., granting claims that are in excess of the discounted price originally paid for the bonds. This is consistent with, and clarifies the implications of, the call included in Human Rights Council resolution 27/30, that States «consider implementing legal frameworks to curtail predatory vulture fund activities within their jurisdictions».

b) Seeking International Assistance and Cooperation

While the adoption of measures to alleviate the burden of the foreign debt are essential, such measures may not be sufficient where poor countries lack the budgetary means to invest in the fulfillment of economic and social rights: it has long been argued that international assistance, in the form of development aid, was also required. Which States have a duty to provide support, however, and the level at which support should be provided, remain to a certain extent controversial. From the point of view of international law, two considerations seem relevant.

First, an international consensus exists on the commitment of rich countries to contribute 0.7 per cent of their gross national income (GNI) to official development assistance. The benchmark originated from the UNCTAD II conference, held in New Delhi in February and March 1968, as part of a broader objective that 1 per cent of the wealth created in «economically advanced» countries, gross national product (GNP) be transferred to developing

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211. Ibid., para. 98.
212. Ibid., para. 100.
213. Restructuring of sovereign debt: UN expert stresses GA Principles are binding, press release, New York, 10 September 2015.
215. Ibid., para. 87(a).
216. Ibid., para. 87(b).
217. A/RES/37/30, para. 2. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 33 to 5, with 9 abstentions.
countries as a combination of both official and private financial flows. UNCTAD II took note of the fact that some developed countries declared their willingness, within the framework of the one per cent target for total flows, to provide a minimum of 0.75% of their GNP in net flows of official resources. The one per cent target of total flows was supported the following year by the Commission on International Development—headed by Lester B. Pearson, and established at the request of the President of the World Bank R. McNamara—which in addition recognized a special need for official development assistance on concessional terms, that is, [for aid] in the form of grants or loans on soft terms. (…) On the assumption that increases in aid can be more closely linked to efficient use and performance than hitherto, we recommend a substantial increase in official aid flows. Specifically, official development assistance should be raised to 0.70 per cent of donor GDP by 1975, and in no case later than 1980. This target was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 2626 (XXV) on the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade adopted on 24 October 1970, which stated that:

Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7% of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the Decade.

This joint commitment has been reaffirmed in subsequent international declarations, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has taken it as a benchmark to define the obligation of international assistance. The rise of the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities among States, and various examples of negotiated systems of burden-sharing established to address challenges or duties of a global character, confirms that international law is moving towards the recognition of differentiated duties, depending on the capacity and resources of each State. Only a handful of countries are in fact delivering on this commitment, however, and even when progress is made towards reaching the 0.7 per cent target, how that figure is calculated continues to be controversial.

Secondly, where a particular outcome could have been prevented by the action of one State—for instance, a famine develops due to the lack of international aid, although provision of support by that State might have averted the disaster—such responsibility is not diminished.


225. For instance, an October 2016 report from Concord and AidWatch lamented that ◆only five EU countries met their [0.7 per cent] target in 2015◆: these were Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK. See Concord AidWatch, Report 2016: This Is Not Enough, http://library.concordeurope.org/record/1834/file/DEEP-REPORT-2016-081.pdf, 6. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Governments expressed their ◆concern that many countries still fall short of their ODA commitments and we reiterate that the fulfillment of all ODA commitments remains crucial. ODA providers reaffirm their respective ODA commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries◆ (Outcome document cited above, para. 51).

226. For instance, it has been shown that rich countries sometimes include in the calculation of their ODA costs of the hosting of refugees or student grants: the Concord / AidWatch report referred to previously notes that in 2015, 17 per cent of the aid reported by EU countries «did not reflect a real transfer of resources to developing countries, because it went to in-donor refugee spending, debt relief, student costs, tied aid and interest payments. Some EU member states increased their reported aid almost entirely through spending on refugees in their own countries, thereby becoming their own top beneficiaries» (Concord AidWatch Report 2016, 6).
by the mere fact that the result might have been avoided if other States had adopted a different conduct. 227 Indeed, any other reading would lead to what might be called the »paradox of the many hands«: the larger the number of States involved in a situation that creates obstacles to one State fulfilling its human rights obligations, the more difficult it will be to assert a responsibility of any individual State in that situation. This problem is well known in the area of climate change. But it is equally relevant here, where the question is whether any State may be held responsible for a situation—resulting in the lack of realization of economic and social rights in another State—for which not the conduct of the former State alone, but that conduct in combination with that of a large number of other States, has contributed to this result. 228

Thus, a particular violation of economic, social and cultural rights may be attributed to the conduct of one State—for instance, a State refusing to provide assistance despite a request to that effect, although that State is in a position to assist—even if other intervening causes, or the conduct adopted by a number of other States, have also played a role in the violation. But the argument remains theoretical and largely speculative: in practice, quite apart from the lack of enforcement mechanisms to coerce a State into discharging its obligations to provide international assistance and cooperation, alleging the responsibility of one State in a situation for which other States also bear some responsibility—potentially to an even larger degree—may be politically difficult to justify. This is especially the case where the argument made is that the State in question should have done more to support the realization of economic and social rights in another State, for instance by increasing the level of development aid or by facilitating access of that State to international finance. In order for a State to be found responsible for implementing trade policies that destroy local producers’ ability to compete on their own domestic markets, the classical tools of attribution and causality should suffice, once the extraterritorial implications of human rights obligations are accepted. It is a different task altogether to seek to engage the responsibility of that State for not providing a certain level of aid to the country which requests it, or for not ensuring that the multilateral trading system works for the benefit of the State which, due to its poor trade balance, finds it difficult to make progress on development indicators. This is because liability for taking certain actions is easier to justify than liability for omissions. But it is also because what is required here from the State is in fact to make up for the failings of an unjust international economic order, for which that State alone cannot be held responsible. 230

c) Seeking Loans

The State that cannot mobilize sufficient resources domestically may then turn to another source of financing to realize economic, social, and cultural rights: it may seek a loan from another State or from international lending organizations such as development banks. This is a double-edged sword, however. On the one hand, running public deficits financed by debt may be important to compensate for a shortfall of capital where investments are needed, in order to stimulate the ability of the economy to grow and for public investment to lead to the creation of decent jobs; indeed, public investments in infrastructure and in education, as well as in institutions-building, have a key role to play in attracting private investment. On the other hand however,

227. In the Bosnian Genocide Case, the International Court of Justice noted that, in order to find Serbia responsible for not having prevented acts of genocide: «it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result – averting the commission of genocide – which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce» (International Court of Justice, Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment of 26 February 2007), ICJ Reports, para. 430). According to the Court, how much the adoption by the State of a different conduct could have altered the outcome would only be relevant to the question of damages to be awarded (ibid., para. 461).


230. Part of the ambition of the Declaration on the Right to Development (A/RES/41/128 (4 Dec. 1986) is precisely to overcome what may be seen as a gap in international human rights law. The Declaration provides that »States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development« (Art. 3[3]). Article 4, which stipulates a duty of all States »to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development«, with »sustained action [being] required to promote more rapid development of developing countries«. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action further confirms that »States should cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development« (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 49). According to the Court, how much the adoption by the State of a different conduct could have altered the outcome would only be relevant to the question of damages to be awarded (ibid., para. 461).
high levels of debt can lead creditors to impose conditions, linked in particular to macroeconomic policies and fiscal consolidation, which could negatively affect the ability of the borrowing country to fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights.

In the recent past, the case of Greece illustrates this best. After it was revealed, in October 2009, that the public debt of the country was much higher than had been reported, Greece faced speculation on the financial markets, making its debt impossible to finance at acceptable conditions. It therefore called for financial support, and three rescue packages were successively granted, in 2010, 2012, and 2015. However, following the implementation of fiscal consolidation programmes adopted by the country at the request of its creditors—the other Euro Area Member States represented by the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank—various human rights bodies expressed their concern on the impacts of these programmes on social rights. The European Commission implemented a Loan Facility Agreement: in effect, an intergovernmental framework agreement on the adoption of fiscal consolidation measures by Greece, the content of which was negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of the creditors. The «Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece» included so-called austerity measures purportedly to restore Greece's fiscal balance (30 billion euros worth of spending cuts were decided for the period 2010–2014); the privatisation of State assets, in the amount of 30 billion euros; and »structural measures«, involving in particular the «flexibilisation» of the labour market, as a means to restore the competitiveness of the Greek economy. In June 2011, after this first set of measures appeared insufficient, the euro-zone Member States granted a second loan for an amount of 130 billion euros for the years 2012–2014. This second bailout was effected through the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It was officially launched in March 2012. Finally, a third rescue package was agreed in July 2015, for an amount of 86 billion euros (see Council Implementing Decision (EU) No. 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece, OJ L 219, 20.8.2015, p. 12).


