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CÔTE D'IVOIRE, THE PRICE OF POSITIVE PEACE

Côte d'Ivoire

The price of positive peace

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Acronyms:

ADDR	Authority for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ADS	Security Guard
AIRD	Ivorian Alliance for the Republic and Democracy
APO	Ouagadougou Political Agreement
CDVR	Commission on Dialog, Truth and Reconciliation
CCSR	Commission for the Coordination and Monitoring of Reintegration Activities for the ex-combatants
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
CFA	African Financial Community
CONARIV	National Commission for the Reconciliation and Compensation of the Victims
CPI	International Criminal Court
CNO	Central Northern West (Zone)
CNS	National Security Council
CURDIPHE	University Research Cell for the Dissemination of Ideas and Policy Actions of President Henri Konan Bédié
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EAN	Soldier of the New Army
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group
EDS	Ensemble pour la Démocratie et la Souveraineté (Together for Democracy and Sovereignty)
FACI	Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire
FAFN	Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles
FPI	Ivorian Popular Front
FRCI	Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire
GIPRI	Geneva International Peace Research Institute
GOR	Gbagbo Ou Rien (Gbagbo or Nothing)
MJP	Movement for Justice and Peace
MPCI	Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PDCI	Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire
OGP	Open Government Partnership
PNCS	Programme National de Cohésion Sociale (National Programme for Social Cohesion)
RDR	Rally of the Republicans
RHDP	Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (Houphouétistes Rally for Democracy and Peace)
RPP	Rally for Peace
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNG	Union for the New Generations

PRELIMINARY NOTE

New year 2017, new turmoil in Côte d'Ivoire! Beyond New Year trumpeting, the country was soon going to be the scene of a series of mutinies and noisy claims from demobilised soldiers. This socio-political situation, known to be sensitive and even tense, made big headlines in the first half of this year. It provoked an uneasy feeling and raised a number of questions amongst chancelleries. This situation made the front page in national newspapers as well as in international media.

Beyond the extreme consequences shed onto the country's image, particular attention should be paid to the symbolic dimension of these events and the context in which they happened. They had the particularity of highlighting the social barometer prevailing in Côte d'Ivoire as well as the relations of certain socio-professional categories with the State's authority. However, in recent years, Côte d' Ivoire has been regarded as an investment-friendly country; after the country joined the Partnership for Open Government (PGO) in 2015, an international platform whose mission is to improve transparency in the management of public affairs, Côte d'Ivoire was shown as a good pupil within the international community and French-speaking Africa. Therefore, given the international renown enjoyed by Côte d' Ivoire, how can we explain the various upheavals the country has gone through in the recent months? In concrete terms, what is hidden behind the apparent stability observed in the country?

The truth is that six years after the bloody post-electoral crisis, Côte d' Ivoire has resolutely embarked on the path of development. Thanks to the various post-crisis programmes initiated by the government with the support of development partners, the country has regained stability. It is now back in the concert of Nations and even aspires to achieve the emergence of Côte d'Ivoire by 2020. However, in the light of the recent events that have marked the life of the Ivorian nation, everything suggests that despite the discreet charm of peace, Côte d'Ivoire seems to be in the grip of symbolic violence, which manifests itself in several forms. It is therefore far from being a quiet river!

Even worse, when trying to understand the root causes that could be at the origin of this generalised social malaise, one observation is that the country seems to be caught up by some old demons or mutants that were born during the eight years of crises or even beyond, whose appetites sharpen as the current national geopolitical context evolves. Indeed, from 2002 to 2010, the various political agreements aimed at bringing about lasting peace in the country sometimes ran up against the complexity of the realities on the ground. A situation materialised by the troubled game and hidden agendas of certain Ivorian political and military actors and of non-State actors.

The developments of this crisis in Côte d' Ivoire, and especially the way it has been resolved, is today having a considerable impact on the climate of peace in the country. In addition to the social upheavals

and mutinies observed during the first half of 2017, particular attention should be paid to the issue of national reconciliation and the issue of exiles.

By straining the socio-political situation, those events have revealed the limits of the social climate prevailing in Côte d' Ivoire. While it is commonly accepted that peace is back in the country, its fragility leads us to question its true nature. The absence of war, violence and repression observed since the end of the post-electoral crisis is indeed a sign of the "*summary peace*" that we are witnessing. However, this restrictive vision of peace, which is nothing less than negative peace, cannot be the basis on which democracy should prosper. Briefly and geopolitically, negative peace is defined as the absence of conflict or organised violence between or within states. Seen in this light, it goes without saying that to understand its dynamics in Côte d' Ivoire, we refer to the socio-political situation prevailing there in order to raise its limits. To this end, the Ivorian government's urgent need to carry out medium- and long-term actions as part of a positive peace process is imperative and must necessarily be considered at all levels of society. Concretely, the State of Côte d' Ivoire needs to go beyond what is already in place, by implementing actions that will contribute to thinking differently about peace and to rooting it more firmly in the culture of the country and in the habits of Ivorians.

This study will seek to determine "*why positive "peace" shows its limitations in Côte d' Ivoire*". To this end, the aim will be to analyse at different levels the evolution of the socio-political situation in Côte d' Ivoire

in the light of the concept of "political economy" and of the interaction between the context and the actors. This analysis will allow to make concrete recommendations, which implementation should contribute to materialising positive peace in the country. Indeed, the evolution of the socio-political climate in Côte d' Ivoire has shown in many respects that the arrival of certain leaders and leading figures on the Ivorian political scene since 1990 has been more motivated by their personal interests than by the best interests of the nation. This is evidenced by the number of alliances that have been forged and settled according to the circumstances.

In such a context, the path to peace taken by the Ivorians in the aftermath of the first peace agreements signed after the 2002 crisis could only be strewn with obstacles. The small calculations between certain politicians against a background of power bulimia have finally had an impact on the life of the nation. Driven by implicit motivations, the behaviour and actions of these politicians trapped the peace process that had begun in Côte d' Ivoire. For many years, due to their parallel agendas, many political leaders have held a double discourse. The consequence of such actions was the outbreak of a post-electoral crisis, whose perverse effects are still being felt to this day. Seen from this angle, one is tempted to understand why peace, so desired by Ivorians, is hard to materialise.

Our reflection will focus on two main areas. After having highlighted the challenges to positive peace, we will analyse through a methodology of political economy the various stakes and the multitude of interactions underlying this approach to peace.

