

European Union | Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Project

# SECURITY FOR ALL

Promoting democratic governance  
and inclusive security through CSO  
involvement in Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon  
and the wider ECOWAS region

## TRAINING HANDBOOK

for media actors on Security  
Issues and Security Sector  
Reform/Democratic  
Governance



Co-funded by  
the European Union



**FRIEDRICH  
EBERT  
STIFTUNG**

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## IMPRINT

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# PREFACE

This training handbook for media professionals was developed within the framework of the regional 3-year “Security for All” project, co-financed by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the European Union.

The project, whose target countries are Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria, aims to contribute to actions and to establishing institutions, to ensure that the security mission (at the local, national and regional levels) is more responsive to the needs of the population as well as being more accountable and more equitable.

Civil society participation in the security sector reform and governance processes needs to be increased by empowering civil society actors and involving them in the dialogue taking place among all security sector actors. Civil society organizations must inform decision-making processes and contribute to setting agendas, monitoring public action, and public debate on the reform of the security sector at the national (Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria) and regional levels in West and Central Africa.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s Peace and Security Competence in Sub-Saharan Africa Office has always placed the media high on its agenda. Therefore, it was only natural that it decided, in partnership with the Center

for Advanced Defense and Security Studies, to dedicate a section of this project exclusively to media professionals, in the broadest sense of the term, on issues of security and security sector reform/democratic governance in Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon and the wider ECOWAS region.

This document was produced through a process of gathering as much real and current information as possible from these countries. It draws on the findings of a regional training of trainers workshop for media professionals on security issues and security sector reform/democratic governance and three national workshops (in Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria) to build the capacity of media professionals on security issues and security sector reform/democratic governance.

This document was produced thanks to the dedication of a number of experts and professionals of the sector from these countries. We wish to extend our heartfelt gratitude to all of the experts and practitioners, from Cameroon to Mali to Nigeria, who actively contributed to this work. They helped enrich this handbook with ideas, contributions, and observations from their own countries.

Special and sincere appreciation is also due to Eugénie Rokhaya AW and Mame Lika SIDIBE who drafted this training handbook with so much professionalism.

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**Philipp M. GOLDBERG**

Regional Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung  
Peace & Security Competence Centre  
Sub-Saharan Africa





# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADM</b>	Municipal Development Agency
<b>CNDHL</b>	National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms
<b>CNRSS</b>	National Council for Security Sector Reform
<b>CONAC</b>	National Anti-Corruption Commission
<b>CONSUPE</b>	Superior State Control
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DIRPA</b>	Directorate of Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces
<b>DSFs</b>	Defense and Security Forces
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>FAMA</b>	Mali Armed Forces
<b>FDS</b>	Defense and Security Forces
<b>GAP</b>	Governmental Action Program
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technologies
<b>MINDEF</b>	Ministry of Defense
<b>MOC</b>	Operational Coordination Mechanism
<b>PGPSP</b>	Program for Shared Governance of Security and Peace
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Communities
<b>SSR/G</b>	Security Sector Reform/Governance
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>WPS</b>	Women Peace and Security

# THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

The “Security for All” regional project, which is co-funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the European Union, aims to contribute to efforts and to establishing institutions to ensure that the security mission (at the local, national and regional levels) is more accountable, responsive and equitable in addressing the security needs of the population.

Civil society participation in the security sector reform and governance processes should be consolidated by empowering their respective civil society actors and by fostering dialogue among all security sector actors. Civil society organizations should inform decision-making processes and contribute to setting agendas, monitoring public action and public debates in security sector reform processes at the national (Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria) level and across the West and Central African regions.

The partner institutions for the media component of the “Security for All” project are the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and, more specifically, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Competence Centre for Sub Sahara Africa (FES PSCC), the European Union (EU) and the Center for Advanced Defense and Security Studies (CHEDS).

## THE FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG PEACE AND SECURITY COMPETENCE CENTRE FOR SUB SAHARA AFRICA (FES PSCC)

The FES is a German non-profit political organization dedicated to the development of social democratic ideas and values. It operates in more than one hundred (100) countries around the world to promote peace, democracy and social justice.

More specifically, the FES-PSCC office coordinates, through a project-oriented approach across a network of seven (07) FES offices, all issues pertaining to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa. The FES PSCC office, which was previously based in Abuja, was reopened in Dakar in November 2016 and directly organizes Peace and Security activities in the Sahel-Sahara region and in West Africa.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s Competence Center for Peace and Security aims to:

- promote progressive approaches to democratic governance and collective human security ;
- create fora for inclusive dialogues at the national, sub-regional and regional levels;
- increase awareness about (inter)regional interdependence;

## THE EUROPEAN UNION (E.U.)

The EU values are common to the EU countries in a society in which inclusion, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination prevail. These values are an integral part of our European way of life: Human Dignity, Freedom, Democracy, Equality, the Rule of Law and Human Rights.

The goals of the European Union are as follows:

- promote peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens
- offer freedom, security and justice without internal borders
- promote sustainable development based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive market economy with full employment and social progress, and environmental protection
- combat social exclusion and discrimination
- promote scientific and technological progress
- enhance economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among EU countries
- respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity
- establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.

## THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED DEFENSE AND SECURITY STUDIES

The Center for Advanced Studies in Defense and Security (CHEDS) is a public administrative body established by Decree No. 2013-12/PR of January 3, 2013, amended on February 5, 2020 by Decree No. 2020-392 PR. CHEDS operates under the authority of the President of the Republic of Senegal's Private Military Staff

The Center uses a human security approach that is consistent with Senegal's concept of defense and security. Its mission is as follows :

- Respond to the expectations of political decision makers on strategic issues affecting the development of the country;
- Participate in the training of senior civilian and Defense and Security Forces (FDS) executives, through the consolidation of fundamental knowledge in strategy, ownership of tools for understanding the geo-strategic environment as well as the issues related to defense and security;
- Promote the resolution of defense and security issues of interest to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) using a holistic approach.

CHEDS has defined four (04) strategic thrusts:

- Provide training and advisory support
- Conduct action research;
- Build leaders' design and action capacities;
- Create discussion and dialogue fora.

The decision to partner with CHEDS was taken in light of its proven experience in the design and implementation of a media program that was launched in 2015 to promote awareness of the importance of defense and security among these actors.

**1**

# **THE MEDIA AND SSR: THE ISSUES AT STAKE**

## I. THE PROJECT

### 1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

Over the past two (02) decades, various multi-faceted threats have emerged on a global scale, ranging from international arms and human trafficking to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. As a result, no country is immune to these insidious and sprawling threats.

Meanwhile, the media environment is changing with a modern news cycle that affords local events a global audience and instant visibility. There is a growing interest in security issues among the public, and a desire to stay abreast of national security requirements, which are now being debated in several, if not all, regions of the world.

Nevertheless, it has to be said that the internationalization of the issue of security has exposed the limits of political actors, as well as of security agencies that are finding it difficult to work out sustainable solutions. At the same time, these actors have failed to recognize the impact that the involvement of civil society, and the media in particular, can have on democratic governance for peace and security.

While the importance of their role has been recognized, there is ongoing mistrust between the military, politicians, and the media; virtually no consensus has been reached.

With this in mind, the project focuses on consensus-building efforts as well as on increasing civil society engagement at various levels in the national Security Sector Governance and Reform<sup>1</sup> (SSG/R) debates and processes in Mali, Cameroon and Nigeria as well as at the regional level (the wider ECOWAS region), including networking and alliance-building among key stakeholders.

### 2. OVERALL OBJECTIVE/IMPACT

The content of the handbook will enable trainers to encourage critical information processing and support an inclusive and sustainable approach to security through capacity building and policy guidance.

It will contribute to supporting actions and institutions that provide more accountable, responsive and equitable security measures (at the local, regional and national levels) to meet the security needs of the population.

### 3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

CSOs and the media, in particular, inform decision-making processes and contribute to policy agenda setting, public oversight and public debate in the area of security sector reform processes at the national (Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria) and regional levels in West and Central Africa.

Various activities will be organized for formal and informal media professionals, including television, radio, print and digital journalists, as well as bloggers, to enhance their understanding of their role in the security field and to encourage them to further develop their conflict-sensitive analysis.

They will be equipped to play an active role in peace-building and violence prevention and will have the skills required to collect, verify, and process information, as well as the judgment and integrity to convey that information as objectively and impartially as possible.

### 4. EXPECTED OUTCOMES

The Train-the-Trainer program should result in the production of a training handbook that will be used for country-specific training and will be supplemented by the security issues specific to these countries.

The first step will be to train trainers during a regional workshop.

At the end of the training, the following outcomes are expected with respect to the participants:

- Common media knowledge and analysis are enhanced in the area of SSG/R;
- Interactions between security sector actors to better supervise the security sector are improved;
- The level of awareness, attitude and behavior of CSOs and security sector personnel, as well as policy makers and the general public is enhanced;
- Regional networks in the media sector are established;
- Ongoing or joint monitoring and dialogue focused on the adaptation/implementation of SSG/R strategies is observed.

The second step will consist in organizing national workshops for journalists from the three countries concerned, Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria, taking into account the results of the regional workshop.

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1 Security sector reform and governance

## II. REFLECTION AND INFORMATION POINTS FOR THE MEDIA

### 1. IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, ETHICS AND DEONTOLOGY

The local, national and regional challenges to peace and security and to democratic governance have become more complicated due to emerging security threats. This is equally true for democratic governance of the security sector. At the same time, there has been some transformation in the media, with the emergence of citizen journalism, social networks and the internet in particular.

The features of the Internet: The Internet brings together information content and a technology that is characterized by the combination of text, images and sound. It is marked by immediacy and speed. As a result, it takes up an unlimited space and can be difficult to control. Distance is no longer a constraint, which is also true of community radio stations, which can broadcast beyond their allotted frequencies.

