



Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Shanghai

China-Europe-Africa Cooperation: Chances and Challenges

中欧非合作：机遇与挑战

Proceedings of the
6th Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance
March 14-15, 2008

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Preface

Chinese-African-European Dialogue or Perspectives of China and Europe in Africa

The Sixth Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance with this year's topic of "China-Europe-Africa-Cooperation: Chances and Challenges" took place on March 14-15th in Shanghai. It was jointly organized by the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and the Shanghai office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The workshop invited participants from China, Africa, Germany and other EU member states. It aimed at engaging all participants in an open and constructive debate. A total of 40 participants attended the workshop – among them scholars from think tanks and academia as well as officials, parliamentarians and representatives from regional organizations from fifteen countries.

The Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance used to be an annual Asian-European forum on foreign and security policy. In 2008, the sixth forum was intended to be a Sino-European-Africa forum, since the relationship between the three actors is undergoing changes and is especially relevant in terms of current and future prospects of global governance. Just as the previous five, this forum featured open political dialogue on the non-governmental or track-two level. It aimed to contribute to an open exchange and dialogue and enhance cooperation between these three important actors.

Against the background of the globalization process, the relationships between China, Europe and Africa have become more complex. The Sino-Africa relations have entered a new phase since the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation/FOCAC held in Beijing in November 2006. China's president Hu Jintao pointed out: "China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the following fields: First, deepen political relation of equality and mutual trust. Second, broaden win-win economic cooperation. Third, expand exchange for cultural enrichment. Fourth, promote balanced and harmonious global development. Fifth, strengthen cooperation and mutual support in international affairs". He also announced the country's intention to double, by 2009, the development aid it provides. Besides the increasing engagement in Economic Assistance, several agreements between Chinese enterprises and African governments and companies were signed on the sidelines of the conference for further economic cooperation.

While the economic and political relations between China and Africa have intensified dramatically in the last years, the relationships between the European countries and Africa are changing as well. In 2005, the EU formulated an Africa Strategy designed to place partnership with African countries on a new footing. It is the first European political framework to address Africa as a single entity and a solid platform to improve the coordination, coherence and consistency of the EU's policies and

instruments in their cooperation with African countries. Moreover, the strategy emphasizes investment in infrastructure and rural development, institutional support to the African Union/AU, Good Governance and Human Rights as well as in post-conflict reconstruction.

The EU and its member states are concerned about the development of Sino-African relations in some aspects, such as the engagement of China in Sudan and Angola, since they fear that it might undermine past and current development cooperation under the criteria of political conditionalities. China in this context regards its relations towards Africa under the supremacy of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state and a strict separation between economic cooperation and political conditionalities. Concerns have also been voiced regarding presumably resource-oriented regional strategies of China in oil rich countries. In China some doubts exist about the purpose of European engagement in Africa, considering the colonial heritage. African countries, on their side, welcome the additional cooperation partner, but are concerned about the missing common African approach towards China, since by now almost all cooperation is bilateral.

Besides these critical aspects, many of the goal criteria formulated by Europe and China in their policies towards Africa are in many respects compatible (i.e. reduce poverty, enhance infrastructure, fight against epidemic diseases). However, there are no new forms of cooperation and only little coordination between China and Europe concerning development aid and international agreements or initiatives for Africa so far. Perceiving the African perspectives towards China's and Europe's contemporary African policy could provide the best way of a constructive dialogue towards a harmonization of the approaches from both actors towards Africa.

The trilateral relations among China-EU-Africa have been gradually tightened and are today involving cooperation in an increasing number of sectors; however, they need to be improved. There certainly are divergences in interests, perceptions, definitions and strategies in the bilateral and multilateral relations among China, Europe and the African continent, which therefore create the need for a dialogue of mutual benefit. This dialogue should be rooted in a learning process among equal partners, in a commitment of all the actors to the Millennium Development Goals/MDGs and the coherent development policies that follow from it.

The workshop papers therefore reviewed most recent developments and concentrated on the Characteristics and perceptions of current trilateral relations among China, Europe and Africa in the process of globalization; the cooperation strategies of China, Europe and Africa towards each other; the African perceptions and strategies on Afro-China and Afro-European relations and the future prospects for a China-Europe-Africa cooperation.

In the first part the *Characteristics of the current trilateral relations among China, Europe and Africa in the process of globalization* are analyzed. **Mr. Johannes Pflug**, Member of the German Parliament and Head of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Group, points out that he is optimistic about the Beijing (FOCAC) resolutions since they seem to open the door to trilateral dialogue between China, Africa and the OECD. There is a need to further strengthen the African Union and the programme of the New Partnership for Africa (NEPAD) – In which China too has a financial involvement. In regard to China's presence in Africa, it is important to note that China's economic activities and its development aid have without doubt played a part in the economic growth of some African countries in recent years. China's presence in Africa is making unprecedented impact in Africa. Traditional global players like the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan who have undisputedly taken center stage in past, are now forced to contend with another major player – China, assesses **Geoffrey Mugumya**, the Director for Peace and Security of the African Union. In the last decade the EU-China Strategic Partnership has focused mainly on bilateral economic cooperation, trade relations and avoided issues concerning security affairs and global governance. Suddenly, the Europeans find their political, economic and development policies in Africa being undermined by China. **Prof. Shu Yunguo**, Director of the Center for African Studies at the Shanghai Normal University, claims that the relationship between Africa and China already started in the Ming Dynasty around 2000 years ago, but these relationships have been very limited because of the distance. China has in opposite to Europe never colonized or sold slaves but has a very rich historic heritage. It has always been a peaceful friendship. **Dr. Beata Wojna** from the Polish Institute of International Affairs states that Poland has no explicit policy for Africa. Institutionally speaking, there are no trilateral relations between the EU, China and Africa.

Part two *Mutual perception and cooperation strategies of Africa, China and Europe towards each other* describes and analyzes the different perspectives. **H.E. Karl Offmann**, Former President of Mauritius and representative of the Forum for Former African Heads of State (Africa Forum), names the chances that a China-Europe-Africa cooperation has. **Prof. He Wenping**, Director, African Studies at the Institute for Western Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, emphasizes that the bilateral relations between China and Africa have been brought forward by the Chinese government in the last years although the western media claims that it's an energy-oriented policy approach in her outline on "China-Africa cooperation: Partnership and global implications". **Uwe Wissenbach**, responsible for DG Development and relations with ACP countries at the EU Commission, argues in his paper "The Renaissance or the end of geopolitics? Towards a trilateral cooperation in Africa" that all three actors need to have a look on some convenient excuses. For example, Chinese analysts see the controversy about Africa as part of the "complexification" of the bilateral relationship where the EU is challenging China in order to protect its interests. They believe the EU strategy and tactics to achieve its objectives is to get China to integrate into EU or OECD political and specifically

DAC frameworks. In parallel, China overstates the EU's interests in resources, securing spheres of influence and alliance politics. More generally, the EU is increasingly perceived as a weakening power on the defensive in the global system.

Part three deals with the *African perceptions on Afro-Chinese and Afro-European relations*. **Prof. Mwesiga Baregu**, Professor of Politics and International relations at the University of Dar es Salaam, points out that without a centralized political authority, Africa will find it very difficult to stabilise its societies, integrate and transform its economies and negotiate from a position of credibility and strength in the international system. In his view, the relationship with Europe has shown in that it has failed to bring about development and therefore current developments are opening up options for Africa to forge new relationships. **Prof. Yu Jianhua**, Depute Director of the Institute of European and Asian Studies of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences explains the five principles of the cooperation between China and Africa. He sees a win-win situation in the cooperation between China and Africa in the trade sector since Africa is a key and growing player on the global stage. **Dr. Christopher Alden**, Senior Lecturer in international relations at the London School of Economics and Politics, argues that in order to cut through the complexity and establish some common features of African responses to China's arrival on the African continent, it is best to look at the nature of the African regime in place and the underlying economy of a particular country. He defines three types of regimes - pariah partnerships, illiberal regimes or weak democracies with commodity based economies and democracies with diversified economies – emerge as providing a discernable set of patterned responses to China's new engagement.

Finally, part four is looking for *Prospects of trilateral relations among China, Europe and Africa and potential Sino-European cooperation for the development and good governance of African countries*. **Dr. Garth Le Pere**, Executive Director at the South African Institute for Global Dialogue outlines, that according to Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”. The African continent has had a long and bitter experience with the pathologies and effects of bad and undemocratic governance and it is this history which highlights the importance of China and the EU's engagement with Africa. Their approaches to Africa differ in many aspects though. For the most part, China believes that Africa is on the threshold of a development takeoff. This gives China an opportunity to make a positive contribution. In contrast to the deficit model of the West this views Africa mostly in terms of poor governance, conflict, underdevelopment and poverty. He underlined the importance of ongoing institutionalized dialogue between China and the EU on Africa. **Prof. Zhang Tiejun**, Research Fellow for European Studies at the SIIS, argues, that while it seems to be that there are substantial differences between the Chinese and the European approaches towards Africa, they are non the less not irresolvable. China's self identity and role perception is, according to Prof. Zhang, a dual identity: On the one hand, the Chinese leadership and its intellectual followers conceive the country as

a developing country in the globalization area; and on the other hand, they also perceive that the country is a potential world power on the international arena. **Jonathan Holslag**, *Research Fellow at the Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies (BICCS)*, concentrates on China's next security strategy for Africa and options for the EU. He argues that China's economic interests in Africa face a dual security challenge. On the one hand there is the increasing number of non-traditional violence. On the other hand, China has to deal with the uncertainty about the future strategic intentions of other powers.

We hereby thank all participants and organizers of the 6th Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance very warmly for their excellent speeches, papers and comments to this important dialogue!

Katharina Hofmann/Katja Meyer

Shanghai, June 2008

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Keynote Speech

China-Europe-Africa cooperation: Chances and Challenges

Johannes Pflug

Member of the German Parliament

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Firstly I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you here today.

In particular I would like to thank the FES and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) for organising this event and for inviting me to speak. Especially I would like to welcome Prof. Yang Jiemian, President of SIIS and also Prof. Ye Jiang, Director of European Studies at SIIS.

As chairman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Friendship Group in the German Bundestag, I naturally cannot fail to mention the upset to relations between Germany and China which occurred in the late autumn of last year. After the German Chancellor received the Dalai Lama in the Chancellery on 23 September 2007, the Chinese Government reacted with protests and by cancelling meetings, conferences and other talks. Allow me to say that I and my political colleagues are very well aware that – despite the fact that this was explicitly declared to be a visit by a religious leader – the reception of the Dalai Lama in the Chancellery was, politically speaking, a mistake. Worse still was the fact that Frau Merkel had not informed Premier Wen Jiabao of her intention to receive the Dalai Lama when she visited China in August/September 2007.

I must also say, however, that Germany, like every other state, naturally has the right to receive not only religious leaders but opposition leaders, too. The principle “Your enemy is my enemy” or “Your friend is my friend” does not apply to political relations, neither does it apply unreservedly to relations between friends. Even where private relations are concerned, there are limits to how far it applies. Furthermore it is, of course, clear to us that the Chinese Government wished to stress another principle at the same time, namely, that of pre-emption, the need to nip things in the bud. And in this it was successful. Some states have already called off the visit of the Dalai Lama, among them, for example, the Vatican.

Since then the problems have been smoothed out, meetings are taking place again and the German Foreign Minister has issued clarifications on behalf of the German Federal Government on Tibet and the “One-China” policy.

Relations are back on track. This is a good thing because bilateral dialogue is the central form of communication. The sovereign nation-states remain the central players, even if sometimes this is a cause of sorrow to a convinced European. For this reason in particular I believe, as I shall say later, that faced with global problems, the world community must find new multilateral forms of organisation, binding frameworks for action under international law, properly functioning instruments and, above all, goals.

Every nation-state must first, however, put its own house in order. As a convinced European, I can say that as far as its Africa policy is concerned, Europe, too, still has a lot of homework to do.

The European Commission, for example, has failed to adapt its aid monies to the needs of Africa in a globalised world. Funding specifications, which have been determined in the course of history, give preferential treatment to some countries in Africa while other regions, whatever their current need, receive less consideration. At the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon in December 2007 three documents were adopted: the Final Declaration, an action plan, and a paper on the Strategic Partnership. The strategy paper alone covers 113 points. It proved impossible at the time, however, to reach a consensus on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). The negotiations are now being continued on the basis of dividing up the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) into six regions. As a result of Europe's colonial past the ACP countries also include Caribbean and Pacific countries.

As far as talks with African states are concerned, we should consider whether the African Union (AU) may not be the best dialogue partner.

Policy on raw materials is a particularly complicated area. The key issue here is improving transparency in the extractive industries (EITI; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). Germany as an EITI donor country supports the "ownership" approach.

China's Africa policy is pragmatic. At the summit meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006, the Beijing Declaration and the Action Plan 2007-2009 set economic milestones for a strategic partnership.

China, in a continuation of a policy formulated in the Fifties, attaches value to the following five points:

- Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
- Mutual non-aggression
- Mutual non-interference in internal affairs
- Equal rights and reciprocal benefits
- Peaceful coexistence

From Europe's point of view, however, it is important not to lose sight of the "conditionalities": purely financial cooperation undermines human rights' efforts and other efforts in the area of good governance (corruption, etc).

Such criticism on the part of the Europeans is often viewed as Big Brotherism.

What makes me optimistic about these Beijing resolutions is that they seem to open the door to trilateral dialogue between China, Africa and the OECD. There is a need to further strengthen the African Union and the programme of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – in which China, too, has a financial involvement.

The aim of the workshop could be to identify multilateral forms of organisation to facilitate better dialogue. It is important here also to include countries such as China in the existing group of donor countries.

The improvement in the transparency of the extractive industries, which I have already mentioned, is only one example of **geostrategic** considerations which in my lecture I will reduce to the interests of the financial markets. Greater international transparency not only in relation to the extractive industries but also in financial markets is a good approach. The bursting of various bubbles in the financial markets (the Asian financial crisis and crisis in the real estate sector in the USA), customs barriers and debt relief for developing countries illustrate our mutual dependence. Transparency helps everyone in the war against corruption.

My second key word: **environment**, that is to say, issues of climate, energy and water distribution, is an even clearer example of how vital a multilateral approach is. This is why climate change and Africa are right at the top of the agenda for the G8 summit in Japan. To strengthen NEPAD and the AU both Africa and China must pull together. Environmental problems do not stop at political borders.

My third key word, **politics**, refers to global problems such as failed states, terrorism and proliferation. These security questions are only one aspect in a long list of subjects which a globalised world must address. Overpopulation and migration are also key issues in this context.

Existing organisations – such as WTO, the UN, OSCE and the G8 – are endeavouring to solve impending global problems.

The establishment of corresponding regional associations such as AU, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) in Africa and Asia is a positive development since they are in a better position to pool together and represent regional interests.

It is important in this respect that as well as promoting regional and subject-related integration, work is increasingly embedded in fixed structures as well as in forms and decisions which are binding on all members. The prerequisite is a clear definition of goals. Here, I should add, I am speaking as a German foreign politician who is ready to relinquish national sovereign rights to the Common European Foreign and Security Policy, with the proviso, of course, that this is always under the oversight of the European Parliament.

As chairman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Friendship Group, I believe, therefore, that while German-Chinese relations are important, it is equally important to secure and consolidate relations between Europe and China.

Shared goals in Africa, pursued preferably in complementary or joint programmes and on a basis of good cooperation: this would signal the birth of a Chinese-European Africa strategy. The prerequisite, however, is that Europe pursues a coherent EU foreign policy. France, the United Kingdom and Germany, in particular, do not always pull together in this respect.

In Africa the beginnings of regional and even continental cooperation are visible. These should be expanded. China and Europe, in particular, can make a contribution here.

Views with regard to China's engagement in Africa vary considerably.

Economic journalists and conservative politicians, in particular, are prone to talking about "neo-colonialism" in this context. The "global players" admired by the self same people engage in such activities all over the world and also in Africa - following everywhere the logic of capitalism. It does not therefore make sense to point the finger at Chinese companies.

Allow me to highlight a few facts.

China's economic activities and its development aid have without doubt played a part in the economic growth of some African countries in recent years, creating jobs and income for Africans.

In some cases, however, the Chinese bring their own labour with them and supply cheap Chinese goods, from clothing to televisions, making it impossible to establish sustainable

economic structures. The whole world helps itself in the exploitation of Africa's resources. In this respect China is not different from other countries.

There is a difference, however, when China cooperates with regimes in states such as Sudan or Burma which commit terrible human rights' abuses. In doing so China makes it impossible for the UN Security Council to pass effective resolutions and measures aimed at outlawing such regimes. China has a particular responsibility on account of its permanent seat on the Security Council.

China is on its way to becoming a global superpower alongside the USA. Seven years of the foreign policy of George W. Bush and his government have severely dented the USA's international reputation. The world expects this superpower to act as a moral role model and show leadership. Superpowers have economic, military and political power, which is why the rest of the world looks to them to act with special responsibility. The principle of non-intervention must not be used as an alibi for a country to protect its own interests.

Equally, it is important that the assertion of egoistical national interests is not allowed to thwart efforts to define common goals and strategies, as is frequently the case in the European Union.

China and Europe need Africa. China needs Africa, with its growing economic development, as a trading partner. Europe hopes that economic development will lead to social development and stability in Africa, making it possible to regulate illegal immigration to Europe. China and Europe have common goals and interests in Africa.

Why do they not have a common strategy? Shared projects could be a start.

Thank you for your attention!

China-Europe -Africa - Is There Possible Collaborative Partnership?

Geofrey Mugumya

Director, Peace and Security Department, Africa Union Commission

Introduction

China presence in Africa is making unprecedented impact in Africa. Traditional global players like the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan who have undisputedly taken center stage in past, are now forced to contend with another major player - China.

In the last decade the EU- China Strategic Partnership has focused mainly on bilateral economic cooperation, trade relations and avoided issues concerning security affairs and global governance. Many European critics vehemently look at “Chinese African policy” as an exploitative relationship manipulated by China. This has forced African issues onto the EU-China agenda. Suddenly, the Europeans find their political, economic and development policies in Africa being undermined by China. In defense, China argues that the EU has historically pursued similar commercial and resource interests in Africa.

Another concern by the Europeans is that Africans ‘elite leaders’ are being visibly drawn towards China’s non-demanding position on good governance, democracy and human rights, which have so far proven to be more attractive to African governments and business interests. Since 2006 China’s Africa policy has become a critical issue on the China-EU political dialogue as well as on the G8 development agenda. The main issue on the EU and G8 development agendas is how to achieve good governance in African states in order to sustain development achievements and progress towards poverty reduction.

In many ways, China and EU development policies towards Africa are complimentary. On the one hand, China’s interest-guided strategies are said to undermine initiatives to support sustainability (Pang 2007). On the other hand, they both share common views on poverty-reduction and working towards MDGs, sustainable development in various sectors, aid effectiveness and local ownership. The latter includes African taking responsibility in solving African problems and capacity-building, especially in the fields of crisis prevention and management.

Some policy makers in Europe and China have suggested to not only look at bilateral relationship between China and the EU but a ‘trilateral dialogue’ and cooperation with Africa.

China and Africa

China’s trade with Africa reached USD 55.5 billion in 2006, making China Africa’s third biggest trading partner. Imports of oil and raw materials are the most important trade components;

- In 2006, 800 Chinese companies have invested USD 1 billion, 480 joint ventures have been established and 78 000 Chinese workers employed.
- China imports 32% oil from Africa, oil related investments in recent years amount to at least 16 billion USD
- China has cancelled almost USD 1.3 billion in debt owed by 31 African countries, abolished tariffs on 190 kinds of goods from 29 least developed countries in Africa and promised to do so for more than 400 goods.
- Since 1956, China has completed 900 projects of economic and social development in Africa.
- China has provided scholarships for 18 000 students from 50 African countries. China has sent 16 000 medical personnel who have treated more than 240 million patients in 47 African countries.
- There are approximately 3 000 Chinese forces participating in UN peacekeeping in Africa

However, China's engagement in Africa has met with certain suspicions among the EU circles. China's rapid engagement in the African continent has lent itself to harsh criticism and deep suspicious highlighting negative aspects and consequences of China's increasing involvement in the continent. Perhaps, one of main criticism about China's involvement in Africa has been the so called scramble for Africa's resources. China has been accused of following neo-colonial patterns of shipping resources out of Africa, importing raw material with little or no processing value. China has been accused of securing access to energy and raw material as cheaply as possible; simultaneous extends its interest of fostering friendship with Africa. Highlighted are some of the other criticisms of China;

- Criticism against China's unethical support for some African states whose human rights record is questionable.
- China's unconditional aid and loans have undermined European and multilateral efforts to persuade African governments to increase transparency, public accountability and good governance.
- China has been accused of 'free riding' western debts relief efforts and undermining individual country's external debt sustainability and disregard multilateral framework for debt sustainability.
- China's self-interest strategies in dealing with developing countries, trying to assert its influence and using its soft power in order to support its own development without any assistance from Western countries.
- China's neglect of the environment and social standards.
- Aid tied to Chinese companies and labor; thus marginalization of African producers in domestic and overseas markets (particularly textile industry)
- The forum on China and Africa cooperation (FOCAC) is suspiciously seen by many as China's means of obtaining political power in multilateral forums like the UN.

While there are maybe many critics on China policy towards Africa they are equally complimented by a positive welcoming view of China's presence in Africa. For many

African people China is perceived as a welcome alternative to the Western ‘white man’ burden policies.

- African leaders have found alternative ideology to “western hypocrisy” and double standards.
- China `s massive investment in infrastructure development into Africa where many western powers have neglected.
- China’s assistance in providing loans and debt relief to many African countries has been a beacon of hope to the continent.
- China has provided external market opportunities for African economies. In doing so it has provided the preconditions for African nations to establish self-sustaining economies.
- The inauguration of the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 was seen by many African countries as a positive direction to get Africa out of dependant cycle.

China-EU-Africa-Partnership?

In 2006, the EU Commission concluded that sharing common global responsibility necessitated effective and issues based cooperation with China in order to organize and shape international affairs and global governance in the future. For the first time, the Commission’s China Strategy Paper highlighted the need to jointly address global challenges including climate change, development policy and Africa (European Commission 2006). At the 9th EU- China summit China hesitantly agreed to a dialogue on peace, stability and sustainable development in Africa. (Council of the European Union 2006) The fact that China agreed to include this topic in summit can be regarded as first step towards larger dialogue- framework and a sign that both sides acknowledge that common issues exist. At the same time, both sides emphasized their different approaches to international affairs; for example China’s preference for non-interference principal versus promotion of good governance.

Many critics would argue that there appears to be more divergent and conflicting views from China and the EU’s development policy towards Africa. However, the challenge is to harmonize policy-goals and implementation-strategies in aid and investment and ways to mainstream initiatives at a regional level.

The success or failure of China and the EU in cooperation on African development can be seen not only as a soft-test case for the EU–China strategic partnership. But the European Commission (EC) is actively trying to develop it into trilateral relationship, in order to pursue an effective multilateral organization. Many African countries realize the desperate need of both sides and in many cases they play one partner off the other. But Africa needs to play with caution here; they must ensure that they do not lose the support of the EU by being lured by short-term benefits from China. Africa will have to develop an effective negotiation relationship with China that is in the interest of Africans and not those that sell out resources for the short-term gain of small elites.

The advantages of a trilateral approach, if steered by Africa, would lie in exploiting the synergies and complementary of the EU's and China's African policies. The policy should include ways to get China to proactively engage with EU on common objectives for economic growth development in Africa. For example, condition versus the no string approach;

Another key challenge is if Africa can manage its multiple partnerships so that it becomes an integrated actor in its foreign policy rather than power struggle among global players. This can result in reverting to the Cold War trends where Africa becomes a battle ground for great powers to assert their position in the international area, and the scramble for resources. Africa's interests are not always best served by developing countries despite the South-South rhetoric, neither are they best served by the Europeans. Africa, once again, becomes a playing field for superpower confrontations between the USA and China's rapid rise to power. This confrontation is seen by the USA, as China aggressive pursued of energy resources, to assert its ideology and its power in the global terrain. In the process China forgets its development strategies towards Africa.

In terms of globalization, African countries need to ensure that steep competition allows them to build their own diversified economies and that they do not remain suppliers of raw material. African countries need to ensure that markets are regulated; trade agreements are in favor of African interests, the rule of law applies and initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Kimberley process are enforced.

Conclusion

To conclude, the question that one should pose is how do African countries intend to define their international position, use their enhanced bargaining power and manage their domestic development. Thus far, Africa has not shown a coherent united strategy. Africa is still fumbling in the dark. Africa intends maintaining its relationship with both the EU and China. However, in terms of addressing the issue of a trilateral cooperation and dealing with tensions between the different approaches- they have not been worked through. Africa needs to put political and economic heavyweights to work for their own interest in dealing with the EU and China.

Comparison of China-Africa and Europe-Africa Relations¹

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China, Europe and Africa being important members of the international community, China-Africa relations and Europe-Africa relations are important part of international relations. In recent years, both China-Africa relations and Europe-Africa relations have evolved. However, it must be pointed out that there are many differences between China-Africa relations and Europe-Africa relations, which result in differences in content as well as form. Therefore, a comparison between China-Africa relations and Europe-Africa relations will facilitate communication and mutual understanding between the two sides, thereby further promoting the development of the two relations.

I

First of all, let's discuss the difference between China-Africa relations and Europe-Africa relations from the historical perspective.

China-Africa relations are characterized by the following:

Firstly, although China-Africa relations date back to ancient times, they tend to be intermittent.

Although tens of thousands of miles away from each other, the Chinese and Africans traded and traveled over the past 2,000 years, constantly pushing forward their economic and trade relations. Two out of the four cradles of ancient civilizations, the Yellow River basin in China is located in the eastern part of the world, while the Nile basin is in the western part. The long history behind both sides has allowed much to play out. Researches find that trade and economic relations between China and Africa started before Christ's time. During China's Han Dynasty 2nd century BC, indirect trade between China and Africa took place. Such Chinese products as silk and household utensils were transported to Africa, where such African products as ivory and rhinoceros horns were channeled into China. During the Tang Dynasty, China had quite some exchanges with the Arab Empire, Chinese products entering North Africa and coastal East Africa. During the Song Dynasty, maritime trade grew rapidly, Chinese products finding their way from coastal East Africa to the hinterlands. Song Dynasty potteries were discovered in Zimbabwe and the south bank of Limpopo River. During the Yuan Dynasty, China's sea route to Africa extended further down south, and there were more flows of people as exchanges between the two sides grew, Wang

¹ Africa in this paper refers to Sub-Sahara Africa. Europe in this paper refers to EU, as represented by Germany, UK and France.

Dayuan's tour around Africa and Ibn Battuta's visit to China being good cases in point. Ancient China-Africa relations peaked during the Ming Dynasty, as embodied in Zheng He's voyages to the Western seas. Zheng He visited East African countries along the coastline on behalf of his government several times. Envoys from North and East African countries visited China as well. Official exchanges boosted relations.

It is worth pointing out that since at that time neither China nor Africa had entered the capitalism stage of development; their exchanges in size and extent were constrained by low productivity, backward transportation and communication. For over 2,000 years China-Africa exchanges, mainly in economic and trade areas, were limited to North Africa and East Africa. Since exchanges during the period were not institutionalized, they took place intermittently. In other words, when economy in China or African countries grew at a faster pace and their national strength became greater, there were more frequent exchanges. In the opposite case exchanges dwindled or even ceased.

Secondly, China-Africa exchanges were conducted peacefully between equals. There has never been any territorial dispute or political conflict. Exchanges enable them to trade for what they need and to develop friendship.

Ancient China-Africa relations were equal friendly exchanges in politics and economy between independent countries and nations. National strengths might vary on the two sides, but the strong never took advantage of the weak or plundered the latter through unfair means (violence, deception, pillage). Available data reveals no armed conflicts, plundering, robbery, or seizure of each other's territory throughout the history of China-African relations. Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out during his visit to South Africa that "In history China has never occupied a single inch of land in Africa, neither has it been engaged in slave trade." Quite the opposite. Through peaceful exchanges, Chinese silk, pottery and their manufacturing techniques were spread to Africa, so did the four major Chinese inventions in ancient times. On the other hand, techniques for making glazed glass, glass and sugar were disseminated from Africa to China. African plants (spices, grapes, cotton and watermelons), astronomy, medical knowledge and acrobatics spread into China, playing a positive role in promoting the socio-economic development on both sides. Evidently, thousands of years of ancient China-Africa relations help accumulate practical experience and develop good heritage.

Europe-Africa relations are characterized by a different set of features:

Firstly, Europe-Africa relations took place mainly in modern times. However, from the very beginning the European powers imposed an unequal relationship between Europe and Africa through violent means.

In ancient times, Europe had almost no contact with Africa except for North Africa.

Starting from the 15th century, major European countries launched 400 years' slave trade in order to develop colonies in the Americas and other places. Portugal, Spain, UK, France, Germany and Denmark entered Africa one after another, capturing native Africans for slave trade almost all over Africa. Upon the end of slave trade, European powers carved Africa up into colonies. There are two things outstanding in modern Europe-Africa relationship: firstly, European powers resorted to force in developing Europe-Africa relationship, be it in slave trade, carving up Africa or colonial rule. Secondly, modern Europe-Africa relationship has been unequal since the very beginning. Europe dominated the relationship while Africa became its subject. In slave trade, European slave dealers forced Africans into slavery and then transported them to places like the Americas, where they were driven to work intensively. When African countries became European colonies, African people lost their autonomy in politics and economy, their sole purpose of existence being satisfying the needs of European suzerains.

Secondly, modern Europe-Africa relations abound with conflicts. Struggle has been a major theme.

Since modern Europe-Africa relationship is an unequal relationship based on violence, this relationship abounds with conflicts, contradictions and struggle. Forced into this relationship, Africa has suffered greatly; therefore it is ready to overturn such an unfair relationship. On the contrary, European powers, being creators and beneficiaries of this relationship, have been trying to protect and maintain this relationship. Direct conflicts of interests between the two sides give rise to constant struggle, sometimes even to life-and-death struggle. Slave rebellions, anti-colonialism uprisings and movements towards national independence well illustrate African people's attitude against such a relationship; whereas European powers try to maintain this relationship by creating and publicizing racialist theories, and by implementing colonial rules.

In summary, historically speaking, despite the long history of China-Africa relations, the understanding between the two parties is far from comprehensive owing to the limitations in frequency and geographical coverage of exchanges. By contrast, since Europe has formed close relations with Africa in modern times, its understanding of Africa is much deeper and more comprehensive. However, the rancor between European countries and African countries accumulated during the long period of confrontation is detrimental to Europe-Africa relations. The absence of conflicts in China-Africa relations is conducive to the establishment and development of a healthy two-way relationship. Heritages for China and Europe in their respective relationship with Africa differ.

II

Secondly, let's discuss China-Africa relations and Europe-Africa relations from a realistic perspective.

Europe-Africa relationship evolves with time since the independence of African countries. In the meantime, the impact of history can still be felt.

Firstly, Europe can no longer dominate Africa. African countries have a growing sense of independence and autonomy.

Since the independence of the African continent, there have been fundamental changes in Europe-Africa relationship, switching from one between rulers and subjects to another between equals. In other words, European countries no longer dominate Africa, and Europe-Africa relationship has been transformed into an equal relationship between independent countries or nations. The internal and external policies of African countries are no longer oriented towards European interests. Instead they are focused on regional and national interests. It is worth mentioning that after ridding themselves of colonialism, African countries have been eager to part with backwardness and secondary positions, for which various efforts have been made. From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), from Organization of African Unity to African Union, they have been trying hard to pursue unity, self reliance and autonomous development. African countries have come to realize that they should promote development through self-dependence instead of external assistance, that they are equal partners instead of secondary affiliates to the rest of the world. The rising awareness of independence has strengthened the position of African countries in Europe-Africa relationship.

Secondly, Europe still exercises rather great influence on Africa.

After de-colonization Europe-Africa relationship is no longer one between colonies and suzerains. However, the traditional Europe-Africa relationship will not go away overnight. The two sides are still related in many ways. Politically speaking, many African countries still maintain a special relationship with their former suzerain, who is usually their biggest helper in finance. Culturally speaking, the language of the former suzerain is usually the official language of the African country, where the culture of the suzerain still has quite some influence. At present, EU is Africa's biggest trading partner, the value of two-way trade amounting to US\$315.2 billion. EU is Africa's biggest donor, its 2006 African aid standing at US\$51.3 billion. EU is also the biggest buyer of African energy, its import of oil from Africa accounting for 36% of total African oil export. Thus it can be seen that owing to historical reasons Europe is still very influential in Africa.

Thirdly, traditional European mentality still exists in Europe-Africa relationship.

Traditional European mentality still plays a role in African relations. Europe finds it difficult to part with its “colonial complex,” meddling with internal affairs of African countries at every turn. In the political arena, Europe is used to judge and measure Africa with its own values, resorting to sanctions or military means when African countries fail to meet “European standards” in human rights, good governance, etc. In the economic arena, Europe often regards its responsibility and obligation in assistance as a favor or charity. Moreover, it imposes the Western economic model on African countries. The “economic restructuring” in the 1980s is a good case in point. Besides, assistance promised by European countries often end up unrealized. Trade protectionism prevails in trade with Africa.

Thus it can be seen that it will take a long time to transform Europe-Africa relations after the independence of African countries. African countries have to continue the exchange and cooperation with European countries for a long time to come, but they want to stand on an equal footing. However, out of historical reasons European countries still rely on the traditional mentality in dealing with African countries. There is no doubt that such practices by European countries will be opposed by African countries. Therefore there are both cooperation and conflicts in contemporary Europe-Africa relations. It has to be pointed out that the change in nature of Europe-Africa relations is an irreversible historical process, during which European countries will deepen their understanding of the evolving position of the African continent and make strategic adjustments accordingly. The “restructuring” in the 1980s, the EU-Africa Common Strategy proposed by EU in the end of 2006, and the “equal partnership” suggested by EU at the 2007 Europe-Africa Summit (as European Commissioner for development and humanitarian aid Louis Michel stated, Europe-Africa relationship will have been “revolutionized” ever since) have clearly demonstrated positive changes in Europe’s African policy. The truth is that there is still a long way to go before the establishment of a healthy new relationship based on equality and mutual benefit between Europe and Africa. More time is needed to attain harmony in Europe-Africa relations.

In contrast, the contemporary China-Africa relationship has the following characteristics:

Firstly, that both are developing countries serves as foundation for the development of China -Africa relations.

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the independence of African countries unveiled contemporary China-Africa relationship. Both being developing countries, China and African countries has quite something in common: similar fate in history (in modern times both suffered from colonial invasions and rules, thereby missing historical opportunities for independent development); and common development goals (to consolidate political independence and to develop national economy). Both being developing countries, China and African countries have

identical or similar views on many major issues related to peace and development, such as North-South relationship, the establishment of a new international political and economic order. Apart from that, enduring friendship between two parties also explain they can trust each other and treat each other as equals. At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit President Hu Jintao pointed out that, “During the past five decades, the Chinese and African people have forged close unity, and our friendship has flourished.... Today, China-Africa friendship is deeply rooted in the hearts of our two peoples, and our friendship has endured the test of time and changes in the world. This is because we have never strayed from the principle of enhancing friendship, treating each other as equals, extending mutual support and promoting common development in building our ties.” After half a century’s development and improvement, China and African countries have become “good brothers, good friends and good partners.”

Secondly, China-Africa relationship has changed as time changes. New contents and characteristics have emerged along the way.

Contemporary China-Africa relationship has gone through three stages since diplomatic relations were first established in 1956. The first phase, or the beginning stage, started from 1956 and ended in 1979. During this period, owing to polarity and the Cold War, China-Africa relationship was political in nature. Between 1977 and 1999, China-Africa relationship went into a stage of adjustment. Leaders in China and Africa adapted the relationship to changes in the environment as they maintained sound political ties. The focus of China-Africa relationship started to shift from politics to economy. The third phase, or the mature stage of China-Africa relationship, started in 2000. Upon entry into the 21st century, the two sides decided to strengthen friendly cooperation in order to join forces in handling changes posed by economic globalization and to promote common development. It is with this aim in mind that the Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in Beijing in 2000. The establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation provides an institutionalized strategic platform for the strengthening of two-way exchanges, communication and cooperation. It is worth mentioning that in January 2006, the Chinese Government published the African Policy Paper, in which it proposed to establish and develop a new strategic partnership with African countries featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. Looking back at the three phases of contemporary China-Africa relationship, one can see clearly that, over the past half century, with care from both sides, China-Africa relationship has developed and matured over the time.

Thirdly, problems have emerged in China-Africa relationship.

In recent years, the extent of China-Africa exchange and cooperation has been growing thanks to the rapid development in China-Africa relations. Problems arise, too, such as the ones in trading structure and investment structure. Most Chinese

investment is in the field of energy, and China's light textile export to Africa impacts the national industry of some African countries. These problems emerge as China-Africa relationship develops. Therefore they can be resolved through consultation between the two sides. Having realized the existence of such issues, the Chinese Government has taken effective measures to tackle them.

Realistically speaking, China-Africa relationship and Europe-Africa relationship have different characteristics. Europe still exercises great influence over Africa (especially the former colonies) in politics because of historical reasons. In economy it is Africa's largest trading partner and donor. Close relations in politics and economy between the two sides ensure the important position of Europe in Africa. By contrast, since both China and African countries are still developing countries, they have identical or similar interests in many major issues. They understand and respect each other. A new strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, cultural exchange, cooperation in security and international issues has been formed. Of course, both China-Africa relationship and Europe-Africa relationship have respective shortcomings. Europe must reposition its relationship with Africa, get rid of the European-centered mentality and regard Africa as an equal partner in the true sense of the word. On the other hand, China must face up to and resolve problems arising from the rapid growth of China-Africa relations.

III

China, Africa and Europe are all important members of the international community. China being the world's largest developing country and Africa having the highest concentration of developing countries in the world, China-Africa relationship represents South-South relationship to a certain extent. Europe having the highest concentration of developed countries in the world, Africa having the highest concentration of developing countries in the world, Europe-Africa relationship represents North-South relationship to some extent. Both South-South relationship and North-South relationship are essential to the peace and development of today's world. Therefore, handling the interaction between China-Africa relationship and Europe-Africa relationship well will be conducive to the development of all three sides, the maintenance of world peace and the promotion of global economy.

China and Europe share many things in common in their respective relationship with Africa. For example, both advocate peace, stability and development of the African continent; both want to strengthen capacity building in Africa; both hope to see an Africa that is continuously growing; both are making efforts to practice what they advocate in Africa. Therefore, similar interests in Africa make it possible for China and Europe to cooperate.

Of course differences exist between China and Europe in African relationship. For example, the two sides differ in economic development and regime, as well as in

views on and perceptions of issues related to Africa, therefore they adopt different positions and approaches to action. As a result, there might be competition, or even contradictions and conflicts between China and Europe over Africa.

It is natural for competition to arise between China and Europe over Africa as economic globalization goes further. The aim of China's African policy is to strengthen cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, to achieve common development. China-Africa relationship is not targeted at any third party. Neither does it exclude anyone. The rising influence of China in Africa does not pose challenge or threat to Europe's interests in Africa. It is a pity that, with the rapid development of China-Africa relations, few Europeans have criticized China-Africa relationship in recent years by putting forward theories like "China threat" and "neo-colonialism," which are unwise because they mislead people on the nature and importance of China-Africa relationship. As it is known to all China is the biggest developing country while Africa has the highest concentration of developing countries. Without peace and development in China and Africa there won't be peace and development in the world. In the new situation China and Africa are seeing more common interests and mutual needs. It is an innate demand of China-Africa cooperation to set up a new strategic partnership between the two sides, and it is a necessity for the promotion of peace and development in the world. An evolving China-Africa relationship is conducive not only to the development and progress of the two sides, but also to unity and cooperation among developing countries. Besides, it helps the world move toward a fair and just new international political and economic order.

China, Europe and Africa are all important members of the international community. They are important partners to each other as well, all committed to enduring peace and common prosperity in the world. At the moment both China-Africa relationship and Europe-Africa relationship are at a new historical stage. Therefore, for the sake of common interests, the three sides should interact with each other in a constructive manner to achieve a win-win outcome on the basis of mutual respect and equal consultation. The effectiveness of dialogue and cooperation among China, Europe and Africa depends first and foremost on whether they can remove the Cold War mentality, deepen mutual understanding and treat each other as true equals. I believe this seminar is a good opportunity for us to exchange and communicate.

中非关系与欧非关系的几点比较¹

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中国、欧洲和非洲均为国际社会的重要成员，中非关系和欧非关系也是国际关系中重要组成部分。近年来，中非关系和欧非关系都得到了不同程度的发展。但是，必须看到，中非关系与欧非关系存在许多差异，正是这些差异决定了中非关系与欧非关系有着不同的内容和表现方式。因此，对中非关系和欧非关系进行一些比较，有利于彼此的沟通 and 了解，从而进一步推动中非关系和欧非关系的发展。

(一)

首先，从历史的角度看中非关系与欧非关系之间的差异。

中非关系的历史具有以下特点：

中非交往的历史悠久，但是缺乏持久性和经常性。

中非交往的历史十分悠久。中国和非洲虽然相距万里，但是中非人民克服地理和环境的障碍，在二千余年的漫长历史中，互通有无，相互交流，不断地推动双方经贸关系的发展。

在世界四大古代文明发祥地中，中国的黄河流域位于世界东端，而非洲的尼罗河流域则处于西端。中国和非洲的悠久历史为中非关系的发生和发展提供了极其广阔的历史舞台。据研究，中非经贸关系早在公元前已经形成。在公元前2世纪中国汉朝时期，中非已经发生了间接的贸易往来。一些中国产品，如丝绸和器皿，被转运到非洲，而产自非洲的商品，如象牙、犀角等，则进入中国。在唐代，中国与阿拉伯帝国发生较多往来，中国产品进入北非和东非沿海。宋代的海上贸易发展很快，中国的产品已经从东非沿海走进内陆，在津巴布韦和林波波河南岸都发现了宋瓷。进入元代，中国通往非洲的航线不断向南伸延，在频繁的交往中，双方的人员开始直接互访，汪大渊周游非洲和伊本·白图泰的中国之行，就是最好的例子。明代把中非古代关系推入高潮，郑和下西洋是高潮的标志。郑和代表政府数次访问了东非沿海地区的国家，而北非和东非国家的官方使者也访问了中国。官方的往来有力推动了双方关系的发展。

必须指出的是，由于中国和非洲都处于前资本主义社会，低下的生产力水平和落后的交通和通讯条件决定了中非关系的交往领域和规模。在二千多年时间里，中非交往主要聚焦于经济贸易领域，且集中在北非和东非等局部地区；鉴于当时的交往没有定期的制度或者机制，因此表现出断断续续的特点，换言之，当

¹ 本文所指的非洲，乃撒哈拉以南非洲；欧洲指欧盟，尤以德、英、法国为代表。

中国或者非洲国家的经济得到较快发展，国力强盛时，这种交往就会出现，且频率较高；反之，这种交往就会减少甚至停止。

第二，中非之间的交往，是以和平的方式所进行的平等的交流。在长期交往中，中非之间没有发生过领土纠纷或者政治纠葛。通过交流，双方在经济上沟通有无，在政治上构建友谊。

古代中非关系是独立的国家和民族之间平等友好的政治经济交流，尽管双方的国力强弱不等，但是始终没有出现以强凌弱或者以不正当手段（暴力、欺骗、抢掠）窃取对方财富的现象。从现有的资料看，中国和非洲国家在交往中从来没有发生武装冲突，没有出现掠夺、抢劫、或者占领对方领土的情况。正如温家宝总理今年访问南非时指出：“从历史上去考证，中国从来没有占领非洲一寸土地，从来没有贩卖奴隶。”相反，通过和平的交流，中国的丝绸和瓷器及其制作技术传入非洲，中国的四大发明也传入非洲，而非洲的琉璃、玻璃和炼糖术传入中国，非洲的植物（香药、葡萄、棉花和西瓜）、天文和医学知识以及杂技传入中国，这对双方的经济和社会发展发挥了积极的推动作用。十分明显，历经千年的古代中非关系不但积累了丰富的实践经验，也形成和发展了良好的传统，这些丰厚的历史积淀成为中非关系的宝贵财富。

欧非关系的历史则具有不同特点：

欧非关系主要发生在近代以后。但是，从一开始，欧洲列强就以暴力为手段，强行建立欧非不平等关系。

在古代社会，除了北非外，欧洲与撒哈拉以南非洲基本上没有什么接触和来往。15世纪以后，为了开发美洲等殖民地，欧洲主要国家发起了长达400年的奴隶贸易。葡萄牙、西班牙、英国、法国、德国、丹麦等先后进入非洲，猎取和贩运非洲奴隶，奴隶贸易几乎席卷了整个非洲。奴隶贸易结束后，欧洲就掀起了瓜分非洲的狂潮，非洲沦为欧洲列强的殖民地。综观近代欧非关系，有二点特别明显：其一，欧洲列强始终使用暴力手段来建筑欧非关系。无论在奴隶贸易、瓜分或者殖民统治时期，暴力成为欧洲列强最经常使用的手段。其二，近代的欧非关系，从一开始就是一种不平等关系。欧洲成为这种关系的主导者和统治者，而非洲则成为这种关系的被动接受者和被统治者。在奴隶贸易中，欧洲奴隶贩子把非洲居民强行沦为奴隶，然后贩运到美洲等地，从事超强度劳动；沦为殖民地后，非洲居民更是丧失了政治经济主权，满足宗主国的殖民利益成为非洲殖民地社会生活的宗旨。

第二，近代以来的欧非关系充满了冲突，斗争贯彻于欧非关系的全过程。

由于近代欧非关系是建立在暴力基础上的一种不平等关系，因此这种关系充满了矛盾、冲突和斗争。在这种关系中，非洲属于被迫接受的一方，它的利益大受伤害；因此它随时准备推翻这种不平等关系。相反，欧洲列强是这种关系的缔造者和受益者，因此它始终保护和维持这种关系。双方利益的直接冲突，使这种关系自始至终充满了斗争，这种斗争甚至达到你死我活的程度。奴隶暴动、反殖

民主义统治的起义和民族解放运动是非洲人民反抗这种关系的具体行动，而炮制和宣传种族主义理论、实行殖民主义统治则是欧洲列强维护这种关系的具体行动。

综上所述，从历史的角度看，中非关系的历史虽然悠久，但是由于时间的不经常性和空间的有限性，因此彼此的了解是不全面的，带有很大的局限性。相比之下，欧洲在近代后，由于与非洲形成了十分紧密的关系，因此对非洲的了解要全面和深刻得多。但是从另一方面看，欧洲国家与非洲长期处于对抗状态，因此积累了大量的历史积怨，这对于欧非关系十分不利。由于中国与非洲在历史上不存在任何矛盾和冲突，因此更易于建立和发展良好的双边关系。这就是中国和欧洲在对非关系上的不同历史遗产。

(二)

其次，从现实的角度看中非关系与欧非关系。

非洲国家独立后的欧非关系，一方面随着历史的变化而变化，另一方面受到历史惯性的影响，在一定程度上保留了历史的痕迹，这表现为：

欧洲已经无法主宰非洲。非洲国家追求独立自主的意识日益强烈。

非洲大陆独立后，欧非关系发生了根本的转变，其性质从统治与被统治关系，转向平等关系。这意味着欧洲国家已经从主宰非洲的地位上跌落下来，欧非关系已经成为独立的国家或者民族之间的平等关系。非洲国家的内政外交不再以欧洲的利益为指针，而以本地区和本民族的利益为标准。值得一提的是，摆脱了殖民统治后，非洲国家急切希望改变落后和依附状态。为此，他们进行了各种探索。从《拉各斯计划》到《非洲发展新伙伴计划》，从非洲统一组织到非洲联盟，清晰反映非洲国家追求联合自强、自主发展的倾向。非洲国家已经清楚认识到：非洲的发展不能依赖外部的援助，而应该立足于自力更生；非洲与外部世界的关系不能是依附关系，而应该是平等的伙伴关系。非洲国家独立意识的提升，使非洲在欧非关系中的独立地位得到强化。

欧洲对非洲仍然具有较大的影响。

欧非关系在经历了非殖民化的冲击后，虽然殖民地和宗主国的关系已经不复存在，但是欧非之间的传统关系在短时间内还不可能完全消失，双方尚有千丝万缕的联系。在政治上，许多非洲国家与前宗主国保持着比较特殊的关系，如许多英国前殖民地仍然是英联邦成员；在经济上，非洲国家与欧洲前宗主国的经济关系依然十分紧密，前宗主国往往是最大的财政援助国；在文化上，前宗主国的语言往往是非洲国家的官方语言，前宗主国的文化依然具有一定的影响。目前，欧盟是非洲最大的贸易伙伴，双边贸易额达 3152 亿美元。欧盟是非洲的最大捐助者，2006 年的援非总额达到 513 亿美元。欧盟还是非洲能源的最大主顾，从非洲进口的石油占非洲石油出口总量的 36%。由此可见，由于历史惯性作用，欧洲在非洲仍然具有很大的影响。

在欧非关系中，欧洲的传统思维依旧存在。

在对非关系上，欧洲国家的传统思维依然发挥作用。欧洲一直难以割舍其“殖民情结”，动辄对非洲国家内部事务指手画脚。在政治领域，欧洲习惯用自己的价值观去观察和衡量非洲，因而当非洲国家在人权、良政等方面不能达到“欧洲标准”时，就会使用制裁或者军事手段进行干涉。在经济领域，欧洲常常把把自己应承担的责任与援助义务视为恩赐与施舍，并把西方经济运作模式强加给非洲国家。1980年代的“经济结构调整”就是一个很好的例子。此外，欧洲国家许诺的援助常常不落实，在对非贸易中，贸易保护主义盛行。

由此看来，非洲国家独立后欧非关系的转型将是一个长期的过程。对于非洲国家来说，在相当长时间里，它们仍需要与欧洲国家的交流和合作，但是这种交流和合作必须是平等的。然而，欧洲国家在历史惯性的作用下，依然用传统思维处理对非关系。无疑，欧洲国家的上述做法必然遇到非洲国家的反对，因此，当代欧非关系会出现既合作又冲突的局面。必须指出，欧非关系性质的转变是一个不可逆转的历史进程。在这个进程中，欧洲国家对非洲大陆地位的变化认识将不断深化，并随之调整对非战略。从1980年代的“结构调整”到2006年底欧盟提出“欧盟—非洲共同战略”，再到2007年欧非峰会上欧盟提出要与非洲建立真正的“平等伙伴”关系（欧盟委员会负责发展和人道援助的委员米歇尔称，欧非关系自此将出现“革命性转变”），已经清晰显示了欧洲对非政策的积极变化。情况表明，欧非之间建立平等互利、健康发展的新型关系仍有相当大的难度。一些问题不是在短时间内可以改变的。因此，欧非关系要达到和谐的状态，还需要时间。

相比之下，当代中非关系的特点是：

发展中国家的共同属性构成中非关系发展的基础。

新中国的成立和非洲国家的独立，开启了当代中非关系的序幕。中国和非洲国家都是发展中国家，因此具有共同属性，即相似的历史命运（在近代，中国和非洲国家都遭受殖民主义的入侵和统治，都丧失了独立自主发展的历史机会）和共同的发展目标（巩固政治独立和发展民族经济）。发展中国家的共同属性使中非双方在和平与发展的许多重大问题上，诸如南北关系、建立国际政治经济新秩序等，达成一致或者相近的看法。传统的历史友谊，加上发展中国家的共同属性，使中非双方能够相互信任，平等相待。胡锦涛主席在中非合作论坛北京峰会上指出：“50年来，中非人民紧密团结，中非友好不断深化。今天，中非友好已深深扎根在双方人民心中。中非友好之所以能够经受住历史岁月和国际风云变幻的考验，关键是在发展相互关系中始终坚持真诚友好、平等相待、相互支持、共同发展的正确原则”。中非关系在半个世纪里不断扩展和完善，已经成为“好兄弟、好朋友、好伙伴”。

第二是，中非关系与时俱进，不断赋予新的时代内容和特色。

自1956年中非开启外交关系以来，现代中非关系大致走过了三个发展阶段。

第一阶段为 1956 年~1976 年，这是现代中非关系初创时期。在这一时期，受两极格局和冷战的影响，中非关系主要表现为政治关系。第二阶段为 1977~1999 年，这是中非关系的调整时期。在这个时期，中非领导人根据形势的变化，及时调整中非关系。具体表现为：在继续保持良好的政治关系的同时，中非关系的重心开始由政治转向经济；第三阶段为 2000 年至今，这是中非关系进入了成熟时期。进入 21 世纪，中非双方为了共同应对经济全球化挑战，促进共同发展，决定进一步加强在新形势下的友好合作，为此召开中非合作论坛北京 2000 年部长级会议。“中非合作论坛”的成立为加强双边交流、沟通和合作建立了机制化的战略平台。值得一提的是 2006 年，1 月中国政府发表《中国对非洲政策文件》，正式提出与非洲国家建立和发展政治上平等互信、经济上合作共赢、文化上交流互鉴的新型战略伙伴关系。梳理现代中非关系发展的三个阶段，我们不难发现，在半个世纪中，中非关系在中非双方的共同呵护和关心下，与时俱进，根据形势的变化而及时调整政策，使之健康成长，日益成熟。

第三，中非关系出现的问题。

近年来，由于中非关系的快速拓展，中非交流和合作的领域和范围迅速扩展，由此也产生了一些问题，诸如贸易结构和投资结构的问题。中国在非洲的投资偏重于能源领域，而中国对非出口的轻纺产品又对某些非洲国家的民族工业造成了一定程度的冲击。这些问题是中非关系中出现的较新问题，但是，又是属于中非关系发展进程中遇到的问题，因此，在双方的协商下，完全可以解决。中国政府已经意识到这些问题，并且采取了有效措施，因此，问题正在得到逐步解决。

从现实的角度看，中非关系与欧非关系各具特点。欧洲借助历史惯性，在政治上对非洲（尤其是其前殖民地）仍保持巨大的影响，在经济上是非洲的最大的贸易伙伴与援助者，双方的政治、经济交往十分密切，这使欧洲在非洲占有重要的地位。相比之下，中国与非洲同是发展中国家，因此在许多重大问题上具有共同或者相似的利益，双方相互理解，相互尊重，现在已经形成新型战略伙伴关系，即政治上相互信任、经济上互利共赢、文化上相互借鉴、安全上相互合作和国际问题上相互配合。当然，中非关系与欧非关系也各具不足。欧洲必须对欧非关系重新定位，克服“欧洲中心论”，真正把非洲作为自己平等的伙伴。对中国而言，中非关系的快速发展也出现了一些问题，这是中国必须正视和解决的。

（三）

中国、非洲和欧洲都是国际社会重要成员，就中非关系而言，中国是世界上最大的发展中国家，非洲是世界上发展中国家最集中的大陆，因此，中非关系在一定程度上代表了南南关系；就欧非关系而言，欧洲是世界上发达国家集中的地区，非洲是发展中国家最集中的大陆，因此，欧非关系则在一定程度上代表了南北关系。无论是南南关系，还是南北关系，对于当代世界的和平与发展，都具有重要的影响。因此，处理好中非关系与欧非关系之间的相互关系，对于三方的发展，对于维护世界和平和推动全球经济的发展，都具有积极的意义。

中欧在对非关系领域有不少共同之处。比如，中、欧都主张维护非洲大陆的

和平、稳定与发展，都主张加强非洲自身的能力建设，均希望看到一个持续发展的非洲，均在身体力行为非洲国家维护和平、稳定和实现共同发展做出努力。这表明，中欧在非洲有着相近的关注重点，有着进行合作的潜能。

当然，中欧在对非关系上也存在许多差异：比如，中欧经济发展水平和社会制度相异，彼此之间在关于非洲的一些问题上持有不同看法和不同感受。因此在行动上会采取不同的立场和方法。这表明，中欧在非洲事务上可能存在竞争、甚至矛盾和冲突。

在经济全球化深入发展的今天，中欧在非洲出现一定竞争是正常的。中国对非政策目标是加强平等友好互利合作，实现共同繁荣发展，中非关系不针对、不排斥任何第三方。中国在非洲影响的上升，对欧洲在非洲的利益并不构成挑战，更谈不上威胁。令人遗憾的是，随着中非关系的快速发展，近年来欧洲少数人对中非关系发难，抛出了“中国威胁论”和“新殖民主义论”。这是极不明智的行动，因为这些论调混淆中非关系的实质及其重要性。众所周知，中国是最大的发展中国家，非洲是发展中国家最集中的大陆。没有中国和非洲的和平与发展，就没有世界的和平与发展。在新形势下，中非共同利益在扩大，相互需求在增加。建立中非新型战略伙伴关系是中非合作的内在需要，也是促进世界和平与发展的必然要求。中非关系不断发展，不仅有利于中国和非洲的发展进步，而且有利于促进发展中国家的团结合作，有利于推动建立公正合理的国际政治经济新秩序。

中国、欧洲和非洲都是国际社会重要成员，彼此是重要的合作伙伴，都致力于促进世界的持久和平与普遍繁荣。当前中非和欧非关系都处在新的、重要的历史阶段，因此，中欧非三方在相互尊重、平等协商的基础上，实现良性互动与合作共赢，这才是三方的共同利益所在。中欧非要进行有效的对话与合作，最重要的在于有关各方之间能否摒弃冷战思维，加深相互理解，完全平等相待。我想，此次研讨会就是相互沟通和交流的一次机会。

Trilateral Relations between the EU, China and Africa: The European Perspective

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It is difficult to write about something that is practically nonexistent. Institutionally speaking, there are no trilateral relations between the European Union, China and Africa. At most, the bilateral relations of the EU and Africa, China and Africa, or the EU and China can be cited. Their common denominator is China's growing involvement in Africa, accompanied by a visible EU's fear of losing economic and political influence on the African continent, and anxiety about the future of African states in the context of the EU's attempt to build an effective system of global governance. The EU's answer to this situation is the idea of trilateral cooperation, which presupposes common efforts and an understanding between the EU, China and Africa on behalf of peace, stability and sustained development on the African continent. This idea was presented at the Ninth EU-China summit in September 2006. The joint statement issued during this meeting contained the following lines:

“Leaders also stressed the importance of their relations with Africa, and stated their commitment to work together on behalf of Africa's peace, stability and sustainable development. [...] The Leaders agreed to pursue a structured dialogue about Africa and explore avenues for practical cooperation on the ground in partnership with the African side, including with the support of NEPAD initiatives and with the aim of attaining the Millennium Development Goals.”¹

An understanding between the EU and China and the active participation of African states is of key importance for the development of this trilateral cooperation. However, a year and a half after beginning structural dialogue on the subject of Africa it would seem that not much has been achieved. Differences in the assumptions underlying Chinese and EU policies with regard to Africa are still a major problem.

EU-Africa. New Interests and Challenges

The European Union has for years pursued its own policy with regard to individual regions in Africa. It is developing relations with the Maghreb in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is also pursuing a separate policy with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa in the context of the dialogue between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of State. In terms of trade the EU remains the first economic partner of Africa, with exportation of merchandise amounting to €91,6 billion and importation reaching €125,6 billion in 2005. Together with the member states, it is the most important donor of official development aid for Africa. In 2006 the EU collective ODA amounted to €48 billion.²

For many years, the policy pursued by the EU in the different regions of Africa was regional in character and reflected many varying concepts. There was no coordination

¹ Ninth EU - China Summit, Helsinki 9 September 2006, Joint Statement, Brussels, 11 September 2006, 12642/06 (Presse 249), p. 4, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf.

² From Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 27.6.2007, COM(2007) 357 final, pp. 2-3.

between measures taken. The EU's efforts to formulate a comprehensive policy with regard to Africa led to a meeting between European Union and African heads of state and governments in Cairo in April 2000. Obstacles were encountered, however, in implementing the operational plan adopted during this meeting. Given the limited interest shown by the EU, which was absorbed by its own transformations (such as EU enlargement and institutional reforms), and the weakness of African regional groups that could become institutional partners for the EU, the results of the first years of dialogue between the EU and Africa were limited. In consequence, the meeting of European Union and African heads of state planned for 2003 was postponed indefinitely.

In the last few years, institutional factors have emerged that make it easier to conduct a more coordinated policy toward Africa. The African Union (AU), which was established in 2002 and oversees the African continent's development plan within the context of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), is a partner with which the European Union can maintain dialogue on an equal level. There has also been rapid development in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), giving the EU the ability to conduct military and civilian operations for the resolution of local conflicts threatening the stability and development of African states. The EU enlargement was successfully ended. Finally, with the approbation of the Lisbon Treaty the EU overcame a very important internal crisis connected with the institutional reform of the organization.

Institutional factors are undoubtedly important, as they facilitate dialogue and the realization of specific tasks, yet new interests and challenges that have emerged in the past few years and which are connected with the African continent have become of key importance in the EU's increased interest in Africa. Such developments as a growing need for energy resources, the struggle against terrorism and the problem of migration, have led the EU to a major reassessment of its view of Africa. In this context, in September 2006, the EU adopted a strategy with regard to Africa.³ This document and the EU-Africa summit, that took place in December 2007, reflect the adaptation of EU policy to new circumstances (threats and challenges) that require coordinated and cohesive steps with regard to the continent as a whole.

African states have traditionally been suppliers of energy resources to Europe.⁴ Natural gas has grown increasingly important for the EU given its lower impact on the environment than petroleum. It has rapidly become Europe's fuel of choice for power generation. The EU's need for this resource is growing at a rate of 3% annually, and over the next 25 years consumption of this product in the EU will double. European natural gas consumption currently represents 18% of world consumption. European gas imports are expected to reach slightly over 80% by 2030.⁵ The African gas producing and transit states, that are most important for the EU, are obviously the Maghreb states. Presently, Algeria is the third largest supplier of natural gas to the EU, supplying about 23% of this resource to EU countries (the first largest supplier is Russia – 29%, followed by Norway – 27%). Aside from the Maghreb states, it should

³ Beata Wojna, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Afryki - nowy dokument programowy* in *Biuletyn (PISM)*, No. 4 (344), 12 .01.2006.

⁴ Beata Wojna, *Afryka Północna jako źródło surowców energetycznych dla Unii Europejskiej* in *Biuletyn (PISM)*, No. 29 (369), 9.0.2006.