I- Challenges of positive peace in Côte d'Ivoire

Contrary to popular belief, positive peace is not defined as opposed to negative peace. Rather, it appears to be the rejection of structural violence. Indeed, according to Roy Preiswerk, founding member of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI), *"structural violence means everything that destroys men in their psychic, physical and spiritual being on an anonymous basis and without them being personally assaulted with a weapon.[...] Reduction of structural violence, which conditions the establishment of a positive peace, is based on certain notions such as social justice, equity, emancipation, human rights, etc.. »*

Norwegian political scientist Johan Galtung defines positive peace in his book *Theories of peace. A synthetic approach to peace thinking* as being a state in which *« cooperation, a life free from fear, need and exploitation, economic growth and development, equality and justice, pluralism and dynamism and where violence is less but not absent ».* According to the Swiss Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Grains of Peace, positive peace is *« an active process that goes beyond a non-violent attitude, looking for ways to not only resolve a conflict, but also build lasting relationships and respect as well as under-tstanding between the parties. »*

The definitions set out above show in many ways that positive peace should be approached from a holistic perspective. This means that its definition and implementation take several parameters into account. The issue of implementing this approach to peace in Côte d' Ivoire makes it possible to question the real meaning of the notion of peace on the continent, and more particularly in a context of emergence from the crisis. Often, after long periods of crisis, peace can be seen as the cessation of hostilities. Yet, this situation is only one step in the long march towards positive peace. The conditions for a positive peace in Côte d'Ivoire also involve several challenges that must be considered in the light of the geopolitical context that characterises the country to date.

• Movements in the Army driven by the socio-political context

While it is widely acknowledged that, since the end of the post-electoral crisis, the noise of boots has sometimes been heard in the country, it must be noted that throughout the first half of 2017, the socio-political situation in Côte d' Ivoire was marked by a series of events. Some of these events are only the logical sequel, or even the direct consequences, of the numerous crises the country has gone through.

In 1990, the advent of multiparty politics in Côte d' Ivoire (followed by the spring of the written press) helped shape the country's socio-political landscape and lay the foundations for a new local geopolitical situation. From then on, in the name of democracy, criticism of the government, and more particularly of the former single party PDCI-RDA, became more pronounced. Challenges of all kinds were launched and spread to all sectors of activity, including the army. The crisis of President Houphouët-Boigny's succession contributed to weakening the climate of

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peace. The Ivorian army, which in the 1980s was considered to be one of the best organised in the region, suffered the effects of the socio-political climate prevailing in the country.

Increasingly, many soldiers have come to serve the same flag, but not necessarily the same men. This politicisation of the army, which was at the origin of its division, became more pronounced over the years. With the coup d'État of 1999, the Ivorian army was projected at the front of the political scene in the country. The ten months of military transition further exacerbated the dislocation of the defence tool. Some soldiers who played a leading role in the military coup d'État were arrested, imprisoned and tortured. Others were forced into exile. Moreover, it is the latter who became the leaders of the rebellion that broke out in 2002. The military transition was seen as a period of increasing disenchantment between the Ivorian people and their army. They described it as being brutal. General Guéï's desire to remain in power after the transition led to the elimination of candidates Alassane Ouattara and Henri Konan Bédié during the October 2000 election contests.

It is in this socio-political and military context marked by upheavals that Laurent Gbagbo was elected President of the Republic of Côte d' Ivoire. Despite efforts to create a climate conducive to reconciliation and social cohesion, the country remained under intense political and military tension until the attempted coup d'État on 19 September 2002. This military operation turned into an armed rebellion.

Thus, for eight years, Côte d' Ivoire was politically, administratively and militarily divided into two: on the one hand, a zone qualified as governmental, with about 40% of the national territory, headed by Laurent Gbagbo; on the other hand, the Central-North-Western part (CNO), controlled by the Forces Nouvelles, originally comprising the three main rebel groups: the MPCI (Patriotic Movement of Côte d' Ivoire), the MJP (Movement for Justice and Peace) and the MPIGO (Ivorian Popular Movement of the Greet West).

The Ivorian crisis received particular attention from the international community. Several agreements and resolutions were signed to try to put an end to it. The presence of a French force, through Operation Licorne, the deployment of the military forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a United Nations mission and finally a United Nations operation in Côte d' Ivoire did not succeed in putting an end to the state of belligerence opposing the different antagonists. During this period, post-crisis programmes showed their limitations. Despite all these initiatives, the country remained in a *"no war no peace"* situation.

At the end of this crisis, Côte d' Ivoire finds itself with an army that is more divided than ever before and a social cohesion that is falling apart. Thousands of Ivorians are in exile in neighbouring countries. Armed Ivorians, who are idle and have played an active role in the military dimension of the post-electoral crisis, must be urgently reintegrated into the socio-economic fabric of the country. Recognising that peace is one of the prerequisites for any socio-economic

development of a country, the Ivorian Government is initiating several post-crisis programmes aimed at contributing at various levels to normalising the situation, establishing an appreciable security climate and returning to lasting peace. It is in this dynamic that a vast programme of Security Sector Reform (SSR) will be launched in the country, with its component relating to the DDR process led by the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR). At the same time, a Commission for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation (CDVR) was set up to reconcile the Ivorians. Furthermore, the National Social Cohesion Programme (PNCS) was created with a view to creating a climate that would help populations to live together. Although all these programmes have had the particularity of creating optimal conditions for a return to normality, it must be noted that the recent events that have shaken the country have shown that peace in Côte d' Ivoire remains fragile.

Indeed, since the end of the post-electoral crisis, despite the implementation of security sector reform, the Ivorian defence tool has found it difficult to be properly implemented. Far from "la grande muette" *(named after the French army where high-ranking officers have no right to vote, the big mute)*, the Ivorian army has recently turned into "*the big talkative one*", to the point where one would be tempted to say that the untimely uprisings in its midst could henceforth appear to the populations as a norm in terms of contestation. Ironically, it is not uncommon to hear in neighbourhood discussions a proverb made in Côte d' Ivoire, which sums up the Ivorians' point of view, annoyed by this question: *"Money does not like noise, but*

the sound of weapons accelerates the payment of money". Above and beyond the sarcastic tone, this phrase clearly reflects the Ivorians' idea of the Army-State relationship.

If in November 2014, the protests of some military personnel against, among other things, unpaid balances had been understood and satisfied by the government, it must be noted that the 2017 mutinies raised several questions and caused much ink to flow.

On the night of 5 to 6 January 2017, a mutiny led by the "*contingent of 8 400*" broke out in the town of Bouaké, the stronghold of the former rebellion, in the centre of the country. As a reminder, the "*contingent of 8 400*" is made up of 5,000 soldiers of the New Army (EAN) from the Forces Nouvelles, who joined the army under the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (APO); and 3 400 security agents (ADS), also from the FN and who had contributed to the security of the elections in 2010 before being recruited into the army. The aforementioned mutiny was caused by the soldiers of that contingent who demanded improved living and working conditions and bonuses amounting to twelve million CFA francs per person. They called these bonuses *"ECOMOG Bonus"* in relation with the circumstances under which they were promised to them. The movement quickly spread to several major cities in the country, such as Daloa, Korhogo, Bondoukou and Abidjan.

These sounds of army boots of early 2017 resulted in total confusion at the top of the state and within the great military commands. Even if these military demands

were described as *"understandable but deplorable"* by the Ivorian Minister in charge of defence at the time, the demand to pay the so-called *"ECOMOG bonus"* amounting to twelve million CFA francs was neither legally justified nor politically logical. However, the mutineers' spokespersons kept on proclaiming loud and clear that the amount was promised to them in 2011 by their leaders shortly before the launch of the *"Restoring Peace and Democracy"* operation launched by the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) against the regime of President Laurent Gbagbo.