The Internet, social medias and citizen journalism have downsides related to content credibility and reliability. Information is traditionally at the heart of journalism. However, citizen journalism, for example, emphasizes the action of citizens, who are also able to produce information through tools provided by the Internet. Anyone can be a journalist, make videos, and send materials to traditional media and websites, which increasingly fail to perform the necessary due diligence, appropriate and comparative documentation before broadcasting. Therefore, citizen journalism should be subject to a minimum of supervision and the traditional media should take the maximum precautions before broadcasting or publishing items on sensitive topics related to security<sup>2</sup>.

Although the Internet can cause problems, it also provides advantages for the media in a fragile security context. These include the possibility of putting radios and TVs online, capacity building for news production by setting up online communities of practice, and online collaborations between journalists to produce joint programs on SSR-related topics.

### 2. WHY CHOOSE SSR?

The democratic control of the security sector is an issue in all countries covered by the project and across the region. There is some deep-seated mistrust between SDFs and civil society and between SDFs and the media. While the need to involve civil society, especially marginalized groups and the media, has been recognized in all countries as essential for democratic and inclusive SSR, progress to date has not been commensurate with the challenges of SSR.

Against what backdrop is security sector reform taking place? As a general rule, security sector reform is resorted to when, at some point in a country's history, the security sector is no longer able to: (i) inspire confidence among citizens and the various major stakeholders in society and/or (ii) play its role in a credible and effective manner for various reasons.

This happens, for example, when:

- a country emerges from a crisis which, among other things, involved armed civilians and/or former military personnel who defected from the regular security forces. In the wake of such crises, SSR is usually undertaken to incorporate former combatants into the regular army.
- SSR may be necessary if the security sector is built in such a way that it does not inspire confidence among citizens and/or other major components of society. This may happen, for example, if the security forces have been involved in serious human rights violations in the past.
- This could also happen if the makeup of law enforcement is met with distrust. This occurs, for example, when an army is an ethnic-based force and/or is structured in such a way that it is not a regalian force, but a force in the service of one man (as can be seen in countries where there is a presidential guard that acts as an army within an army).

The noticeable deterioration of the security situation in West and Central Africa, which is characterized by new types of so-called asymmetric threats, inter- and intra-community violence, tensions at common borders and conflicts over the control of natural resources (water, grazing land) which are becoming increasingly scarce as a result of cli-

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2 Medias and SSR – A practical guide to improving reforms. [https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/123435/2512847/Media%20&%20SSR%20practical%20note\\_1.pdf](https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/123435/2512847/Media%20&%20SSR%20practical%20note_1.pdf)

mate change, calls for a paradigm shift in security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) in the countries covered by the project, where the progress achieved has been overshadowed by new challenges.

Similarly, the lack of a clearly defined land tenure system in these Sahelian countries has meant that peripheral regions, which are often border areas, have been neglected and marginalized.

These countries are facing demographic pressure due to an increasingly young population that is demanding greater social integration, especially in terms of employment and opportunities, in order to improve their living conditions<sup>3</sup>.

Due to the nature of conflicts and the multiple actors involved, SSR/G must be fully inclusive, since it is now recognized that security management can no longer be the preserve of *“the most senior security officials and an elite of civilian political actors”*.<sup>4</sup> This is why the training of trainers in education for peace, security, coexistence, tolerance and acceptance of differences is both necessary and urgent.

Furthermore, Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals urges UN member states to *“promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable*

*and inclusive institutions at all levels”*<sup>5</sup>. Although the project’s focus countries have their own specificities, it must be noted that they all face the same major challenges to the democratic management of SSR. These challenges include corruption, a lack of inclusiveness, political turmoil that interferes with the operation of the defense and security forces, and social and security issues that prevent or slow down the SSR process.

### 3. WHERE DOES CITIZEN CONTROL COME IN, AND WHAT DO THE MEDIA DO?

Citizen control, including through civil society organizations and the media, reduces levels of impunity, abuse of power, and violence by government. At the regional level, i.e., with ECOWAS, progress in collectively addressing common security and development issues has been slow and has yielded mixed results.

The participation of civil society organizations in the countries concerned is still limited, even though the ECOWAS policy framework for security sector reform and governance in West Africa stipulates that all member states should ensure that civil society organizations and the media are fully and effectively involved in the formulation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases of SSR/G programs, projects and activities.

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3 The Bill Gates Foundation’s 2018 Development Progress Report calls for aid to Africa, a continent facing unprecedented population growth. Its population will double by 2050 to 2.4 billion, half of whom will be under the age of 25.

4 Gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité : Tirer les leçons des expériences ouest-africaines, Alan Bryden et Fairlie Chappuis

5 <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/peace-justice/>

**2**

**JOURNALISTS:  
FOR A BETTER  
UNDERSTANDING  
OF SSR**



## I. FIRST STATUS REPORT ON THE PROJECT'S TARGET COUNTRIES

### 1. STATUS OF SSR/G IN MALI FOR USE BY THE MEDIA

The debate was first launched in the 1990s by state actors and civil society organizations in Mali after they noted the repeated interference of the military in the political sphere and the consequences this had for the stability of the country. The blueprint for solutions and proposals that emerged from the various meetings were never implemented.

Other achievements included the emergence of the Special Armed Forces, based on the same model as that implemented in France, and the creation of a National Security Reform Council attached to the Prime Minister's Office.

SSR/G in Mali has not been inclusive for now. The issues raised in a 56-page document published in 2019 entitled *Livre Blanc de la société civile pour la sécurité et la paix au Mali* [Civil Society White Paper for Security and Peace in Mali] and the recommendations of this survey are not taken into account by the authorities.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program which was officially launched in 2018 has seen only limited progress (the 2019-2025 military programming law) due to a lack of trust between the Malian military and former rebels. There were also some limitations in the intelligence services. This is demonstrated by the numerous attacks perpetrated at the country's borders.

The same applies to the justice system, access to which is an essential component of the rule of law and democracy. However, an Afrobarometer survey published in 2017 reported compromised access to justice due to Malians' perceptions of bias and corruption<sup>6</sup>. A report by NGO HiIL - User-Friendly Justice reached the same conclusion a year later. Nevertheless, the report noted that justice issues differed from one region to another, and that land, family and crime/offenses were categories that affected large numbers of people throughout the country. In an op-ed published on the IRIS website in November 2018, the authors Patrick Ferras and Jessica Ekon, note that SSR can only yield results if the principles of good governance, including equitable access to justice, are accepted by all. The Malian authorities launched an action plan in 2018 focusing on justice reform.

### 2. STATUS OF SSR/G IN NIGERIA FOR USE BY THE MEDIA

The most prevalent security challenges in Nigeria are associated with the Boko Haram-imposed war, the numerous conflicts between communities (herders - farmers) and the Biafran independence movement. These are essentially internal security challenges.

Numerous scandals surrounding the management of oil resources, cases of corruption and embezzlement of public funds involving high ranking civilian and military authorities have further exacerbated these tensions by creating a serious lack of confidence in the political and military authorities among the population.

It is also worth noting that in this country, which has experienced military coups and civil wars, the first SSR/G acts were exclusively managed by the military. An Armed Forces Transformation Committee was established in 2006. This committee, which operates under the Ministry of Defense, is seen as a first step towards transforming the Nigerian military as a whole. It has 06 focus areas covering the equipment of the armed forces and the motivation of the troops, among others. Upon analysis of the document, it appears that defense and security management is still the preserve of the defense and security forces.

The presence of Boko Haram, in the face of which a poorly trained, under-equipped and corruption-ridden army was unable to resist and suffered numerous setbacks (the most spectacular of which was certainly the abduction of the Chibouk girls), has led to civilian and CSO involvement.

There is widespread acceptance that this war against the Islamist sect is an unconventional one and that more inclusive ways of dealing with various actors need to be implemented. Self-defense groups and militias ("vigilantes") have emerged at a time when the methods of the army and police in suppressing the Boko Haram insurgency are being strongly criticized. These untrained self-defense groups have also earned a negative reputation for disrespecting human dignity and for engaging in indiscriminate violence against civilians. Back in 2015, several human rights organizations and the press reported on abuses perpetrated by these militias, including road blockades, improvised checkpoints, and assaults on the homes of suspected Boko Haram members, who were acting under the influence of narcotics from various trafficking operations, and using bladed and war weapons<sup>7</sup>.

### 3. STATUS OF SSR/G IN CAMEROON FOR USE BY THE MEDIA

Like Mali and Nigeria, Cameroon is facing a security crisis: the war against Boko Haram, maritime piracy and, since 2017, the Anglophone insurrection in the northwest and southwest. The influx of refugees from the Central African Republic and Chad has also put a strain on the security sector, which was already experiencing a number of dysfunctional situations.

There is a need for SSR/G in this country, as far as the Defense and Security Forces are concerned. There has been a confusion of roles in their deployment to various hotbeds of tension. There is a real need to clarify roles, especially as regards the gendarmerie as a defense force and the gendarmerie as a security force.

A number of problems have been identified in the way the traditional security system operates. In the police and gendarmerie, the operational units are real bottlenecks in the enforcement of criminal justice in Cameroon. This is documented in a civil society report that highlights the urgent need for security sector reform.

The country lacks a genuine mechanism for implementing a broad-based and comprehensive reflection on SSR/G. There are some ad hoc and operational actions that can be seen as falling within this framework. These include the redeployment of forces to the Anglophone regions and the reassignment of strategic missions to certain units that were previously devoted to territorial surveillance. Cameroon's armed forces regularly receive support from its partners (USA, Switzerland) for advanced training on SSR/G.

Note: This initial assessment was based on research commissioned by FES and will be supplemented by analyses conducted at the regional meeting and country workshops (Mali, Cameroon and Nigeria). The second step will consist in organizing national workshops for journalists from the three countries concerned, Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria, taking into account the results of the regional workshop.

## II. THEME-BASED TRAINING ON SSR

### 1. SECURITY CHALLENGES AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

#### 1.1. Key Concepts and Basic Concepts of Violent Extremism and Radicalization

#### 1.2. History and Human Security Issues

##### Purpose of the Module

To understand the complexity and polysemic nature of terms used in the context of peace and security and to develop a common understanding of these terms.