232. Greece called for financial assistance on 23 April 2010. In response, the representatives of the Euro Area Member States other than Greece decided on 2 May 2010 to provide stability support to Greece through a Loan Facility Agreement: in effect, an intergovernmental framework that allowed the pooling of bilateral loans in the form of an international contract. The Euro Area Member States provided Greece with a total of 80 billion euros in loans on the understanding that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to which Greece had also turned for assistance, would provide another 30 billion euros (Loan Facility Agreement [2010], preambular § 3). The disbursements, however, were made conditional on the adoption of fiscal consolidation measures by Greece, the content of which was negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of the creditors. The «Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece» included so-called austerity measures purportedly to restore Greece's fiscal balance (30 billion euros worth of spending cuts were decided for the period 2010–2014); the privatisation of State assets, in the amount of 30 billion euros; and »structural measures«, involving in particular the «flexibilisation» of the labour market, as a means to restore the competitiveness of the Greek economy. In June 2011, after this first set of measures appeared insufficient, the euro-zone Member States granted a second loan for an amount of 130 billion euros for the years 2012–2014. This second bailout was effected through the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It was officially launched in March 2012. Finally, a third rescue package was agreed in July 2015, for an amount of 86 billion euros (see Council Implementing Decision (EU) No. 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece, OJ L 219, 20.8.2015, p. 12).

233. ECSR, Decision on the merits, 23 May 2012, Complaint No 65/2011, General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece; ECSR, Decision on the merits, 23 May 2012, Complaint No 66/2011, General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece.

234. ECSR, Federation of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v Greece, Complaint No 76/2012, Panhellenic Federation of Public Service Pensioners v Greece, Complaint No 77/2012, Pensioners’ Union of the Athens–Piraeus Electric Railways (ISAP) v Greece, Complaint No 78/2012, Panhellenic Federation of Pensioners of the Public Electricity Corporation (PAS-DEI) v Greece, Complaint No 79/2012, Pensioners’ Union of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) v Greece, Complaint No 80/2012.

235. See, for example, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report of Greece, UN doc CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/7 (1 March 2013); Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the combined second and third periodic reports of Greece, UN doc CRC/C/GRC/CO/2-3 (13 August 2012).
the Covenant are duly taken into account when negotiating financial assistance projects and programmes, including with international financial institutions. 236

The Greek episode was one of the examples that prompted the Committee to adopt its 2016 Statement on »Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights«, referred to above. The statement noted in particular that:

The State party seeking financial assistance should be aware that any conditions attached to a loan that would imply an obligation on that State to adopt regressive measures in the area of economic, social and cultural rights that are unjustifiable would be in violation of the Covenant. The borrowing State should therefore ensure that such conditions do not unreasonably reduce its ability to respect, protect and fulfill the Covenant rights. 237

The important lesson is that, while States that are unable to mobilize enough resources domestically to discharge their obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should call upon international assistance and cooperation in order to seek support from other States and from international agencies,238 any conditionalities attached to loans should be consistent with the requirements of the Covenant. 239

Indeed, in its resolution 20/10 endorsing the Guiding Principles on foreign debt and human rights, the Human Rights Council emphasized that »every State has the primary responsibility to promote the economic, social and cultural development of its people and, to that end, has the right and responsibility to choose its means and goals of development and should not be subject to external specific prescriptions for economic policy.«240

The duties of countries confronted with a lack of domestic resources, making it impossible for them to fulfill economic and social rights without calling for international support, cannot therefore be assessed without considering the extent to which countries in a position to provide support are complying with their own international obligations. Yet, while there is a clear duty for States who are unable to mobilize sufficient domestic resources to fulfill the full range of Covenant rights, to call upon international assistance and cooperation, and to seek to attract resources from abroad, the correlative duty to respond to any request for support remains ill-defined. As to loans a State may seek to obtain, they may of course serve to fill a financing gap, but whether this shall support the full realization of economic and social rights depends on the content of the structural adjustment programmes imposed on the State concerned by its creditors. It is indeed striking that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been paying attention in the past, more to the dangers involved in the accompanying conditionalities, than to the benefits of financing itself. Indeed, this interdependence between the financing needs of one State and the international support it may claim (and the form in which such support is provided) is even more strikingly illustrated by the obligation discussed above, to support poor countries’ efforts to combat tax evasion and abusive tax practices by controlling corporations’ practices and reforming tax secrecy laws. 241

Although this part has examined successively the royalties from the exploitation of natural resources, taxation, and international financing as three major sources of public revenue, this remains a very incomplete list: the imposition of users’ fees in the delivery of public services, and trade tariffs on the import or export of goods or services, should also have been considered in a more comprehensive effort to list such sources. Of all these sources of public revenue however, taxation should be seen as the most important. It is not necessarily so in purely quantitative terms: in some poor countries, revenues from trade tariffs are higher in volume than the taxes collected internally. But taxation creates a special bond between the State and its citizens, because it results in a


238. On this international dimension, see above, text corresponding to notes 217–28.

239. See also Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Cephas Lumina, Guiding Principles on foreign debt and human rights (A/HRC/20/23) (10 April 2011), which the Human Rights Council endorsed at its 20th session in June 2012, in resolution 20/10. The effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights (A/HRC/RES/22/10), para. 2

240. Ibid., para. 6.

241. See above, text corresponding to notes 161–63.
strong incentive both for the State to use public revenue for the good of the population, and for the population to control the use of public finance. The reverse is true for the other sources of State revenue discussed above: as noted by Angus Deaton, where governments are well funded by the sale of natural resources (...) they have no need to collect revenue from the population. Since he who pays the piper usually calls the tune, governments can use such revenues to maintain a system of cronies and patronage that has little interest in popular health or wellbeing. In extreme cases, particularly in Africa, foreign aid has been significant enough to act in this way too, providing governments with resources but undermining their incentives to spend them in the right way. This argument against foreign aid as a development tool already figured prominently in the pamphlets by William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo, published respectively in 2006 and 2009. These critiques tend to ignore that development aid can also be made more transparent and accountable to the populations. But taxation remains specific in that it requires an effort from the population itself, encouraging it to hold governments accountable for the results.

6. Spending for the Realization of Economic and Social Rights

Mobilizing domestic resources and calling on international support—and being supported by international cooperation in seeking to mobilize domestic resources—is one step towards complying with the duty to dedicate the »maximum available resources« to the fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights. But it is a step that, though necessary, still remains insufficient. The other part of the equation is to define spending priorities in the public budget that aim at achieving the full realization of these rights. It is perhaps in this area that the need for guidance is most obvious. The sections below describe different proposals that have been made to clarify how much effort we can expect from States.

6.1 Social Investment Ratios

A first set of proposals provide benchmarks to assess whether the efforts invested by States are sufficient to comply with the need to fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights, based on certain assumptions as to the needs to be covered. The human expenditure ratio proposed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) falls under the category. In the second of its series of annual Human Development Reports, published in 1991, the UNDP proposes to analyse how public expenditures can be mobilized in favour of human development objectives. The 1991 HDR proposes the use of four ratios in this regard. The public expenditure ratio is the percentage of national income that goes into public expenditure: it represents the weight of the public sector in the total GDP of the country. The social allocation ratio is the share of social services in total government spending: it measures how much of the public budgets goes to finance health, housing, or education, rather than to other expenses such as those related to national defence or infrastructural projects. The social priority ratio measures, within the public spending that goes to social services, what goes to basic health care, primary education, and the extension of basic water systems to poor areas in both cities and rural areas, all of which are called »human priority concerns«. These three ratios can be combined to lead to a fourth ratio, which the HDR calls the human rights framework ratio.