Very soon, the town of Bouaké, the former stronghold of the former Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN), became the nerve centre for contesting men in arms. In almost all barracks, flags were flown at half-mast. Border crossings were maintained by these disgruntled soldiers. In this sensitive environment, the move of the Ivorian Defence Minister to Bouaké was interpreted differently by public opinion. While some have seen in this move political courage, others interpreted it as a strategic mistake that gave a new twist to the mutineers' demands. The fact remains that this departure to Bouaké allowed the Ivorian government and the mutineers to find an agreement that provided for the payment of a bonus of twelve million CFA francs to each of the mutineers of the 8400 contingent. For one week, they demonstrated until part of their bonuses was paid.

Despite the talks immediately initiated by the Ivorian authorities with the soldiers, the country lived for almost a week at the pace of this mutiny. The Ivorian government's decision to commit to settle the payment of the *"ECOMOG bonus"*, with the immediate disbursement of an advance of five million CFA francs to each of the mutineers, contri-

buted to the return of the soldiers to the barracks. The stance of the State of Côte d' Ivoire in the face of the demands of the mutineers will be at the origin of several other grunts and attempts at mutiny within certain Ivorian defence and security forces. This was the case for the national gendarmerie, water and forests, the prison guard and the national civil protection office. In May 2017, the government's decision to rescind payment of the remaining bonuses was the cause of another mutiny throughout Côte d'Ivoire. For four days, there were intense tensions in some cities.

Faced with the deterioration of the socio-military climate, the government finally opted for the payment of the remaining bonuses.

• Consequences of mutinies of January and May 2017

The mutinies that broke out in January and March 2017 have placed the tension between the Ivorian army and the government under the spotlight of international news. They also revealed a certain limit in the management of some defence-tool cases, even though in an interview with the weekly continental magazine *Jeune Afrique N°2948 of 9-15 July 2017,* the Ivorian Prime Minister did not fail to *"recall that these mutinies are related to facts of the past, having nothing to do with the successive governments since President Ouattara took office in 2011".* However, the least we can say is that the decision to pay bonuses to a part of the military could be interpreted as a highly strategic error, in that it has contributed to further weakening the *"almost non-existent"* social cohesion in the army. The immediate consequence is that other groups of soldiers and elements from different paramilitaries have become angrier.

The observation that emerges is that the payment of bonuses to the 8400 soldiers has opened the door to claims and disputes within the defence and security institutions of Côte d'Ivoire. Several military and para-military bodies have denounced a policy of discrimination and division which, according to them, would be maintained by the Ivorian government. For example, since the payment of the balance of the 8400 quota bonuses, groups of soldiers have exposed their anger. Among them, a group of soldiers who call themselves "Contingent *2600*" made themselves known in mid-June 2017. Indeed, like the other small groups in the shadows and often paid off by rogue politicians, soldiers from the contingent 2600 believe they fought the same battle as those of the 8400. They therefore demand that the State of Côte d' Ivoire also pay them bonuses. Despite talks with their line ministry, these soldiers remained stuck on their positions. For example, on the night of 14-15 July 2017, they decided to carry out their threats by starting a mutiny in three of the country's barracks. Faced with this situation, the soldiers of the "contingent 8400" fiercely opposed this uprising. At the 4th infantry battalion of Korhogo, clashes amongst the soldiers resulted in four dead and three wounded on the side of the "contingent of 2600". This mutiny constitutes a turning point in the history of the Armed Forces of Côte d' Ivoire (FACI) because it is the first time that a confrontation took place amongst soldiers pertaining to the same military camp.

Since 2011, movements within the Armed Forces and Security Forces have been seen as the result of an incomplete Security Sector Reform (SSR), whose immediate impact on the environment of soldiers has not been significant. Five years after the launch of this reform, the assessment of the defence aspect of SSR remains in part theoretical. The soldiers' most basic needs, namely improving their living and working conditions, remain unsatisfied. The authorities must provide solutions to these needs in order to put the Ivorian defence tool in a new posture, which, over time, will not only enable the army to reconcile with itself but also with the population and, above all, to turn the page on recent events that have put the Ivorian defence system to rest. In addition to the various mutinies, the first half of 2017 saw other movement such as that of the demobilized soldiers.

• The thorny issue of the ex-combatants

Two years following the end of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process for ex-combatants, the issue of demobilised soldiers in Côte d' Ivoire continues to be a pressing one. Indeed, in 2017, on the fringes of the various mutinies, several thousand demobilised soldiers from the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) formed into different groups and regularly beat the pavement in the country's largest cities to shout out their indignation and frustration at what they call unjust situations. The decision by the State of Côte d' Ivoire to pay a premium of twelve million CFA francs to each of the soldiers in the "contingent 8400" was one of the triggers for the movement mood among demobilised soldiers. Referring to the argument put forward and supported by the State of Côte d' Ivoire to justify the payment of these bonuses, the ex-combatants believe that they should in turn

benefit from the same advantages (12 million bonuses and corporal ranks) as their former rebel brothers-in-arms. In addition to these, there is the category of ex-combatants who, although they have benefited from reintegration projects in the socio-economic fabric, are now challenging the DDR process. As paradoxical as it may seem, after being inserted or reintegrated into civilian life by opting for life projects, ex-combatants continue to behave like soldiers. Despite the fact that they have carried out their disarmament through the DDR process, some of them continue to have weapons and ammunition at their disposal. Thus, it appears from the investigations that many demobilised soldiers have played a very active role in the various mutinies that shook the country in 2017.

In Bouaké, in the former Forces nouvelles stronghold, in a sign of protest, demobilised soldiers have regularly blocked corridors at the city's entry points during the first half of 2017. That situation has resulted into widespread psychosis in the country. In Korhogo, in the extreme north of the country, the same has happened. In the main cities of the country, the "*cellule 39"* was created. The "*cellule 39*" is a movement that claims to defend the interests of the demobilised soldiers whose registration numbers begin with the number 39.

The countless and constant threats that those demobilised soldiers have raised and their clear nationwide plan have led the Ivorian government to engage in dialogue with members of the "*cellule 39*". In May 2017, demobilised soldiers' demands took a dramatic turn. In fact, during the last mutiny, soldiers from Bouaké opened fire on demobilised soldiers, who were holding a meeting at their headquarters in order to

take advantage of the mutiny to claim, in their turn, the payment of their bonuses. On 23 May 2017, when they blocked the corridor south of the town of Bouaké, four demobilised soldiers died during a regular forces operation (police and gendarmerie) that tried to disperse them. The communiqué issued by the Ministry of State, Ministry of the Interior and Security clearly implicates the demobilised soldiers in the death of their comrades. It must be said that some of these ex-combatants who were armed during this demonstration pulled the pin out of a grenade that exploded in their bosom.

Notwithstanding talks with some members of the government, demobilised soldiers kept on protesting violently to make their voice heard. During the night of 14-15 July 2017, former combatants from the city of Abidjan attacked the police station in the 32nd district, stole the national police service vehicles and two Kalashnikovs, before occupying a road axis for long hours in the municipality of Abobo. On the basis of the above analysis, everything suggests that, in addition to financial claims, demobilised soldiers' movements would mask other objectives that should be taken into account in the analysis of the country's socio-political development.