⁵ Green Paper, *A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*, Brussels, 8.3.2006, COM(2006) 105 final, p. 3, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf.

be borne in mind that 2.9% of the world's natural gas reserves are located in Nigeria. The planned construction of the trans-Saharan gas pipeline linking Nigeria, Algeria and the Mediterranean Sea basin raises justified interest in this African region.

The EU has also other reasons for looking toward Africa besides its own energy security. It sees other threats to security originating from this neighbouring and geographically very proximate continent. The activeness of terrorist organizations in Maghreb states is disturbing, as this could produce a direct threat to the internal security of EU member states. I.e., the investigation into the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid showed the ties between the perpetrators and Moroccan terrorist organizations.⁶ Terrorist groups from Northwest Africa are used to conduct small scale attacks, raise funds, recruit and conducted other support activities across the Trans-Sahara. Terrorism also contributes to political instability in countries in East Africa. Sudan has for many years been on the American list of states sponsoring terrorism. Terrorist groups with ties to Al-Qaida, active in Somalia and neighbouring countries, are a destabilizing factor. Somalia remains a concern, as the country's unsecured borders and continued political instability provide opportunities for terrorist transit and/or organization.⁷

The growing migration of people to European countries, and particularly to the Union's southern members, such as Spain, Italy and France, constitutes a next serious problem. Illegal immigrants enter the Community states by various means, i.e. by land, air and sea, although it appears that the Mediterranean Basin is one of the primary channels, if not the top one, through which the immigrants penetrate into the European Union. It is estimated that from 100,000 to 120,000 illegal immigrants cross the Mediterranean Basin annually, of whom approximately 55,000 are illegal immigrants coming from its southern and eastern regions, some 35,000 come from the Sub-Saharan area and approximately 30,000 from other regions, e.g. Asia.⁸

Over the last years, migration pressure in the Mediterranean region has grown substantially. For a long period, migrants originated mainly from Maghreb states. At present, they are increasingly coming from sub-Saharan Africa, while the Maghreb has become a transit area for emigrants on their way to the EU. The Europeans realized that the effective curtailment of this emigration requires coordinated steps to be taken in both regions in summer of 2005, when, in a few days, hundreds of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa tried to force their way through the

⁶ See Auto de Juzgado Central de Instrucción no 6 sobre los atentados terroristas del día 11 de marzo de 2004 en Madrid in Audiencia Nacional, Administración de Justicia, sumario, No. 20/2004, p. 1441, <http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2006/04/11/autohtml/>.

⁷ Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, U.S. Department of State, 30 April 2007. According to the Report, "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) merged with Al-Qaida in September and changed its name to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM/GSPC continued to operate in the Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad to recruit extremists within the region for training and terrorist operations in the Trans-Sahara and, possibly, for operations outside the region. Its new alliance with Al-Qaida potentially has given it access to more resources and training."

⁸ More on the subject in Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean, Mediterranean Migration Observatory University Research Institute for Urban Environment and Human Resources, Panteion University Athens, Greece, September 2005, http://aei.pitt.edu/7046/02/Migration_in_the_Middle_East_and_Mediterranean.pdf; See also Migration dynamics and dialogue in the Western Mediterranean, in World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration, International Organization for Migration, pp. 75-81, http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/wmr_sec01.pdf; Gemma Aubarell and Xavier Argall, Immigration and the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Keys to Policy and Trends, in EuroMeSCo Papers, No. 47, September 2005, http://www.euromesco.net/imgupload/euromesco_paper_47.pdf.

Moroccan/Spanish border in order to reach Ceuta and Melilla, a Spanish territory in North Africa.⁹ Under the circumstances, José Luis Zapatero's government demanded EU assistance in solving the crisis situation that emerged on the Spanish/EU-Moroccan border. In response, at the informal meeting of the European Council held at Hampton Court on 27 October 2005, EU heads of states and governments called for a comprehensive approach to the problem of immigration. One month later, the European Commission put forward a list of priority actions intended to improve the general situation related to illegal immigration, with a special focus on the Mediterranean Basin and African states. This document represented the basis for the "Global approach to migration: priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean."¹⁰

The EU's prescription for stabilizing the political situation on the African continent, which is shaken by all sorts of conflicts, is to reinforce peace and security through measures aimed at averting and resolving these disturbances. Peace in Africa is a precondition for Africa's development. The EU and the African Union have been working together toward this end since 2003. In the last few years, the EU's involvement in conducting civilian and military crisis management operations in Africa has increased and is a sign of the EU's growing interest in the situation of the African continent.¹¹ Another area of EU activity in Africa is its assistance on behalf of good government, the reinforcement of institutions, the struggle against corruption and the promotion of human rights. The EU is also striving to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), defined by the UN in the year 2000 as the struggle against poverty, hunger, disease, environmental degradation and discrimination against women in developing countries.

Against this background, in July 2005, the EU agreed to reach the target of 0.7% of GNP to official development assistance by 2015. The EU has set itself the interim target of 0.56% ODA/GNI by 2010. These EU commitments should translate into €20 billion more ODA per year by 2010 and €45 billion more per year by 2015. Half of the increase is earmarked for Africa.¹² At the moment the main vehicle of the European aid to Africa is the 10th European Development Fund with €22.7 billion for the period 2008–2013 (some €3,78 billion a year) out of which approximately €20 billion will be allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa which is covered by Development Cooperation Instrument). The other main instrument for translating the Strategy into practice at EU level is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for partner countries in North Africa (€11,18 billion

⁹ Visit to Ceuta and Melilla – Mission Report, Technical mission to Morocco on illegal immigration, 7th October – 11th October 2005, MEMO/05/380, Brussels, 19 October 2005, annex, p. 2, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/380&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>; Rickard Sandell, ¿Saltaron o les empujaron? el aumento de la inmigración subsahariana, in *Analysis* ARI, No. 133/2005, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/890.asp>.

¹⁰ Global approach to migration: priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean, 15-16 December 2005, Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, pp. 7-10.

¹¹ As part of the European Security and Defense Policy, the European Union has completed four civilian and military crisis management operations in Africa: the EU Support to AMIS (Darfur), the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC), EUPOL Kinshasa, the EUFOR RD Congo, and the EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis). Presently the EU is conducting three missions: EUFOR TCHAD/RCA; EUPOL RD CONGO; EUSEC RD Congo. For more on the subject, see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g>.

¹² The European Consensus, Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European Union, in Official Journal C 46/01 of 24 February 2006, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:046:0001:0019:EN:PDF>.

the period 2007-2013). The African countries can apply also for funds from the Development Cooperation Instrument (1.244 billion for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries), from the new Stability Instrument (€2,06 billion for 2007-2013) and the new Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (€1,1 billion for 2007-2013). ECHO will also continue to provide humanitarian and emergency aid, at least another €4 billion to Africa.¹³

China's policy toward Africa: the EU's fears

“China merits special attention given its economic weight and political influence.”¹⁴ In reality, considerable anxiety on the part of the EU lies behind this neutral-sounding statement contained in the September 2005 *EU Strategy for Africa*, especially for the Union countries whose interests and foreign policy are connected with Africa.¹⁵ Beijing is becoming the EU's economic – especially in the domain of energy resources – and political rival in Africa.

China's presence in Africa is not new. However, there has been a marked increase in China's activity on the African continent since the beginning of the present decade.¹⁶ In fact, China has rapidly emerged as Africa's third most important trade partner, with total trade amounting to about €43 billion in 2006 (up from €30 billion in 2005) and with 23% of all Chinese oil imports now coming from Africa.¹⁷ Between 1999-2004 exports to China from Africa grew by 48% annually.¹⁸ Interest in Africa has been in large measure fuelled by China's economic growth in the 1980s and 90s. The successful development of the Chinese economy and new conditions – WTO membership and greater demand for resources – has led to China's interest in developing cooperation with Africa. Increased supplies of resources, including energy resources, are prerequisite for the continued success of the Chinese economy.¹⁹

China is primarily interested in gaining access to oil deposits and in assured supplies of petroleum. An almost 10% annual rate of economic growth has contributed to a rising demand for oil. Since 1993, China has become a net importer of oil and the demand for this resource has been rising steadily. As the Middle East has grown

¹³ The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership – The Way Forward and Key Achievements in 2006, Brussels, 11 December 2006, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st16/st16630.en06.pdf>.

¹⁴ EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's Development, Brussels, 12.10.2005, COM(2005) 489 final, p. 10,

http://www.delnga.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_country/eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf.

¹⁵ Africa is a subject of interest for countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. The newer members of the European Union from East-Central Europe are rather uninterested. The priorities of their foreign policies are connected with, firstly, the EU's eastern neighbors and, secondly, the Balkans. For more on the subject of the African policies of selected EU countries, see Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen, eds, *Africa and the North: between globalization and marginalization*, London and New York, Routledge, 2005.

¹⁶ See Joshua Eisenman, *China's Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa. Examining Beijing's Methods and Objectives* in Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, and Derek Mitchell, eds., *China and the Developing World. Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, M. E. Sharpe (Armonk, N.Y. and London, 2007), pp. 29-59.

¹⁷ From Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 27.6.2007, COM(2007) 357 final, p. 3.

¹⁸ Harry G. Broadman, *Africa's silk road: China and India's new economic frontier*, Washington, World Bank, 2007, p. 11.

¹⁹ Political reasons for China's interest in Africa, in addition to economic reasons, have been also emphasised. Ian Tylor claims that “Africa has been of value to the PRC [...] because of the influence that developing nations possess in the United Nations, and because Africa provides a large support base. [...] Whilst Beijing's priorities have increasingly focused on economic growth and development, the conceptualization of anti-hegemonism as a tool of Beijing's foreign policy has remained constant. Certainly, the developing world in general and Africa in particular has – and is – a most useful site for China to project its status claims and also, to act as a serviceable shield in times of crisis for Beijing.” See Ian Tylor, *China and Africa: engagement and compromise*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 3.

increasingly unstable in the wake of the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, China has sought to diversify its oil supplies. The most convenient region was Africa – home to almost 10% of the world’s known reserves – where, given the relatively modest undertakings of American and European oil corporations, there were wide possibilities for Chinese enterprises, which are actively supported by the Chinese government. 23% of all Chinese oil imports is coming now from Africa. Angola supplies 47% of Africa’s oil export to China, followed by Sudan (25%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (13%), Equatorial Guinea (9%) and Nigeria (3%).²⁰

In addition to oil, China is also interested in other types of natural resources. In Zambia and other places, it has invested 170 million USD in mining, mainly of copper, of which it is presently the world’s largest consumer. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, investments have been made in cobalt and copper mines and in the construction of roads leading to the mines. The construction of electrical power plants is also planned.²¹

China is presently Africa’s third trade partner. It is estimated that either directly through economic cooperation or indirectly through the rising price of natural resources and agricultural products that China imports, the “China effect” is responsible for one third of Africa’s 6% economic growth.²² This is China’s undoubted contribution to the economic development of the African continent. However, it is important to notice that Africa mainly exports petroleum and raw materials to China, while it imports more value-added commodities from China. Oil and natural gas are the most dominant category of products exported from Africa to China, accounting for more than 62% of total African exports to China, followed by ores and metals (17%) and agricultural raw materials (7%).²³ Increasing exports to China presents both opportunities and challenges to Africa. The continent could benefit from rapidly growing trade to achieve economic development or it could become merely a resource base for China and Asian economies as a whole.²⁴ The EU stresses the necessity of avoiding this second scenario.

In addition to Africa’s economic future, the EU’s anxiety is also fuelled by the fact that, for Africa, China is becoming an interesting alternative political partner – one that trades and offers assistance or loans without political preconditions. The EU’s efforts to strengthen institutions, fight corruption and promote human rights in African countries are thus undermined. China’s involvement in Sudan is a prime example. After the withdrawal of Western corporations due to the civil war and the humanitarian crisis, China became the foremost investor in the Sudan’s petroleum industry and associated infrastructure projects. China’s offer to Sudan was comprehensive in nature: extensive funding, expert technical assistance and a guarantee of protection from UN sanctions. Thanks to this, Sudan has become a net

²⁰ Harry G. Broadman, *Africa's silk road: China and India's new economic frontier*, Washington, World Bank, 2007, p. 81.

²¹ Artur Gradziuk, *Polityka Chin wobec państw Afryki* in *Biuletyn (PISM)*, No. 66(406), 10.11.2006.

²² Louis Michel, *UE-Chine-Afrique: d'une relation de concurrence à un partenariat triangulaire pour le développement de l'Afrique*, Bruxelles, 28 juin 2007, Conférence organisée par la Commission européenne, SPEECH/07/442, p. 5,

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/442&format=PDF&aged=1&language=FR&guiLanguage=en>.

²³ Harry G. Broadman, *Africa's silk road: China and India's new economic frontier*, Washington, World Bank, 2007, p. 80-81.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

exporter of oil, half of which is destined for China. The situation is similar in Zimbabwe, a country subject to an international embargo and where China is investing in the mining of mineral resources, the construction of roads and agriculture, and also provides all the most important goods. In exchange, President Mugabe's regime grants Chinese corporations unlimited freedom of action, something that makes the Zimbabwean economy almost entirely dependent on China.²⁵

From Bilateral EU-Chinese Dialogue to Trilateral Cooperation?

China has rapidly emerged as Africa's important economic partner [...] "This means – as we read in a European Commission document from June 2007 – that if the EU wants to remain a privileged partner and make the most of its relations with Africa, it must be willing to reinforce, and in some areas reinvent, the current relationship – institutionally, politically and culturally."²⁶

The EU's strategy with regard to Africa is undoubtedly just one of many responses to China's growing presence on the African continent. The idea of trilateral EU-Chinese-African cooperation probably has to be viewed in similar terms.²⁷ Considering the wider context, i.e., the rivalry for energy resources and the new threats to Europe originating from Africa, it is difficult to view this idea otherwise than as a reaction to China's growing involvement in Africa. There is much to support this view. As an organization made of 27 member countries, the EU is not engaged on the international stage purely for charitable purposes, but, like national players in international relations, strives to realize its national interests. However, on the other hand, it is worth remembering that in contemporary international relations, which are based on far-reaching interdependencies, the problems of individual regions become global ones, and resolution requires multilateral efforts based on coordinated action. The absence of coordination between those partners wielding considerable influence on the economic and political situation in a given region can contribute slowing the state-building processes on the African continent, and can thus lead to a worsening of the economic and political situation.

Coordination between the EU and China in conducting an active policy in Africa is a necessary precondition for initiating trilateral cooperation with the participation of African countries. Reaching an understanding between the two partners could prove very difficult, however. There are wide discrepancies in the principles forming the basis of the EU's and China's policies with regard to Africa. This is reflected in a fragment of the declaration from the Ninth EU-China Summit concerning both partners' structural dialogue on behalf of African development. It states that: "The EU reaffirmed its attachment to the principles of good governance and human rights, as embodied in its Africa Strategy. The Chinese side emphasized the upholding of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, in particular the principle of non-interference into others' internal affairs."²⁸

²⁵ On China's relations with Zimbabwe, see Ian Tylor, *China and Africa: engagement and compromise*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 106-126.

²⁶ From Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 27.6.2007, COM(2007) 357 final, p. 3.

²⁷ Bernt Berger and Uwe Wissenbach, *EU-China_Africa Trilateral Development Cooperation. Common Challenges and New Directions*, German Development Institute, Discussion Paper, 21/2007, [http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/be803da30eaa92b8c12572670041d831/\\$FILE/Berger%20Wissenbach%20EU-China-Africa.pdf](http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/be803da30eaa92b8c12572670041d831/$FILE/Berger%20Wissenbach%20EU-China-Africa.pdf).

²⁸ Ninth EU-China Summit, Helsinki 9 September 2006, Joint Statement, Brussels, 11 September 2006, 12642/06 (Presse 249), p. 4, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf.

It can generally be stated that the EU and China have different stances with regard to the principle of conditionality. The European Union, like the United States or institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, makes economic cooperation and developmental aid dependent on fulfilling specific conditions usually connected with adapting the internal situation of potential trade partners and/or development aid recipient countries to liberal-democratic standards. Under such pressure, African states interested in economic cooperation or receiving EU developmental aid have to introduce economic or political reforms and to respect human rights.

A characteristic trait of China's policy toward Africa is the absence of any link between trade and investment issues on the one hand and political issues on the other. This is in accordance with the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" formulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1953 and still observed today in Chinese foreign policy, i.e., mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful co-existence.²⁹ China does not make its assistance and the signing of business contracts dependent on the introduction of specific political and economic reforms. China does not combine economic cooperation with attempts to promote its own political and social values. While the EU is trying to convince authoritarian governments to implement Western political standards, China is only interested in economic cooperation without additional conditions. Such a form of cooperation is more accessible to many African leaders who wish to avoid Western countries' accusations of corruption, nepotism, repression of political opponents, or failure to abide by human rights. Viewed from the EU perspective, this form of cooperation with China weakens the pressure to introduce democratic reforms or to fight corruption in African states, thus weakening the effectiveness of EU policy aiming at Africa's development. The offer of international organizations, whose assistance is tied to the above-mentioned issues, loses out against China's offer, which is financially far more attractive and easier to accept.

Given the discrepancies between the EU and China, as well as the somewhat uninterested stance of African countries, trilateral cooperation is merely a concept which exists at the level of a bilateral, sectorial dialogue between the EU and China and which hasn't gone beyond the EU-Chinese declaration on the subject of common action for "Africa's peace, stability and sustainable development." The two parties did agree "to pursue a structured dialogue on Africa and explore avenues for practical cooperation on the ground in partnership with the African side,"³⁰ but from an institutional perspective, this has only led to the beginning of an EU-China dialogue at the level of directors for African Affairs. After the Ninth EU-China Summit, the directors met for the first time on 15 June 2007 in Beijing. Soon thereafter, on 28 June 2007, a conference of experts on the subject of cooperation between the EU and China in Africa took place under the patronage of the European commissioner for development, Luis Michel. In answer to the EU's invitation, the China's

²⁹ For more on this subject, see Derek Mitchell and Carola McGiffert, 'Expanding a "Strategic Periphery: A History of China's Interaction with the Developing World' in Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham and Derek Mitchell, eds., *China and the Developing World. Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, New York and London, M. E. Sharpe Armonk, 2007, pp. 13-17.

³⁰ Ninth EU -China Summit, Helsinki 9 September 2006, Joint Statement, Brussels, 11 September 2006, 12642/06 (Presse 249), p. 4, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf.

representative also participated as an observer at the EU-Africa Summit.³¹ This is not much, although the initiation of dialogue is doubtless only the first step on a long road and forms part of the EU's policy of encouraging China to greater involvement in the resolution of global problems.

“The EU's fundamental approach to China must remain one of engagement and partnership. But with a closer strategic partnership, mutual responsibilities increase. The partnership should meet both sides' interests and the EU and China need to work together as they assume more active and responsible international roles, supporting and contributing to a strong and effective multilateral system. The goal should be a situation where China and the EU can bring their respective strengths to bear to offer joint solutions to global problems.”³²

In relations with China the EU applies the strategy of constructive engagement which is based on a belief that by engaging Beijing in a constructive way and by concentrating on supporting China's transformation process, over time the EU will acquire more leverage over political developments in China.³³ A similar rationale can be advanced as an explanation for the EU's striving to secure China's cooperation in its efforts on behalf of Africa. However, the results of such a policy can only become visible in the long term and on the condition that China will gradually abandon a foreign policy based on a rigorous respect for the principles of non-engagement and non-interference.

Conclusions

Viewed from the EU perspective, and for the time being, trilateral relations between the EU, China and Africa is the sum of three factors: EU-African relations, China-African relations, and the EU's efforts to involve China in cooperation on behalf of “Africa's peace, stability and sustainable development,” which could in the future form the seed of trilateral cooperation between the EU, China, and Africa. This third element – trilateral cooperation – is merely an EU's idea and, for the time being, is still at the conceptual stage.³⁴ The remaining two elements – the EU's and China's bilateral relations with Africa – are characterized by a more or less visible rivalry for economic and political influence on the African continent. On the one hand, the EU policy toward Africa is a mixture of a realistic and idealistic approach which leads frequently to contradictions, misunderstandings and lack of coherence. In this context, the EU proposition of trilateral cooperation can be perceived by African states and China with some degree of suspicion. On the other hand, the wide discrepancies in the principles forming the basis of the EU's and China's policies with regard to Africa persist. A year and a half after beginning structural dialogue on the subject of Africa not much has been achieved.

³¹ Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit, Beijing, 28 November 2007, p. 7, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/97355.pdf.

³² EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, COM(2006) 631 final, Brussels, 24.10.2006, p. 2, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/docs/06-10-24_final_com.pdf.

³³ Nicola Casarini, The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership, Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper, nr 64, October 2006, p. 21.

³⁴ In January, Commissioner Michel announced a project of trilateral EU-China-African cooperation to be presented in the spring of 2008. See Michel veut un partenariat UE-Chine-Afrique, 10 January 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/michel/speeches/docs/articles/2008/CAB17_0121114324_001.pdf#zoom=100.

It seems unlikely that this state of affairs will change rapidly, especially as, in addition to China and the EU, Africa also draws the attention of other major international players, particularly the United States, India or Brazil. Africa on the other hand, theoretically the most important link in the said trilateral relations, seems not to have worked out its own concept of relations with the EU and other interested countries in such a way as would allow it to emerge from the present situation of political and economic dependence.

Statement by

Karl Auguste Offmann

Former President of Mauritius

Excellencies Ladies and Gentlemen,

I should like to thank the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and the Shanghai Coordination Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the organizers of this event, for inviting me to speak on the important topic of China-Europe-Africa Cooperation.

Allow me also on behalf of the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government, commonly known as Africa Forum, to present to you the greetings of our group and to emphasize that the subject has attracted our attention at the Africa Forum as that of many other institutions in Africa and Europe.

The main theme of today's Conference is China-Europe-Africa Cooperation: Chances and Challenges

- It is a chance because of the Historical links that both Europe and China have with Africa.
- It is a chance because Africa needs development, technology, investment, that both Europe and China have in return Africa and offer their vast territory for projects, their varieties resources, and their huge market of nearly 900 millions people.
- It is a chance because the 21st century offers tremendous opportunities of progress and development for humanity, because of interdependence, inter-linkages and Globalization.
- It is also a challenge because China-Europe-Africa needs a new mind set.
- Is China-Europe-Africa capable to look for OUR interest instead of MY interest only?
- It is a challenge because the benefit for our people and humanity as a whole is so great that we cannot do otherwise.

March 5, 2008, at a meeting organized by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) with 78 ACP countries and members from the European civil society as well as members of the European Institutions, to discuss about the future of the EU-Africa Strategy.

Louis Michel the Commissioner for development has underlined that Africa is his priority and Europe will continue to have a positive and strong relationship with Africa because of its geography and its history. On the economic level, Europe is not

only the biggest trade partner but it is also the biggest importer of African agricultural products. What has strengthened these links is the consistency and continuity that Europe has had during the last years being far the biggest donor to Africa. This underlines the strong ties with the African continent.

- It is a fact that Europe with various conventions and the United States with AGOA and other treaties are doing their part in the development of Africa.
- It is also a fact that China has become the third investor in Africa behind the European Union and the United States. China is developing three exclusive economic zones in three countries. In Nigeria as regards sea food development hub, Zambia concerning mining and raw materials development area and Mauritius with the Tianli group setting up a trade development area with an investment of half a billion dollars. China is spending billions in infrastructural investment development funds to help provide basic needs such as communications by road and rail and the essential services.

That's why Louis Michel laid emphasis when he mentioned the topic of Chinese intervention in Africa on the fact that he does not regret the involvement of China in Africa. He thinks that this is a reality, and this is the current situation. I can't change it, he said and added that the inter action and involvement between China and Africa justified even more the need of a change in the relationship between the EU and Africa that has been put forward by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

We have a New Economic World Order.
We have a New Political World Order.

We have new challenge with China emerging as a superpower and having a say in the shaping of the new world economic and trade policy, the new International Affairs context.

China shares many of the development issues of the African Nations on a large scale. There are many similarities in the requirements, needs and aspiration of the people of China and the people of many African countries. China is facing the same challenges regarding basic needs of its huge population Health facilities, Education, Housing and Social Security. China and Africa share the same concerns regarding surge oil and commodities prices. One other major concern is food security, HIV/AIDS and environmental sustainability. On the other hand, China remains a developing country with almost 600 million people living in the rural area and having a very low per capita income.

The potential of genuine South-South cooperation is immense and this has already been translated into reality when we see what has been achieved between China and Africa in the last decade.

The Sino-Africa new deal has sent political shockwaves to Europe and the United States. We believe that the situation calls for a serious reengineering of the issue regarding Europe-Africa and China in contemporary international relations. We need to think beyond historical bitterness into the world of globalization where the policies of spheres of influence have lost their relevant meaning.

There is no doubt that in the new configuration of power within the international community, China is a power that the rest of the world must as well learn to co-exist with. It was for this reason that Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, the former President of Mozambique and Chairperson of the Africa Forum emphatically said *“there is no doubt that China’s renewed interest upon the continent and the nature of Chinese investment in Africa has raised some concerns in Europe and in the United States”*.

As Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development, stated in his opening statement during the Europe-Africa-China Conference in June last year *“we are competitors, but we are also partners and Africa should benefit rather than suffer from our presence”*. In the same perspective Xing Hua, Director of the Center for European Union Studies at the China Institute of International Studies warned that Chinese investment in Africa is based on *“a mutual trust which has been fostered by more than 50 years of solidarity”* with the continent.

We could, therefore, ponder over the possibilities of a tripartite relationship and how should the new China-Europe-Africa partnership be natured for the benefit of all. I am more persuaded by a constructive dialogue rather than a confrontational approach. I am aware that the results of a confrontational approach will inevitably results into seeds of discontent, suspicion, mistrust and unnecessary war of words.

On the other hand, in Europe we have the challenge of uniting 27 nations with diverse economic potential and historical backgrounds with an economy which is rowing at less than 3 percent and facing the huge competition of the production power house of China and the huge service provider which constitute another superpower emerging that is India.

The EU has also recently addressed the issue of a new partnership with the EPA’s which have not met the consensus amongst the African Nations. EU has also sent a shockwave with the cuts of 37% in the price of sugar, thereby denouncing a Sugar Protocol which has been a formidable tool of economic cooperation for decades. In spite of the commitment of Louis Michel and other leaders the EU and Africa have yet to forge a new partnership at the WTO, for example for a faire and equable trade mechanism.

The political system in China, whereby a communist government at the helm of the country is engineering a liberal economy and competing on the world market with success, interacts with the political power structures in Africa in a different way as

compared with the former colonial powers such as the UK, France, Belgium, Italy and the United States influence in Africa. The Chinese foreign and trade policy is more pragmatic and down to earth and relates to basic issues in many cases.

China has already a booming middle class of more than 350 million people who have a purchasing power as high as that of most Europeans. This number is expected to increase to half a billion in the next decades.

In the meantime, Africa endowed with the world's greatest reserves of raw materials from oil to uranium, it is still plagued with calamities, sluggish growth, political instability, overshadowed poverty and the Aids pandemic.

The terrible recent crisis of Kenya has again brought to the international scene the images of a doomed Continent which has no role and future on the World scene.

We from the Africa Forum recognize the historical basis of Sino-Africa Relations just as it recognizes the historical importance of Europe-Africa Relations. The fundamental question we must ask is whether the new Sino-Africa relations pose a threat to Europe-Africa cooperation built over many centuries. We might also ask why Europe should be worried about the new economic scramble for Africa and how Europe should respond to the Chinese economic interests in Africa. But, perhaps a more pertinent question could be what type of partnership could emerge out of the China-Europe-Africa Cooperation.

With the new set up on the World scene whereby the new pillars decision makers and policy makers have to face are as follows:

- Greater democracy which raises the issues of good governance, human rights and corruption.
- Liberal and competitive market economy, a trade system which benefits one and all and safeguards the interests of vulnerable economics.
- Sustainability of the eco system and the limitation as regards to natural resources.
- Inclusive growth for a faire spillover of the proceeds of economic growth.
- The threat of international terrorism, money laundering and white collar crime.

What can we do?

- Joint ventures of US, EU and China investment into Africa.
- The expediting of the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.
- Transfer of technologies.
- The correction of trade imbalance between China and the development economies.
- The tourism and travel potential.
- The transformation of African raw materials on site with Chinese, the EU and the US technology and investment.
- The acceleration of infrastructural works in Africa.

- Educational training to tap the huge human resource potential in Africa.
- To raise the standard of living and the purchasing power of the average African for him to become a world player.
- To devise a foreign policy where China's voice can be heard to find solutions to international affairs and issues with the EU and the US and other major players such as India on Darfur/Middle East/Kenya, North Korea.

My recommendation is that we need to think seriously about the China-Europe-Africa triangular partnership. Europe needs China, China needs Africa and Europe. We need to begin to lay a strong foundation for a more structured cooperation involving China-Europe-Africa in the 21st Century. A partnership which goes beyond the politics of Independence or the liberation struggles to social and economic emancipation of the whole Continent of Africa.

Thank you!

China-Africa Cooperation: Partnership and Global Implications

Prof. He Wenping

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On November 4, 2006, when leaders from China and 48 African countries gathered at the People's Hall in Beijing for an unprecedented summit in the history of China-Africa relations, President Hu Jintao said, "Our meeting today will go down in history." Indeed, the China-Africa Beijing Summit that caught world attention is a grand gathering of the largest scale, highest level and broadest participation. It is an important event in the history of not only Chinese diplomacy, but also China-Africa relations. It is a milestone in the development of China-Africa relationship.

In recent years, the world media has given China-Africa relationship constant attention and discussion triggered by Chinese Foreign Minister's visit to African countries at the beginning of each year, China's first ever *African Policy Paper*, as well as visits paid by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. However, to our regret, there are huge perceptual differences between China and the outside world on the development of China-Africa relationship. Both the Chinese Government and Chinese scholars regard the recent development in China-Africa relationship as natural extension of the all-weather friendly cooperation between the two parties over the past half century. They also believe that the nature and basic characteristics of China-Africa relationship are mutual respect, sincerity, friendship and mutual benefit. Yet in the eyes of most Western media and think tanks (including some politicians), China pays attention to developing its relationship with Africa simply because it scrambles for such strategic resources as oil. To them China's growing influence on African politics and economy is actually a form of "Neo-Colonialism." They also accuse China's unconditioned assistance to some so-called "Rogue States" in Africa of obstructing the Western efforts in promoting democracy, human rights, fight against despotism and corruption.

Even before the convening of the Beijing Summit, some Western media and individuals dismissed the summit as an event only a dozen African heads of state would attend. Certain countries and persons of influence went on to dissuade African heads of state from flying to Beijing. When leaders from 48 countries having diplomatic relations with China (including 35 heads of state and six heads of government) gathered in Beijing, some Western media and individuals were acerbic, saying that "African leaders can only be found in Beijing between the 4th and 5th of November," or that the Summit was "a pilgrimage of the 21st century."

Therefore, how should we interpret the China-Africa Beijing Summit and China's African strategy in the new age?

China-Africa Summit Promoted the Establishment of a New China-Africa Strategic Partnership

At the recently convened China-Africa Beijing Summit, leaders from China and African countries reached consensus over the New China-Africa Strategic Partnership that stresses equality and mutual trust in politics, cooperation and win-win in economy, exchange and mutual learning in culture, exchange and consultation in security and strengthened cooperation in international affairs. In a speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi remarked that the convening of the Summit demonstrated to the world the utmost resolute in establishing a new strategic partnership between China and Africa, and that Africa was ready. The Beijing Summit Declaration passed by the Summit solemnly announced the intention to establish a new China-Africa strategic partnership in the form of a political document. That China and Africa jointly announced the establishment and development of this new strategic partnership should be regarded as one of the major outcomes of this Summit.

Over the past half century, China-Africa relationship went from political support to economic cooperation and then to comprehensive development. Between the 1950s and 1970s, China-Africa relationship was characterized by mutual support and cooperation in the political arena. Despite difficulties in its domestic economy and the need for full-scale construction, China was selfless in providing African countries and their people with mental as well as physical support to help the latter in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, or for national independence. In the 1980s, with China's implementation of the economy-oriented reform and open-door policy and the restructuring in African economy, greater attention was paid to economic reciprocity in China-Africa relationship. While the friendly political relationship was strengthened, the focus was shifted to trade and economic relations, on multiple forms of economic and technological cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and changes in African situation, China-Africa relationship entered a phase of comprehensive cooperation. In addition to economic and trade cooperation, China also gives priority to developing its relationship with Africa from multiple fronts such as politics, culture and education. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation dating back to 2000 has become an institutionalized strategic platform for strengthening bilateral exchanges, communication and cooperation. The new China-Africa Strategic Partnership offers an accurate summary of the current China-Africa relationship. It also points out direction for future development.

The new China-Africa Strategic Partnership is new mainly in content and approach. As far as content is concerned, the new strategic partnership includes cooperation in politics, economy, cultural exchanges, security and international affairs. In addition to the existing and ever strengthening political mutual support and economic reciprocity (in fact, politics and economy have become interwoven and interacting with each

other), with time passing by, cultural exchanges and cooperation in security and international affairs have been added to China-Africa relationship. In this age of globalization, especially after the 9/11 attack, the theory of “clashes of civilizations” and that of “Western civilization supremacy” were heatedly discussed by mainstream international media. In fact human society has advanced so far thanks to every civilization and culture in existence today. Both China and Africa saw some of the earliest civilizations in the world. Both boast resplendent civilizations and cultural heritage. The two sides should further strengthen their cultural exchanges as well as promote tolerance, equality and mutual learning among civilizations with a view of building a harmonious world.

In the security aspect, with the increasing internationalization of all kinds of conventional and non-conventional threats, China and Africa should strengthen exchanges and consultations, raise the international community’s awareness of collective security, set up a new security mindset based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, collaboration and create an international environment conducive to common development. On one hand, China should make more efforts in the area of conventional security, taking active part in UN-led peacekeeping missions in Africa, playing a positive role in the peaceful resolution of internal conflicts and disputes in Africa. On the other hand, in the area of non-conventional security, China and Africa should strengthen consultation and cooperation in the prevention of major epidemics, bird flu, cross-border crime, etc., so as to cope with challenges posed by globalization together.

Africa is an important force in international affairs. China and Africa share extensive common ground over major international issues. The two sides have a long tradition of cooperation. In the future, they should strengthen coordination and strive for common interests. Better coordination and cooperation are needed between China and Africa in the promotion of multilateralism, democracy in international relations and UN reforms aiming at building a peaceful, harmonious and balanced world.

Moreover, when it comes to the approaches of implementation, the new China-Africa strategic partnership is not just empty talk. Instead it is related to detailed action plans and implementation measures. The *Beijing Summit Declaration* not only states clearly that there should be more high-level exchanges, strategic dialogues, reciprocal cooperation in agriculture, infrastructure development, industry, fishery, information, healthcare and human resources training, but also stresses exchanges and mutual learning between China and Africa in governance and development, humane dialogue, cultural exchanges and enhanced links among peoples, especially young peoples. Therefore, exchanges between China and Africa have gone beyond the material aspect to cover the spiritual and humane aspects. Emphasis has been placed on the younger generations.

In order to promote the development of the new China-Africa Strategic Partnership, so that there will be cooperation on a wider scale and higher level, President Hu Jintao announced eight measures to be taken in the following three years on behalf of the Chinese Government at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit: expanding the size of its African aid; providing preferential loans and preferential buyer's credits to African countries; setting up a China-Africa development fund as well as economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa which encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa; building a conference center for the African Union ;exempting all the outstanding interest-free government loans due as of the end of 2005 owed by all HIPCs and LDCs having diplomatic relations with China; further opening China's markets to exports from Africa; strengthening cooperation in agriculture, healthcare and professional training. The Summit's closing ceremony passed the *Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation* and the *2007-2009 Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, pointing out the direction for future China-Africa relations.

It is worth noticing that the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was unprecedented in its luminous participation and significant measures proposed. Those measures cover a wide range, from debt reduction, stepping up aid to Africa, stimulating investment in Africa, increasing the number of African commodities exported to China that enjoy zero-tariff treatment, to quantified objectives in agricultural cooperation, human resources training, healthcare and education cooperation. Those quantified objectives demonstrate China's deep concern over African development as the largest developing country as well as a responsible power. On the other hand, when it comes to implementation, specific goals and quantified targets will make supervision and implementation easier, thereby the realization of goals easier. In fact, the objectives put forward at the first and second Forum on Cooperation were realized either on time or ahead of schedule. Six years' track record has proven that the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is not a luxury item, but a solid platform and effective mechanism for China and African countries to conduct collective dialogue, exchange experiences in governance, enhance mutual trust and carry out pragmatic cooperation.

The eight measures demonstrate the importance the Chinese Government attaches to promoting mutual investment between China and Africa, whose growth still lags far behind the rapid growth in trade between the two sides. Yet mutual investment, an important part of economic cooperation, is essential to ensure mutual benefit, win-win outcome and sustainable growth in China-Africa economic cooperation. African countries prefer capacity building so that they can better cope with changes in international economy and market and eradicate poverty to the traditional approach of poverty reduction through "transfusion (assistance)". Investment in local businesses will not only create employment, promote transfer of technology suitable to Africa, speed up training of professional managers, but also play a positive role in helping Africa achieve industrialization and African Renaissance. Therefore, major measures encouraging Chinese companies to invest in Africa proposed at the Summit, such as

the US\$60 billion China-Africa Development Fund, the establishment of multiple overseas economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa, and the founding of China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce, will inevitably lead to a new wave of investment in Africa by Chinese companies.

China's Interests in Africa and the Significance of China-Africa Relationship to the World

National interests are the starting point for a country to formulate its diplomatic strategies and policies. They usually include security interests, political interests, economic interests and cultural interests. From the perspective of priority, they can be divided into short-term interests and long-term interests, current interests and future interests, primary interests and secondary interests. The identification of national interests depends on four variants: international context, national strength, level of science and technology, and perception. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, as the four variants changed, priority in national interests shifted from security interests in the first years of the Republic, to political interests in the 1960s and 1970s, to economic benefits in the 1980s, and then to both political and economic interests in the 1990s. At present, although our diplomacy still focuses on developed countries in Europe and America, for the sake of our national security as well as economic interests, Africa is also indispensable.

First of all, from the long-run strategic point of view, a strengthened China-Africa relationship will play a positive role in unity and cooperation among developing countries, and in pushing the world pattern towards multi-polarization. Although Africa's strategic position was weakened when the Cold War just ended, in recent years African countries have spoken increasingly in one voice, thus becoming a force hard to be ignored. As a main force in developing countries, the 53 African countries account for about a half of all non-aligned countries and close to one third of UN membership. China can depend on them when it functions in international affairs as a power, or when it fights against hegemony and power politics. China's independent foreign policy of peace and non-alignment, together with its socialist nature, determine that it took, is taking, and will always take, sides with developing countries. In fact, a new strategic partnership stressing cooperation and win-win outcome between China, the largest developing country in the world, and Africa, where there is the greatest number of developing countries, is significant not only to the two sides, but also to the entire world.

From the perspective of South-South Cooperation, strengthened consultation and cooperation between China and Africa is conducive to enhance the international influence of developing countries as a whole, to promote a fair and reasonable new international political and economic order. For a period right after the end of the Cold War, the international influence of developing countries went down owing to divergences among them. However, in recent years, with the resurgence of trade

protectionism in developed countries as well as growing bellicosity in certain powers, developing countries have been more united than before in fighting against hegemony and power politics, for fair and just rules in international economy and trade. Their influence in international affairs has also been more profoundly felt. For example, during the agricultural talks of WTO, it was exactly because developing countries including China and Africa were consistent in their demand that developed countries had to make certain concessions on and commitment to the eventual removal of agricultural subsidies. Besides, because China and Africa have identical or similar views on many major international issues such as opposition to unilateralism, emphasis on development, maintenance and strengthening the UN authority, and increased representation of developing countries including Africa at the UN Security Council, cooperation in international affairs between China and Africa is also significant to the promotion of democracy in international relations and the enhancement of developing countries' influence in international affairs.

Secondly, from the perspectives of near-term, medium- and long-term economic benefits, China-Africa economic cooperation is a complementary and win-win partnership. On one hand, a strengthened China-Africa relationship could secure raw materials, market and investment destination for the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy. On the other hand, Africa could also benefit from a strengthened China-Africa relationship because it gets development funds, technology and expertise, diversifies its raw materials export and exercises more autonomy in exploiting its own resources. There are 53 countries and 850 million people in Africa. Rich in natural and human resources, Africa is a large market with huge development potential. However, owing to years of colonial plundering and regional conflicts, its economy lags behind, lacking capital, technology and expertise needed for development. After more than 20 years' reform and opening up, China has grown considerably in economic size and strength, coming into possession of technologies and equipment suitable for various levels of development, as well as success stories (of course lessons, too) in reform, opening up and economic development. Yet China is also confronted with such new issues and resource shortage and fiercer competition in the domestic market. Therefore, if China and Africa could complement each other in resources, market, technology and expertise, it will do tremendous good to common development and South-South Cooperation. In recent years, more efforts have been made in human resources development cooperation between China and Africa. Training and capacity building add new momentum to sustained economic growth in Africa while blazing a new trail for South-South Cooperation.

Lastly, from the perspective of wider human development and societal progress, against the background of enlarging gap between North and South as well as looming threats from terrorism, common development and extensive participation in economic globalization of developing countries is significant to lasting world peace and harmonious development.

As a matter of fact, the successful convening of the Beijing Summit and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has gone beyond promoting China-Africa bilateral relations only. It propels other countries or even the entire international community to heed Africa and help its development. After the Beijing Summit, six African heads of state and over 20 ministers were invited to participate in a Korea-Africa Summit, at which Korea pledged to increase its aid to Africa by three times and to increase the number of scholarships awarded to African students to 2,000 per year. Some African state leaders and ministers were also invited to visit Japan. Moreover, Africa watchers in Russia also proposed to their government that a Russia-Africa Summit should be organized in 2007. The new wave of concern for Africa demonstrated by the international community is undoubtedly good news. It will help improve the external environment for Africa's development. It will also solicit more international support for Africa's development.

中非合作：伙伴关系及全球影响

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2006年11月4日，当中国领导人和48个非洲国家领导人齐聚北京人民大会堂举行这次中非关系史上史无前例的中非领导人峰会时，胡锦涛主席说：“今天是值得历史记住的日子”。的确，举世瞩目的中非领导人北京峰会是中非外交史上规模最大、级别最高、与会非洲国家领导人最多的一次盛会。它不仅是中非关系，同时也是中国外交史上的一件盛事，对推动中非关系的发展具有里程碑式的重大意义。

近年来，无论是中国外长每年年初按惯例对非洲国家的访问，还是中国政府首次就对非洲外交发表的《中国对非洲政策文件》以及胡锦涛主席、温家宝总理等中国领导人对非洲的访问，均在国际媒体上掀起了一阵对中非关系的持久关注和讨论。但遗憾的是，在如何看待“中非关系发展”这一命题上，中国自身和外部世界之间却存在认知上的巨大差异。在中国政府和学者看来，近年来中非关系的发展是半个多世纪以来中非全天候友好合作关系的自然发展和延伸，互相尊重、真诚友好和平等互利是中非关系的实质和基本特征。而在大多数西方媒体和智库（包括一些政界人士）看来，中国重视发展对非关系完全是出于对石油等战略资源的争夺，中国在非洲政治经济影响的扩大是一种“新殖民主义”的表现，中国对一些所谓“无赖”国家不附加任何条件的援助则阻碍了西方在非洲推动的民主、人权事业以及反专制和反腐败运动的进展，等等。

甚至在北京中非峰会召开之前，也曾有一些西方媒体和人士悲观预言称，恐怕只有10多个非洲元首能够与会。个别国家和个别有影响的人士甚至劝说非洲国家首脑们不要到北京来。当48个与中国有外交关系的非洲国家领导人（其中35位国家元首，6位政府首脑）齐聚北京时，一些西方媒体和人士又酸溜溜地说什么，“要想在11月4—5日找非洲领导人，只能是上北京去”以及什么“21世纪的朝拜活动”云云。

那么，究竟如何理解北京中非峰会以及新时期的中国对非战略呢？

中非峰会推动建立中非新型战略伙伴关系

在刚刚闭幕不久的中非领导人北京峰会上，中非领导人就建立政治上平等互信、经济上合作共赢、文化上交流互鉴、安全上加强交流和磋商，以及国际事务上加强合作的“中非新型战略伙伴关系”达成了共识。埃塞俄比亚总理梅莱斯在峰会开幕式的致辞中说，峰会的召开向世界显示了中非构建新型战略伙伴关系的最坚定决心，非洲已为这一战略伙伴关系的建立做好了充分准备。会议通过的《北京峰会宣言》以政治文件的形式郑重宣示要建立中非新型战略伙伴关系。应当说，中非共同宣示建立和发展这一新型战略伙伴关系是本次峰会取得的重要成果之

一。

半个多世纪以来，中非关系总体上经历了一个从政治支持到经济合作，再到全方位发展的历程。在上世纪 50~70 年代，中非关系主要体现在政治上的相互支持和合作。中国在自身经济仍比较困难、百废待兴的情况下，为支持非洲人民反帝反殖、争取民族解放和巩固国家独立的斗争，向非洲国家和人民提供了大量无私的精神和物质援助。20 世纪 80 年代，随着中国以经济建设为中心的改革开放方针的确立以及非洲经济结构调整的进行，中非关系中的经济互利合作内容得到了扩展和提高。在继续加强中非友好政治关系的同时，开始将重点转向经贸关系，强调在平等互利的基础上开展多种经济技术合作。进入 90 年代以来，随着冷战的结束以及非洲形势的变化，中非关系进入了全面合作的新阶段。除继续加强中非经贸合作的力度外，中国还重视从政治、文化和教育等方面多渠道、多层次地全方位发展中非关系。2000 年“中非合作论坛”的成立为加强双边交流、沟通和合作建立了机制化的战略平台。“中非新型战略伙伴关系”的建立和发展则既是对当前中非关系的一个准确定位，同时也为未来中非关系的发展指明了方向。

“中非新型战略伙伴关系”中的“新”主要体现在内容和途径两个方面。从内容上看，这一新型战略伙伴关系主要包括政治、经济、文化交流、安全以及国际事务中的合作等 5 个方面的内涵。除了继续强调以往中非关系中业已存在并不断得到加强的政治相互支持和经济互利合作以外（事实上，政治与经济之间的联系已日益紧密，不能分割，彼此发挥着互相推动的作用），还特别强调了文化交流以及安全和国际事务中的合作，为中非关系赋予了时代的新内容。在全球化时代，特别是 9.11 事件之后，“文明冲突论”和“西方文明优越论”一度成为国际主流媒体的热门话题。事实上，人类社会发展到今天，任何一种现存的文明和文化都有其独特的历史渊源，都对人类社会的发展和进步做出过自己的贡献。中国和非洲都是人类文明的发源地，有着璀璨的文明和文化遗产。中非之间理应大力加强文化交流，推动世界不同文明相互包容、平等相待、取长补短，携手共建和谐世界。

在安全领域，随着各种传统与非传统安全威胁的日益国际化，中非应加强交流和磋商，推动国际社会树立集体安全意识，树立互信、互利、平等、协作的新安全观，营造有利于共同发展的国际环境。一方面，在传统安全领域，中国要加大投入，积极参与联合国主导的非洲维和行动，为非洲内部冲突和争端的解决发挥促和等建设性作用。另一方面，在非传统安全领域，中非应在防治重大传染性疾病、禽流感、跨国犯罪等方面加强磋商和合作，共同应对全球化挑战。

在国际事务中，因非洲是国际事务中的重要力量，中非在重大国际问题上有着广泛的共同立场和良好的合作传统，在国际事务中加强协调和配合符合双方的共同利益。中非应在推进多边主义、国际关系民主化以及联合国改革中加强协调和配合，为建设一个和平、和谐和均衡的世界共同努力。

另外，从实现途径上看，中非新型战略伙伴关系并不仅仅是空泛的政策宣示，而是和具体的实施计划和推进措施连接在一起的。此次《北京峰会宣言》中不仅

明确提出了要加强高层交往、战略对话以及重点加强在农业、基础设施建设、工业、渔业、信息、医疗卫生和人力资源培训等领域的互利合作，而且还重点提出要加强中非之间在治国理政和发展经验上的交流和借鉴，以及加强人文对话和文化交流互鉴，促进人民之间、特别是青年一代的联系。由此可见，中非交往已不仅停留在物质层面，更上升到精神层面，关注人文内涵，着眼于青年一代。

为推动中非新型战略伙伴关系发展，促进中非在更大范围、更广领域、更高层次上的合作，胡锦涛主席在峰会开幕式上还代表中国政府宣布了未来三年内将采取的 8 大举措，包括扩大对非洲援助规模、向非洲国家提供优惠贷款和优惠出口买方信贷、设立中非发展基金和在非洲建立境外经济贸易合作区以鼓励和支持中国企业到非洲投资、援助建设非洲联盟会议中心、免除同中国有外交关系的所有非洲重债穷国和最不发达国家截至 2005 年底到期的政府无息贷款债务、进一步向非洲产品开放中国市场，以及在农业、医疗卫生和非洲人力资源开发等方面加大合作力度，等等。会议闭幕当天还通过了《中非合作论坛北京峰会宣言》以及《2007~2009 年中非论坛——北京行动计划》，为未来中非关系的发展指明了方向。

应当说，和以往相比，此次中非论坛的规格之高，所推出的举措力度之大都是空前的。这些新举措所涵盖的领域可以说是全方面的，不仅涉及减债、大幅增加对非援助、促进对非投资、以及大规模扩大非洲零关税进口商品的种类，而且针对农业合作、人力资源培训、医疗卫生和教育合作等均提出了量化的目标。这些量化目标的提出，一方面彰显了中国作为一个最大发展中国家以及负责任大国对非洲发展问题的关切，另一方面从技术和操作层面上看，目标越具体，指标越量化，监督落实就越容易，从而目标实现的可能性就越大。事实上，从中非第一届和第二届合作论坛行动纲领的落实情况看，每届论坛提出的目标都能按计划如期甚至提前完成。中非论坛用 6 年的实践和行动表明，它不是奢谈非洲发展的空谈俱乐部，而是一个实实在在的中国同非洲国家之间开展集体对话、交流治国理政经验、增进相互信任、进行务实合作的重要平台和有效机制。

从 8 大举措中我们还能看到中国政府对推动中非相互投资的高度重视。和近年来中非贸易的快速发展相比，中非间的相互投资额还比较低。而相互投资作为经济合作的重要纽带，是确保中非双方经济合作的互利共赢和可持续发展的重要一环。和依靠“输血”（援助）脱贫的旧有模式相比，非洲国家更希望通过提高自身的“造血”机能来增强应对国际经济和市场变化的抵抗力，从根本上摆脱贫困。而投资兴业，既能扩大当地人的就业、促进各种适用技术的对非转移以及加快非洲各类管理人才的培养，同时对于非洲实现工业化和非洲复兴都会发挥积极的作用。因此，本次峰会设立总额将达 50 亿美元的“中非发展基金”、在非洲建立多个境外经济贸易合作区以及“中国—非洲联合工商会”的成立，这些推动中国企业对非投资重大举措的出台必将掀起一轮中国企业对非投资的新高潮。

中国在非洲的利益及中非关系发展的世界意义

国家利益是一国制定外交战略和政策的基本依据和根本出发点。从内容上看，它一般包括安全利益、政治利益、经济利益和文化利益等。从轻重缓急上看，

又有短期利益和长期利益、当前利益和未来利益、重要利益和次要利益之分。国家利益的判断和确定主要依据的是国际环境、自身实力、科技水平和主观认识水平等四大变量。建国以来,根据不同时期这四大变量的变化,我国的国家利益曾经历了从建国初期强调安全利益、20世纪6-70年代强调政治利益到80年代重视经济利益、90年代兼顾政治和经济利益这样一个转变过程。当前,从我国安全利益和经济利益的角度考虑,尽管欧美发达国家和周边国家仍是我国的外交工作重点,但非洲在我国外交战略中亦发挥着奠基性的地位和作用。

首先,从战略全局和长远角度看,中非关系的加强对于发展中国家的团结合作以及世界格局走向多极化的进程将发挥积极作用。冷战结束后初期,尽管非洲的战略地位曾一度有所下降,但近年来非洲联合自强、以一个声音说话的势头增强,联合起来的非洲的力量不可小视。作为发展中国家的主力,非洲有53个国家,约占不结盟国家的半数和联合国成员国的近1/3,是中国在国际事务中发挥大国作用、反对霸权主义和强权政治可借重的力量。中国不结盟的独立自主和平外交政策以及其社会主义的国家属性决定了它不管是过去、现在,还是将来都将坚定地 and 广大发展中国家站在一起。事实上,中国作为当今世界最大的发展中国家,与发展中国家最集中的非洲大陆之间建立合作共赢的新型战略伙伴关系的意义已经不仅仅局限于中非双边关系本身,而是具有更广阔的世界意义。

从南南合作的层面看,中非加强磋商和团结合作有利于提高发展中国家作为一个整体的国际影响力和推动建立公正合理的国际政治经济新秩序。冷战结束后初期,发展中国家内部曾一度出现了某种程度上的分化,在国际上的整体作用也有所减弱。但近年来,随着发达国家贸易保护主义的抬头以及某些大国在国际关系中黠武主义倾向的滋长,发展中国家在反对霸权主义与强权政治、争取公平和公正的国际经济贸易规则方面的共同利益和纽带进一步增强,在国际事务中的影响力也进一步提高。如在世界贸易组织有关农业问题的谈判中,正是由于中国和非洲等广大发展中国家采取协调一致的立场集体维权,才迫使发达国家在最终取消农产品贸易补贴问题上做出了一定的让步和承诺。另外,由于中非双方在反对单边主义、强调发展优先、维护和加强联合国权威、增强非洲等发展中国家在联合国安理会中的代表性等许多重大国际问题上有着相同或相似的立场,中非在国际事务中的合作对于推进国际关系的民主化,发挥发展中国家对国际事务的影响力也有着重要意义。

其次,从现实以及中长期的经济利益看,中非经济合作是一种优势互补、互利共赢的合作伙伴关系。一方面,中非关系的加强可为中国经济的可持续发展提供原料、市场和投资场所的后续保证。另一方面,非洲也可通过大力发展中非关系得到发展资金、技术和经验,并使其原料出口多元化,同时在开发自有资源的过程中有了更多自主选择的权利,能够真正成为自己资源的主人。非洲有53个国家和8.5亿人口,自然和人力资源丰富,市场广阔,发展潜力巨大。但因长期的殖民掠夺和局部冲突动荡,经济仍比较落后,缺乏发展资金、技术和经验。中国经过20多年的改革开放,经济规模和实力有了显著增长,拥有各个阶梯层次的适用技术和设备以及20多年来改革开放、经济建设的成功经验(当然也包括一些教训),但同时也面临着资源短缺、国内市场竞争加剧等新的问题。因此,中非之间在资源、市场和资金、技术与经验间的取长补短、相互借鉴与合作可以

促进共同发展并极大地提高南南合作的水平。特别是近年来，中非间加大了人力资源开发合作的力度，通过人才培训和促进能力建设，为非洲的经济可持续发展增添了新的动力，同时也为南南合作开辟了一条新路。

最后，从更广阔的人类发展大势和社会进步的视野看，在当今南北差距持续扩大、恐怖主义威胁阴霾不散的情况下，发展中国家的共同繁荣以及深度参与并分享经济全球化的果实对于推动世界的持久和平与和谐发展也具有深远的意义。

事实上，北京峰会及中非论坛的成功举办，其意义已经不仅局限于推动中非双边关系前进本身，而是对推动其他国家以及整个国际社会关注非洲、帮助非洲发展都产生了辐射效应和推动作用。北京峰会结束后，约 6 个非洲国家领导人和 20 多名部长应邀到韩国参加韩非峰会，韩国允诺将把对非援助在现有基础上提高 3 倍，并把对非国家的奖学金名额增加到每年 2000 人。还有部分非洲国家领导人和部长应邀访问了日本。另外，俄罗斯的非洲研究专家也建议政府在 2007 年举办俄非首脑峰会。国际社会对非洲发展的新一轮关注对非洲发展应当是一个利好消息，这有利于改善非洲发展的外部环境以及为非洲发展争取更多的国际支持。

The Renaissance or the end of geopolitics? Towards trilateral cooperation in Africa

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Abstract: The paper describes a series of common perceptions of China, Africa and Europe towards each other and explains the current state of the debate as a transition from old, cold war and post-colonial patterns of thinking towards a cooperative strategy that better responds to the interdependent character of global politics and global governance in transition.

In such a transitory environment, all sides need to go through a phase of self-critical review of current strategies and approaches in order to lay the basis for trilateral cooperation to mutual benefit. The author contributes to this process by pointing out the respective perceptions and assumptions and explains why many of these current perceptions are outcomes of ill-informed analysis and suspicions. The paper also points to a high degree of synergies achievable between the three sides based on respective strengths and weaknesses. The author proposes a series of objectives and cooperation proposals to enter into a phase of trilateral win-win cooperation, while respecting each others' underlying values and principles. Indeed, the paper is based on the assumption that neither side will sacrifice in the medium-term a series of fundamental values and principles that are the cornerstones of their foreign policies: Europe will continue to base its foreign policy on multilateralism, the promotion of international law, democracy and human rights, good governance and the eradication of poverty. China will pursue its independent policy of peace, based on the 5 principles for peaceful coexistence, as recently confirmed in the adapted Party Constitution. The majority of Africans will continue to pursue the drive towards unity based on democracy, human rights, liberal market economy, the right to development and good governance and the principle of sovereignty, but non-indifference. Having said that all actors face important challenges to translate principles into concrete action and pursue pragmatic adaptations of their policy to overcome contradictions and dilemmas in a rapidly changing environment. The key challenge to start with is overcoming old thinking and distrust. The key determinant needs to be Africa's agenda in order to find a common response to global challenges of security and peace, sustainable development, economic prosperity, achieving the MDG and addressing climate change. Trilateral cooperation on specific, shared objectives in the areas of peace and security, infrastructure and sustainable management of natural resources is proposed as a starting point to pick up these challenges for the mutual benefit. The European Commission will propose a policy paper to this effect this year.

I. Some convenient excuses

1) Africa as an issue of EU-China relations

Chinese analysts see the controversy about Africa as part of the "complexification" of the EU-China relationship where the EU is challenging China in order to protect its interests (European Commission 2006). They believe the EU strategy and tactics to achieve its objectives is to get China to accept EU or OECD frameworks. This would imply for China to sacrifice some key principles or interests in Africa and ultimately

Europeans are believed to protect their “backyard” and try to keep China out of it. China sees the EU’s approach to Human Rights (HR), democracy and governance as ideology-driven attempts to achieve regime change, not as a policy to address the root causes of Africa’s poverty and development challenges. In parallel, China overstates the EU’s interests in resources, securing spheres of influence and alliance politics. More generally, the EU is increasingly perceived as a weakening power on the defensive in the global system (and relative to a rising China) intent to avoid a second marginalisation (after WW II and the loss of Empires). Africans seem to share this view: the EU had its chance, missed the train and is running on the platform to catch up (Wade FT). They conclude that the EU should change its attitude towards Africa (EPAs, conditionality).

The Chinese analysis tends to ignore the EU’s key policy documents on development policy and Africa strategy and nourishes the above perceptions from linear continuations of colonial, post-colonial and Cold War politics. China mostly analyses “Western” Africa policy through the US prism and misses the point that the US and EU agendas in Africa differ quite a lot. The analysis of the EU agenda in Africa is further complicated by the fact that the functioning of the EU is often not properly understood (especially by analysts who are not specialists of the EU), but also that there is not always unity and consistency in the activities of Member States within the EU framework (this has improved a lot since 2005 with the adoption of the European Consensus on Development and the EU’s Africa strategy). Chinese analysts also tend to ignore the African Union’s and many African countries’ own agenda on good governance, democracy, HR and the right to interfere in domestic affairs based on the principle of non-indifference (Art 4 of the AU’s Constitutional Act). Democracy and human rights in Africa are not a Western construct or imposition, but values widely shared by Africans in spite of some regimes’ violation of these values.

2) China as an issue of EU-Africa relations

In the EU there are two main strands of analysis/perception:

1. China as a threat to the acquis in development policy and to economic and political interests of EU Member States (MS) (for a list cf. Berger/Wissenbach 2007)¹
2. China as a catalyser of overdue change in post-colonial and charitable attitudes and policies towards African development (Belloni 2007). In this view, held widely in the European Commission (Michel, 2007), the old power politics

¹ The critical items of such news stories were:

- China’s unethical and string-free support for ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, which finally served as a peg to stigmatise the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games as the so-called ‘Genocide Olympics’;
- China’s unconditional aid and opaque loans that are said to undermine European and multilateral efforts to persuade African governments to increase their transparency, public accountability and financial management (governance agenda);
- China has been accused of ‘free-riding’ Western debt relief efforts and undermining individual country’s external debt sustainability and disregarding the multilateral framework for debt sustainability;
- Economic and strategic competition with China especially about energy supplies;
- China’s self-interested strategies in dealing with developing countries;
- China’s neglect of environmental and social standards;
- Aid tied to Chinese companies and labour;
- Marginalisation of African producers in domestic and overseas markets (in particular the textile industry);

followed by a charitable reflex (guilt, scar on our conscience) have done much to perpetuate a vicious cycle of power politics, bad governance and corruption, poverty and conflict.

There is a strong consciousness of the marginalisation of Africa in the global economy despite long-standing trade preferences and aid (this explains the aid fatigue and afro-pessimism in the 1990s) with great burdens for the EU in terms of security (conflict resolution, refugees/migration, drug trafficking etc.) and finance (ODA, debt cancellation and missed investment opportunities and markets). The trade preferences progressively eroded in the WTO system challenged by other developing country competitors (EU/ACP lost several WTO panels on bananas, sugar etc. (Defraigne 2007)).

There is uncertainty about China's resilience and commitment in being a true and reliable partner for African countries (notably those without important resources) and there is speculation about future Africa fatigue in China.