242. See Saiz, Resourcing Rights, B3 (referring to the »accountability functions of taxation and clining on this point, in particular, Moore, „How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?“, Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 280 (2007)).
243. Deaton, The Great Escape, 121. See also Saiz, Resourcing Rights, B3.
244. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (Penguin Books, 2006), 15-17 (»How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?«).
245. Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid. Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa (London: Penguin Books reprint, 2010), 58 (»Now that most functioning and healthy economies, the middle class pays taxes in return for government accountability. Foreign aid short-circuits this link. Because the government’s financial dependence on its citizens has been reduced, it owes its people nothing.«).
246. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, to the tenth session of the Human Rights Council, The role of development cooperation and food aid in realizing the right to adequate food: moving from charity to obligation (A/HRC/10/9S) (11 February 2009), para. 26 (»A human rights framework requires that we deepen the principles of ownership, alignment and mutual accountability, by shifting our attention to the role of national parliaments, civil society organizations, and the ultimate beneficiaries of aid—the rights-holders—in the implementation and evaluation of foreign aid. It is this triangulation, away from a purely bilateral relationship between governments, which the adoption of a human rights framework requires«).
expenditure ratio, representing the share of total GDP that goes to human priority concerns.

Where human development outcomes are poor, it may mean that the decisions on the respective allocations are inadequate and should be revised. The UNDP estimates that the human expenditure ratio «may need to be around 5 per cent if a country wishes to do well in human development». This, the UNDP suggests, should ideally be done «keeping the public expenditure moderate (around 25 %)» (for instance by cutting down on military spending, on internal policing, on debt servicing or on the costs associated with loss-making public enterprises), [but allocating] much of this to the social sectors (more than 40 %) and [focusing] on the social priority areas (giving them more than 50 %); in contrast, a less efficient option is to «withdraw a large proportion of national income into the public sector, to depress private investment and initiative and to restrict the economic growth and resource expansion that can ultimately finance human development». Countries with a high public expenditure ratio but a low ranking of social priorities would therefore constitute the worst case: based on data from 1988, the HDR 1991 places in this category countries such as India, with a public sector representing 37 per cent of the GDP (public expenditure ratio) but only 2.5 per cent of the GDP going to human priorities (human expenditure ratio); Nigeria (29 per cent public expenditure ratio and 2.2 per cent human expenditure ratio); Pakistan (25 per cent and 0.8 per cent respectively); or Indonesia (25 per cent and 0.6 per cent).

Drawing attention to such figures is useful to stimulate a public debate about whether a State is setting the right priorities, which are consistent both with human development aims and with the progressive realization of the corresponding economic and social rights. As such however, the benchmarks set by the UNDP cannot form a substitute for a deeper analysis relating outcomes to the actions or omissions of the State. First, some public investments that would not count as corresponding to «human priority» issues or even to «social services», in fact matter significantly to the realization of economic and social rights. That is largely what, in the respect-protect-fulfill typology of State obligations, the duty to «facilitate»—as part of the broader duty to fulfill—refers to. The duty to facilitate may be described as duty to take proactive measures in order to create the conditions that will ensure that individuals may enjoy the right in concern: it consists, in brief, in a duty to create the required «enabling conditions» for such enjoyment. Such conditions may require investment in infrastructures, ranging from roads and grain storage facilities to clean energy and agricultural research and development, which do not fall under the narrow definitions of either «human priority» or «social services». Yet, such investments can be vital both to human development and to the realization of certain economic and social rights such as the right to food or the right to housing. In 1991, when the Human Development Report on Financing for Development was published, it was perhaps necessary to emphasize the need to focus more on the needs of the poor in social spending, as investments in infrastructures had been mobilizing both domestic resources and international donors’ contributions during the previous two decades; but two decades and a half later, we now understand better the limitations of an approach that aims to respond to the most urgent needs, without addressing the deeper causes of the inability of the poor to climb out of poverty and graduating out from short-term support measures.

248. Ibid.

250. Sub-Commission for the promotion and protection of human rights, The right to adequate food and to be free from hunger. Updated study on the right to food, submitted by Mr. Asbjørn Eide in accordance with Sub-Commission decision 1998/106 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999, 28 June 1999), para. 52 (»the State has the obligation to facilitate opportunities by which the rights listed can be enjoyed»); Asbjørn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, eds. Asbjørn Eide, Catharina Krause and Alan Rosas (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed., 2001), 24; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12 (1999): The right to food (E/C.12/1999/5), para. 15 (»The obligation to fulfill (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen people's access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food security»). As Eide has remarked, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights occasionally refers explicitly to duties that belong to this category: Article 11(2), for instance, describing the duty to ensure »basic freedom from hunger» and to ensure the right to food, provides that the State shall take measures to improve production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge and by developing or reforming agrarian systems.

251. It will be noted however that the UNDP does acknowledge the important role of the State in providing such public goods, in particular through infrastructural projects: the State should »create physical infra-structure such as roads, railways, harbours, electric power stations and telecommunications«, all of which often will be best provided by the State (Human Development Report 1991: Financing for Development, cited above note 246; 39; the UNDP adds, however, that »where private enterprises can provide it efficiently, and does so, policies must promote private investment«).
In addition, it cannot be ruled out that a State shall ensure an adequate level of fulfillment of human rights even though it dedicates less than the ratio of 5 per cent to total GDP to social priority issues, the ratio suggested by the UNDP if countries want to «do well in human development»252. Where, for example, a smaller percentage of the total GDP goes to healthcare in State A than in State B, but healthcare is both more affordable and of better quality in State A than in State B, should we consider that State B complies with the requirements of the right to health, when State A does not? Perhaps the total GDP per capita is significantly higher in State A, so that in absolute terms, the public spending per pupil in State A is higher than in State B;253 or perhaps the resources are used more efficiently in State A than in State B, for instance because of a greater emphasis being put on preventive medicine. Should we care more about the results achieved, or about whether the efforts deployed by the State correspond to the resources available—its capacity to fulfill rights?

Of course, the notion of progressive realization of economic and social rights «to the maximum of [each State’s] available resources», as prescribed by article 2 para. 1 of the Covenant, bridges the conceptual gap between obligations of result and obligations of means, by requiring from States not that they achieve certain results—by whichever means they see fit—but that they dedicate a sufficient share of the resources at their disposal to move towards the full realization of economic and social rights, in a never-ending quest for improvement. Yet, apart from the fact that this would provide no indication as to which share is «sufficient», it does not take into account that beyond a certain level of enjoyment, the financing of economic and social rights has a decreasing marginal utility, which means that determining fixed percentages of public expenditure—or of a country’s total incomes—is hardly defensible: in a country where access to all levels of education is free and where the educational services are of good standard, is it justified to still demand that any increase in GDP results in a proportionate increment in the sums dedicated to education? In order to answer such questions, we need what the health economist Victor Fuchs has called a holistic view of well-being, one that is aware of the need for trade-offs between different aspects of well-being.254 The comparison between figures 4 and 5 shows, for instance, that whereas there is a relatively strong correlation between the growth of a country’s GDP and spending on healthcare—from both private and public sources—the gains in terms of increased life expectancy reach a plateau beyond approximately 3,000 USD / person / year (see figure 5). In other terms, beyond that level, it makes less sense to invest more in healthcare, since the benefits—at least as assessed in the number of lives saved—will be minimal compared to the additional resources absorbed:

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253. The UNDP provides examples, based on data from 1988-1990: «The Republic of Korea and Malaysia spend similar amounts on social priority concerns per person ($128), even though Malaysia’s human expenditure ratio is twice that of the Republic of Korea, because the latter’s GNP per capita is twice that of Malaysia. Similarly, Kuwait’s human expenditure ratio is half that of Botswana, yet its absolute expenditure per person is nearly seven times that of Botswana» (Ibid.).

If resources were infinite and if there were no trade-offs between different dimensions of well-being—and the corresponding rights of the Covenant—it would perhaps be understandable to set fixed measures, so that each increase in a country’s wealth should lead automatically to a commensurate increase in the spending on health, education, or social housing. But resources are finite, and trade-offs may be required.

Other benchmarks have been proposed, however, also with a view to assessing States’ efforts, but focusing on specific rights, based on an estimate to what is required to fulfill them at the appropriate level. The World Health Organization for instance, estimated in 2012 that the »minimum spending per person per year needed to provide basic, life-saving services« represented 12 USD. During that same year, the average amount spent on healthcare in OECD countries was 4,380 USD per person and per year; in the US, with a record 8,362 USD per person and per year, the spending was almost double that average for rich countries. However, the respective contributions of households and of the State diverged widely from country to country: whereas Luxembourg had the highest level of public spending on health per person and per year (with 6,906 USD, which compares to the meagre 2 USD/person/year Myanmar spent in 2010), Switzerland has the highest level of private spending (or out-of-pocket spending per household), with 2,412 USD. As we have seen, other (more recent) studies have proposed more ambitious targets, both absolute (86 USD per person per year in the 2014 Chatham House report, for instance) and as a percentage of the country’s GDP (5 per cent, according to that same report). This is a higher estimate even than the one proposed in the 2010 World Health Report, which concluded that low-income countries would need to spend on average 60 USD per capita by 2015 in order to deliver a set of essential health interventions.