• **Violent youths or social pheno-menon known as "microbes"**

The appearance of the phenomenon of "*microbes*" has contributed to the increase in youth violence in Côte d'Ivoire. Investigations have shown that this form of banditry has emerged in the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis, more precisely in the municipality of Abobo. Immediately after President Gbagbo's arrest, the country's socio-political context, marked by a "*security vacuum*", led former combatants to ensure security in Abobo. Faced with such a situation, the demobilised soldiers involved in the different groups of transporters of the municipality organised informal security operations around certain sites. This led them to recruit young people known as "*les bons petits*" ("the good kids") to ensure security in several areas, with the hidden goal to control the transport sector in the municipality of Abobo. Those "good kids", their foot soldiers, were also responsible for collecting parallel taxes on all businesses located at the bus station and in the vicinity of Abobo. This network enabled this group of former combatants to collect large sums of money on a daily basis.

On 15 October 2012, when, as part of the eviction exercice launched by Minister Anne Ouloto, the traders at the Abobo road station were summoned to clear the premises, the security forces came up against fierce resistance from union leaders who would not hesitate to open fire on them. Despite this showdown, union leaders and their foot soldiers would eventually be ousted. On leaving Abobo road station and town hall, the trade unions, which claim to have been betrayed by the state, reorganised differently. The

context would give birth to the first attacks by foot soldiers. Since then, these young people have become ultra-violent and commited melee weapon assaults, sometimes very violent. During their many operations, inspired by the Brazilian film "*The City of the Gods*", these young people metaphorically call themselves "microbes". The recurrence and cruelty of their acts make the phenomenon of "*microbes*" very quickly grow in scope. In addition to Abobo, several municipalities in Abidjan, as well as cities within the country, will be the scene of these "*microbes*" operations. Over time, a new wave of "*microbes*" has emerged. These groups are now beyond control of trade union leaders and are interconnected. We note that the movements of "*microbes*" have become empowered and have changed their operating methods.

Unlike the first wave, the new generation of "*microbes*" is more violent. In each of their operations, there are always severe injuries and often fatalities. To prove bravery, "*microbes*" do not hesitate to operate frequently, in the middle of the day and with an open face, as if to show their contempt for the regular security forces. Investigations have shown that not a day goes by without *"microbes"* killing. This new generation of "*microbes*" is also engaged in fetishism and mysticism.

What must be kept in mind is that the phenomenon of "*microbes*" has had a profound impact on the way Ivorian society functions. As a source of widespread insecurity, it has brought the debate on internal security into the national spotlight, and has therefore projected the real capabilities of our defence and security forces to combat this phenomenon. Over the past few

months, general psychosis has reigned among the Ivorian population, particularly in the communes such as Abobo, Miticoubé, Adjamé and Yopougon, which are subject to regular attacks. The limits of the actions of the regalian forces in response to this phenomenon have led the populations (of these various affected neighbourhoods or communes) to organise their own security by forming self-defence groups. Although these reactions on the part of these populations are legitimised by the search for security, they could be the door open to all kinds of abuses (summary executions, settling of scores, lynchings, false denunciations etc.). They could therefore increase the feeling of insecurity among the population.

Today, the State of Côte d' Ivoire has grasped the extent of this event. A programme has even been set up to get these young offenders out of the vicious circle they have entered. Thus, after having completed the management of the reintegration of former combatants' residuals, the Coordination and Monitoring Unit for the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers (CCSR) is now dealing with the resocialisation of "*microbes*" and, above all, their integration into the socio-economic fabric through job training and apprenticeship. Despite this programme, "*microbes*" continue to spread psychosis and insecurity throughout the country because the reintegration component lacks genuine economic and social prospects with long-term "turnkey" activities. Indeed, after six months spent in this resocialisation centre, these young people are brought back into the same environment of drugs and violence, where economically poor families are not prepared to receive them. According to the programme, 50 per cent of these children can neither read or write.

The majority of these children are out of school due to the parents' financial difficulties and lack of interest in school. This is a consequence of, among other things, the resignation of parents.

Alongside the problem of children in lawlessness, the phenomenon of road robbers is a further challenge that must be borne in mind when building positive peace in Côte d' Ivoire.

• **The phenomenon of highway robbers**

The phenomenon of highway robbers is a form of criminality in which criminals ambush the road users of a thoroughfare, which may be a modern road, a rural or a pedestrian path. In Côte d' Ivoire, that phenomenon is a long-standing practice. Since the end of the post-electoral crisis, however, it has reached staggering proportions, especially with the proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons and the introduction of mobile phones into people's habits. Now, having obtained weapons of war, those thieves have gradually turned these means of communication into strategic tools for their operations. The mobile phone makes it easy for them to coordinate their actions on the ground and to learn more about the movements of law enforcement forces. For some time, It has been the case that these criminals automatically open fire on vehicles to stop them.

In Côte d' Ivoire, the phenomenon of road robbers has major repercussions on people's lives. Beyond the insecurity it causes, it creates a generalised psychosis among the

populations and sometimes causes human casualties and/or injuries of all kinds that these highway bandits impose on their victims. From an economic point of view, it should be underscored that the phenomenon of road robbers is causing a disruption in the flow of trade in goods between major cities, particularly in the economic capital and areas affected by this form of crime. As a result of this phenomenon, farmers in some parts of the country are finding it more difficult to sell their produce.

In response to this worrisome situation, the Ivorian government has been developing a series of security initiatives to combat this scourge. For example, the *"Renard"* operation, launched by the national gendarmerie in December 2015, has enabled the Ivorian State to curtail the actions of road robbers in selected areas of the country. In the Eastern region, the operation called "vent d'Est" has made it possible to neutralise the actions of these highway bandits. Unfortunately, the phenomenon seems to be getting worse in other places. In the margins of Operation *"Renard",* several police forces patrols are carried out along the main roads to deter any attack on the main roads. Investigations have shown that some people involved in this form of banditry are either former demobilised soldiers or former militiamen, depending on the area of action. Still, the perpetrators involved in such attacks have often had an active part in the various crises that have shaken the country in the recent past. In addition, there are certain nationals of border countries who have been living in Côte d' Ivoire for generations and whose professional activities provide them with a thorough knowledge of their area of operation.

The phenomenon of road robbers has a considerable impact on the social climate in Côte d'Ivoire, in that it puts a harsh strain on the emergence of positive peace. It not only hinders the free movement of goods and people, but above all it has a psychological impact on people who, contrary to the fundamental principles of human security, live in constant fear and anxiety.

In Côte d' Ivoire, the issue of positive peace should be viewed from a global perspective. To this end, beyond the various factors developed, the study of positive peace in the country should take into account a number of recurrent issues that could hinder social cohesion. These include the issue of land tenure, which has resulted in inter-community violence, the role of the media in changing the socio-political climate, and the situation of exiles since the end of the post-electoral crisis. It is by taking all these parameters into account that we will be able to better understand the stakes and interactions around positive peace in Côte d' Ivoire.