Such European doubts about China's "real intentions" are often considered as "sour grapes". Nevertheless, what is currently perceived as a new situation, also has aspects of "déjà vu": Africa had earlier commodity booms, infrastructure investments, capital injections and aid packages which have not worked but left Africans saddled with debt. Where African economies have prospered and diversified, this is due to domestic strategies (e.g. Mauritius).

African leaders use China as a trump card in securing a new global position, and expressing a new-found self-confidence and sometimes a revenge on European pressures of the past. While this is understandable, and perhaps a necessary process of final emancipation, they may overlook the structural weakness of being simply an object of desire rather than an influential actor and agenda setter in international relations. The commodity boom is the backdrop for this new (?) pattern. Fundamentally, can it be used to diversify Africa's economies, move out of dependency relations and harnessed for comprehensive development rather than satisfying short-term elite interests and perpetuate rentier-states? While the new global context offers real opportunities, there is a danger for African leaders to sit between two chairs.

3) The EU as an issue of China-Africa relations

The EU and its MS serve as a common "bogeyman" in the rhetoric with criticism of a shared colonial past, post-colonial attitudes and suggestions of hidden agendas in line with this colonial past.

China assumes to a large extent that the EU has the same objectives of exploiting natural resources and economic opportunities and tends to overlook that a) the EU's political interests have moved beyond this point; b) that the EU relies on global market mechanisms to ensure its supplies and does not use aid packages for commercial purposes (while some Member States still do); c) that the majority of EU MS are not former colonial powers (some of the EU MS actually share the experience of having been colonised).

Finally, for the old generation of leaders and the authoritarian governments in Africa, the Europeans are a convenient scapegoat for home-made problems and a "common enemy".

II. Some inconvenient truths

Are all those assumptions true? In fact there is a larger convergence of interests than antagonisms in this trilateral relationship, than meets the eye.

In general, we need to be aware and take account of the large diversity of Africa itself and the diversity of views of Africans on these topics. Thus the above points are necessarily already simplifications, maybe even caricatures. But, such views have been borne out in media articles, comments by leaders and used in various more or less official statements. Thus they constitute a psychological as much as a political and diplomatic reality, which has done much to obstruct a rational and constructive discussion.

1) The common interests and objectives are overshadowed by misperceptions, hidden agendas and a focus on particularly salient but exceptional situations such as Sudan or Zimbabwe.

2) China and Africa share common interests, but there are also many issues which diverge, which they may not discuss in public too much, but nevertheless need to be addressed: market access, industrialisation and diversification of the economy, different culture of labour relations, interest in commodities versus interest to escape the commodities curse, African values in terms of human rights, democracy (based on Africans' experiences with both colonialism AND indigenous tyrants after independence not on Western prescriptions!). African diversity/disunity and lack of capacity (including regarding China) are additional factors. The harmony display in the 2006 FOCAC summit was only possible because of the lack of independent media and CSO supervision. Haggling and bargaining went on till the evening before the summit. This contrasts with the openly reported "discord" at the Lisbon summit (focusing on the divisive issues of Mugabe and the EPAs which in reality did NOT dominate the summit). FOCAC was closed, Lisbon was open.

3) China's lack of experience and empathy with African situations beyond anti-colonial rhetoric on the one hand is part of a picture where China on the other hand brings in its own experience of domestic development and poverty reduction. That experience, however, is only partially relevant in the African context given the huge differences between China and Africa in terms of population numbers and density, ethnic diversity, geography, strength of administration and strategic capacity, market size, skills levels etc. (China Agriculture University 2008). China harbours illusions about the strength of state structures in Africa, capacity to implement a development strategy and the effectiveness of the exercise of sovereignty (Clapham 2006, Taylor 2007). Chinese leaders and up to now most analysts based in Beijing and even in China's Embassies in Africa have had little understanding of how African societies and politics work. Analysis of African realities is not helped by dated ideological prescriptions on world views or band-waggoning on self-interested anti-European rhetoric.

4) Africans know little about China's domestic development path and are dazzled by what they see now (surface) and the new economic and political power of China in the global game. They tend to ignore that it took China 30 years of reform with a strategy based on comprehensive development rather than rent-seeking. The current problems of China's Western Development and rural development strategies, regional imbalances, environmental costs etc. are little known in Africa and China is understandably not keen to show its problems or weaknesses. Africans may to a large extent be unaware that some of the ingredients of China's success are based on extracting strong concessions from foreign investors in terms of compulsory joint ventures, forced technology and know-how transfer combined with selected protectionism notably in the early decades of opening up and reform.

5) Many Europeans harbour grudges about Africa's "ungratefulness", and many vested interests stand in the way of a reform of the aid industry and development policy. It is difficult to admit mistakes in a policy of good intentions. There is also a large diversity of views on the "right" path of development and Africa policy. It is indeed for Europeans and other traditional donors to do their homework on scaling-up (the EU actually pays for 90% of G8 pledges and is the only traditional donor to deliver on its Monterrey commitments with a few MS lagging) and aid effectiveness. Many Europeans see the emergence of China as "unfair competition" or as self-interested. This reflects a self-righteous and patronising attitude, which is responsible for many policy failures in the past. Europeans need to stop preaching and be more self-critical about double standards and exaggerated expectations (trying to solve all problems of development at the same time with a complex conditionality while advocating ownership).

6) European or World Bank/IMF development models are often criticised for being theoretical, prescriptive and one size fits all. They do have to compete now with alternative models which are attractive not for their theoretical and analytical quality, but because "they have worked". This may be an oversimplification, as there still needs to be an analysis of which factors made these models work and whether these factors are relevant in the African context. This situation can be exploited by creating an artificial competition between a Washington and a Beijing consensus, but the more realistic and at the same time constructive approach is to use the opportunity to enhance a shared knowledge base on development and share experiences among the Western, African and Chinese partners.

7) The effects of climate change notably on Africa are likely to wipe out all progress Africa has made towards the MDG and recent economic growth. Food insecurity, natural disasters (floods, droughts, desertification), environmental refugees and conflict over water and arable land are phenomena which can already be observed in many areas. This problem is not only an issue of financing for adaptation measures. For Africa it is imperative that the global community agrees an effective package of mitigation and adaptation in Copenhagen in 2009 and that global warming is limited to 2°C. From Africa's strategic interest, even if developing countries are stressing the West's historic responsibility, the first priority must be that all emitters of GHG – including China – need to reduce emissions and work towards the 2°C target. The financing is only the second priority.

III. Some convenient solutions: A new approach to trilateral cooperation

The EU is the only global player to have mostly moved away from Cold War thinking (not least as it has successfully integrated the former Soviet dominated countries). China in its rivalry with the US and its allies (notably Japan), but also with Taiwan, remains locked in Cold War thinking of balance of power, sovereignty/non-interference with only a gradual evolution at the margins (integration into global economy and within the region). Africa for its part has started to move away from these principles (AU Constitutive Act, APRM, principle of non-indifference and right/obligation to interfere), but not all African countries have. Familiar patterns of using rivalry among external partners to extract concessions subsist, yet, in the long-term this may be counterproductive to African unity and Africa's strategic position in geopolitics on the one hand and sustainable development on the other.

The EU is not as worried as media reports suggest about China's role in Africa. The EU is aware of its strengths and increasingly aware of China's weaknesses. It has moved considerably closer to a better understanding of the African agenda and to abandoning old habits. However, hype and exaggerated criticism in the media, and aggressive statements by Western, African and Chinese politicians have helped to create a climate of suspicion, rivalry and ideological antagonism.

The EC now proposes a more rational approach focusing on common/shared interests in

- 1) Stability, security, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction;
- 2) Development to reduce and eradicate poverty, sustainable economic growth, employment and regional integration (larger markets, more intra-African trade, asymmetrical market access), improved business environments;
- 3) African unity and capacity to address Africa's challenges themselves, comprehensive cooperation with Africa to address global challenges (e.g. climate change) on the basis of political equality.

Given that these shared interests are often based on very different approaches and philosophies it is important to "de-ideologies" and "de-emotionalise" the dialogue. The EU is not in Africa to pursue an agenda of regime change or post-colonial intervention. There may still be some flickers of that in some parts of Member States and the old generation of African leaders cultivates the post-colonial suspicion of the Europeans to justify autocratic rule or to achieve other aims, but by and large, the Lisbon summit with Africa has turned the page on these issues. The frank and open exchanges on some of these questions has actually shown the strength of the partnership – a bit like an old couple can more easily shout at each other than young lovers without risking divorce.

The EU accepts China's interests in Africa and Africans interest in diversifying its partnerships as not only legitimate, but also desirable. China brings in additional resources and useful experiences and Africans get more opportunities for development and prosperity, which is also in Europe's interest (stability, burden-sharing, migratory pressures, market opportunities, political maturity). While some

criticism of China is overdone and reflects a certain degree of paranoia in some minds, a sober analysis will show that some of the criticism is justifiable (seeking truth from facts and reacting to the African criticism is the best recipe to calm paranoid voices in Europe and the US). China's tit for tat reaction to criticism by Europeans can only make matters worse, even if they win some applause among African leaders. However, here again, some of the criticism is containing truths that Europeans should seriously reflect upon. In short, to begin with we need a "rhetorical disarmament" followed by constructive cooperation.

Agreement on common interests or objectives can reduce the negative effects of underlying differences in approach, without either side being forced to change the values of its policy. Pragmatic adaptation is a practical way to advance, even if periodic arguments about approaches are inevitable (but these are acceptable among partners).

While Chinese and European policymakers use different words because of "ideological" reasons, in many cases objectives are similar and pragmatic approaches can be developed: for instance where the EU uses "good governance" China speaks of "soft infrastructure" or "effective governance" (Zhang 2008). Regarding legal certainty, strengthened state capacity and improved accountability and business environments there is a large overlap in objectives. There may be differences in approach on how to achieve these objectives, but that can be complementary and Africans need to take up the opportunities to create synergies and steer this process.

In the short-term and in some countries where Chinese officials are relying excessively on (biased) information from elites with self-serving short-term interests, China looks like enjoying an advantage, but in the long-run and in the majority of African countries the balance may turn in favour of the Europeans notably as the EU is adapting its Africa-policy in strong cooperation and partnership with the Africans themselves. The Joint Strategy and Action plans elaborated jointly over a year and agreed at the EU-Africa summit are good examples. The summit, as well as the action plan were explicitly opened to external participants and Chinese observers could follow all deliberations of EU and African leaders during the summit (not only ceremonial sessions). This may serve as proof that the EU has nothing to hide and is not intent on embarking on a confrontational course with China or other actors in Africa. Rather Europeans seek synergies with all partners. The EU does not single out China, even if the focus is on it as a big player. The EU has intensified cooperation with Japan (TICAD) and also India and Korea.

In order to formulate a cooperation strategy it is worthwhile to look at the different instruments the EU and China use. There is a widespread misunderstanding in Europe where many people simply assume that what China does in Africa is roughly the same as "official development assistance" and thus propose that China simply follows rules and definitions set in the OECD DAC framework. This fails to acknowledge that China uses many modes of cooperation with Africa of which grant aid is only a small part. Conversely, China does not necessarily understand the complex rationale and genesis of the DAC and other multilateral rules as China has been largely absent (understandably so) from the long and protracted evolution of the development consensus. Like Japan in the past, China bases its foreign aid policies on other experiences at home and in Asia and on South-South economic cooperation. While

Japan sought to enter the mainstream of Western policies and influence its direction from the inside, China, for the time being feels more comfortable outside the mainstream and arguing for alternatives. The way forward is to exchange information and experiences and advance research and better understanding. Based on that dialogue new approaches to development can be conceived with all sides contributing to progress. It would be a mistake (and at variance with the long history of debate on approaches to development) to simply assume that the present ideas are static and the final word on development.

In terms of tools of cooperation the EC gives only grants not loans, EU MS provide both loans and grants and all work within frameworks elaborated of course within the EU, but also in larger forums such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the OECD. China's instruments are predominantly loans, concessionary and commercial, with a modest amount of grants (understandable for a developing country). The different instruments have different modalities of implementation and different rationales of conditionality (not necessarily political, but conditions for debt repayment etc.). Most loans are actually promoting Chinese companies' investments in Africa, based on an understanding that these investments help African and Chinese development. In general loans present a liability for the future of a country, which grants do not imply, but loans also create a discipline of management of funds for objectives and a higher degree of self-reliance. These different instruments are also consequently used for different purposes.

The rest of the issues can be left to competition e.g. between companies. However, there is a need to agree the rules of the game between the three sides. Not in all cases does this translate into "imposition of Western standards" on China. China should take an active role in defining rules of engagement. New, partner-country driven initiatives such as EITI, FLEGT, Kimberley and Equator principles are a good starting point, allowing China also to get progressively familiar with cooperation with NGOs which China will discover are not necessarily subversive agents. In fact, many NGOs have taken a critical stance on Western development aid, which opens avenues for debates where Chinese experts and development banks/officials can have a constructive role (Cf. Li Ruogu 2007, Dahle Huse & Muyakwa 2008).

Companies of whatever nationality need to comply, and be pushed by African and "mother country" governments to comply with certain standards that are in the interest of the African country. Again this is often perceived as Western-imposed standards, but this perception is only partly true, Western policy-makers may indeed have to review critically whether all the well-intentioned standards and conditions are equally relevant or whether there should be a prioritisation and sequencing of standards in phase with progress in countries on economic growth and development. Such a debate can be very enriching and benefit from practical experiences in Africa and Asia. Compliance with African regulations and expectations are a minimum requirement (or in the absence of these, home standards), but enforcement capacity can be very limited in some countries. Elite interests may compromise the long-term interests of a country and a well-understood leadership role for China in the developing world implies that China promotes sustainable development and not corrupt elites. This is not only a Western expectation, but an African people's concern. These are tricky situations that need to be addressed, and they cannot be left to merely profit-oriented actors.

IV. What if trilateral cooperation fails?

Scenarios for the rejection/failure of trilateral cooperation are of course speculative, but in all likelihood failure of cooperation will lead to zero-sum games or even costly policy choices. The main losers will be African societies. Some possible scenarios:

- New Cold War type of great game may not only enhance Sino-US rivalry, but make the EU a more critical actor in its relations with China. Thus China's economic interest in the West may be compromised.
- Re-equilibration of aid and other transfers ("fair burden sharing"): if China does the business in Africa, it should also foot the aid bill.
- Rising inequality in Africa between and inside countries e.g. through rising oil and commodity prices being a boon for some and a burden for others (recent oil price rises have cost 137 billion USD annually to developing countries compared to 85 billion USD in net aid).
- Undermining of African unity as a consequence of these economic disparities and pursuit of different strategies with different partners (friends of Europe, friends of China, friends of US, friends of Japan...and Taiwan).
- Impact of medium-long-term cycles: if commodity boom ends, or China's growth subsides, Africans could be marginalised again – the current global slow down is an omen.

V. Working together with Africa and China in Africa: EU proposals

The European Commission is working on a policy paper (Communication) on trilateral cooperation. It is scheduled to be tabled in September 2008 and to be discussed and endorsed by the Council in October, ahead of the next EU-China summit.

Initial EC proposals, based to some extent of earlier deliberations such as in the June 2007 trilateral conference (Wissenbach, 2007c) or the senior officials meetings between the EU and China, cover cooperation in three areas: peace and security, infrastructure and sustainable management of natural resources.

In more detail the following ideas are worth discussing:

1) Peace and Security:

Enhance political dialogue beyond the current focus on crisis spots of the day (e.g. Sudan) which should of course continue, but be enriched by more profound dialogue on concepts of peace- building, post-conflict resolution, crisis prevention and responses, human security etc. This could be done by complementing the usually short official SOMs where generalists meet with a workshop of 2-3 hours duration facilitated by government, military and police experts and including the AU side. Themes would be identified sufficiently early to allow for invitation of and preparation by experts.

Possible themes: approaches to post-conflict reconstruction; capacity building for the African Peace and Security architecture; training of military and civilian personnel; the vulnerability of Africa to climate change; concept of human security and the development-security nexus.

Complementing the improved dialogue as proposed above by training courses which could simply mean integrating Chinese experts or military in the EU-AU capacity building programmes under the EU-Africa Peace and Security partnership. Another track could be specific training for Chinese peacekeepers/military decision makers in Member States (language, specific skills, civil-military cooperation) or in the framework of the ESDP College.

Track 2 diplomacy involving specialised government think tanks may usefully complement and underpin these deepening exchanges between governments and international organisations.

2) Infrastructure

Integrating Chinese actors in the planning agencies (NEPAD/AU, RECs and ICA as well as the EU-Africa infrastructure partnership). China Development Bank has already agreed to some initial steps and participated in two relevant meetings since the June 2007 conference. This could develop into a specific type of public-private partnership.

Besides coordination of overall African continental and regional planning (in which the EU's experience with trans-border networks and cooperation is very relevant) the different actors can cooperate on implementation in parallel, but coordinated ways. African partners would achieve better alignment, can use the expertise and capacity of EU and Chinese partners, get better quality at lower cost than if they were working with both partners separately, more widely shared quality control and capacity building. All sides benefit through sharing of expertise. Of course the downside is in start-up negotiations being more complex, but that seems easily outweighed by the benefits provided there is commitment, clarity of roles, transparency and good faith of all parties.

3) Sustainable management of natural resources

A task force could be created between African (AfDB, African business forum), European and Chinese (CCPIT, MOFCOM, Banks) experts for responsible business conduct and help enforce Chinese government requirements on its companies and African governments' standards and regulations on all companies, by providing advice and guidelines that are widely agreed. They should apply to companies of all nationalities. A general guidebook and training programme with country-specific modules could be developed. The interest for a company could be the obtention of a certificate for its managers that enhances its reputation or even as a qualification requirement to win tenders. There could even be a prize awarded for innovative or excellent performance. Civil society from Africa could be invited to play an advisory role or voting for award of the prize.

Internationally the EITI, FLEGT, Kimberley, Equator secretariats/boards could be involved alongside UNDP.

4) Learning from China's development model?

China's model is not transferable to Africa, but Africans can learn useful lessons from Chinese development. And here again, there is a lot of overlap with European approaches. After all the last three decades of China's reform strategy are based on the one hand on strategies that correspond to China's comparative advantages and a pragmatic, independent approach to put this strategy into practice. On the other hand China has consciously learned from the West, including in its own construction of a new legal and service environment for its economy and population that bears strong

resemblance with what is called “good governance” in Europe. The main difference is China’s reluctance to include Western style democracy in its own good governance model. However, from the rule of/by law to the provision of public goods, strides towards a service oriented government and more transparency, public accountability and participation and the fight against corruption this agenda is pretty similar to what Europeans and African citizens expect African states to do.

The key issue is not to “copy China”, but to learn from China’s experiences in such a way as to integrate lessons learnt into an African development strategy. The International Poverty Reduction Centre in China aims at becoming a platform for such exchanges and it is in the process of developing an implementation strategy. If this platform was to include key actors in China’s foreign aid system and MOFCOM in particular, it could become indeed an important platform for trilateral exchanges.

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**Africa-China-EU Relations:
A View from Africa**

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Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century and on the threshold of fifty years of independence, Africa stands at a very critical historical conjuncture. This conjuncture is defined by at least three inter-related challenges which must, of necessity, be addressed simultaneously for Africa to move ahead. It is the main contention of this paper that the future of the continent in terms of the fundamental twin tasks of economic transformation and socio-political stability will depend on how effectively it will be able to address these challenges. The first and overriding challenge facing the African continent is its steady marginalization and near exclusion from the world economy. With the notable exception of supplying raw materials to industrialised countries, Africa's position and role in global production and consumption has been declining. Attempts to create an African Economic Community and to stimulate the domestic market have, so far, failed. This is because this task has been approached based the false assumption that gradual economic integration can eventually lead to political unity. The opposite may actually be the case. This assumption has to be reversed by revisiting Kwame Nkrumah's approach, i.e. seek thee the political kingdom and all else shall be added to it!¹

In order to address the marginalization and possible eventual exclusion challenge it is proposed that Africa needs to centralise political authority (a union government) before it can successfully integrate its economies. This is a necessary condition in order for Africa to find, for itself, a new economic space in the highly competitive and rapidly changing global economy. Without centralised political authority Africa will find it very difficult to stabilise its societies, integrate and transform its economies and negotiate from a position of credibility and strength in the international system. I therefore agree with Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, that without unity Africa has no future.

The second challenge arises from Africa's historical colonial relationship with Europe. For over forty years now, from the Yaunde Convention in 1963 to the ACP in 1975 and on to the present Cotonou Agreement, Africa, along with other ex-European colonies, has maintained close economic ties with Europe. This relationship has been guided by two main assumptions. One is that the arrangement would help to bring about development in the continent and the other is that Africa has limited to no options in its choice of economic strategy. Experience has shown, however, that the relationship has failed to bring about development and current developments are opening up options for Africa to forge new relationships.

At this juncture, therefore, Africa has to decide on whether its long term interests can best be served by extending and deepening the present relationship with Europe through such arrangements as the evolving Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)

¹ Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*. London, Panaf Books, 1970.

under the Cotonou Agreement or if it should curtail and cut back its engagements with Europe to allow for a process of meaningful and focussed forging of new relationships. This is currently a highly controversial issue with some African countries taking diametrically opposed and potentially divisive positions, some in support of EPAs and others in opposition. Many would like to have more time. Meanwhile the EU continues to exert pressures on African countries to sign on to EPAs in the shortest time possible. It is clear that most of this pressure, as Rob Davis, South Africa's deputy minister of industry and trade, has put it, arises, because "...the EU is afraid that it will lose its foothold on the African continent and wants to prevent this at any cost"²

The third challenge, which is closely related to the second, emanates from the rise of China, its rapid economic growth and the fast deepening economic relationship with Africa particularly in the raw materials sector. As Rob Davis puts it: "China and India, due to their industrialization, offer developing countries higher prices for natural resources, they do not force us to lower our tariffs, contrary to Europe."³ The emergence of China and how it may affect Africa's role and interests in the global economy raises a number of interesting questions. What are China's goals and Africa's goals in the emerging relationship? Can China present the opportunities that could enable Africa to find the new economic space or does it pose predatory threats which can further marginalise Africa? What are the possibilities of China-European collaboration in the exploitation of Africa? What are the critical challenges for Africa if the new Sino-African relationship is to be made to work to Africa's advantage? Is Africa, in its present form, ready to maximise its benefits in a relationship with China? What kind of relationship? In this paper we shall deal with the latter two challenges with the objective of providing the context within which the first can be addressed.

Africa in Global Change

Among the major contradictions of globalization is the tendency to integrate and centralise certain regions while disintegrating and marginalizing other regions from the global system. While the former process has produced large and powerful blocks such as the EU, the latter process tends to produce what Castells has, quite aptly, described as "black holes in informational capitalism: regions where [there is] no escape from suffering and deprivation."⁴ Africa is progressively acquiring that image. The rapid integration and growth of the European and North American economies and the steady centralization of political authority, particularly in Europe, stands in stark contrast to the marginalization, impoverishment, disintegration and fragmentation on the African continent. The failure of African countries to integrate meaningfully is, at least in part, attributed to these divergent but interconnected processes.

Almost all of the African countries, though playing a marginal and steadily diminishing role in the European economy, still remain vertically integrated to the European countries creating a situation of persistent structural dependence. This dependence is in the course of being re-enforced by the signing of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP under the Cotonou Convention which will open up Africa's resources to European multinationals, block Africa's integration and obstruct south-south cooperation. This fact of being

² Miriam Mannak, Trade: EPAs born of EU's concern with China in Africa. IPS, Feb. 26, 2008.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Quoted by Joel Netshitenzhe, Article: Letter from Tshwane, Survival in the global jungle, GCIS, South Africa.

appendages of the European economies, by itself, constitutes a major obstacle to horizontal integration between the African countries themselves and may create obstacles in Africa's relations with China.

Thus the irony is that while Europe is deepening its union and creating greater unity through an expanded EU, Africa, under EU pressure, is disintegrating into regional Economic Partnership Agreements linked to the EU with the effect of weakening the existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and eventually scuttling the dream of a politically unified Africa. There are four such EPAs proposed for Africa (West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community) and one each for the Caribbean and the Pacific.

In Africa the EPAs create new regions on top of existing RECs. It is not surprising therefore that whereas European trade Commissioner, Barroso, at the Lisbon EU-Africa summit in December 2007, claimed that the EPAs "...will turn our trading relationship into a healthy, diversified, development oriented partnership", Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade countered by saying: "It is clear that Africa rejects the EPA...the EU was losing out to China in Africa...Europe is about to lose the battle of competition in Africa."⁵ African Union President Konare highlighted the danger of interim agreements playing African regions off against each other. He appealed for more time.

Almost invariably, Africa's vertical integration to Europe has entrenched economic dependence, weakened the African states and facilitated the plunder of Africa's resources. The weakness and dependence of the state undermines its capacity rendering it unable to exercise effective control over its national resources. Loss of control over resources combines with structural dependence and indebtedness to produce what Beckford described as 'persistent poverty' for the majority of the population.⁶ Persistent poverty precipitates the disintegration of national societies as well as the fragmentation and polarization of ethnic communities. It is the politicization of polarized ethnic communities by political elites that produces and sustains many conflicts in the continent. The convergence of external integration and internal disintegration also creates a crisis of legitimacy of the African state resulting in authoritarian rule, state failure/collapse, ethnic conflicts and internecine warfare. In brief for Africa globalization has unleashed a chain reaction which may be depicted as follows: Economic marginalization, resource plunder, impoverishment, state failure, political disintegration, social fragmentation, community polarization, conflicts.

Ironically, the process that has brought about the socio-economic marginalization of Africa in terms of its share of international production, consumption and trade as well as its impoverishment, is the very same process which is intensifying and centralizing the exploitation of Africa's resources. Africa's position and role in the international division of labour, which has gone through at least three phases, is changing yet again. As it is always the case such transitions present challenges as well as opportunities. All the prior phases of Africa's history over the last five hundred years have been driven by external forces and promoted the interests of those forces. The crucial

⁵ EU-Africa Summit fails on trade. 10 Dec. 2007. www.euractiv.com

⁶ George Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies*. London, Oxford University Press, 1972.

question, this time around, is whether Africa will seize the opportunity to shape and drive its own future to serve its own interests.

In the first phase during the slave trade, Africans provide the labour that opened up the New World and supplied the commodities that led to the industrialization of Europe. In this phase Africa not only lost most of its able-bodied population, but the continent was also depopulated thus losing the population pressure that could have provided the spurt for transformation a la Boserup.⁷ To this day, one of the most contentious issues in assessing the impact of the slave trade particularly on Africa's development is the number of people pressed into slavery by the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. Estimates range from ten to one hundred million.

Demographically, two things are clear however. One is that the so-called trade basically removed the young and able bodied people leaving the continent's demographic structure tilted towards the very young and the very old for a very long time. Secondly, the three centuries of slave trading decimated Africa's population. The continent's population growth remained either static or declined in both absolute (population size) and relative (share of world's population) terms. In terms of size Africa's population stagnated at around 100million over the period having lost nearly 100million to the slave trade and the violence it precipitated on the continent. It is estimated by some that for every one person transported into slavery sixteen were lost.⁸ In relative terms, Africa's share of world population declined from nearly 15% in 1500 to approximately 7% around 1900. Socially, slave raiding and catching left a legacy of what Rodney describes as social violence which survives to this day. Politically, the slave trade, not only destroyed stable and expanding empires but it also perverted political authority. From protecting the people and promoting their interests, African political systems instead, exposed their publics to external danger and predation. This affliction continues to reproduce itself and to haunt the post-colonial state. To the extent that the African state continues to serve external interests and to neglect internal needs this affliction is the source of endemic political instability and underlies legitimacy deficit of the state.

When the slave trade was no longer economically viable and politically sustainable, Europe embarked upon the scramble for Africa which culminated in the Berlin Conference and the partition of the continent in 1884. During the nearly eighty years of colonial occupation that followed, from being exported as slave labour, Africans were, through forced labour, made to produce industrial and food commodities for Europe on their own land. This period was in many respects even worse than the slave trade period. Population declined so precipitously that it prompted some observers of the situation to remark that "Africa was able to survive the three centuries of slavery but is likely to succumb to one century of colonization"⁹ This condition has largely persisted over the post-independence period with Africa continuing to produce and export colonial crops and, almost invariably, failing to create 'new economic space' for itself.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the traditional markets of the colonial crops in particular, have

⁷ Esther Boserup, *Population and Technological Change*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981.

⁸ Louise-Marie Diop-Maes, *Demography and History in Sub-Saharan Africa*.

www.ankhonline.com/africa_population

⁹ M. Reinhard and A. Armegaud, *Histoire generale de la polulation mondiale*. Paris, Montchrestien, 1961.

¹⁰ The concept of 'new economic space' was coined by Arthur Lewis in dealing with the options available to primary commodity producers when they lose their traditional colonial markets. Sir W.A. Lewis, *The state of development theory*. *American Economic Review*. 74, March, 1984.

been collapsing either from oversupply, growth of substitutes or changing tastes in the European countries.

Africa's Contemporary Threats

The current global changes have also ushered in contradictions of their own. Perhaps the most glaring and disturbing contradiction arises from the fact that in the first and second phases Africans were required either as slave labour or as colonial corvée labour, respectively. In the current period, however, owing to technological advances, lack of skills and the overproduction or growth of substitutes of their traditional exports, African labour power is no longer required either to extract Africa's resources or to supply agricultural and industrial commodities. It has become dispensable rendering Africans redundant in the global division of labour. The popular saying that "we produce what we do not consume and consume what we do not produce" is no longer tenable. We may be producing what we do not consume, but we consume very little of what we don't produce. This, too, has progressively assumed the form of 'mitumba' – the proverbial used products of all kinds that have become the hallmark of African markets.

Meanwhile Africa's resources are becoming globally demanded and exploited at an inverse rate to the marginalization and steady exclusion of its people. The rampant plunder of Africa's resources by external agents is rapidly becoming reminiscent of the plunder of its population during the slave trade. On the production front traditional agricultural export markets are failing while the continent suffers from structural food shortages because of producing non-food commodities. In industry production is encumbered by high production costs, narrow domestic demand due to low incomes, and stringent export markets due to supply and quality conditions. Raw material production, including mining and logging, is rising under predatory conditions precipitating violent conflicts and generating low returns to the countries concerned. Capital intensive methods of production and demand for highly skilled labour mean low employment creation for manual as well as unspecialised skilled labour.

This situation engenders both positive and negative implications for Africa. On the negative side it exacerbates the crisis of unemployment in at least two senses. One sense is in absolute terms through the growing army of unemployed youth – structural unemployment. Secondly is the relative sense in which peasants continue to produce agricultural crops at prices far below their costs of production – relative unemployment. Either way this situation is largely responsible for the persistent poverty that has become the hallmark of the continent.

On the positive side, however, this process is shattering the long held illusion embedded in such arrangements as the ACP-EU Cotonou (formerly Lome) agreements that the colonial pattern of production and trade can bring about long-term transformation in Africa. By shattering this illusion it liberates the mind and opens it up to new ideas in contemplating the challenges and opportunities facing the continent. By making African labour redundant in the emerging international division of labour it frees it up making it potentially available, for the first time since the slave trade, to be re-allocated, reorganized and mobilized to stimulate, produce and supply domestic markets. Africa is being forced to reposition itself and create new roles for itself. In rising to this challenge, Africa will, for once, have to pose and answer the three basic economic questions: *What to produce; For whom to produce and How to produce.*

The marginalization of Africa also creates new opportunities for African countries including East Africa. As the bonds with the west become loosened Africa has at least two windows of opportunity. One is to embark seriously upon regional integration and continental unity, realising that this is a necessary condition for transformation and reconstruction. This is a precondition for taking advantage of the second window and is the subject of the following section. The second window is the opportunity to forge new relationships, particularly with the rapidly growing economies of China and India. A symbiotic relationship can grow with these countries and create a new and different economic space. These countries have a high demand for raw materials which Africa still has while Africa suffers from a major deficit in technology. Rather than exporting their commodities in return for dollar earnings Africa could negotiate resource-for-technology deals with these countries. It is the combination of these two windows i.e. African integration and repositioning of Africa that holds the prospects for fundamental and sustainable transformation.

Africa-China relations

China's relations with post-independence Africa have always aroused considerable anxiety from the West and stirred up some controversy both within Africa and between Africa and the West.¹¹ Western anxiety may partly arise from the symbolic image of China as a dragon. There exist two contradictory mythical images of a dragon held by the East and the West. In Chinese mythology the dragon is "...a divine, mythical creature that brings good fortune, prosperity and bounty...eastern dragons [in general] are perceived as good and benevolent, western dragons are all fire and flinging their tails about and biting heads off".¹² More realistically however, western hostility stems from a suspicion of China's motives towards Africa – a traditional sphere of western influence and source of resources. In a nutshell, the question has been whether China, like the west itself, has its own designs for the exploitation of Africa or whether, as China would claim, "Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-[these] are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and are the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations"¹³

The controversy, particularly within Africa, has revolved around whether, regardless of China's own stated motives, Africa can forge a new and gainful relationship with China. Specifically the issue has been whether China provides a unique and productive opportunity for Africa to realize its development aspirations as is anticipated by the joint statement that emerged from the Beijing Summit of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006. Adopted by the leaders of 48 African countries and China, the statement proclaimed the establishment of "a new type of strategic partnership" featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges". The statement also stresses the point that China and Africa have common development goals and converging interests "...which offer a broad prospects for cooperation...between Africa and the world's largest developing country"¹⁴

¹¹ An interesting on-line debate between Brautigam and Gaye under the title: Is Chinese investment good for Africa? Will be found on the Council for Foreign relations website www.cfr.org/publications

¹² Dragons: A history of mythology and beliefs. www.darkfiredragons.com

¹³ China's African Policy. January 2006. www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng

¹⁴ Beijing Summit and Third Ministerial Conference of Forum on China -Africa Cooperation. Beijing Summit adopts declaration, highlighting China-Africa strategic partnership, 2006-11-05. <http://english.focac.org>

In the early 1960s, as newly independent African countries groped around and reached out to China and the Soviet Union, in particular, in the quest to forge new relations with the outside world, the stock response, particularly from the West was that China was motivated by material and ideological interests and that Africa was being rather naïve in flirting with China – the dragon as serpent! This relationship, it was constantly argued, could not be good for Africa since not only Africa would be encroached upon by communism but also that it stood to lose its resources to the teeming millions of China. This was in the context of the cold war in which countries and regions were judged by the sphere of influence they belonged to – Western (capitalist) or Eastern (socialist/communist).

Post-independence Africa was seen in the cold war as the new prize to be won by the East or lost by the West, which had just reluctantly yielded to Africa's demands for political independence but wanted to continue with economic domination. The underlying, though unstated, assumption by the West was that singly and collectively the African countries did not have interests of their own to protect or pursue. It was in this context that Kwame Nkrumah protested in exasperation making the now famous statement; "We face neither East nor West, we face forward" adding, in the same context, that it was far easier "...for the proverbial camel to pass through the needle's eye, hump and all, than for an erstwhile colonial administration to give sound and honest counsel of a political nature to its liberated territory". To the extent that the imagery of China as a dragon made any sense to them, the African countries, at least in the 1960s and 70s, subscribed to the eastern benevolent view.

Despite the fact that African leaders have variously continued to protest and uphold Nkrumah's position, this patronizing attitude on the part of the West does not seem to have changed much over the years. With the end of the cold war and China's economic break through in the last decade, western attention has now been turned to China's strategic objectives in Africa. This is summed up by Derek Quinn of Radio Canada International: "As China gains more power in Africa, it will increasingly become a major power for countries in Africa and the Middle East to turn to for support against the United States and Europe. In establishing closer ties in Africa, China is setting up geopolitical alliances so it can become a global superpower."¹⁵ More recently in the run up to the November 2006 summit Time asserted that: "The primary impetus for China's drive into Africa is the raging thirst for oil for its booming economy..."¹⁶

Again no credit is given to Africa for seeking, in its own interests, to form a strategic relationship with China. Responding more recently to the western claim that the development of China poses a threat to Africa, Tanzania's President Kikwete in a speech on the occasion of the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Tanzania in June, 2006, had the following to say:

The Tanzanian and African people strongly oppose such a claim. In the past, China, though not rich, helped the African people in our struggle for

¹⁵ Radio Canada international, China's Influence in Africa. July 18th. 2005.

¹⁶ Time, Fri. Nov. 30, 2006.

independence and liberation. Today, the developing China is again helping us to cope with the challenges brought about by globalization.¹⁷

But it is not enough for Africa to defend China and to take its motives for granted. It would certainly be wrong to assess modern China's motives on the basis of the 'proletarian internationalism' of Maoist China. The more urgent task is for Africa to clearly define its interests with China and to pursue these interests with consistency and vigor. Just as China unveiled its 'Africa Strategy' in early 2006, so does Africa need to formulate an articulate, coherent and unified 'China Strategy' particularly focusing on the engaging China to bring about fundamental economic transformation in Africa.

Prospects and Conditions for China-Africa engagement

China's renewed and growing engagement with Africa will remain rather enigmatic for quite a while. That is because quite clearly China's emerging policy towards Africa is progressively acquiring a realist image in which her interests will be the major driving force. This does not mean, however, that China's interests and Africa's interests are diametrically opposed. They can be mutually reinforcing such that the 'win-win' outcomes espoused by China's policy statements are achievable. This will depend much more on objective conditions rather than subjective conditions though the latter in the form of 'political will' on the part of China, will play a major part. On the whole, on a scale of threats and opportunities, China represents more opportunity than threat to Africa in general and Tanzania, in particular. Through the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) African countries are coming closer together with the opportunity to form a strong united forum of their own in dealing with China. This is certainly a more coherent and newer opportunity than Nepad or Cotonou's EPAs.

The objective conditions include, but are not confined to the practical circumstances or imperatives which necessitate or in any way conduce this kind of positive-sum game. Some of these conditions are the following;

- China and Africa were roughly at the same level of development until recently when China made an economic leap forward. Africa has a lot to learn from the Chinese path and hopefully, China is keen to share its remarkable experience through training opportunities in China.
- China's demand for resources, which is growing, can be turned into an opportunity for Africa to industrialize Africa. The level of technology, particularly the labor intensity in Chinese production, is certainly more appropriate. This creates an opportunity for resources-for-technology barter arrangements between Africa and China. This can create more employment and create more opportunities for artisan miners, for example.
- This kind of technology transfer can also be done through resource-for-technology barter exchanges bypassing the traditional trade with hard currency with its constraints.
- China offers Africa an opportunity to diversify its composition of production in manufacturing and agriculture using its massive market size. The possibility of a new division of labor exists.

¹⁷ Premier Wen Jiabao Holds talks with Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete. 2006/06/23 . www.fmprc.gov.cn

- China needs Africa as an ally in the struggle against US hegemony. A stronger ally, i.e. less subservient to the US is preferable. This is particularly the case with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the current counter-terrorism crusade.

The subjective conditions revolve around what Africa, in particular, must fulfill to realize its aspirations in the relationship. Some are the following:

- Political will which is well grounded in the recognition and commitment to mutual interest and trust between Africa and China. Since political will is a function of interests it will be necessary for Africa and China to identify and negotiate their interest with openness and honesty, particularly with the view not simply of promoting trade but industrial transformation in Africa.
- The second condition is the capacity to take risks. Africa as a whole has tended to exhibit risk aversive behavior when it comes to braving the frontiers of diversifying their economies away from traditional patterns of trade and investment. Whereas it is clear that centuries of linkage to western markets have not brought about prosperity to Africa, it remains less clear to Africa that China offers a unique opportunity to transform its economy and break away from structural dependence.
- The third condition is the necessity of African countries to define their strategic goals vis-à-vis China together. China is a mammoth market with many potential opportunities, but so does it entail a number of potential pitfalls. China is too big for individual African countries to gain from the relationship. The China-Africa Forum should not be conceived simply in terms of structuring China-Africa relations but also in terms of Africa collectively defining and articulating its strategic goals with China. Large scale industrial, irrigation or hydro power projects will vitally depend on economies of scale. In this sense China-Africa relations could accelerate the long stalled African integration project.
- The fourth condition is to develop a sense of African resource nationalism a la Venezuela under Hugo Chavez in response to its own economic transformation needs and China's resource hunger. In this connection Africa needs to prepare a comprehensive resource survey, exploitation and utilization plan akin to that proposed by Cheik Anta Diop in the early 1970s.¹⁸
- The fifth condition is to marshal strategic economic information on global traditional and emerging markets mapping out Africa's current position and role in the international division labor and seeking to carve out a new economic space that would reposition Africa in the emerging international division of labour.

¹⁸ Cheik Anta Diop, *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated Republic*. Westport, Conn., Lawrence Hill & Co., 1974.

China-Africa Strategic Partnership Ushered in a New Era

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In the current context of international politics, economy and strategic pattern, the large number of developing countries play a pivotal role in globalization and international affairs. China's peaceful development in the new century would not be possible without the mutual support for and cooperation with each other, between China and other developing countries. Therefore, the further development of the relationship between China and other developing countries fully embodies an important diplomatic strategy of contemporary China that "developing countries are most essential." With Africa having the highest concentration of developing countries, China-Africa strategic partnership has been ushered in a new era.

Soft and Hard Features of China-Africa Relationship

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit held in November 2006 goes down in the history of China-Africa relations as a gathering of the largest size, highest rank and the most extensive participation by African leaders. It is not only a major milestone in the 2,000-odd-year history of China-Africa friendship, but also a collective pledge by two ancient civilizations to jointly build a harmonious world in the new millennium.

Since then both China and Africa have taken effective steps to implement the outcome and consensus of Beijing Summit. Between January 30 and February 10, 2007, President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to the eight African countries of Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and Seychelles. These eight countries, located in different parts of Africa, vary in size and development, which fully reflects how comprehensive and diverse China-Africa relations are. It was the first time for six countries out of the eight to receive a Chinese head of state. This trip is an African-oriented trip of friendship and cooperation, another milestone in China-Africa relations after the Beijing Summit. During his 12-day visit President Hu Jintao explained to African counterparts that, on the basis of mutual benefit, win-win outcome, friendly consultation, effectiveness and pragmatism, China would take steps to implement the eight measures it had proposed at the Beijing Summit tailored to the needs of African countries, including donations to the eight countries, interest-free or preferential loans, the identification of aid projects, the implementation of debts and tariff exemption, assistance in building rural schools, agricultural technology demonstration centers as well as malaria prevention and control centers, increase in government-sponsored scholarships. The majority of the over 50 cooperation agreements signed between China and Africa during his visit are related to the implementation of outcome of the Beijing Summit. It is worth mentioning that

President Hu Jintao made a special trip to the University of Pretoria, a prestigious university in South Africa, where he addressed more than 1,000 students. According to him, “The young Chinese and Africans are a dynamic force in advancing China-Africa friendship and in building a harmonious world.” He also announced that “the Chinese Government will invite 500 African youths, including university students, to visit China in the next three years.” Confident that China-Africa friendship would be passed from one generation to another, he declared that “I am sure that the Chinese and African peoples will live in friendship from generation to generation.” All these suggest Chinese leaders’ care for African youth, as well the ardent hope and firm belief that China-Africa friendship will last forever.

African friends sing highly of President Hu Jintao’s visit to the eight African countries, believing it to be “a visit of historical importance” and that “China’s concern for and cooperation with Africa are significant to African renaissance.” Mr. Mahmoud Allam M.Allam, the Egyptian Ambassador to China, said that “the fact that President Hu Jintao made African countries his first stop in his annual tour around the world clearly demonstrates the Chinese attitude.¹ African friends praise China for implementing the outcome of the Summit in a highly effective manner, a clear manifestation of the Chinese commitment to help Africa developing and improving African people’s life. African leaders have a high opinion of China’s African policy, claiming it to be “a new practice in international cooperation,” “cooperation on the basis of unity, friendship, sincerity and mutual benefit,” and “a role model for cooperation between countries.”² President Mbeki said candidly that, economically speaking, China is South Africa’s most important partner; politically speaking, consultation and cooperation with China is a great resource for South Africa in coping with all types of challenges; China’s concern and cooperation with Africa have great implications for African renaissance.

People may have noticed that at almost the same time as President Hu Jintao visited Africa, US President George Bush Jr. approved a US military plan in February 2007 to set up an Africa Command, in addition to the five existing US military commands around the world. Prior to African, US military affairs in Africa had been under the joint oversight of European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. Although the US Government claims that the main objective of the Africa Command is to prevent the spread of terrorism on the African continent, this is by no means the only objective. The Africa Command aims at “killing three bird with one stone,” or to ensure US energy security in Africa and contain other power’s influence there as well as the prevention of terrorism from spreading. As reported by *Wall Street Journal*, in 2006 the US imported more oil from Africa than Middle East for the first time in 21 years, accounting for 22% of total US crude oil import, or 2.23 barrels, which was not only a 4.8% increase over that of 2005, but also the highest volume since 1979.³ It is estimated that in the next ten years 25% of US oil import will be from Sub-Sahara regions. It is self-evident why the US set up the Africa Command. In the subsequent

¹ Source: http://www.embassy.org.cn/eg/egypt_sino_africa/esa05.htm.

² “A Journey of Friendship and Cooperation into the African Continent: President Hu Jintao’s Visit to Eight African Countries,” Feb. 10, 2007, www.people.com.cn.

³ David Bird, “Africa Tops Middle East as US Crude Source,” *Wall Street Journal*, 2/22/ 2007.

months US military dignitaries visited Africa once and again trying in vain to convince African countries of the plan and to find a country to host the Command. The US plan to set up Africa Command in Algeria was rejected by the Algerian authorities. Later Morocco, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda followed suit. The Africa Command, which was officially established on October 1, 2007, had to call Stuttgart, Germany, its home. Public opinion in Africa believes that the US attempts to achieve overall control of the African continent in military, economic and political affairs through the establishment of the Africa Command. Tanzanian media commented that the establishment of the Africa Command is “an imminent tragedy to Africa.” Zimbabwe media pointed out that the new US focus on Africa boded ill for the continent. They are worried that the Africa Command will be used by the US not only to extract natural resources from Africa, but also to spur illegitimate regime changes there. Even U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank in the US, pointed out in a report that the Bush Administration might have done just the opposite to what it had wished by setting up the Africa Command, which would damage the US image in Africa and bring disastrous impact on regional stability.⁴

On the other hand, when President Hu Jintao visited Africa in 2007, he not only brought with him the sincere commitment of the Chinese Government to African countries, but also called Chinese businesses in Africa to “get along harmoniously with the local community for the sake of long-term China-Africa cooperation.” He advised Chinese businesses there to “take initiatives in social responsibility, help the locals create employment, improve living conditions, develop public-good projects, train professionals and protect the eco-environment” and “try the best to gain the support of local people by making practical contributions.”⁵ In fact, we can derive several characteristics of the China-Africa relations from the entirely different attitudes towards Africa between China and the US.

First of all, peace orientation in China-Africa relations. For a long time China has persisted in handling relations with other countries with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which applies to its African policy as well. The Chinese Government tries its best to support and promote peace and stability in Africa. It is opposed to resorting to arms or sanctions in dispute resolution, or interfering with the internal affairs of Africa by force. In 2000, China gave US\$ 200,000 in cash to the Peace Fund of the Organization of African Unity (the predecessor of African Union), to which another US\$100,000 in cash was added later. With regards to Darfur, the Chinese Government insisted on equal dialogue on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of the Sudanese government despite external pressure, earning full trust of Sudan and other African countries. In 2005, China again gave US\$ 400,000 in cash to African Union to support the expansion of African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan. In 2006, China further increased its aid to African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur to US\$1.4 million.⁶ According to UN statistics, by

⁴ Guo Xiaobing, “US Africa Command: No Headquarters, No Troops,” *World Affairs*, Issue 16, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-02/07/content_5706003.htm.

⁵ “Hu Jintao: Promoting Comprehensive China-Africa Cooperation on a Larger Scale and Higher Level.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-02/07/content_5706003.htm.

⁶ Xu Renlong, “Friendly Cooperation between China and African Union (Organization of African Unity),” in Lu Miaogen, Huang Jiaoshe & Lin Yi(eds.), *Of One Mind: The Glorious Course of China-Africa Friendship*, World Affairs Press, 2006, p.214.

the end of May 2007, 1,828 Chinese military observers, soldiers and police officers had joined UN peacekeeping operations,⁷ among whom three quarters are deployed in Africa to support peace and stability there, especially in conflict zones in Libya, Sudan, Congo (Kinshasa). China extends its influence in Africa mainly through economic, cultural and technical assistance as well as cooperation. Peace orientation is the first and foremost characteristic of China-Africa relations. It sets China-Africa relations apart from others.

Secondly, reciprocity in China-Africa relations. Cooperation can't last long without reciprocity. The China-Africa relationship is not simply a relationship of resources and markets, but cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit. According to a recent World Bank report, "Economic growth in China and India presents a second chance to Africa." The report states that China has overtaken Japan to become the largest importer of African products in Asia.⁸ As mentioned by a professor at the University of Illinois, "Africa has what China needs in terms of resources, while China is willing to provide Africa with capital, technical and organizational know-how and low-cost products. No match presently for what the advanced Western powers can provide, but China is making a presence."⁹ According to statistics collected by the Ministry of Commerce, the 2006 China-Africa trade stood at US\$55.5 billion, the fifth year of growth at 30% or above. At the same time, Chinese companies fulfilled labor contracts valued at US\$9.5 billion. The reason behind the fast but solid growth behind China-Africa trade is that China pursues "mutual benefit and win-win outcome" in Africa, not colonial plunder. Good inexpensive Chinese goods can undoubtedly meet current African consumption needs better. In Senegal, a second-hand Toyota car imported from Europe is sold at US\$40,000, while a brand new four-wheel drive SUV by China's Great Wall Motor Company Limited fetches a mere US\$32,000. According to a local business owner, "Why would you want used when you can buy new for cheaper?"¹⁰ For China, the vast African market is conducive not only to Chinese businesses going international, but also to industrial upgrading and economic restructuring. Mutual benefit is another characteristic of China-Africa relations. It is a fundamental driving force.

Thirdly, equality in China-Africa relations. A cornerstone of the long-term healthy development of China-Africa relations is that the two sides treat us as equals, sharing joys and sorrows. For a long time the Chinese Government has respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African countries, supported the latter's fight for national liberation against imperialism and colonialism, as well as all efforts on the latter's part to defend its rights on the international stage. According to the record kept by African Liberation Committee, 75% of military supplies obtained by the Organization of African Unity from the outside world in 1971 and 1972 came from China. For a long time the Chinese Government has been extending development assistance within its power to African countries without attaching any political string. It follows the principle of non-interference with internal affairs, supports African countries' right to choose their own paths of development and resolve internal

⁷ *Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations*,

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/may07_1.pdf.

⁸ "Silk Route in Africa: the Economic Frontier of China and India," World Bank report, 2006,

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/ASR_Chinese.pdf.

⁹ Li Yan, "Contending with Western Influence, China Broadening Its Road to Africa," *Washington Observer* weekly, Issue No. 198, 2006.

¹⁰ John Miller, "Africa's New Car Dealer: China," *Wall Street Journal*, 8/29/2007.

conflicts in peaceful means. It is because of mutual respect and equality that China and Africa manage to maintain mutual trust and support for a long time.

Finally, the strategic nature of China-Africa relations. China-Africa relations are strategic from all respects. Africa having the largest number of third-world developing countries on earth, China being the world's most populous developing country in the world, over time the two have been supporting and coordinating with each other to fight against Western colonialism and hegemony. The majority of African countries pursue the "One China" policy. Having no diplomatic ties with Taiwan, they are important strategic resources for China to fight against Taiwan independence forces on the world stage. An expert on China-Africa relations once commented that, if the narrower sense of strategy relates to political, military and security issues, then China-Africa relations are more significant to economy and trade than to strategy. But if the broader sense of strategy refers to a broad perspective of benefits China and Africa can gain from the two-way relationship, then the strategic significance of China-Africa relations supersedes any other significance. "Although economic and trade relationship constitutes the main content of China-Africa relations, this type of relationship has great strategic importance."¹¹

China's International Responsibilities and National Interests in Africa

As its international status and economy improve, China is gradually integrated into the world while taking up more and more "international responsibilities" including helping underdeveloped African countries realize development and stability. It's of special importance since "Africa of the 21st century is different from Asia in the 1960s when national liberation movement surged. Deteriorating environment, shortage of resources, epidemics, tribal conflicts, and employment pressure has become the focal points of public opinion..."¹² It takes more international responsibilities to cope with such issues than China did in the last century. Specifically speaking, there are three aspects in China's international responsibilities for Africa:

1. Promoting African socio-economic development. To the vast number of African countries, it is their governments' top priority to promote healthy socio-economic development and to eradicate poverty. The Chinese Government has long since been engaged in assisting and supporting the socio-economic development of African countries. Since the 1950s China has invested an accumulated amount of US\$46.27 billion in Africa. By 2005, 26 African countries imported US\$100 million-worth goods from China each (the number reached 31 in 2006), and China imported US\$100 million worth of goods from each of 18 African countries. So far China has established trade relations with over 50 countries and regions in Africa, signed Bilateral Trade Agreements with over 40 countries, set up bilateral joint economic and trade committees with 36 countries, signed Bilateral Agreement on Encouraging and Protecting Investment with 28 African countries, and signed tax treaties with eight African countries. In recent years, within the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China has cancelled a total of RMB¥10.9 billion in debts owed by 31 heavily indebted and least developed countries in Africa.

¹¹ Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Strategic Significance of China-Africa Relations," http://www.embassy.org.cn/eg/egypt_sino_africa/esa07.htm.

¹² Huang Renwei, "China's Growing 'International Responsibilities' and Their Characteristics," *International Relations*, Volume II, 2007, p.10.

It has also granted zero-tariff treatment to certain products imported from 28 least developed African countries that have forged diplomatic ties with China. By 2007, the Chinese Government has trained 3,600 professionals for African countries. As Chinese-invested businesses promote local economic development, they have turned out a large group of technological and management experts for local communities. Even more important, China is a good reference for African socio-economic development with its experiences in reform and opening up. Many African countries had tried unsuccessfully to imitate the Western Capitalist Model during the colonial period and then the Stalinist Socialist Model of the former USSR. China has attracted their attention for coming up with a socialist course with Chinese characteristics through reform and opening up, maintaining political and social stability while achieving rapid economic growth. An expert on African strategy pointed out that “China sets a positive example for development and modernization, which is in many ways more suitable for Africa than Western models because we give priority to similar issues.”¹³ This is an important reason why in recent years some African countries have proposed the “Look East” strategy.

2. Promoting political stability in Africa. Owing to the colonial heritage and interference by Western countries, many African countries still see political instability, disturbances and wars after independence. Instability causes greater poverty, while poverty aggravates instability. The Chinese Government has not only supported African countries in their fight against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony, but also given priority to effective participation in helping Africa gain security and stability. The Chinese efforts in supporting political stability in Africa can be summarized into four aspects: a.) Active participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Since early 1990s China has taken part in 12 operations with more than 1,800 people, 1,300 of which have been dispatched to conflict hot spots in Africa. In September 2007, Major General Zhao Jingmin was appointed Force Commander in the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, thus becoming the first Chinese commander in UN peacekeeping forces. b.) Active cooperation with African countries in security areas like military technology exchanges, military training, military aid, fight against terrorism, cross-border economic crimes and weapon trafficking. The purpose is to strengthen African countries’ ability in protecting their own security and stability. c.) Offering aid to African Union (Organization of African Unity) to help the latter maintain regional peace and stability. In recent years China has increased assistance in this aspect. Starting from 2000, China has provided an annual sum of US\$300, 000 in cash to African Union (Organization of African Unity) to support its autonomous peacekeeping missions. In July 2003, China provided RMB ¥2.5 million’s worth of military supplies to African peacekeeping forces in Burundi. In 2005 and then in 2006, the Chinese Government offered two special aids worth US\$400,000 each to help African Union’s peacekeeping efforts in Darfur, Sudan. d.) Strengthening political consultation with countries and international organizations concerned, mediating and facilitating dialogue among parties over international conflicts and hot spots.

3. Improving the social welfare of local communities, including infrastructure development, human resources training, disease prevention and control. Since China

¹³ Ahmad Ibrahim, “The Strategic Significance of China-Africa Relations,” http://www.embassy.org.cn/eg/egypt_sino_africa/esa07.htm.

established diplomatic relations with African countries more than 50 years ago, China has helped the latter implement close to 900 infrastructure and public-good projects, offered about 20,000 government scholarships to 50 African countries, dispatched 160,000 medical workers to 47 African countries who have treated approximately 180 million patients. At present there are over 1,000 Chinese medical workers in Africa. Construction of 200 hospitals will start in 2008. The first malaria prevention and control center China has helped built is open in Libya. In addition to free medication, China will provide complimentary medical devices and circuit expert teams to impart knowledge, guide clinical practice and train local staff. For a long time the Chinese Government has been donating HIV/AIDS treatment drugs, including wormwood extract, to more than 30 African countries, saving the lives of many HIV/AIDS patients. In 2007, China dispatched over 120 young volunteers to ten African countries. They teach Chinese, act as gym teachers, train computer-related personnel and provide traditional Chinese medical treatment in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Seychelles. In 2007 the Chinese Government offered 2,383 scholarships to African countries, an increase of about 700 over that of the previous year. Meanwhile, China has signed either agreements or letters of intent with six African countries on the establishment of ten Confucius Institutes or Classrooms to develop Chinese language teaching there. In addition, Chinese-invested businesses in Africa are taking active part in local public-good projects. For example, in recent years, CNPC has invested tens of millions of US dollars in building hospitals, schools and digging wells in Sudan. It has also trained a large number of local professionals and managers.

“International responsibilities” are closely related to “national interests.” As China’s “international responsibilities” grow in Africa, its “national interests” are expanding, which can be summarized into the following parts.

First of all, international political interests. They mainly include close cooperation with African countries at UN or other international institutions, joint efforts in building a new international political and economic order, fight against hegemony and power politics, opposition to Taiwan independence forces. Africa, with the greatest number of developing countries in the world, is a force not to be ignored on the international political stage. China’s peaceful rise needs the support of African countries. As a developing country, China will regard Africa as its ally in foreign policy for a long time to come.

Secondly, energy security interests. China became a net oil importing country in 1993. With rapid economic growth its energy dependence on external sources grows day by day. Africa accounts for 8% of the global oil reserve and 11% of global oil output. In 2005, African oil output grew by 6.8%, ranking number one in the world. According to expert estimates, by 2010 the proportion of Africa’s crude oil output in the world total will have increased to 20% from the current 11%.¹⁴ 31.5% of China’s oil import coming from the African continent, Africa, as a major supplier of overseas oil to China, is essential to China’s energy security strategy.

Thirdly, economic and trade interests. China-Africa trade has developed rapidly since China’s adoption of reform and open-door policies. The trade value grew from

¹⁴ “Preliminary Thoughts on Strengthening China-Africa Energy Cooperation,” 4/17/2006. http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/nyjt/gjjlyhz/t20060421_67092.htm.

US\$177 million in 1970 to US\$1.19 billion in 1980, and then to US\$1.66 billion in 1990 and US\$6.484 billion in 1999. It exceeded US\$10 billion for the first time in 2000, the exact figure being US\$10.6 billion. In 2006 the figure rose to US\$55.464 billion, a y-o-y increase of 40%. China's cumulative direct investment in Africa also grew rapidly from US\$440 million in 1999 to US\$6.64 billion, a fourteen-time increase in seven years.¹⁵ There are quite strong complementarities between China and Africa in trade, the vast market and rich natural resources in Africa providing important strategic space for China's further opening up and industrial structure readjustment.

Finally, exchanges and cooperation between different cultures and civilizations. Both China and Africa boast the most ancient civilizations in the world, making key contribution to the progress of human society. Since China signed the first cultural agreement with Egypt in the 1950s, cultural exchanges and cooperation between China and Africa have been thriving. Today, strengthened cultural cooperation between the two sides on different levels and in different forms will not only facilitate mutual learning and common development, deepen mutual understanding and friendship between peoples, but also boost cultural diversity in the world, so that there will be a more harmonious world where different civilizations tolerate each other, treat each other as equals and learn from each other.

China's Constructive Role in Darfur Issue

Darfur in western Sudan had not been related to China until some individuals and organization in the world that are biased against China accused China groundlessly of adding fuel to the Darfur crisis by investing in Sudan and cooperating with the Sudanese Government in multiple areas. They clamored that China should be held responsible for the Darfur crisis. Some even exerted pressure on China by relating the issue to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. In early March 2007, Nakagakwa Shoichi, a right-wing Japanese politician and Policy Research Council Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, threatened to "boycott Olympic Games in Beijing" in a magazine article. On March 21st, Francois Bayrou, a presidential candidate and head of the UDF Party in France, claimed at a gathering that should China refuse to exert pressure on the Sudanese Government to resolve the Darfur issue as soon as possible, "then France shouldn't attend the (Beijing) Olympic Games."¹⁶ Afterwards some international forces (including quite a few people who have little or distorted understanding of China's African policy) made an uproar about "boycotting Olympic Games in Beijing for Darfur". On March 28th, an American actress published an article in *Wall Street Journal* blaming China for the Darfur crisis from her skewed perspective and calling on people to boycott the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. On June 5th, the US Congress passed a resolution on Darfur, in which it again accused China of cooperation with Sudan and linked the Darfur issue with Olympic Games in Beijing. Their argument was simple: since China didn't exercise "adequate pressure" on the Sudanese Government for the sake of its oil interests in Sudan, it constituted a "stumbling block" for resolving the Darfur crisis.¹⁷

In fact, those people in the know realize that the Darfur crisis arose because of lasting

¹⁵ "Chinese Direct Investment in Africa Grew 14 Times in Seven Years," chinanews.com.cn, 5/14/2007.

¹⁶ Xiong Zhangyan, "Who Advocates Boycotting the Olympic Games: Ignorant or with Ulterior Motives?" *International Herald Leader*, 4/17/2007.

¹⁷ Peter Brookes, *Empowering Evil: China Aids Sudan's Killers*, *The New York Post*, 4/10/2007.

tribal disputes and conflicts of interest in the area, or, to be more specific, it arose from the lack of economic development. These disputes and conflicts were caused by severe imbalance in economic development in Sudan as well as competition for survival by locals. Worsening draughts and encroachment by the desert resulting from global warming are key catalysts to the Darfur crisis. The ultimate resolution of the Darfur crisis lies in local economy development. Under the current circumstances, political negotiation is an effective mean to alleviate the crisis. Therefore the Darfur crisis shouldn't have been pinned on China.