We are concerned here, not with the numbers as such, but with the methodological questions raised by such an attempt. There is broad agreement on some issues. It is clear, for instance, that it is more appropriate to define a target in terms of governmental expenses (public spending) as a percentage of the GDP, rather than in terms of the percentage of total governmental spending that should go to a sector such as healthcare. A target expressed as a percentage of public spending obviously ignores the fact that some States may have a

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255. All of these figures, based on 2010 data, are from the WHO fact-sheet No. 319: Spending on Health: A global overview (April 2012), accessed 18 October 2016, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs319/en/.

256. See above, text corresponding to note 96.

257. World Health Organization (Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems), More money for health and more health for the money (WHO, 2009).

258. See, for instance, the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases, adopted at the African Summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases, convened in Abuja, 26–27 April 2001 (in which the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) pledged to allocate »at least 15% of our annual budget to the improvement of the health sector« (OAU/SPS/ABUJA/3) (available at: http://www.un.org/ga/aids/pdf/abuja_declaration.pdf), at para. 26).
much larger public sector than others, and that States in which the public sector is least developed may have far more unused fiscal space. It is also clear that the same levels of investment may have more or less impact on the fulfillment of the right to health, depending on how efficiently the resources are used and, in particular, on whether they go to meeting the priority needs of the population, particularly those of the low-income groups within the population. Thus, who is reached matters, at least as much as how much governmental spending goes to any particular sector. And far more attention should go to combating inefficiencies: the Institute of Medicine in Washington DC, for instance, estimated that in 2009, more than a third of health care costs in the United States were unnecessary or wasted, for a total amount ranging between 750 and 765 billion USD. 259

These problems are similar to those already noted regarding the UNDP proposal to define a human expenditure ratio as a target for States to reach on »human priority« programmes. Other illustrations could be provided for other social rights. For instance, UNICEF has presented a model to assess the financial needs of the education sector, taking into account a number of variables—such as the number of children to be educated (itself a function of the percentage of school-age children in the total population), the desirable pupil-teacher ratio (40 being the target), the recurrent funding to cover salaries and materials, and the additional costs of enrolling marginalized children—as well as capital expenditures, including in particular classroom construction and maintenance. 260 Yet, »transforming resources into outcomes« raises specific challenges (in other terms, to ensure that the money is spent efficiently, and the education provided is of adequate quality), and so does ensuring that the resources are used equitably—for instance, reaching the poorest regions or addressing the education needs of the lowest quintiles of the population. 261

Some of these problems could be addressed in the simplest of ways: by taking a rights-based approach to the delivery of services such as health, education, or housing. That means defining clearly the level of support that individuals may claim from the State, as well as the eligibility conditions; providing potential beneficiaries with access to remedies, before independent bodies including courts, so that they may challenge a refusal to provide the support they claim; and informing them about their rights. Such an approach, ideally, would be able to address questions of underinclusiveness or discrimination, or inadequate targeting of the efforts. Where the level of support or the coverage of the population is insufficient, the question however remains: which weight should be given to the argument that the State simply cannot dedicate more resources to the public programme in question? How are we to assess whether the State has done »enough«, although it appears that its efforts are insufficient to meet the needs? Neither the UNDP’s approach based on the human expenditure ratio, nor similar approaches as developed by WHO or UNICEF answer that question. These attempts do assist in setting targets; but they do not allow us to assess whether a State could do more. Obviously, if this is the purpose, the definition of needs by setting absolute figures—the per capita public expenses for healthcare, for instance, or the public expenses for each pupil attending primary education—is of little help. Defining a percentage of the country’s GDP that should go to particular sectors is more useful in this regard. But is this the right measure of a country’s ability to realize economic, social, and cultural rights? That is the question raised by recent attempts to define an »achievement possibility frontier« for States, to which we now turn.

6.2. The Achievement Possibility Frontier

One attempt to propose criteria by which to assess States’ capacity to fulfill human rights is by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and her collaborators. Fukuda-Parr, formerly a loan officer at the World Bank, later joined the UNDP, for which she worked a number of years in Africa. As the Director of the Human Development Report Office between 1995 and 2006, she was a lead author of the UNDP’s annual flagship publication, the Human Development Report, which is best known for popularizing the »Human Development Index« as a measure of development alternative to GDP growth per capita. 262 Now

259. Institute of Medicine, Best Care at Lower Cost: The Path to Continuously Learning Health Care in America (Institute of Medicine, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2013).


261. Ibid. See, respectively, sections 3.5. and 4.2.

262. The UNDP website describes the Human Development Index (HDI) as a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and
a professor at the New School in New York, she brings the human development perspective to human rights, seeking in her recent work to define a metrics through which to assess the fulfillment by States of their obligations towards economic and social rights, taking into account their capacity (in terms of resource availability) to do so. In a 2008 paper, Fukuda-Parr and her colleagues offer to assess whether a particular economic and social right is adequately fulfilled (z) by examining the ratio between the extent of rights enjoyment, as measured through socio-economic indicators commonly used in the development field (x), and State resource capacity, using GDP per capita as a proxy for such capacity (y), so that \( z = x / y \). Under this approach, countries such as Moldova, Malawi, and Tanzania, though scoring low on the HDI, would score well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfillment (SERF) Index, initially referred to as the «Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index - ESRF Index»; the reverse would be true for Mexico and Malaysia, two countries that, although relatively well ranked on the HDI, could do much better to fulfill economic and social rights given the resources at their disposal.

Alternatively, in another, slightly different version of the same approach, the degree of fulfillment of the right (z) could be assessed as a value between 0 and 1, calculated as the ratio between the actual achievement of the country (x) and the maximum level of achievement possible at the per capita income level of the country concerned, such a maximum being based on the highest level of the indicator historical-
The method of analysis per definition cannot integrate the duty of the State to seek international support, when the domestic resources that could be mobilized are insufficient. Perhaps more fundamentally, the method proposed confronts us with the question of how the capacity of a State to fulfill economic and social rights should be measured. Such capacity is determined essentially by reference to the GDP per capita, as a proxy for the resources available to the country. While this may be questioned—as such a measure of capacity fails to take into account factors other than GDP per capita that influence such a capacity—this simplification may not make a significant difference in fact. Cingranelli and Richards found from their empirical analysis that using other indicators of the ability to fulfill economic and social rights, beyond GDP per capita—such as foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, official development assistance, or foreign debt (the latter obviously affecting negatively the ability to fulfill economic and social rights)—does not result in a change of ranking between countries. Indeed, econometric studies have concluded that GDP per capita may be taken to be an adequate proxy for the various factors that could be anticipated to affect the ability of the country to move towards the fulfillment of economic and social rights.

There is at least no doubt that GDP per capita is a more appropriate measure of capacity to fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights than public revenue, since the latter depends on policy choices—concerning in particular the rates of taxation—that cannot be relied upon by governments to justify a weaker performance in the fulfillment of economic and social rights. But as the authors themselves acknowledge, just like public revenue depends on budgetary choices made by States—and thus contestable—a low GDP per capita could be the result of poor macroeconomic policy choices by governments, or of the mismanagement by a government of the country’s economy. Indeed, some cases of mismanagement could be such that they could amount to a violation of the obligations imposed on the State by the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, where the failure to take appropriate policy measures impedes the realization of economic and social rights.

The model is incomplete, also in that it does not allow distinguishing between the different reasons why a country scores poorly on the proposed measure of economic and social rights fulfillment—either because of a relatively poor ratio between its achievements on certain outcome indicators and the resources it could mobilize to improve such indicators further, or compared to what, historically, countries at a similar level of development could achieve. But this would seem to matter. For instance, even with an identical GDP per capita, the ability of countries to perform well on socio-economic indicators related to health or child malnutrition (as measured by stunting rates) may differ widely in the presence of epidemics or where climatic conditions affect the quality of harvests; access to water and sanitation may be more difficult to achieve in countries with a population dispersed over a large territory, than in countries where the population is concentrated in certain areas; and certain social or cultural norms, such as those that reduce the mobility of women or their decision-making power within the household, may be difficult to transform in the short run.