II- The stakes and interactions around positive peace in Côte d'Ivoire

Since the post-electoral crisis ended, the year 2017 has emerged as the year with the most social and military crises, which have tended to shake up the country. As mentioned above, while the various mutinies have created a sense of fear and instability in the country, the recent social movements of several socio-professional groups observed throughout the first half of 2017 have had the peculiarity of undermining the security climate and social cohesion prevalent in Côte d' Ivoire. This shows the different interests and interactions that pervade the issue of building positive peace in the country.

• The country's political future: stakes of all antagonisms

"The tragedies of history bring out the great men. But tragedies are caused by feeble people." This quote from Maurice Druon captures in many respects the role played by certain Ivorian political actors in the various crises that have affected the country. Whether they were in the opposition or belonged to the ruling party, depending on the circumstances and period, politicians have a great deal of responsibility in recent events. It is for this reason that one cannot apprehend the country in a forward-looking dynamic without referring to them. The achievement of a positive climate of peace in Côte d' Ivoire should therefore take into account the local geopolitical context and the actors

that animate it. Moreover, drawing lessons from a painful past, the country's political future appears to be the first challenge in establishing a lasting peace in Côte d' Ivoire. Having been the subject of all kinds of fantasies for some time now, this future has gradually taken root at the heart of public debates.

In accordance with the Constitution of the 3rd Republic of Côte d' Ivoire, which restricts the executive power to two terms of five years each, President Ouattara is currently completing his second term. Since, out of a concern for political transparency, the Head of State himself announced publicly and on several occasions that he would not be a candidate for his own succession in 2020, all eyes are now on the presidential chair. Many Ivorian politicians today are already longing to succeed Alassane Ouattara, to the point of turning it into a mad obsession. The time for mobilisation has come in all the political chapels. Whether at the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), the Democratic Party of Côte d' Ivoire (PDCI), in the coalition RHDP (Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix) or in the opposition parties, the succession of President Ouattara in 2020 is in everybody's sights.

○ *2020 Presidential elections in the Crosshairs*

In Côte d' Ivoire, 2020 will be appreciated based on the personal ambitions of politicians. Some of them believe that 2020 is still a long way off, while others believe that it is now time to start preparing for the political challenges they will face during this period. In such a context, egos, which are often oversized, may constitute an obstacle to governmental action. However, without falling into the hands of the fetish of dates, the 2020 presidential election will mark a decisive turning point in the establishment of a climate of positive peace in Côte d' Ivoire. A purely geopolitical analysis shows that some of the socio-political upheavals that we are currently experiencing are intimately linked to the ambitions of some politicians in 2020. Moreover, based on the positions of politicians, several informed observers of the Ivorian political scene are very sceptical about the outcome of President Ouattara's succession. Whereas many in Côte d' Ivoire have predicted the apocalypse in 2020, Ivorian politicians believe that this period could be the climax of their political career.

In the view of the above analysis, the political future of Côte d' Ivoire, as a major challenge in building a climate of positive peace in the country, should put a point of pride on the electoral contests that are on the horizon for 2020. If, from a socio-economic point of view, the country seeks to enter the category of so-called "*emerging*" countries, it must be noted that a possible crisis around the succession of President Ouattara risks plunging the country into chaos. At present, the real challenge facing Côte d' Ivoire in building a climate of positive peace is to address the 2020 presidential

election in the best interests of the nation. What we need to do is to organise credible, transparent and inclusive elections that will result in the triumph of the ballot box route. It is by doing so that a number of achievements can be consolidated.

○ *2020: End or resumption of a cycle of Violence?*

In Côte d' Ivoire, 2020 appears to be the end of a cycle and the renewal of a generation of politicians. For the first time since the death of President Houphouët-Boigny, the three top tenors (Henri Konan Bédié, Alassane Ouattara, Laurent Gbagbo) who have been at the forefront of the Ivorian political scene for more than two decades might not run for this presidential election. It is therefore an opportunity for the new generation of Ivorian politicians to emerge and position themselves in a world where the geronto-cracy is in full swing and on "*a political chessboard with the appearance of a crab basket*". Indeed, in Côte d'Ivoire, as else-where in Africa, there are political parties where, at the age of 50, one is rightly or wrongly considered a *"young man"*. It is this intergenerational political transition that we are called to witness.

In 2020, the Ivorian political system will be at a crossroads. In such a framework, the conditions for the achievement of a positive peace in the country call for the new generation of Ivorian politicians to place at the heart of their actions the issues of development, social justice and promotion of human rights that are so dear to the African continent. The political accounta-bility of the new generation of Ivorian politicians will be based on the relationship between power and freedom, mainly that of the average citizen. This new generation of politicians, who tend to break with the

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previous generation, can certainly help lay the foundations for building a positive climate of peace in Côte d' Ivoire. However, this generation has grown politically in a context of tolerated and even sustained violence. It is crucial that the forthcoming elections are credible and legitimate to prevent violence from re-emerging. More-over, politicians must understand that losing power is a democratic normality. Whilst waiting for 2020, we are witnessing a profound change in the Ivorian political landscape, through positioning games and the emergence of real or supposed alliances. This is the case of the new political coalition called Ensemble pour la Démo-cratie et la Souveraineté (EDS) which was launched on Thursday 20 April 2017. It includes the Rassemblement pour la Paix (RPP), the Alliance Ivoirienne pour la République et la Démocratie (AIRD), the Union des Nouvelles Générations (UNG) and the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), the Aboudramane Sangaré trend.

O **Positioning Games and Opportunity Alliances**

The political future of Côte d'Ivoire is interwoven with the various political alliances that have been formed and settled according to the ongoing situation. While it is generally accepted that in politics, the interest of the moment often takes prece-dence over intrinsic convictions, it must be acknowledged that in this field, promises are only binding on those who believe in them. The truth is that the analysis of the geopolitical context shows in many respects that the Ivorian political class is gradually but undoubtedly changing. Some of the political alliances that were valid in 2010 have shattered.

Now, in Côte d' Ivoire, the political debate revolves around a possible rotation within the framework of President Ouattara's succession. The PDCI, the inescapable ally of the ruling RDR, has lifted a wedge of the veil, through its President, former Head of State Henri Konan Bédié, by clearly stating its intentions. Indeed, the seventy-year-old party believes that the candidate of the Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la paix should be drawn from its ranks, in accordance with *"Daoukro's appeal"* and his support for the re-election of President Ouattara in 2015.