##### Description

- Review the various terms and discuss the most appropriate definition
- Discuss and demonstrate the polysemic nature of certain terms
- Readjust based on the experience of the participants
- Agree on a widely shared definition

### 2. SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE REFORM AGAINST A BACKDROP OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS

##### Purpose of the module

To break down the various aspects of security sector reform and governance and their application in the countries concerned.

##### Description

- History and significance of SSR
- The role of security in sustainable development
- Status of SSR/G in Mali, Nigeria, and Cameroon
- Security sector governance reform against a backdrop of asymmetric threats
- Obstacles and Responses

#### 2.1. Security Sector Governance and Human Rights: The Cases of Mali, Nigeria and Cameroon

##### Purpose of the module

Ensure respect for human rights during the SSR process; international instruments and conventions on the protection of civilians, belligerents, cultural monuments, religious buildings, and activities of vital importance.

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- 6 <https://afrobarometer.org/fr/publications/ad166-au-mali-lacces-la-justice-est-compromis-en-raison-des-perceptions-de-parti-pris>
  - 7 Nigeria : l'urgence d'encadrer les milices d'autodéfense, Oumarou Sali Bouba, analyste pour Libre Afrique. le 23 février 2015

### Description

- How to turn SDFs into rule of law-abiding republican forces
- Jurisdictions beyond emotion
- Terrorists in prisons: minimizing the risk of indoctrination

## 2.2. Democratic governance of the security sector: citizen control of SSR

### Purpose of the Module

To equip journalists with the tools they need to clarify, understand and embrace the significance of citizen and media involvement in a sector from which they have traditionally been excluded.

### Description

- Development of SSR/G: How to get citizens and the media involved at an early stage
- Warning / Monitoring / Citizen training: Critical analysis of citizen control mechanisms of SSR/G, role of the media
- The impact of citizen control in SSR

## 2.3. Gender and security sector governance reform: the cases of Mali, Nigeria and Cameroon

### Purpose of the module

To understand the concept of gender and relate it to democratic governance reform specifically in the security sector in the three countries concerned.

### Description

- Inclusive SSR: For an effective implementation of resolutions, protocols and conventions
- Findings on unequal power dynamics between men and women and the failure to take into account women's contribution to development processes and SSR
- What is the role of widows and children of victims of security crises in SSR/G?
- The role and place of women in SDFs

## 2.4. The role of regional organizations in security sector governance reform: The case of ECOWAS

### Purpose of the module

Through governance reform, learn about regional institutions and ECOWAS more specifically.

### Description

- Application of the ECOWAS policy note: What are the means of control and pressure mechanisms?

- Ensure that SDFs protect the population while protecting their rights, using limited resources: The ECOWAS challenge
- Effectiveness of ECOWAS mechanisms in SSR/G

## 3. THEMATIC EDITORIAL SECTION

### 3.1. The Media's SSR Capacity

### Purpose of the module

Identify the obstacles to and tools needed (training, capacity building, documentation, etc.) for appropriate media coverage of SSR, after a refresher on the various aspects of security sector reform and governance and their application in the countries concerned.

### Description

- Assess media actors' understanding of SSR/G in Mali, Nigeria and Cameroon
- Agree on the mechanisms to be put in place for adequate coverage of sensitive issues and on the methods to be developed to establish a connection with the SDFs
- Identify what journalists need to cover security-related issues and SSR more specifically.

### 3.2. Field Investigation and Fact-finding Techniques in an Environment with Fragile Security

### Purpose of the Module

To learn about basic field investigation and fact-finding reporting techniques while understanding the complexity of operating in a security crisis situation.

### Description

- Review the basics of investigation and fact-finding processes.
- Explore challenges in a fragile security environment
- Sources and relationships to be established: DSFs, experts, civil society, populations (citizen's voice, men, and women), etc.
- Empathy and field research (Victims and perpetrators)
- Cultural specificities to be taken into consideration



### 3.3. Security Information Analysis and Processing Tools

#### Purpose of the Module

To review the basic tools used to analyze and process information while considering the specificity of a conflict environment and insisting on issues related to sensitive information.

#### Description

- The basic tools for analyzing and processing information, sensitive information
- Avoid endangering others, avoid endangering oneself, take into consideration the specificity of women journalists' safety
- The concept of defense secrecy: limitations of the freedom to inform

### 3.4. Research and Information-gathering Techniques in the Field of SSR

#### Purpose of the Module

To apply fieldwork and information processing to the issue of SSR.

#### Description

- Fieldwork and information gathering
- Sources and documentation
- Verification
- Inclusiveness
- Networks
- Treatment mode

### 3.5. Ethics and Professional Conduct

#### Purpose of the Module

To review the ground rules that journalists have set for themselves in the practice of their profession through various charters and conventions and question their relevance in the context of dealing with safety-related issues.

#### Description

- Some definitions based on reference instruments and bodies responsible for safeguarding ethics and deontology in Africa and in the countries covered by the project
- Media representation of security issues (who has legitimacy to speak out: Africans, Westerners, who are the referents?)
- A few guidelines on how to address security-related ethical issues (breach of the social contract, hate speech, women's issues, confidentiality, etc.).

**3**

**LET'S DO SOME  
PRACTICE!**

## I. THEMATIC SHEETS OF CONCEPT DEFINITIONS AS THEY EMERGED FROM THE REGIONAL AND COUNTRY WORKSHOPS

### 1. THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL-LEVEL SECURITY

Security is a contingent concept that can be assessed from various angles. Nevertheless, one thing stands out with respect to its various components, both objective and subjective.

From an objective point of view, security implies an absence of danger or threat to an individual. From a subjective point of view, the term refers to the absence of a feeling of a fear that a person may be experiencing. A lack of security, i.e. insecurity is always the outcome of an economic, social, environmental or other situation.

For this reason, it has now been strongly demonstrated that security and development are complementary. Kofi Annan, once said that *“there is no security without development and no development without security”*.

This concept of security has evolved. We have moved from conventional security, which refers to its purely military dimension, to human security, which refers both to the rights of citizens to live in a secure environment and to the existence of political, social, religious and economic activity within each society.

This approach implies the ability to reduce or even eliminate vulnerabilities related to social, economic, health, environmental and cultural threats that define the sustainable development of communities. It is therefore a step towards economic growth, conflict prevention, sustainable development, and, in short, the fulfillment of the individual.

#### 1.1. The concepts of terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization

These are ambiguous and polysemic concepts. A common understanding of these concepts is necessary in order to allow actors within the media to have the right language.

This holds true for extremism, which refers to having views that are very different from those of the majority of the population. When it is combined with the adjective “violent”, it refers to the use of all methods, including aggressive and violent ones, to impose one’s preferred system.

Terrorism, on the other hand, is difficult to define and can be understood to mean acts of violence or threats aimed at influencing the government or an international organization or at intimidating the public or a segment of the public in order to promote a political, religious, racial or ideological purpose. Terrorists operate in a variety of ways (ambush, kamikaze, kidnapping, sequestration, etc.) and situations that facilitate their establishment are widely present in various countries (poor governance, corruption, injustice, insecurity, porous borders).

Source: Summary report on the regional SSR/G training of trainers workshop for media actors; May 25-27, 2021

### 1.2. Security Challenges, Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Mali

#### Increased Security Challenges

Mali has experienced increased security challenges. The first of these stems from political instability, which illustrates inadequate governance models that have been in place in the country since 1960, with the country experiencing three armed rebellions and four coups d’état. Adding to this are a rapid population growth (the country’s population is expected to rise to 26 million by 2030)<sup>8</sup> and climate change, which has resulted in the scarcity of natural resources, the control of which is now a source of conflict between communities. The issue of effective state sovereignty over the country’s territory (1.24 million km<sup>2</sup>) is another challenge combined with a poorly designed and implemented decentralization policy. These two issues have resulted in the spread of all kinds of trafficking and organized crime, poor governance and the hybridization of security risks, turning Mali into one of the most unstable countries in West Africa.

#### Threats

There is an increasing number of threats facing Mali. These threats include increased criminal activity (urban and peri-urban), inter and intra-religious intolerance, the galloping proliferation of small weapons, small caliber weapons and an increasing number of war weapons, increased identity-based and irredentist claims, intra- and inter-community conflicts, uncontrolled migration flows, rampant unemployment (on this point, it is legitimate to question the education system), and terrorist attacks, which are becoming more and more prevalent.

Another issue is slavery, which is still practiced in the north and south of Mali, especially in Kayes, where slavery by descent is still prevalent despite the adoption of

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8 [www.jeuneafrique.com](http://www.jeuneafrique.com), data updated in 2015

a social pact for community cohesion (signed in August 2021). In addition, Article 2 of the Malian constitution and the international treaties to which the country has subscribed prohibit discrimination based on social origin. Observers are concerned that this practice could be exploited by terrorist groups, as it has been described as highly discriminatory and a source of frustration.

### **Conditions Conducive to Violent Extremism, Radicalization, and Terrorism**

Poor governance and corruption are the first indicators mentioned. The following issues are also mentioned: precariousness and limited economic opportunities, injustice or a lack of justice, a large territory and porous borders, recurrent intra- and inter-community conflicts, deficiencies in the education system, under-equipped defense and security forces, and insecurity associated with new criminal activities through social networks for example.

### **Issues: Peace, human security, human rights**

No development without peace. The factors contributing to lasting peace include: democracy and the rule of law, political stability, sustainable development, sovereignty, which underpins the effective presence and social utility of the State of Mali, and a commitment to promoting peace and regional security.

Security threats have a major impact on human security because they are now multifaceted: food, community, environmental, political and health. The concept of human security refers to meeting needs while upholding universal, inalienable, indivisible and non-negotiable human rights.

Human rights entail three obligations: the obligation to respect (refrain from interfering with the exercise of rights); the obligation to protect (prevent violations); and the obligation to fulfill (take action). These are the consecutive elements of international humanitarian law (IHL).