In assessing whether a country is setting its priorities adequately, such constraints cannot be ignored. Indeed, that is what makes the use of indicators in development studies different from their use to promote human rights accountability: while there are many reasons why socio-economic indicators are poor in certain countries—including natural calamities, lack of resources, or country’s predicted rather than actual per capita GDP).
strains imposed by the international environment—the allegation that human rights violations have occurred, potentially leading to a finding of responsibility, presupposes that the State is in a position to improve such outcomes, in other terms, that the deprivations are the result of a lack of political will. The 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights put it succinctly: »In determining which actions or omissions amount to a violation of an economic, social or cultural right, it is important to distinguish the inability from the unwillingness of a State to comply with its treaty obligation«.273 But does a low GDP per capita necessarily result in an inability to fulfill rights, and conversely, can we presume that a high GDP per capita necessarily allows a State to overcome any obstacles it may face?

In some respects therefore, the approach by Fukuda-Parr and her colleagues underestimates a country’s ability to transform the conditions with which it is confronted; in other respects, such an ability seems to be overestimated, and the real constraints it faces ignored. In fact, in order to assess State conduct, we need to treat the lack of implementation of social, economic and cultural rights as a question of political economy: what really matters is to whom the failure is attributable. It is this question of attribution that is at the heart of another approach, our third approach, which we may call diagnostic monitoring: the identification, by a causal analysis, of the reasons why certain outcomes are unsatisfactory, and of the measures that could be adopted to remove such obstacles.

6.3 Diagnostic Monitoring: Causality Analysis

Diagnostic monitoring is the label attached, for ease of exposition, to the approach initially pioneered by Eitan Felner.274 Felner proposes using quantitative data, combined with qualitative information, in order to move from outcomes—economic and social rights deprivations and disparities of outcome—(step #1 of the three-steps approach), to the identification of the »main determinants of these outcomes so as to identify the policy responses that can reasonably be expected of the state« (step #2), and finally (in step #3) to the assessment of the extent to which »deprivations, disparities, and lack of progress can be traced back to failures of government policy«.275

Only by identifying why a State scores poorly on certain socio-economic indicators, can certain questions be asked about State conduct: for instance, in a State with a low schooling rate for girls, whether that outcome is attributable to social or cultural norms or, instead, to the lack of economic incentives—for instance, due to discrimination against women in employment, which is a disincentive to invest in girls’ education—leads to different expectations as to what the response of the State should be.276 Such a causality analysis should make it possible to identify which deprivations of social and economic rights—as measured by outcome indicators—are attributable to a failure of the State to comply with its obligations, and which are instead the result of a lack of capacity of the State. Indeed, the final stage of the analysis (step #3) should enable the identification of »cases in which the government had the capacity to deal with some of the determinants of specific deprivations and inequalities identified in step #2, but failed to do so«.277

But how should such a capacity be assessed, and how can we determine what a reasonable response of the State should be? Felner proposes five ways to identify the relevant benchmarks. Some of the answers proposed are irrelevant to the question of how a country’s responses are to be assessed where the outcomes are unsatisfactory, because, by design, they rule out the possibility that the country could invoke factors beyond its control to provide a justification for poor achievements: this corresponds to violations of the prohibition of discrimination, or of the core obligation of the State, which should not be made to depend on State capacity.278

276. Ibid., 126.
277. Ibid., 122.
278. This is the case where Felner notes that international human rights standards should provide the benchmark. He provides the following example: »the obligation of universal primary education sets a benchmark of 100% primary education completion rate. Comparing rates in the focus country with the relevant international human rights obligation can reveal shortfalls in the enjoyment of a right in the focus country« (ibid., 115). But that amounts to substituting an obligation of result for an obligation of means, and does not provide an adequate methodology for identifying the standard of conduct to be adopted by a country with a
other answers fall in two groups: they consist either in taking the State concerned as the reference point, or in defining the benchmark through cross-country comparisons. The first approach may consist in relying on an objective a State has set for itself, for instance by endorsing an international goal such as one contained in global development goals—the Millennium Development Goals until 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals today—or by specific commitments, say, to increase the budget going to public housing by 20 per cent in two years; or in the past performance of the State constituting the benchmark against which to assess further progress. The main advantage of this approach is that the benchmark is not imposed from the outside, but is the result of the concerned State itself, which makes it difficult to challenge on legitimacy grounds. Yet, it begs the question of how to assess whether the goals set by the State are adequate, given the resources at its disposal: has the State been ambitious enough in setting an objective, and if progress was made in comparison to previous years, was that progress sufficient? As Felner himself recognizes, referring to the suggestion of evaluating the performance of a State against the targets it has set for itself, this commitment in turn «should also be scrutinized, as it could be flawed from a human rights perspective».279 The same holds, of course, for global development goals—and their associated targets—as set by the international community, which have often been denounced for not being sufficiently ambitious when contrasted with the kind of outcomes that international human rights would require.280

The second approach is more promising. It relies on cross-country comparisons, using as a reference point countries of a same region at a similar level of development: such cross-country comparisons, Felner argues, «could reveal whether the levels of deprivation of the focus country are lower than expected given the country’s development level».281 The choice of relying on countries of the same region and at a similar level of development—by which Felner presumably means countries with a similar GDP per capita—should be seen as a compromise. A more rigorous methodology should take into account a variety of factors in multiple regression analyses, to control for the various obstacles that a country may be confronted with. Such obstacles could include, though not being limited to, the country being landlocked, the country having a weak population density making the delivery of services more expensive and more difficulty, or the country being heavily dependent on a narrow range of commodities as a source of export revenues. But taking into account a large range of factors that might potentially affect a country’s ability to fulfill economic and social rights would soon make monitoring compliance with social and economic rights an unmanageable task: for the sake of simplicity, Felner therefore proposes limiting the comparison to the countries of the same region—geographical proximity being a proxy for the range of obstacles faced.282

In order to understand the original contribution of this new frontier in economic and social rights advocacy proposed by Felner, it may serve to recall its origins in a joint project of the Center for Economic and Social Rights and the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies on the right to education in Guatemala.283 Guatemala is a country with potentially many resources that could be mobilized in order to address socio-economic deprivation, in particular access to members of the large indigenous community to education. It fails however, largely as a

view to progressively realize a social or economic right as required under article 2, para. 1, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; it corresponds in fact to the methodology some commentators would use for assessing compliance with «core obligations» corresponding to the «essential minimum levels» of enjoyment of a particular right such as the right to education, discussed in Part II of this paper. The same is true for another method proposed by Felner, which consists in using disaggregated data by ground of potential discrimination—sex, membership in an indigenous group or in a particular ethnic group, etc.—in order to «identify disparities, and therefore possible discrimination, among population groups in the access to and enjoyment of economic and social rights« (ibid., 116). Here again, the conclusion that a violation has occurred is based on the identification of an outcome that is unsatisfactory, an approach that—though defensible from the normative point of view—does not answer the question of progressive realization and of the corresponding obligation of means imposed on the State.

279. Felner, A new frontier in economic and social rights advocacy? (cited above, note 273), 116
280. Ibid., 149–50 (»To avoid controlling for a whole set of possible relevant factors (such as weather/climate reasons, conflict spillovers, population density and cultural beliefs) which would require making the quantitative tools proposed here more complex (because of the use multiple regressions), it is instead suggested here to only use comparisons across countries of the same geographic region, a standard practice used as a simple alternative to controlling for these potentially relevant factors«).
281. Ibid., 135, and the reference to a then forthcoming report, published since, by the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) and the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEFI), Rights or Privileges? Fiscal Commitments to the Rights to Health, Education and Food in Guatemala (New York and Guatemala: CESR/ICEFI, 2009).
result of a regressive taxation system that an oligarchic minority refuses to change. In such a situation, it is of vital importance to demonstrate that poor outcomes can be traced back to State policy, in order to categorize such outcomes as violations of human rights obligations and thus to improve accountability.

As its background illustrates, the principal merit of Felner’s approach is that it allows for a highly contextualized analysis. Even when the levels of deprivation in certain areas—such as health, education, or food—are identical in countries at a same level of development, different recipes will correspond to their respective conditions. Because the démarche proposed here is inductive, taking outcomes as a departure point and moving backwards along the causality chain to identify the policies that explain the outcomes, it avoids falling into the trap of presupposing that there are certain policies valid across time and geography to address social and economic deprivation. Instead, there is room for deliberation: where one country from a group underperforms, the question must be asked why it does not succeed, and whether, given the constraints that country faces and in the light of how other countries at a same level of development address similar constraints, it could perform better.