As a reminder, it was on 17 September 2014, during a meeting in his hometown of Daoukro, that President Bédié launched an appeal to the entire RHDP, more notably PDCI, to vote for President Ouattara. The particular feature of this call is that it established the rotation in 2020 between PDCI and RDR. In an interview with *Jeune Afrique on 23 October 2015*, President Bédié explained at length the reasons for this major political act: *« It's a call of reason. Since 2000, elections in Côte d' Ivoire have always ended in serious unrest and thousands of deaths. We should avoid that this time, especially since most of the political actors present during these unrests are still active in the political arena. It is also a call for continuity. Ouattara then began work that is now visible to everyone and is well worth a second mandate. I recom-mended that all should gather around him once again in order to consolidate both the political stability of our country and the security of the Ivorians. ».*

And yet, today, there is every reason to believe that the alternation of 2020 seems to be the subject of disagreement between the two major allies. For its part, the RDR

does not seem to get the same tone as the PDCI. In a communiqué from the political bureau dated 4 July 2017, the party considered the resurgence of the debate on the succession to President Ouattara *"ill-timed and inappropriate"*. Some of the same party's tenors do not hide their disagreement about the fact that the alternation returns to their PDCI ally in 2020. When interviewed on this question, the President of the Republic himself pointed out that it was too early to talk about alternation. In his televised speech delivered on August 6, 2017, on the eve of the national holiday, he said "*to one and all that for the next presidential election, all will be able to run for office, according to the provisions of our fundamental law which guarantees democratic and transparent elections".* The issues of President Ouattara's succession and the alternation in 2020 are increasingly being discussed within the traditional political parties. For example, over the past few months, the gloomy atmosphere that was sometimes followed by heated debates through the media or on social networks between the RDR and its "natural" ally of the former Forces Nouvelles have revealed the struggle for strategic positioning and, above all, the volatility of the various political alliances in this context of alternation. These positioning struggles and observed alliances of circumstances should be paid attention to in the search for positive peace in the country.

The Ivorian opposition also suffered from many tensions due to a fierce struggle for control of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), a political group created by President Laurent Gbagbo in the early 1990s. While the loss of power and, above all, the incarceration of their emblematic leader at the International Criminal Court (ICC) may seem like a blow to the former presidential majority, it should be pointed out that the FPI is experiencing a real leadership crisis. Seven years after the fall of their government, this party continues to be torn between two currents. The former, radical and composed of the *"Gbagbo ou rien"* (GOR) makes the liberation of President Gbagbo a prior condition for FPI's participation in the political life of the Nation. The other current, more moderate, believes that the Ivorian opposition cannot prosper or make itself heard by opting for the empty chair policy. Consequently, this current believes that it is its duty to take an active part in the country's political activities.

It should be noted that these two trends of the FPI have the distinction of agreeing to disagree. And yet, the Ivorian opposition should play a crucial role in building a climate of positive peace, acting as a countervailing power. It is important to stress that in this positioning game the military is also seen as a key player in the changing geopolitical context. This position they have adopted is the consequence of the politicisation of the Ivorian defence and security tool. In addition to the political future of the country, which, alas, is the object of antagonism, the issue of national reconciliation appears as the challenge to be met in the process of building a positive climate of peace in the country.

● National reconciliation: rethinking the dynamics

The decade of conflict in Côte d' Ivoire ended with a post-electoral crisis of unprecedented violence. The presidential election of 2010, which all Ivorians had been calling for and which, in principle, could have been the keystone to a successful resolution of political tensions in the country, caused itself serious tensions that further divided the population. This post-electoral crisis exacerbated the social divide that already existed between communities across Côte d' Ivoire. It has created a climate of mistrust between different ethnic groups, which for more than a decade, due to the political manipulation of the concept of "Ivoirity", had already been living in a climate of extreme mistrust. It should be remembered that, *in the book Manifesto, l'Ivoirité ou l'esprit du nouveau contrat social by Henri Konan Bédié, published by the CURDIPHE*, ivoirité is defined as *"all the socio-historical, geographical and linguistic data that allow us to say whether an individual is a citizen of Côte d' Ivoire or an Ivorian citizen"*. However, as a follow-up to the hate speech of politicians, the various inter-ethnic clashes in some regions revealed the tensions that had persisted in the country. It is clear from the various investigations that during this critical period in the history of Côte d' Ivoire, several human rights violations, and not least, were perpetrated on the basis of political, ethnic and religious affiliation.In the light of the above, reconciling all Ivorians appears to be a serious challenge in establishing the conditions for building a climate of positive peace in the country. Regrettably, seven years after this sorrowful episode of the post-electoral crisis, the socio-political context in Côte d' Ivoire continues to be fragile and, above all, marked by resentment and revenge. And yet, in the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis, the State of Côte d' Ivoire showed its willingness to reconcile all the sons and daughters of the country in the best interests of the nation. The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Dialogue Commission (CDVR) was seen as an essential step in the completion of this vast project to end the crisis. Among other things, it was tasked with resolving the traumas and creating the conditions for real reconciliation. Despite all the actions carried out by the CDVR before it took over from the Commission Nationale pour la Réconciliation et l' Indemnisation des Victimes (CONARIV), many challenges remain to be met and substantial efforts should be made towards genuine reconciliation among all Ivorians.

○ *Holding politicians accountable for their actions*

In Côte d' Ivoire, reconciliation requires first and foremost the genuine will of politicians, especially their leaders, to reconcile among themselves, despite current or future political issues. These issues are expressed, on the one hand, by the changeover within the RHDP and, on the other hand, by the reconciliation between the REIT's executives. For the past seven years, this political will on the part of the political class, which is limited only to the various rhetoric of good intention, appears to be the missing link in

this project of society, which is essential in creating the conditions that should foster the emergence of a climate of positive peace in the country. The involvement of some Ivorian politicians in the national reconciliation process is not marked by strong actions, which could accelerate the process. Indeed, in a geopolitical context dominated by the consciousness of belonging, each political leader retains his or her political tactics in order to dominate a group of individuals and establish his or her hegemony and political ideology in a given geographical area. At the same time, opinion leaders, who represent regional and social benchmarks, are seen as models for their different populations. And because they are powerful, their attitudes often have a tremendous impact on people's opinions and actions. In Côte d' Ivoire, the political landscape is such that there is a strong interconnectedness between political actors and their communities of origin. This ethnicisation of the political game could be an impediment to reconciliation.

In the collective imaginary in Côte d' Ivoire, the post-electoral crisis witnessed the emergence of two sides: "*the winners' side and the vanquished*". Some of those who feel that they belong to the "*vanquished*" camp, i. e. the former ruling party, continue to grumble about their anger and revenge on those they call "winners", who are none other than the RHDP affiliates. From this perspective, national reconciliation appears to be a sensitive project whose success must lay the foundations for the rise of positive peace in Côte d' Ivoire. It must involve mutual acceptance, fair justice and compromise and negotiation. In addition, national reconciliation must represent a return to lost social order or the construction of a new consensual social order. It is therefore a question of inclusion and justice.

Since the end of the post-electoral crisis, detention in prison of some key political leaders with no trial may constitute a burden that certainly drags the reconciliation process down. If this situation is poorly experienced by the so-called "*vanquished*" camp, it is not infrequent to hear some leaders of the Ivorian opposition speak out against selective justice in the hands of the "*winners*" camp, to ensure their domination over the "*vanquished*" camp.

In the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis, more than 300,000 Ivorians went into exile. But over the years, thanks to the considerable efforts of the government, several waves of refugees have returned home. However, there are still a couple of thousand Ivorians who, since their exile, have continued to fuel vengeance projects, which take the form of a desire to undermine state security. The question of the pro-Gbagbo exiles, who were ruminating on revenge when they spoke of a "return match", should grab the attention of the Ivorian authorities. Because lasting peace in a country cannot be achieved as long as there are military and political exiles who are always prepared to fight with the regime in power. For this reason, it is more than opportune for the government to pursue the dynamics of the dialogue that has already begun, so that all the sons of the country return to the "Mother house". Beyond its political connotation, national reconciliation in Côte d' Ivoire has a social facet that should be underlined.