### **Possible Solutions**

A comprehensive and objective assessment and the promotion of good governance are essential. The establishment of warning and monitoring units across the country is also recommended, along with the promotion of religious debate and the training and regulation of religious leaders.

Citizenship education, adapting training to the job market, initiating a de-radicalization program in prisons, and providing professional training to prisoners are other possible solutions.

Regarding the media, regulation and training are essential, especially in the context of the emerging so-called

citizen media supported by digital platforms that are widely used by influencers and activists.

Source: Boubacar SOKONA, SSR specialist, expert at the SSR Commission of Mali, national capacity building workshop for mainstream media professionals on Security and Security Sector Reform/ Democratic Governance issues for Mali, November 2-4, 2021

## **2. THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL-LEVEL SSR**

SSR is not an activity. It is an endogenous process aimed at evaluating and improving the effectiveness and accountability of security and justice service providers. There is no single or universal model for SSR and names may even vary.

SSR is not necessarily associated with a crisis or conflict situation. It must be nationally and locally owned. In this respect, the media play an important role in its understanding, dissemination and appropriation by local populations, and therefore in its effective and efficient implementation.

### **2.1. Security Sector Reform in Mali: Background, Human Security and Human Rights**

In his political project presented in 2013, the President of the Republic of Mali had already announced the State's willingness to reform the security sector. This desire was taken into account in the PAG during the same year and materialized in 2014 through the creation of a National Council for Security Sector Reform (CNRSS). Several actions were carried out for its consolidation. The first was to make an inclusive assessment including former fighters that would make it possible to draw all the lessons from previous crises.

To further shape the CNRSS, the reintegration of former fighters (FAMA, MOCs) became a reality, as did the deployment of the first units of the new army.

After a series of workshops, seminars and trips to countries implementing SSRs to gain a better understanding of the process, the CNRSS was validated and an action plan was established.

Some aspects that form the basis of good governance in SSR were clearly highlighted in the action plan: exploring structural causes, highlighting cultural factors that can cause conflicts as well as provide a way to resolve conflicts, finding ways to eradicate or at least considerably reduce aggravating factors (drug and arms trafficking, mercenaries, use of child soldiers).



Strengthening institutional frameworks, implementing national instruments on SSR/G, inclusion, transparency, citizen control, civil-military collaboration and female leadership within SDFs are some of the strategies that the Malian state is trying to implement, albeit with some difficulty.

Source: Boubacar SOKONA, SSR specialist, expert at the Office of the SSR Commissioner of Mali, national capacity building workshop for mainstream media professionals on security issues and Security Sector Reform/Democratic Governance for Mali, November 2-4, 2021

## 2.2. Security Challenges and Security Sector Reform in Cameroon

While Cameroon is actively involved in regional efforts by the international community to promote SSR, it has yet to officially launch the process, despite the fact that some reforms have been undertaken within the defense and security forces. These reforms, which were imposed by maritime piracy, the rise of the Boko Haram group and the Anglophone crisis, led to the creation of community-based forces. They took place from 2001 onwards, based on three pillars: rejuvenation, professionalization and equipment of the defense and security forces.

Other changes took place before these reforms – firstly in 1972 with the reunification and “cameroonization” of personnel, then in 1980 with the emergence of a coordination center, and finally 2001 with the great reform.

Some ad hoc and operational actions are also considered part of SSR.

The main challenges facing security system governance efforts and the protection of human rights in Cameroon are of a social and political nature.

These require a space for dialogue involving various civilian, military, government, national, and regional actors. The new security dynamics make it impossible to keep governance under control and centralized. Practical actions need to be taken to implement the governance of the security system. These include imposing a regime of sanctions, conducting fact-finding missions, preventive deployment, strengthening democratic practices, upholding the rule of law, and promoting a culture of security.

Source: Colonel Dr. Didier BADJECK, Former Head of the Communication Division of the Ministry of Defense of Cameroon, Cameroon National Workshop, 28-30 September 2021

## 3. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The concept of human rights refers to all subjective rights that belong to any man, any woman, and are enshrined in international conventions and national instruments, and which are binding on States. The human rights ideology goes back to the beginning of mankind, even if it was formally adopted after the Second World War. Its foundation lies in the preservation of human dignity, which must be the fundamental yardstick for any action taken.

Human rights are subject to generational change, depending on the needs of the individual. Therefore, the following rights can be mentioned:

- First generation rights, i.e. civil and political rights such as the right to life, the right to vote and to be elected, the right not to be subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, etc.
- Second generation rights, i.e. economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to health care, the right to education, the right to drinking water, the right to property, etc.
- Third generation rights which refer to solidarity rights such as the right to peace, the right to development, and the right to a healthy environment.
- Fourth generation rights which refer to rights related to the digital environment such as the right to personal data protection, the right to be forgotten on the internet, etc.

## 4. THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZEN CONTROL

The concept of citizenship is critical in understanding the media's potential role in SSR.

The following definitions have been adopted: Citizenship is the state or quality of being a citizen. It refers to the legal status conferring equal rights (civil and political, economic, social, etc.) and equal obligations for all in a given political community with participation in power, decision-making and control.

Citizenship is also a set of moral qualities and civic duties considered necessary for the proper operation of the city. In this respect, *“resistance and obedience are the two virtues of the citizen. Through obedience, he ensures order, and through resistance he ensures freedom”*, which means that citizens have a role to play to ensure that order, in general, and security in particular, prevail in the city.

Public action control or citizen control refers to all practices, whether collective or not, sectoral or general, aiming to make the actors involved in the management of public affairs accountable, in particular through greater transparency.

#### 4.1. Citizen Control of Security Sector Reform

Public control refers to all practices, whether collective or not, sectoral or general, aimed at ensuring that those involved in the management of public affairs are accountable, especially through greater transparency.

The purpose of public control is to inform, sometimes alert, but also influence or redirect public action. It is about achieving more effective and legitimate public action, i.e., in accordance with the legal framework but also with the demands of the population. While control was mainly carried out by independent public institutions on State institutions, it now tends to be exercised by a range of actors and to focus more broadly on the implementation of public action (Definition by the Institute for Research and Debate on Governance).

From a human perspective, citizen control of security sector reform is imperative. In addition to encouraging the support of the populations, the idea of citizen control makes them adopt a preventive approach to conflicts. SSR is an inclusive process. The effective involvement of citizens in monitoring implementation sums up its holistic approach, which is about security *“for, with and by”* citizens.

Citizen control of SSR must have objectives and means.

It is about developing knowledge tools, disseminating standards and promoting good practices. It requires scientific, legal and technical expertise that can be obtained through capacity building of populations, CSOs and public institutions.

Source: Le contrôle citoyen de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité [Citizen control of security sector reform] (Dr. Rachid ID YASSINE/ LASPAD)

#### 4.2. Citizen Control of SSR/G in Cameroon

The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 are the legal basis for citizen control. At the regional level, Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights gives citizens the right to directly participate in the public affairs of their country. At the national level, the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon states in its preamble that: *“All citizens shall contribute to the defense of the homeland”; “freedom*

*and security shall be guaranteed to each individual while observing the rights of others and the superior interest of the State”*; security is a right and a duty for the citizen which constitute a legitimate reason for his/her interest in public action in this sector.

Public institutions exercise control over SSR: parliamentary, judicial, financial management, ethics and human rights bodies (CONSUPE, CONAC, NCHRF, etc.). In addition, toll-free numbers [1500 for the Police and 1501 for the Gendarmerie] have been set up for the population to report abuses.

This control can also be exercised a priori, concomitantly and a posteriori by private institutions such as civil society organizations and the media through access to information as a journalist guaranteed by Act No. 90/02 of December 19, 1990. Freedom of access to administrative documents is formally recognized, as is access to documents of public interest, unless otherwise provided for by law or regulation, and the protection of sources of information can only be lifted before a judge and in camera. The intervention of the media in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms within the framework of security policies and programs is also noteworthy, and whistleblowers and influencers in the media and social networks play an important role.

#### Obstacles to monitoring SSR

Security policy (design and implementation) falls under the exclusive remit of the state. It is the preserve of the President of the Republic, who *“shall define the policy of the nation”* (Article 5 paragraph 2); is *“Head of the armed forces”* (Article 8 paragraph 2); and *“shall see to the internal and external security of the State”* (Article 8 paragraph 2).

The secrecy of military operations (military documents are classified: State secret, defense secret, confidential, restricted distribution) while the disclosure of information classified as confidential is considered a breach of national security (treason or espionage). The issue of mobile communication control, the lack of protection of whistleblowers and sources of information are serious concerns.

Source: Dr. Grâce Essama MANGA, Lecturer at the University of Yaoundé, Head of PAUGHSS programs and Associate Researcher at CREPS/UYII, Cameroon National Workshop September 28-30, 2021

### 4.3. Roles of non-media actors in ensuring effective/ Democratic Defense Security Sector Reform in Nigeria

The operations of players in the Justice sector no doubt complement efforts of the media in covering and reporting issues of conflict or in covering fragile environments.

Security and Justice providers should have clearly defined guidelines and they should be limited by statutory laws. There should be control and enforcement mechanisms to deal with misconduct by security and justice providers in cases where they exceed their competences or act outside the law (*ultra vires*)

Coercive powers should be used on the basis of the principles of proportionality, rule of law and human rights. There should be existing policies concerning illegal or discriminatory actions and orders within security and justice services and security and justice providers should be trained in an established code of conduct, human rights and international law. Neutrality of security and justice providers should be guaranteed. There should be internal financial controls, disciplinary procedures, and performance reviews. Equal opportunity employment, retention and promotion policies should be held within the justice and security system.

#### The Executive

Executive powers of censorship and coercive powers (surveillance and detention for example) should be defined within a system for oversight and review. There should be safeguards against ministerial abuse. A balance should be achieved between the need for ministerial responsibility and the need for professional autonomy of security and justice providers. Planning, budgeting and accounting systems must be in place, including a strong role for the Ministry of Finance and the Audit office. The Executive, on whose table the buck stops, must have the right to know and to approve all politically sensitive issues. This is because the elected executives have some role in setting basic security and justice policies, priorities and procedures.