Although China shouldn't be blamed for the Darfur crisis, China has not dodged its "international responsibility" for this regional conflict. The Chinese Government has always been advocating resolution of the crisis through political means. It has repeatedly stated its willingness to play a constructive role in resolving the Darfur issue. It does not believe that sanctions or conflicts are conducive to problem solving, because "any solution to the Darfur issue, if it does not help maintain the national unity of Sudan, will inevitably add uncertainty to the Sudanese national reconciliation, trigger and aggravate regional conflicts like a set of falling dominos. In the same logic, conflicts resulting from differences in interests can never be totally removed without the insistence on peaceful resolution or the pursuit of a fair and permanent resolution on the basis of seeking common points while preserving differences."¹⁸ Therefore, China abstained in the voting for UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564 in July and September 2004, respectively since they contained threat to impose sanction on Sudan. In August 2006, considering the ill timing of Security Council Resolution 1706, which was "not conducive to the prevention of local situation from deteriorating," China abstained once again with Russia. However, all the above does not mean that the Chinese Government turns a blind eye to the Darfur issue or simply sits and watches. In fact, China supports international collaboration in resolving this hotspot issue, appreciating the efforts made by the Sudanese Government, African Union, League of Arab States, the UN and other countries concerned. At the same time, China is doing its share of work. Generally speaking, efforts on the Chinese side include the following aspects:

1. Conducting bilateral or multilateral communication and dialogue with parties concerned to reduce divergence in opinions and reach consensus. Since the outbreak of the Darfur crisis, China has been helping parties concerned reduce their differences in opinion by exchanging visits of heads of state, dispatching special envoys, phone calls, letters as well as coordinating and communicating at venues such as the UN. In November 2006, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a three-phase plan for the UN to support African Union forces deployed at Darfur, a pragmatic way to settle the Darfur issue peacefully. According to the plan, during the first phase, the UN would provide the AU troops with US\$21 million worth of military equipment and supplies, as well as about 200 military officers, police officers and civilian personnel who would act as advisors. During the second phase, UN personnel and equipment in support of the AU troops would reach a certain scale. During the third phase, a "hybrid" UN/AU peacekeeping mission, made up of 17,000 military personnel and 3,000 police officers, would be deployed in the Darfur region under a

¹⁸ Wen Xian, "Darfur: China's Global Perspective," *People's Daily* overseas edition, 2/7/2007.

UN command system. The Sudanese Government opposed the plan. It attributed the turbulence in the Darfur area to opposition military forces. It also insisted that the Darfur issue was part of its internal affairs and therefore should not be internationalized.

It was because of the key role played by China that Sudan accepted the Annan Plan in principle and showed willingness to demonstrate more flexibility over the issue. On June 12, 2007, Sudan announced that it would accept unconditionally Phase III of the Annan Plan. On July 31, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1769, deciding to dispatch a “hybrid” UN/AU peacekeeping mission of 260,000 people to Sudan, which was accepted by the Sudanese Government the following day. China’s constructive role in securing the three-phase Annan Plan was widely recognized and highly appreciated by other international parties concerned.

2. Communicating actively with the Sudanese Government, dispatching special envoys to the Darfur region. In January 2006, Lu Guozeng, Special Envoy of the Chinese Government and Deputy Foreign Minister, visited the Darfur region. In April 2007, Zhai Jun, another Special Envoy of the Chinese Government, spent four days in Sudan, during which he met with President Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbashir of Sudan. Zhai Jun also visited Darfur, meeting Governors of North Darfur and South Darfur as well as other local government officials. He paid visit to three refugee camps, where he held talks with local representatives and refugees to get first-hand information on humanitarian and security situation there. On May 10, the Chinese Government appointed Ambassador Liu Guijin, a senior diplomat familiar with African affairs, as the first Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African affairs, announcing that he would focus on Darfur in the near future. Between May 19th and May 23rd, Ambassador Liu Guijin visited Sudan in the capacity of China’s first Special Representative on Darfur issue, during which he not only had extensive contact with senior members of the Sudanese Government, but also made on-site visit to Darfur refugee camps, with a view of settling the Darfur issue. Between June 13th and 24th, Ambassador Liu Guijin, in his capacity as Special Representative, visited South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan as well as the headquarters of African Union and the League of Arab Countries. Later he attended an international conference on Darfur in Paris, where he exchanged opinions with parties concerned over the Darfur issue, communicating, consulting, expatiating on China’s view on and role in the Darfur issue, making positive contribution to the political settlement of the Darfur issue.

3. Proposing constructive initiatives to ensure that the interests of all parties concerned are given due respect. On November 2, 2006, when President Hu Jintao met President Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbashir of Sudan, who was in Beijing attending the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit, he said that China appreciated and supported peace between northern and southern Sudan, and that it was willing to make further contribution to peace and stability in Darfur as soon as possible. On November 27, President Hu Jintao expressed his opinion that China welcomed positive progress on the political settlement of the Darfur issue, while on a scheduled phone conversation with US President George Bush Jr.. He hoped that all parties concerned could go on talking among each other in order to reach a consensus

over a solution at the earliest date possible, so that peace and stability could be restored in Darfur. In February 2007, when President Hu Jintao visited Sudan, he proposed four explicit principles on the Darfur issue: a.) Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan should be respected; b.) Insistence on the peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue and consultation on equal footings; c.) African Union and UN should play constructive roles in Darfur; d.) Promoting regional stability and improve the living condition of local people. It is apparent that the Chinese Government insists that the Sudanese Government shouldn't be excluded from the problem resolution in Darfur, that the sovereignty of the Sudanese Government should be given due respect, and that the settlement of the Darfur issue must be promoted by following the UN Charter and humanitarian principles.

4. Laying particular emphasis on the living conditions of refugees in Darfur and the humanitarian crisis there. The Chinese Government has given humanitarian assistance in both material and monetary forms worth approximately RMB ¥ 80 million to Darfur and the AU Mission. When President Hu Jintao visited Sudan in early 2007, he announced another aid package of RMB ¥ 40 million to Sudan. China also agreed to send a 315-strong engineer corps to participate in peacekeeping operations in Sudan within the framework set up by the UN Security Council. The first batch of 135 Chinese peacekeepers arrived in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, in late November, 2007. This advance team, reporting to the UN/AU Darfur Mission, is part of Phase II of the Annan Plan. It is mainly responsible for engineering projects such as building and maintaining roads, bridges, buildings, fortification, prospecting for water, drilling wells and building water intake facilities, so as to smooth out the way for joint operations of UN/AU peacekeepers.

China's position over the Sudan issue is basically the following: sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan should be respected; the issue should be resolved through political means of dialogue and consultation on equal footings; UN and African Union should play key roles. Since the aim of peacekeeping missions is to solve problems, UN peacekeepers should obtain Sudanese Government's approval before entry into Sudan; otherwise the problem won't be solved. The friendly relationship between China and Sudan is a normal relationship between countries. Chinese investments in Sudan are normal cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. This type of cooperation is widely welcome by Sudanese people for its equality, reciprocity, and non-exclusiveness. It contributes to the socio-economic development of Sudan. At the same time, it creates favorable conditions for the settlement of the Darfur issue.

The Chinese Government has been able to exercise unique influence on the Darfur crisis because it handles three issues well: a.) It respects the sovereignty of the Sudanese Government. Instead of interfering with internal affairs in Sudan, it plays a constructive role as a friend. On this topic Ambassador Liu Guijin, the Chinese Government's Special Representative on Darfur, stated repeatedly that "Darfur is Darfur in Sudan, and Darfur in Africa."¹⁹ China won the complete trust of the Sudanese Government by abiding by the principle of non-interference with internal affairs. b.) It insists on conducting dialogues and consultation with the Sudanese Government as equals in a friendly manner, instead of adopting a commanding

¹⁹ Liu Dongkai, Lin Li Ping, "Common Language between China and Africa Enables China to Play a Unique Role in the Darfur Issue," 10/4/2007, <http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/chn/zzxw/t369384.htm>.

attitude with constant threats of sanction. Moreover, it has taken full consideration of the interests of all parties concerned. The Security Council Resolution 1769, passed with support from China, paved the way for the deployment of an AU/UN “hybrid” peacekeeping mission without imposing any pressure or economic sanction on Sudan. Sudan’s Ambassador to the UN Abdul Haleem noted that this Resolution took into account many issues of concern to the Sudanese Government. Ambassador Liu Guijin, who had attended an international conference on Darfur in Paris as the Chinese Government’s Special Representative, said, “China tries its best to convince Western colleagues that toughness is not the only way out, that economic sanctions will only complicate the matter further by raising Sudanese Government’s resistance.”²⁰ c.) It insists on a long-term perspective and problem resolution in a big picture. China finds poverty to be the root cause of the Darfur issue. The ultimate resolution of the conflict lies in development. The Chinese Government has been actively promoting bilateral trade and economic relations, offering multiple development or humanitarian aids to Sudan. Chinese investments have helped establish a complete system of oil refineries, petrochemical plants and trading companies. More than 100,000 Sudanese are employed by China-Sudan joint ventures. CNPC has spent an additional US\$35 million in building roads, bridges, hospitals and schools for various Sudanese communities, benefiting over 1.5 million local residents. The dam of the Merowe hydropower project is currently under construction. By the time it is completed in 2008, it will increase Sudan’s power generation to three times, not only mitigating power shortage in Sudan but also irrigating land within a 100 kilometer range. Adebayo Adedeji, a famous economist from Africa, once commented that “economic cooperation between Africa and China is carried out on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, win-win outcome and symbiosis, bringing a great deal of benefits to the people.”²¹

The initiatives taken by the Chinese Government over Darfur have won wide recognition by the international community. Ahmed bin Helli, Arab League Assistant Secretary General for political affairs, said that China’s position over Darfur was fair, positive and balanced, that China played a constructive role with unique influence, and that the Arab League was willing to strengthen cooperation and coordination with China to make relentless efforts together towards peaceful settlement of the Darfur issue.²² Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, also stated that China played “a key and constructive role” in reaching consensus over Darfur at the UN Security Council. According to him, as an influential power, China could leverage its good relationship with the Sudanese Government to urge all parties concerned to pay more attention to the interests of Sudan and Africa, and to find a way to resolve the Darfur issue through political means.²³

It is worth noticing that by September 2007, even the US, where there had been quite

²⁰ Liu Dongkai, Lin Li Ping, “Common Language between China and Africa Enables China to Play a Unique Role in the Darfur Issue,” 10/4/2007, <http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/chn/zzxw/t369384.htm>.

²¹ Liu Dongkai, Lin Li Ping, “Common Language between China and Africa Enables China to Play a Unique Role in the Darfur Issue,” 10/4/2007, <http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/chn/zzxw/t369384.htm>.

²² “Arab League Assistant Secretary General Commends China’s Constructive Role over Darfur, Sudan,” 4/18/2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/zybd/t312344.htm>.

²³ Xie Dongfeng, “UN Senior Official Commends China’s Role in Resolving the Darfur Issue,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-09/11/content_6700473.htm.

some clamor relating the Darfur issue with “boycotting the Olympic Game in Beijing,” recognized the constructive role played by China over the Darfur issue. On September 19, US President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios, pointed out that “China has played a facilitating role behind the curtain over the Darfur issue.” “China has also made other commitments (over the Darfur issue), which is very constructive.” Director Bader of the China Center at the Brookings Institute for Foreign Policy Studies in the US also stated that China should not be held responsible for the Darfur issue; that China has played a positive role in the political settlement of the Darfur issue and some positive results have already been attained in the past year; and that any government’s boycott against the Olympic Games in Beijing would be unacceptable and may likely give rise to serious consequences. Allyn Brooks-LaSure, spokesman for the non-government organization Save Darfur Coalition also pointed out to the American media that the passing of UN Resolution 1769 reflected the fact that China faced up to international expectations in the political settlement of the Darfur issue, exerting important international influence. On the same occasion he clarified that organizations like the Save Darfur Coalition do not support the boycott against the Olympic Games in Beijing.²⁴ It has to be pointed out that these three persons mentioned above are from the US Government, the academy and NGO, respectively. It is far from easy for China’s constructive role over Darfur to be unanimously acknowledged by all of them.

China-Africa Relationship Ushered into a New Era

To some extent the Darfur crisis poses a challenge to China’s diplomacy in Africa. But at the same time it indicates that China’s diplomacy in Africa has entered a new stage. China’s foreign policy on Africa has gone through three stages.

The first stage lasted between the 1950s and 1970s. Chinese and African leaders started contact with each other at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Starting from 1956 China established diplomatic ties with Egypt and other African countries. Between December 1963 and June 1965, Premier Zhou Enlai paid three visits to Africa, during which he proposed the five principles on developing China-Africa relations. In January 1964, when Premier Zhou visited Mali, he proposed the eight principles in China’s economic and technical assistance to foreign countries, which fully demonstrated China’s willingness to offer moral and material support to Africa, trying its best to help independence and liberation of the African continent. By the end of 1979, China had established diplomatic ties with 44 African countries. During this period, China and African countries were united as allies in the Third World in their fight against colonialism, imperialism and hegemony. Because of the Cold War, ideological concerns were important at the time.

The period between 1980s and 1990s saw the second stage of China’s relations with Africa. During this period pragmatic economic cooperation replaced ideological concerns as the dominant factor in two-way relations. As is known to all, great changes took place in both China and Africa during this period. Since almost all African countries had fulfilled their historical mission of national independence and liberation, they were faced with the new task of developing national economy. Meanwhile China started to implement the reform and open-door policy, focusing on

²⁴ Li Xuejun, “China’s Role in Darfur Recognized,” 9/27/2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-09/27/content_6801372.htm.

economic development. It was against this background that China-Africa relations became more pragmatic with more emphasis on equality and mutual benefit in economic cooperation, “National interests instead of internationalism, pragmatism instead of ideology, have gradually become the major themes of China-Africa relations and the political justifications of China’s foreign policy towards Africa.”²⁵ In 1983 the Chinese Government announced the four principles in China’s economic and technological cooperation with African countries, which were “equality and mutual benefit, multiple forms, effectiveness and common development.” In 1996, President Jiang Zemin put forward a five-point proposal for the development of a 21st century-oriented long-term stable China-Africa relationship of all-round cooperation.²⁶ During this period, economic and trade relations between China and Africa grew dramatically from US\$1.66 billion in 1990 to US\$6.48 billion in 1999.

In the new century China-Africa relationship entered a brand new phase. China made strategic adjustments to its African policy, now focusing more on equal strategic “mutual benefit and win-win outcome.” In 2004, when President Hu Jintao visited Egypt, Gabon and Algeria, he raised a three-point proposal to deepen China-Africa relations. In the beginning of 2006, the Chinese Government published its first African Policy Paper, in the foreword of which it is pointed out that “China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances.” The African Policy Paper also stated that China wanted to establish with African countries a new strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange.²⁷ The Policy Paper also proposed principles and objectives for the development of China-Africa relations. It was the first time for the Chinese Government to publish a white paper on its African policy. In early November of the same year, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, whose theme being “friendship, peace, cooperation and development,” saw the convening of the Beijing Summit and the Third Ministerial Conference in Beijing. The Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation affirmed the official establishment and development of a new China-Africa strategic partnership to the international community through a political document. The Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2007-2009) further improved the forum mechanism, strengthened collective dialogue, promoted the alignment and coordination between the Action Plan and socio-economic development plans in Africa. Hence the success of the Beijing Summit laid a solid foundation for China and Africa to build a lasting, stable, rich and evolving new strategic partnership. President Hu Jintao’s second visit to Africa in early 2007 further consolidated the outcome of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, propelling China-Africa cooperation to larger extent, wider area and higher level. In May the Chinese Government appointed the first Special Representative on African Affairs in history. Economic and trade cooperation between the two sides are growing rapidly. In 2000 two-way trade exceeded US\$10 billion for the first time. In 2006, the amount rose to US\$55.464 billion. In the first half of 2007, two-way trade reached US\$32.05 billion, a year-on-year increase of 25%.

²⁵ Luo Jianbo, *African Integration and China-Africa Relations*, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2006, p.282.

²⁶ The five-point proposal includes the following points: to foster a sincere friendship between the two sides and become each other's reliable "all-weather friends"; to treat each other as equals and respect each other's sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs; to seek common development on the basis of mutual benefit; to enhance consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and to look into the future and create a more splendid world.

²⁷ *China's African Policy Paper*, Xinhua News Agency, 1/12/2006.

In the age of globalization the development of China-Africa relations has greater significance. On the one hand, thanks to fast economic growth in China in the past 30 years, China has emerged peacefully. The Chinese economy has a growing impact on the outside world, as its dependence on the outside world also grows unprecedentedly. China is more proactive in its African policy. On the other hand, some African countries are still struggling with poverty and stagnant socio-economic development although they have successfully achieved national independence. Quite a few African countries want to take advantage of China's fast economic growth to become less dependent economically on Western countries. At the same time they also hope to learn development experiences from China. Besides, they want China to play a bigger role on the international stage, to speak out for developing countries. Mauro De Lorenzo, a resident fellow and Africa expert at the American Enterprise Institute, believes that in addition to material and technological assistance, "the greatest benefit Africa can get from China is a perceptual change. For the first time in life we realize that African countries can contribute something to the world instead of getting things from the outside world. This shows that China's interests in Africa have raised the political and economic status this region enjoys in the world."²⁸ An editorial of Singapore's *Lianhe Zaobao* pointed out that, "Africa is no stranger to competition among external powers on its continent after centuries of bitter experience with colonialism. The US military response has evidently not broken away from the old mentality. If China manages to set up a new role model in its African policy, then not only will it achieve diplomatic success in Africa, it's also quite possible to pose a brand new challenge to the existing guidelines over Western international relations, thereby becoming a real rising power."²⁹

²⁸ Li Yan, "Contending with Western Influence, China Broadening Its Path to Africa," *Washington Observer* weekly, Issue No. 198, 2006.

²⁹ Ye Pengfei, "Life or Death of African Diplomacy," *Lianhe Zaobao*, 2/12/2007.

继往开来的中非战略伙伴关系

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当今国际政治、经济和战略格局中，广大发展中国家占据着举足轻重的地位，在全球化进程和国际事务中发挥着不容低估的影响。新世纪中国和平发展的大业，离不开中国与广大发展中国家的相互支持与合作。由此，中国与发展中国家的关系在原有的基础上大踏步地向前推进，全面体现了“发展中国家是基础”的这一当代中国极其重要的外交战略。非洲是发展中国家最集中的地区，近年来中非战略伙伴关系在继往开来中迅速发展即是一个典型例证。

一软一硬折射出中非关系特征

2006年11月中非合作论坛北京峰会是中非外交史上规模最大、级别最高、与会非洲国家领导人最多的一次盛会，是两千多年来中非友好交往历史长河中的重要里程碑，更是两个古老文明在新千年携手共建和谐世界的集体宣誓。

北京峰会之后，中非双方认真而高效地积极落实北京峰会成果和共识。2007年1月30日到2月10日，胡锦涛主席又对喀麦隆、利比里亚、苏丹、赞比亚、纳米比亚、南非、莫桑比克和塞舌尔等8个非洲国家进行国事访问。这8个国家地处非洲大陆各次区域，国家大小、发展水平各异，体现了中非关系的全面性和多样性，其中6国是我国家元首首次到访。这是一次面向全非洲的友谊之旅、合作之旅，是继中非合作论坛北京峰会后中非关系中又一件大事。在为期12天的访问期间，胡锦涛主席向非方介绍，中方将本着互利共赢、友好协商、高效务实的原则，根据非洲国家的需要，统筹规划，分步实施，认真落实北京峰会上宣布的中方援非8项措施；在措施框架内，向8国提供无偿援助、无息贷款和优惠贷款，确定援助项目，落实免债免关税待遇，援建农村学校、农业技术示范中心和疟疾防治中心，增加政府奖学金名额。访问期间中非签署的50多个合作协议中，大多数涉及落实峰会成果。还需特别提及的是，胡锦涛主席专程来到南非享有盛名的比勒陀利亚大学，在对千余名莘莘学子的演讲中，他特别谈到，“中非青年是中非友好事业的有生力量，也是和谐世界的重要建设者”。他还宣布“中国政府决定今后3年邀请500名非洲青年访华。”他坚信中非友谊必将薪火相传，宣示“中非人民一定能够世代友好下去！”这不仅体现了中国领导人对非洲青年的关注，更体现了对中非友谊万古长青的殷切期许和坚定信念。

非洲朋友也高度评价胡锦涛主席这次非洲8国之访，认为这是又一次“具有重大历史意义的访问”，“中国对非洲的关注和合作对非洲实现复兴意义重大”。埃及驻华大使贾拉勒·阿卜杜勒·马阿兹先生评论说：“中国国家主席胡锦涛将几个非洲国家作为他的年度出访日程的第一站，这表明了中国的态度。”¹非洲朋友们称赞中方如此高效地落实峰会成果，切身感受到中方信守承诺，帮助非洲发展、改善非洲人民生活的真诚愿望和实际行动。非洲领导人高度评价中国对非

¹ 参见阿拉伯埃及共和国驻华大使馆新闻处网站，http://www.embassy.org.cn/eg/egypt_sino_africa/esa05.htm。

政策，称其为“国际合作中新的实践”，是“团结、友谊、真诚、互利的合作”，是“国与国合作的典范”。² 南非总统姆贝基坦言，经济上，中国是南非最重要的合作伙伴；政治上，同中国磋商合作是南非应对各种挑战的财富；在非洲复兴方面，中国对非洲的关注和合作意义重大。

稍微留心的人也许会注意到，大约在胡锦涛主席访非的同时，2007年2月美国总统布什批准了军方设立非洲战区司令部的计划。此前，美军在全球有五大地区性司令部，美国在非洲的军事事务一直由欧洲司令部、中央司令部和太平洋司令部共管。美国政府宣称此次设立非洲战区司令部的主要目的是为了防止恐怖主义在非洲大陆的蔓延，但其目的远不至于此。美军设立非洲司令部的目的可以说是“一石三鸟”，即在防止恐怖主义在非洲蔓延的同时，确保其在非洲的能源安全利益，并遏制其他大国的影响。³ 根据《华尔街日报》报道，2006年美国从非洲的石油进口量21年来首次超过了中东，占到美国的原油进口总量22%，达到223万桶。这不仅较2005年增加了4.8%，而且是1979年以来的最高水平。⁴ 据预测，今后10年美国进口石油的25%将会来自撒哈拉以南非洲国家。在此背景下，美国设立非洲司令部的意图可谓不言自明。随后几个月，美国军方要员频频出访非洲，试图说服非洲国家接受组建美军非洲司令部计划，并为司令部选址，却收效甚微。美国原计划将非洲司令部设在阿尔及利亚，但遭到阿尔及利亚官方拒绝。而后摩洛哥、利比亚、尼日利亚、南非、乌干达等非洲各区域多国也纷纷对美军非洲司令部落户说“不”。无奈之下，2007年10月1日正式成立的美军非洲司令部总部只得设立在远离非洲大陆的德国斯图亚特。非洲众多舆论认为，美国企图通过建立非洲司令部，从而实现其在军事上、经济上、政治上对非洲大陆的整体控制。坦桑尼亚媒体评论道，美国设立非洲司令部对非洲而言是一场“即将来临的悲剧”。津巴布韦媒体指出，美国转而重视非洲的这一态度变化对这个大陆是一个不祥之兆。它们担忧美国借助非洲司令部榨取非洲自然资源的同时，又在非洲大搞非法的政权更迭。就连美国的一家智库——对外关系委员会在一份报告中也指出，布什政府设立美军非洲司令部效果可能适得其反，它将损害美国在非洲的形象，并对地区稳定造成灾难性影响。⁵

至于2007年胡锦涛主席此次访问非洲，不仅带去了中国政府对非洲国家的真诚承诺，还号召驻非的中资企业要“从中非合作的长远发展出发，积极与当地社会和谐相处”，并告诫他们“要主动承担社会责任，在促进就业、改善生活条件、兴建公益项目、培养建设人才、保护生态环境等方面多为当地排忧解难，在力所能及范围内多做深得民心的好事实事。”⁶ 实际上，我们从中美两国在非洲问题上截然不同的举措可以看出中非关系的若干特征。

首先是中非关系的和平性。长期以来，中国坚持用和平共处五项原则来处理国与国之间的关系，在对非政策上同样如此。中国政府尽自己的最大努力支持并推动非洲的和平与稳定，不仅反对有关国家之间动辄使用武力和制裁来解决争

² “深入非洲大陆的友谊之旅合作之旅：记胡锦涛访问非洲八国”，人民网2007年2月10日。

³ 郭晓兵：“美军非洲司令部，一无总部二无兵”，《世界知识》2007年第16期。

⁴ 大卫·伯德，“非洲取代中东成美国最大石油进口地”，《华尔街日报》2007年2月22日。

⁵ 郭晓兵：“美军非洲司令部，一无总部二无兵”，《世界知识》2007年第16期。

⁶ “胡锦涛：促进中非在更大范围更广领域更高层次上全面合作”，http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-02/07/content_5706003.htm。

端，也反对使用武力干涉非洲内部事务。2000年，中国向非统（非洲联盟的前身）“和平基金”捐赠20万美元现汇，后又增加10万美元现汇。在达尔富尔问题上，中国政府不惧外部压力，坚持在尊重苏丹政府主权的基础上进行平等对话，得到了苏丹等非洲国家的充分信赖。2005年，中国又向非洲联盟（非盟）提供40万美元的现汇，支持非盟扩大在苏丹达尔富尔地区的维和行动。2006年，中国进一步增加对非盟在达尔富尔地区维和行动的援助，将援助额增加到140万美元。⁷ 根据联合国有关统计，到2007年5月底，中国参与联合国维和使命的军事观察员、士兵和警察总数已达1828人，⁸其中四分之三被部署在非洲，支持非洲的和平与稳定局势，主要是利比里亚、苏丹、刚果（金）等热点冲突地区。中国在非洲影响力的扩大更多地是通过经济、文化、技术援助与合作等方式实现的。和平性是中非关系的首要特征，也正是中非关系的独特性所在。

其次是中非关系的互惠性。合作总是要互惠的，否则就难以为继。中非合作并不是简单的资源和市场关系，而是一种互惠互利的合作。世界银行最近在一份报告中指出：“中国和印度的经济增长是非洲的第二次机会”。报告认为，中国已经超过日本，成为亚洲最大的非洲产品输入国。⁹ 美国伊利诺伊州大学一位教授指出“非洲拥有中国经济发展所需的各种能源，中国则愿意向非洲提供资本、技术和管理的实用知识，以及低廉的产品，并分享发展中国家经济腾飞的经验和教训，而这些都是先进的西方国家无法提供给非洲的。”¹⁰ 根据商务部统计，2006年中非贸易额达到555亿美元，连续五年保持30%以上的增长。与此同时，中国企业在非完成承包劳务营业额95亿美元。中非贸易不仅增长势头迅猛，而且根基深厚，原因就在于中国在非洲追求的是“互惠共赢”，而不是殖民式的掠夺。价廉物美的中国商品无疑更适合非洲当前的消费水平。在塞内加尔，一辆从欧洲进口的二手丰田车售价会高达4万美元，而中国长城汽车公司生产的一辆崭新的四驱运动型多用途车，售价也不过3.2万美元。一位当地的老板说道：“如果能用便宜一点的价格买新车的话，为什么还要买二手车呢？”¹¹ 对中国来说，非洲的广阔市场不仅有助于中国企业走出去，也有助于中国实现产业升级和经济结构调整。互惠互利既是中非关系的一大特征，也是中非关系的根本动力所在。

再次是中非关系的平等性。中非关系之所以能够长期健康地发展，一个重要基石就是双方能够平等相待，休戚与共。长期以来，中国政府尊重非洲国家的主权独立和领土完整，支持它们为实现民族解放而进行的反帝反殖斗争，也支持它们在国际舞台上为维护自身权益进行的各种努力。根据非洲统一组织解放委员会的记录，1971和1972两年，非统组织从国外获得的军需物资援助中75%来自中国。中国政府在力所能及的范围内长期对非洲国家提供发展援助，从未附加任何政治条件。中国政府坚持不干涉内政原则，支持非洲国家选择自己发展道路的权利，支持它们以和平的方式解决内部争端。正是因为能够做到互相尊重，平等相待，中非双方才能长期互相信赖，互相支持。

⁷ 徐人龙，“中国与非盟（非统）的友好合作关系”，陆苗耕、黄骄舍、林怡主编，《同心若金：中非友好关系的辉煌历程》，世界知识出版社2006年版，第214页。

⁸ *Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations*, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/may07_1.pdf.

⁹ 2006年世界银行“非洲的丝绸之路：中国和印度的经济疆界”研究报告，http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/ASR_Chinese.pdf.

¹⁰ 李焰，“对冲西方势力，中国拓宽非洲之路”，《华盛顿观察》周刊2006年第40期。

¹¹ 约翰·米勒，“中国圆了非洲人的新车梦”，《华尔街日报》2007年08月29日。

最后是中非关系的战略性。无论从那个角度来衡量，中非关系都有着高度的战略性。非洲拥有全球最多的第三世界发展中国家群，而中国则是世界上人口最多的发展中国家，长期以来中非双方一直在国际舞台上互相支持、互相配合，共同反对西方殖民主义和霸权主义。非洲国家众多，但绝大多数奉行“一个中国”原则，和台湾没有外交联系，他们是我们在国际上反对“台独”势力的重要战略资源。一位中非关系专家曾评论道：如从狭义上说，战略意义指的是和政治、军事、安全有关的意义，那么中非关系的战略意义要排在经贸意义之后。但如从广义角度来看，战略意义意味着中国和非洲能够从双方关系中获得的全面的利益，那么中非关系战略意义无疑居于其他意义之首。“尽管经贸关系是中非关系的主要内容，但这种经贸关系却带有极为重要的战略意义。”¹²

中国在非洲的国际责任和国家利益

随着国际地位的提升和经济的不断发展，中国也正在日益融入世界，并承担着越来越多的“国际责任”，包括帮助非洲落后国家实现发展与稳定的国际责任。尤其是“21世纪的非洲已经不同于20世纪60年代民族解放运动风起云涌的非洲。环境恶化、资源紧缺、疾病流行、部族斗争，就业压力增大等新的安全问题成为舆论焦点。……”¹³ 应对这些问题，就需要承担比上个世纪援助非洲国家更多的国际责任。具体来说，中国在非洲的国际责任主要有三个方面：

1、推动当地社会经济发展。对于广大非洲国家来说，促进社会经济的健康发展，消除贫困是当地政府面临的首要任务。中国政府长期以来积极援助和支持非洲国家的经济社会发展。从50年代至今，中国累计对非各类投资达到62.7亿美元。到2005年，中国对非洲出口超一亿美元的国家已达26个（2006年增至31个国家），中国从非洲进口超过一亿美元的国家达18个。目前，中国已同非洲50多个国家和地区建立了贸易关系，同40多个国家签订了《双边贸易协定》，与36个国家建立了双边经贸混（联）委会机制，同28个非洲国家签署了《双边鼓励和保障投资协定》，与8个非洲国家签订了《避免双重征税协定》。近年来，在中非合作论坛框架下，中国免除了31个非洲重债国家和最不发达国家部分对华到期政府债务共109亿元人民币，相继对与中国建交的28个非洲最不发达国家部分输华商品实施零关税待遇。2007年，中国政府已为非洲国家培训了3600多名各类人员。广大中资企业在推动当地经济发展的同时，也为当地社会培养了一批技术和管理人才。更为重要的是，中国以自己的改革开放实践为非洲国家的经济与社会发展提供了重要借鉴。很多非洲国家在殖民地时期仿效西方的资本主义模式，后来又仿效苏联的斯大林社会主义模式，但均严重受挫。而中国通过改革开放成功地摸索出一条具有中国特色的社会主义道路来，在保持政治与社会稳定的情况下实现了经济高速增长，引起诸多非洲国家的注目与重视。一位非洲战略问题专家指出“中国提供了发展和现代化的好榜样，而且在很大程度上比西方模式更适合非洲的情况，因为中国模式中的很多重点都和非洲的发展重点很接近。”¹⁴ 这也是近年来一些非洲国家提出“向东看”战略的重要原因。

¹² 艾哈迈德·易卜拉辛，“中非关系的战略意义”，http://www.embassy.org.cn/eg/egypt_sino_africa/esa07.htm。

¹³ 黄仁伟：“中国承担的‘国际责任’不断提升及其特点”，载《国际关系研究》2007年第二辑，第10页。

¹⁴ 艾哈迈德·易卜拉辛，“中非关系的战略意义”，http://www.embassy.org.cn/eg/egypt_sino_africa/esa07.htm。

2、促进非洲政治局势的稳定。由于殖民主义的历史贻害和西方国家的外部干预，不少非洲国家独立以后局势仍然不稳定，处于长期动荡战乱的状态。动荡造成了更大的贫困，而贫困又加剧了原有的社会动乱。中国政府不仅长期支持非洲国家从事反帝、反殖和反霸斗争，而且一贯重视有效参与非洲的安全与稳定事业。中国为支持非洲政治局势稳定所做的努力主要包括四个方面：一是积极参与联合国驻非洲维和部队的行动。自90年代初至今，中国已参与此类行动12次，目前中国派驻联合国的各类维和人员共有1800多人，其中有1300多人被派驻在非洲热点冲突地区执行维和任务。2007年9月，来自中国的赵京民少将就任联合国西撒哈拉全民投票特派团军事部队指挥官，成为联合国维和部队中的首位中国司令。二是积极同非洲国家在安全领域开展合作，包括：军事科技交流、军事培训、军事援助、反恐和打击跨国经济犯罪和武器走私等等。中国在这些方面与非方合作，目的在于加强非洲国家保卫自身安全与稳定的能力。三是积极向非盟（非统）提供援助，支持其在维护地区和平与稳定方面的努力。近年来，中国加大了这方面的援助力度，从2000年起，中国每年向非盟（非统）提供30万美元的现汇，支持其开展自主维和行动。2003年7月，中国向参加布隆迪非盟维和部队提供了价值250万元人民币的军用后勤物资。2005年和2006年，中国政府分别向非盟提供40万美元的专项援助，支持其在苏丹达尔富尔地区维和的努力。四是加强同有关国家和国际组织的政治磋商，就有关国际冲突和热点问题各方进行居中斡旋和对话等。

3、改善当地民众的社会福利状况，包括修建基础设施、培养人才、防治疫病等。新中国与非洲国家开启外交关系50多年来，中国帮助非洲国家实施了900项基础设施和社会公益项目，为50个非洲国家提供政府奖学金名额近2万人次，向47个非洲国家派遣医疗队员，累计达1.6万人次，共诊治疾病患者近1.8亿人次。目前中国在非的医疗队员达到1000多人，2008年将开工建设20个援非医院。中国第一个援非疟疾防治中心已在利比里亚成立，除向该中心赠送药品外，中方将免费提供诊疗设备，并派遣巡回专家小组传授防治经验，临床指导和培训医护人员。中国政府还长期向30多个非洲国家赠送包括青蒿素在内的治疗艾滋病药物，挽救了众多艾滋病患者的生命。2007年，中国向约10个非洲国家派遣了120多名青年志愿者，他们在埃塞俄比亚、津巴布韦、塞舌尔从事汉语教学、体育教育、计算机培训、中医诊治等服务。中国政府2007年向非洲国家提供奖学金名额比上年增长近700个，达2683个。与此同时，中国还与6个非洲国家签订了设立10所孔子学院或孔子课堂的协议或意向书，帮助非洲国家开展汉语教学。另外，在非的中资企业也积极参与当地的社会公益事业。近年来，仅中国石油天然气集团公司（中石油）用以苏丹的医院、学校、水井等公益事业上的投入已达数千万美元，并为当地培养一大批专业技术骨干和企业管理人才。

“国际责任”同“国家利益”是紧密相联的，中国在非洲“国际责任”的增多也同时意味着“国家利益”的扩展。概括来说，中国在非洲的国家利益主要包括以下几个方面。

首先是国际政治利益。主要是在联合国等国际舞台上和非洲国家紧密合作，一道致力于国际政治经济新秩序的构建，共同进行反对霸权主义与强权政治的斗争，共同反对“台独”分裂势力。非洲拥有世界上最多的发展中国家，是国际政

治舞台一支不可忽视的重要力量。中国的和平崛起需要得到非洲国家的支持。中国作为发展中国家的属性决定了在相当长的一个时期内，非洲仍将是中国对外战略的同盟军。

其次是能源安全利益，中国从 1993 年开始成为石油纯进口国，伴随着经济的高速增长，能源对外依赖与日俱增。非洲拥有全球石油储备总量的 8%，石油产量占全球的 11%。2005 年非洲石油产量增长 6.8%，居世界首位。专家预测，2010 年非洲原油产量在世界原油总产量中的比例将从目前的约 11% 上升至 20%。¹⁵ 2006 年中国进口原油的 31.5% 来自非洲大陆，非洲是中国海外石油进口的主渠道之一，对中国能源安全战略关系重大。

再次是经贸利益。中国实施改革开放政策后，中非贸易发展迅速。中国与非洲国家的进出口贸易额由 1970 年的 1.77 亿美元和 1980 年的 11.9 亿美元增长到 1990 年 16.6 亿美元和 1999 年的 64.84 亿美元。中非贸易额于 2000 年首次突破 100 亿美元，达 106 亿美元，2006 年中非贸易额更达 554.64 亿美元，同比增长 40%。中国对非洲的直接投资累计也已由 1999 年的 4.4 亿美元快速增长到 2006 年的 66.4 亿美元，7 年间增加 14 倍多。¹⁶ 中非之间的贸易合作有着较强的互补性，非洲广袤的市场和丰富的自然资源将为我国的进一步对外开放和产业结构转型提供重要的战略空间。

最后是不同的文化与文明之间的交流与合作。中国和非洲都是人类文明的古老发源地，有着璀璨的文明和文化遗产，在数千年的历史进程中均为人类文明的进步作出了重要贡献。自 20 世纪 50 年代中国同埃及签署第一个文化协定以来，中非之间的文化交流合作蓬勃发展，方兴未艾。当今中国与非洲之间进一步加强文化合作，开展不同层次、多种形式的交流互动，不仅可使双方在相互学习和借鉴中共同进步，增进中非人民的相互了解和友谊；也有助于世界文化多样性的发展，推动世界不同文明之间相互包容、平等相待、取长补短，携手共建和谐世界。

中国在解决达尔富尔问题上的建设性作用

远在非洲苏丹西部的达尔富尔问题原本与中国并无任何牵连。但这些年来，一些国际上对中国有成见的个人和组织以莫须有的罪名，无端指责中国在苏丹的投资以及与苏丹现政府的多领域合作起着为达尔富尔危机推波助澜的作用，叫嚷中国应该为达尔富尔危机负责，有的甚至借此与 2008 年北京奥运会相挂钩，无理地向中国施压。在 2007 年 3 月初，日本右翼政客、自民党政调会长中川昭一在一个杂志上放言要“抵制北京奥运会”。3 月 21 日，法国民主联盟主席、总统候选人贝鲁在一次集会上突然放言，声称如果中国拒绝向苏丹政府施压以尽快解决达尔富尔问题的话，“那么法国应该不参加(北京)奥运会。”¹⁷ 此后一些国际势力(包括相当一批对中国对非政策盲目无知或认识有误解的人们)“热心”地掀起一阵把达尔富尔问题与“抵制北京奥运会”相联系的鼓噪。3 月 28 日，美国一女演员在《华尔街日报》发表文章，更是充满偏见地指责中国应对达尔富尔问

¹⁵ “加强中非能源合作的初步构想”，2006年4月17日，http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/nyjt/gjlyhz/t20060421_67092.htm。

¹⁶ “中国对非洲直接投资七年增加 14 倍”，中新网 2007 年 5 月 14 日。

¹⁷ 熊争艳，“谁在鼓吹‘抵制奥运’是无知还是别有用心”，《国际先驱导报》2007 年 4 月 17 日。

题负责，并号召抵制 2008 年北京奥运会。6 月 5 日，美国众议院甚至通过一项苏丹达尔富尔问题涉华决议案，继续无端指责中国与苏丹开展合作，并将达尔富尔问题与北京奥运会挂钩。这些人的理由很简单：中国政府为了维护其在苏丹的石油利益，没有对苏丹政府施加“足够的影响力”，因此中国是解决达尔富尔问题的“绊脚石”。¹⁸

实际上，真正了解达尔富尔问题起因的人都知道，达尔富尔问题的形成，是与当地长期的部族矛盾和利益冲突分不开的，其根源还在于经济发展问题，这些矛盾、冲突是由苏丹国内经济发展严重失衡以及当地居民生存竞争所引发的，全球气候变暖加剧的当地干旱和沙漠化则是达尔富尔危机的重要催化剂。解决达尔富尔问题的根本出路还在于发展当地经济，在目前形势下，政治谈判是缓解达尔富尔危机的有效途径。因此，达尔富尔危机不能归罪于中国。

尽管达尔富尔危机不能归罪于中国，但中国没有回避对这一地区冲突的“国际责任”。中国政府始终主张通过政治途径解决危机，并多次表示愿意为达尔富尔问题的解决发挥建设性作用。中国政府认为，制裁和冲突在任何时候都无助于问题的解决，因为“任何事关达尔富尔问题的解决方案，如果不利于维护苏丹的国家统一，势必在苏丹全国民族和解进程中横生枝节，也势必引发地区矛盾如推倒多米诺骨牌般进一步复杂化和动乱的加剧。同理，如果不坚持以和平方式解决问题，不通过求同存异获得问题的公正持久解决，也断然无法根治由利益差异产生的矛盾。”¹⁹ 正因为如此，在 2004 年 7 月和 9 月联合国安理会就达尔富尔问题 1556 和 1564 号两项决议表决时，由于其中含有威胁对苏丹进行制裁的内容，中国投了弃权票。2006 年 8 月，考虑到通过决议的时机不当，“无助于阻止当地形势进一步恶化”，中国又和俄罗斯一起对安理会 1706 号决议投了弃权票。但这并不意味着中国政府对达尔富尔问题视而不见或是坐视不管，实际上中方支持在解决这一热点问题过程中的国际合作，赞赏苏丹政府、非盟、阿盟、联合国以及有关国家为解决达尔富尔问题作出的努力，同时中国自身也在为推动这一问题的妥善解决而积极努力。就总体而言，中国政府的努力主要包括下述几个方面：

1、通过双边和多边途径同有关各方进行沟通与对话，推动有关各方缩小分歧，达成共识。自达尔富尔危机爆发以来，中方一直通过元首互访、派遣特使、互通电话、互致信函以及在联合国等场合进行协调与沟通，推动有关各方缩小分歧。2006 年 11 月，时任联合国秘书长的安南提出联合国分三个阶段向非盟驻达尔富尔部队提供支援的计划，为和平解决达尔富尔问题找到了一条符合实际的道路。“安南计划”的主要内容为：第一阶段，联合国向非盟部队提供价值 2100 万美元的军事装备和物资，并派遣近 200 名军官、警官和文职官员，在非盟部队中担任参谋和顾问等职务；第二阶段，联合国支援非盟部队的人员和装备将达到一定规模；第三阶段，在达尔富尔完成部署联合国—非盟混合部队，这支部队将由 1.7 万名军人和 3000 名警察组成，其指挥权将掌握在联合国手中。苏丹政府对“安南计划”持反对态度，认为反政府武装是导致达尔富尔地区动荡不安的罪魁祸首，同时坚持认为达尔富尔问题属于苏丹内政，反对把达尔富尔问题国际化。正是由于中国从中发挥了重要作用，苏丹方面才原则接受了安南方案，并表示愿

¹⁸ Peter Brookes, *Empowering Evil: China Aids Sudan's Killers*, *The New York Post*, April 10, 2007.

¹⁹ 温宪，“达尔富尔：中国着眼全局”，《人民日报》海外版，2007 年 2 月 7 日。

意在此问题上进一步显示灵活。2007年6月12日，苏丹宣布无条件地全面接受“安南计划”第三阶段方案。7月31日，联合国安理会通过1769号决议，决定向苏丹派遣2.6万人的非盟—联合国混合维和部队。翌日苏丹政府宣布接受此项决议。中国在促成安南三阶段方案方面所发挥的建设性作用，得到了其他有关国际各方的公认和赞赏。

2、积极与苏丹政府沟通，多次派遣特使赴达尔富尔访问考察。2006年1月，中国政府特使、外交部副部长吕国增访问了达尔富尔地区。2007年4月，中国政府特使翟隽又对苏丹进行了为期4天的访问，苏丹总统巴希尔会见了翟隽。翟隽还访问了达尔富尔地区，会见了北达尔富尔州和南达尔富尔州的州长以及地方政府其他官员，并参观了3个难民营，与当地各界代表和难民进行了座谈，实地了解达尔富尔地区的人道主义和安全状况。5月10日，中国政府又任命熟谙非洲事务的资深外交官刘贵今大使为首任中国政府非洲事务特别代表，并宣布他近期工作重点围绕达尔富尔问题展开。随后5月19—23日，刘贵今大使以首位中国政府达尔富尔问题特别代表的身份访问了苏丹，在短短四天行程里，他不仅广泛接触了苏丹政府高层，而且到达达尔富尔难民营实地考察，就解决达尔富尔问题展开工作。6月13—24日，刘贵今大使再度作为特别代表访问了南非、埃塞俄比亚、埃及、苏丹等非洲四国及非盟、阿盟总部，随后又在巴黎出席达尔富尔问题国际会议，与有关各方就达尔富尔问题全面深入地交换意见，进行沟通与协商，阐述中方在达尔富尔问题上的立场和所发挥的作用，为推动达尔富尔问题的政治解决作出了积极贡献。

3、积极提出建设性倡议，确保有关各方的利益能够得到应有的尊重。2006年11月2日，中国国家主席胡锦涛在北京会见前来出席中非合作论坛北京峰会的苏丹总统巴希尔时表示，中方赞赏和支持苏丹实现北南和平，愿继续为达尔富尔地区早日实现和平稳定做出贡献。随后11月27日，胡锦涛主席在应约同美国总统布什通电话中，也表示欢迎达尔富尔问题的政治解决取得积极进展，提出希望有关各方保持对话势头，在兼顾各方关切的基础上，早日就解决方案达成一致，以实现达尔富尔地区和平稳定。2007年2月，胡锦涛主席在访问苏丹时，更是明确提出了中国处理达尔富尔问题的四项原则：一、尊重苏丹的主权和领土完整；二、坚持对话和平等协商，以和平方式解决问题；三、非盟、联合国等应该在达尔富尔维和问题上发挥建设性作用；四、促进地区局势稳定，改善当地人民生活条件。显然，中国政府坚持达尔富尔问题的解决不可能绕开苏丹政府，坚持苏丹政府的主权必须得到应有的尊重，坚持在尊重联合国宪章和人道主义的原则下推动达尔富尔问题的解决。中国政府在不同场合多次重申了这一立场，并在将之贯穿于整个外交实践过程当中。

4、高度重视达尔富尔地区的难民生活状况和人道主义危机，努力帮助达尔富尔地区人民改善生活条件。中国政府先后向达尔富尔和非盟特派团提供了约8000万元人民币的人道主义物资援助和捐款。胡锦涛主席在2007年年初访问苏丹期间，宣布再次向苏丹提供4000万元人民币的援助。中国还同意在联合国安理会框架内向苏丹派驻315人的工兵维和部队，参与达尔富尔地区的维和任务，首批135名中国赴苏丹达尔富尔维和人员也已于2007年11月底抵达南达尔富尔州首府尼亚拉。这支先遣分队隶属联合国—非盟达尔富尔特派团，作为落实“安

南方案”第二阶段支援计划的一部分，主要承担任务区内修建及维护道路、桥梁、建筑物和防御工事、勘察水源、钻井和修建相关取水辅助设施等项工程保障任务，为联合国与非盟维和部队的联合行动创造条件。

中国在解决苏丹问题上的基本立场是：苏丹的主权和领土完整应得到尊重；通过对话和平等协商政治解决问题；联合国和非盟应发挥关键作用。维和行动的目的在于解决问题，所以联合国维和部队进驻苏丹需事先征得苏丹政府同意，只有这样才能解决问题。中国与苏丹的友好关系是正常的国家与国家之间的关系，中国在苏丹投资是正常的平等互利基础上的合作。这种合作是平等、互利、透明、非排他的，受到苏丹各界的广泛欢迎，为苏丹经济社会发展做出了贡献，也为达尔富尔问题的解决创造了有利条件。

中国政府之所以能在达尔富尔问题上发挥独特的影响力，关键就在于处理好了三个问题：一、尊重苏丹政府的主权，坚持不干涉苏丹政府的国内事务，而是以朋友的身份发挥建设性的作用。对此，负责中国政府达尔富尔事务的刘贵今大使多次表示“达尔富尔是苏丹的达尔富尔，是非洲的达尔富尔。”²⁰ 中国始终遵循互不干涉内政的原则来处理达尔富尔问题，从而赢得了苏丹政府的充分信任。二、坚持平等相待，以平等的身份、友好的态度同苏丹政府进行对话和协商，而不是以居高临下的态度动辄以制裁来进行威胁，并且充分考虑到了各方的利益。在中方支持下安理会通过的 1769 号决议不仅为非盟—联合国部署混合维和部队铺平了道路，并且没有表示要对苏丹施加压力或经济制裁的内容。苏丹常驻联合国代表阿卜杜·哈利姆表示，决议照顾到了苏丹政府的许多关切。曾经作为中国政府代表参加巴黎达尔富尔问题国际会议的刘贵今大使说道：“中方努力说服西方同行采取强硬手段不是解决问题的唯一办法，实施经济制裁只会阻碍苏丹政府在这解决这一问题上的合作态度，并使形势更加复杂。”²¹ 三、坚持以长远的眼光，从大局出发来解决问题。中方认为，达尔富尔问题的根源在于贫困问题，只有把发展问题解决了，这一冲突才能得到最终的解决。中国政府积极发展双边经贸关系，多次向苏丹提供发展援助和人道主义援助。中国的投资使苏丹形成了一整套炼油、石化工厂和贸易体系，10 多万苏丹人在中苏合作项目中找到了工作。中国石油天然气集团公司还斥资 3500 万美元用于在苏丹各社区修建道路、桥梁、医院和学校，惠及 150 多万当地居民。中国帮助苏丹建造的麦罗维水电站大坝已初步成型，并将于 2008 年竣工。届时，它将使苏丹全国发电量增长到原来的三倍，不仅可以缓解苏丹电力短缺的情况，还将为方圆 100 公里内的土地提供灌溉水源。非洲著名经济学家阿德巴约·阿德德吉曾经评论说“非洲同中国的经济合作是平等互利、双赢共生的，民众得到了较多实惠。”²²

中国政府在达尔富尔问题上的积极努力得到了国际社会的广泛赞誉。东盟副秘书长本·哈拉说，中国关于解决达尔富尔问题的立场是公正、积极和平衡的，所发挥的作用是建设性的，有独特的影响力，并愿与中方加强协调与配合，共同

²⁰ 刘东凯、林立平，“中非共同语言使中国在达尔富尔问题上发挥独特作用”，2007年10月4日，<http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/chn/zzxw/t369384.htm>。

²¹ 刘东凯、林立平，“中非共同语言使中国在达尔富尔问题上发挥独特作用”，2007年10月4日，<http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/chn/zzxw/t369384.htm>。

²² 刘东凯、林立平，“中非共同语言使中国在达尔富尔问题上发挥独特作用”，2007年10月4日，<http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/chn/zzxw/t369384.htm>。

为推动达尔富尔问题的和平解决做出不懈努力。²³ 联合国负责维和事务的副秘书长盖埃诺也表示,在联合国安理会寻求解决苏丹达尔富尔问题的共识方面,中国起着“非常重要和具有建设性的作用”。盖埃诺表示,相信作为一个有影响的大国,中国可以利用其与苏丹政府的良好关系,促使各方更加关注苏丹和非洲的利益,找到通过谈判政治解决达尔富尔问题的途径。²⁴

值得注意的是,到2007年9月,即使在主张把达尔富尔问题与“抵制北京奥运会”相挂钩的鼓噪一度喧哗四起的美国,中国在达尔富尔问题上所发挥的建设性作用也得到广泛认可。9月19日,美国总统苏丹问题特使纳齐奥斯指出:“在达尔富尔问题上,中国在幕后发挥了非常有益的作用。”“中国(在达尔富尔问题上)还作出了其他承诺,这是非常有建设性作用的。”美国布鲁金斯学会中国中心主任贝德也声称,不应该让中国为达尔富尔问题负责;在过去一年中,中国为推动达尔富尔问题的政治解决上发挥了积极作用,并取得积极的成果;任何政府抵制北京奥运会的行为都是不能接受的,也将造成严重的错误。总部设在华盛顿的非政府团体“拯救达尔富尔联盟”发言人艾伦·布鲁克斯一拉舒尔也对美国媒体发表谈话,指出联合国第1769号决议的通过,反映了中国在通过政治渠道解决达尔富尔问题上承担了国际期望,发挥了重要的国际影响力。他同时澄清,“拯救达尔富尔联盟”等组织均不支持抵制北京奥运会。²⁵需要指出的是,这三人分别来自美国的官方、学界和非政府组织,中国在达尔富尔问题上所起的建设性积极作用能够同时赢得他们的一致赞誉着实不易。

中非关系迈入承前启后的新阶段

从某种程度上说,达尔富尔危机既是对中国非洲外交的一场考验,同时也表明中国非洲外交正进入一个全新的阶段。新中国对非外交已经历三个发展阶段。

第一个阶段从20世纪50年代到70年代,中非双方领导人在1955年的万隆会议上开始接触,随后1956年起中国与埃及等非洲国家陆续建交。1963年12月至1965年6月,周恩来总理三次访问非洲,并在1963年访问埃及时提出了发展中非关系的“五项原则”。1964年1月周总理访问马里时,又提出了中国对外经济技术援助的八项原则。这些原则充分表明中国愿意从道义上支持非洲,在物质上援助非洲,为非洲大陆的独立和解放作出自己的最大努力,因而在非洲大陆赢得了大批的朋友,与中国建交的非洲国家迅速增加,至1979年底,我国已与44个非洲国家建交。这一阶段,中国和非洲国家作为第三世界的盟友共同团结起来,开展反殖、反帝和反霸的斗争。由于冷战的国际大背景,意识形态考虑在这一时期占有重要的地位。

20世纪80到90年代是中国对非外交的第二阶段,这一时期中非关系中的意识形态成分开始淡化,务实的经济合作成为双边关系中的主导因素。众所周知,

²³ 东盟副秘书长高度赞赏中国在解决苏丹达尔富尔问题上发挥的建设性作用, 2007年4月18日, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zwjg/zybd/zybd/t312344.htm>。

²⁴ 谢栋风,“联合国高官赞扬中国在解决达尔富尔问题上的作用”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-09/11/content_6700473.htm。

²⁵ 李学军,“中国在达尔富尔问题上作用获赞誉”, 2007年9月27日, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-09/27/content_6801372.htm。

这一时期的中国和非洲都发生了很大变化。几乎所有非洲国家都完成了民族独立和解放的历史使命，进入了为发展民族经济而奋斗的新阶段。同时，中国开始实施改革开放政策，将工作重点放在了经济建设上。在这种情况下，中非关系的内涵逐渐发生了变化，更加讲求实效，更注重经济合作的平等互惠，“国家利益至上而非国际主义优先，务实外交选择而非意识形态挂帅，逐步成为中非关系发展的主旋律，成为中国开展对非外交工作的政治依归。”²⁶ 1983 年中国政府宣布了中国同非洲国家开展经济技术合作的四项原则，即平等互利，讲究实效，形式多样，共同发展。1996 年，江泽民主席提出了发展中非关系的五点建议，²⁷ 表示要与非洲国家构筑“面向二十一世纪长期稳定、全面合作的国家关系”，与此同时，中非经贸关系则飞速增长，从 1990 年 16.6 亿美元发展到 1999 年的 64.8 亿美元。

进入新世纪后，中非关系也开始进入了一个全新的阶段。中国对非外交开始了战略性的调整，平等的战略性的“互利共赢”成为中非关系的主轴。2004 年，胡锦涛主席在出访埃及、加蓬和阿尔及利亚三国时提出了深化中非关系的“三点倡议”。²⁸ 2006 年初，中国政府发布了《中国对非洲政策文件》，文件开篇指出“新形势下中非传统友好关系面临新的发展机遇”，并表示要“与非洲国家建立和发展政治上平等互信、经济上合作共赢、文化上交流互鉴的新型战略伙伴关系”。²⁹ 文件还提出了发展中非关系的原则和目标，这是中国政府首次以书面形式发布对非政策文件。同年 11 月初，以“友谊、和平、合作、发展”为主题的中非合作论坛北京峰会暨第三届部长级会议在北京举行。《中非合作论坛北京峰会宣言》让中非双方以政治文件的形式，共同向国际社会正式确认建立和发展中非新型战略伙伴关系。而峰会通过的《中非合作论坛——北京行动计划（2007 至 2009 年）》则确定进一步完善论坛机制，加强集体对话，推进论坛行动计划同非洲经济社会发展计划的协调和配合。由此，北京峰会的成功举办，为中非双方构筑长期稳定、内涵丰富、不断发展的中非新型战略伙伴关系奠定了坚实基础。2007 年年初，胡锦涛主席再次访问非洲，进一步巩固和落实中非合作论坛的成果，推动中非合作在更大范围、更广领域和更高层次上全面发展。5 月，中国政府正式任命了历史上的第一位非洲问题特使。双方的经贸合作更是发展迅速，2000 年中非贸易额首次超过 100 亿美元，2006 年双边贸易额即已达到 554.64 亿美元。2007 年 1-6 月，中非贸易额就已达 320.5 亿美元，同比增长 25%。

在全球化不断深入的大背景下，中非关系的发展有着更加深刻的内涵和意义。一方面，由于中国经济近三十年的高速增长，中国和平崛起的态势日渐显现，中国经济发展的“溢出”效应也日益突出，中国对外部世界的依赖也超过了历史上的任何一个时候，中国对非外交呈现出更加积极的姿态。另一方面，虽然一些非洲国家实现了民族独立的使命，但是仍然无法摆脱贫困的境地，社会经济发展依然停滞不前。不少非洲国家既希望能够搭乘中国的经济快车，摆脱对西方西方

²⁶ 罗建波著，《非洲一体化与中非关系》，社会科学文献出版社 2006 年出版，第 282 页。

²⁷ 五点建议的具体内容是：1、真诚友好，彼此成为可以信赖的“全天候朋友”；2、平等相待，相互尊重主权，互不干涉内政；3、互利互惠，谋求共同发展；4、加强磋商，在国际事务中密切合作；5、面向未来，创造一个更加美好的世界。

²⁸ 三点倡议的主要内容为：坚持传统友好，推动中非关系新发展；坚持互助互利，促进中非共同繁荣；坚持密切合作，维护发展中国家的权益。

²⁹ 《中国对非洲政策文件》，新华社北京 2006 年 1 月 12 日电。

国家的经济依赖，同时也希望可以学习中国的发展经验，并期望中国在国际舞台上发挥更大的作用，为发展中国家仗义执言。美国企业研究所研究员、非洲问题专家莫罗·德·洛伦佐认为，除了物质与技术上的帮助之外，“非洲能从中国得到的最大的利益是一种认知的变化。我们有生以来第一次感觉到，非洲国家可以向这个世界贡献些什么，而不是要从外部世界得到什么了。这说明中国在非洲的利益已经将这一地区在世界上的政治经济地位都提高了。”³⁰ 新加坡《联合早报》则发表评论指出：“背负着几世纪惨痛殖民历史的非洲，对外来强权在自己的大陆上竞争并不陌生。美国的军事反应显然并没有摆脱旧思维的本能，中国如果能在对非外交上开创新的典范，‘惟仁者为能以大事小’，则不仅将在非洲获得外交成功，恐怕对于现有西方国际关系准则也将提出全新的挑战，从中真正实践大国崛起的意义。”³¹

³⁰ 李焰，“对冲西方势力，中国拓宽非洲之路”，《华盛顿观察》周刊 2006年第40期。

³¹ 叶鹏飞，“非洲外交的存亡继绝”，《联合早报》2007年2月12日。

**Africa Turns East:
The role of political regimes in shaping responses to China¹**

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*'This 21st century is the century for China to lead the world. And when you are leading the world, we want to be close behind you. When you are going to the moon, we don't want to be left behind.'*²

Olusengun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria.

*'We are returning to the days when our greatest friends were the Chinese. We look again to the East, where the sun rises, and no longer to the West, where it sets.'*³

Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, April 2006

The euphoria exhibited by African elites at the arrival of the Chinese in Africa into a terrain once held to be the 'chasse garde' of European interests is palpable. This appeal has been predicated on China's role as a countervailing force to both Western conditionalities and to the continent's reliance on Western sources for foreign investment and development assistance. Furthermore, with China's much publicised eclipse of the French and British economies in terms of sheer size, there is a strong perception amongst African politicians and businessmen that they needed to tie their fortunes to a Chinese future rather than a Western past. From the promulgation of Zimbabwe's 'Look East' policy to the blossoming of Chinese language studies in Nigeria, the African continent has eagerly embraced Chinese capital, its diplomatic entreaties and even cultural trappings at an unprecedented rate.

Since China's foreign policy foray into Africa has been primarily centred on capturing the elites and the resources under their control, the rapidity of engagement has belied its shallow roots in wider African society. With over fifty countries and deeply diverse societies, the complexity of assessing how Africans respond to China's dramatic arrival on the continent is obvious. Moreover, it has taken Africans some time to assess the interests and determine the impact on their own concerns. In order to cut through this complexity and establish some common features of African responses, it is best to look at the nature of the African regime in place and the underlying economy of a particular country. Three types of regimes—pariah partnerships, illiberal regimes or weak democracies with commodity based economies and democracies with diversified economies—emerge as providing a discernable set of patterned responses to China's new engagement.

At the same time, the rise of public debate outside of the framework of official ties increasingly impinges upon the conduct and the possibilities of extending these government to government relations. As African civil society— from labour activists and trade analysts to environmental and human rights lobbies—develops a voice on

¹ This paper is partially based upon a chapter in my book, *China in Africa* (London: Zed 2007).