However, even placing Felner’s proposals under the best possible light, it fails on one point: it does not take into account that certain obstacles that appear in a static perspective as being constraints imposed on the State, can be treated in a dynamic perspective as a State’s own creation. This is in part compensated by Felner’s proposal to develop cross-country comparisons across time, in order to show, for instance, that »while India had a much higher income growth than its neighbours that have made progress during the same period, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990, in contrast to many of Kenya’s neighbours that have made progress during the same period since 1990«. But even that would not address explicitly the question of the shifting boundary between what the State may be held responsible for in the assessment of the duty of progressive realization, and what are factors beyond its control: if India were to impute its failure to reduce child mortality to inadequate feeding practices by women, and if Kenya were to attribute its poor record on access to water and sanitation to budgetary constraints, should these factors be treated as exogenous or as endogenous? And if treated as exogenous in the short run (India, say, was surprised to find that increases in food availability did not result in improved nutritional outcomes due to poor feeding practices), should they not be treated as endogenous in the long run (after India had time to conduct information campaigns towards the population about feeding infants)? This is the challenge associated, in legal thought, with the realist school of jurisprudence, which questions the apparent neutrality of baselines that, although they may seem pre-political, in fact are a creation of the State; it is one that still must be met in scholarship on economic and social rights.

Perhaps unsurprising, the approach pioneered by Felner was later built upon by the New York-based NGO Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), of which he was the former Executive Director. In 2012, CESR proposed a systematic attempt to define the duty of progressive realization according to such a contextual approach, attentive to the political economy dimensions of States’ efforts—allowing a focus on the reasons why certain policies were not adopted that might have improved the situation of rights-holders. The result of this effort is presented as the »OPERA framework«. The acronym OPERA stands for »outcomes – policy efforts – resources – assessment«, describing the various steps that, according to this framework, human rights advocates should take to assess whether a State is doing enough for the fulfillment of economic and social rights. The steps may be briefly summarized as follows:  

1. Outcomes: advocates should assess the level of enjoyment of rights (including in particular whether the „minimum core obligations“ are complied with),

2. Policy efforts: advocates should assess whether a State is doing enough to fulfill economic and social rights

3. Resources: advocates should assess whether a State faces budgetary constraints that prevent it from fulfills its obligations

4. Assessment: advocates should assess whether a State is doing enough to fulfill economic and social rights

In particular, »Factsheets« it produced respectively on India and on Kenya.


285. Felner, A new frontier in economic and social rights advocacy? (referring to the work of the Center for Economic and Social Rights and the former Executive Director. In 2012, CESR proposed a systematic attempt to define the duty of progressive realization according to such a contextual approach, attentive to the political economy dimensions of States’ efforts—allowing a focus on the reasons why certain policies were not adopted that might have improved the situation of rights-holders. The result of this effort is presented as the »OPERA framework«. The acronym OPERA stands for »outcomes – policy efforts – resources – assessment«, describing the various steps that, according to this framework, human rights advocates should take to assess whether a State is doing enough for the fulfillment of economic and social rights. The steps may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Outcomes: advocates should assess the level of enjoyment of rights (including in particular whether the „minimum core obligations“ are complied with),

286. For a description of the framework and of how it came about, see Saiz, Resourcing Rights, 77–104.

287. Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), The OPERA Framework: Assessing compliance with the obligation to fulfill economic, social and cultural rights (New York: CESR, 2012).
disparities in rights enjoyment (corresponding to the duty of non-discrimination), and whether there is progress over time (corresponding to the duty of progressive realization).

2. Policy efforts: advocates should examine the legal and policy commitments of the State and whether these are sufficient to demonstrate a commitment to «take steps» for progressive realization of rights; the policies adopted (and whether such policies ensure availability, accessibility, adequacy, adaptability and quality of the rights concerned); and the process through which the policies are designed and implemented (and specifically, whether such policies comply with the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and remedies—the so-called PAN- THER principles, initially presented in this form by the Right to food unit of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation in 2006.²⁸⁸

3. Resources: advocates should assess whether States dedicate enough resources to rights fulfillment and whether they duly mobilize all resources available (both domestic and international), as well as the process through which decisions concerning resource mobilization (including taxation) and spending are made.

4. Assessment: advocates finally should assess whether the policy efforts and resource mobilization and spending are sufficient.

The final step of «assessment» shall of course be the most heavily contested: as the CESR publication notes, it is here that we must «distinguish deprivations that might be the result of factors genuinely beyond the control of the state from those for which the state should be help accountable».²⁸⁹ The CESR summarizes its effort at this stage of the analysis as follows:

By triangulating the findings from the first three steps—outcomes, policy efforts and resources—it is possible to bring to light the obstacles that are preventing commitments made on paper translating into practical action that has a meaningful impact improving the situation on the ground. Much like a diagnostic chart, this approach helps to establish the often opaque causal links between these elements. The analysis may show, for example, that the problem is attributable to inadequate or discriminatory use of resources, inadequacy of policy efforts, a lack of participatory processes, or other factors. On the basis of this analysis, a picture should emerge, from which it is possible to draw conclusions about the reasonableness of the State’s efforts to progressively fulfill the right(s) under review to all sectors of the population without discrimination and employing the maximum of its available resources.²⁹⁰

The «reasonableness» criterion thus assumes a considerable burden. This is hardly surprising. It is this criterion too which, borrowed from the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court,²⁹¹ appears in the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which uses this term in defining the approach the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should take when examining individual communications.²⁹² The distinct contribution of reasonableness is to call for a highly contextual assessment, in which the range of reasons that could be invoked on either side of the argument is not limited a priori as in rules-based argumentation. Reasonableness, in other terms, does not work as a rule (as does Joseph Raz) as a second-order reason to exclude

²⁸⁹. Center for Economic and Social Rights, The OPERA Framework, 27.
²⁹⁰. Ibid., 29.
²⁹¹. Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 11/00, Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11) B.C.L.R. 1169 (judgment of 4 October 2000) (leading judgment of Yacoob, J.). Taking as departure point s. 26 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to housing and provides in para. 2 that «The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right», the Constitutional Court notes in particular that «the obligation does not require the state to do more than its available resources permit. This means that both the content of the obligation in relation to the rate at which it is achieved as well as the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the result are governed by the availability of resources. Section 26 does not expect more of the state than is achievable within its available resources (…). There is a balance between goal and means. The measures must be calculated to attain the goal expeditiously and effectively but the availability of resources is an important factor in determining what is reasonable» (para. 46).
²⁹². See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted on 10 December 2008 during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly by resolution A/RES/63/117, in force since 5 May 2013, UNTS No. 14531, Art. 8(4) («When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II (listing the substantive rights) of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant»).
certain first-order reasons from a decision-making process. Instead, it is an invitation to a deliberative process, in which the question of whether the State has done enough in mobilizing resources and in defining its budgetary priorities can only be answered taking into account not only the outcomes (the results achieved), but also the full range of constraints faced by the State, and—as already mentioned—the time the State had (or did not have) to amend policies that failed to produce the expected outcomes.

Was the State caught by surprise, or unable to take action, due to a lack of resources? Or was it negligent or unwilling to amend policies that were failing? That question can only be answered by taking into account what the State knew or should have known, and which processes it put in place to remedy situations showing poor outcomes. In such an approach to the duty to dedicate the maximum available resources to the progressive realization of economic and social rights, the question of which procedures have been designed to make progress towards the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights that becomes decisive: how the decisions were reached in order to mobilize resources and in making spending decisions shall matter as much as what decisions were made.

6.4 From Substance to Procedure: Democracy in Budgetary Decision-making

There are three strong arguments for shifting the focus from the substance of policies for resource mobilization and spending to the procedure through which such policies are designed and implemented. First, strengthening participation, transparency, and accountability in budgetary decision-making is a way to ensure that budgetary priorities shall take into account the interests of the most marginalized groups within society. The point barely requires elaboration. Economic marginalization (the deprivation of social and economic rights) typically is paired with, and largely to be explained by, political disempowerment (in violation of civil and political rights, in particular the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs). This leads to a vicious cycle in which because the poor are unable to influence political processes, the policies shall serve the elites rather than respond to their needs. Strengthening the participation of the poor in shaping policies can help to break this cycle, leading in turn to the adoption of policies that will be more attentive to their needs.