#### The Legislature

The parliament has to be strong in terms of legal powers, resources, staff and expertise on SSR- related issues. There needs to be parliamentary oversight committees (or bodies) that are mandated to oversee all security and justice providers. All political parties represented in the parliamentary must have oversight bodies. This exist on paper but implementation has been problematic.

#### The Judiciary

The Nigerian constitution prescribes the independence of the three arms of governance namely: the Executive, Legislative and the Judiciary. These entities' independence is expected to be guaranteed, in relation to both the executive and the security system. If security and justice providers violate the Rule of Law, there should be an effective way to hold them accountable for their actions through the justice system.

Therefore, the public and employees of the security system should have fair and effective access to justice. There should be a fair, effective and separate system of military justice, which should also adhere to established rules and regulations in dealing with civilians.

#### Independent bodies

Nigeria has a National Human rights Commission, an Inspector General, and an Auditor General. These bodies are expected to be independent oversight bodies functioning on the basis of statutory law, and reporting to Parliament and the Minister concerned directly. They should have quasi-judicial powers to undertake investigations and site visits at their own initiative. They should be able to institute proceedings in courts. The recommendations and findings of such independent oversight bodies should be binding and they should have access to classified information enabling them to carry out their mandate.

There are effective international or regional oversight mechanisms (e.g. regional human rights courts, UN special rapporteurs) and their judicial decisions should be respected; International or regional reports must be influential for SSG reforms to be effective.

#### Civil Society

Nigeria has a freedom of information law, which should guarantee freedoms of expression, association, and assembly. Additionally, civil society must seek (and be allowed) to participate actively in legislative consultations, and to provide expertise to parliamentarians. Some civil society groups have the capacity to and actually undertake legislative engagements.

Effective and respected human rights organizations are expected to and do actually monitor and document the behavior of state and non-state actors as well as their compliance with human rights and humanitarian laws. However, their interventions are yet to produce the desired results. Prior to Nigeria's return to civil rule, civil society organizations were quite active and contributed in no small measure to the push that returned Nigeria to democratic rule. But currently, civic space is gradually shrinking and more stringent measures are being put in place to restrict registra-

tion and operations of non-governmental organizations. Some might go as far as saying that there are attempts by the Executive to close down and weaken NGOs, including media organizations. This has had some negative effects on the accuracy and quality of reporting in the media, especially as they relate to the performance of security and justice providers. There have been actions by the Executive against the media which sometime include threats to close down media companies. It is questionable whether civil society organizations are able to monitor the inappropriate justice and security sectors' observance or breach of human rights violations and corruption without intimidation or interference.

## **5. SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS**

It is difficult to identify the protagonists of a conflict. This is a mixture of civilians and armed actors, conflicts that also tend to escalate into urban settings. Despite a strong outlay of military capabilities (national armies, foreign armies, UN missions, regional partnerships, etc.), attacks against civilians and armies have become more frequent and more violent. We are now witnessing a difficult implementation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

IHL, whose objective is to protect people and property affected by armed conflicts, is barely enforced, even though States have signed the four Geneva Conventions and their additional protocol. There is a perception that IHL does not apply, or applies in a different way, to groups or individuals described as terrorists and their families.

Some States, which characterize an act of violence by a non-state armed group in an armed conflict as an act of terrorism, reject the applicability of IHL in counter-terrorism operations.

Source: Security Sector Governance and Respect for Human Rights in a Context of Asymmetric Threats (Dr. Jean Sylvestre Djibiany BIAGUI, CHEDS)

### **5.1. The concepts of security sector governance and reform and Nigeria**

The concepts of security sector governance and reform generally refer to a process in Western-based international development and democratization to amend the security sector of a state towards good governance and its principles, such as freedom of information and the rule of law.

## **What is Security Sector Reform?**

Security sector reform (SSR) is both a political and technical process to enhance the provision of human and state security by making it more effective, transparent, accountable, inclusive, and consistent with principles of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance. It aims at transforming the system for the provision of security and justice in a polity and directly affects power dynamics. The end goal is to create a secure and stable environment for both people and the state, and to enable economic development.

Military and civilian agencies have worked more closely in recent years to prevent or reduce violent conflict, build the capacities of governments and strengthen national security. Still, lessons from the field show that more needs to be done to improve mutual understanding and cooperation among the array of organizations providing assistance. Lack of understanding has led to duplication of efforts, inefficient use of limited resources and unintended consequences. The Civ-Mil program of the U.S. Institute of Peace includes education, training, working groups and exercises to advance information-sharing and coordination. These efforts inform professionals on how they can work together to build peace more effectively in complex conflict environments.

## **Democracy & Governance**

Democracy embodies responsive and responsible governance, rule of law, human rights, civic participation and peaceful transfers of power through electoral processes. Each of these underpins a peaceful and stable society. The U.S. Institute of Peace teaches democratic principles and democratization processes and techniques that are critical to both peacebuilding and effective governance. USIP seeks to strengthen governance by supporting inclusive, accountable institutions and a robust civil society. These in turn uphold human rights, justice and the rule of law, and promote public participation in social and political processes.

## **Justice, Security & Rule of Law**

Peaceful, prosperous societies need people and institutions to be subject to law that is fairly applied. The U.S. Institute of Peace helps states and members of society work together to strengthen the rule of law, often through justice and security sector reforms. USIP develops innovative models to foster and shepherd sustainable and locally supported reforms, trains rule-of-law practitioners, conducts research and holds forums to share knowledge. The institute also supports programs such as Justice and Security Dialogues, which seek to build trust between civil society and officials from the justice and security sectors.

Source : Freedom C ONUOHA, PhD fdc, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science University of Nigeria, Nsukka, national workshop in Nigeria, October 18 – 21, 2021

## 6. THE CONCEPT OF GENDER IN BROADER TERMS

The concept of gender corresponds to the socio-cultural, economic, social and political characteristics associated with being a girl, a boy, a woman or a man and refers to equity and therefore to justice, equality and therefore to rights.

Gender equity therefore refers to the search for balance and equal opportunity among a group of people regardless of age, sex or skin color. Gender equality will include the adoption and effective implementation of the conventions and various international instruments on women's rights at the national level.

### 6.1. Gender and SSR/G at the Regional Level

Sex or biological sex refers to the biological differences between men and women. It is universal and static. Gender or social sex is a concept based on non-biological differences between men and women. It varies and depends on culture, society and time. It also refers to basic ideas, expectations and obligations about how men and women are perceived and expected to think and act based on how society is organized, not because of their biological differences.

Since African society is predominantly patriarchal, women are faced with male domination. In the specific context of SSR/G, gender is taken into account thanks to the existence of a body of law at the supra-national organization level.

In this respect, one can mention the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa or Maputo Protocol (2003), the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), the Solemn Declaration on the Common African Defense and Security Policy (2004), the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (2006), the African Union Policy on Gender Equality (2009), the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 and 1889 (2009) as well as other gender-related instruments of the RECs and member states.

In addition, UN Resolution 1325 assigns a prominent place to women in all post-conflict processes.

Gender mainstreaming in SSR is therefore essential. In addition to building local ownership, it also aims to raise awareness and respond to the distinct security experiences, needs and roles of men, women, girls and boys.

At the community level, women's organizations are seen as bridges between local communities and security policy makers. They may be able to identify security threats and problems facing individuals and communities and can facilitate dialogue and negotiation between local communities and SSR&G officials and practitioners

Despite some progress, there are still obstacles to promoting the equal participation of men and women ("gender balance"). This is where the media can support women by making them visible and communicating their contribution to security sector governance.

Source: Gender and Security Sector Governance Reform: the cases of Mali, Nigeria and Cameroon (Dr. Aicha PEMBOURA, Peace and Security Expert)

### 6.2. Gender in SSR/G in Mali

In Mali, women joined the armed forces as early as 1974 and it was only in 1985 that they were authorized to join the other army services. In 2010, women were given their due with the disappearance of the male soldier myth. In fact, this was the year when a woman was promoted to the rank of General for the first time and another woman became Inspector General of Police for the first time.

These advances were achieved after it was established that the absence of men deployed in the field full time was offset by the presence of women in offices. The great capacity of women to work in the intelligence service was also noted. Their presence in garrison maternity wards or medical wards is a major asset for the development of the wives of military personnel, especially in remote areas. In their homes, a degree of social balance is achieved thanks to the income generated by recruited girls, and these recruitments contribute to the reduction of unemployment among girls.

However, there are still weaknesses. These include the generally low school enrollment rate for girls and convenience recruitments illustrated by the low level of female recruits. They often occupy low-level secretarial and office work positions as a result of their low level of education.

Sexist abuses and various deviant complexes in relation to the profession are another weakness in women's leadership within the Malian armed forces. The drop in performance levels due to physiological unavailability (pregnancy, maternity, breastfeeding, illness of family members, etc.) is frequently mentioned. There are some possible solutions. The schooling and, more importantly, the retention of girls in school is a major challenge, but not an insurmountable one.



Effective implementation of UN Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889; a stringent observance of recruitment regulations (e.g., morality investigation, age limit); a strict application of sanctions in the event of sexual abuse; and a scrupulous observance of military ethics in the selection of trainers and supervisors are highly recommended.

Source: General Kani DIABATE, international consultant, trainer, national capacity building workshop for mainstream media professionals on security issues and security sector reform/democratic governance for Mali, November 2-4, 2021

### 6.3. Leadership of Women in SDFs in Cameroon

In addition to ensuring inclusiveness and local ownership, gender mainstreaming in SSR/G contributes to building more representative security institutions and ensures compliance with international, regional and national legal instruments. Such mainstreaming is recommended in the strategic and legal frameworks formed by the United Nations 2030 Agenda, especially its Points 5 and 16, which call for gender equality and women's employment as well as universal advancement and inclusion, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and other related resolutions, the African Union Constitutive Act (2000), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women (2005), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), the African Union's Women, Peace and Security Agenda, and the AU Operational Guidance Note on Gender and SSR.