O *Prioritising every step in the process*

In Côte d' Ivoire, reconciliation will only be achieved if a certain number of steps are taken without skiping any of them. It is by acting this way that it will be able to

contribute to the emergence of a climate of positive peace. We need to shed light on all the crimes that have been perpetrated in recent years. This will help pinpoint the responsibilities of each party. Moreover, this reconciliation will have to be all-out. Concretely, the Ivorians must be reconciled with themselves and with the foreign communities living in Côte d' Ivoire. The Ivorians must also be reconciled with their army. But what is very important is to reconcile the army with itself, by banishing the habits of soldiers, this clan spirit that has remained and whose purpose is to divide the Ivorian defense tool further. This must be achieved through the establishment of a genuine cohesion programme within the FACI. In this reconciliation process, we must above all ensure that no one has been left behind.

In order to better carry out this vision of reconciliation and determine the objective conditions for successful and true reconciliation in Côte d' Ivoire, it would have been advisable to have a national sociological survey carried out before the setting up of the CDVR. This study could have informed the real problems to be solved by the CDVR, which would have made its actions more effective. The failure to carry out such a study, even before the commission was set up, contributed to its fragility until the end of its mission. In order to foster a climate of positive peace, national reconciliation must put the emphasis on its social dimension by favouring relations among Ivorians. Considered to be the symbol and cement of national unity, it must pass exclusively through the forgiveness of one another and the forgetting of accumulated resentments. In addition to politicians, it must take into account all socio-professional groups in the country. Like reconciliation, effective implementation of security sector reform appears to be a major challenge in achieving positive peace.

• SSR: Beyond what currently exists

In the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis, Côte d'Ivoire undertook a wide-ranging Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme. The country's implementation of such a process was urgently needed for two reasons. On the one hand, it was a matter of reinvigorating the Ivorian defence and security system, which during these years of crisis had been put under heavy strain. On the other hand, such a reform was necessary to remove the army (which had become too political over the years) from the political field, in order to situate it in the place that suits it best in Ivorian society. President Ouattara created the National Security Council (CNS), whose mission is to handle issues relating to the internal and external security of Côte d' Ivoire. Since its creation, and under the leadership of the Ivorian Head of State, the CNS has been able to give the main strategic orientations to enable the various structures in charge of security to take action on the ground. It is in this context that the government has implemented the SSR. As practiced in 2012, the SSR has helped to relegate the State, strengthen its regulatory function and empower the various actors in the security sector. It was launched in a propitious context. In addition to the support of the international community, the process benefited from political will at the highest level. This is reflected by the fact that the CNS, which is the structure in charge of implementing the security sector reform programme, is placed under the direct authority of the President of the Republic, who chairs it. It should therefore be stressed that in its implementation, SSR has been subject to national ownership with the availability of high-level Ivorian expertise.

This was a feeling shared by the Ivorian authorities and the international community as a whole. Broadly speaking, this national human resource, which has a better understanding of the country's socio-political context, has made it possible to implement the reform while taking into account certain sensitivities. Another favourable condition for Côte d'Ivoire is the availability of its own financial resources. Civil society was also routinely consulted in the implementation of this reform.

In Côte d'Ivoire, security sector reform should be viewed as a key element in the process of national reconciliation. It focuses on human security, i. e. the individual and his or her well-being, the peace of mind of the population, as well as the defence and national security system. It therefore concerns the whole security framework in the broadest sense, namely the army, the gendarmerie, the police, customs, water and forests, the judiciary, the penitentiary system, and democratic and citizen control bodies, such as parliament and civil society. Seen in this light, SSR can be described as a set of measures intended to enhance the professionalism of all security actors and institutions in order to ensure that they act within a framework that respects the principles of good governance. In a word, make them accountable to the people. Ultimately, security sector reform should bring confidence back into the social fabric.

To date, the process is ongoing. Some urgently-needed reforms could be introduced and are effective, while others have not yet been implemented. Moreover, depending on the sector that is targeted, the institutions of the concerned sector react differently. Some make up resistance, based on lack of understanding or balance of power. Under the defence and security

system, despite notable improvements in some areas (the promotion of gender in defence and security institutions), the overall situation is dire. After the post-electoral crisis, the army, having been devastated by successive crises for ten years, crystallises all the attentions. It is with this in mind that the current political authorities pledge to do everything possible to reform it. At this time, the implementation of reforms is stalled and the reconstruction of the Ivorian army therefore turns out to be a mammoth task.

The other sectors such as police, customs, water and forestry, justice and the prison system also benefited from structural reforms in the context of the restructuring of the internal security forces. Such forces are underpinned by the seal of coordination and synergy of their actions in their areas of competence. They shall be complementary, capable of exchanging and sharing information which may assist in the resolution of investigations and judicial proceedings. The concrete implementation of these measures is not yet visible. However, it is important to stress that the DDR process, which is only one aspect of SSR, appears to be a major dynamic in setting the stage for the emergence of a positive peace in Côte d' Ivoire.

• DDR and the current priorities

At the end of the post-electoral crisis, the need to re-establish security and stitch up the shattered social fabric called for the disarmament of hearts and minds, and even for the effective disarmament of the forces that took part in the various confrontations. It is in this atmosphere that the Authority for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) of ex-combatants has been created to lead the DDR process. ADDR's main mission was to contribute to the restoration of lasting security and peace in the country. After the effective start of its activities in October 2012, this body ended its mission in June 2015, to the satisfaction of the Ivorian government and the entire international community. DDR is now perceived as a model of success by the United Nations and all development partners, who regard the implementation of this process in Côte d' Ivoire to be a case study that should serve as an example for all countries in post-crisis situation. However, the recurrence and persistence of the mood swings of demobilised soldiers since the end of the process, particularly in 2017, invite us to reflect on the stakes of this process, given the political, security and economic context of the country, especially three years before the presidential election of 2020.

Implementation of the DDR programme in Côte d' Ivoire has been guided by a number of challenges, which in themselves have been obstacles to the smooth running of the process and continue to influence the post-DDR period. The first issue that emerges is political. And this is evidenced by the fact that during the entire crisis, both in the government zone and in the former

CNO (Central-North-West) zone, certain personalities imposed themselves in the political sphere of the country because they had men in arms. In other terms, it is the men in arms who have given them weight. DDR was not properly perceived by almost all of these personalities who saw the implementation of the process as a way of losing their political power, in the sense that disarming, demobilising and reintegrating their men would destroy them. Today, with the end of the process, it is not surprising that these personalities continue to have a close connection with some former combatants who have already been reintegrated.

The second issue in the implementation of DDR is security. This is explained by the fact that the charisma and power of certain political and military leaders, who were involved in the crisis, were measured against the yardstick of their fire powers. The weapons available to each side also contributed to creating a "*no peace/no war*" situation in the country and to containing violence. From this perspective, none of the parties to the conflict actually adhered to the DDR process.