Secondly, improving participation in budgetary decision-making will strengthen the negotiating position of departments dealing with health, education or social welfare, whose demands frequently compete with those from departments concerned with law and order—the Interior, National Defence, or Justice. The bargaining position of advocates of social investment within governments is especially weak in countries in which controlling the population and law enforcement are seen as major challenges on which the very stability of the government may depend. If civil society are involved in defining the budgetary priorities, it is likely that they will support the human development sectors within the State. The competition however is not only between the

293. See Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), 15-84 and The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), 3–33. Raz sees rules as second-order reasons of a particular type: as exclusionary reasons. That is, rules require that we exclude certain (first-order) reasons we may have to do a certain thing (or to refrain from doing a certain thing), so that we will be constrained not to act taking into account the full range of reasons that would otherwise be relevant in making the decision. This is what distinguishes rules-based decision-making from decision-making that seeks to be optimal «all things considered».

294. See above, text immediately following note 284. 295. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, to the 29th session of the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/29/31) (26 May 2015), para. 21 (citing Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.II.Y.1), 6) «Economic inequalities seem to encourage political capture and the unequal realization of civil and political rights. High levels of economic inequalities may create institutions that maintain the political, economic and social privileges of the elite and lock the poor into poverty traps from which it is difficult to escape». For instance, the governing elites may veto tax reforms that would lead to a more progressive system of taxation, and they may undermine efforts at combating the practices of tax evasion that they, more than the average citizen, may be able to rely on: see Corbacho, et al. (eds.), More than Revenue, 3 «One of the rent-seeking mechanisms that the most affluent have imposed on the rest of society is the regressive design of the tax structure. Opportunities to evade taxes that vary greatly across income groups compound this perverse structure, shrinking the effective tax base and resulting in low levels of revenue». 296. See, for example, World Health Organization, World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing: the path to universal coverage (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010), 25 «Dealing with universal health coverage also means dealing with the poor and the marginalized, people who are often politically disenfranchised and lack representation. This is why making health a key political issue is so important and why civil society, joined by eminent champions of universal coverage, can help persuade politicians to move health financing for universal coverage to the top of the political agenda». For a powerful empirical study relating the diffusion of power in society (i.e., its degree of democratization) to the adoption of pro-poor policies, see Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Economic Rights, Human Development Effort, and Institutions, in Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement, and Policy Issues, as well as the previous effort of this scholar finding a statistical correlation between indicators of power diffusion and progress along the Human Development Index: Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Institutions of Governance, Power Diffusion and Pro-Poor Growth and Policies (African Economic Research Consortium, 2005).
»left hand« of the State and its »right hand«, to borrow from Pierre Bourdieu’s distinction297; it also is between macroeconomic policies that keep the public debt under control and thus reassure the external creditors of the State and the needs of the population. Here too, the role of participation may be key, this time to strengthen the bargaining position of the government in its negotiation with its creditors and with international financial institutions in particular. While this makes it more difficult for the government to find an agreement with creditors in situations where it needs financial support, the creditors may take solace in the fact that transparency and accountability may improve the efficiency of public policies, and maximize the effectiveness of public investment in reducing poverty and placing the country on the track of sustainable human development.298

Thirdly, the focus on norms of participation, accountability, and transparency in budgetary decision-making helps to move beyond the apparent tension between national democratic self-determination and supervision by courts or by international human rights bodies. Such a tension occurs obviously where courts or expert bodies question the budgetary priorities set by national governments, on the basis of a reading of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that remains so vague about the implications of the requirement that States parties should dedicate the »maximum available resources« to the full realization of the Covenant rights. Democratic self-determination should not be treated as synonymous with the fiat of the governing elite, however: once the scrutiny by human rights bodies focuses not only on outcomes, relating them to resources and spending choices, but also on procedural requirements of participation, accountability and transparency, its effect is to reinforce self-determination, not to undermine it.

It is perhaps telling that, when human rights mechanisms address States’ duties under the Covenant, they tend to refrain from imposing specific outcomes—to increase the taxation on corporate income by a certain amount, for instance, or to dedicate a certain percentage of the revenue to education or the health. Instead, they insist that budgetary decisions be adopted through a process that recognizes the primacy of human rights. Thus, after the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed its concern about fiscal reforms introduced by the United Kingdom, such as increases of the threshold for the payment of inheritance tax and of the rate of the value added tax, or cuts to the tax rates of corporations, it recommended that the UK »conduct a human rights impact assessment, with broad public participation, of the recent changes introduced to its fiscal policy, including an analysis of the distributional consequences and the tax burden of different income sectors and marginalized and disadvantaged groups«.299 Similarly, deploiting the impacts on poor families of the Welfare Reform and Work Act enacted by the UK in 2016, the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council criticized the lack of credibility of the impact assessments preceding the cuts to welfare benefits, noting that these cuts were based on often unproven assumptions and that the government had failed to explore the full range of alternative options to ensure the sustainability of the welfare system; and they asked the government to indicate whether they had »consulted the individuals, groups and families most likely to be affected by the Act«.300 The implicit suggestion is that more democratic and inclusive decision-making,

298. World Health Organization, World Health Report 2010, 25 (»Improving efficiency and accountability may also convince ministries of finance, and increasingly donors, that more funding will be well used«).
300. See the Allegation Letter addressed to the UK by the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, and the Special Rapporteur on the right to food (ref. AL GBR 1/2016, 8 April 2016). See in particular questions 5 (»What evidence is available to demonstrate that the Employment Support Allowance for persons in the WRAG [Work Related Activity Group: people deemed unfit to work as a result of health problems or a disability] has created a disincentive for them to take steps towards work? Further, what evidence is available to demonstrate that they would be incentivised to move towards work by reducing the Employment Support Allowance, in view of the fact that they have been assessed not fit for work?«), 7 (»What evidence is available to establish that your Excellency’s Government has considered alternative options to the benefit cut, in the context of the full use of maximum available resources?«), 12 (»Please indicate whether there has been an independent review and assessment of the Act and if so, provide details. Please also indicate whether the human rights of persons likely to be subject to the benefit cut have been considered in the review / assessment and what the findings were «), and 13 (»Could you please indicate what mechanism will be available to monitor negative effects of the Act?«). The response of the UK was sent on 14 July 2016 (Verbal Note of the UK Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, No. 231). On these procedural dimensions, it states simply, »As per the usual Parliamentary process, the Public Bill Committee took 6 oral evidence sessions with a range of stakeholders representing interest groups, which are recorded in the parliamentary record. Furthermore, an open call for evidence was held with 86 pieces of evidence submitted and considered over the course of 8 months of Parliamentary scrutiny and 26 Parliamentary sessions «. The scantiness of the response on this procedural front is in direct proportion, perhaps, to the disruptiveness of the question.
better informed by impact assessments, might have led to better policies—more pro-poor, more imaginative, and ultimately more in line with the UK’s international commitments.

The same set of austerity measures adopted by the UK in recent years attracted strong criticism from the Committee on the rights of persons with disabilities: after the Committee launched an inquiry into the situation in the UK—an exceptional procedure which, according to the terms of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, can only be triggered when the Committee receives reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention. It found in October 2016 that this high threshold had indeed been reached. The conclusions included a broad, but vague, recommendation that the UK ensure that public budgets take into account the rights of persons with disabilities, that sufficient budget allocations are made available to cover extra costs associated with living with a disability and that appropriate mitigation measures, with appropriate budget allocations, are in place for persons with disabilities affected by austerity measures. But the procedural recommendations are more precise and, perhaps, the most actionable. They include a requirement that the UK conduct a cumulative impact assessment of the measures adopted since 2010 on the rights to independent living and to be included in the community, social protection and employment of persons with disabilities, which should be rights-based and meaningfully [involve] persons with disabilities and their representative organizations; that the government actively consult and engage with persons with disabilities through their representative organizations and give due consideration to their views in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of any legislation, policy or programme action related to the rights addressed in the present report; and that it set up a mechanism and a system of human rights-based indicators to permanently monitor the impact of the different policies and programmes relating to the access and enjoyment by persons with disabilities of the right to social protection and an adequate standard of living, the right to live independently and be included in the community and the right to work, in close consultation with persons with disabilities and their representative organizations.

Such procedural mechanisms go beyond ensuring democratic decision-making, based on the regular holding of elections: they involve the search for a deeper and more inclusive type of democracy, in which affirmative measures are taken to ensure that the poorest and most marginalized groups of the population have their views taken into account, and in which democratic politics is not just about institutions and procedures, but also about concrete outcomes. To borrow from a distinction of Sanskrit jurisprudence revived by Amartya Sen, this involves moving from electoral niti, in which attention is paid only to institutional fitness, to democratic nyaya, which involves critically examining the implications in terms of substantive justice of particular arrangements. It is not any kind of democracy, but a form of democracy informed by human rights, and because it is inclusive, forced to pay attention to the outcomes on the most marginalized groups.