Gender mainstreaming and the rise of women in SDFS in Cameroon could be attributed to their strong operational performance during the post-independence insurgency, their participation in popular defense activities, and their involvement in the fight against the attempted putsch in 1984, combined with the action of international feminist movements. Thus, between 1990 and 2000, the number of women in the SDFs increased from 40 to 510. Women were most prominent in the central administration of the MINDEF or in service specialist areas.

In the service area, women's presence is relatively high because they do not need to be on the front line (police stations, health, justice, supplies, etc.). Despite these efforts, inequalities persist. Women are marginalized when it comes to accessing command positions. Women are under-represented in command positions, especially in operational formations such as brigades, battalions and squadron groups.) No woman has reached the rank of General and the number of women in command positions is still very limited.

This situation is due to persistent discrimination:

- Persistence of socio-cultural constraints (the army is a reflection of society): transposition within the army of gender roles assigned to women and men in society.
- Interference between private and public life
- Maintenance of stereotypes (honors: are women entitled to the same honors as their male colleagues?) (Mr. Colonel, Mr. Captain) Feminized titles: Madam Colonel, Commander, Captain, Lieutenant...
- Sexual segregation of military personnel (men's skepticism about either accepting orders or command from female personnel or about the ability of military women to assume command roles)
- Representations, perception and stigmatization of female personnel,
- Gender-based violence

To reverse this trend, it is recommended that military rules and regulations be strengthened through gender mainstreaming. Another solution is to implement incentive policies within the army (quotas) upon entry, but also with regard to access to command positions. It is also recommended to promote a change in women's mentalities (adaptation of women to the army system) and to enhance women's managerial skills within the army (lifting the image of the female soldier).

Source: Dr. Grâce Essama MANGA, Professor at the University of Yaoundé responsible for PAUGHSS programs and Associate Researcher at CREPS/UJYII, Cameroon National Workshop 28-30 September 2021

### 6.4. Gender and Security Sector Reform in Nigeria

#### The relevance of the gender question in security sector reform

- The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1325 emphasis Women Peace and Security (WPS)
- Nigeria adopted its first NAP on UNSCR 1325 in 2013
- Women make up about 49% of the Nigerian population
- Four critical issues relate to the issue of gender in SSR in Nigeria

#### Very low numerical strength in SSIs

The Nigerian NAP [I, II & III] has a relatively strong focus on recruitment and retention of women in the security sector. The first NAP pledges that "women should form at least 35% of the military and security force in the country". But significant numerical deficits exist in almost all the Security Sector Institutions.

### **Underrepresentation in leadership position in SSIs**

- Gender inequality is widespread due to patriarchy, imbalance in socio-economic opportunities, cultural and religious factors and inadequate enabling legal and policy frameworks, among other factors.
- The dynamics of underrepresentation in security sector institutions in Nigeria

### **Gender discriminatory practices in some SSIs**

- The NPF Force Orders No. 430 Sub 81 (Admin Instruct No. 23) provides amongst other things that “a woman candidate for enlistment in the Police force shall be unmarried”. Meanwhile no such restriction applies to the men.
- Section 2.5 of the NSCDC Condition of Service provides that on first appointment, unmarried female staff (officers) shall remain unmarried for the 2 years after which marriage approval would be sought for
- The Armed Forces Act, Section 5 made provisions for the recruitment and maintenance of AFN to include women, but the ratio of women remains insignificant

### **Exploitation in security provisioning by SSIs**

- Insecurity and increased militarization disproportionately affected women and girls.
- Women and girls make up at least 79% of approximately 2.5 million people displaced across the country's northeast
- Before and during displacement, women and girls routinely face SGBV from:
  - **Boko Haram** (Rape, sexual violence, and suicide bombing)
  - **Camp officials** (SEA mainly in IDP camp)
  - **Security forces** (SEA in Communities/IDP camp)

### **Gender in the security sector in Nigeria**

- Adoption of National Gender Policy (2008)
- Adoption of an institution-specific gender policy
- Establishment of Gender Desks in SSIs
- Nigerian Army Women's Corps (NAWC)
- Security Sector Reference Group

Source : Freedom C ONUOHA, PhD fdc, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science University of Nigeria, Nsukka, national workshop in Nigeria, October 18 – 21, 2021

## **7. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SSR/G: THE CASE OF ECOWAS**

The numerous crises facing the world pose a threat not only to citizens but also to States' very existence. Most national and international efforts are focused on protecting States rather than citizens. Challenges remain in the implementation of SSR as a result of an ever-increasing level of violent extremism and institutional crises. However, there have been some successes, especially in some ECOWAS countries, which have put the human dimension at the heart of its various initiatives in accordance with its 2020 vision. In December 2021, this vision was changed to ECOWAS Vision 2050 at the end of a meeting of parliamentarians under the slogan: *“The ECOWAS of Peoples: Peace and Prosperity for All”*.

The regional organization adapts its instruments, support and strategies - which are not static - to changing situations. However, there are immutable aspects that must be guaranteed in any SSR process. These include in particular respect for human rights, democratic governance and inclusive monitoring of SSR. Similarly, solidarity and partnership between member states is strongly recommended.

ECOWAS plays a dual role in SSR: a political and strategic role in adopting resolutions impacting the political development and security sector of member states, mediation and resource mobilization; and a technical role that consists in supporting and assisting member countries through training and capacity building.

Source: Freedom C ONUOHA, PhD fdc, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science University of Nigeria Nsukka

## II. SSR/G AND THE MEDIA

### 1. SECURITY AND THE MEDIA: HOW THINGS HAVE EVOLVED

Due to the root causes of vulnerabilities, the concept of security has evolved into one of human security. Security issues are no longer the preserve of security professionals alone because their management requires a holistic approach. This requirement turns the media into essential and indispensable actors for the proper implementation of an inclusive SSR, as recommended by ECOWAS. However, the media and security actors have a complex and often conflicting relationship.

The media world faces numerous challenges: there is too much information coming from different sources, which poses a problem of reliability and credibility; misinformation and/or disinformation conveyed by warring parties; lack of training; social networks whose content is uncontrollable and difficult to verify. Knowing how to identify actors and actresses could help to make well balanced and professional productions.

Therefore, there are key male and female actors who, virtue of their competencies, power and knowledge, can influence the implementation of SSR in a significant way.

As for the primary actors, they are directly concerned by SSR (in terms of involvement and benefit) and are in contact with the key actors and can influence them; finally, the secondary actors participate indirectly or only temporarily in the implementation of SSR. As a result, they can influence it.

This is what advocacy efforts to build synergy between SDFs and civilians and a communication strategy to encourage nationwide mobilization and maintain donor interest in SSR are all about. These actions require the active involvement of the media in the process at all levels (local, national and regional). The media will thus inform and raise awareness among the population, local authorities, state actors, private sector actors, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations and technical and financial partners in order to obtain their support and adherence to SSR; keep the issue of SSR on the national and international agenda; and prove that SSR is a valid approach that is appropriate to the situation.

For journalists, there are legitimate questions to be asked:

- How to avoid condoning crimes and attacks while reporting on them?
- How to warn on issues without being seen as a “crime mongering agent” or as a bird of ill omen?

Manipulation, the search for scoops and buzz have made it difficult for the media and the SDFs to live together. Yet, the democratic governance of SSR is based on accountability, integrity and transparency.

The media is expected to switch from a crisis (problem-oriented) messaging to comprehensive narratives of change from the perspective of all stakeholders who advocate for and support reform, presenting solutions and explaining how they will work better than existing solutions. This requires training to better understand the concepts, conflict dynamics and mechanisms of SSR. The introduction of modules on SSR governance in the curricula of journalism schools and capacity building for journalists in newsrooms will help achieve this goal. In addition, an assessment of the legal framework governing the media will make it possible to review certain provisions in light of the context. These include aspects relating to freedom of information, access to official documents and “public interest” documents, protection of whistleblowers and a sharing of classification rules and practices.

Sources: Les enjeux de la RSS/G - Les médias sont-ils-ils outillés pour traiter de la question (Alexis KALAMBRY); RSS/G et Média : Quels défis et quelle formation pour les médias? (Samba Dialimpa BADJI)

### 2. TRUTH IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND JOURNALISM IN TIMES OF CONFLICT: “GOOD PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN THE FACE OF SECURITY CHALLENGES

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**“Information and truth allow citizens to build their opinion while allowing institutional authorities to make the right decisions”.**

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Identifying the root causes of a conflict helps to provide appropriate solutions. However, in times of war, information is subject to censorship and propaganda. The challenge for journalists is to strike the right balance because they are not party to the conflict. Journalists must not take sides, must not consider themselves as belligerents or risk reprisals. Their objective is to remain professional and objective. This can be achieved if a critical distance is maintained between the victims and the perpetrators. Journalists’ work has become more demanding. A number of factors are mentioned: citizen journalism, the race for scoops and social networks among others.

Source: La vérité en temps de crise et le journalisme en temps de conflit : “Les bonnes pratiques professionnelles face aux défis sécuritaires” (Denis NKWEBO, President of the SNJC, Member of the Cameroon Human Rights Commission)



### III. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDIA, SECURITY AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED: BEST PRACTICES

#### 1. SSR/G AND THE MEDIA IN MALI (SECURITY INFORMATION PROCESSING)

Processing information on SSR/G is no easy task. Journalists are faced with several challenges: understanding the concepts, the absence or lack of specialized and ongoing training, and the difficulty of making in-depth analyses of the real causes of this multifaceted and multidimensional crisis.

The tools that allow them to do their job properly are unknown or inaccessible to them. Access to documentation is restricted, if not impossible. They are regularly opposed the defense secrecy rule. Many are unaware of the existence of national documentation and instruments on SSR and relations between journalists and SDFs are rather strained. Even though the State has decentralized the Directorate of Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces (DIRPA) to all regions across the country, the information they are willing to share is limited and the duty of reserve is often invoked. In fact, this strategy is more in response to the need to counter the flow of information distilled through social networks, whose contents endanger cohesion and security.