² Cited in Sharath Srinivasan, 'Nigeria-China Relations: expansion and negotiation as the rising great power embraces Africa', paper presented at conference Cambridge University, July 2006, p. 1.

³ Cited in 'Chinese Technology for Mugabe's Spies,' 11 March 2006, NewZimbabwean.com

the range and breadth of Chinese involvement in continental affairs, this begins to set parameters on Chinese action in collusion with African elites.

This chapter will examine African responses to China's policy and presence utilising regime type and political economy as a guide to understand differing reactions across the continent. The reaction of Africa's pariah regimes, illiberal regimes and weak democracies with commodity based economies and, finally, democratic regimes with diversified economies to Chinese engagement will all be investigated. Coupled to this will be an analysis of how the emerging critique of Chinese-African relations from Africa's civil society influences the debates and measures taken to deepen relations between the two regions.

Pariah regimes

Perhaps the most common image of the new role of China in Africa is captured in the many public gathering where one of its leaders is seen embracing a recognised African dictator. Until recently, this has been a situation that the Chinese government has been quite willing to accept, if not encourage. 'Non-intervention is our brand, like intervention is the Americans' brand', one Chinese diplomat chortled.⁴ This confident portrayal of Chinese-African partnership drew in part from China's need to publicise its deliberate strategy of breaking into a Western dominated resource market (as noted in Chapters One and Two). But, this controversial approach clearly reflected Beijing's own assessment of African politics, the elite character of regimes which controlled resource economies and the possibilities of forging ties with like-minded actors. How have African pariah regimes responded to Chinese entreaties?

For '*pariah*' regimes China is a welcome source of regime stability, a new strategic partner and a provider of development assistance and foreign investment. States like these include Sudan, Angola, Zimbabwe and Chad, all of which have fallen afoul of Western governments and are routinely castigated in the Western media for a host of failings in governance and human rights. Subject to international condemnation and even sanctions in the aftermath of the Cold War, these governments have found their ability to raise capital or provide for their own security interests has been constricted through an increasingly co-ordinated set of actions by Western governments, NGOs and international organisations. The elites within these states preside over significant resources, usually in the form of extractive energy or mineral resources, but also unexploited timber, fisheries and agricultural areas. State control of these resources takes a variety of forms, from direct ownership of mines and land, to licensing and leasing arrangements. Typically, the reliance of their economy upon a single resource or a collection of resources has not led to significant development but has rather served as a source of elite enrichment in the midst of a sea of poverty. Where mass poverty and elite competition have spilled over into conflict over resources themselves, embattled regimes actively use their resources in the service of security needs and to shore up support within the military. Restrictions on the official arms trade impose potentially disastrous penalties on pariah regimes.

Sudan is a key state for China due to their natural resource endowments in energy. Over \$3 billion have been invested by China, primarily in the oil industry and related infrastructure projects that, like Angola, include refineries, roads, railroads, hydro-

⁴ Dan Large, 'As the Beginning Ends: China's return to Africa', Pambazuka News, 14 December 2006, www.pambazuka.org

electric dams and telecommunications. Tens of thousands of Chinese workers, technicians and managers were brought in to build and run these massive infrastructure and industrial projects. As a result, bilateral trade between the Sudan and China which stood at US\$890million in 2000 has shoot up to US\$3.9 billion in 2005. To a great extent, Sudanese government actions in Darfur have benefited from the protection provided by the Chinese veto in the UN Security Council but, at the same time, authorities in Khartoum have felt that Beijing has not always supported their position as expected and sufficiently (as the organised street protests at the Chinese embassy indicate). A preferential loan was signed in and another US\$3 million loan was secured by the Sudanese government in July 2006 towards rehabilitating infrastructure. It is the hope of Chinese officials that they will be able to convince the newly autonomous Southern Sudanese government, which had vehemently opposed Chinese support for Khartoum during the civil war, to award them rights to exploit oil fields in their region.

With the Sudanese government seemingly locked in perpetual conflict, first for over two decades in the South and since 2004 in the Western area known as Darfur, the role of the Chinese in support of Khartoum has been under the international spotlight for some time. The building of the oil pipeline across parts of the central, contested provinces brought Chinese construction workers in direct contact with the Southern Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and reportedly required them to be armed.⁵ Moreover, in order to lay the pipeline, villages of the Dinka-dominated region were forcibly cleared out by the Sudanese army (much as the people settled around the proposed Merowe dam are being driven out). The onset of a new conflict in Darfur, coming in the aftermath of the official ending of the North-South civil war in 2004, did not directly involve Chinese economic concerns in the way that the civil war did. Nonetheless, Beijing came to the defence of the regime when the US government declared that Khartoum was engaged in acts of genocide and asked that the UN Security Council pass sanctions against the regime. The Chinese threat of a veto of economic sanctions, which would have hurt its own economy (9% of its oil imports are derived from Sudan), forced the Security Council to water down its measures against the government. At the same time, the costs to China continued to grow, from financial penalties for Chinese oil companies attempting to raise money on the international capital markets to the realisation that its international standing was being harmed (see Chapter Four). As Abda El-Mahdi, a former Deputy Finance Minister who withdrew from the government in 2003 said, the country's prolonged political volatility may even eventually cause 'even the investors (such as the Chinese) who did not think that it was relevant to them...to stop investing.'⁶

Zimbabwe is another salutary example of China's relations with a pariah regime. The Zanu-PF government, having been subject to a structural adjustment programme since the early 1990s and, in the wake of protest from urban dwellers and ex-soldiers, embarked on a controversial 'fast track' land reform of the white-dominated commercial sector. Its defiance of the norms of property law and the Zimbabwean constitution had drawn criticism from Western donors and NGOs which, after Zanu-PF rigged a series of elections against the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, turned to targeted sanctions against the regime. As external investment dried

⁵ Human Rights Watch, 'Report: Sudan and Oil', www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/21.htm.

⁶ 'Chinese Investment Sparks Economic Boom in Sudan', transcript, Public Broadcast Service, News Hour, 15 May 2006.

up and the Zimbabwean economy went into freefall, the Mugabe regime looked to new partners to supplant Western investors and development assistance programmes. China's willingness to publicly embrace Mugabe resulted in Harare's promulgation of a 'Look East' policy. Purchases of military equipment, tourism agreements and airline connections all signalled the intentions on the part of Zanu-PF to use state resources to secure the partnership but China has proven to be elusive. Individual investors have entered into co-operative agreements with state-owned companies in the areas of telecommunications and power utility companies but, beyond yet to be realised commitments to rehabilitate the coal station at Hwange, no serious financial capital has been forthcoming. The Chinese have leased some of expropriated farms as well and are said to be a major buyer of tobacco, once Zimbabwe's leading agricultural export. The mining sector, which contains significant platinum reserves that are of interest to China, has so far remained out of bounds (though rumours persist that Mugabe has already put public shares and/or the possibility of acquiring some rights to the mines but that the Chinese are waiting for the value to drop further before making any move). A prospective Chinese buyer of Zimbabwe's Iron and Steel Company pulled out in April 2005 when faced with the absorption of the state-owned enterprises' substantial losses. In the words of one Zimbabwean banker:

Zimbabwe has literally mortgaged most of its key assets to the Chinese in the hope that it would get assistance. Without overstating the point, Zimbabwe is a desperate ally of the Chinese.⁷

Contrasting the two pariah regimes highlights the importance of stability and, increasingly, the role of African and even international public opinion in shaping Chinese policy. In the case of Sudan, where substantive economic interests are fundamental to the depth and character of ties with Khartoum, Chinese involvement is sustained and features at all levels, that is diplomatic, financial, ODA and symbolic. This is even the case after the shift in Beijing's approach to the Bashir regime, which became apparent in late 2006, and involved a more publicly – and apparently privately – critical stance towards Khartoum (see Chapter Five). As for Zimbabwe, the absence of significant Chinese investment has produced a much greater level of diffidence on the part of Beijing associating itself with the Mugabe regime. Indeed, in spite of Mugabe's vocal celebration of ties with Beijing as being 'a new paradigm...against the Anglo-American axis' the matter of fact is that the Zimbabwean government has received very little in comparison to Sudan.⁸ For instance, though Beijing was instrumental in blocking a submission to the UN Security Council Resolution that was critical of 'Operation Murambatsvina' (which regime opponents claimed was instigated to rid the Chinese of indigenous retail competition), efforts to secure Chinese financial assistance in paying the US\$295 million owed the IMF came to naught in 2005. In fact, apart from a university diploma and US\$6 million in food aid, Mugabe's sojourn to China produced no tangible results and Zimbabwe remains off the official itinerary, much to the chagrin of Harare. All of this has caused putative Zanu-PF loyalists to question publicly the friendship which underpins the relationship:

⁷ 'Zimbabwe: Look East policy failing', Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Africa Report No 42, 27 September 2005.

⁸ 'Mugabe Hails China as Beijing Promises Africa Aid', Reuters 15 December 2003.

The Chinese do not believe, just like the fence-sitting Western investors, that Zimbabwe can uphold bilateral investment protection agreements and manage its economy to international standards. They have witnessed, in Zimbabwe, instances of the arbitrary violation of...the law of property and law of contract. And unless the government realises this, then all Zimbabwe will continue to get from the Chinese are good words of intent until such a time the situation in the country is deemed to have returned to normal.⁹

The above-mentioned examples of pariah partnerships suggest that the Chinese approaches with these regimes are fundamentally opportunistic in nature and not necessarily driven by a desire to bolster or create a ‘league of dictators’ as Robert Kagan claims (see Chapter 4). For the Chinese government, the overriding economic considerations mandate a defence of the regime in Khartoum, especially when aimed directly against their own investments, but there is not necessarily a need to go beyond that position. And, like their Western counterparts, Beijing recognises that the arbitrary conduct of the Zanu-PF regime is as much a threat to their own prospective investments and, when coupled to the much more important ties to a nervous South African government (and the West as well) make Zimbabwe a pariah partnership to be maintained at arms length. The problematic of tying their economic fortunes to the fate of a particular illegitimate regime, while not identified as an issue at the time, is however increasingly become apparent to Chinese authorities.

Illiberal regimes and weak democracies with commodity based economies

Though admittedly a broad category encapsulating everything from states emerging from conflict – like Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola – to reasonably stable if weak democracies with a commodity based economy – such as Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia – illiberal regimes and democratic regimes with commodity based economies represent a governance type that has broadly similar reactions to external engagement. With respect to post-conflict regimes, though nominally on the road to economic recovery and often making claims to be conforming to democratic principles (a reflection of the donor led bias as much as domestic commitment), the willingness to use elite control over state resources as a means of securing rents is deeply engrained in their conduct. Equally, those states with a commodity based economy that are democratic in character can exhibit similar behaviour though in some cases checked by formal legal institutions or through the influence of political forces in the country. For both *illiberal regimes and democratic regimes with commodity based economies* China is primarily seen as a strategic partner and new source of FDI, though local business sector and trade unions/civil society may be concerned about impact on their interests.

One example of the post-conflict state, *Angola* is fast becoming one of Beijing’s most important partners, both because of its tremendous oil wealth but also due to the investment opportunities it offers in a range of sectors. The Angolan government’s willingness to open up the country to Chinese investment has meant, for example, that the \$5 billion of loans from China’s Exim Bank provided since 2004 are targeted from the construction of an oil refinery, a new international airport, diamond mining and the fisheries industry. Moreover, as the terms of the loan specified that 70% of the contracts be awarded to Chinese firms, officials in Luanda have invited tens (some

⁹ ‘China Snubs Country’, *Financial Gazette*, 1 February 2007.

say hundreds) of thousands of Chinese labourers to do work on rehabilitating key railways and roads damaged during the long civil war. Total trade between Angola and China was US\$1.876 billion in 2000 and grew to \$4.9 billion in 2004. A further loan of US\$3 billion was negotiated over a two year period which included provisions for building an oil refinery at Lobito (something that the international community had been unwilling to support). A massive construction project, aimed at building a second city south of the capitol called 'Nova Luanda' with over 120,000 new residences, is underway along with parks, leisure centres and schools.¹⁰ From the Angolan government perspective, the link with China is a key source of capital independence from the pressure applied by the International Monetary Fund to meet standards of accountability and, in awarding oil concessions to Sinopec, the MPLA leadership has been explicit in declaring its interest in diversifying the profile of foreign investors in Angola beyond those from the West. Interestingly, it is reportedly due to accusations by the Chinese government of Angolan corruption in handling its development assistance that caused Luanda to demote a senior party official recently.

As a commodity-based economy that is a weak democracy, *Nigeria* is an important country for China on three accounts. First due to its oil fields, secondly, as Africa's most populous state, potential market size, and third because of its prominent political role in the African Union and NEPAD. Two-way trade between Nigeria and China was US\$856million in 2000 and grew to just over US\$2 billion by 2004. Hu Jintao made a point of visiting Nigeria on his last two visits to Africa and it has been designated a 'strategic partner' in the Chinese diplomatic lexicon. Like South Africa, the Nigerian government harbours ambitions to take up the proposed African permanent seat on the UN Security Council and this plays a part in its diplomacy with China. Chinese investment has been primarily in oil sector, and it was Beijing's willingness to sell arms in support of the Nigerian military action in the Niger Delta that apparently secured the deal. A US\$2 billion investment by CNPC into rehabilitating the Kaduna oil refinery in the north coupled to pledges of US\$1 billion aimed infrastructure projects in 2006 was an indication that the pace of investment and aid is quickening. Other Chinese investments can be found in timber, cotton and palm oil as well as the telecommunications sector. Controversy over the role of Chinese traders has periodically erupted in Lagos, causing the government to temporarily take action against them such as closure of their main trading centres, and bringing the issue to the attention of the Nigerian Senate. A further complication in the relationship has been the treatment of thousands of Nigerians who, along with many other Africans, work in Hong Kong and Guangzhou area. Calls by the Nigerian consulate for the establishment of a 'Nigeria Town' in Guangzhou have been summarily rejected by local authorities.¹¹

As these examples suggest, what all of these regimes have in common is their desire to diversify the sources of investment, a willingness (and desire) to accept symbolic projects as part of a comprehensive Chinese aid and investment package as well as a disinterest (in keeping with their distance from society) in the consequences of that these might produce. From the Chinese perspective, these economies are generally closely tied to African elites' interests and there are fewer obstacles to rapid investment in the resource sector than they might experience in a state with stronger

¹⁰ *African Confidential*, 41:14, 7 June 2006.

¹¹ 'Guangzhou Crackdown Nets African Drug Mules', *South China Morning Post*, 12 September 2006; 'Out of Guangzhou, Africa Trade Booms', *China Daily*, 23 May 2006.

institutions and commitment to constitutional law. At the same time, though they may not recognise this dimension initially, like the pariah regimes, the weak legitimacy and poor institutions of these regimes may make them more susceptible to disruption, local dissent or even outright political challenges.

Democracies with diversified economies

Within the African continent, the prevailing levels of economic development and the preponderance of low, primary product exporting countries have meant that there are few truly diverse economies. The same could be said of fully fledged democracies. In fact, there is really only one state that fits in full the category of having both a diversified economy and being a democracy, inclusive of a well-represented and active domestic civil society, and that is South Africa. Other states like Namibia, Botswana and Senegal can make claim to this standing but do not share the same profile or economic capacity that South Africa has on the continent. Ironically, Zimbabwe was at one time in an equivalent position – albeit at a smaller scale – but has, as noted above, embarked on a rapid descent into authoritarianism and economic collapse. For *democracies with diversified economies* China is an important strategic partner, new source of FDI who, nonetheless is increasingly being seen as a competitor by local business interests, a threat by trade unions and civil society and more broadly challenging NEPAD and South African interests on the continent.

South Africa is without doubt the most important all round sub-Saharan country for China. Its mineral endowment satisfies China's demand for resources, its relative wealth presents more market opportunities than any other African country, its multinational corporations have invested in China and Pretoria's own multilateral interests in reforming the WTO and UN present opportunity for pursuing common interests. Total trade has risen from US\$2.051 billion in 2000 to nearly US\$6 billion in 2004. South Africa is an influential country within the region and has exhibited a strong interest in co-operating with China, not the least due to its own ambitions to take up a permanent seat in a restructured UN Security Council. This was confirmed by South Africa's prominent role at the Sino-Africa Co-operation Forum in October 2000 and the subsequent creation of the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission as well as the discussions of creating a Free Trade Area (FTA).

As the continent's most industrialised country with its own MNCs expanding rapidly into Africa, South Africa has a vocal lobby which, in coalition with trade unions and other civil society activists, has played a key role in stalling the above-mentioned negotiations towards an FTA. For South African business, in the words of Moeletsi Mbeki, 'China is both a tantalizing opportunity and a terrifying threat' and position echoed by other South African business leaders at the World Economic Forum on Africa in Cape Town in 2006.¹² Competition with Chinese firms in areas such as construction, both inside South Africa and in other parts of the continent, is strong as is the case in other areas such as telephony. An additional dimension of the South African case is the fact that it is Africa's only significant foreign investor in China itself. SAB Miller, Naspers and Sasol are some of the leading firms involved directly in the Chinese market and by 2005 these investments have come to US\$700 million

¹² Sanusha Naidu, 'South Africa's Relations with the People's Republic of China: mutual opportunities or hidden threats?' in Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman, eds., *State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006* (Pretoria: HSRC 2006), p. 457.

(as opposed to China's US\$210 million invested in South Africa).¹³ South African technical expertise in mining and related areas is well-regarded by the Chinese government, as witnessed by the lengthy negotiations aimed at bringing Sasol's coal-to-oil production to China and the purchase of South African nuclear technology from the decommissioned production facility at Pelindaba in 1998.

In certain ways, democratic regimes with diversified economies represent relatively difficult terrain for Chinese investors and foreign assistance due to the regulatory requirements and degree of labour and social legislation which is imposed on business activity. Resistance by local industry and labour to the threat posed by Chinese business and the import of its products, which directly challenged their livelihoods, are an inevitable feature of relations as well. Furthermore, the level of economic development in these regimes may even (as it does in the South African case, but not Namibia) preclude using some of the usual 'quick-impact' prestige projects like presidential palaces to gain the support of political elites in pursuit of larger resource-oriented deals. That being said, it is worth remembering that rule of law and contract law have not been significant barriers to Chinese investment in a host of Western countries, where the leading MNCs have shown themselves to be fully able to comply with and operate in these settings.

Zambia: China's 'perfect storm'

The case of Zambia in many ways highlights the pitfalls facing Chinese involvement in Africa and potential costs to Beijing of its deepening engagement in continental affairs. In fact, though relations between the two countries became severely strained over the last year, local perceptions of China were quite positive in the initial stages of its new engagement. This was primarily based on the Chinese decision to build the TanZam railway, apparently in response to a request by Kenneth Kaunda directly to Mao Zedong in the late 1960s, offered the land locked country an alternative route for its trade to that of the Rhodesian regime to the South. The spectacle of thousands of Chinese workers diligently building the railroad, living modestly and conducting themselves with decorum, made a lasting and positive impression on ordinary Zambians as well as the political elite.

The new wave of investment into Zambia came in the wake of the decade long structural adjustment programme which, amongst other measures, re-privatised the mining sector (which had been nationalised under Kaunda). President Levy Mwanawasa eagerly welcomed the Chinese entrepreneurs and went so far as to provide state assets at concessional rates to these investors as well as give them special treatment relative to other foreigners.¹⁴ In 1998, the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group paid US\$20 million for the dilapidated Chambishi copper mine located in the north and proceeded to rehabilitate it, putting in place a munitions factory and company store alongside the new extraction and processing facilities. After putting US\$100 million into the mine, it started production again in 2001, hundreds of new jobs were created and, for a community that had not seen a major employment opportunity for a decade, the mine provided a modicum of prosperity. Along with

¹³ Sanusha Naidu, 'South Africa's Relations with the People's Republic of China: mutual opportunities or hidden threats?' in Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman, eds., *State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006* (Pretoria: HSRC 2006), p. 470.

¹⁴ According to other mining companies active in Zambia, the Chinese investors had privileged access to the presidency.

this focus on mining came the decision to rehabilitate a textile complex 140km north of Lusaka that had fallen into disuse. The Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture, which had originally been set up by the Chinese government during the waning years 'revolutionary' phase of engagement and abandoned after their departure in 1994, was given a fresh injection of capital through a US\$200 million concessional loan. At the same time, the launching of a joint venture with Qingdao Municipality and a Zambian company to purchase of a cotton ginnery in the country's eastern province seems to echo the vertical integration strategy utilised by China in the energy field, had come to employ hundreds of Zambians and, through its contracts with 5000 farmers its impact was extended to include 10,000 hectares of agricultural land devoted to growing cotton. A cotton ginning facility was added to Zambia-China joint venture, as well as 18 stores based in country, Tanzania and Namibia, and plans were made to establish an industrial park.¹⁵ And, finally, as the interest in Zambia began to pick up, Chinese wholesale and retail traders trickled into the country, building up stalls in the markets in Lusaka and other population centres.

The problems started to surface as early as 2004 when the local Zambian employees began to complain about the low wages of US\$65 a month and poor safety standards at the Chambishi mine. Trade unions, with the collusion of the government in Lusaka, had been banned from recruiting or operating at the mine with the result that their organisational structures were brought in to challenge this breach of their legal rights. An explosion at the munitions factory serving Chambishi in April 2005, which killed 46 Zambian workers, provoked outrage amongst the rest of the workforce and was not mollified by promises (and eventual delivery) of monetary compensation for families of victims of the accident from the Chinese embassy. Strike action over wages and conditions intensified and an agreement to allow unionisation was finally reached in July 2005 which would allow for up to US\$500 in back pay. On 24 July, workers stormed the management's offices after hearing that the money would not be forthcoming and five of them were reportedly shot by a frightened Chinese manager.¹⁶ Coming as this did in the run up to an election the event sparked a national debate over the conduct of the Chinese in the country and, concurrently, the failure of the Mwanawasa government to uphold either Zambian law or the interests of its people.

Exploiting the growing disquiet at all levels of Zambian society over the 'China question', the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, built much of his campaign for the presidency around the anti-Chinese sentiment. 'Zambia,' he declared, 'is becoming a province – no a district – of China.'¹⁷ He made contact with Taiwanese representatives during a visit to neighbouring Malawi (which still holds diplomatic relations with Taipei), where he reportedly committed himself – presumably after receiving funding support – to switching recognition back to Taipei should he win the election. This sparked a furious response from Beijing's ambassador, Li Baodong, who threatened to withdrawal Chinese investment should Sata be elected. Clearly the Chinese commitment to non-interference in domestic affairs of African states had been violated. Alarm bells were sounded in other African capitols as the conduct of the Chinese business and diplomacy came under the spotlight.¹⁸ In the end, though Sata's Patriotic Front received only 28% of the vote, it won key seats and control of

¹⁵ 'New Form of Chinese Aid Revives Zambia's Largest Textile Factory', *Peoples Daily*, 27 November 2003.

¹⁶ Other reports suggested he shot four and the police shot one miner.

¹⁷ Yaroslav Trofimov, 'As China's Presence in Africa Increases, so does Resentment', yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com.

¹⁸ See various reports and editorials in the African press.

Lusaka and other municipalities in the mining areas making it a political force to be reckoned with. Subsequently a series of national apologies were made by the incumbent president and his ministers to the Chinese government aimed at assuaging Beijing's sensibilities.

On the Chinese side, there was a determination to carry on in the country despite the uproar. Health clinics, an HIV/Aids project and other community programmes were rolled out for the local people in the township surrounding Chambishi. A spokesman for the mining company declared:

By complying with the laws of Zambia, we are confident that no problems will come to us. We will do our best to run this mine successfully. We have to keep quiet and to keep working. Why should we fear?¹⁹

Indeed, such was Chinese confidence that China has selected the Chambishi mine and its environs to serve as one of its five designated 'special economic zones' for Africa at the FOCAC meeting in Beijing, and will be building a US\$220 million copper-smelting plant. The planned ceremonial opening of the plant by the visiting Chinese president in February 2007, however, had to be cancelled for fear of protests. And, to add further to the woes of Zambian-Chinese collaboration, the once-feted Mulungushi Textile endeavour was struggling to avoid closure against the backdrop of a 'bloated' labour force, the high cost of local taxation and, ironically, the low prices of imports from China.²⁰ It would seem that events in Zambia are casting a longer shadow over Chinese relations with Africa than expected.

African diplomacy responds to China

The recognition that Chinese activism in Africa has been played out simultaneously at a bilateral and multilateral level has generally limited the possibility to date of a co-ordinated African response. At the same time, however, it has not stopped all African governments from developing a stance towards China in collusion, albeit to a limited degree, with other states. For instance, at the bilateral level, South African Department of the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry have conducted studies of China's role in, respectively, a proposed free trade area with China, its development assistance in Africa and the trade (especially textiles) impact on the Southern African region as well as the local economy.²¹ Given the close relationship between South African policy makers and the NEPAD initiative, the research and policy recommendations produced by Pretoria are likely to receive a serious hearing within NEPAD. The Namibian government has created a special co-ordinating committee to examine ways of devising a strategic approach so that the country could maximise the ties with China.²² Ghana and Zimbabwe's 'Look East' policies, though springing from different rationales (one economic the other geo-political), are additional examples of explicit policy responses to China. Pressure from, as noted below, co-ordinated action by African trade unions concerned about the impact of Chinese manufactured textiles and clothing on their members interests has also served to place the formulate of an 'African response' to China on national foreign policy agendas. This was manifested in over a third of all African countries

¹⁹ Yaroslav Trofimov, 'As China's Presence in Africa Increases, so does Resentment', yaroslav.trofimov.@wsj.com.

²⁰ 'Kabwe Textile Firm Survival Plan Coming', *The Times of Zambia*, 30 January 2007.

²¹ Various conversations with South African government officials.

²² 'Govt, China Sign Deals to Tune of N\$60 Million', *The Namibian*, 6 February 2007.

signing onto the Istanbul Declaration, a diplomatic note requesting that quotas on Chinese textile exports be continued by the WTO, by 2005.²³ And, as African civil society increasing turns its attention to Chinese involvement in trade, debt and the environment and publicising its findings, seen through such vehicles as the web broadcasts of China-Africa topics on Pazambuka News, a public debate on how to respond to China is emerging.

However, the fact remains that at the multilateral level African reactions to Beijing have been basically uncoordinated and ad hoc, reflecting the underlying bilateral structure of China-Africa relations. This may not always be the case as FOCAC's region-to-region summitry gains a surer foot in the African political calendar. There were already signs at the pre-FOCAC meeting in September between the NEPAD Secretariat, African and Chinese diplomats that Africans were developing common positions and critiques on subjects which they identified to be of mutual concern to Africa.²⁴ These included a desire to see China open its markets to African agricultural products more readily and address the question of the use of Chinese labour.

Perhaps the most telling evidence of the shortfall in developing nuanced and critical analysis of the potential gains and losses for Africa (though Western governments, the World Bank and the OECD have started to produce these) is the nature of relations between the leading African multilateral institutions and the Chinese government. The public embrace of the FOCAC by the NEPAD Secretariat contrasted with the ambivalence of the African Union towards the grand festival that was the China Africa Summit. The donation of US\$500,000 towards a health training project in East Africa in mid 2006, which received much publicity in NEPAD communiqués, was one indication of the concrete support by this organisation. At the same time that the head of NEPAD, Firmino Mucavele, expressed support for China-Africa engagement, personnel within the NEPAD Secretariat remain much more critical of the Chinese role, seeing it as both threatening to aspects of its trade and development strategy as well as the broader governance aims.²⁵ South African government officials have been particularly vocal in seeking formalised Chinese engagement with the NEPAD Secretariat.²⁶ As mentioned above, it is significant that China decided at FOCAC to fund the construction of a new building to house the African Union as a gesture in keeping with its emphasis on practical support for this Pan-Africanist organisation.

African civil society discovers China

African civil society, disparate and chronically under-funded, even actively persecuted in countries, nonetheless plays a part in fostering debate within Africa on key political, economic and social issues. Generally, and in keeping with its self-assigned role as state 'watch dog', African civil society has been critical of aspects of Chinese aid policy and the conduct of some of its businesses. In particular, civil society groups have focused on concerns of China's negative impact on local labour, trade, governance and the environment. Their critique of Chinese conduct and African elite collusion that is beginning to shape the relationship though the depth of

²³ 'Istanbul Declaration', Global Alliance for Fair Textile Trade, www.fairtextiletrade.org

²⁴ FOCAC pre-meeting, SAIIA-NEPAD-RAS, September 2006, Johannesburg.

²⁵ Personnel claimed that they were restricted from criticising China after the donation had been made. Off the record conversations.

²⁶ Mandisi Mphalwa, Minister for Trade and Industry, South Africa, speaking at the World Economic Forum, Cape Town, 31 May-2 June 2006.

this impact is very much a function of the regime/political economy nexus outlined above.

Labour

In terms of official Chinese statistics, there are 82,000 Chinese labourers working for Chinese firms based in all of Africa as of 2005, up from 42,000 the previous year.²⁷ These figures, however, jar with anecdotal experience emerging from specific African countries where the presence of Chinese labourers is clearly growing. Indeed, even information drawn from individual African countries paints a different picture. According to one Angolan source, the number of Chinese labourers in Angola was estimated to be 30,000 in 2006 and expected to rise anywhere from 80,000 to 200,000 by 2008 (though persistent rumours suggest that this will eventually rise to the astronomical figure of three million).²⁸ In Zambia, figures vary from an official figure of 2,300 registered Chinese citizens to a reported 30,000.²⁹ In Nigeria, in the wake of the Chinese commitment to rehabilitate road and railroad infrastructure in late 2006, there are supposed to be upwards of 100,000 Chinese workers being brought into the country.³⁰ In Algeria, there are said to be 20,000 Chinese labourers while in Egypt the number is approximately 10,000.³¹ And in Sudan, the first country to host a large Chinese labour contingent (since the early 20th century, that is), there were said to be 74,000 in the country (of which 10,000 are employed by CNPC) in 2006.³² This latter figure it must be said, contrasts with the lower figure provided by the Khartoum government which suggested that over 23,800 Chinese workers were registered in Sudan by 2004.³³ In any case, Chinese labourers comprise one third of work force at one of Sudan's largest construction projects, a Khartoum's oil refinery being built on the outskirts of the city.³⁴

Where did all of these Chinese employees come from and why are they brought in to work on Chinese-funded and managed projects? The rationale behind the use of Chinese labour for infrastructure projects has been clear from the Chinese perspective: the need to complete the work as quickly as possible and with minimum complications. Issues like the language and cultural barriers, low wages and long hours, all problems frequently cited by Africans working for Chinese firms, can be bypassed in this way. As the general manager of the state-owned China National Overseas Engineering Corporation based in Lusaka explains:

Chinese people can stand very hard work. This is a cultural difference. Chinese people work until they finish and then rest. Here (in Zambia) they are

²⁷ Chinese International Labour Co-operation, *Annual Report*, 2006.

²⁸ Maneul Enes Ferreira, presentation at China Scramble Conference, Cambridge University, July 2006. The figure of 3 million was derived from the statement of an Angolan minister at a conference on energy issues held in Cape Town in 2005 but, though widely repeated, has never been confirmed.

²⁹ 'Zambians Attack Chinese Businesses', *The Times* 3 October 2006. *The Times* reported the Chinese community to be 30,000, a figure which is touted by Guy Scott, Secretary General of the opposition Patriotic Front, as reported in IRIN, 'Cold Reception for China's President', 5 February 2007.

³⁰ Dan Large, Christian Aid report, London 2007, p. 8.

³¹ Report supplied by the South African Treasury.

³² Human Rights Watch, 'Report: Sudan and Oil', www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/21.htm.

³³ As reported in Ali Abdalla Ali, *The Political Economy of the Relation Between Sudan and China: a brief survey*, paper presented in Pretoria, October 2005, p. 47.

³⁴ 'Chinese Investment Sparks Economic Boom in Sudan', transcript, Public Broadcast Service, News Hour, 15 May 2006.

like the British, they work according to a plan. They have tea breaks and a lot of days off. For our construction company that means it costs a lot more.³⁵

Even Africa businessmen acknowledge these same traits as key to the success of Chinese workers in out-competing their African equivalents. As Briss Mathabathe, Imbani Consortium (a joint Chinese-South Africa venture to expand Richards Bay shipping facilities) said:

The Chinese have a strong work ethic, and we hope that this will be assimilated into the trainees that we send over (to China). They also need to be exposed to the sometimes arduous working conditions that can be associated with this industry.³⁶

A Tanzanian trader who lives in Hong Kong echoed with view:

(The Chinese) are very hard working. In Africa, our foundation was a lazy foundation. We used to have land, we used to have food, so people did not bother about working hard. Africans have to pull up their socks to meet the standards of the current world situation.³⁷

Trade unionists and ordinary labourers within Africa rile against this situation, pointing out that the potential development gains of Chinese investment for African economies are undermined by this approach. As one study of the Chinese construction industry in Africa has shown, however, the blame for employment practices may not fully rest with Chinese business but rather the African governments that host them. For example, in Angola, where the MPLA government had not made specific provisions for use of local labour in awarding contracts, Chinese workers are playing a prominent role. By way of contrast, in Tanzania local labourers are used, alongside Chinese labourers, in infrastructure projects.³⁸ In Zambia the leading Chinese construction firm claims to employ 15 Zambians for every Chinese hired though the general manager admits preferring Chinese labourers over indigenous ones.³⁹

Immigration and xenophobia

However, it is not just the number Chinese workers employed by Chinese firms to do a variety of skilled and unskilled work that is of concern to Africans. Once Chinese workers have spent time in African countries, there is a marked tendency for some to stay on either working on new projects with the Chinese firm that brought them to the continent or to branch off into their own small business pursuits. This situation feeds into the concerns of Chinese settlement in parts of Africa.

The matter of fact is that Chinese government incentives to invest long term in Africa have put into place, whether deliberately or otherwise, a de facto emigration policy. This is given expression through the use of state-linked MNCs and ODA to encourage investment into African countries with which China has economic interests and the

³⁵ 'Thanks China, Now Go Home', *The Guardian* 5 February 2007.

³⁶ Cited in *Mining and Engineering News* (Johannesburg), 9 June 2006.

³⁷ Mohammed Kadala, cited in 'Africa's thriving trade with China', BBC report – Africa Live!, no date.

³⁸ Centre for Chinese Studies, 'China's Interests and Activities in Africa's Construction and Infrastructure Sectors', Stellenbosch University/DFID, February 2007.

³⁹ 'Thanks China, Now Go Home', *The Guardian* 5 February 2007.

lack of follow through by Chinese authorities to keep tabs on their workers. The other manner that Chinese emigration is being encouraged is through the scaling up of Chinese government publicity as to the opportunities available in Africa for Chinese business. And, with provincial and local officials taking the lead, local SOEs, small businesses and even labourers are seeing opportunities in moving to Africa. Reflecting these trends are hundreds of thousands of Chinese settling in African countries in the last decade and half. As noted in Chapter Two, estimates vary, primarily due to poor data collection on the part of both African and Chinese governments, so all figures should be treated with caution. Furthermore, illegal immigration makes these official calculations suspect.

Many Africans are pointing out the possibilities that the influx of Chinese migrants, coupled to the negative impact of employment practices and other acts viewed as discriminatory by local people could spark acts of xenophobia and racism.⁴⁰ Indeed, this has already occurred in Lesotho in the 1990s and more recently in the aftermath of the anti-Chinese election campaign in Zambia. But instances of anti-Chinese feeling prevail in many African countries with Zambians being particularly vocal on this point. One letter to the editor declared:

The (Zambian) employees are even subjected to serious beatings due to lack of communication. They (the Chinese) can't speak English to give proper instructions...⁴¹

It remains the case that xenophobia and racism are experienced by Africans in China. This was a persistent and well-documented problem for visiting African students in the past and one can presume that some of these attitudes are carried over in the Chinese communities taking root in Africa today. A Chinese art curator, himself raised in Africa, pointed out the narrow attitudes of many Chinese as well as the possibilities for cultural affinity:

I have lived in Hong Kong for a long time, and I know that when some Chinese hear mention of Africa, it conjures up images of cannibalism, black magic, human sacrifice and famine. They don't realize the Africans and Chinese share certain fundamental beliefs and traditions, such as respect for their ancestors and a belief in spirits, and even certain elements of art.⁴²

The growing numbers of African traders, till now little commented upon, in Southeast China and Hong Kong, exposes the Chinese to Africa (and vice-a-versus) in ways that may act to change these prejudices.

Trade and environment

At the macro-economic level, the structure of trade between Africa and China has brought numerous complaints from concerned African elites both within and outside governments. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has indicated that it found the pattern of trade between China and Africa to be worrisome as it merely replicated the continent's traditional role in the political economy of colonialism.⁴³

⁴⁰ 'NSHR Slams China over its Human Rights Record', *The Namibian*, 5 February 2007.

⁴¹ Mandy Mwaseba, *The Post* (Lusaka) 13 September 2006.

⁴² Henry Lu, museum curator based in Hong Kong as cited in *China Daily* 12 July 2004.

⁴³ Discussions with officials from Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 18 January 2008.

Trade researchers at think tanks in South Africa have reacted cautiously to the prospects of a Free Trade Agreement with China.⁴⁴ At the micro-level, the proliferation of Chinese retail shops has brought about its own source of discontent amongst Africa's ordinary people. A street vendor in Lusaka captured the concern of many when he declared:

These Chinese investors just come here to make money and take away from us even the simple businesses like selling groceries in markets. Honestly, is this the kind of foreign investment we can be celebrating about?⁴⁵

African environmental groups have also discovered that China's presence has had an often delirious effect on the local ecology. For instance, the legal and illegal logging of timber in Liberia, Cameroon and Mozambique (and possibly other locations) have wreaked havoc on the prospects for sustainable forestry and have even taken place within national parks. Chinese triads have been implicated in the stripping of the Southern African coast of abalone (90% of it is gone after only a few years) while over-fishing by Chinese and Taiwanese trawlers have begun to damage local communities dependent on fishing for their livelihood. As one African environmental campaigner has put it: 'This low-price development model (used by China) actually comes at a very high cost – to societies, both inside and outside China, as well as to the environment.'⁴⁶

Adding to these concerns is the willingness of the Chinese government to fund large infrastructure projects such as dams which are deemed to be unsound due to arbitrary displacement of local inhabitants and the environmental consequences. The construction of the US\$1.8 billion Merowe Dam in Sudan, as well as two other dam projects on the Nile, has provoked controversy for its uprooting of the Hambdan and Amri peoples.⁴⁷ In Mozambique, a recent commitment to build the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam on the Zambezi in what is purported to be an earthquake prone area has raised similar issues. This trend towards Chinese government financing of big dams has its roots in the decision in the 1990s to fund the Three Gorges Dam project in China itself after the World Bank had turned it down for its negative effects on a host of reasons.

Governance and human rights

Finally, some African NGOs raising the alarm regarding the relations China is cultivating with pariah regimes. For example, Phil ya Nangolah, head of Namibia's National Society for Human Rights declared:

China's defiance of international public opinion vis-à-vis the dictatorial Sudanese regime of President Omar al-Bashir is totally unacceptable. Chinese trade and other involvements with Sudan only serve to economically strengthen al-Bashir's iron fist and thereby aggravate the genocidal human rights violations in Darfur.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ See Peter Draper and Garth le Pere, *Enter the Dragon: towards a free trade agreement between China and the Southern African Customs Union*, (Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue 2005).

⁴⁵ IRIN, 'Cold Reception for China's President', 5 February 2007.

⁴⁶ Michelle Chan-Fishel, 'Environmental Impact: more of the same?', in Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds., *African Perspectives on China in Africa* (Naibori: Fahamu 2007), p.149.

⁴⁷ Ali Askouri, 'China's Investment in Sudan: displacing villages and destroying communities', in Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds., *African Perspectives on China in Africa* (Naibori: Fahamu 2007), pp 78-81.

⁴⁸ 'NSHR Slams China over its Human Rights Record', *The Namibian*, 5 February 2007.

Linked to this are concerns about the growing trade in Chinese manufactured arms, from light weapons to heavy military equipment, with pariah regimes and other African governments.⁴⁹ Lastly, the impact on governance issues has raised fears that the gains in asserting the right to greater transparency and accountability in would be undermined by Chinese loans as well as saddle Africa with a new cycle of unsustainable debt.⁵⁰

Conclusion

African responses to China have been in the main positive, though greater exposure and more thorough going analysis of the costs and benefits of Chinese investments and ODA to Africans have tempered some of the initial unbridled enthusiasm. For African governments, the Chinese role has produced differentiating reactions based on the three regime-types outlined above. What is crucial to understand the varied reactions by African governing elites is their own relationship to law and constitutional structures that prevail in their respective states. In those countries where elites have exclusive control over access to the country's resources, they oblige external actors to cultivate personal relations with them whereas in those countries where rule of law is meaningfully enforced, the emphasis has been on meeting legal requirements and due process.

These responses by African governments in turn have influenced the Chinese approach to the continent as their own position and standing within Africa has changed from that of an aspirant investor to an increasingly established presence. The vast majority of China's investments in Africa have been in the energy sector and the first impulse by Chinese officials has been to seek out easy deals that allow them to capture resources quickly, which has generally corresponded with a high level of fostering of elite ties and a low level of due process or legal scrutiny. However, as Chinese business has become more deeply embedded in a particular country, their concerns have shifted from that of attaining access to resources and market share to sustaining their position and investments. This can be seen, for example, in the tentative relationship between China and the Mugabe government, which has yet to produce the kind of investment that the Zanu-PF proclaims is forthcoming. It can also be seen in the changing attitude of Chinese mining company in Zambia, which increasingly has sought to bring their business practices in line with established legal requirements, such as allowing trade union activity, as a safeguard against popular dissent. It is significant that complying with Zambian law is now seen as a refuge for Chinese businesses rather than something to avoid or ignore.⁵¹

With respect to African civil society, the growing negative assessment of China's role coming out of its civil society activists – as opposed to Western government or NGOs – on the issues of labour conditions, environmental, trade and human rights areas is more difficult for the Chinese authorities to counter than equivalent statements from Westerners. At this stage, the Chinese reaction to such criticism has been to make a symbolic gesture, similar to the actions aimed at winning over African elites, such as

⁴⁹ Ndubisi Obiorah, 'Who's Afraid of China in Africa? Towards an African civil society perspective on China-Africa relations', in Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds., *African Perspectives on China in Africa* (Naibori: Fahamu 2007), pp 47-49.

⁵⁰ Diane Games, 'China: the new economic imperialists in Africa', *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 21 February 2005; AfroDad and others at World Social Summit, Nairobi, January 2007.

⁵¹ See Chinese mining spokesman's statement cited in Yaroslav Trofimov, 'As China's Presence in Africa Increases, so does Resentment', yaroslav.trofimov.@wsj.com.

financing a 'social good', such as building a hospital or offering financial assistance to ameliorate the perceived problem. The announcement of US\$3.5 million towards supporting the financially strapped African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur in June 2006 is an example of the latter. The matter of fact is, however, that short of donations to civil society groups themselves, these measures are unlikely to do much to dampen down criticism.

Especially disconcerting for Beijing and probably with greater potential fallout has to be the growing connection between their activities in a particular country and the use of this link by opposition parties in their domestic strategies for power. With China deliberately fostering close ties with governing elites, it inevitably is tarred with accusations of mutual collusion if not outright collaboration with the standing regime. At the benign end of the spectrum, opposition parties in Botswana criticise the terms of Chinese loans to the government for a housing construction project using Chinese firms.⁵² In Zimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic Change sees the government's close ties with China as a tantamount to an alliance with their oppressor. And, as was seen in Zambia, opposition politicians use the growing discontent with China's role in the economy and even the very presence of Chinese in the country as a gambit for winning support. This perhaps exemplified by the xenophobic remarks of the deputy leader of Zambia's main opposition party, Guy Scott, who declares, 'The Chinese are no longer welcome. They are seen as cheats and our government as crooks for allowing them to get away with it.'⁵³

For China, the ability and desirability of holding to its stance of 'non intervention' in African affairs is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as its own embedded interests are subject to domestic influences and challenges by Africans from all sectors. The realisation of the ambitions which drove China to engage Africa now preclude it from maintaining that position where it is, by dint of political associations or business activities, part of the domestic environment and therefore subject to local politics. Managing this emerging and troubling dynamic is one of the key challenges facing the Chinese as they seek to consolidate ties with Africa.

⁵² 'MPs Divided over Chinese Loan', *Mmegi/The Reporter* (Gaberone) 14 July 2006.

⁵³ *The Times* (London), 2 February 2007.

**China-Europe-Africa Cooperation
Challenges and prospects for development and good governance**

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1. According to Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”. This injunction has been echoed in the Millennium Declaration of the UN which embodies an unprecedented consensus in outlining a common vision of peace and security, development and poverty eradication, securing human rights and promoting democracy and good governance. This vision finds expression in the MDGs to which both China and the EU are strongly committed. It is thus not surprising that governance has become integrally linked to development both as a normative construct and a policy imperative, yet remains problematic in the African context. Importantly governance is about processes and not simply about ends; if anything it provides an essential impetus for development. As such, good governance is, among other things participatory, transparent and accountable, effective and equitable and above all, it promotes the rule of law. The African continent has had a long and bitter experience with the pathologies and effects of bad and undemocratic governance and it is this history which highlights the importance of China and the EU’s engagement with Africa. I propose to briefly examine the main contours of Chinese and European approaches to Africa, emphasising their governance and development dimensions.

2. The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000 and has become the main institutional vehicle for shaping and managing China’s cooperation framework across a range of technical, economic, social and political platforms. The Forum’s work has been significantly enhanced by the publication of China’s White Paper on Africa in January 2006. Together with the FOCAC process, the White Paper embeds Chinese discourse about mutual economic benefit, development assistance, political dialogue and international cooperation. As the White Paper makes clear China respects African countries’ independent choices and paths of development; as such, China has been unequivocal about upholding the principle of non-interference and this is an area where it has come in for close scrutiny and often, in my view, unwarranted criticism. China has provided and increased development assistance with no political conditions or requirements attached, except adherence to the ‘one China’ principle. (China has diplomatic relations with every African country, except four.) Thus 48 African countries have participated in FOCAC frameworks and processes of cooperation, with ministerial meetings taking place every three years. The second ministerial meeting took place in Addis Ababa in 2003, where 44 African countries were represented. This meeting resulted in the Addis Action Plan, which proposed 16 areas around which cooperation could be structured. It was at this meeting that Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would cancel the debt of 31 countries, totalling US\$1,3 billion. He also promised support for the AU’s socio-economic blueprint, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), and increased Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations. By May 2007, there were

1800 Chinese peacekeepers, observers and civilian police participating in seven UN missions.

3. The work of the first two FOCAC meetings was folded into a new strategic partnership at the November 2006 FOCAC summit in Beijing, attended by 43 African heads of state and 48 delegations. At the summit, China again made far-reaching commitments, which include:
 - sending 100 agricultural experts to Africa;
 - setting up a development fund of US\$5 billion to encourage Chinese firms to invest in Africa;
 - further cancelling interest-free loans that were due by the end of 2005 for African countries classified as either highly indebted or least developed;
 - providing US\$3 billion in preferential loans, a further US\$2 billion in preferential buyer's credits to Africa over the next three years;
 - undertaking to establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa; and
 - providing enhanced market access on the basis of zero tariffs for Africa's LDCs through an increase from 190 to 440 export products.

China's Export-Import Bank (Exim) plays an important role in the practical implementation of FOCAC's financing for development commitments. The bank is China's official credit agency, and assists with financing infrastructure required for extracting and transporting energy and mineral resources. By the end of 2005, the Exim Bank approved US\$6,5 billion for 260 projects in 36 countries. Concessional and low-interest loans for infrastructure development amounted to US\$12,5 billion and more than 80 per cent of these loans are concentrated in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Projects in electricity generation account for 40 per cent of the loans, followed by multi-sector commitments (24 per cent), transport (20 per cent), telecommunications (12 per cent) and water projects (4 per cent). Projects at various stages of development include hydroelectric dams in Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan and Zambia; railway lines in Angola and Sudan; copper mines in the DRC and Zambia; timber in Liberia and Sierra Leone; and platinum mines in Zimbabwe.

4. Trade, investment and improved physical and communications infrastructure are parts of the strategic calculus that defines Sino-African relations. Social development also forms an integral part. From the first medical team sent to Algeria in 1963 until the end of 2005 more than 15000 Chinese medical personnel have been active in 47 countries and over 10000 agro-technicians have been sent to work on some 200 agricultural projects. In 2006, more than 1000 Chinese doctors and nurses were working in 36 countries. The Chinese National Overseas Engineering Corporation has built two pharmaceutical plants in Africa for the sole purpose of manufacturing artemisinin (a synthetic derivative of the Artemisia shrub), which is very effective in the treatment of malaria. At the Beijing summit, Hu Jintao also announced support for building 30 new hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres, and an additional US\$38 million was made available for the provision of artemisinin over the next three years. By 2009, government scholarships for African students to study in China will be doubled from their present 2000, and 15000 African professionals will be trained in

technical, scientific and administrative fields from 2007 to 2009. And similar to the US Peace Corps, under the Chinese Young Volunteers Serving in Africa Programme, China will send 300 Chinese youth to support education, sports, agriculture, and health projects.

5. The strategic compass and logic that guides China's relations with Africa can thus be summarised as follows:
- China's attempt to develop a strategic partnership with Africa is consistent with Beijing's global foreign policy and its vision for a different kind of world order. As such, China's core national interests and its own imperatives for growth and development will increasingly bind it to Africa: it needs resources for its growth and modernisation, it needs markets to sustain its burgeoning economy and it needs political alliances to support its global ambitions.
 - The Chinese leadership and officials believe that China's historical experience and its development model are instructive and useful for Africa and that these resonate powerfully among African governments and societies. This gives it a comparative advantage that the West does not enjoy. Over the course of its turbulent history, China has experienced colonial domination and encroachment of more than a century; and it knows the effects of internal chaos and economic hardship. Africa finds common ground with China because, in Beijing's view, the Western development experience has been too remote and patronising, offering few transferable lessons; if anything, the legacy of Western involvement in Africa has had disastrous consequences for its growth and development.
 - China's history of solidarity, sincerity, friendship and assistance to Africa remain overarching values that continue to define its engagement. This goes back to the Bandung conference in 1955. China supports principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries in contrast to what it sees as the 'hegemonism' of the West.
 - For the most part, China believes that Africa is on the threshold of a development takeoff. This gives China an opportunity to make a positive contribution and play a constructive role in assisting the continent with addressing its multiple challenges. In contrast to the deficit model of the West, which views Africa mostly in terms of poor governance, conflict, underdevelopment and poverty, China sees rich diversity in culture and religion, social dynamism and popular energy, vast development synergies and great opportunities for trade and economic cooperation.
 - China prefers the bilateral state-centred approach as the primary avenue of its engagement with Africa, for developing its core strengths and for defining common interests. The Beijing Action Plan of 2006 is a result of several years of political dialogue, careful planning, and high-level reciprocal visits by heads of state and senior government officials. China's Africa policy is thus not complicated or encumbered by private domestic constituencies and interest groups. In its economic and business activities and transactions, China's engagement is led by state-owned or state-influenced companies. The relative weakness of its civil society and organised independent business give Chinese leadership and diplomats a relatively free hand in shaping and implementing their policies on Africa.

- China views engagement with third parties on Africa as serving its interests but will do so on its own terms, and then only incrementally and cautiously. It is open to dialogue with the US, the EU, the G-8 and other developed countries on its approach to Africa. China is mindful that Western expertise, experience and knowledge in Africa could be useful, especially in how to relate to regional organisations, civil society and business. However, China remains very sensitive to Western criticism of its conduct in Africa.
6. Coming to the EU, it adopted an Africa Strategy in 2005 as a single, comprehensive framework based on several principles: partnership, ownership, subsidiarity, solidarity and political dialogue. The strategy is informed by three essential premises: firstly, sustainable development is not possible without good governance, the rule of law, and peace and security; secondly, regional integration, trade and development are necessary to promote economic growth; and thirdly, more support is needed in improving living standards in Africa, especially with regard to health, education and food security. The strategy marks a significant shift in the EU's Africa paradigm since it stresses a move away from the paternalism of the past to a political partnership with Africa. This will take the form of engaging new African institutions on the basis of equality and forging a strategic partnership with Africa in international relations. As a Commission paper puts it: "The EU side will build on the emergence of the AU as the central political player in Africa and increasingly treat Africa as one." The strategy seeks to further expand the relationship at various national, regional and continental levels on the basis of subsidiarity. On the issue of ownership, the EU strategy underlines that good governance, respect for human rights and democracy are concepts embraced by the AU and Nepad and hence, deserve the full support of the EU. The EU will, therefore, consistently and collectively support African approaches and country-owned policies, through budget support, targeted development assistance and mutually beneficial trade relations. The EU remains Africa's primary economic and trading partner: in 2005, exports to Africa amounted to Euro 91,6 billion and imports from Africa reached Euro 125,6 billion. In 2006, the EU's collective donor aid amounted to Euro 48 billion.
7. At the EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon in December 2007, the substance and principles of the EU Strategy were translated into a Joint Strategy and an Action Plan in which several key policy initiatives were defined:
- Peace and security: A central goal is to support better management of Africa's conflict cycle and to help with improving Africa's peace and security architecture. An African Peace Facility of Euro 250 million has been established with a further Euro 300 million committed for October, 2008. The purpose is to provide sustainable, predictable and flexible EU funding for Africa-led peace support operations. There is also an undertaking to help strengthen the AU's 15 member Peace and Security Council which was set up in 2004.
 - Energy: An Africa-EU partnership will seek to share knowledge and experience, develop common policy responses and approaches that address energy challenges. This includes security and diversification of energy supply, promoting access to clean, affordable and efficient energy services, stimulating energy markets, and increasing financial and human resources to

- secure sustainable energy development. The EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership will be augmented through access to the ACP Energy Facility of Euro 220 million.
- Climate change: Africa remains vulnerable in terms of food security, sustainable water supply and extreme weather phenomena such as floods and droughts. African leaders have already committed themselves to integrating climate change into national and regional development policies and activities on the basis of the Addis Ababa Declaration on Climate Change and Development adopted in January 2007. The African-EU interface will strengthen cooperation in disaster risk management and reduction, halting deforestation, promoting the participation of African countries in the global carbon market and monitoring the environmental effects of climate change.
 - Migration and employment: The aim is to develop and facilitate legal migration, and to address illegal migration and human trafficking. The EU will support a network of Africa-based monitoring mechanisms that will collect, analyse and disseminate information on migration flows within Africa and between Africa and the EU. Importantly, attention will be paid to the migration of skilled human capital. It is estimated that 80000 highly qualified people leave Africa every year, including 23000 executives and professionals. Critically, there is also the need to stimulate job creation in the formal economy, especially for women and youth.
 - Democratic governance: Besides ongoing support for the new AU governance architecture, it is proposed that a Governance Forum be launched which will involve governments, civil society, national and continental parliaments, local authorities and regional organisations. The forum will promote enhanced dialogue on issues such as the rule of law, human rights, natural resources management, corruption, transparency and accountability in public finance, and institutional reform.
8. In examining the governance and development contours of China in Africa and the EU in Africa, there are overlapping and complementary policy areas which can usefully be summarised in terms of joint challenges that frame their respective approaches. The European Commission's 2006 China Strategy Paper is also a useful template for focusing on shared responsibilities in Africa and locating the continent in their multilateral and global governance concerns. There are four areas that can be readily identified and which invite closer cooperation between China and the EU in Africa: firstly, investing in people and supporting the MDGs in order to address poverty and improve standards of education and health; secondly, investing in infrastructure, especially energy and transport, telecommunications, roads, and housing; thirdly, there is a need for policy harmonisation on food security and agriculture, natural resources management, labour standards, environment and climate change; and fourthly, there must be improved dialogue on the coordination of development aid and assistance with regard to levels, effectiveness and debt management. Governance, which is a core value for the EU, will remain problematic as long as China insists on adherence to the non-interference principle and justifiably views Western approaches to governance in Africa as sanctimonious, arrogant and patronising. Similarly, the trade and investment regimes are markedly different and the EU faces the difficult prospect of its EPA agreements meeting with strong resistance since Africa has a

wider a la carte menu to choose from, with better opportunities and less onerous conditions.

9. The importance of ongoing and institutionalised dialogue between China and the EU on Africa cannot be over-emphasized. As a Commission document makes clear: “The EU’s fundamental approach to China must remain one of engagement and partnership. But with a closer strategic partnership, mutual responsibilities increase... The goal should be a situation where China and the EU can bring their respective strengths to bear to offer joint solutions to global problems.” The context of EU-China cooperation in Africa with regard to governance and development will continue to be challenged by political differences on this score. This is compounded by a general misreading and ignorance in the West about China’s fundamental interests in Africa and criticism of a perceived lack of transparency in its bilateral engagements, especially in providing loans and financial support to regimes which are seen as autocratic or which abuse human rights. Key to the future of their Africa engagement will be firstly, how the EU and China reconcile aspects of their development paradigms to support the four areas referred to above. Secondly, in the face of the strategic imperative to maintain its trade and economic relations with Africa, especially as far as resources are concerned, China will have to avoid outright confrontation or conflicts of interest with the EU and the United States, amid pressures from these quarters to change its approach. For Africa, finally, a major challenge will be to manage the centrifugal effects of multiple external interests and partnerships such that it becomes more of a unitary actor in international relations and ceases to be the object of great power agendas.

**Good Governance vs. Effective Governance:
The European and Chinese Engagement with Africa**

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I. Introduction

After the Second World War, Western European countries have long been engaging with Africa, for reasons of colonial past, economic benefits and political interests, etc. The EU and its member states have been investing substantially on the economic development and political governance in Africa. China also had long experience of engaging with Africa, but the present Chinese activities show the nuance of engagement. The new Chinese approach to Africa is very different from the existing European one, and triggers controversies in the Sino-European relationship.

This paper examines the Chinese and European approaches to Africa, with a particular consideration of Sino-European relations taken into account. Firstly, the paper begins with an analysis on dual identity of the contemporary China, which has direct impacts on its policy towards African countries. Secondly, I will discuss the European and Chinese approaches to Africa that, to a certain extent, contrast to each other. The European one is labeled as “soft imperialism” (a term used by the Swedish scholar Bjorn Hettne) and the Chinese one as “pragmatism”. Thirdly, it follows with a discussion on why China has increased greatly of its political and economic activities in Africa. Fourthly, the paper examines why China is attractive in Africa. Fifthly, the chapter goes on to discuss the contradictions between the Chinese and European approaches to Africa, and why Europe is increasingly concerned about the new Chinese engagement in Africa. In conclusion, the paper argues that while it seems to be that there are substantial differences between the Chinese and European approaches, they are nonetheless not irresolvable. The European approach emphasizes good governance in Africa and seeks to build a better framework for governance on the continent, while the Chinese one stresses on effective governance and tries to build an improved economic basis for political governance in Africa. In my mind, both of them are needed for Africa, and both approaches should not be in so sharp contradictions with each other as it seems to be now on the surface. In order to be so, more dialogs between China and Europe are needed on various levels, and policy and activity coordination of various kinds are necessary.

II. China’s self identity and role perception

In this section, a dual identity of the present China is seen as officially constructed. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership and its intellectual followers conceive the country as a developing country in the globalization era; and on the other, they also perceive that the country is a potential world power on the international arena.

China as a developing country in the globalization era, one side of the dual identity highlights the weaknesses China endows, the resulting necessity and urgency of economic development and the common interests China shares with many other developing countries.

Identifying the country as a developing country endowed with weaknesses, Chinese leadership has repeatedly indicated that economic development and modernization are the highest priority for China. Deng Xiaoping, the initiator of China's economic reforms after the Cultural Revolution, proposed his argument of "development as the hard fact" (*fazhan shi yingdaoli*) and claimed that virtually all the problems China faced in contemporary time would be solved with economic development.¹

While stressing the centrality of economic development at home out of its identity as a developing country, the Chinese leadership has also been emphasizing the common interests it shares with many developing countries in opposing Western criticisms on human rights, environmental and various other problems of these countries, exemplified, for instance, by objection to Western (especially the US) proposals of criticizing the human rights records of China in the annual UN Conference on Human Rights. With the backing of many developing countries (including African ones) on China, these proposals have never been passed in the conferences.

The other side of the dual identity is China as a potential world power. Chinese leaders' frequent assertion on China as the largest developing country most frequently goes together with the admittance to the US as the largest developed country to emphasize China as an influential player on the international arena. Among other attributes that emphasize China's increasing international influences are the country as a standing member of the UN Security Council, the most populous country of the globe, and a nuclear power. While the Chinese leadership has never openly claimed that China is a world power, China's strong appeal for creating a multipolar world order in which China itself would constitute one pole, the country's determination to oppose decisively hegemonism, and especially its mission to become a "medium developed" country² by the mid 21st century, all suggest a vision among the Chinese elites to make the country world power in the future.

In the end of 2003, the present Chinese leadership proposed the national strategies of "peaceful rise" (*hepingjueqi*) and "scientific development" (*kexuefazhan*). While the former indicates the determination of the Chinese leadership to secure the self-identity of a potential responsible world power and the consequent necessity of rising peacefully and responsibly, the latter reveals a clear understanding of Chinese leaders in the country's weaknesses and the need of development in a correct, sustainable or "scientific" way.

III. European soft imperialism and Chinese pragmatism

As Bjorn Hettne argues, in European foreign policy, the type of power exercised by the EU is of the "soft" rather than the "hard" type, and is based on economic instruments, dialog and diplomacy, but even this kind of power can be used in different ways. A distinction that he made is between "civilian power" and "soft imperialism"³: the former implies (soft) power without the hard option, the latter refers to soft power applied in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialog or

¹ See Li Baojun, "Dangdai zhongguo waijiao gailun" (Outline of Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy), Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (People's University of China Press), 2001, p. 146-147.

² Considering its sheer size and large population, it would mean that China would be among the largest economies in the world.

³ Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter 2005, p. 539.

even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of a genuine dialog.⁴

Both civilian power and soft imperialism are helpful in explaining EU inter-regional relations towards Africa, Latin America and Asia. In the case of ASEM, there is a pragmatic approach based on civilian power consisting of a reasonably symmetric dialog among "equals" in combination with a cautious stress on norms and good governance, at least in the case of Myanmar. This sharply contrasts with the EU-African relations that are more asymmetrical, dominated by the strong part (Europe) and built on conditionalities and imposition of norms for material self-interests. Thus, civilian power may have the most relevance in the case of ASEM and soft imperialism describes EU foreign policy relationships towards Africa, while EU-Latin American (such as Mercosur) relations lie in between. As some European politicians and analysts argue, the European approach to Africa emphasizes to make Europe as model for Africa, regardless the local conditions of the latter. While doing this the Europeans do not even want to understand Africa, and just make Africa as "Black Europe".⁵

China has long historical links with African countries, dating back to the era of independence of African states in the 1950s and 1960s. This kind of links emphasized, among other factors, the solidarity of the developing world. Later on, China has strived hard to secure African countries' diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan. During the late Cold War era, China built infrastructure for African nations, and helped them in other aspects. The more recent Chinese engagement, or new engagement of China with Africa, nonetheless, concentrates more on resource extraction for fueling the growing Chinese economy, together with infrastructure building and other trade and investment activities.

III. Motivations of the Chinese new engagement with Africa

From the messages of Chinese President and Premier to the Africans, we can observe two important factors behind Chinese policy towards Africa: on the one hand, although China itself is a poor country with low level of economic development, China is willing to help African countries; on the other, the assistance that China provides to Africa is without conditionality, and for no selfish motivation.

The official statement aside, the new Chinese engagement does have a number of motivations that are driven by Chinese national interests. First of all, to gain access to African raw materials, especially oil and natural gas, is certainly the most important reasons for the recent Chinese interests in Africa. With continuous high economic growth, China is increasingly facing the problem of energy shortage. Since 1993, China has become net importer of oil, and by 2003, China has been the second largest energy consuming country in the world, only after the United States. China accounts for 31% of global growth in demand for oil.⁶ Diversifying and increasing its energy

⁴ M. Telo, "Inter-regionalism as a Distinctive Feature of the Civilian Power of EU's Foreign Policy", a paper presented at SGIR Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, 9-11 September, 2004.

⁵ Personal discussion with Christoph Moosbauer, advisory board member of the Committee for A Democratic UN, and former member of German Parliament, May 18, 2007.

⁶ The country is also the second largest importer of copper, and a major importer of nickel, zinc, iron ore and platinum. Some analysts argue, "an unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy". See Sweig D. & B. Jianhai, "China's Global Hunt for Energy", *Foreign Affairs*, 84 (%), September/October 2005, p. 25.

and other raw materials importing sources is one of the priorities for the sustained economic growth of the country, which, in turn, would have profound impacts on the domestic well-being and social stability. Secondly, being a developing country, one side of the Chinese self constructed dual identity, China does share a host of common interests with African countries. The close links and common interests between China and Africa have been formed ever since the independent movement of African countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Thirdly, to secure the other side of the Chinese dual identity (a potential world power), China needs assistance and support from Africa in a number of international institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially when considering the large number of countries on the African continent. Last but not the least, Africa is also significant for the Chinese efforts on limiting the “international space” of Taiwan. If there *are* conditionalities behind the Chinese aid to Africa, dropping off diplomatic recognition to Taiwan is probably the only one.

IV. Attractiveness of the Chinese approach to Africa

In comparison with Europe, the Chinese attractiveness to Africa comes from following factors.

Firstly, China sets no conditionality for its aid to African countries, no matter what the political situation is there, except for the requirement that recipient countries do not recognize Taiwan diplomatically. Most African elites welcome China’s strong willingness of avoiding the conditions for human rights, better governance and so on. The ambassador of Sierra Leone to China, referring to the Chinese rebuilding of a stadium in the country, once commented that “There are no benchmark and preconditions, no environmental impact assessment. If a G8 country had offered to rebuild the stadium, we’d still be having meetings around it”.⁷

Secondly, being a developing country itself, China often emphasizes the third world solidarity, which has been well-received in Africa.

Last but not the least, the Chinese engagement in Africa gives new sources of income and assistance to African countries, which provides an alternative to Western aid. Africa has benefited from the dramatic rise in prices for its natural resource exports, not only oil, but copper, zinc, platinum and other minerals are at record or near record high, largely due to the heavy demand from China and other fast growing Asian countries.

V. Good governance vs. effective governance

Two years back, a paper from *Survival* depicted China’s new engagement in Africa and warned that it had gone “little noticed in the West”.⁸ Since then, however, there have been increasing research and policy analysis on the subject in the West, and Europe in particular.

Are China’s increasing activities a major challenge to European countries that has long been engaging in the continent? How competitive is the Chinese and European engagement in Africa?

⁷ Hilsum L., “China in Africa”, *New Statement*, 4 July 2005.

⁸ Chris Alden, “China in Africa”, *Survival*, Vol. 37 (Issue 3), 2005.

Here we need to distinguish between “good governance” and “effective governance”. The former is a value-based approach, and sometimes idealized, more in the case of modeling the democratic governance of Western democracies into all other countries. The foreign aid policies of Europe to Africa, to a large extent, reflect such a trend.

The latter (effective governance) is an end-oriented approach. The Chinese engagement in Africa is a case here.

My view on the differences between effective governance and good governance is as follows. Effective governance denotes, in principle, the functioning of an efficient governing system. Good governance, in conventional sense, is always connected to Western rules and norms, and associated with Western democratic political system, which, in the Western context, *is* effective. Commenting on that, a former member of German parliament once said that the Europeans wanted to make the Africans as black Europeans. Effective governance, on the other hand, does not have a democratic system as a precondition. It is not value laden, but has a pragmatic orientation. The most important requisites for effective governance are to ensure political stability and a suitable environment for economic development. The governing system of Singapore is an example here.

Then, what are the main reasons behind which China wants to promote effective governance in Africa? I argue the three points below: firstly, you cannot expect China to promote the Western value-based good governance practices in Africa, because China itself does not subscribe to it domestically. Secondly, without effective governance, a certain degree of anarchic or chaotic society might follow, which would certainly be harmful to Chinese business and other activities in Africa. Lastly, one of the prerequisites for a sound investment environment is an efficient governing system. When addressing the issue of Afro-Asian cooperative partnership, Zhou Xiaochuan, head of China’s Central Bank, in the press conference after the Annual Conference of African Development Bank, in May 2007, proposed three key aspects for promoting the partnership, and one of them is to improve investment environment that requires “enhancing governmental management”.

In foreign aid, China prefers much the language of mutually beneficial economic cooperation to that of “aid” or development assistance. When China does pronounce about development cooperation, it avoids the language of donor and recipient. Instead, the discourse has a strong emphasis on solidarity, deriving from a claim about China and Africa’s shared “developing country” status, and it is weathered by several decades of working together.

From the perspectives of the African aid-recipient countries, this framing of language is felt comfortable, since it probably gives an alternative for African countries, than the mere Western donation.

While taking care of its legitimate national interests needs, China does care about African peace and stability, and how unstable countries could cause harm to them. At issue here is that while we all agree that poor performance in both economic and governmental aspects lead to the problems in Africa. The Chinese approach to Africa shows that China believes that the problem of Africa is more the lack of development

than the lack of better governance. Chinese workers build infrastructure for many African countries and help African countries to develop their own manufacturing capacity.

China believes that with development more effective governance might follow.

VI. Conclusion

As analyzed earlier, it seems to be that there are substantial differences between the Chinese and European approaches to Africa, they are nonetheless not irresolvable. The European approach emphasizes good governance in Africa and seeks to build a better framework for governance on the continent, while the Chinese one stresses on effective governance and tries to build an improved economic basis for political governance in Africa. In my mind, both of them are needed for Africa, and both approaches should not be in so sharp contradictions with each other as it seems to be now on the surface. In order to be so, more dialogs between China and Europe are needed on various levels, and policy and activity coordination of various kinds are necessary. China is still very inexperienced with its new engagement in Africa. Learning from Europe of its success and failure in engaging Africa would be a great benefit for China, and an incentive that the country might consider as valuable.

Like many other countries, Chinese foreign policy can be defined as centering on satisfying national interests. In this case, China needs to have a balance between its issue-related national interests, such as energy needs, and relational national interests like its important relations with African and Western countries. The latter requires that China, in formulating and enforcing its African policy, accommodates, to a large extent, Western and African interests. In its activities in African countries, China should have a thorough understanding on how African countries are different from each other, and dealing with them case by case. Towards the Europeans, China's increasing influences in Africa and European concerns about Chinese engagement with resource rich African "failed states" can be used as leverages to persuade European countries to collaborate with China as energy consumers, a consumers' cartel of petroleum could be an option.

To enhance dialogs and coordination, on the one hand, there should be a realization from both sides that the Chinese and European engagement in Africa is and should not be a zero-sum game for each other. On the other, coordination between the two sides could start with more simple things, for instance, to decrease the duplications in the Chinese and European infrastructure projects in Africa, and then move on to more difficult ones such as building donor association or the like.

China's Next Security Strategy for Africa Options for the EU

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1. Introduction

The further China forays into the resource abundant African continent, the more it bumps into various security challenges. It is obvious that the People's Republic is set to become Africa's most prominent economic partner. It is also unmistakable that it swiftly gains diplomatic leverage. What is less clear, however, is how it will respond to the perils that lay ahead. Throughout history, most external powers for which Africa's mineral wealth became an indispensable factor in their industrial growth, backed up their economic ventures with the projection of military power, whether this aimed at the suppression of resistance in their dominions or fending off their realms from imperialist competitors.

The dispatching of troops in Africa stemmed from the willingness to reduce vulnerability and to do so while not having to rely on others.¹ Now that China has arrived at a stage of economic development that digests torrents of African raw materials and starts to develop the capacity to put boots on the ground in all parts of the globe, the extrapolation of history predicts that distrust and uncertainty will inevitably lead the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in large numbers to Africa. Departing from the realist paradigm of self-help, China is expected to deal with security challenges in an autonomous way and while doing this to keep other powers at bay. This paper starts with an overview of recent security challenges and of how China has been adapting its security policy until now. Subsequently it is discussed what China's options are for the future and what this implies for the EU.

2. Security challenges

There are several sources of uncertainty that harass China's aspirations in Africa. To start with, Chinese mining activities more often fall prey to endemic instability and violence in economic partner states. Since 2004, several Chinese companies ended up in the frontline of internal conflicts. In 2004, rebels abducted Chinese workers that were dispatched in Southern Sudan². In April 2006, a separatist movement detonated a car bomb in the South of Nigeria and warned that investors from China would be "treated as thieves" and could expect new attacks on oil workers, storage facilities, bridges, offices and other oil industry targets. A spokesperson for the militant Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) condemned China for

¹ Taylor, Ian and Paul Williams eds. (2004), *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*, Routledge, London; Gregory, S. (2000), *The French Military in Africa: Past and Present*, *African Affairs*, vol. 99 (14), pp. 435-448; Balmond, Louis ed. (1998), *Les Interventions Militaires Francoises en Afrique*, Pedone, Paris.

² Two Chinese Abducted by Rebels in Sudan, *China Daily*, 17 March 2004.

taking a 2.2 billion USD stake in oil field in delta.³ In July that year, violent protests erupted at the Chinese-owned Chambisi copper mine in Zambia, leading to five deadly casualties and severe material damage. In November, Sudanese rebels launched three short attacks on Chinese oil facilities and briefly seized the Abu Jabra oil field close to Darfur.⁴ In January 2007, five Chinese telecom workers were kidnapped by Nigerian gunmen in the oil city Port Harcourt in Southern Nigeria. Two weeks afterwards, another nine Chinese oil workers went missing after being attacked by an armed group in Bayelsa state, Nigeria.⁵ A month later, four assailants raided a Chinese stone materials plant in Kenya and killed one Chinese employee.⁶ In April, nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopian oil engineers were killed during an assault on an oil exploration site operated by SINOPEC's Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnic Somali group, also kidnapped seven Chinese who it released later. The ONLF has repeatedly warned foreign oil companies to leave the region bordering Somalia. In 2008, the Chinese government organized the evacuation of 212 compatriots from Chad to Cameroon after clashes in the capital N'Djamena. In the seas around Africa another risk looms. Chinese trawlers were poached repeatedly when they approached the Horn of Africa. Between 2000 and 2006, seven incidents were reported with Somalian pirates.

Violence also threatened economic interests indirectly. Mindful of Deng Xiaoping's proverb, safeguarding world peace to ensure domestic development, Beijing spends increasing efforts to brand itself as a responsible actor at the international scene.⁷ "The multi-field, multi-level and multi-channel co-operation within the international community has become the realistic choice," Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing wrote in 2005, "the vigorous pursuit of peace, development and co-operation by the people of all countries has formed a tide of history [...] China's diplomacy has made bold headway, serving domestic development and contributing to world peace and common development."⁸ Mayhem in the Sudanese Province of Darfur threw doubt on these premises.⁹ Not only became China criticized for supporting Khartoum committing war crimes. Darfur also placed Beijing for a dilemma between two diverging aspects of its new diplomatic standards. On the one hand, the traditional emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference, principles that proved to be lucrative to carve out economic deals in Sudan and elsewhere in Africa.¹⁰ On the other hand,

³ Timberg, Craig (2006), Militants Warn China Over Oil in Niger Delta, *Washington Post*, 30 April 2006.

⁴ Sudan Rebels Attack Kordofan Oilfield, *Sudan Tribune*, 27 November 2006.

⁵ Espinola, Martin (2007), Nigerian Militants Attack Oil, Gas Industries, *Reuters*, 25 January 2007.

⁶ Qiang, Guo (2007), Chinese Engineer Killed in Kenya Attack, *China Daily*, 2 February 2007.

⁷ On the transition of China's diplomatic identity, see: Foot, Rosemary (2001), Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State, *The China Journal*, vol. 45 (1), pp. 1-21; Medeiros, S. and Fravel, Taylor (2003), China's New Diplomacy, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December, pp.21-35; Zhao, Kejin (2005), *Hard Diplomacy, Soft Landing: On the Formation and Consequences of the New Thought of China's Diplomacy*, International Review, Fifth Edition; Su, Changh (2005) Discovering China's New Diplomacy: Multilateral International Institutions and New Thought of China's Diplomacy, *World Economics and Politics*, vol.4 (2).

⁸ Li, Zhaoxing (2005), Banner of Diplomacy Stressed, *People's Daily*, 23 August 2005.

⁹ Holslag, Jonathan (2007), China's Diplomatic Victory in Darfur, *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 17 (54).

¹⁰ On the application of non-interference as economic lever, see: Holslag, Jonathan (2006), China's New Mercantilism in Central Africa, *African and Asian Studies*, pp; 133-171.

constructive engagement as described by Minister Li, necessary to maintain good relations with other countries and to play a role in multilateral organizations. In Sudan China's traditional diplomacy of non interference collided with the expectation of other African states to contribute to the stabilization of Darfur. Domestic violence reduces China's diplomatic maneuverability and its ability to maintain the posture of non-interference that facilitated business with many states.

China's position became even more awkward when violence in Sudan started to make a way into Chad. After the establishment of diplomatic ties with Chad in 2006 and the consequent oil deals with this country, the government in N'Djamena made Beijing clear that the infiltration of rebels from Darfur in its own territory should stop. During his visit to Beijing in April 2007, the Chadian Minister of Foreign Affairs urged the People's Republic to pressurize Khartoum to end its support to Chadian armed opposition. After the siege on N'Djamena at the beginning of 2008, Chad's Envoy to the UN stated that "China was a friendly country to both the Sudan and Chad" and expressed his hope that "China would bring to bear more pressure on the Sudan to stop the process of destabilization in Chad. After all, the Sudan was trying to overthrow the legitimate Government of Chad, in order to settle the conflict in Darfur. It was, therefore, in the interest of China to pressure the Sudanese."¹¹ "When Li Zhaoxing visited the Central African Republic, President Francois Bozize joined Chad's appeal for exerting more pressure on Sudan. In April 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked by the Ethiopian government to take a more active stance on the mayhem in Somalia, implying that China would fiat the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia to drive out the Union of Islamic Courts.

Finally, China is concerned about the increasing military presence of other powers.¹² The US increased the number of its troops in Africa from 220 in 2000 to nearly 1,000 in 2006. The establishment of a new Africa Command (AFRICOM), announced when the Chinese President Hu Jintao was completing a tour in the region in 2006, raised eyebrows in Beijing. Although the Chinese government did not officially comment, state-controlled media reported that the American initiative stood for "Cold War balancing" and that this move "was rejected by African countries".¹³ An official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted the establishment of AFRICOM mainly as a part of the war against terrorism, but also recognized that "for the Americans military diplomacy is a way to counterbalance China and to maintain a strategic

¹¹ Press Conference by Chad's Foreign Minister, Department of Public Information, UN, New York, 26 February 2008.

¹² Campbell, Horace (2008), China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 29 (1), pp. 89-106; Jiang, Chunliang (2000), 21 shiji shijie shiyou jingzheng yu Zhongguo shiyou anquan [21st Century World Oil Competition and China's Oil Security] in *21 shiji Zhongguo shiyou fazhan zhanlue* [21st Century China's Oil Development Strategy], Shiyou gongye chubanshe, Beijing, p. 30-43; Kang, Sheng (2006), American Factor and Chinese Petroleum Security and Diplomacy in Africa [Meiguo Yinsu yu Zhongguo zai Feizhou de Shiyou Anquan he Waijiao], *Lilun Daokan* [Journal of Socialist Theory Guide], April 2006; Wang, Jinchun (2003), Geopolitical Analysis on USA's Oil Strategy towards Africa, *Keji Qingbao Kaifa yu Jingji* [Development and Economy], September 2003.

¹³ See for instance: African States Reject Military Command Centre, *China Daily*, 27 June 2007; and North Africa Reluctant to Host US Command, *Xinhua*, 24 June 2007.

edge”.¹⁴ Lin Zhiyuan, the deputy director of the Academy of Military Sciences went further. “AFRICOM will surely facilitate coordinating or overseeing US military actions in Africa for an effective control of the whole of Africa,” he wrote, “the US has enhanced its military infiltration in Africa in recent years, with its military aid to the continent doubling and its weaponry sale skyrocketing continuously.”¹⁵ Chinese officials also tend to believe that in case of Sudan and Zimbabwe Washington is not so much concerned about human rights, but uses this argument to constrain China and eventually to effectuate a regime state at the expense of China’s influence.¹⁶

India as well is expanding its military prowess. Along the East African Coast it inked defence agreements with countries like Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique. It initiated joint training programmes with Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa. In particular its naval dominance in the strategic maritime shipping lanes around Africa make Chinese security analysts worry about safety of supply. Delhi convinced island states like Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles to cooperate on maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. Its fleet in the Indian Ocean is turning into one of the most capable naval forces in the region, including new advanced aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and other surface combatants.¹⁷ The vulnerability of China’s shipping lines to Africa has worried several Chinese scholars. “As one of the emerging powers in the world, India now is catching up with their involvement in Africa,” a Chinese expert asserts, “The maritime build-up of India along the African shores is one of these endeavours taken by India. The purposes are multifolded: economically for market and resources, politically for international influence and support for possible permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and may also involve competing with China for influence in Africa.”¹⁸ Another scholar, Zhang Yuncheng, claims that “if some accident occurs or if the strait is blocked by foreign powers, China will experience a tremendous energy security problem.” This assessment is also shared by Zhu Fenggang, who points at the possibility of sea denial as a coercive measure against China.

Instability and geopolitical rivalry loom large over China’s future supply of natural resources. Most of its energy deposits are located in the swamp of violence that surrounds Sudan or in the Gulf of Guinea where the United States continues to strengthen its influence. In the East, India is just starting to convert the Indian Ocean into an Indian lake. The immediate need is to protect Chinese citizens and companies

¹⁴ Interview: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 7 December 2007.

¹⁵ Lin, Zhiyuan (2007), U.S. moves to step up military infiltration in Africa, *People’s Daily*, 26 February 2007.

¹⁶ Peng Jianli and Luo Huijun (2002), *Dangqian Fazhanzhong Guojia dui Meiguo Renquan Waijiao Ying Caiqu de Duice* [On the Countermeasures the Developing Countries Should Take Against America’s Human Rights Diplomacy], *Human Shifan Daxue Shehui Kexue Xuebao* [Journal of Hunan Normal University], April 2002; Holslag, Jonathan (2008) China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvring on the Darfur Question, *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 17 (54).

¹⁷ Holslag, Jonathan (2008), *China, India and the Military Security Dilemma*, BICCS Asia Paper, vol. 3 (5), pp. 13-25; Zhang, Wenmu (2004), *Jingji quanqiu hua yu Zhongguo haiquan* [Economic Globalization and China’s Seapower], *Zhanlue yu guanli* [Strategy and Management], n° 1, p. 90-96; Zhang Jie (2005), *Zhongguo Nengyuan Anquan de Maliujia Yinsu* [The Malacca Factor in China’s Energy Security], *Guoji Zhengzhi* [International Politics], February 2005.

¹⁸ Interview by email: Chinese Africa Expert, Beijing, 28 February 2008.

whenever they fall victim of disorder. The long term risk is that local tensions and conflicts entice external powers to interfere and to exploit instability for gaining clout to the detriment of the People's Republic. It is this double security challenge that Chinese experts and policy makers start to discuss.

3. Raising to the challenge

Subsequent to the incidents that occurred in the last four years, China has been taken up the problem of non-traditional security threats at several occasions. Its initial reaction is to work with local governments. "China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange," China's 2006 Africa Policy stated. "In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, trans-national economic crimes, etc."¹⁹ Beijing has instructed its embassies in Africa to watch local security attentively. The swift and successful evacuation of Chinese citizens from Chad also demonstrated that it has developed operational scenarios to deal with emergencies. The Chinese government has also started with a procedure of travel advice. In Sudan and Kenya, state-owned companies receive protection from local armed forces to ward off assaults by rebels. With South Africa, Beijing inked an agreement to prevent that the Chinese diaspora becomes the target of armed gangs.²⁰

Such measures might help Chinese citizens and companies to escape some of the risks, but they do not offer any guarantee for securing economic activities if the situation keeps deteriorating. In case of Sudan, China learned that prodding instable governments can slap back into its face as a boomerang. If problems start to occur at regional level, supporting states might prove even more risky. Nor does such a narrow security response address the uncertainty about the military presence of nations. Hence, at the end the dilemma comes back to the realist supposition of self-help. Will the People's Republic try to safeguard its interests by building up its own military presence?

Bilateral military exchanges are a first parameter to test whether this assumption holds true. According to figures of the Chinese government, interactions with other armed force expanded significantly with 174 high-level visits in 2001 and over 210 in 2006. Yet, this upward trend did not persist in Africa where such bilateral exchanges remained stable at an annual average of 26. Only with South Africa Beijing established a permanent military dialogue. Interviews with European diplomats in 10 randomly chosen African countries also learned that the number of accredited military officers in Chinese embassies, i.e. military attachés and their support staff, did merely

¹⁹ China's Africa Policy, 12 January 2006, § 4.4.

²⁰ Interview: expert at CICIR, Beijing, 17 December 2007.

or not expand over the last few years. In fact, only in 15 countries Chinese military attachés are dispatched on a permanent base.²¹ Hence, China's military diplomacy in Africa remains modest, and does certainly not follow the impressive number of trade officials that in the last few years have been posted in African countries to strengthen economic ties.

Country	Year	Value	Description
Angola	2004	6	Building training centre elite unit
Angola	2006	100	Upgrade military communications
Cameroon	2006	?	Donation of uniforms
CAR	2007	0.8	Donation of computers to headquarters
DRC	2005	0.5	Donation of uniforms to armed police
Ghana	2004	1.7	Building new headquarters
Ghana	2006	3.8	Renovation Ministry of Defence
Guinea-Bis.	2007	12	Loan for the construction of hospital
Liberia	2005	0.6	Donation material and logistics
Mozambique	2007	0.9	Donation of equipment
Mozambique	2007	1.5	Donation of light vehicles and uniforms
Nigeria	2006	3	Donation of uniforms and dinkies
Senegal	2007	2	Donation of ambulances and mine clearance
Sierra Leone	2006	1.2	Donation of small patrol boats
Sudan	2005	?	Donation of uniforms and radios
Tunisia	2006	?	Health care support
Uganda	2001	1	Donation of military trucks
Zimbabwe	2005	4	Donation of trucks and medical equipment
Zimbabwe	2006	1.5	Donation of machines

Table 1. China's military aid to African countries (In USD, 2004-2007: not exhaustive).

Military aid is another indicator. Granting military hardware to partner countries can serve various objectives. In a context of competition it helps thwarting defence cooperation with another state or preventing another power's attempt to alter the regional military balance. Defence aid might help a privileged political partner that is of use to safeguard economic interests. Whereas these three aims are characterized by security and long term economic interests; defence aid might well be the result of short-sighted shop-keepers aspirations. There is no proving that China's military aid aims at counterbalancing other powers, such as the United States. Apart from Sudan and Zimbabwe, most countries that have received Chinese aid in the last years are also supplied by Washington. Moreover, in 2007 Beijing temporarily froze the supply of heavy arms to Khartoum after pressure from the West.²² When Nigeria's Vice-President Atiky Abubakar publicly announced that his country would turn to

²¹ Puska, Susan (2008), Military backs China's Africa adventure, *Asia Times*, 7 July 2007.

²² Interview: EU official, Brussels, 20 February 2008; Belgian diplomat, New York, 21 February 2008.

China instead of the United States for arms, Beijing reacted reluctantly and no major supplies followed the two years afterwards. China's military aid programmes cannot be considered as securing its ventures in mining industry. Between 2004 and 2006, resource-rich Nigeria for instance received only half of the value of the military aid that China provided to Ghana or Uganda. That period it furnished more military assistance to Angola than to Sudan, even though the security challenges in Sudan were much more severe than in the former. Even though violence in Somalia threatened China's oil exploration activities in both Ethiopia and Kenya, China made only commitments to Kenya to help the country to protect its border. Concluding, China does provide military aid, but this does not seem to be driven by a coherent strategy to protect its security interests.

Finally, self-help would imply the deployment of troops whenever China's stakes are at risk, for training friendly armed forces or to engage challengers directly. Yet, such presence is negligible. China has no bases in Africa like the United States or France, nor does it train African soldiers to deal with hostility that China perceives as a threat to its national interests. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, Cameroon and Gabon, China has dispatched teams of three to ten instructors, but these are assisting to maintain equipment rather than providing training for specific combat activities. In Zambia and Algeria, such cooperation also exists but limited to medical aid. Whereas all major powers have been deploying naval vessels to combat piracy or to keep the maritime supply lines in the waters surrounding Africa open; the Chinese Navy (PLAN) does rarely show its flag. In 2000, China's sent its newest Luhai-class guided missile destroyer and a supply ship to Tanzania and South Africa. A 2002 naval ship visit by a fleet composed of a guided missile destroyer, the Qingdao, and a supply ship, the Taicang, called on Egypt, thereby crossing the Suez Channel.²³ Yet, these voyages were a gesture of courtesy rather than a reaction to specific security challenges. These calls were limited in time and no actions were taken against pirates or poachers. No ships were deployed in the energy-rich Gulf of Guinea.

Instead of balancing and dealing with security threat unilaterally, China resorts to bandwagoning. Whereas in the 1980s and early 1990s, Beijing bluntly opposed moves by the international community to interfere with African security issues; nowadays it tends to join them. Beijing more and more recognizes the United Nation's role in soothing the numerous conflicts and to safeguard the frail states' sovereignty. In the 1990s China began supporting UN missions that were deployed to implement peace agreements in which all rivaling parties were included, and at the condition of a well defined and restricted mandate. Traditional *peacekeeping* operations like these in Somalia (UNSOM I), Mozambique (ONUMUZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) all got its green light. When the Security Council decided to dispatch troops in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003, China offered to contribute to this mission, and from then on it gradually stepped up the number of blue helmets to 1,800 in 2007.

²³ Puska, Susan (2008), op cit.

Though, simultaneously, failed states and national governments that actively participated in atrocities challenged the efficacy of traditional UN operations. China's primacy of sovereignty, implying at least the state's consent, collided with the willingness of other players to intervene more aggressively under Chapter VII mandate. Beijing loudly opposed when European countries pushed for Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, at the moment that Washington instigated to broaden the mandate of UNSOM, or when France demanded to increase the troop levels of the UN operation in Ivory Coast in 2004. Despite its strong concerns China did not veto these interventions, but abstained and kept aloof of the implementation. Sudan was the first case where China actively lobbied an African government to allow a UN mission on its soil. Via active brokering and indirect pressure it succeeded to neutralize the predicament between its economic interests and the principle of noninterference on the one hand and on the other the Western appeal for intervening in Darfur and the need for long-term stability.

That China recognizes the importance of collective security became even more visible in 2006, when China was the first to ask the UN Security Council to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia. In June that year, at a UN Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, China's Permanent Representative to the UN Wang Guangya scolded other diplomats for neglecting Somalia and urged them to support the deployment of peacekeepers. "I was reluctant to take this role," said Wang, explaining that African governments had been pushing China to raise the issue in the Council, "but there was a lack of interest by the other major powers." Initially, the proposal was only hesitantly received by Britain and the United States, but after various talks in New York, Beijing and Washington jointly sponsored a resolution for the deployment of a UN Mission. In 2007, in early consultations with France, China supported a French draft resolution on Chad, involving the dispatching of mainly European peacekeepers under Chapter VII. Significant was that China gave green light for "close liaising" with the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), whereas before it objected the development of links between UNAMID and other UN missions. "Our support for the resolution on Chad shows that we are prepared to cooperate to tackle security issues at a regional level and that our awareness on the increasing complexity of violent conflicts in Africa grows", a Chinese diplomat explained.

China also turns to African regional organizations to work with on security issues.²⁴ In the China-Africa Action Plan, approved in November 2006, Beijing vowed "to support Africa in the areas of logistics" and that it will "continue its active participation in the peacekeeping operations and de-mining process in Africa and provide, within the limits of its capabilities, financial and material assistance as well as relevant training to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union".²⁵ In

²⁴ Wan, Yulan (2007), Feimeng yu Feizhou Anquan Tixi de Goujian [African Union and the Creation of African Security System], *Xiya Feizhou*, [West Asia and Africa], June 2007; Luo, Jianbo (2006), Lixiang yu Xianshi: Feimeng yu Feizhou Jiti Anquan Jizhi de Jiangou [Ideal and Realty: AU and the Construction of African Collective Security Mechanism], *Waijiao Pinglun* [Foreign Policy Review], April 2006.

²⁵ Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan.

June 2006, the Chinese government granted the African Union's Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 3.5 million USD in budgetary support and humanitarian emergency aid. Earlier, it handed over financial and technical support to the Association for West African States (ECOWAS).

Bit by bit, China also shows itself prepared to participate to international efforts to prevent small arms and natural resources fuelling conflicts. In 2002 for instance, Beijing revised its Regulation on Control of Military Products Export and published the Military Products Export Control List that provided in several guidelines for the export of military products. The same year, it inked the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms that committed the People's Republic to control the manufacturing, marking, import and export of firearms, and to confiscate and destroy all illicit firearms.²⁶ In 2005, the government launched a national information management system for the production, possession and trade of light arms, and introduced a system to monitor end users of Chinese-made weapons to prevent the arms from finding their way via a third parties to 'sensitive regions' around the world.²⁷ In 2006, China supported a draft UN resolution on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, contrarily to the United States who disapproved.²⁸ In 2002, China joined the Kimberley Process, a joint government, international diamond industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, mainly originating from Africa.²⁹ In 2005, it allowed a voluntary peer-review under this scheme.³⁰ Although, these efforts show many flaws, they seem to make clear that China wants to do more than putting boots on the ground.

Despite the strategic importance of Africa, China does not attempt to safeguard its stronghold by unilaterally projecting military power. Its military diplomacy in Africa remains limited compared to defence exchanges in other regions and if it developed bilateral cooperation programmes these rather fulfill a role in China's diplomatic charm offensive than that they address threats to China's interests. Instead of using military presence to counter-balance other powers like the United States, the People's Republic tends to join collective security efforts within the framework of the United Nations and African regional organizations. Over the past few years this bandwagoning has evolved from passive support to active cooperation. Moreover, Beijing has softened its traditional dedication to noninterference. While maintaining the primacy of sovereignty, it showed itself increasingly prepared to support interventions whenever regional stability is at stake.

²⁶ Guyanga, Wang (2002), China's Vice Foreign Minister on Small Arms Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 10 December 2002.

²⁷ Qiao, Zonghuai (2005), Statement by Chinese Representative at UN Workshop on Small Arms and Light, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 20 April 2005.

²⁸ The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (A/C.1/61/L.15/Rev.1), Revised Draft Resolution, United Nations Disarmament Committee, 19 October 2006.

²⁹ See: www.kimberleyprocess.com.

³⁰ Implementing the Kimberly Process: Five Years On, Partnership Africa Canada, 5 June 2005; Wright, Clive (2004), Tackling conflict diamonds: the Kimberley process certification scheme, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 11 (4), pp. 697-708.

Whereas China became a revisionist power in terms of economic aspirations, especially trying to expand its influence in Africa's primary sector, it takes the profile of a status-quo power in terms of security objectives. There are several explanations for this posture. To start with, China embarked only recently on its economic safari through the African continent. Whereas in the past two decades China concentrated at curbing the diplomatic position of Taiwan; the economization of its Africa policy only commenced in the late 1990s. Hence, the security challenges that it experiences now are a recent phenomenon and answers to these perils are just starting to be explored. China does through an early stadium of re-securitization of its China's Africa strategy, and bandwagoning can be considered as the easiest immediate response. Second, and related to this point, China has not yet developed the means to back up its own security policy with military power. This is a matter of budgetary priorities: building up an independent and sustained military presence is a costly affair and will, at this stage, overstretch the PLA for who Asia remains the primary terrain of action. In addition, the PLA does not possess enough logistic capacity to buttress sustained region-wide deployment. Therefore, its long-range airlift and sea lift capacity, as well as its intelligence and command facilities are not adequate enough. Thirdly, the Chinese government wants to avoid the People's Republic being perceived as a strong power. In the initial stage of the economic charm offensive, it tried to pursue a business-as-usual approach, maintaining low profile and keeping its hands off politics. This is no longer possible now that it stands at the forefront of Africa's political scene and alters the economic balance of influence. Beijing is aware of the clash between its weak and strong identity, and is therefore reluctant to bolster an independent military capacity, as this might decrease China's diplomatic manoeuvrability, increase resistance in Africa, as Washington experiences nowadays, and nourish suspicion in the West and elsewhere. Yet, as interests, perceptions and capabilities are susceptible to change, the question remains whether China will keep on this track of cooperative security.

3. China's future security strategy for Africa

China's interests in Africa have been changing continuously throughout the past decades and will undoubtedly keep evolving in the coming years. The conceiving of its future security policy in this region will of course depend on the importance of Africa as a supplier of natural resources. Africa nowadays supplies 18 percent of China's oil imports. Beijing and its African partners announced that they are set to increase bilateral trade to 100 billion USD by 2010. Most of this augmentation will come from the trade in raw commodities. In the last years, Chinese companies have laid the fundamentals of a substantial increase of production in all kinds of resource industries. Exploration in the Gulf of Guinea, Angola and the Horn of Africa might result in a growth of oil exports to China of more than 80 percent over the next ten years. Chinese companies are just starting to tap large mines that were recently acquired in Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia and many other countries. Given the fact that other emerging markets like India and Brazil will shift the use of their raw materials from export to domestic consumption, the economic

relevance of Africa for China cannot be underestimated.

Then it has to be seen what the need is to back the Chinese economic ventures up with more security measures. The incidents described in the first section, the persistent instability in many states, as well as the weak position of several amicable political leaders will undoubtedly lift Africa further up in Beijing's foreign security agenda and ask for a more robust reaction. Consequently, the question rises what China's interest is whether to do this independently or in synergy with others. Short term costs of unilateral action certainly exceed these of collective action, but long term uncertainty about the intentions of other players like the United States and India, might in turn prevail on costeffectiveness. If in the future, Washington or Delhi decide to change course and to contain China's expanding influence in Africa by means of counter-balancing and sea denial, the repercussions for the People's Republic will be dramatic. The nervousness of the security community in these two countries and their growing military footprint in Africa is not going unnoticed in China and highlights the necessity to build the capacity to deal with crisis independently.

Apart from its interests, China's diplomatic identity will also lead policy decisions more towards an active and autonomous security strategy. For Beijing it becomes clear that the comfortable coat of frailty does not fit any longer. On the one hand, African partners do not attach much value to China's diplomatic schizophrenia and its complicated image of an economic giant, political gnome and military worm. When mayhem erupts, China nearly automatically ends up in the frontline, finding itself haunted by African governments asking it to use its leverage. The cases of Chad and Somalia have not been the only ones. South Africa has addressed China on the problem of illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe.³¹ Central Africa has carefully tabled the violent incursions from Sudan.³² The African Union has summoned China several times to play a more active role in promoting security. Moreover, individual countries might even find it attractive getting closer to China to reduce their reliance on the EU and the US for maintaining security. Nigeria's announcement to call China instead of the US to get military support already hints at that direction. Hence, the relevance of keeping its military presence low profile diminishes. On the other hand, China's self-perception is going through a transition too. The *Century of Humiliation* is left far behind and makes place for confidence and assertiveness. Chinese leaders grasp the success of their neighbourhood diplomacy that resulted both in a mitigation of frictions and increasing influence. The People's Republic drew confidence from the successful launch of major new defence systems. As China sees its diplomatic prowess expanding geographically from the Strait of Formosa, via the Asian region to the rest of the developing world, its assertiveness in dealing with security issues is likely to follow.

Finally, there is the factor of capability. China is gearing its military for a larger

³¹ Interview: South African scholar, Brussels, 5 February 2008.

³² Interview: French Foreign Affairs Official, Paris, 12 February 2008; interview by email with French diplomat, Bangui, 13 February 2008.

international deployment. Its large immobile Army components are gradually converted into highly specialized and flexible units. Simultaneously, the PLA has been launching various new systems that should enhance its capacity to lift these troops. In 2007, the Chinese government approved the development of large passenger jets, including military transport variants similar to the American C-17 Globe master. Beijing also ordered to beef up naval transport capacity. In 2006, hull of a first T-071 was laid. This landing platform dock has a reach that goes way beyond Taiwan and is aimed at providing sea-based support to operations at land, to send humanitarian aid, evacuation and disaster management. These vessels will be supported by a new generation of large replenishment ships and could be escorted by various types of advanced frigates and destroyers. In absolute terms China increases its ability to pursue a more confident and independent security policy in Africa.

Will all this military vigor suffice to deal with a presumably irritated response of other powers? Not likely. If China decides to go solo and to resort to a more aggressive security policy in Africa, it is unlikely that it will be able to overcome military counter-moves by India and the United States. As I explained elsewhere, it will be unfeasible to guarantee security of maritime trade with Africa if India uses its naval dominance in the Indian Ocean to counter-balance China. The sheer geographic gap between the People's Republic and the African continent will make it extremely hard to back military activities if the United States or India oppose them as China will render itself highly vulnerable to sea denial operations.

4. Conclusion

China has several reasons to abandon its current bandwagoning strategy. Yet, for the long haul, it will be geo-economics that is going to prevent China from resorting to a kind of gunboat diplomacy that many powers pursued before. Despite the changing interests, perceptions and means, to a large extent China is and will remain dependent on a cooperative posture of other players to safeguard its economic strongholds in Africa: as long as its social stability relies on the supply of Africa's natural richness. China will thus have to keep on the track of security cooperation. In fact, it will be the main stakeholder in peace, social stability, good governance and equitable development in its African partnering countries. Beijing's only option is to avoid future frictions with other powers by preventing to be drawn into power plays and by easing and preventing regional and domestic hostility. As no other external power it is in China's interest to turn regional bodies into agile and broadly supported actors, claiming a far reaching ownership of conflict management.

For the European Union this increases the scope to engage China. Although competition for influence in Africa might entice the EU to revise the conditional component of its Africa policy; it is in its own interest to maintain its standards on good governance, financial transparency, human rights, regional cooperation and sustainable development. At this stage it should more actively and efficiently work with the People's Republic to contribute to these objectives. The EU's leverage is

flawed in many aspects, but should not be underestimated. Given its colonial past, its moral mandate is limited, but this is no reason to neglect the actual relevance of its standards. It lacks coherence, but all member states that play a role in Africa have a common interest to maintain a certain degree of influence and to avoid great power rivalry erupting in this region. Its economic policy raises many frustrations with African partners, for instance regarding the EPA's and obdurate trade barriers. Yet, it will remain the largest trade partner for at least a couple of years, it is still the largest donor of aid, and it has taken some modest steps to accede to the African demands to make its market more open. Militarily, it plays an inferior role in UNPK, but European peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Chad, as well as its potential contribution in terms of logistics, show that it has still a role to play. If the EU succeed to foster more coherence in its Africa policy and actively plays on the security interdependence with China, nothing inhibits stronger security cooperation.

Yet, the EU should also be aware that it is not the focal point in China's Africa strategy. This position is taken by the US, the African countries themselves and China's future economic challengers like India and Brazil. In the first place, the EU should therefore facilitate confidence building and avoid being seen as ganging up with Washington to counter-balance China. In many ways, the US is as much a competitor for the EU as the People's Republic. The EU could support regional African forums developing capacity to have multilateral exchanges with all its old and new partners. It could also encourage expert exchanges in a broader setting than the traditional trilateral meetings. Simultaneously, the EU should preventively engage countries like India and Brazil. Instead of developing a Sino-centric Africa policy, it is of utmost importance to take the very complex nature of Africa's global significance into account.

It is recommended to continue insisting China to develop on a comprehensive and cooperative security policy that includes standards on sustainable economic and political development. Yet, instead of imposing those, China should have ownership as well, and therefore the EU needs to build consensus on these principles from the bottom up. Chinese experts and officials could be encouraged to further explore their own stakes in goals like transparency and good governance, and therefore to interact with European counterparts from an equal position. More and more specific conferences like these should be organized, better coordinated at EU level. As China stands only at the beginning of its new partnership with Africa, so could the EU and the People's Republic turn this issue into one of the key pillars of their cooperation.

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**‘Africa Issue’ and China-US-EU Trilateral Relations
After the Cold War**

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Foreword

For a long time Africa was a continent forgotten by outsiders. Constant internal conflicts and poverty distanced it from other countries. However, the situation has changed since the late 1980s. Changes were especially profound around the year 2000. In the 1990s, Africa broke away from recession in the 1980s, the so-called “lost decade,” to a new age. Waves of democratization, drastic social changes accompanied by conflicts, and accelerating economic growth rekindled the world’s interest, including growing interest demonstrated by powers. The Americans switched their African strategic focus from military assistance to economic and trade interactions. After losing its traditional influence to some extent, Europeans again stressed the significance of the close traditional “friendship” of the past and upgraded it to strategic importance. More Chinese have arrived in Africa, more as businessmen than as generous donors. Around the new millennium powers rediscovered Africa, this charming old Dark Continent.

However, their rediscovery of and re-entry into Africa is by no means plain sailing. Conflicts of interests and values among powers, African countries’ tradeoffs and choice of old or new “friends” are some of the most interesting games on the international stage in the new century. As a result, the Africa rediscovered by powers has become an important factor impacting power relations and international order. After the anti-colonialism movement of the 1950s and 1960s, Africa has once again become an “issue” in power relations, which reflects the many conflicts among powers or between powers and Africa, brought by the changing status of Africa after the Cold War as well as by the readjustments of interests held by powers in Africa.

It is for this purpose that this paper will give a detailed account of the process and reasons of the generation of the “African issue,” on whose basis this paper will go on to present new changes in African policies and African relations in the US, Europe, and China, as well as misgivings among these players. This paper will try in the end to identify some basis for and approach to mitigating disputes among powers over Africa so that they could start cooperate with each other.

I. Geopolitics and Africa's Changing International Status

Africa assumed greater importance on the international stage after national liberation and anti-colonialism movement. After the Second World War, the construction of a modern international system symbolized by the UN injected legitimacy and vitality to the political status of African countries. In the fight against colonialism and imperialism, the African continent used to play a key role on the international stage. It improved its international status thanks to equal voting power at the UN, unity and capability-building movements and its support for the non-alliance movement. With the outbreak and escalation of the Cold War, the formation of two divided camps, the African continent was victimized by the polar system. It became the target of contention between the US and the former USSR, its geopolitical importance standing out more than before. However, the end of the Cold War changed everything.

1. Reduced Geopolitical Importance

In the era of polar system, both the US and the former USSR tried to grab a larger sphere of influence from each other. Africa was no exception. Therefore, owing to the cold war, except for few countries that managed to maintain neutrality, most African countries were forced to join one of the two camps, acting as agents in the fight for hegemony between the US and the former USSR. Africa's geopolitical importance was highlighted. When the Cold War was over Africa seemed to have been "abandoned." A US scholar wrote that "when radical political changes in East European countries started to make it to the top of the agenda of US decision makers, Africa's importance declined."¹

For a long time Europe kept an average instead of close relation with Africa, despite the enduring effective Lome Convention— a classic success story of North-South cooperation. Yet Europe in its entirety did not have a will strong enough to develop a more profound Europe-Africa relation except for old colonial powers such as France, Britain and Germany (which have maintained special economic, trade, political and military relations with their former colonies), the European Community (EU) has not yet developed a systematic African policy.

2. Wave of Democratization

As Africa's geopolitical importance declined, Africa was shocked by a wave of democratization. Owing to historical reasons, most African countries do not share the Western tradition of democratic politics. Even during the process of national liberation and independence, such Western forms of democracy as representative democracy and multi-party politics did not take root in Africa. Basically speaking, after the de-colonization movement of the 1960s and the wave of democratization in the late 20th century, most African countries were ruled by one party. Such a regime is known as "neo-patrimonialist", meaning that before the symbolic year of 1990, political power in African countries were often concentrated at the executive branch supported

¹ Peter J. Schraeder, "US Africa Policy since the Cold War," *West Asia and Africa*, Issue 5, 1997.

by the military, while the judicial and legislative branches were controlled by the executive branch. Such executive branches “are the head of state, government and party. They can appoint at least part of the members of the legislative branch, all judges and civil servants. (The entire political system) lacks control of executive autocracy, while citizens are regarded as servants to state leaders.”² However, the “neo-patrimonialist” regimes were immediately engulfed by the wave of democratization at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. In Black Africa, most countries were rapidly transitioned into democratic systems in a short span of less than five years.

Democratization did not sweep across Africa by accident. There were both internal and external stimuli. The internal factors are mainly related to widespread corruption, increasing instead of decreasing poverty, and deteriorating living standards for people in most African countries as a result of the long-term “neo-patrimonialism” regimes. The external factors are mainly derived from the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, neither the US nor other Western countries minded corruptive and autocratic practices of African leaders since they needed allies. However, after the Cold War, the US ambition to promote global democratic values has influenced its attitude towards African countries, stressing more than before conditions such as improving human rights and political democracy when offering assistance to Africa countries, while the latter are forced to accept those conditions in order to maintain domestic stability and economic growth.³

To a certain extent democratization has improved African people’s political status and human rights, contained corruption, and strengthened ties with developing countries after accepting political conditions designated by the US and other Western countries. However, there is also some apparent negative impact. Since the transition towards democracy took a very short time (some as short as three years), many countries had not yet adapted to it before getting plunged into national political struggles or even civil wars stimulated by tribal disputes. There is still a long way to go for democratization.

3. Regional Clashes and Social Conflicts

Africa has often been afflicted by social conflicts and domestic disputes. According to data collected in 2000, over 20% of Africans had been affected by conflicts, making African the area in the world suffering from the greatest number of conflicts. The International Rescue Committee estimates that about 3.8 million Congolese died in the six-year conflict before 2005.⁴ Libya, Rwanda, Somali, Sierra Leone and Zaire are countries that are in or used to be in severe conflicts. Moreover, conflicts in these countries and regions often spill over to neighboring countries, causing social

² *Democratization in the Twentieth Century Africa*, pp.2-3.

³ There are multiple reasons for democratization, such as leaders educated in the Western way, increasingly close socio-economic and political ties, and the global impact by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Please refer to *To understand the ubiquity of democratization on the African Subcontinent*.

⁴ Abraham McLaughlin, *Can Africa solve African problems?*

instability there.⁵

These conflicts can be attributed to large extent to historical heritages by Western colonialism. As Western countries were leaving Black Africa in haste, they “founded” many so-called nation states simply on the basis of their respective sphere of influence. However, tribal and cultural diversity in those countries could not be integrated in a short time. Slapdash imperialist behaviors that showed no regard to cultural or tribal traditions as the boundaries were drawn became important root causes of domestic conflicts. During the Cold War, these conflicts were suppressed by superpowers against the large context of polarity. After the Cold War, internal disputes escalated rapidly with encouragement from democratic politics. Those tribes who believe that they were suppressed would rise against the dominant tribe, giving rise to conflicts or even tribal cleansing and civil wars.

After the Cold War there has been rampant corruption in many African countries, where government leaders or senior officials often pocket foreign monetary aid.⁶ Lack of effective supervision of senior government officials, fragile public institutions, weak civilian organization, lack of judicial independence and shortage of civil servants all boost corruption.

Private foreign investment in Africa has been sluggish owing to regional conflicts and rampant corruption. According to some 2004 statistics, despite the over 800 million population, Africa had only attracted less than 0.5% global investment.⁷ Shortage of foreign investment makes it difficult for local economy to grow, poverty to be reduced, healthcare, education and social equality to develop. On the other hand lagging economy aggravates conflicts in the society.

4. Accelerating Integration

Internal integration accelerated in Africa after the Cold War. There are two types of African integration: radical integration and incremental integration. Radical integration usually refers to the Pan-African movement led by African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and supported by overseas Black groups in the US and other parts of the world. Incremental integration is a process of regional economic integration and the consequent cooperation in other areas. Constrained by historical and realistic reasons, the Pan-African movement has basically dissipated except as a school of thoughts, or has been gradually absorbed into incremental integration. Therefore, African integration after the Cold War mainly takes the form of incrementalism.

There has in fact been a long history of African integration. The Southern African Customs Union was established in 1910. The Southern Rhodesia Customs Union was set up in 1949, covering the present-day South Africa and Zimbabwe. Between the

⁵ *The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Preventing and Reducing Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Published by the Department for International Development September 2004.

⁶ Susan Dicklitch, *African corruption is a crime against humanity*, August 09, 2004.

⁷ Michael Dynes, *What chance saving Africa?*

1960s and 1970s, more regional economic integration organizations emerged in Africa, including the East Africa Community (1967), Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (1974), and Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (1976). By 2007 there have been 13 sub-regional trade agreements in Africa.⁸

Of course, the most important integration organization is the African Union founded in 2003, whose predecessor is the Organization of African Unity founded in 1963. The AU is the most important international institution in integrating economic and political relations across all African countries. It has grander concepts of integration and more comprehensive integration targets than the above-mentioned economic integration organizations. However, the acceleration of integration does not necessarily mean that integration is more substantial or goes deeper. To a large extent integration is still superficial.

II. African Policy and African Relations of China, the US and Europe

1. US African Policy and African Relations

Before the Cold War Africa was a major issue of contention between the US and the former USSR. After the Cold War Africa lost geopolitical strategic importance. Influenced by isolationism, voices urging the US to exit Africa surfaced in the US. However, the ambition of the US after the Cold War contained isolationism. Moreover, Africa started to assume new geopolitical strategic importance. Therefore, instead of giving up Africa the US reinforces its ties with Africa in another manner.

The African policy of the George Bush Sr. Administration focused on grabbing the former sphere of influence of the former USSR and promoting democratization. The Clinton Administration stressed economic and trade relations between the US and Africa. In 1995, the Office of International Security Affairs of the US State Department published a report on Africa, according to which there was limited US security and economic interests in Africa, and there were limited ties with African countries. However, the report still claimed that “Staying economically engaged with Africa is in America's interest. Today, sub-Saharan Africa comprises an emerging market.”⁹

At first the Bush Jr. Administration followed the Clinton Administration's African policy. But after the 9/11 attack it immediately adjusted the African policy, paying more attention to Africa. In 2006, the US *National Security Strategy* (NSS) wrote that, “To this Administration Africa has growing geopolitical strategic importance and high priority.” Apparently such wordings were drastically different from that of the Clinton

⁸ Some scholars divide African economic integration into two types: economic integration that either falls within or out of the 1980 *Lagos Plan of Action*; see REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA; and *The need for African integration*.

⁹ *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, Report published by the Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Tuesday, August 01, 1995.

Administration ten years before. Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, also said, “In the American agenda Africa is more important that it was ten to fifteen years ago.”¹⁰

According to the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, there are four major purposes in developing relations with Africa: a.) to support and promote democratic governance and political freedom in Africa; b.) to seek opportunities for economic growth and expansion, particularly to make Africans serve themselves by trade, private businesses and the creation of a fair environment for competition; c.) fight with diseases on the continent; d.) end all chaos caused by war in Africa.¹¹ However, the US policy on Africa attempts to foster development and democracy in such a way that it advances US interests.¹²

It can be seen that the African policy of both the Clinton Administration and the current Bush Administration demonstrates the willingness to develop more proactive relations with Africa, especially the development of economic and trade relations (instead of the traditional one-way assistance to Africa). This policy is established on the basis of a series of acts on trade and economic relations with Africa, the most important of which is the *African Growth and Opportunity Act* effective starting from the year 2000. In 2007, US Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab pointed out that, “Since AGOA was initiated in 2000, bilateral trade between the US and sub-Sahara Africa has grown by 143%.”¹³ At present the US is undoubtedly Africa’s largest trading partner, while AGOA serves as foundation to such a close relationship.

Trade between the US and Sub-Sahara Africa (million USD)

	2003	2004	2005	2006
Import	6,870.9	8,438.5	10,342.6	12,116.8
Export	25,633.3	35,879.5	50,364.6	59,175.2

source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census

Nevertheless, there are also some differences in the African policy of the two Administrations. The Clinton Administration regarded Africa as important because of increasing economic interests, its policy focus having switched from a struggle for geopolitical influence against the former USSR to a pursuit of reciprocal trade and economic benefits. The US used to show concern for Africa out of its value-based aspirations, but after suffering defeat on the verge of victory in Somalia, it adopted a passive attitude towards later security issues in Africa (like tribal cleansing in Rwanda).

¹⁰ *US Security Strategy: Spotlights African Partnerships.*

¹¹ *Current Themes in U.S.-Africa Policy*, Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chatham House, London, England, May 16, 2006.

¹² Africa is important to the United States. U.S. policy on Africa attempts to foster development and democracy in such a way that it builds on Africa’s traditions and advances U.S. interests.

¹³ *2007 AGOA Report Shows Growth in U.S. – Africa Trade*, 05/18/2007.

During the George Bush Jr. Administration, Africa assumed security importance to the US on top of economic and trade interests. After the 9/11 attack, Africa became an importance partner to the US in the latter's fight against terrorism. Some terrorist attacks on the US took place in Africa, including attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam.

African policy in non-economic areas is also embodied in the application of "Transformational Diplomacy" in Africa and the efforts made towards the establishment of the Africa Command. Secretary of State, C. Rice, of the Bush Administration said in a speech delivered at a university that Transformational Diplomacy means the guideline of US diplomacy is partnership instead of paternalism in the past, "to act with people, not for the people... we seek to use US diplomatic power to help foreign citizens live a better life, establish their own nation and change their own future."

Besides, the Bush Administration also devoted itself to the establishment of the Africa Command and beachheads in Africa. In 2007, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs described the function of the Africa Command in the following way – with the establishment of AFRICOM, Africa will eventually become a separate and discrete part of the world. All territories except for Egypt will be placed under the control of one single command.¹⁴ However, such intention has not been very successful. African countries are worried that US military presence will attract undue terrorist attention to Africa, thereby adding new elements of instability there. In February 2008, when President Bush visited Africa the second time, he asserted that the establishment of the AFRICOM was only aimed at helping African countries strengthen their abilities in peacekeeping, cracking down on smuggling and fight against terrorism. However, none of the countries he visited, including Ghana and Liberia, declared their willingness to accept the Command. The Tanzanian President stated after Bush's departure, that Tanzania was not capable of hosting the AFRICOM.

2. EU's African Policy and African Relations

Owing to historical and geographical reasons there is a special relationship between Europe and Africa. For a long time Europeans colonized most of Africa. Geographically speaking, Africa is close to the Mediterranean countries, and there were close trade, commercial and political relations between the two sides. After the decolonization movement between the 1950s and 1960s, most African countries are independent politically, although Western countries still maintain strong influence there. Because of these historical reasons Europe would often stress how special its relationship with Africa has been. For example, in a 2005 EU document on developing strategic partnership with Africa it was written, "Europe and Africa are linked together by history, geography and the shared vision of future peace,

¹⁴ *Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa*, Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa Washington, DC, August 1, 2007.

democracy and prosperity for all people.”¹⁵ Similarly it was written in a communication at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon that, “Europe and Africa are linked together by the following factors, or a combination of history, culture, geography and common future values.”¹⁶

In history, Europe-Africa relations have been consolidated through a series of documents, including the Lome Agreement signed first in 1975. Afterwards the Lome Agreement guided Europe-Africa relationship until the Cotonou Agreement was signed between EU and 48 sub-Sahara countries in 2000 with a period of validity of 20 years. In 2005, political causes were inserted into the amended Cotonou Agreement, making it the single comprehensive relationship framework (politics, trade and social development) between EU and sub-Sahara African countries. Meanwhile the relationship between EU and North Africa countries is based mainly on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Association Agreements, the European Neighborhood Policy and the Action Plan for the European Neighborhood Policy.

Despite the relatively close relationship between Europe and Africa, Europe-Africa relations have changed somewhat due to internal changes on either side as well as changes in the world. After the Cold War, rapid globalization has made countries dependent on each other in economy more than ever before, with ensuing crises threatening economic growth in less developed countries and regions, and growing international problems having negative impact on the world. As competition for influence between the two superpowers in the polar system gave way to rising regional conflicts, especially after the 9/11 attack, real threat of terrorist attacks plus the US hype make the international environment less secure. At the same time, integration accelerates in Europe and Africa respectively. These latest events made it necessary for Europe to adjust its relationship with Africa. Consequently Europe started to lay more emphasis on equality in bilateral relations so that the latter is built on the basis of common interests, mutual acknowledgement and mutual responsibility.

In other words, the main purpose of such adjustment is to switch from the economy-oriented relationship in the past to a more profound comprehensive relationship with Africa. In an October 2005 African strategy paper, presented by the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, it was written that the purpose of EU-Africa partnership was to promote peace and prosperity for all Africans, and the realization of UN Millennium Development Goals in Africa.¹⁷ The final African policy paper, published by the European Council in December the same year, made it clear that the major purposes of the Europe-Africa strategic relationship were to promote UN Millennium Development Goals as well as sustainable

¹⁵ Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Presse 367), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*.

¹⁶ Lisbon, 9 December 2007, 16344/07 (Presse 291), *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*.

¹⁷ Brussels, 12.10.2005, COM(2005) 489 final, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*, {SEC(2005)1255}.

development, security and good governance in Africa.¹⁸ Specific goals include: EU agencies should discuss Europe-Africa relations regularly and submit relevant reports; cooperation with major international organizations in Africa such as the African Union; participation in multilateral forums in Africa; political dialogues with Africa.¹⁹

In December 2007, the European Council published the new EU African Strategy, the first formal political framework within which Europe regards Africa as a whole. EU will use this as a platform to ensure coordination and consistency in its African policies. This new strategy document proposed four major objectives for the Europe-Africa strategic partnership, including one on enhancing political ties between the two sides.²⁰

It can be seen that Europe's African policy is aimed at deepening comprehensive partnership instead of pure economic relations of the past. The promotion of political democracy and human rights is highlighted. EU wants to continue the traditionally close ties dating back to colonial days and tries to promote progress in Africa up to EU standards. If successful, Europe will no doubt be a coach to Africa in culture, values, social development modes and politics, thereby becoming the most important external force in Africa.

3. China's African Policy and African Relations

China has attached great importance to developing relations with Africa ever since its founding. For a long time, China and Africa supported and helped each other in the international community owing to the shared memory of colonization as well as the need to fight against imperialism and colonialism at that time. However, as international situation evolved, especially as the Cold War was ended and globalization started, China-Africa relations also evolved. Overall speaking, China's African policy has experienced ups and downs from economic assistance between the 1950s and 1970s, to relative coolness in the 1980s, and then to a warming-up after the 1990s.

In the 1950s, China and former colonies, including African countries, developed friendship in their fight against imperialism and colonialism. During the 1960s and 1970s, influenced by the Cold War, relations between China and African countries were often determined by ideology.

In the early 1980s, with the deepening reform and opening-up in China, especially as the Cold War slackened off in the mid-to-late 1980s, China's foreign policy started to break away from ideological constraints. China-Africa relationship entered a new era. Chinese leaders visited Africa more frequently. When President Hu Jintao visited Africa in 2004, he restated China's basic policy towards Africa, i.e., to develop an

¹⁸ Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Presse 367), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Lisbon, 9 December 2007, 16344/07 (Presse 291), *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*.

equal relationship based on mutual benefit and respect for sovereignty. It can be safely concluded that after 1990 China adjusted its African policy from one-way complimentary assistance to Africa and political mutual support to cooperation for win-win outcome. At the same time, with the development of market economy in China and rapid globalization, more and more Chinese businesses are present in Africa, participating in local economic development, especially resources exploitation and infrastructure development.

Increasingly active China-Africa exchanges posed challenges to China-Africa relations that had long been driven by bilateral relations. Reforms were needed in China-Africa relations. It was against these backgrounds that the first ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in Beijing in October 2000. The conference set out directions for China and Africa in developing a new stable long-term partnership of equality and mutual benefit. In January 2006, the second ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in Addis Ababa. In January 2006 the Chinese Government came up with the first African Policy Paper. As a single document guiding China's African relations and policy, it aims at proclaiming the objectives and measures of China's African policy, planning cooperation in all areas for a certain time to come. In November 2006, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit was held in Beijing. The Beijing Summit Declaration advocated promoting China-Africa friendly cooperation according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as well as all other international principles promoting multilateralism and democratization of international relations.