301. In what Katharine Young calls a governance approach to the constitution of economic and social rights (which she contrasts with the more classic constitutionalist approach in which courts and the legal means of enforcement of rights are given priority), the involvement of social actors is seen as important, in particular, to broaden our political imagination as to how such rights might be implemented in specific settings. See Katharine Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 262–75. The human rights informed democracy envisaged here—enriched by the use of impact assessments and indicators of progress, and including mechanisms to ensure that the voices of the poor are heard—presents strong similarities with that governance approach.


303. Article 6 of the Optional Protocol.

304. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland carried out by the Committee under article 6 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention. Report of the Committee, UN doc. CRPD/C/15/R/2/Rev.1 (6 October 2016), para. 113 (there is reliable evidence that the threshold of grave or systematic violations of the rights of persons with disabilities has been met in the State party).


306. Ibid., para. 114, a).

307. Ibid., para. 114, g).

308. Ibid., para. 114, j).

7. Conclusion: Democracy as a Tool for Pro-poor Policies

This inquiry started as an attempt to clarify the meaning of the duty of States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to dedicate the maximum available resources to the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights. It closes with a plea for budgetary decision-making procedures that are based on participation, accountability, and transparency, involving in particular the poorest groups of the population in setting priorities.

The substantive and the procedural dimensions of the inquiry are complementary. In 2004, the International Human Rights Internship Program and other organizations published Dignity Counts, intended as a guide to use budget analysis to advance human rights, using the analysis of health-related expenditures in the Mexican national budget as a case study. They noted the dangers of dissociating political empowerment from the task of budget analysis, if accountability is to improve:

Despite the importance of funding for recognizing the economic rights of marginalized people, programs that benefit the poor are often among the first to face cuts in times of budget deficits. There are many reasons for this. Other items such as interest on the debt, the public-sector wage bill, and military expenditures are more likely to have first claim on scarce funds. Other groups such as business leaders or urban elites often have more effective and experienced lobbyists. Too often vulnerable people are comparatively »invisible« to government elites who may socialize with and circulate among the well-to-do. And even when funds have been allocated to anti-poverty programs or other services benefiting vulnerable communities, weak expenditure and program management and the lack of political power among the poor can mean that the money never reaches the intended beneficiaries.

Indeed, budget analysis and political empowerment are mutually supportive. Whereas budget analysis will barely improve accountability if it is performed in a technocratic fashion, with no or only limited participation of the public, it can be deeply empowering in its own right, as it will promote transparency in the use of public revenue. By comparing sources of government revenue with expenditures, instances of «leakage» can be identified, and corruption, nepotism or clientelism by government officials can be highlighted by examining who benefits from public programmes. Such a scrutiny may take many forms, including social audits at community level, which can be empowering even to the poor and illiterate. By thus enhancing accountability, budget analysis is a major asset in ensuring that public policies are more pro-poor, and that they will therefore benefit the realization of economic and social rights. In and of itself, budget analysis is nothing more than a tool, and it could be limited to an expert-led exercise. But once the tool is used by the people themselves or by their representatives, it can represent a serious check against abuse of power and a wrong ranking of priorities.

Under such an approach, substantive rules and procedural requirements are deeply intertwined. The insistence on the strengthening of participatory processes in budgetary choices should not be mistaken with a plea for a «representation-reinforcing» theory of rights adjudication, according to which, in the words of its most explicit proponent, judicial review «can appropriately concern itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under attack». Instead, the emphasis on compliance with procedural norms is a way to ensure that the substantive norms will be effectively taken into account and complied with. Strengthening participation is not only an end in itself. It also has an instrumental value, ensuring

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311. Ibid., 29.
312. The various forms of social audits include: the practice of government officials reporting publicly on the use of funds allocated to certain programmes, and on the allocations received by each of the beneficiaries (such as individuals provided employment in cash-for-food schemes or schools supported in school feeding schemes), to village assemblies, the publication of revenues and disbursements on the internet, allowing NGOs to track instances of misuse or diversion of funds; citizens’ report cards as in India or the Philippines; community score cards as in Kenya and the Gambia; or budgetary audits conducted by Javanese farmers in Indonesia. See, for example, Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto, Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in India, Regulation & Governance, vol. 4(3) (2010): 261–280; UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization), Social Audits for Strengthening Accountability: Building blocks for human rights-based programming – Practice note (Bangkok: UNESCO, 2007). For a more skeptical approach, see Frances Cleaver, Paradoxes of participation: Questioning Participatory Approaches to Development, Journal of International Development, vol. 11 (1999): 597–612.
that broad prescriptions concerning the consistency of budgetary choices with human rights shall be effectively implemented, by reforming how such choices are made.

Indeed, greater participation, accountability, and transparency in budgetary processes on the one hand, and compliance with the «constitutional background norms» discussed earlier are mutually supportive: just like improved decision-making can ensure the background norms are complied with, a reference to such norms can strengthen the demands emanating from civil society and social movements. They were supplicants, and they had to overcome their political marginalization in order to count in the political process; once they rely on a human rights framework, they become claimants, and they can enlist the support of the domestic human rights machinery—NGOs, independent human rights institutions, and even courts—in their struggle for social justice.

The traditional approach has seen human rights and democratic self-determination as competing requirements, and human rights scholars have dedicated considerable energy at justifying the role of courts in upholding rights against the will of popularly elected majorities. This view now looks increasingly outdated. It was based both on an impoverished representation of the functioning of democracy—as if democracy could be assimilated to the ritual of fair and regularly held elections—and on the idea that the State was the chief threat to human rights, rather than an institution indispensable, through its redistributive role, for their full realization. In these times when governments in all world regions, invoking the need for fiscal orthodoxy, are tempted to remove budgetary choices from democratic scrutiny—in effect constitutionalizing austerity—we need more democratic recognition, not less, in order for economic and social rights to be fulfilled through supportive macro-economic policies. More democracy however does not mean democracy as usual, just like pro-poor economic policies are not pro-growth policies as usual. Democracy can be made more responsive to the rights of the poor: it can be enriched, by democratic deliberations relying more systematically on rights-based impact assessments involving the poor, by independent monitoring of progress in the realization of human rights, and by more participatory forms of budgeting. It is towards creating this virtuous cycle, in which stronger participation leads to policies that are more pro-poor, and in which the contribution of taxation and spending policies to the fulfillment of social rights encourages civil society and social movements to monitor budgetary choices, that efforts should now converge.

314. See Chapter II of this text.
315. See Paul O’Connell, Let Them Eat Cake: Socio-Economic Rights in an Age of Austerity, in Human Rights and Public Finance, eds. Aiofe Nolan et al. Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights, 73, and Shareen Hertel and Lanse Minkler, Economic Rights: The Terrain, in Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement, and Policy Issues, eds. Hertel and Minkler, 29 (»By invoking the normative force of human rights in defense of their own needs (….) grassroots protesters can change the nature of their interaction with powerful government or private sector representatives. Instead of offering petitions for help, they can demand that rights be fulfilled (….) In so doing, they transform their status from that of supplicants to claimants«).
316. This is illustrated for instance by the adoption in the European Union of the «Fiscal Compact», introduced in 2012 to impose stronger fiscal discipline on the Member States: the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance within the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) signed on 2 March 2012 commits the States parties to seek to maintain balanced public budgets, or even to strive to have a surplus (Article 3(1) a). To this end, Article 3(2) of the TSCG imposes that the balanced-budget rule be stipulated in rules of constitutional rank in the domestic legal order: this is the so-called golden rule, to which the Fiscal Compact is often reduced. See Federico-Fabbri, The Fiscal Compact, the «Golden Rule», and the Paradox of European Federalism, 36 Boston College Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2013). This temptation is not limited to Europe, however. In December 2016, Brazil amended its Constitution (Constitutional Amendment 55, or PEC 55 in its Portuguese acronym) freezing public spending in real terms until 2036. In a press release of 9 December 2016, the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Mr Philip Alston, stated that »it is completely inappropriate to freeze only social expenditure and to tie the hands of all future governments for another two decades. If this amendment is adopted it will place Brazil in a socially retrogressive category all of its own«. (Brazil 20-year public expenditure cap will breach human rights, UN expert warns, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21006&LangID=E (accessed 20 Dec. 2016).


Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981.


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