The third issue of the DDR is economic. The failure of the national economy, due to the partition of the country into two zones, was a reality. This special situation led to the development of a war economy, both in the former rebel and government zones.

In the former CNO zone, the withdrawal of state government structures and public and private enterprises marked the collapse of formal economic activity. This left a gap that would be filled by the progressive development of a de facto economy.

Although unique in its character, due to the context of the crisis in which it developed, it was nevertheless structured and organised by certain political and military leaders in the area. Parallel to the rebel-dominated zone, the area controlled by the government authorities during the crisis saw the development of a circumstance-based economy bathed in uncertainty. Indeed, the need to mobilise resources in order to finance the war effort led the State to turn away from daily and ordinary activities under its responsibility. Much of the State's financial resources was devoted to recruiting and maintaining the army, as well as to the purchase of weapons to counter security threats. But this exceptional economy has also benefited a category of military-civilian actors which, in the meantime, has emerged with new types of jobs that are distinguished by their ephemeral and circumstantial character. This category of actors made up of young people, organised into political, civil and armed groups, has minted their militancy and military commitment in exchange for remuneration. Analyses show that the economic stakes of DDR are presented as a precarious and disorganised economic context, both in rebel and loyalist zones, and partly benefiting a privileged minority. It is in this context that the DDR process was set up and above all evolved. This would have a negative impact on the course of DDR and its final outcome, as the new privileged entrants in each side have been more concerned with preserving the financial advantages gained by force of arms or their political involvement in the crisis than with engaging openly in the process. Such a commitment would be tantamount to a return to civilian life, to a normal life and thus to the loss of the financial benefits linked to their status as major armed and political actors in this military-political crisis.

It should also be noted that the political, security and economic challenges have contributed to influencing the conduct of the protracted DDR process in Côte d' Ivoire, despite the satisfactory results that this process has been able to achieve. Its application has highlighted the ability of political actors to steer this process according to their partisan interests. The events of the year 2017 show in many respects that the issue of taking demobilised soldiers into account as key players in the current and future political game is no longer to be demonstrated. They have succeeded in establishing connections with these political actors for whom they could monetise their services in a timely manner. Indeed, the parliamentary elections of 2011 demonstrated this reality. Some candidates did not shy away from using demobilised soldiers during the election campaigns. Better yet, the latest violent demonstrations have finally convinced the public of their capacity for nuisance. Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, DDR in Côte d' Ivoire remains a success story for all countries emerging from crisis.

III- « No peace / No war »? Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has made it possible for us to highlight the varied geopolitical stakes that are intertwined and allowed us to understand the evolution of the socio-political situation in Côte d'Ivoire. As we have witnessed, the country has suffered a few major crises that have undoubtedly reshaped its destiny. The post-electoral crisis of 2011, however, appears to be a critical period in the analysis of the conditions for sustainable peace in Côte d' Ivoire. It is true that, thanks to the various post-crisis programmes implemented since 2011, Côte d' Ivoire has embarked on the path of peace. But the indices of the social barometer show that there are many upheavals in this peaceful environment. The analysis of this social barometer shows that, at the moment, it is indeed a climate of negative peace that prevails throughout the country. Côte d' Ivoire is no longer at war, but there is still a long way to go on the road to peace. The various social challenges (among them poverty) pose a risk to long-term human security if part of the population is left without education, health and work. This situation can contribute to the radicalisation of young people in the future. Indeed, if development does not improve the social situation of the average citizen, it represents a security challenge. For example, we can cite for the year 2016 the wrath against the rise in electricity prices; and for the year 2017, the protest of cocoa producers, the strikes by civil servants, teachers, students and pupils.

But the real challenge for the nation as a whole is to succeed in developing a number of mechanisms that will enable the creation of conditions which will see the emergence of a positive peace. More than a patriotic outburst, every Ivorian, whatever his position in society, should tackle it. It is by acting in this way that we will be able to follow the philosophy of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, for whom "*peace is not a vain word but rather a behaviour*". In this sense, we believe that more than behaviour, positive peace should be a state of mind. Thus, for the purposes of the exercise, we make recommendations at different levels. Therefore,

➢ **The Ivorian Government should**

o Pursue the political will for reconciliation through effective and sustainable establishment of a framework for dialogue with the opposition and civil society, and address all key issues on the political process, the trial of political and military actors. Such a framework should also be put in place at the local level to work for local peace;

o Rethink security sector reform in the country by adapting it to the realities on the ground. Concretely, it is a question of taking concrete actions and defining priorities for the reform of the Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, in particular by focusing on improving the living and working conditions of soldiers;

o Establish an entity to hear and provide guidance to vulnerable people, especially to demobilized soldiers. This will not only have the advantage of finding an interlocutor but also to better understand their state of mind, beyond their financial claims;

o Reform the education system to make it attractive and adapt it to the expectations of social and economic needs, for a better supervision of young people;

o Improve communication on security-related actions and on the risks for the population;

o Recommend a process to encourage less dangerous political practices for peace through new rules and new public commitments by leaders;

o Fight against one's own erosion by educating citizens in citizenship (respect for the laws and institutions of the Republic)

➢ **The Friedrich Ebert Foundation should**

o Contribute to the emergence of positive peace in the country by developing modules for education in the culture of peace, given the credibility of its activities in the country and its international reputation;

o Support local roundtables to secure the anchoring of peace at the communal level;

o Play the role of focal point between government and civil society;

o Advocate for key social issues pertaining to the security debate and sensitise the government and the international community to sustainable solutions;

o Provide regional and global exchanges on security and peace.

➢ **The German Government and the European Union should**

o Reorganise the financial and technical support provided to the Ivorian government, with a focus on financing certain essential activities to build positive peace in Côte d'Ivoire. This includes activities related to national reconciliation and security sector reform;

o Support Ivorian civil society organisations working in the field of national reconciliation and governance of the security sector through training and funding;

o Favour investments in initiatives with direct impact on improved living conditions of Ivorians, and not only in flagship projects in Abidjan;

o Back up Ivorians in the practical organisation of the forthcoming presidential elections, particularly in terms of expertise and by mobilising highly-involved observers from ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and other relevant institutions.

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About the publication

"Why does 'positive' peace fail in Côte d' Ivoire?" Dr. Jean-Jacques KONADJE answers this question through this study, which has highlighted the multiple geopolitical challenges and stakes that are intertwined and allows us grasp the evolution of the socio-political situation in Côte d' Ivoire. The post-electoral crisis of 2011 proves to be a critical period in the analysis of the conditions for lasting peace in Côte d' Ivoire. If Côte d' Ivoire is no longer at war, it must be said that the road to peace is still a long one when analysing the indices of the social barometer. The various challenges (the mutinies, movements within the army, influenced by the socio-political context, demobilised former combatants, the social phenomenon of "microbes", the issue of roadbusters...) pose a risk to human security in the long term. But the real challenge for the whole nation is to succeed in establishing a number of mechanisms,

which will create conditions that will see the emergence of a positive peace, in keeping with the philosophy of social democracy. As Willy Brandt said: "Where there is hunger, there will be no long-term peace. Where there is extreme poverty, there will be neither law nor justice. Where life remains threatened in its most basic necessities, it is not acceptable to speak of security".

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