In a nutshell China's African policy today follows the time-honored tradition of non-interference with internal affairs in Africa and economic reciprocity. In addition many new approaches have been created to promote and deepen the China-Africa strategic partnership, including forums and summits. As China-Africa relations deepen, trade and economic relations between the two sides have grown significantly. According to statistics, China's export to Africa stood at US\$1.382 billion in 2004, an increase of 36% over that of the previous year. China's import from Africa, mainly natural resources, grew by 81% to US\$ 1.565 billion. In 2005, the China-Africa trade amounted to US\$4 billion while the figure in 2007 was US\$7.4 billion.

III. Policy Divergence and Realistic Conflicts in the African Policies of China, the US and Europe

In general, around the new millennium China, the US and Europe all adjusted and repositioned their respective African policy, all endeavoring to deepen and upgrade relations with Africa. As their relations with Africa changed, Africa seems to grow in importance. However, divergence and disagreement over Africa among China, the US and Europe are more outstanding than before. The major disagreements fall between China and the US, or China and Europe. They include the following three aspects: whether African policies should insist that Africa accept Western liberalism and

integrate it into its socio-political life or stay respectfully away from African internal affairs; whether China is practicing colonialism or neo-colonialism in Africa; whether China's African policy harms the interests of Europe and the US in commercial areas.

1. Washington Consensus or Beijing Consensus

There is a theoretical controversy over Africa, i.e., whether it is Washington Consensus or Beijing Consensus that is more adaptable to African realities. Behind this controversy are different attitudes towards Africa among China, the US and Europe. Washington Consensus basically indicates that Americans, or even Europeans, try to use liberalism and depreciative attitude towards African sovereignty to spur African countries to change political and social systems. Whereas the existence of Beijing Consensus demonstrates that China has no such plan. Therefore, the controversy over the relationship between the two consensuses and sustainable growth in Africa reflects the biggest difference in African policies between the US or Western Europe and China.

In fact, although Washington Consensus does not seem to be fully embraced by Western Europe, it is widely applied by both Europe and the US to African policy. It means not only free trade, but also that there is little difference in handling African affairs between the Americans, who try to implant freedom and democratic politics into Africa, and the Europeans, who stress promotion of human rights and democracy in Africa. However, since the first contact between China and Africa in modern times at the 1955 Bandung Conference, China has persistently followed the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Even the application of trade liberalism to its economic and trade relations with Africa after China's accession to WTO is not contradictory to previous principles, which is regarded as application of Beijing Consensus in Africa. Because of the key importance of the two consensuses in understanding African policy differences, their content should be fully investigated.

Washington Consensus was formed during a review of experiences in South America in the 1980s. In 1989, US economist John Williamson advocated Washington Consensus, which he summarized in the following way: finance and trade liberalization; establishment and reinforcement of a legal framework that protects private property right; strengthening budget control and cutting fiscal deficits. In 1990 he offered a further summary of Washington Consensus.²¹

According to American scholar William Finnegan, Washington Consensus is sometimes simply "free trade," a major US ideological export after anti-communism lost its strategic balance. It is disseminated directly through US foreign policy, or indirectly through such multilateral organizations as the World Bank, IMF and WTO. Its core principles are deregulation, privatization, "opening up", unrestricted capital

²¹ Balanced budget, strict control of budget deficit, optimization of public expenditure; optimization of the redistribution of national income; advocacy of capital market liberalization; establishment of a flexible competitive exchange rate system; trade liberalization; attraction of foreign investment; promotion of privatization in the public sector; deregulation; clarification and protection of private property right.

flow and lower taxation.²² He also criticized the George Bush Jr. Administration for propagandizing Washington Consensus “not as an idealism of freedom or democracy, but as a control system, a kind of imperial economy.”²³

Washington Consensus didn’t achieve the expected results; instead it is widely criticized by developing countries, especially after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, which gave rise to the so-called “Post-Washington Consensus” Consensus. The concept was first proposed by former World Bank Chief Economist J. E. Stiglitz to criticize market economic globalization and pure economic liberalism disregarding social discontent. In short, “Post-Washington Consensus” Consensus demands attention to social justice, economic sustainability and development of democracy.²⁴

However, Beijing Consensus stands for another model of economic growth or even social development. In May 2004, the Foreign Policy Center in London published Joshua Cooper Ramo’s paper *Beijing Consensus*. Concepts included in Beijing Consensus are: to be determined in carrying out innovation and experimentation (such as special economic zone), to actively protect national boundaries and interests (such as the Taiwan issue), to continuously and purposefully accumulate tools of asymmetric power (such as a huge foreign reserve). The overall objective is to realize growth while maintaining independence.²⁵ In short, Beijing Consensus is a summary of China’s experience in social and economic development. It emphasizes sovereign independence, prudent economic liberalism, fast economic growth, etc.

When it comes to Africa, both Washington Consensus and “Post-Washington Consensus” Consensus intend to spread their major social values in Europe and the US, or liberalism in economy and politics, to this continent more by force than by attraction. The US African policy makes it very clear that democracy and human rights are important objectives for US-Africa relations. The implementation of such policy is either through financial assistance extended by IMF and the World Bank, both controlled by the US, to Africa, or through terms attached to economic assistance. EU has given increasing attention in its African policy papers in the past ten years to “political” links between Europe and Africa, human rights, good governance, development of democracy and the stimulation of social freedom. However, China’s African policy reflects a different attitude. Although the Chinese Government has not formally recognized the wording of Beijing Consensus, in its relationship with Africa it does follow the principles outlined in the Consensus, such as the respect for African sovereignty, non-interference with internal affairs (development on the premise of national independence). It is a way to popularize the Chinese model of development by attraction and example, not by force. It is free trade with a view of mutual benefit instead of China-Africa relations within the framework of political liberalism. It

²² William Finnegan, “The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington Consensus (Part I),” *Harper’s Magazine*, May 2003.

²³ Ditto.

²⁴ (J. E. Stiglitz, *The “Post-Washington Consensus” Consensus* (Part II).

²⁵ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus*, The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.

becomes a major controversy as the US and Europe try to develop their respective relations with Africa. It reflects differences between China, the US and Europe in ideas and behavior, which will lead to real conflicts of interest.

2. Contending for Interests

Principles behind different African policies reflect interest divergence between China, the US and Europe. The US and Europe accuse China's trade policy in Africa hampers the West from obtaining more resources there and reduces their influence. Their rebuke can be summarized as follows: China develops trade relations with Africa disregarding corruption and totalitarianism in Africa, seriously undermining the West's political investment in Africa; China exploits African resources with competitive terms, undercutting advantages previously enjoyed by the US and Europe, raising the prices of African resources and consequently the operational cost of US and European businesses; last but not the least, China's progress in enhancing its geopolitical influence in Africa is changing the existing relationship between the West and Africa.

Paul Wolfowitz, President of the World Bank, once criticized China for ignoring human rights and environment standards when granting loans to developing countries. He warned that China's soft loans and pure mercantilism would aggravate corruption in Africa. Many Western critics echoed his comments by saying that Chinese banks do not abide by the so-called Equator Principles like Western banks do when extending loans to Africa, or transparency by African governments in disposing loans insisted by Western companies.²⁶ In a word, more and more Americans and Europeans believe that the prosperity of democratic countries in Africa, where human rights, rule of law and free market are respected, is increasingly challenged by China. China's distinctive way of development, rapid economic growth through well-disciplined one-party system, has become a role model for African countries. Besides, Europe and the US also believe that China damages the democratic cause in Africa by supporting Africa through diplomatic, financial and military means, challenging the traditional relationship between Africa and them. The West claims that autocratic African governments purchase weapons and military devices from China to crack down minorities in their respective country, implement harsh political rules, adopt tough policies towards neighboring states and kill any sign of democracy in the cradle.²⁷

In addition to political impact, Europe and the US also believe that China is trying to take away their market. At present, China is the world's second largest crude oil consuming country, second only to the US. It is estimated that by 2010, China's oil

²⁶ On June 4, 2003, ten major banks in seven countries announce the adoption of the Equator Principles (EP), a set of voluntarily adopted environmental and social benchmarks for managing environmental and social issues in development project finance.

²⁷ For example, some Western media claimed that in 2004, despite the arms embargo by the US and EU against Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe obtained fighter jets and military helicopters worth US\$200 million from China.

and gas import will grow from the current 33% to 60%.²⁸ At the same time, output growth of oil and gas in Asia can not meet China's demand, while oil and gas production in the oil-rich Middle East is usually dominated by Europe and the US. Right now, 25% of China's crude oil import comes from the Bay of Guinea and Sudan, while its annual oil consumption growth rate stands at 10% (statistics also show that China's rapidly growing crude oil need only accounts for 10% of Africa's oil export, whereas Europe and the US take up 36% and 33% respectively.)

In 1999, China-Africa trade stood at US\$560 million. The figure grew rapidly to US\$2.95 billion in 2004, and US\$3.22 billion by the end of 2005. Although US-Africa trade has also grown rapidly, from US\$2.69 billion in 1999 to US\$5.89 billion in 2004, the growth rate of China-Africa trade has been greater, amounting to over 50% every year starting from 2002.

Anyway, with the growth of China's power and influence in Africa, the US and Europe feel that their interests in Africa have been challenged. They believe that China's conduct in Africa offsets Western political influence and economic market, as well as the strong influence they used to exert over Africa in the latter's democratization process, which is intolerable to them.

3. Is China a New Colonial Power in Africa?

There is another aspect of the criticism against China, i.e., regarding China as a colonial power. In February 2006, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw of the UK commented that what China was now doing in Africa was simply a repetition of what the West had done 150 years ago. That is to say, he regarded the Chinese as new colonialists in Africa. Such criticism has been incessant in the West. China is also criticized for attaching political strings to its aid to Africa, i.e., demanding that Africa cut political ties with Africa and vote for China over Taiwan issue at the UN.

Realistically speaking, some practices of Chinese businesses in Africa are not that commendable. Peter Bossard described in *San Francisco Chronicle* how China damaged the ecology and its own image in Africa:

“A Chinese company is building a large dam on the Kafue River in Zambia that puts important wetlands, including two national parks, at risk. The dam will generate power for nearby mines, which produce copper and cobalt for China's industry. When Western financiers hesitated to fund the Kafue River project because of environmental concerns, the Chinese developer immediately stepped in, and urged Zambian authorities to cut the environmental assessment process short. A backlash against the social and environmental impacts of Chinese investments has already begun. Workers have protested the poor labor conditions in Chinese mines in Zambia. Rebel groups have targeted Chinese oil installations in Nigeria

²⁸ Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, *China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States*, February 22, 2006.

and Ethiopia. Environmental groups in Burma and Sudan have asked Chinese dam-builders to stay away from their rivers. And the government of Sierra Leone has outlawed timber exports because of the ravaging impacts of Chinese logging.”²⁹

There are some other impacts on Africa, such as the damage of domestic industries in Africa to a certain extent. In South Africa, where trade unions have complained that Chinese textile imports have been devastating domestic industry, President Thabo Mbeki pointedly told a student audience last month that Africa needed to guard against allowing relations with China to develop into a "colonial relationship."³⁰ When interviewed by *New York Times*, Wilfred Collins Wonani, who leads the Chamber of Commerce in Zambia, said, “Sending raw materials out, bringing cheap manufactured goods in. This isn’t progress. It is colonialism.”

However, those undesirable practices by some Chinese businesses in Africa do not prove that all allegations against China are true, especially those labeling China as a colonial power, to which the Chinese Government has strongly objected. When Premier Wen Jiabao visited Egypt in 2006, he said that “Neo-colonialism is not a label for China. The Chinese nation knows the pains colonialism once inflicted on its people and knows well that we must fight against colonialism.” Western allegations were also refuted by some African state leaders. Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa said China helped Zambia before it gained independence in the fight against colonialism and provided Zambia with selfless assistance on a large number of economic and social development projects after its independence, including the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. The president of Cameroon's National Assembly, Cavaye Yequie Djibril, said Cameroon completely disagrees with those who see China as a "neo-colonialist" presence in Africa and believed that China's cooperation with Africa benefits people on both sides.³¹

According to widely accepted definitions, colonialism is to occupy foreign land, control political and economic affairs of that country, practice unfair trade through violence and immoral means; whereas neo-colonialism is to exploit other countries' wealth in a mild way and through investment and economic assistance with strict political conditions. Judged by such criteria, China has not occupied any land in Africa, exercised de-facto control of political and economic systems in Africa, neither has it used deceitful means to steal and exploit African resources. Problems do exist, but they can be resolved step by step. More importantly, Africa maintains its sovereign independence. If China does have colonial behavior and has hurt the fundamental interests of Africa, Africa can well shut its door in the face of China. Obviously China is not a colonial power in Africa.

²⁹ Alex Pasternack, *China and Africa and Us*, 02.15.08.

³⁰ 2008 China faces charges of colonialism in Africa, *the International Herald Tribune*, January 28, 2007.

³¹ Some responses to the 'China threat in Africa,
http://www.chinataiwan.org/english/News/op/200711/t20071107_480470.htm.

IV. Foundations and Ways to Transcend Power Politics in Africa

If the above mentioned disputes and divergence go on for a certain period of time, lasting conflicts among China, Europe and the US will ensue. Maybe these disputes do not seem to be solvable for the moment, but it is in fact not the case. In this age of global economic interdependence, the interests of China, Europe and the US in Africa are interwoven. In other words, to a large degree their common interests in the world are gradually dwarfing their respective interests in Africa. Actually there is room and necessity for the three parties to cooperate over Africa, thereby enabling them to resolve disputes in a way that transcends power politics.

1. Transcending the Foundation of Power Politics

Martin Wight describes in *Power Politics* the key role played by power in international relations. He believes that international relations are irresistibly inclined towards immoral power politics. Powers will stress state interests so much that they will not consider moral constraints. This concept of obsession with power over morals is a key concept in realistic theories in international relations. For example, realism masters like E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz extol with no exception the importance of power politics in deciding the order of international relations, or regard it as the almost only ultimate power. Of course, the reality of international relations makes it easier for people to accept the concept of power politics. Power speaks at critical moments, which leaves a deep impression on people about the importance of power status. Even weak countries could obtain through power politics logic capital and space to coerce or dissociate themselves from powers.

Therefore, generally speaking, the trend of international relations—from the existing international system to an ultimate state—seems to always end up in a violent global war, and then there will be the trend towards a second war. The history of international relations seems to evolve through cycles that end up in war. The omnipresence power conflicts have never been changed. Human society simply lingers on the verge of the next unpredictable war.

The pessimistic picture painted by realism offers such profound philosophical significance to the human society that all people, especially state leaders, need to handle international relations cautiously so as to avoid the early advent of that predestined war. Therefore, the pessimistic forecast of the future society by realism and the profound revelation of the nature of the international community sound a lasting and resonating alarm to all people on earth.

Nevertheless, even if there is nothing fundamentally wrong about the assumption behind this philosophical proposition – the norm of conduct in the international community relies mainly on power, not morals—it can not pass judgment that the ultimate state of power politics will be war. Theoretically speaking, the human society can prolong the interval between two wars, even indefinitely. Historical experiences

show that it is no longer a norm for the international community to undergo large frequent wars. The international community has learned many ways to avoid the outbreak of war. The concept that power politics determines international relations and external behaviors has come under challenge.

Therefore, even if it is admitted that power politics underlie international relations, it does not necessarily lead to violent conflicts among countries. It can be said that, constrained by other factors, it is increasingly less likely to cause constant conflicts. According to liberalists, the position of an international system is shown through intervening variants or regulating factors like international power structure, interests relations and the consequences of actors' behavior. Whether as a dependent or independent variant, such factors as international mechanisms enable international relations to go on in a mild way.

In Africa, the transcendence over power politics depicts reality as far as international mechanisms and interdependence are concerned. There are already channels of communication between China and Europe, including the China-Europe Strategic Dialogue and ASEM. Certainly these mechanisms are not yet functioning perfectly, but they are at least available to solve problems that used to be solved by power politics. Maybe there is a lack of effective multilateral venue for China and the US to resolve their conflicts in Africa, but bilateral dialogue between the two has been set up, and the two sides are to a large extent dependent on each other in economy, like the way it is between China and Europe.

In other words, the major foundation for the China-US-Europe triangular relations to transcend power politics in Africa is the interdependence of the three parties on each other in their pursuit of global interests. If the Europe and the US criticize and exclude China's interests in Africa excessively, then the Chinese economy will be hurt, which will in turn leave a negative impact on consumers in the US and Europe and on investors in China from the two sides. If Europe and the US try to elbow China out of the natural resources market in Africa, especially the oil supply, then China will have fiercer competition with them in the Middle East, which will only aggravate the disturbance already existing there. These tradeoffs put constraints on power politics. Within the framework of international institutions, such tradeoffs can be better made in a mild, not coercive, manner.

2. Changes in Concepts and Behaviors

In order to resolve conflicts and disagreement among China, the US and Europe in Africa, power politics must be transcended, and corresponding action must be taken. First of all, neither the US nor Europe should believe that the growth of China's interests and influence in Africa is a threat, or that a zero-sum game must be played. Since there is a foundation for transcending power politics, interests of the three sides being interwoven, a constructive attitude is needed to explore how to peacefully co-exist in Africa. It's better to strive for a win-win outcome for China, the US,

Europe and Africa than to chide each other and allow disputes to escalate.

Apparently the win-win model will be built on the basis of multilateral institutions and bilateral negotiations. The exploitation of resources in Africa should abide by WTO rules. Each country should carry out free and equal international trade with African countries. Simply put, the economic and trade relations between Africa and powers should be based on equal and reciprocal economic liberalism, not political liberalism.

The African economic policies of Western countries including the US are mentioned in the same breadth as political conditions, a practice that insists on universal morals (such as requiring African governments to respect human rights, rule of law and democratic liberty) in name, but does not give up on the power politics approach of coercion. When Westerners believe a certain African country has violated political conditions they set, they will use embargo, military threat or even direct intervention to compel the other side to meet their standards of political liberalism. Therefore the West is hypocritical in their African policy, stressing equal partnership with Africa on one hand while keeping a condescending attitude in politics on the other hand.

China is by no means faultless. If it pursues pure mercantilism, ignoring the mess of African internal politics instead of helping find a way out, China will face increasing pressure from all sides, such as the US, Europe, Africa, and those parties in China whose African interests have been hurt. We must admit that China's focus on economic interests in Africa and its mercantile attitude have provoked protests from a growing number of Africans, including non-government organizations such as environmental protection organizations, labor unions, national industry association, etc. as well as political groups. Civil societies have come into being after the rapid democratization in Africa around 1990. Democratic politics makes it possible for some political groups to stand out blaming China in order to cater to a certain constituency. The 2007 presidential election in Zambia is a good case in point. At that time, Michael Sata, opposition leader and presidential candidate, issued a strong warning against China's negative impact on domestic industries, environment, fair labor practice and resource sustainability. Similar warnings (though milder in terms) have also been heard from leaders of other African countries, including South Africa.³² Moreover, realizing that the quality of human rights in its African partner countries has deteriorated China should actively use multilateral approaches to fulfill its international obligations and maintain international morality and justice. Therefore, China should not ignore the mess of political affairs in African countries; neither should it impose unilateral intervention disregarding African countries' sovereignty. Instead it should play a proactive, constructive role in pursuing a multilateral solution.

However, not all inherent interests can be changed by changes in attitude. Scarcity of

³² During the fall 2007 Presidential campaign in Zambia, Michael Sata, head of the opposition party Patriotic Front, vowed to "run 'bogus' Chinese investors out of the country," winning 28% of votes.

resources leads China, Europe and the US to compete in different ways in Africa, resulting in conflicts that may not be entirely smoothed out even by multilateral solutions. Reconciliation and win-win strategy require that attempts be made not change the others but to change oneself, or to change the modes of economic growth and social consumption in one's own country.

As the world's second largest (probably the largest) CO₂ producer, China should accelerate the upgrading of industrial structure, improve energy and resources efficiency, develop more alternative energy sources so as to reduce resource dependence on Africa, or at least to slow down the growth of resources demand. Whereas the US and Europe need to change their domestic consumption pattern. Energy consumed by a US household on average is several times higher than that by a Chinese household, which means the US is consuming energy several times faster than the world average. Damaging the prospects for sustainable development in the world (including Africa), it is in fact exploiting other countries. Moreover, the US and Europe have to realize that the legitimacy of a rising China pursuing more overseas resources and energy is not be challenged or censured. As China rises, the US and Europe gets cheaper consumer products. This kind of reciprocity indicates we are all in the same boat.

In summary, there is no need for China, the US and Europe to rebuke or take revenge against each other over Africa. For the sake of common interest, the three sides should respect each other. More importantly, they should share benefits through multilateral approaches and reconciliation, but not to clash with each other owing to disputes over the distribution of interests.

Conclusion

So far this paper has not given a full coverage of African views and reactions. In the China-US-Europe triangular relations, Africa should not be a target to be dominated, but an equal partner and a stakeholder. The US, Europe and China should listen to Africa's voice. When they explore possibilities of cooperation, they should take full account of Africa's interests and strengths, not solely self interests or interests common to two parties only. Anyway, in this age of globalization and economic interdependence, economic growth in China, the US and Europe should not come at the cost of African interests, a colonial practice that is both immoral and at odds with the three sides' own interests.

Therefore, China, the US and Europe should discuss and agree on a proper attitude towards Africa, which includes: a.) Respect the economic and political autonomy of Africa, so that it has the full right to allocate its resources and energy. This could prevent predatory exploitation by foreign capital and ensure sustainable economic growth in Africa; b.) Fair trade with Africa, which means that China, the US and Europe should abide by WTO rules as best as they can when trading with Africa; c.) The three countries should separate their economic policy towards Africa from the

political policy. The African policies of Europe and the US often attach coercive political terms to economic policies, which does not suit the interests of Africa as a whole. A separation of the economic policy from the political policy does not mean that the international community will turn a deaf ear to dangerous political situations in Africa, but it means that international actions targeting political situations in Africa should be taken in parallel with day-to-day economic policies, e.g., solving problems through multilateral means (such as international mediation) instead of unilateral suppression. Neither does it mean that the international community should be indifferent to such political issues as the disregard for human rights, but it means that actions should be taken on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of African countries.

d.) Maybe the most important thing is for China, the US, Europe and Africa to conduct flexible four-party talks to fully understand the wishes and internal situation of each other, making win-win African policies based on facts. Consultation, cooperation, win-win strategy, no rebuke or confrontation, are the best way to sort out disputes between China, the US and Europe over Africa.

冷战后“非洲问题”与中美欧三边关系

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前言

长期以来，非洲几乎是一个被外人所遗忘的大陆，持续不断的内部冲突和贫困使世界上其他国家唯恐避之不及。然而这种状况在 1980 年代之后，尤其是 2000 年前后发生了深刻变化，从 1990 年代起，非洲开始摆脱 1980 年代的衰退这一所谓“失去的”10 年而进入新的时期，民主化浪潮和剧烈的社会变革及其所引发的冲突，以及逐渐加速的经济进步重新引发了世人的关注。这包括大国所表现出来的对非洲日益强烈的兴趣。美国人改变了非洲战略，从军事援助为主改为经贸互动为主；欧洲人在一定程度上丧失传统影响力之后，再次强调过去紧密的传统“友谊”的意义，并上升到战略高度；中国人也越来越多的以商人身份而不只是过去慷慨的施舍者姿态进入非洲。在千禧年前后，列强重新发现了非洲这块散发着迷人气味的古老的黑色大陆。

然而，它们重新发现和进入这块大陆的过程并非风平浪静，大国之间的利益纠葛和价值冲突，以及非洲本地的利害取舍和对这些新老“朋友”的选择成为新世纪国际舞台上最为有趣的博弈之一。因此，被列强重新发现的非洲成为了影响大国关系和国际秩序的重要因素，也因此，非洲继 1950—1960 年代的反殖民运动之后，再次成为一个大国关系中的“问题”，它反映了冷战结束后由于非洲自身地位的变迁和大国在非洲利益的重新调整，引发了大国之间以及大国与非洲之间的诸多矛盾。

为此，本文将详尽阐述“非洲问题”产生的过程和原因，并在此基础上，依次介绍美国、欧洲和中国的对非政策与对非关系的新变化，以及这些国家间的龃龉。本文将最终致力于在理论上寻找缓和和大国在非洲问题上的冲突并开始合作的基础和途径。

一、地缘政治与非洲国际地位的变迁

自民族解放和反殖民主义运动之后，非洲在国际舞台的地位变得重要起来。二战之后，基于以联合国为象征的现代国际体系的建构为非洲国家的政治地位注入了合法性与活力，在反对殖民主义和帝国主义的斗争中，非洲大陆一度成为国际舞台的重要角色，它们在联合国具有的平等投票权、联合自强运动、以及对不结盟运动的支持提升了自己的国际地位。与此同时，冷战的爆发与延展，两大阵

营的形成也迫使他们成为两极体系的牺牲品，成为美苏两国争夺势力范围的对象并由此显示出地缘政治的重要性。然而冷战的结束改变了这一切。

1. 地缘政治地位的下降

两极体系时代，美苏为争夺全球势力范围，都极力拉拢和分化对方的势力范围，在非洲也不例外。因此，受冷战的影响，除了少数保持中立的国家之外，非洲大部分国家都被迫加入两大集团之一，成为美苏两国争夺霸权的代理人，其地缘政治的重要性极其明显。冷战终结之后，某种程度上，非洲似乎陷入被“抛弃”的命运境地。一位美国学者这样写道：“当东欧国家政治制度剧变开始主导美国决策机构的议事日程时，非洲问题的地位逐渐下降。”¹

很长时间以来，欧洲也只是保持着一般的而非紧密的关系，尽管存在长期而有效的《洛美协定》——它是较为成功的南北合作的典范，但在短暂的 1990 年代前后，作为整体的欧洲没有足够意愿经营更为深厚的欧非关系。除了法国、英国和德国这些过去的老牌殖民主义者之外（它们一直保持着与非洲前殖民地国家较为特殊的经贸、政治和军事关系），欧共体（欧盟）没有发展出一套系统的对非政策。

2. 民主化浪潮

地缘政治地位下降的同时，非洲却突然遭遇了一股民主化浪潮的冲击。由于历史原因，非洲大部分国家并没有西方民主政治的传统，即使在民族国家解放和独立运动过程中，代议民主和多党政治这些西方民主形式并没有在非洲扎根，基本上说，从 1960 年代的去殖民化运动之后到 20 世纪晚期民主化浪潮之前，非洲各国基本上处于一党独大和一党执政的局面，这种政体形式被冠以“新祖传主义”（neo-patrimonialist）的标签，它意味着在 1990 年这一象征性年份之前，非洲国家的政治权力经常集中在获得军队支持的行政机关之下，立法和司法机构则受到行政机关的控制，这些行政机关“是国家首脑，政府首脑和执政党的首脑。他们至少可以任命部分立法机关成员，并任命全部法官和公务员，（整个政治体系）缺乏对行政专制行为的限制；公民则被视作国家领袖的的奴仆”。²然而“新祖传主义”政权在 1990 年代冷战终结之后迅速被民主化浪潮所吞没，在黑非洲地区，大部分国家快速转入民主体制，在不到 5 年时间之内完成了民主转型。

民主化浪潮迅即席卷非洲大陆并非偶然，这期间包括外部因素的推动，也有内部因素的刺激。就内部因素而言，由于长期沿袭“新祖传主义”政制，最后导致大部分非洲国家腐败盛行，社会贫困有增无减，百姓生活水平下降，这成为内部改革的重要动力。而外部因素则主要源于冷战的终结。冷战时代，为了结成同盟关系，美国和西方国家不会太计较非洲国家领导人的腐败行为和政治独裁，但冷战结束以后，美国在推行全球民主价值观上的雄心壮志影响到它对非洲国家的态度，在对非援助上更加强调改善人权和政治民主的条件，为了稳定国内局势和

¹ [美] 彼得·施雷德：《冷战结束后的美国对非政策》，《西亚非洲》，1997 年第 5 期。

² *Democratization in the twentieth century Africa*, pp.2-3.

维持经济发展，非洲国家被迫接受这些条件。³

民主化的结果是在一定程度上改善了非洲人民的政治地位和人权状况，并有限地遏制了腐败，在接受美国和其他西方社会的政治条件之后，加强了与发达国家的联系。但是其消极影响也显而易见。由于在极其短暂的时间（最短的不过3年）内完成民主化转型，许多国家没有来得及消化便陷入具有部族纷争为背景的国家政治斗争甚至内战之中，民主化道路依然任重道远。

3. 地区冲突和社会矛盾

非洲历来是多事之地，社会冲突不断，国内矛盾重重。根据2000年数据，有超过20%的非洲人口受到过冲突的波及，是世界上冲突最多的地区。根据国际救援委员会（International Rescue Committee）估计，2005年之前的6年冲突里，仅刚果就有380万人罹难。⁴处于和曾经处于严重冲突的主要国家包括利比亚、卢旺达、索马里、塞拉利昂、扎伊尔等。而这些国家和地区的冲突往往会外溢到周边邻国，导致邻国社会的动荡。⁵

这些冲突在很大程度上应归咎于西方殖民主义的历史遗产。由于西方在匆忙离开黑非洲之际，仅根据自己的势力范围“创建”了许多所谓民族国家。但是，这些国家内部族性和文化的多元化并不能在短期内成功整合，仅仅依照领土边界而不顾文化和部族传统疆域的草率的帝国主义行为成为了内部冲突的重要根源。在冷战时期，这些矛盾在两极体系的大环境下分别受超级大国的压制，冷战结束以后，内部矛盾在民主政治的鼓励下迅速得以释放，那些自以为受到压制的部族会奋起反抗占据统治地位的部族，引发内部冲突甚至部族间屠杀和内战。

在社会矛盾方面，冷战后非洲国家内部依然存在严重的腐败行为，许多国家的政府领导人和高官常常私吞国外的资金援助。⁶这种状况主要由于缺乏对政府高官的有效监管，脆弱的公共机构、软弱无能的市民社会组织、司法机构缺乏独立性、公务员不足，等等，都是助长官员腐败的原因。

由于地区冲突和腐败盛行，外国资本对非洲的民间投资一直增长缓慢。据2004年统计，非洲有8亿多的人口规模，但所获得的海外投资只占到全球份额的0.5%还弱。⁷海外资本的欠缺致使本地经济的发展难有较大发展，社会贫困难以获得改善，健康、医疗、教育和社会平等问题都难以得到长足发展，经济落后所导致的问题反过来又加剧了社会冲突和矛盾的增长。

³ 就具体的原因而言，民主化得益于多方因素，诸如受过西方教育的领导人；社会经济和政治关系的日益紧密和1989年柏林墙倒塌所产生的世界性影响。参见 *To understand the ubiquity of democratization on the African Subcontinent*.

⁴ Abraham McLaughlin, *Can Africa solve African problems?*

⁵ *The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Preventing and Reducing Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Published by the Department for International Development September 2004.

⁶ Susan Dicklitch, *African corruption is a crime against humanity*, August 09, 2004.

⁷ Michael Dynes, *What chance saving Africa?*

4. 加速的一体化进程

冷战后非洲加速了内部一体化进程。从表现形式来看，非洲的一体化包含两种类型：激进主义的一体化和渐进主义的一体化。激进主义一体化主要是早期由恩克鲁玛等非洲国家领导人所主导的、受到美国等海外黑人群体支持的泛非主义运动；而渐进主义一体化则是通常所见的地区经济整合以及由此所导致的其他领域的合作进程。基于历史和现实原因的限制，泛非主义作为思潮虽然依旧存在，但作为运动已基本消散，或已经逐渐被渐进主义一体化所吸收，因此冷战后的非洲一体化进程主要表现为渐进主义。

非洲渐进主义的一体化进程其实有着悠久的历史。1910年，曾经建立过南部非洲关税同盟，1949年，又成立了南部罗得西亚关税同盟，涵盖了当前的南非和津巴布韦。从1960年代到1970年代，非洲又涌现了多个区域经济一体化组织，如东非共同体（1967）、中非经济与关税同盟（1974）、大湖国家共同体（1976）等。及至2007年，非洲成立了13个次地区贸易协定。⁸

当然最重要的一体化机构是2003年成立的非洲联盟（The African Union），其前身是1963年成立的非洲统一组织（The Organization of African Unity）。非洲联盟是整合全非洲地区各国经济和政治关系的最重要的国际机构，它比上述所有纯粹的经济一体化机构具有更宏伟的一体化构想和更完整的一体化目标。但是一体化进程的加速并不意味着一体化成果实质性地丰富与深化，在很大程度上，一体化仅仅是形式上的。

二、冷战后中美欧的对非政策与对非关系

1. 美国对非政策与对非关系

冷战之前，非洲是美国和苏联竞争的大舞台，冷战之后，非洲在地缘战略上不再有以前那样重要，在孤立主义思潮的影响下，关于美国应退出非洲的呼声在美国国内也开始出现。但是，由于美国在冷战后所特有的雄心壮志阻止了孤立主义思潮的泛滥，也由于非洲在地缘上具有新的战略意义，因此美国并没有放弃非洲，而是用一种别的方式加强了和非洲的联系。

老布什政府对非政策的重点是填补前苏联遗留下来的势力范围并推行民主化，到克林顿主政时期，则重点强调美非之间的经贸关系。1995年，美国国务院安全事务办公室发表了一份针对非洲的报告，该报告指出，美国在非洲的安全利益、经济利益和国家间联系都很有有限，不过报告依然宣称，“与非洲保持经济联系符合美国的利益。今天，撒哈拉以南非洲已形成一个新兴市场”。⁹

⁸ 有学者将非洲经济一体化分为两大类型：符合1980年获得接受的《拉格斯行动计划》的经济一体化；一类是外在于《拉格斯行动计划》的经济一体化。见 *Regional Integration in Africa*；同时参见 *The need for African integration*。

⁹ *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, Report published by the Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Tuesday, August 01, 1995.

小布什上台之后，其政府起初也只是沿袭了前任克林顿的对非政策，但是 911 事件之后，迅即调整了对非政策，增大了对非关注。及至 2006 年，美国《国家安全战略》(NSS) 这样写道：“对本届政府而言，非洲具有日益重要的地缘战略上的重要性和高度的优先性”，显然，这一用词与 10 年前克林顿政府的措词极为不同了。非洲事务代理副国务卿 Theresa Whelan 也曾说：“在美国日程里，非洲比过去的 10—15 年里显得更为重要了。”¹⁰

而发展对非关系的目的，按照 2006 年美国国务院非洲事务助理国务卿的看法，主要集中在四个方面：第一，支持和促进非洲民主治理和政治自由；第二，寻求经济增长与扩展其机遇，特别是通过贸易和私人企业以及通过创造公平的竞争环境来使非洲人为自己服务；第三，与这个大陆的疾病作斗争；第四，结束所有非洲的战乱。¹¹不过对美国而言，对非政策表面上都宣称是为了推进非洲经济发展与政治民主，但其实质不过是推进美国的国家利益。¹²

可以看出，从克林顿政府到当前的小布什政府，对非政策都表现出与非洲发展更积双边关系的愿望，其中发展经贸关系（并不是传统上的单向对非援助）是两届政府共同的对非政策内涵，这一政策是建立在一系列对非经贸法案上，其中最重要的法案是 2000 年生效的《非洲增长与机遇法案》(The African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA)。2007 年，美国贸易代表 Susan C. Schwab 指出，“自从 AGOA 于 2000 年启动以来，美国与撒哈拉以南非洲的双边贸易提升了 143%”。¹³无疑，美国是现今非洲最大的贸易伙伴，而 AGOA 奠定了这种紧密关系的基础。

美国与撒哈拉以南非洲贸易（百万美元）

	2003年	2004年	2005年	2006年
出口	6, 870. 9	8, 438. 5	10, 342. 6	12, 116. 8
进口	25, 633. 3	35, 879. 5	50, 364. 6	59, 175. 2

资料来源：U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census

不过两届政府的对非政策也有不同之处。对克林顿政府而言，非洲的重要性主要体现为日益增长的经济利益，其政策重心从过去与苏联争夺地缘政治势力转变为寻求互惠的商贸利益。美国也曾经基于价值观上的理想而关注过非洲，但在索马里的军事行动功败垂成之后，它对后来的一些非洲内部安全问题（如卢旺达部族屠杀）基本采取消极态度。

而小布什政府时期，非洲之于美国的重要性除了经贸利益之外，更增添了安

¹⁰ US Security Strategy: Spotlights African Partnerships.

¹¹ Current Themes in U.S.-Africa Policy, Jendayi Frazer, Assistant, Secretary for African Affairs, Chatham House, London, England, May 16, 2006.

¹² Africa is important to the United States. U.S. policy on Africa attempts to foster development and democracy in such a way that it builds on Africa's traditions and advances U.S. interests.

¹³ 2007 AGOA Report Shows Growth in U.S. – Africa Trade, 05/18/2007.

全上的重要地位。911 事件之后，非洲成为了美国进行反恐的重要伙伴，恐怖主义者曾经针对美国在非洲发动过一些恐怖活动，包括对美国驻内罗毕和达累斯萨拉姆的大使馆的袭击。

非经济领域的对非政策还体现为“转移外交”在非洲的运用以及为成立非洲司令部所作的努力。小布什政府的国务卿赖斯在大学的一次演讲中提出，转移外交 (Transformational diplomacy) 意味着美国外交的指导原则是伙伴关系而非过去的家长式管理 (Paternalism)，是“和人民一起行动而不是为他们行动……寻求使用美国的外交力量以帮助外国的公民过上更好的生活、建立自己的民族、以及改变他们自己的未来”。

此外，小布什政府也致力于建立非洲司令部和在非洲建立军事据点。2007 年负责非洲事务的助理国务卿这样描述非洲司令部的功能——随着非洲司令部 (AFRICOM) 的成立，非洲最终将作为世界上单独的和分离的一部分，除埃及之外的所有领土都将置于一个单独的统一的司令部管辖之下。¹⁴不过这种意图并没有取得很大的成功，非洲国家担心美国的军事存在会招引不必要的恐怖主义者对非洲的注意，从而增添新的非洲动荡的因素。2008 年 2 月，布什总统再次访问非洲时提到美国建立非洲司令部的目的，宣称这只是为了帮助非洲国家加强在维和、打击走私和反恐作战等领域的能力云云。但是受访国加纳、利比里亚等都没有表态接受这个司令部，坦桑尼亚总统则在布什离开之后表示，坦桑尼亚不具备接纳美军非洲司令部的能力。

2. 欧盟对非政策与对非关系

基于历史与地理原因，欧洲与非洲有着特殊关系。很长时间以来，欧洲人在非洲进行殖民主义活动，控制了非洲大部分地区，而地理上，非洲又与地中海国家很接近，历史上也一直保持着紧密的商贸和政治关系。在 1950—1960 年代的去殖民主义运动之后，非洲大部分国家虽然保持名义上的政治独立，但西方国家依然在非洲保持强大的影响力。基于这些历史原因，欧洲在发展和非洲的关系时往往会强调它们之间所存在的这些特殊性，比如在 2005 年，欧盟在发表一份对非战略伙伴关系文件时强调说，“欧洲与非洲基于历史、地理、和给所有人带来和平、民主和繁荣的未来这一共享愿景而联系在一起”。¹⁵ 2007 年，在里斯本欧非峰会上达成的共同文件中同样写道：“欧洲与非洲基于以下因素而联系在一起，即历史、文化、地理、共同的未来价值共同体。”¹⁶

历史上，欧非关系通过建立一系列文件而得以巩固，包括 1975 年开始签订的第一份洛美协定 (*The Lomé Agreement*)。之后，《洛美协定》成为联系欧非关系

¹⁴ *Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa*, Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa Washington, DC, August 1, 2007.

¹⁵ Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Presse 367), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*.

¹⁶ Lisbon, 9 December 2007, 16344/07 (Presse 291), *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*.

的主要国际条约，直到2000年欧盟与撒哈拉以南48个国家签订了有效期为20年《科托努协定》（*The Cotonou Agreement*）。2005年，重新修订的《科托努协定》加入了政治条款，使该条约成为欧盟与撒哈拉以南非洲国家全面的（政治、贸易与社会发展）的单一关系框架。而欧盟与北非国家的关系则主要建立在《欧洲—地中海伙伴关系与联系协定》（*The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Association Agreements*）、《欧洲邻居政策》（*The European Neighborhood Policy*）以及《邻居政策行动计划》之上。

尽管欧非之间一直保持相对紧密的关系，但是基于欧非自身的变化和世界情势的变迁，冷战后的欧非关系发生了一些改变。冷战以后，全球化的迅猛发展使得国家间经济和相互依赖的程度比以前更高，而它所带来的危机也不断威胁欠发达国家和地区的经济增长，以及日益增多的国际问题对全球都产生消极后果；当两极体系下超级大国的势力争夺让位于不断增长的地区冲突时，尤其是911事件之后，恐怖主义的现实威胁和美国对这种威胁的鼓吹提高了国际安全环境的危险程度；与此同时，欧洲与非洲各自的一体化进程也加速了。这些新的情势的出现，要求欧洲对原有的欧非关系进行调整，这时，欧洲开始更多地加强双边关系的平等性，使其建立在共同利益、相互承认和负责任的基础之上。

或者说，这种变化的主要目的是为了加深与非洲的全面关系而不只是过去以经济为主的联系。2005年10月，欧盟委员会在提交给理事会和议会的对非战略文件中提到，欧盟发展与非洲伙伴关系的目的是为了促进所有非洲人的和平与繁荣，促进《联合国千年发展目标》（*The UN Millennium Development Goals*）在非洲的实现。¹⁷在同年12月由欧盟理事会发表的最终对非政策文件则明确表示，欧非战略关系的主要目标是促进《联合国千年发展目标》与非洲的可持续性发展、安全与善治，¹⁸其具体目标包括：欧盟机构经常讨论欧非关系并提出报告；与非洲主要国际组织如非洲联盟进行合作，参与非洲的多边论坛；与非洲进行政治对话。¹⁹

2007年12月，欧盟理事会发表了新的欧盟对非战略，这是欧洲首份将非洲视为一个整体的正式政治框架，以此为平台，以保障欧盟对非政策的协调性和连贯性。这份新的对非政策文件提出了构建欧非战略伙伴关系所要达到的四大目标，其中包括提升双方的政治关系。²⁰

可以看出，欧洲对非洲政策的目的在于深化全面伙伴关系而非只是以往的经济关系，其中促进非洲政治民主和人权等政治发展的目的十分明显。欧盟设想在殖民主义时代所建立起来的传统的紧密联系得以延续，并试图按照欧盟自身的社

¹⁷ Brussels, 12.10.2005, COM (2005) 489 final, Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, *EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*, {SEC(2005)1255}.

¹⁸ Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Press 367), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Lisbon, 9 December 2007, 16344/07 (Press 291), *THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*.

会发展标准推进非洲的进步，如果获得成功，欧洲无疑将会成为非洲在文化、价值观、社会发展模式和政治生活领域的教师爷，也因此重新成为在非洲最重要的外部力量。

3. 中国对非政策与对非关系

新中国成立以来，就十分重视发展与非洲国家的关系。长期以来，由于共同的被殖民的历史和在当时国际形势下，反帝反殖斗争的需要，中国和非洲在国际社会相互支持和帮助。但随着国际形势的变迁，尤其是冷战的终结和全球化的开始，中非关系也经历了种种变化。整体而言，中国对非政策经历了从 1950 年代至 1970 年代的经济援助，到 1980 年代的相对冷淡，再到 1990 年代之后的重新热络这样曲折的历程。

1950 年代，中国和殖民地国家人民在反抗帝国主义和殖民主义斗争中和非洲结下了友谊。在 1960 和 1970 年代，由于受冷战影响，中国和非洲国家交往时较多以意识形态划线。

1980 年代初，随着中国改革开放的全面深入发展，尤其随着 1980 年代中后期冷战的缓和，中国对外政策开始摆脱意识形态的束缚，中非关系也进入新的天地，中国领导人对非洲的访问不断加强。国家主席胡锦涛在 2004 年访问非洲时重申了中国对非洲的基本政策，即发展双向互利和尊重主权的平等关系。由此可知，1990 年代之后中国对非洲政策进行了调整，从过去中国向非洲的单向无偿援助和双方政治上的相互支持，转向为合作互利双赢的模式。与此同时，随着中国市场经济的发展和全球化的迅猛发展，越来越多的中国企业走进非洲，参与非洲当地的经济建设，尤其是资源开发与基础设施建设。

在日益活跃的中非交流面前，长期以来由双边关系所推动和发展的中非关系遇到了一定阻碍，中非交往方式需要进行新的改革。在此背景下，2000 年 10 月，中非合作论坛第一届部长级会议在北京举行，会议为中国与非洲发展长期稳定、平等互利的新型伙伴关系确定了方向。2003 年 12 月，在亚的斯亚贝巴又举行了中非合作论坛的第二届部长级会议。2006 年 1 月，中国政府终于发表了首份《中国对非洲政策文件》。作为指导中国对非关系政策的单一文件，其目的在于宣示中国对非政策的目标及措施，规划今后一段时期双方在各领域的合作。2006 年 11 月，中非合作论坛北京峰会在北京召开，会议所发表的《北京峰会宣言》主张根据和平共处五项原则以及所有倡导多边主义和国际关系民主化的国际准则发展中非友好合作关系。

概括地说，中国对非政策发展至今，既延续了长期以来所遵循的不干涉非洲内政的原则，也坚持了经济上互利互惠的原则，但同时创造了不少新的方式来促进和深化中非之间的战略伙伴关系，包括论坛峰会的形式。随着中非交往的深化，中非之间的经贸关系取得了显著成长。根据统计数据显示，2004 年，中国向非洲的出口额比往年增长了 36%，达到 13.82 亿美元，而进口的主要是自然资源，

增长了 81%，达到 15.65 亿美元；2005 年，中非贸易额为 40 亿美元，2007 年则达到 74 亿美元。

三、中美欧对非关系中的政策分歧与现实冲突

总体来看，千禧年前后，中美欧分别对非洲政策进行了重新调整和定位，都试图在新世纪加深和提升与非洲的关系。在各自相互发展对非关系的同时，非洲似乎变得重要起来，但中美欧三方在此问题上的分歧和异议也明显起来，其中最主要的矛盾发生在中美和中欧之间，这主要集中在以下三个方面：对非政策中应坚持让非洲接受西方的自由主义观念并融入到其政治和社会生活中还是严格尊重其内政；中国在非洲是否在走一条殖民主义或新殖民主义道路；在商业领域，中国的非洲政策是否损害了欧美的利益。

1. “华盛顿共识”与“北京共识”之争

在非洲问题上，理论上存在一个争议，即“华盛顿共识”还是“北京共识”更适合于非洲现实？这一争议的背后，又反映了中美欧对非洲的不同态度。“华盛顿共识”基本上代表了美国人甚至欧洲人试图运用自由主义理念和对非洲主权的贬抑来促使非洲国家改变其政治和社会体制，但“北京共识”的存在表明中国并不打算这样做。因此两种共识与非洲可持续发展之间关系的争论正反映美国或西欧在非洲政策上与中国的最大差别。

实际上，“华盛顿共识”这一看起来似乎并不完全被西欧所接受的理念，正被欧美通用于非洲政策，它意味着自由主义贸易，也意味着在处理非洲事务时，将自由民主政治内涵植入非洲大陆的美国人和强调在非洲促进人权和民主的欧洲人在原则上没有太多区分；但是，中国从 1955 年万隆会议开始和非洲接触并发展出现代中非关系以来，从来都坚持不干涉原则或尊重内政的原则。即使在中国加入世界贸易组织之后，以贸易自由主义原则来处理与非洲的经贸关系，但它并不与以前所坚持的政治原则相冲突，这种方式被视作“北京共识”在非洲的运用。由于两种共识在理解他们非洲政策的差异时非常重要，因此其各自的含义应得到广泛的解释。

“华盛顿共识”是在总结 1980 年代南美洲经验时形成的。1989 年，美国经济学家约翰·威廉姆森（John Williamson）倡导了“华盛顿共识”，将此概括为：金融和贸易自由化；建立和强化私有产权的法制体系；强化预算约束和削减财政赤字等。1990 年，他对“华盛顿共识”进行了进一步的归纳和总结。²¹

美国学者芬尼根（William Finnegan）指出，华盛顿共识有时仅仅就是“自由贸易”，是反共产主义失去了战略平衡后的美国思想的主要出口物。它直接通

²¹ 平衡预算，严格控制预算赤字，优化公共开支；优化国民收入的再分配；提倡资本市场自由化；建立可变动的有竞争力的汇率体系；走贸易自由化之路；吸引外国投资；推进国有部门的私有化；政府放松管制；明晰产权并保护私有产权。

过美国的外交政策，或间接地通过多边组织，比如世界银行、国际货币基金组织和世贸组织来传播。它的核心原则就是解除控制、私有化、“开放”、不受限制的资本流动以及更低的税收。²²他还批评小布什政府在对外大肆宣扬“华盛顿共识”时“并不是自由或民主的一种理想主义，而是一个控制系统，一种帝国经济。”²³

由于“华盛顿共识”在实践层面并没有取得预想的成功，甚至遭到发展中国家广泛地诟骂，尤其在1998年前后的亚洲金融风波之后更是如此。这促使了所谓“后华盛顿共识”的产生。前世界银行首席经济学家斯蒂格利茨首先提出了“后华盛顿共识”的概念，批评了不顾社会不满的市场经济全球化和纯粹的经济自由主义。总之，后华盛顿共识要求关注社会公正、经济可持续性和民主发展。²⁴

然而“北京共识”却代表了另一种经济增长模式乃至社会发展途径。2004年5月，英国伦敦外交政策中心发表了Joshua Cooper Ramo的论文即《北京共识》，这一概念的含义包括：坚决进行创新和试验（如经济特区）、积极维护国家边境和利益（如台湾问题）、以及不断精心积累具有不对称力量的工具（如庞大的外汇储备），其目标是在保持独立的同时实现增长。²⁵总之，“北京共识”是对中国经济和社会发展模式的经验总结，它强调主权独立、谨慎地实行自由主义经济政策、保持快速的经济增长等。

再回到非洲问题时可以看到，“华盛顿共识”或“后华盛顿共识”在非洲政策中的含义就是欧美将它们的主要社会价值观念即经济和政治上的自由主义推广到这个大陆，而且这种推广包含着一种强制而不只是吸引力的方式。在美国的对非政策中明确提出要将民主和人权的发展作为美非关系发展的重要目的，而在手段的执行上则通过由美国所操控的国际货币基金组织和世界银行对非洲的金融援助来实现，或者经济援助中所附加的其他限制性条款。欧盟在最近10年来的对非政策文件中日益强调欧非“政治”上的联系和人权、良治、民主发展和社会自由对非洲的激励作用。然而中国的对非政策反映了另一种态度。尽管中国政府并不正式承认“北京共识”的措词，但对非关系事实上遵循了它所概括的对非洲国家的主权尊重，包括不干涉内政原则（实现国家独立前提下的发展）。这一纯粹通过吸引力和模范作用而非强制力推广中国发展道路的方式，以及纯粹以互惠为目的的自由贸易而不是政治自由主义所指导和实践的中非关系，成为和美国与欧盟在发展对非关系时的一个矛盾焦点，它反映了中国与欧美之间在理念和行动的差异，而这些差异会带来实际的利害冲突。

2. 利益之争

不同对非政策原则的运用同时反映了中美欧在非洲问题上的利益分歧。欧美

²² (美)威廉·芬尼根(William Finnegan):《帝国经济学——评华盛顿共识(上)》，选自美国《哈泼斯杂志》2003年5月号，《国外社会科学文摘》2003年第8期。

²³ 同上。

²⁴ [美]斯蒂格利茨(J. E. Stiglitz):《后华盛顿共识(下)》。

²⁵ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus*, The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.

指责中国在非洲的贸易政策损害了西方在非洲获得更多资源，并同时减少了他们在那里的影响力。概括而言，他们对中国共同的指责包括：中国无视非洲内部的腐败和极权主义而只发展与他们的贸易关系，使西方世界对非洲的政治投资受到严重的削弱；中国以诱惑性的条款对非洲的资源开发既损害了欧美的资源占有优势，也提升了非洲资源价格，从而提升了欧美企业的经营成本；另外很重要的，中国在争夺非洲的地缘影响力方面取得的进展正在改变西方世界固有的与非洲的传统联系。

世界银行行长 Paul Wolfowitz 曾经批评中国在贷款给发展中国家时忽略人权和环境标准，警告中国的软贷款和赤裸裸的重商主义行为使得非洲腐败加剧。西方的大量批评家也附和说中国银行在向非洲贷款时并不坚持西方银行所注重的所谓“赤道原则”（Equator Principles），以及西方公司所坚持的要求非洲政府在处置贷款时的透明性。²⁶总之，越来越多美国人和欧洲人认为，那些尊重人权、法治和自由市场的非洲民主国家的繁荣景象日益受到来自中国的挑战，中国坚持其独特的发展模式——通过纪律严明的但一党执政的方式获得的快速增长——成为了非洲国家仿效的对象。此外，欧美还认为中国通过外交和金融、军事支持回馈非洲，对非洲民主事业也造成了损害，这是对欧洲与美国和非洲传统关系的挑战。西方宣称，非洲独裁政府是中国武器和军事装备的买主，这些武器通常被用来镇压非洲国内的少数派、实施严厉的政治统治、对邻国采取强硬政策、消灭任何民主的苗头。²⁷

除了对它们与非洲的政治关系造成冲击之外，欧美也认为中国在经济上也在抢夺它们的市场。如今，中国是世界上第二大原油消费国，仅次于美国，估计到2020年，中国油气进口量将由目前的33%增长到60%。²⁸与此同时，亚洲石油和天然气产量的增长并不能满足中国需要，而油气资源丰富的中东地区的油气生产又通常被欧美市场所瓜分。现今，中国有25%以上的原油来自从几内亚湾和苏丹，而且其石油消费增长速度达到每年10%（尽管事实表明，中国快速增长的原油需要只占到非洲出口原油的10%，相反，欧洲和美国却分别占到36%和33%）。

从贸易角度来看，1999年，中非贸易量为5.6亿美元，2004年则迅速达到29.5亿美元，2005年底，又增长到32.2亿美元。虽然美非贸易增长也很快，从1999年的26.9亿美元增长到2004年的58.9亿美元，然而中非贸易额增长速度更快，从2002年起，增长速度达到每年50%以上。

²⁶ 2003年6月4日，七个国家的10个主要银行宣布实行“赤道原则”，即由这些银行制定的、旨在管理与发展项目融资有关的社会和环境问题的一套自愿性原则，以保证在其项目融资业务中充分考虑到社会和环境问题。

²⁷ 例如，有西方媒体宣称，2004年，尽管美国和欧盟对津巴布韦实施武器禁运，但津巴布韦从中国获得了价值2亿美元的战斗机和军事直升机。

²⁸ Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, *China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States*, February 22, 2006.

无论如何，随着中国力量和影响力在非洲的增长，美国和欧洲感到了中国对它们在非洲利益构成了挑战，认为中国在非洲的行动在抵消西方的政治影响力和经济市场，也在抵消欧美国家与非洲传统关系中对非洲所具有的促进其自由化的强大影响力，这是他们不能容忍的。

3. 中国是非洲的新殖民主义者吗？

对中国的批评还来自另一层面，即将中国看作殖民主义者。2006年2月，英国外交大臣斯特劳斯就这样评价过中国的非洲行动，说中国在非洲的所作所为不过是西方人150年前在非洲的所作所为。这就是说，他将中国人看作非洲的新殖民主义者。这种批评在西方不绝于耳。他们还批驳中国在对非援助事业附加政治条款，那就是要求非洲断绝与台湾的政治关系以及在联合国投票支持中国的台湾政策。

实事求是地看，中国确实在非洲有着不光彩的企业行为，Peter Bosshard在San Francisco Chronicle上这样描述过中国对非洲的生态影响和对其自身形象的破坏：

中国公司正在赞比亚的喀辅埃河（*Kafue River*）修筑一座大型水坝，使得重要的湿地包括两座国家公园遭受威胁。水坝可以为附近的矿产地发电，那里为中国工业生产铜和钴。当西方金融机构还在为喀辅埃河工程贷不贷款而犹豫不决时，中国的开发商已经迅速挤了进来，使得赞比亚当局对环境问题的关注降低了。

对因中国投资而造成社会和军警冲击的反抗阵线已然出现，有工人抗议赞比亚的中国矿区低劣的劳工条件。在尼日利亚和埃塞俄比亚，反抗群体盯住了中国人的石油设备。缅甸和苏丹的环保群体已要求中国水坝建设者滚出这些流域。由于中国乱砍乱伐的冲击，塞拉利昂政府宣布木材出口是非法的。²⁹

此外，还包括一些其他的对非冲击，如对非洲国家民族产业一定程度的破坏。在南非，“贸易联盟”抱怨中国的纺织品进口在吞噬其国内产业，其总统Thabo Mbek就明确警告过非洲要防止与中国的关系发展成一种“殖民关系”。³⁰赞比亚商工会长柯林斯—沃纳尼在接受《纽约时报》的采访时也曾表示：“中国正在横扫（非洲的）天然资源，带进廉价的商品。这不是发展，而是殖民主义。”

然而中国企业的所有这些不光彩的行动并非使所有对中国的指责完全正确，尤其以殖民主义标签斥责中国没有太多根据，这一指责遭到了中国政府的强烈反对。2006年总理温家宝访问埃及时表示，新殖民主义不是中国的标签，中国人深知殖民主义曾给中国人民带来的痛苦，也深知必须反抗殖民主义。西方人的这一指责也遭到一些非洲国家领导人的反驳。赞比亚总统雷维·穆瓦纳瓦萨（Levy Mwanawasa）赞赏中国在赞比亚独立之前就帮助赞比亚反抗过殖民主义，在赞比

²⁹ Alex Pasternack, *China and Africa and Us*, 02.15.08.

³⁰ 2008 China faces charges of colonialism in Africa, *the International Herald Tribune*, January 28, 2007.

亚独立之后，又无私援助了大量的经济和社会发展方案，包括坦赞铁路。喀麦隆民族阵线主席 Cavaye Yequie Djibril 则说，喀麦隆完全不同意有些人的看法，说中国在非洲是一个“新殖民主义者”，他相信中国同非洲的合作互惠互利。³¹

然而，基于一般被广泛接受的定义，殖民主义表现为占领外国人的土地、控制该国的经济和政治事务、并利用暴力与非道德手段实施不公平的贸易，而新殖民主义无非以温和的方式和带有严格政治条件的投资与经济援助来剥削这些国家的财富。就此而言，中国既没有占领非洲的土地，没有在事实上控制非洲的政治和经济体系，也没有通过不道德和不诚实的方式掠夺非洲的资源。即使存在许多问题，但这些问题可以通过进步逐步解决，最重要的是，非洲保持着主权独立，如果中国确实有殖民主义行为而损害到其根本利益，非洲可以关闭中国进入这块大陆的大门。显然，中国并不是非洲的殖民者。³²

四、在非洲问题上超越权力政治的基础与途径

如果上述矛盾和分歧积累到一定程度，这将引发中美欧在非洲的持久冲突。或许表面上看来，这些矛盾和分歧一时还没有化解的空间，但事实并不如此。在非洲，在全球经济相互依赖的时代，中美欧三方的在非利益处在相互交织的状态下，或者说，在很大程度上，它们之间在全球范围内的共同利益逐渐使彼此的在非利益变得不那么重要和明显，而且实际上，三方在非洲问题上存在合作的空间和必要，这就使它们能够在超越权力政治基础上化解矛盾和分歧。

1. 超越权力政治的基础

怀特在《权力政治》一书中描述了权力在国际关系具有关键地位的作用，他认为国际关系总在不可阻挡的朝向不道德的权力政治，列强最注重国家利益而不会顾及道德的约束。这种迷恋权力甚于道德的观念在国际关系现实主义理论中成为一种核心观点，就像卡尔、摩根索和沃尔兹这些现实主义大师无一例外地吹捧权力政治在决定国际关系秩序的重要性，或者是几乎唯一的最终的力量。当然，国际关系的现实状态总会让更多人比较容易接受权力政治的观点，在最终关头往往让拳头说话的国际关系事实加深了人们对权力地位的印象，就是弱小国家也可以通过权力政治逻辑而获得要挟和游离于大国之间的资本和空间。

因而总的来看，国际关系的趋势——那一当前国际体系通向终极状态的趋势——似乎总会以某场剧烈的国际战争收场，之后便是通向另一场新的战争的趋势。国际关系的历史就在以战争为归宿的逻辑循环中不断演绎，权力冲突无处不在和无时不有的实质没有发生过改变，人类社会就是在迎接下一场不可预料的战争而在两场战争的间歇期间苟延残喘。

³¹ Some responses to the 'China threat in Africa', http://www.chinataiwan.org/english/News/op/200711/t20071107_480470.htm.

³² 参见 Jian Junbo, China in Africa: From capitalism to colonialism? *Asia Times Online*, Jan 5, 2007.