Journalists also find it difficult to travel to certain places due to insecurity. To do so they need an uncertain permit signed by the relevant authorities. This situation prevents certain types of journalism, such as fact-finding journalism, feature stories, and investigative reporting.

The financial difficulties experienced by the media also prevent journalists from seeking out information, i.e. in the field. The ineffectiveness of media/journalist protection mechanisms has also been noted.

It is against this backdrop of poor conditions that journalists are trying to do their job and are trying to establish certain intrinsic values in the practice of journalism, as best they can: have good contacts, be independent and also responsible.

The primary mission of the media is to inform. However, in this difficult mission to inform, journalists must be guaranteed protection by the State. In reality, there has been a proliferation of lawless areas where the State is almost absent, leaving the field open to parallel societies. Under these conditions the first rule that is required of

the media in conflict zones is to nurture the “virtue of prudence”. The media working in the Central Regions (Mopti, Bandiagara, Segou, and San), which are the real epicenter of the security crisis where violence by radical groups is raging on a daily basis, must first and foremost take responsibility for their own safety.

On the whole, all media, especially those operating in conflict-ridden areas, must abide by unchanging ethical rules:

- Obstinate search for the truth;
- Impartiality in the processing of information;
- Responsibility (awareness of the impact of one’s writings or broadcasts on the outbreak or aggravation of a crisis);
- Protection of one’s sources;
- Refusal to compromise with political or financial powers.

This list of good behaviors is not exhaustive. However, if applied wisely, it can considerably reduce suspicion and re-establish a relationship of trust with people in the field. Knowledge of the field and the people who live there can help the media understand the root causes of a conflict.

To avoid the pitfalls of misinformation, they must have solid background information and reliable sources. General knowledge is a considerable asset in establishing a typology of conflicts in all their diversity. Why do the militias that have formed in the Center identify with an ethnic group, a leader whom the fighters blindly obey? Mono-ethnic militias are formed under the pretext of defending a community that is threatened and attacked at its core. They are not content with defending their community but bring insecurity to the opposing camp by setting their crops on fire, taking away or destroying their livestock. The cycle of endless reprisals that are organized jeopardizes the peaceful coexistence that has characterized for centuries the fraternal relations between different communities united by blood.

Faced with such situations, the journalist must be above the fray and as Jean-François Revel puts it, “*behaving scientifically means that you can only give an opinion on an issue after taking into consideration all the information at your disposal, without purposely eliminating any part thereof or distorting or expurgating any of it, and after drawing, as best you can and in good faith, the conclusions that they seem to authorize*”. Such extreme caution is necessary for the media, especially in areas where the potential for violence seems high. Unfortunately, the media are often used intentionally or unwittingly to defend

a cause. When they are trapped in their obvious bias, they expose themselves to reprisals and endanger the lives of the members of the community they are supposed to defend; or take the path of internal exile.

However, journalists who are aware of their responsibility can lower tensions through a balanced treatment of security information. This is where a local community radio station can truly reconcile and bring people together. In this respect, Mali is beating many records in Africa. The country currently has 496 authorized radio stations, 44 private television channels, 200 newspapers, including about 50 regular publications, and 46 online information sites, 29 of which are operational. What should have been an asset remains a challenge to quality.

There is no doubt that being a journalist in the northern and central regions is a perilous task. We must recognize the merit of women and men who, at great risk to their lives, have chosen the profession of informing in these troubled regions of the country by braving the forces of irrationality and obscurantism.

Source: Bréhima TRAORE, journalist, communication advisor to the African Union, national capacity building workshop for mainstream media professionals on Security and Security Sector Reform/Democratic Governance issues for Mali, November 2-4, 2021

## 2. SECURITY AND MEDIA CHALLENGES IN CAMEROON

Security must be provided in an effective and accountable manner, within a framework of civilian and democratic control, respecting the rule of law and human rights. Such a challenge can only be met if a number of actors in society outside the traditional security services are involved in promoting democratic governance and inclusive security measures. Such is the case of the media.

In Cameroon, the security challenges include the Anglophone crisis, a real threat to the country's stability; the Boko Haram security crisis in the Far North and its perverse effects; security threats on the Cameroon-Central African border (hostage-taking, various forms of looting and large-scale banditry); political divisions and the rise of hate speech on the media/social networks; problematic inter-community relations (Mousgoum-Arable Choa clashes in the Far North with dozens of deaths);

All these challenges have an impact on the media and journalists. We are talking about understanding the African and Cameroonian security environment for relevant, easy and objective communication all around; ownership of

the terminology of the security sector, its reform and good security governance; professionalism and objectivity for communication that cannot hurt different sensitivities; production and dissemination in the service of peace and stability; taking into account the specificities of Cameroon - multiculturalism

Source: Presentation by François WASSOUNI, Lecturer/University of Maroua-Cameroon, Cameroon National Workshop Sept. 28-30, 2021

## 3. ETHICAL USE OF MEDIA: NIGERIA WORKSHOP

### Who are responsible users and competent producers of media and information?

The topic that will be discussed is about responsible users and competent producers of media and information. This topic aims to build students' creative and critical thinking skills and capacity to be responsible users and competent producers.

<https://shopannie.wordpress.com/2018/08/09/responsible-users-and-competent-producers-of-media-and-information/>

### What is the role of ethics in media and Technology?

Ethics emphasizes standards of decency in today's technologically advanced media journalism sector such as the fact that media should not indulge in discrimination or use inflamed hatred on grounds of nationality or religion nor should they prejudge the guilt of an accused without an actual court judgement.

Unethical media reporting may be the result of political control and abuse of media and/or irresponsible journalism that pursues sensationalism. Manifestations of unethical media reporting are particularly dangerous in the context of highly contested electoral processes in conflict-prone societies.

### Unethical media reporting

[https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ev/factors-that-may-trigger-electoral-violence/external-factors/unethical-media-reporting/mobile\\_browsing/onePag](https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ev/factors-that-may-trigger-electoral-violence/external-factors/unethical-media-reporting/mobile_browsing/onePag)

### What types of unethical behavior can the media exhibit?

Unethical behavior: When the media do not perform their duties; when media works beyond their limitation... TV, radios and newspapers insulting a famous person on baseless grounds. <https://www.slideshare.net/DamithaLakchan/unethical-behavior-of-media>

### What does it mean to practice unethical journalism?

Unethical journalistic practice occurs when a journalist does not practice their profession according to the media ethics,

press laws or NBC codes. However, unethical practices in journalism do not exist in isolation, but as part of the overall ethical issues and societal problems in the world.

<file:///C:/Users/USER/AppData/Local/Temp/30439-33282-1-PB.pdf>

### What are the ethical problems associated with digital media?

Digital media ethics deals with the distinct ethical problems, practices, and norms of digital news media. Digital news media includes online journalism, blogging, digital photojournalism, citizen journalism and social media.

<https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/resources/digital-media-ethics/>

### Why are there so many news reports gone wrong?

In a world where headlines can travel as far and fast as technology allows, even a simple underestimation of the public's sensitivity to an issue can spark a caustic controversy. The stock market is a finicky, fickle animal that improves and implodes with each new financial forecast. Swiftiness and accuracy in reporting is essential.

<https://listverse.com/2015/02/17/10-glaring-examples-of-news-reporting-gone-wrong/>

### Unethical media reporting

<https://aceproject.org/.../external-factors/unethical-media-reporting>

Unethical media reporting may be the result of political control and abuse of media [3] and/or irresponsible journalism that pursues sensationalism. [4] Manifestations of unethical media reporting are particularly dangerous in the context of highly contested electoral processes.

### Unethical practices in the mass media: a study

<https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/NMMC>

These unethical practices manifest in under-reporting, selective reporting, distortion of facts, sensationalism and the blackout of some social groups or people that reflect the society in which Nigerian journalism operates. However, after considerable research, I have identified unethical media practices in Nigeria.

### Unethical media practices | Global problems & issues ...

<http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/137862>

- Abolishing unethical media practices
- Corrupting commercial television
- Studying freedom of the press
- Being fraudulent Being fraudulent
- Using communication systems illegally
- Addressing misconduct by media representatives

<https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/NMMC/article/view/30439>

## IV. EXERCISE OF JOURNALISM ON SECURITY AND SSR/G

### 1. EXPLORATION AND ARTICLES ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SECURITY

#### Economic security

- Having minimal incomes
- Establishing equity
- Access to employment

#### Food security

- Access to food
- Development of arable land
- Assistance to those in distress

#### Environmental security

- Combating environmental scourges
- Drought
- Floods
- Geological shocks

#### Personal security

Provide for any violence committed against people by:

- The State
- Gangs, other perpetrators of violence

#### Community security

- Controlling community stability dynamics
- Judging irredentism
- Anticipating inter-ethnic conflicts

#### Political security

- Ensuring individual freedoms
- Rule of law
- Freedom of expression
- Responsible media

### 2. RESEARCH ON OTHER DEFINITIONS RELATED TO SSR/G: A GLOSSARY

#### Examples:

**VIOLENT EXTREMISM** is a multifaceted phenomenon that eludes clear definition (UN Plan, 2015); To provide a rough definition, in simple words, we can say that the highest stage of extremism is about “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives” (USAID, 2011). Violent extremism includes fanatical or hateful types of violence based on ideology; it refers to dogmatic thinking that advocates violent forms of action, promotes religious, cultural and social intolerance.

### **PVE/CVE (PREVENT OR CONTROL VIOLENT EXTREMISM):**

addressing the root causes of radicalization. This requires strengthening government and good governance at the local level, because in the absence of State violence, insecurity, and organized crime easily flourish; counterterrorism is necessary, but not sufficient to prevent violent extremism (PVE), especially for fragile States, often facing crisis, conflict, and poverty. The study proposes a comprehensive nationally and community-driven effort based not only on the security and development sectors, but also on faith-based organizations, youth organizations, and women's groups. Prevention must take place before undesirable behaviors occur or their warning signs; prevention of radicalization leading to violence must be directed at populations in general, although individuals who are early in the radicalization process and "at risk groups" may be specifically targeted.

**RADICALIZATION:** The process by which an individual adopts increasingly extreme political, social, or religious positions that may include the use of extreme violence to achieve their goals. Radicalization can occur among a wide range of groups through political or religious organizations, indoctrinating movements (sects, jihadist groups), hooligans or right or left-wing extremist groups. The mechanisms involved in radicalization are independent of ideological orientation. Radicalization is an active process, distinct from indoctrination, and different factors contribute individually to its emergence. This makes it possible to establish a typical profile.

Studies on radicalization are not unanimous in describing the spiral that leads to (violent) extremism. Most models identify three components:

- Individual feelings of anger, dissatisfaction, or conflict (e.g., identity conflict), experience of exclusion, or a climate of political tension;
- adoption of an extremist ideology;
- involvement in group dynamics and sociological mechanisms characterized by group loyalty and group pressure.

However, there is no consensus among researchers on the importance of these three factors, their pattern and order of appearance. The Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) defines radicalization as *"a process whereby people adopt extremist belief systems - including the willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence - with the aim of promoting an ideology, a political project or a cause as a means of social transformation"*. At the heart of the process of radicalization leading to violence are dynamics that involve

individuals severing ties with those in their immediate environment (family, friends, colleagues, etc.), and progressing along a radical path that may eventually lead to violence.

In short, violent radicalization entails:

- The adoption of an ideology that becomes a way of life and a framework for meaningful action for the individual;
- Belief in the use of violent means to promote a cause;
- The merging of ideology and violent action.

## **3. FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYSIS**

Examples of workshops as a way to share elements of content analysis.

### **3.1. Model Framework for Investigative Technique Analysis**

- Investigation and field investigation techniques in a fragile security context;
- Analysis of a production model (in the form of workshops)

Propose one or a few productions to collect the following information related to investigative and field survey techniques (and more...) in a fragile security context.

#### **General information**

1. Theme of the production
  - Subject covered
  - Author
2. Media
  - Type of media
  - Level of proficiency in the language
  - Level of proficiency in the general style required by the media (Press, radio, TV, community radio):  
Headline, presentation, animation, etc.

#### **Analysis of research and investigation methods**

1. Sources
  - Sources refers to all persons or documents to which the journalist refers in their production
  - Number of sources used, types of sources and function of sources. Diversity of sources
  - Link between the source and the subject covered (here the fragile environment) or the problem addressed, relevance of sources; gender balance
  - Ability to cross-check information

2. Quality/knowledge of the technique used
  - Interview
  - Investigation
  - Survey
  - Etc.
3. Information and communication technologies
  - Their role in information gathering
  - The ability of the media to use them

### 3.2. Model Framework for Research Techniques

- Research and information gathering techniques in the field of SSR ;
- Analysis of a production model (in the form of workshops)

#### Same as above but on Security Sector Reform

1. Theme to be added:
  - Protecting the safety of journalists
  - Protecting the safety of sources
  - For example: Are the areas chosen relevant because of a risk or a threat?
2. Use a training theme in the selection of the production to be analyzed: this could be on governance and citizen control, on gender, etc.

### 3.3. Model Information Processing Analysis Framework

- Tools for analyzing and processing secure information ;
- Analysis of productions

Propose one or a few productions to collect the following information related to security information analysis and processing tools

#### General information

1. Production theme
  - Subject covered
  - Author
2. Media
  - Type of media
  - Level of proficiency in the language
  - Level of proficiency in the style required by the media (Press, radio, TV, community radio):  
Headline, presentation, animation, etc.

#### Sources

1. Profile and diversity of people affected or concerned
  - Relevance of the selection of witnesses
  - Taking into consideration the “voiceless”
2. Words used according to the sources
3. Possible cross-checks
4. Confidentiality, protecting the anonymity of sources

#### Characteristic of the production

1. Originality: how?
  - Consideration of the audience and their need for information
  - Consideration of level of understanding
3. Solution-oriented or partisan production

#### Analysis of thematic knowledge and its processing

1. Fragile situation: does the content of the productions really deal with aspects directly related to this context and/or to Security Sector Reform and governance?
2. Does the angle chosen to cover the issues raised, in particular on the life of individuals and the community, make it possible to properly understand them?
3. Are the thematic documentary references cited properly used and illustrative?

#### Respect for the sensitivity of the information

1. Source of the information
2. Nature of the documentation used and how it is used
3. Method of analysis and processing of ICT-generated information

### 3.4. Analytical Framework Model: Ethical and Professional Conduct

- Ethical and deontological behaviors ;
- Production analysis

Propose one or more productions to collect the following information related to ethical and deontological behaviors



### General information

1. Theme of the production
  - Subject covered
  - Author
2. Media
  - Type of media
  - Level of proficiency in the language
  - Level of proficiency in the style required by the media (Press, radio, TV, community radio):  
Headline, presentation, animation, etc.

### The sources

1. Are they secure?
  - Protection of anonymity under certain conditions (to be discussed: give equal weight to the perpetrator or the victim?)
  - Rules regarding virtual sources: regulations

### The contents

2. Does the production convey prejudices, stereotypes, biases? If so, which ones?
  - On women
  - On ethnic groups
  - On certain groups
3. Does the production discriminate against a particular group?
  - Which group?
  - Hate speech?

4. Are communities' rights mentioned?
5. Are responsibilities clearly established?
  - Responsibility of the State
  - Responsibility of SDFs
  - Responsibility of civil society
  - Community responsibility
  - Etc.
6. Possible impact of production

### 3.5. Treatment of photos, images

1. Are the photos and images informative?
2. Does their presentation respect the rules of ethics and deontology?

### 3.6. The role of regulatory and self-regulatory organizations

1. Censors, safeguards, training institutions in the fields of security and SSR/G
2. Partisan bodies?

Inspired in part by the Media Pilot Action of the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin Project. This framework is a proposal to support workshop facilitators. They can remove and add what they deem relevant to the analysis of the products presented during various workshops. In addition, it would be interesting to identify good media (institutional) and journalistic (professional) practices,

# 4

# APPENDICES





## I. CONTRIBUTION OF THE REGIONAL TRAINING OF TRAINERS WORKSHOP

Within the framework of a partnership effort between the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung's Peace and Security Competence Centre, the Center for Advanced Defense and Security Studies (CHEDS) and the European Union, a regional training of trainers workshop on security and SSR issues for media actors was held from May 25-27, 2021. This hybrid workshop was attended by media actors from Mali, Nigeria and Cameroon and would be followed by national workshops in each of the target countries.

### Objectives

- Enable media actors from a range of backgrounds (formal and informal media, TV, radio, print and digital journalists, and bloggers) to support the development of a training handbook for media actors.
- Provide them with the tools they need to ensure quality coverage of security governance issues.
- Encourage the handling of sensitive information in an appropriate manner,
- Support an inclusive approach and facilitate the process of establishing regional networks in the media sector

### Outcomes

Based on the presentations, debates and group work feedback, the three-day workshop yielded three core outcomes:

- the concepts were clarified
- the issues were discussed
- and the contents of the training handbook were defined.

All these outcomes were integrated into the training handbook either in the form of modules or in the form of thematic sheets.

It is worth mentioning the specific issues discussed.

### The issues discussed

First of all, the issues of democratization of SSR, the violation of human rights in the implementation of security policies, the freedom of information or freedom of the press dialectic, the requirements of national security and the role of the media in SSR.

### The issue of the democratization of SSR

The presentations and discussions led to the conclusion that the democratization of the security agenda presupposes an accountability approach based on citizen control (a) and an inclusive gender-based approach (b).

The need for an accountability approach based on citizen control: Citizens are the primary recipients of public security policies. As such, they should not be mere consumers of policies defined for them and without them, especially since the classic mechanisms of representation of the populations are confronted with a crisis of confidence with their "representatives".

The need for a gender-inclusive approach: The need to mainstream gender in public security policies is mentioned in most of the documents and strategic orientations of various countries within the sub-region and even at the regional level.

### Such mainstreaming involves the following :

- The need to take into account gender in SSR;
- Taking gender into account in SSR/G reinforces local ownership
- Gender mainstreaming in HSS/G enables effective service delivery
- Monitoring and accountability

In this respect, the media can play an important role. They can communicate on women's activities within the framework of SSR, enhance their actions and improve their image and the impact of their actions on the governance of the security sector, just as they enhance their social position. In addition, media monitoring contributes to local ownership of the reform, and to ensuring a participatory and inclusive SSR process.

### The issue of human rights violations in a security context

The issue of human rights as a challenge to SSR was widely discussed during the presentations and discussions. Human rights are in fact an essential component of security governance and must be taken into account in the entire SSR process.

However it must be noted that respect for human rights is a formidable challenge in the context of a security crisis.

In this respect, the media have a very important role to play, both in raising awareness among stakeholders and in documenting, investigating and reporting on acts of human rights violations.

### Freedom of information vs. national security exception

This is indeed an important issue that questions the legal limit of the media's action when they operate in the field of security.

### **The role of the media in SSR**

The various presentations and discussions highlighted the important and sensitive role that the media play in SSR.

### **The contents of the training handbook defined**

This content has been reintroduced, for the most part, in the manual. We would like to emphasize the following points:

- The training approaches used
- The networking aspects
- The list of proposed experts (see point X)

### **The training approaches used**

- Induction methods ;
- Interactive approach ;
- Group work
- Field work (learning by doing)
- Presentations-discussion
- Role-playing games
- Interactive workshops with experts

### **Networking elements**

- Database of experts
- Database of journalists
- Creation of WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram groups
- A dynamic platform for the monitoring and evaluation of the programs objectives between the three countries and the regional office
- Exchange visits
- Regional conferences

## **II. DOCUMENTATION**

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