现实主义的悲观图景为人类社会所提供的哲学含义如此深刻和宏大，以至于所有人，尤其是国家领袖需要谨慎地处理国际关系以避免那场宿命似的战争提前到来，因此现实主义对未来社会的悲观预测和对国际社会本质的深刻揭示为地球人提供了持久和深沉的警讯。

然而，即使这一哲学命题的基础并不存在致命的假设错误——国际社会的行为原则主要依赖于权力而不是道德——它也不能断定权力政治的最终状态一定会导致战争，从理论角度来看，人类社会可以延长两场战争的间歇期，甚至于将它们无限期延长下去。而从历史经验来看，大规模的和频繁战争已经不是国际社会的常态，国际社会已经积累了许多避免战争爆发的途径，单纯的依赖权力政治原则来决定国际关系和对外行为的观念受到了挑战。

因此即使承认权力政治作为国际关系的本质所在，但它并不一定表现为国家之间的暴力冲突，甚至可以肯定地说，在其他因素的制约下，它越来越不能导致持续冲突的产生。基于自由主义者的观点，对权力政治的制约力量来自于国际机制和相互依赖的现状。按照自由主义者的观点，国际制度的地位是通过作为国际权力结构和利益关系与行为体的行为后果之间的干预变量或调节因素体现出来的。无论是作为“因变量”还是“自变量”，国际机制等因素使国际关系能够以温和的方式开展下去。

而在非洲，对权力政治的超越力量正是国际机制和相互依赖的现状。中欧之间已经存在沟通管道，这包括中欧战略对话机制和亚欧会议，当然，这些机制的作用还需要得到更广泛和深入地发挥，但至少它提供了可能的途径来解决本应该由权力政治来就解决的具体问题。也许中美之间缺乏有效的多边主义场所来解决中美在非洲问题上的冲突，但两国也存在双边对话机制，并且在经济上已经达到深厚的相互依存状态，这种状态也适用中欧关系。

或者说，中美欧在非洲的三角关系能超越权力政治的主要基础在于三者各自全球利益的相互依赖。如果欧美过分地批判和排挤中国在非洲的利益，则由此受到伤害的中国经济将对美国和欧洲的消费者产生冲击，也对他们的在华投资者产生不利后果；如果欧美排挤中国在非洲地区的自然资源，尤其是石油，那么中国将会和欧美在中东地区展开更剧烈的竞争，这只能加剧本来就动荡不安的中东地区的国际局势。这些利害关系成为权力政治的制约力量，而在国际机制的框架下，利害关系可以通过有效而温和的方式而非胁迫的方式加以化解。

2. 观念和行动的改变

为了缓解中美欧三方在非洲的冲突和矛盾，需要超越权力政治的观念，并且在行动上体现出来。首先，无论是美国或者欧洲，都不应将中国在非洲利益和影响力的增长视作是对自己的威胁，或者认为彼此利益的消长遵循零和原则。由于存在超越权力政治的基础，彼此利害关系相互纠缠，这就需要以建设性的态度来探索彼此如何在非洲和平共处，与其相互斥责和任由矛盾扩大，不如寻求中美欧

非四方共赢的多赢模式。

显然，多赢模式将建立在多边主义机构和双边谈判的基础之上，对非洲资源的开发应遵循于世界贸易组织规则，以及各自实施与非洲国家自由与平等的国际贸易。简单地说，非洲与大国的经贸关系建立在平等互惠的经济自由主义基础之上，而不是建立在政治自由主义基础之上。

西方国家包括美国的非洲经济政策都会与政治条件相提并论，这种方式在名义上坚持了普适的道义原则（如要求非洲国家的政府尊重人权、法治和民主自由），但是它却依然没有放弃权力政治的手段即“胁迫”——当西方人认定非洲特定国家没有遵守附加的政治条款时，他们会采用禁运、武力威胁甚至直接干涉的方式去达成他们设定的政治自由主义标准。因此事实上西方世界在非洲政策问题上表现伪善，一方面强调与非洲的平等与伙伴关系，一方面却自认为保有高傲的政治上的道义优势，这一优势在实际操作中不会将非洲平等看待。

当然中国并不是完美无暇，在纯粹的重商主义道路上，因为过于忽视非洲内部政治的糟糕现状而不试图加以积极引导，中国会日益遭遇来自各方面的压力，这一压力不仅来自美国和欧洲，也来自非洲以及由此所引发的中国在非利益的损害。不可讳言的是，中国在非洲只关注经济利益和以十足的商人姿态与非洲交往，已经引发了日益众多的非洲人的抗议，这些抗议不仅仅来自民间社会，诸如环保组织、劳工群体、民族产业代表和其他相关群体，也来自于一些政治团体。由于非洲 1990 年代前后的迅速民主化培育出了许多市民社会，民主政治的形式又使得一些政治团体在迎合特定选民的时候会成为指责中国的政治代表。这在 2007 年赞比亚的总统选举中可见一斑，当时反对党领袖、总统候选人迈克尔·萨塔对中国冲击其民族产业、忽视环保、劳工条件和资源的可持续性利用发出了强烈警告。而相似的语言（尽管相对温和）也出现在南非等国家的领导人之口。³³此外，在面对非洲伙伴国家内部人权质量的下降时，中国应积极通过多边主义的方式来承担自己的国际责任和维持国际道义的尊严。因此，中国既不应对非洲国家糟糕的政治事务充耳不闻，但也不能无视其主权而进行单边主义干涉，它应该以建设性的积极的方式寻求多边主义的解决途径。

但是，有些固有的利益并不是可以通过观念的改变可以发生转变。基于资源的有限性，当中国和欧美以不同方式在和非洲的资源贸易中相互竞争并产生冲突时，即使多边主义方案也不一定可以平复彼此的怨恨，基于和解共赢的理念，彼此不要试图改变对方而需要改变自己，即改变自己国内的经济增长方式和社会消费模式。

对中国而言，作为全球第二大（或许是第一）二氧化碳排放国，应加速产业

³³ 在 2007 年秋天赞比亚的总统选举上，反对党“爱国阵线党”主席迈克尔·萨塔喊出了“把中国人赶出去”的口号，并由此获得 28% 的支持率。

结构升级，提升资源和能源的利用率，开发出更多的替代能源产品，以减少对非洲资源的依赖度，至少放慢资源需求的增长速度。对美国 and 欧洲而言，则更多的是要改变其国内的消费方式。美国家庭所平均消耗的能量几倍于中国家庭，这反映了美国的资源消耗已超过世界平均水平数倍的额度在摧毁世界（包括非洲）的可持续性发展前景，这无异于对他国的剥削。此外，美国和欧盟应该了解到，由于中国兴起而追求更多海外资源和能源的合法性是不能被怀疑和遭致非议的，而且在中国兴起的过程中，美国和欧洲获得了廉价的消费产品，这种互惠关系决定了彼此利益与共。

总而言之，在非洲问题上，中美欧三方都不具有相互指责对方并实施报复的必要，为了共同的利益，彼此应在非洲问题上相互尊重，更重要的是，应通过多边主义的、和解的方式达成利益的分享而不是利益分割和使冲突四起。

结语

在所有讨论中，本文还没有足够关注非洲人自身的看法和反应。在中美欧三边关系上，非洲并非任意主宰的对象而应是大国平等对待的伙伴和利益相关方。无论是美国、欧盟还是中国，都应该倾听非洲的声音，以及在中美欧三方寻求合作的过程中，应充分讨论非洲的利益和优势，而不只是关注自身利益和彼此之间的共同利益。无论如何，在一个全球化和经济利益相互依存的时代里，中美欧的经济发展不能以牺牲非洲利益而代价，这一殖民主义似的方式既不道德，也不符合各自的利益。

为此，在非洲问题上，中美欧三边讨论与合作应该对非洲所采取的恰当态度，这包括：第一，尊重非洲经济和政治主权，使他们能够对自身的资源和能源享有完全充分的支配权利，以阻止国外资本对它们的掠夺式开采，保障非洲的可持续性经济增长的条件；第二，以公平贸易的方式与非洲交往。这意味着中美欧在非洲进行经贸往来时应尽量遵循世界贸易组织的规则，并在这一框架内采取行动；第三，各自的非洲政策应该尽量实行政经分离原则。欧美对非政策往往会将胁迫性政治条款附加于经济政策之上，这不符合非洲的整体利益。政经分离原则不表示国际社会应该对非洲危险的政治情势置若罔闻，而是应该使针对非洲政治局势的国际行动在日常的经济政策之外进行，比如采用多边主义的方式（如国际协调）而不是单边压迫的途径加以解决；它也不表示国际社会应该对诸如人权损害等政治问题漠不关心，而应在尊重非洲国家主权基础上采取行动；第四，也许更重要的是，中美欧非应该实行灵活多样的四边会谈，彼此充分了解对方的意愿和国家情况，在尊重事实的基础上制定多赢的非洲政策。协商、合作、共赢而非指责与对抗是解决新非洲问题上中美欧三方分歧与矛盾的最佳途径。

African Perceptions of Afro-Chinese Relations

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*The earth moves at different speeds depending on who you are. (Nigerian Proverb)
What you see depends on where you sit.*

1. Introduction¹

Interactions between China and Africa have become both more frequent and more varied. High level diplomatic forums, rising trade, increased Chinese investment and trading activity within African countries, new aid relationships, cultural exchanges, scholarships, and the movement of people have sparked varied reactions. Participants and observers of these activities perceive China's relations with Africa in very many ways depending largely on "who they are" and "where they sit."

This paper sets out to explore those perceptions to see how they shape the behaviour, responses and reactions of the African side of Afro-Chinese relations. The hope is that this analysis will be useful in enabling Africa and its people to maximise the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of this rapidly changing relationship. The paper addresses three specific questions: How do Africans perceive Afro-Chinese relations? What are China's main engagements in Africa? In what areas does Africa expect to benefit or lose from these engagements?

The paper has drawn mainly on a wide range of secondary sources: published articles and papers, books, newspapers, policy documents and websites. The nature of the inquiry made it imperative that African sources be privileged in this review. Because Africa-China relations are constantly changing, particular attention was paid to the most recent sources available. Written sources were complemented with a few key informant interviews, all carried out in Kenya.

The paper is presented in five parts. Following this introduction, Part 2 gives a brief background on both China and Africa, and the relations between the two. Part 3 offers a framework for understanding people's perceptions of global processes and the relations between international actors. Part 4 explores African perceptions of Afro-Chinese relations, using five thematic headings gleaned from the research. Part 5 concludes and makes some tentative recommendations.

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2. Background

2.1 China and Africa

China has changed dramatically since the 1970s. In 1978 it opened doors that had been closed for decades. It espoused an approach which it calls ‘socialist market economy’ which embodies elements of pragmatism, free market, and state *dirigism* (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2007) that has been accompanied by spectacular economic growth and allowed it to accumulate the third largest stock of inward foreign direct investment in the world (after the UK and USA). China has become a major exporter, an importer of raw materials, and a major investor in many parts of the world (Kaplinsky et al 2007, Winters and Yusuf 2007). China is also becoming more active in international affairs, not only through conventional diplomatic channels, but also as an emerging donor (Madeiros and Fravel 2003, Gu et al. 2007, McCormick 2008). China is one of the few countries in the developing world that can claim to have significantly reduced its absolute number of poor people from 250 million in 1978 to 30 million in 2000 (Fan et al. 2004).

Africa – a continent rather than a country -- is characterised by considerable diversity. Its 55 countries vary in history, geographic and population size, political structure, economic strength and resource base. The continent has vast oil and mineral deposits, but these are unevenly distributed. Despite this diversity, African countries show many similarities. All countries except Ethiopia were once colonies, and their colonial history has affected the development of their institutions and their ongoing links to the rest of the world. The continent is home to hundreds of ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the fact that many culturally similar groups extend across national borders or are found in different parts of the continent creates a sense of a common African culture.

Present-day, Africa also faces many common economic and political challenges. Economies grew very slowly in 1980s and 1990s, causing Africa to lose ground relative to other parts of the world. Most countries are still characterised by poverty, declining productivity in real sectors, unemployment, poor infrastructure and lack of a conducive environment for investment. Growth has picked up since 2000, with sub-Saharan Africa recording growth of 5.4 per cent in 2006 (World Bank 2008). Much of Africa’s recent growth can be attributed to increased production and export of oil and other natural resources. Manufacturing remains weak and unable to compete in international markets (Kaplinsky and Morris 2008).

Many countries have experienced periods of internal conflict and/or wars with neighbouring countries. Not only have such conflicts weakened their economies and strained their social fabric, but they have also in many cases affected the process of building political institutions.

2.2 Policy Setting for Africa-China Relations

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, China has been developing its policy towards Africa. Although China-Africa relations have often been traced to the Bandung Conference in 1955 and China’s assistance to Africa in the immediate post-independence period, China’s policy has taken a decidedly new shape since the formation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000.

China's policy evolved over a six-year period, which was punctuated by three FOCAC meetings. The First Ministerial Meeting produced Beijing Declaration, a document that affirmed the consensus between China and Africa on certain international issues (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007, p.4). In 2003, FOCAC's Second Ministerial Meeting in Addis Ababa consolidated Chinese-Africa relations and specified areas of cooperation, including trade, economic assistance and cultural exchange. China announced its Special Preferential Tariff Treatment programme, which removed import tariffs on some 190 items. The policy took effect at the beginning of 2005, and coverage has since been extended to 400 items (Kaplinsky et al. 2007, Minson 2008). In January 2006, China announced its comprehensive policy towards Africa, which laid out general principles and mechanisms for enhancing cooperation in the political and economic fields, in education, science, culture, health and social arenas, as well as in peace and security (see China 2006 for details). The policy reiterated the importance of FOCAC and also stated the intention of China to work with NEPAD.

The policy emphasises the importance of high level visits for building mutual understanding, and was followed with the China-Africa Beijing Summit of the FOCAC, 4-5 November 2006. The fact that this meeting was attended by 41 heads of state or government and senior officials of all 48 African countries that have diplomatic ties with PRC attested to its importance for Africa (Beijing Summit 2006, Shinn 2007). The fact that Premier Wen Jiabao paid official visits to seven African countries in June 2006 (Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda) and to eight countries in February 2007 (Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles and South Africa) suggests that the China-Africa relationship is also important to China.

China is active in Africa. On the ground are multiple projects in infrastructure, agriculture, human resource development and access to the Chinese market (see China Monitor, various issues). China has also made promises for enhanced technology transfers (see van Hoeymissen, 2007), partly to counter accusations that Chinese projects are "giving people fish, rather than teaching them to fish". Observers claim that the China's practice of tied aid means that many projects, especially infrastructure projects, are implemented by Chinese firms. The construction industry is beginning to be a subject of research (see, for example, Corkin and Burke 2008), but there is still only partial understanding of its operations and the resulting implications on capacity building for African workers.

Africa has no policy towards China comparable to China's Africa policy. This is at least partly because it is much more difficult for the continent consisting of many countries to develop a unified policy. The African Union Commission in 2006 examined Africa's strategic partnership with the emerging power of China, India and Brazil, but this has not resulted in an overall policy towards China. NEPAD, according to the Kenya Chief Executive Officer, is positive towards the growing China-Africa relations². In July 2006 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between NEPAD Secretariat and Secretariat of Chinese Follow-Up Committee of FOCAC. It provided for a US\$500,000 donation from China to cooperate with NEPAD on a training programme for African nurses and midwives, with pilot

² Personal communication, 26 February 2008.

projects in Kenya and Tanzania, is the first instance of Chinese direct cooperation with NEPAD.

The position of individual countries must be assessed by actions rather than pronouncements. The fact that 49 African countries maintain diplomatic relations with China, and nearly all of these sent their heads of state or other high-level official to participate in the 2006 FOCAC meetings suggests that individual African countries are ready to cooperate with China. At the same time, as will be clear from the following analysis, various individuals and groups have misgivings and concerns about China-Africa relations. Before discussing these in detail, we first examine the key concepts used in that analysis.

3. Framework for Understanding Afro-Chinese Relations

3.1 Country-to-Country Relations

The term “relations” is used to encompass interactions between countries, organisations and individuals. Relations are sometimes ‘official’ and sometimes ‘unofficial’ or even ‘informal’. They may be between partners who are equal or unequal. “Afro-Chinese relations” include a range of individual and institutional interactions characteristic of country-to-country relations. The content of these relations can be roughly divided into three groups: international political relations; economic relations, especially trade and investment; and individual and group social relations.

The first set includes various types of country-to-country political interactions. Diplomatic recognition sets the stage for others. In the case of the People’s Republic of China, recognition of the PRC and adherence to the “One-China” policy is a necessary condition for other political and economic relations. Malawi’s switch from Taiwan to the PRC on 27 December 2007 left only four African countries (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland) with diplomatic ties to Taiwan (China Monitor, issue 25, January 2008; Wikipedia, 2008a). China makes extensive use of another form of political interaction: the high-level visit. In 2006-2007 President Hu Jintao made three major goodwill visits to Africa, each including several countries. China’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister made several other such trips designed to emphasise the importance that China places on its relationship with the African continent.

International trade between China and individual countries has grown tremendously, but is very uneven. Much has been made of China’s growing imports of African oil, but this affects relatively few countries.³ A few others export timber or significant metal products to China (Kaplinsky et al. 2007; Zafar 2007). Most, however, are oil importers who are feeling the pinch of rising prices. Still others are finding that they are competing with China in third-country markets. Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland, all saw their exports of clothing under the AGOA preferences drop sharply when the end of the MFA allowed Chinese garments unlimited entry into the US market (Kaplinsky et al 2007). Zafar (2007) divides Sub-Saharan Africa into three groups.

³ Africa has fourteen oil exporters are Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tunisia. Oil accounts for less than 20% of exports in four of these: Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, DRC, and Tunisia (World Bank 2007).

The potential winners in China-Africa trade relations are those that export oil, timber, or significant metal products.⁴ The potential losers are oil importers who produce agricultural commodities and textile products.⁵

Investment and operations of Chinese companies in African countries and African companies in China form another set of Afro-Chinese relations. Included in this group are Chinese companies investing in Africa under classic FDI arrangements, Chinese companies operating in Africa, and small-scale producers and traders owned by Chinese entrepreneurs. Unlike the trade channel where there is extensive data, information on most of these is scanty. Chinese FDI used to come mainly from state owned enterprises (SOEs), but this is changing as more and more private firms are entering Africa and managers of SOEs in Africa are leaving to start their own companies (Mohan 2007). Some countries are also host to increasing numbers of Chinese traders and small-scale producers who compete directly with local entrepreneurs for business (Dobler 2006, Mohan 2007, Centre for Chinese Studies 2007).

The final type of China-Africa relation concerns the movement and/or activities of Chinese individuals in Africa and African individuals in China. Estimates of Chinese nationals resident in African countries are notoriously vague. Nevertheless it appears that some countries have significant numbers, while others have few or none (Mohan 2007). Africans are actual or potential customers, employees, neighbours and colleagues of these resident Chinese. There are, on the other hand, relatively few Africans in China (Sautman 2006). Most of these are students who expect to return home after their studies. The interactions of both Chinese and African migrants are mediated through their different cultures, languages and positions.

3.2 Perceptions and Global Processes

In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting and organising sensory information (Wikipedia 2008b). In popular terms, the word refers to the way a person views some reality. Two people, standing side by side, will see the same thing with their eyes, but may perceive its meaning differently. At least some of the variation in what people see can be explained by differences in position, experience, and/or ideology or implicit theoretical framework of the one perceiving.

In an academic investigation, the theories and assumptions underlying peoples' perceptions are particularly important. Broadly, one can identify three main paradigms shaping people's thinking about global change: neo-liberalism, dependency theories and institutional theories.

Neo-liberalism gives primacy to economic variables and market relations. It emphasises individual choice and points to the role of the state in encouraging both individuals and institutions to conform to the norms of the market (Larner 2000). Observers taking a neo-liberal perspective will look at China-Africa interactions as primarily market relations, driven by China's desire to become a major economic

⁴ These are the oil producers plus Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia.

⁵ These are Burundi, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, and Uganda.

power. Dependency theories, like their Marxist antecedents, emphasise class, inequality and the distortions created by unequal relations between persons and nations. The many variants of dependency theory revolve around the idea that the economy and prospects for development in poor countries are conditioned by a global economy dominated by the already developed states (Lake 2004). Observers using these theories tend to question whether China-Africa relations are replicating the colonial domination of the South by the North, creating a new core-periphery imbalance. Institutional theories posit that development is about the creation and modification of the rules by which society carries on its economic, social and political activities. Observers coming from an institutional perspective are likely to examine the “rules of the game” and the organisations society has created to facilitate its social, political and economic life. Some of this share the neo-liberal emphasis on the economy, focusing mainly, or even exclusively, on economic institutions (see, for example Williamson 1985, Nabli and Nugent 1989, North 1990) while emphasise political or socio-cultural institutions (see Chang 2001, Sklair 1999).

Paradigms can be explicit or implicit. Academic writing on global processes more often than not adopts an explicit framework, while journalism and other forms of discourse may leave their perspectives unstated. The following analysis is thematic rather than strictly theoretical. Nevertheless, as we shall see, a certain convergence in theoretical orientation appears to exist among African observers of Afro-Chinese relations.

4. African Perceptions of Afro-Chinese Relations

How do Africans perceive Afro-Chinese relations? Alden (2006) in an insightful review identified three basic portrayals of China within Africa: China as Africa’s development partner, China as Africa’s competitor and China as hegemony. To these we add two others: China as supplier of low-cost goods, and China as development role model.

4.1 China as Africa’s Development Partner

China as Africa’s development partner is the portrayal that China itself most often makes in its official statements and documents. China’s Africa Policy emphasises the shared elements of China’s and Africa’s history and experience:

China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathised with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship (China, 2006).

The policy paper also reiterated China’s declared policy of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

The theme of partnership has been picked up by assorted African voices. In May 2006, for example, Firmino Mucavele, Chief Executive of the NEPAD Secretariat in South Africa, said, “I see in India and China an opportunity to convert our comparative advantage into competitiveness” (World Economic Forum 2006). In July 2006, NEPAD and FOCAC signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they

promised to cooperate on concrete projects and to harmonise and synchronise FOCAC and NEPAD (South African Government Information 2006). Some have contrasted this notion of partnership to the typical donor-recipient relationship. The Task Force on Africa's Strategic Partnership with the emerging powers China, India, and Brazil recommended that "Africa's relationship with the emerging powers should be that of true and equal partnerships, of mutual trust and benefit, not that of donor and recipient" (AU 2006).

Although some non-African observers have seen China's actions as indicating an entirely new development approach – a "Beijing Consensus" set to replace the neo-liberal Washington Consensus (Ramo 2004) – African academics tend to be more cautious. For example, in a thoughtful theoretical discussion, Lumumba-Kasongo (2007) explores the possibilities of South-South partnership as a concept undergirding China-Africa relations. Marafa (2007) questions whether trade and investment relations are guided by the needs of both sides, or are they only replicating the classic North-South model? Others stress the particular challenges of partnership between unequal parties (AU 2006: 11). Still others conclude that the "Beijing Consensus" is not qualitatively different from the Washington Consensus in its ability to challenge the framework of the international economic system (Zezeza 2007).

At a practical level, observers note that loans disbursed by China's Exim Bank "follow the classic pattern of tied aid." (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007). Tied aid from other donors has been shown to reduce the value of assistance by about 25 per cent (World Bank 1998). Tied aid from China is likely to have a similar effect.

Nevertheless, even the sceptics are ready to work with China. They emphasise China's better understanding of Africa's history and stage of development (Lumumba-Kasongo 2007) and Africa's need for new partners as alternatives to "Euroamerica" (Zezeza 2007). According to one, "Africa should embrace the opportunities offered by strategic partnership with China, whilst seeking to preserve and promote its interests" (Obiorah 2007). Kornegay (2007) raises the follow-up question of agenda setting on the Continent: "Whose agenda? An African agenda for Africa or a Chinese ... agenda for Africa?"

4.2 China as Africa's Competitor

A second common perception of China-Africa relations is that the two are competitors. This emerges especially in trade relations, where Chinese manufactured goods compete with African products on domestic, regional and global markets.

On global markets, the main sector affected is textiles, and this only for certain countries. Following passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the US Government in 2001, some African countries developed their textile and garment industries to enable them to take advantage of concessionary entrance into the US market. Otiso (2004) mentions significant job creation in Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland. Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa also became important clothing exporters under AGOA (Kaplinsky et al. 2007). At first, these countries were doubly protected by their duty-free status under AGOA and by quotas on imports from various Asian countries, including China, imposed under the rules of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA). The MFA came to an end on 31 December 2004 and with its demise all quotas were abolished. This put African textile exporters into

direct competition with China in the lucrative US market (McCormick et al. 2006, Kamau 2007, Kaplinsky et al. 2007).

African manufacturers also compete with Chinese goods within the African region and at home. The Kenyan clothing industry provides one example of this. Kenya's own markets are small, people are poor, and imports, including those from China, are taking a large share of the market (McCormick et al. 2007). The situation is similar in neighbouring countries, making it difficult for Kenya to expand its manufacturing through regional exports.

Chinese FDI is also creating a perception of "China as Africa's Competitor" in some quarters. A recent announcement that a Chinese leather company is planning to open a tannery in Kenya has been met with concern because this would bring the Chinese into direct competition with Kenya's 15 tanneries, many of which face a shortage of raw hides for processing (Business Daily, 2008).

Finally, there is some evidence that China is competing with Africa on the ground. In some countries, Chinese traders compete directly with small-scale African traders. Dobler (2006) has documented this for Namibia, and Kernan (2007) for Mali and Senegal, while various reports suggest that similar problems exist in Zambia and Uganda (Chimangeni, 2006; Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007). Chinese immigrants are also competing with Africans for jobs. This is particularly evident in the construction sector, where contracts are part of aid packages that reserve up to 70 per cent of jobs for Chinese workers. This includes not only technical and managerial positions, but also skilled and semi-skilled construction workers (Maswana 2007).

4.3 China as a Rising Power

China is a rising global power. Some would see it as exercising hegemony in the world. A hegemonic power is a state with considerable influence over other states. As a strong force, it can exercise its power in ways that benefit others or alternatively, it can overpower and cripple them. African observers of the China-Africa relationship are seeing China as a new hegemony, either replacing the West or acting as a counter-balance to it.

China's economic growth has been staggering, averaging 9 per cent for nearly three decades (Kaplinsky et al 2007). Its political power has not yet matched its economic might, but the fact that it holds a seat on the UN Security Council and has nuclear weapons makes it a force to be reckoned with. According to one South African observer:

"China's position is unique. It has one foot in the developing world and another in the developed one with a seat on the UN Security Council. This dual status gives it a considerable political and diplomatic advantage in the pursuit of its interests" (Muekalia, 2004).

Alden (2006: 10) makes the important point that China, as a rising global power, is seen in both a positive and negative light within Africa. Some see China as a strong force that will carry Africa with it. Others view China as a predator, ready to extract Africa's mineral resources, abuse its human resources and crush local industry in its

quest for its own business success. This view is strongly presented by Akinrinade and Ogen (2007), who observe that

“Like other predatory capitalists, China deliberately encourages the free flow of raw materials and mineral resources from Nigeria to fuel Chinese industries while at the same time ensuring that the large and dynamic Nigerian market remains open for the sale of Chinese manufactured goods.”

The view of China as a predator sees it wilfully crushing African industry. The case of China Town, an ultramodern Chinese shopping mall in Lagos, is given as an example. The mall deals in illegally imported Chinese textile products, transshipment of Chinese-made garments to the US to benefit from AGOA, and counterfeit textiles (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2007; Ogen 2007). Giving further examples of carcinogenic toothpaste, expired drugs, pirated compact disks and contraband textile materials, Ogen (2007) states:

“It would seem that China has little or no intention of stopping its citizens who daily engage in criminal and harmful practices such as smuggling and counterfeiting all in the name of neo-liberalism.” (Ogen 2007).

Resource extraction is another key issue for those who see China as a predator. In this view China’s Africa strategy is underpinned by its “voracious appetite for natural resources, especially gas, oil and minerals, rather than a genuine desire to foster strong and long-lasting partnerships with Africa” (Rocha 2007). Those with a more positive view of China would have Africa adopt a new strategy of “resource nationalism” that would use its resources to create new opportunities by engaging with partners such as China (Baregu 2007).

Closely linked to its resource strategy is China’s perceived indifference to the environmental consequences of the projects it is funding. A study of a proposed dam in Mozambique typifies this concern:

“The proposed Mphanda Nkuwa Dam is a good example of the problems linked to China’s lack of concern for ... the environmental impact of the projects they are financing The production of the power will cause twice daily fluctuations in the river’s flow, which will adversely affect the people downstream that depend on the river for suitable and acceptable access to water, fishing, river navigation and flood recession farming. The dam will also undermine years of restoration work in the Zambezi delta ..., which has been damaged by the mismanagement of the Cahora Bassa Dam ...” (Lemos and Ribeiro 2007).

Some African observers are concerned about human rights abuses that appear to be linked with Chinese investments. Dam construction is especially vulnerable to these criticisms because it appears that neither China nor the host governments make adequate arrangements for people – often poor people – displaced by new dams. Examples of this include Al Multaga in Sudan (Askouri, 2007) and Mphanda Nkuwa in Mozambique (Lemos and Ribeiro 2007). There have also been accusations of abuse of workers in Chinese-owned factories and mines. In Zambia, for example, when an

explosives factory blew up, the Zambian press claimed that all the Chinese workers escaped but 40 Zambians who were locked inside perished (Chimangeni, 2006).

Several observers, including NEPAD officials, emphasised the lack of technology transfer and skills upgrading in Chinese firms as an indication that China is not serious about developing Africa (AU, 2006; personal communication, 26 February 2008). Two points were stressed. First, Chinese companies prefer to bring their own workers. This reduces opportunities for African workers to learn by doing. Second, even those workers who are hired rarely participate in formal training programmes.

In summing up, some observers compare China with the West. They point out that China has a distinct advantage over the West in that it has no history of enslavement, colonisation, supporting coups, or deploying troops to support its foreign policies (Guerrero and Manji 2008). Nevertheless, at the level of economics, China and the West share some characteristics. Both use aid as a tool to gain economic power, and both have a strong appetite for resources to fuel their own economic expansion. In some eyes, both Chinese and Western capitalism have within them the “merely rapacious and the more sophisticated” (Marks 2007, Guerrero and Manji 2008). Neither, in other words, is all good or all bad, and therefore it is up to Africa to be discerning in its dealings with both China and the West.

4.4 China as Supplier of Low Cost Goods

In the past ten to fifteen years, China has become Africa’s supplier *par excellence*. Not only does China supply the low cost manufactured goods that are ubiquitous in African shops and markets, but China has also become the contractor of choice in many infrastructure projects.

Most manufactured goods are probably legal imports, though the proportion probably varies from one country to another. The fact that African imports of various manufactures from China have risen sharply over the years, supports the contention that many of the imports come through legal channels (see, for example, Kaplinsky *et al.*, 2007 for trade data). Nevertheless, in some cases, official statistics understate Chinese imports. The Centre for Chinese Studies (2007) reports that Angola has rising Chinese presence in informal trading, but almost no increase in the rather low proportion of its official imports coming from China. More expensive items from Europe, favoured by the elite, continue to dominate the trade statistics.

Some Chinese imports are illegal. Akinrinade and Ogen (2007), reporting on the case of China Town in Lagos, note that at one point Customs Officials “discovered that 30 trailer loads of contraband goods, mostly textile materials, had been smuggled into the country by key Chinese businessmen.” The businessmen were arrested, but quickly released after apparent intervention by the Chinese Embassy.

African views on the desirability of these goods ranges from enthusiastic buyers to those who see them as a sign of China’s neo-liberal economic strategy to destroy African industry. In between are those who have learned to distinguish among types of products. A visit to a Nairobi supermarket or one of the City’s many street vendors reveals the range of products available. On offer are clothing, shoes, travel bags, radios, electrical adapters and paper products. Many of the same products find a ready market in towns and villages far from the city. Some consumers have become more discerning. They will buy some Chinese goods but not others. A Nairobi informant,

for example, said that he would not buy a Chinese mobile phone “because they only last about three months” (personal interview, 11 March 2008). Chinese shoe imports made a major inroad into the market in Addis Ababa (Tegegne, 2007). They were cheap and seen to be more stylish than locally made shoes. After some time, however, customers began to return to the local products, claiming that they were more durable than the Chinese ones.

A few observers attribute China’s massive imports into Africa, especially the illegal variety, as a sign that China is out to destroy African industry. For example, Akinrinade and Ogen (2007) argue that the incident of smuggled goods in Lagos, which involved active intervention by the Chinese Embassy, shows that “China with its neo-liberal economic policies is deliberately pursuing a strategy of de-industrialisation in the Nigerian textile industry.” Others acknowledge that cheap Chinese textile imports have undoubtedly contributed to Africa’s industrialisation woes, but point out that the primary cause of de-industrialisation lies elsewhere. The Centre for Chinese Studies (2007) attributes the problem in Angola to the destruction of arable land during the war and an influx of donations of second-hand clothes from developed countries. Second-hand clothes and the loss of people’s purchasing power that accompanied structural adjustment are no doubt fundamental problems for the textile and clothing sector in many African countries (McCormick *et al*, 2007). A further problem, as acknowledged by Akinrinade and Ogen (2007), is the porous nature of borders and the ineptitude of many security agencies, both of which make smuggling easy for unscrupulous businessmen.

4.5 China as Development Role Model

African elites identify with China’s rise, feeling that if this populous and once-poor developing country can develop, there is hope for Africa. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on his return from the 2006 FOCAC Summit commented enthusiastically about the meeting saying, “China is an inspiration for all of us.” He added, “What China shows to Africa is that it is indeed possible to turn the corner on economic development” (Quoted in Prah 2007). In particular, China’s achievement in lifting millions of people out of poverty in two decades “has bolstered African countries’ optimism that the Western Model is not sacrosanct ...” (Maswana, 2007). One African scholar puts it even more strongly: “For some among Africa’s contemporary rulers, China is living proof of the existence of ‘successful’ alternatives to Western political and economic models” (Obiorah 2007).

Unfortunately, however, most references to China as a model for Africa do not go beyond generalities. In a few cases, observers refer to qualities such as hard work. For example, the Ghanaian ambassador to China, speaking in Beijing, said: “We have learned a lot from Chinese workers, and we were impressed a lot by their disciplined and highly effective work” (Lu, 2008). The lack of more detailed African commentary on the implementation of the China’s development strategy suggests that it has received insufficient attention in Africa. Neither scholars nor the popular press appear to have attempted a full analysis of this “alternative model” and its applicability to Africa.

5. Conclusions

There is no single African perception of the China-Africa relationship. Perceptions, like the relationship itself, are multiple and multi-dimensional. Although a full theoretical analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it appears that most African commentators favour political economy approaches over the more economistic neo-liberal analysis. From where they sit, perhaps they recognise more easily than most the importance of politics and political institutions in determining the shape of international relations, including Africa's relations with China.

The thematic examination of perceptions revealed considerable variety in the views expressed.

- i. China as Africa's development partner: Commentators range from enthusiasts to sceptics. Even the sceptics are ready to work with China, but they caution that while embracing the opportunities China offers, African governments must seek to preserve and promote their own interests.
- ii. China as Africa's competitor: African observers recognise that China is posing a serious competitive challenge to Africa in trade, the construction industry and foreign direct investment. Most, however, see the benefits to consumers of readily available and inexpensive goods. Concerns have also been expressed about the threat of small-scale trading.
- iii. China as a rising power: Many African observers of the China-Africa relationship are seeing China as a new hegemony, either replacing the West or acting as a counter-balance to it. Some view China as a predator, ready to extract Africa's mineral resources, abuse its labour and crush local industry. Others see China as more benign, with business interests that enable it to serve as a balance to Western domination. Both groups make it clear, however, that in dealing with China, Africa's interests must be protected.
- iv. China as supplier of low-cost goods: A number of observers note that China has become the major supplier of low-cost goods to many African countries. They also note that most imports appear to be legal, but some are smuggled, apparently with the cooperation of African customs officials. Views range from enthusiasts who point to their affordability for low-income African consumers, to those who see them as a sign of China's neo-liberal economic strategy to destroy African industry. Some analysts point to other causes of Africa's de-industrialisation, including structural adjustment, war and its aftermath, and corruption.
- v. China as a development role model: African elites identify with China's rise, feeling that its rise offers hope that Africa can also develop. Unfortunately most references to China as a model for Africa do not go beyond generalities.

China can and does take issue with some of the views reported here. Yet perceptions are important because even those that appear baseless carry a certain weight that is likely to influence future actions. If China is serious about creating a partnership with Africa based on trust and mutual benefit, China will want to address Africa's concerns. This will require at least three specific approaches. The first involves establishing the facts, and will require carrying out research into some of the areas of concern that have been noted in this paper and elsewhere. A second approach is institutional. China and Africa can work together, using existing institutions (or in some cases

establishing new ones) that can provide forums for discussing and resolving areas of concern/conflict. The third approach recognises that some of the perceived negative consequences of China's activities are at least in part a result of Africa's own weak institutions and enforcement capabilities. The first responsibility for redressing this situation rests with African countries themselves. Nevertheless it is in China's own interests to recognise this and put in place mechanisms for ensuring that the activities of its firms and citizens respect the rights of Africans to freedom and safety.

To reap the greatest benefit from its growing relationship with China, Africa must also take some positive actions. African countries need to work together. The African Union and NEPAD Secretariat have already played an important role in enabling Africa to speak with one voice, but more needs to be done to ensure that Africa coordinates its policies on China and defines its interests and relations with China realistically.

There is also a need on both sides for greater mutual understanding. Presently there is little knowledge beyond what is in the popular, often Western, press (Obiorah 2007). There is a clear need for both scholarly attention and civil society involvement to provide a balance of ideas from African perspectives. Research is necessary to provide evidence for policy development, and civil society groups can play a critical role in mediating and pushing governments to recognise the merit of alternative approaches to development. Perhaps even more importantly, Afro-Chinese relations have got to reach more effectively into the arena of culture and 'people-to-people' relations" (Prah 2007). Finally, African actors need to identify the points of convergence and divergence of interests and then establish a working agenda for making its engagement with China more beneficial to the African people (Kornegay 2007).

The fact that Africa sees China as a role model, "proving" that alternatives to the Western approach are possible, deserves a final comment. Role models can simply be admired, be imitated, or they can become mentors, encouraging the one being mentored to surpass them by using their own talents and resources to the full, but possibly in different ways. Africa needs to consider what it really wants from China. How can Africa best gain from China's experience? Answering this question will require a thorough understanding of the Chinese development model, including its political, social and economic institutions, and the processes used to apply them.

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China's Aid to Africa: Achievements, Challenges and International Cooperation

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I. An Overview of China's Aid to Africa

China's aid to Africa, started in 1956, has been extended so far to 53 African countries.

China has built for African countries close to 900 projects in total, covering areas in agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, light textile, transportation, broadcasting and communication, hydraulic power, machinery, public and civil engineering, education and healthcare, handicraft, and food processing, which are conducive to the local socio-economic development, taxation revenue growth and employment.

In addition to projects, China has also provided a great amount of material and technological assistance to African countries. It has trained a large number of African professionals, by far the number of African officials and professionals trained in China having approached 20,000. Upon returning to their respective country these people become indispensable to their employers, playing a positive role in promoting China-Africa cooperation and friendship.

Fulfilling its pledges made at the 2000 Beijing Ministerial Level Meeting of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, the September 2005 UN Conference on Development Financing, and the November 2006 China-Africa Cooperation Forum Beijing Summit, by the end of 2007 China has canceled in total 374 loans due owed by 49 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Least Developed Countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and South Pacific, the majority of which originated in Africa. China's prompt action in exempting and canceling African debts were warmly received by African countries and positively viewed by the international community.

II. China's Current Aid Policy and Administrative System

Aid to and cooperation with Africa is an important part of China's overall foreign aid policy. China follows unswervingly the road of peaceful development, committed to "seeking peace and development through cooperation" and nurturing friendly cooperation with other developing countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. China adheres to the eight principles in foreign aid without attaching any political string. In order to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals, China tries its best to help other developing countries build capacities while promoting socio-economic development in its own territory. This type of aid is part of the South-South Cooperation.

As a developing country, China still has a long way to go. Consequently its foreign aid is limited in size. The guidelines for China's foreign aid are to help according to its own abilities, do the best it can, promote cooperation and strive for common development. China offers assistance to Africa where it is most urgently needed. The

projects are identified through friendly bilateral consultation and delivered in the form of projects or materials. Priorities are given to public good projects in healthcare, basic education, infrastructure, protection and improvement of the ecological environment, poverty reduction and relief. The focus of has started to shift from project assistance to development assistance in human development and capacity building. By giving the most benefits possible to governments and peoples in Africa, Chinese aid programs have won wide acclaim among African nations and peoples. As its national strength grows China will step up its foreign aid, improve the cost effectiveness of aid dollars, flexibly utilize various forms of assistance, and enlarge economic and technological cooperation with African countries.

The Department of Foreign Aid at the Ministry of Commerce administers foreign aid on behalf of the Chinese Government, safeguarded by the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation and Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, with the Export-Import Bank of China acting as undertakers of preferential loans, and the Ministry of Health in charge of dispatching medical teams. The cooperation mechanism in foreign aid is that the Ministry of Commerce reports to the State Council after consultation with the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, other government agencies concerned, and the banks.

III. Challenges Confronting China's Aid to Africa

Despite achievements made in China's aid to Africa that have attracting world attention, there are also some challenges, even some misunderstandings or unfounded condemnations. Hereby I'd like to elaborate on these fundamental issues.

(1) Some international voices accuse China of practicing "Neo-Colonialism" in Africa, which is totally unfounded, at odds with realities in China-Africa relation, and irresponsible. Evidence abounds that China's normal economic and trade cooperation with African countries differs in essence from the so-called "Neo-Colonialism." Unlike the economic colonialism practiced by Western powers in history that took every means possible to control the economic lifeline of African countries in order to protect and seek colonial interests, the Chinese Government conducts economic and technological cooperation with African countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and common development.

In recent years some people have advanced the theory that China is in Africa for resources. It is worth mentioning that China's development is based first and foremost in China. Observing market principles and international practices, capable Chinese companies decide on their own to cooperate with Africa in resources. It is part of the normal international economic cooperation. At the same time, the Chinese Government encourages Chinese companies to extend the industrial chain for resources development cooperation, injecting vitality into the local economy, creating jobs in the local market, and contributing to export by the host country.

(2) Secondly I'd like to talk about China's principle of "not attaching any political string" to its aid to Africa. In as early as 1950s the Chinese Government proposed the five principles of peaceful coexistence, including "non-interference in each other's internal affairs." In the past half century, these five principles have not only become the foundation of China's independent peaceful diplomacy, but also included in the

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. Accepted by most countries in the world, they have become important principles governing international relations. For developing countries, it is their most basic and most fundamental human rights to live and to develop. Only by developing local economy and satisfying the basic needs of the people can these human rights be ensured. “Development is of overriding importance.” China has had quite some experience in this aspect over the years which it is willing to share with other countries.

(3) I’d like to talk about the so-called ‘free rider’ non-preferential loans extended by China. Some Western countries accuse China of getting a free ride by extending a huge amount of non-preferential loans to other developing countries, thereby possibly affecting the debt sustainability of the latter. It is our belief that sustainable development provides the basis for sustainable debts. The ultimate objective is not to reduce debts, but to develop. Debt sustainability must be based on development sustainability. Development requires not only debt reduction, but also, more importantly, the inflow of new capital. Preferential loans provided by China serve exactly this objective by encouraging new capital to enter developing countries and promoting the sound development of economy there. Being a developing country, China needs a large amount of capital for its own economic development. Right now the overall domestic interest rate is still high in China. On September 15, 2006, the prime rate for RMB-denominated loans with terms longer than five years extended by domestic financial institutions rose to 7.83%. At present the annual interest rate of the most preferential part of preferential loans provided by the Chinese Government has dropped to 2%, the maximum term being 20 years, which implies quite some donation content. In order to demonstrate its sincerity in the support for African development, China is actively researching into ways to improve the preferential elements in loans, so as to benefit African countries more.

IV. International Cooperation in Aid to Africa

The Chinese Government has long since been providing assistance within its means to other developing countries including Africa, conducting effective economic and technological cooperation, helping recipient countries reduce poverty and build capacity. In recent years the Chinese Government has also been engaged in researches in multilateral foreign aid and is willing to exchange ideas with countries concerned.

Evidence shows that China’s product quality, price, technological level and management expertise meet the demand of most developing countries including Africa. This is an advantage enjoyed by China in its economic and technological cooperation with other developing countries. Whereas Western developed countries and international financial institutions are more capable of offering aid of larger sizes. Therefore, we hope that each could play to its own advantage. For example, Western developed countries and international financial institutions provide a sizable amount of aid money to help some developing countries build urgently needed infrastructure projects. At the same time China will select some competent and reputable companies to participate in the project construction by preferential pricing, reasonable time limit, and high quality. Concerted efforts will promote the socio-economic development of developing countries including those in Africa.

中国对非援助：成效、挑战与国际合作

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一、中国对非洲援助概况及成效

中国对非援助始于 1956 年。截至目前，中国已向 53 个非洲国家提供了各类援助。

中国为非洲国家共援建了近 900 个各类项目，涉及农牧渔业、轻纺工业、交通运输、广播通讯、水利电力、机械、公用民用建筑、文教卫生、工艺和手工业、食品加工等各个领域。这些项目的建设有利于促进当地经济社会发展，增加税收和就业。

除了提供成套项目援助外，中方还向非洲国家提供了大量的物资援助和技术援助，为非洲国家培训了大批技术人员。截至目前，来华参加培训的非洲官员和技术人员已达 2 万人。这些人员回国后大多成为了各领域的技术骨干或在政府部门重要岗位上工作，为促进中非交流和友好关系的发展发挥了积极作用。

根据中国政府在中非合作论坛北京 2000 年部长级会议、2005 年 9 月联合国发展筹资会议、2006 年 11 月中非合作论坛北京峰会等承诺，截至 2007 年底，中国已累计免除非洲、亚洲、加勒比和南太地区的 49 个重债穷国和最不发达国家的 374 笔对华到期政府债务，其中绝大部分是非洲国家的债务。中方迅速减免非洲国家债务，受到非洲国家热烈欢迎，在国际社会引起良好反响。

二、中国政府现行援助政策与管理体制

对非援助与合作是中国对外援助总体方针政策的一个非常重要的组成部分。中国坚定不移地走和平发展道路，致力于“以合作谋和平、以合作促发展”，在和平共处五项原则的基础上同其他发展中国家发展友好合作关系。中国遵循对外援助八项原则，对外援助不附带任何政治条件。为推动落实联合国千年发展目标，中国在促进本国经济社会发展的同时，也努力帮助其他发展中国家增强自主发展能力，其援助属于“南南合作”范畴。

中国作为发展中国家，自身的发展任务还很艰巨，对外援助规模有限。量力而行、尽力而为、促进合作、共同发展是中国的援助方针。中国对非洲的援助是根据非洲国家急需，经双边友好协商确定项目，通过援建项目和提供物资等实物交付形式实施的。援助资金优先用于加强受援国医疗卫生、基础教育等公益性项目和公共基础设施建设、保护和改善生态环境、以及减贫扶贫方面的努力。援助的重点开始从成套项目援助逐步扩展到以人的发展和能力建设为中心的发展援助，援助项目尽可能让非洲国家政府和人民得到实实在在的好处，因而赢得了广大非洲国家和人民的广泛赞誉。随着国力的增长，中国将逐步增加对外援助规模，继续提高援外资金的使用效益，灵活运用各种援外方式，不断扩大与广大非洲国

家各种形式的经济技术合作。

在援助的管理体制上，商务部是政府援外归口管理部门，下设对外援助司，保障机构是国际经济合作事务局、国际贸易经济合作研究院。中国进出口银行是提供优惠贷款的承办行。卫生部负责派遣援外医疗队。援助政策协调机制：商务部与外交部、财政部等有关部委和银行协商后，上报国务院批准。

三、中国对非援助面临的挑战

中国对非援助取得了举世瞩目的成绩，但也面临一些挑战，特别是有一些误解甚至是无端指责。这是个重要的原则问题。我想讲一下。

（一）一些国际舆论指责中国在非洲搞“新殖民主义”，这一指责既没有事实依据，也不符合中非关系现状，是极不负责任的。“新殖民主义”这顶帽子绝对扣不到中国头上。实践证明，中国与非洲国家发展正常的经贸合作关系与所谓“殖民主义”有着本质区别。中国政府与非洲各国开展经济技术合作，坚持平等互利、共同发展的原则，这与历史上某些西方列强推行的以维护和谋求殖民利益为目的，采取种种手段控制非洲国家的经济命脉，对其实行剥削和掠夺的经济殖民主义存在根本的区别。

近年来，一些人士还抛出了所谓“中国掠夺非洲资源”的论调。需要指出的是，中国的发展首先是立足国内。中国对非资源合作是按照市场经济规律和国际惯例开展的合作，由有条件的企业自主决策，属于正常的国际经济合作范畴。同时，中国政府鼓励本国企业延长资源开发合作的产业链，不断为当地经济发展注入新的动力，为帮助解决当地就业、扩大出口做出贡献。

（二）关于中国对非援助“不附加任何政治条件”的原则。早在 20 世纪 50 年代，中国政府就正式提出了“互不干涉内政”等和平共处五项原则。半个世纪以来，这五项原则不仅成为中国奉行独立自主和平外交政策的基础，也被正式列入联合国《关于各国依联合国宪章建立友好关系及合作的国际法原则宣言》和《关于建立新的国际经济秩序宣言》，为世界上绝大多数国家所接受，成为规范国际关系的重要准则。对于发展中国家来说，生存权和发展权是最基本、最重要的人权，解决上述问题的根本途径是使当地的经济得到发展，人民的基本生活需求得到满足。“发展才是硬道理”——中国在几十年的发展过程中对此深有体会，也愿意与别国共同分享发展的经验。

（三）所谓中国对非优惠贷款“搭便车”问题。有关西方国家指责中国对其他发展中国家提供大量非优惠贷款，从而“搭便车”，并可能影响其债务可持续性。我们的看法是，发展可持续是债务可持续的基础。减债不是目的，发展才是目的。债务可持续必须建立在发展可持续基础之上。发展需要的不仅是减债，更重要的是新的资金的流入。中国提供的优惠贷款正在起到这一作用，这可以鼓励新的资金进入发展中国家，促进其经济良性发展。中国仍然是一个发展中国家，自身经济建设还需要大量资金，而且目前国内的利率水平总体还比较高。自 2007 年 9 月 15 日起，国内金融机构人民币贷款 5 年期以上基准利率已达到 7.83%。目前我国政府提供优惠贷款中最优惠部分的年利率已降至 2%、期限最长为 20

年，赠与成分已达到相当水平。为体现支持非洲发展的诚意，中国正在积极研究进一步提高贷款优惠度，以使非洲国家获得更多的实惠。

四、对非援助的国际合作

长期以来，中国政府在力所能及的条件下向包括非洲在内的其他发展中国家提供了援助，开展了富有成效的经济技术合作，帮助发展中国家受援国削减贫困，增强自主发展能力。近年来，中国政府还加强了在多边领域开展对外援助合作的研究，并愿与有关国家进行交流。

实践证明，中国的产品质量、商品价格、技术水平和管理经验适合包括非洲在内的大多数发展中国家的需要。这是中国与其他发展中国家开展经济技术合作的长处。而西方发达国家和国际金融机构在安排对外援助规模方面具备明显优势。因此，我们希望能发挥各自长处，比如，由这些国家和机构提供一定规模的援助资金，帮助建设一些发展中国家急迫需要的基础设施项目，中国负责选派本国有实力、信誉好的优秀企业，以优惠的报价、合理的工期、过硬的工程质量参与建设，通过各方共同努力，促进包括非洲在内的发展中国家经济和社会的发展。

Possibility of Cooperation: China and EU in Darfur

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I. Introduction

This February, Hollywood director Steven Spielberg decided to withdraw from his role as an artistic adviser to the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This event became a focus of the whole world because it was regarded as the second wave of such a tendency that some western countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) made an improper linkage between the Darfur crisis and Olympic Games and used it as a means to accuse Chinese government. Meanwhile, given the instability of Darfur security situation, states have carried out a ‘shuttle diplomacy’: Ambassador Liu Guijin, Special Representative of the Chinese Government on the Darfur Issue, has paid visits to Britain and Sudan from February 21 to 23 and February 24 to 27 respectively; US special envoy to Sudan Richard S. Williamson also has visited Sudan at the end of February; and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has visited China from February 24 to 29; and so on. China has the same goals with other countries, that is to keep peace and stability of Sudan in general and Darfur in particular, and to promote the standard of life there. However, with different perspectives of the source and nature of Darfur crisis, China and the Western countries have different diplomatic approaches to that issue, which caused some unnecessary and untrue accusations. Thus, to bring to comprehensive cooperation on Darfur issue and facilitate its early solution, China and European Union should come to consensus on its sources, nature and solution, find their interests and challenges in Sudan, and finally identify the space of cooperation in that issue.

This paper falls into four parts. The next section analyses of the roots and nature of Darfur crisis, and discusses its ‘should-be’ comprehensive solution. Then the third section focuses on China and EU’s interests in Sudan, and the challenges of Darfur crisis bring to these interests. After that, I would like to discuss Chinese and EU’s diplomatic efforts for promoting the solution of Darfur crisis. Finally, as conclusion remarks, I will present some policy suggestions for China and EU on how to cooperate on this issue.

II. Darfur Crisis: Roots, Nature and Comprehensive Solution

There are different perspectives on the roots and nature of Darfur crisis among different countries, however, neither China nor EU agrees with the America’s argument that it is an ‘ethnic genocide’ despite there have many cases that violated the international human rights and humanitarian laws.¹ However, China and EU have

¹ Rory Carroll, “Sudan massacres are not genocide, says EU,” *The Guardian*, August 10, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/aug/10/eu.sudan>; “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui Attends the Ministerial Meeting of the Enlarged International Contact Group on Darfur,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 25, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg/xybfs/gjlb/2883/2885/t334571.htm>.

different views on the Darfur's roots and nature. According to EU, the major cause of the Darfur conflict is that Sudan government aims to maintain control of oil resources over the Arab minority area, and support the Arab militias, known as *Janjaweed*, to fight against the black African forces.² In China's perspective, however, Darfur crisis in nature is a struggle for resources among different ethnics which has been deteriorated by the environmental degradation and climate change. Many scientific research of UN Secretary-General BAN Ki-Moon, The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and other institutions and scholars have validated Chinese point of view.

Sudan is on the leading edge of the continental demographic divide, where sub-Saharan black Africa melds with Arabic-speaking populations. Meanwhile, Sudan is also on the leading edge of the continental religious divide, where Islamist Arabian melds with Christian and primitive religion followers. This fact makes Sudan's ethnical and religious conflict much severe than other Sub-Sahara African countries.

Greater Darfur, a territory roughly the size of France or Texas and with an estimated population of about six million people, is Sudan's largest region in terms of landmass and population and the most concentrated region in terms of demographic and religious divide. Thus it is one of the least developed regions in the country with a long history of ethnic and racial strife. Located in the north-western region of the country, the region shares Sudan's international borders with the Republic of Chad to the west, Libya to the northwest and Central Africa Republic to the southwest. The ecology of the area ranging from desert in the north, fertile belt in the Jabel Marra region to mixed vegetation of the southern zone provide a massive resource base for agriculture resulting in conflict between sedentary farmers and itinerant nomads. In the past, such clashes have occurred between mainly Fur, Masalit and other 'African' farming communities' pastoralist 'Arab' tribes, particularly those from Beni Hussein from Kabkabiya region (North Darfur) and Beni Halba (South Darfur). Following administrative divisions in 1994, Darfur has been divided into three provinces: North, South and West. West Darfur comprises mainly of the Fur and Masalit, albeit with a panoramic mixture of other ethnic groups.³ The pattern of farmers-pastoralists clashes cut across the three administrative divisions of Darfur but intensifies as a result of annual migration by pastoralists seeking greener pasture for their livestock.

In the past, clashes between cattle and camel rearing Arab tribes and sedentary African farming communities were often resolved through age-hallowed means of conflict resolution reinforced by Anglo-Egyptian legal heritages.⁴ Acting as third party mediators, community leaders and tribal chiefs – Sheikh Kabilah – often serve as veritable tools for conflict management. These traditional mediation mechanisms often prove fruitful resulting in compensations for lost crops, establishing the time and pattern of seasonal migration, as well as setting buffer zones for grazing. However,

² "A Merciless Battle for Sudan's Oil," *The Economist*, August 29, 2002, http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=1302474; Gerard Prunier, "Willful Impotence: Darfur and the International Community," *Current History*, Vol. 105, No. 691 (May 2006), p.195.

³ Usman A. Tar, "Old Conflict, New Complex Emergency: An Analysis of Darfur Crisis, Western Sudan," *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006), pp. 412–413; Human Rights Watch, "Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan," *Report of the Human Rights Watch*, Vol. 6, No. A (April 16, 2004), p. 5.

⁴ For details of Anglo-Egyptian legal and political legacies over Sudan, see Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1990).

with the accelerating environmental degradation and climate change, the struggle for natural resources increased and the traditional mediation mechanisms invalidated.

UNEP has published its research findings on Sudan in June 2007, *Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*, concluded that complex but clear linkages exist between environmental problems and the ongoing conflict in Darfur, as well as other historical and current conflicts in Sudan. This report points out that because of a decline in rainfall, which is probably the result, at least in part, of man-made climate change, the rainfall of Darfur dropped greatly. This contributed to, directly or indirectly, large-scale forest clearance, loss of wildlife and severe land degradation. Rapid population growth – from around one million in 1920 to around six million today – made all of this far more deadly by slashing living standards. The result has been increasing conflict between pastoralists and farmers, and the migration of populations from the North to the South, which greatly deteriorated the old struggle for natural resources among tribes.⁵

On June 16th, 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon published an article named *A Climate Culprit in Darfur* in *The Washington Post*, argues that the fundamental reason for Darfur conflict lies in climate warming. In this article, he pointed out that:

Two decades ago, the rains in Southern Sudan began to fail. According to U.N. statistics, average precipitation has declined some 40 percent since the early 1980s...It is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought. Until then, Arab nomadic herders had lived amicably with settled farmers. A recent Atlantic Monthly article by Stephan Faris describes how black farmers would welcome herders as they crisscrossed the land, grazing their camels and sharing wells. But once the rains stopped, farmers fenced their land for fear it would be ruined by the passing herds. ...Fighting broke out...⁶

Some other scholars and observers agree with the above views. Didrik Schanche, NPR's Foreign Desk Editor, argues that the deadly conflict in Darfur has deep roots in a vast, and arid long-neglected region in Sudan's west, where battles over water and grazing rights stretch back generations. The world wide climate change worsens such a resource struggle. The demographic shift that plays out across Africa's north helps feed the conflict.⁷

Wangari Maathai, a Kenyan environmentalist and winner of the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize, described the roots of the conflict. "To outsiders, the conflict is seen as tribal warfare. At its roots, though, it is a struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it," she said in an interview with *The Washington Post*.⁸

⁵ UNEP, *Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment* (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, 2007); Jeffrey D. Sachs, "No Development, No Peace," July 2007, Project Syndicate, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sachs131>.

⁶ Ban Ki Moon, "A Climate Culprit in Darfur," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 2007, p. A15.

⁷ Didrik Schanche, "Scarce Resources, Ethnic Strife Fuel Darfur Conflict," *NPR*, October 29, 2007, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6425093>.

⁸ Jim Hoagland, "Seeds of Hope in Africa," *The Washington Post*, May 12, 2005, p. A21.

It is the collapse of traditional dispute settlement mechanism that complicated the struggle for natural resources. For lacking of effective governance and the widespread of small arms, such an ecological strife transferred into a struggle over public resources. Finally, Omar al-Bashir, president of Sudan, ordered to broaden minority Arabian political prerogatives into West Darfur in 1994, which speeded up the collapse of traditional dispute settlement mechanism. The current hostilities erupted in February 2003, when two black groups - The Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) - attacked government targets, claiming that the predominantly African region was being neglected by the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum, and arguing more equitable distribution of power and resources. As a means of response, Khartoum recruited proxy groups of local Arab minorities, known as *Janjaweed*, to carry out state-sanctioned killings, arsons and rapes against the black African population of Darfur. Till now, more than 10,000 people had been killed and 1.2 million had been displaced.⁹

Thus, Darfur crisis is not an 'ethnic genocide' that American government charged, it is a struggle over natural sources mainly between Arabian and African black tribes, complicated and deteriorated by the global climate change. Meanwhile, there are indeed many cases of violation of international human rights laws and international humanitarian laws. In this regard, Darfur crisis needs international efforts to keep its peace and stability. As far as the roots and nature of Darfur crisis, a comprehensive and rational solution should aware the following dimensions:

Firstly, given the independent foreign policy tradition of Sudan, it is important to respect for Sudanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its diversity of religion and demography. Thus the best way for solving Darfur crisis is not coercive sanctions, but a soft way through persuasion and private influence. Unlike other African countries, Sudan didn't have a single colonial power—it had two, Britain and Egypt. And insofar as Egypt was itself busy negotiating the terms of its domination by Britain and France, Sudan always maintained a line to Paris. After World War Two, Sudan won her independence by deftly playing off Britain, Egypt, France and the U.S.—its nationalist leaders used intrigue and balancing to play a weak hand superbly well. During the Cold War it was the same, as successive governments diversified their sources of foreign support and patronage. After mid 1990s, especially the U.S. government carried out economic sanctions on Sudanese government in 1997, relationship between Sudan and the Western countries has fallen down. However, Sudan has turned her eyes toward the east, and developed close relationship with China, India, Malaysia, Iran and others. According to the Theory of Sanctions, it is the availability of 'alternative strategy' that makes sanctions failure.¹⁰ Sudan always has an 'alternative strategy' by its balancing between different sides. So, to reach a comprehensive and rational solution of Darfur crisis, persuasion and exercise of soft power is better than coercion and sanction.

Secondly, given the fact that Darfur is on the leading edge of the continental demographic and religious divide, it is necessary to pay special attentions to promoting local cultural integration and education development. It is not an

⁹ YANG Ziai, "Where Darfur Go?," *China Daily* (Chinese), October 29, 2007.

¹⁰ On the importance of alternative strategy in sanctions and diplomatic negotiation, see William Mark Habeeb, *Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Negotiate with Strong Nations* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

appropriate approach to use ideological rhetoric, for example, so-called universal human rights language, to end the issue. As far as EU and the U.S. current approach of waving humanitarian flags to put pressure on Sudan government is concerned, there are at least two reasons. The first is that EU and the U.S. want to play an ‘ethic power’ in international relations, which I will discuss further in next section. The other one is that there is a conscience shame indeed among Western governments because of their earlier failure to stop the genocide of Rwanda in 1994.¹¹ Thus they prefer to overreaction than non-action. That’s why many observers criticize the EU talks a lot but does a little.¹² The real reason is that such an approach is overstretched and EU can’t afford the ability and will to do so, thus the only one result is to pick up the old cultural and ethnical strives.

Third, given the influence of climate change and struggle for water and other resources, Sudanese government should establish a flexible resource allocation system so as to suit for different life style, and educate the tribesmen into a advanced way of life. Thus, international community should encourage and help it to establish a relative perfect system to distribute political power and resource wealth. However, some Western countries are pursuing an approach of supporting some groups while sanctioning other groups. For example, while condemning that Sudanese government supports the Arab *Janjaweed* militias, the Western countries, especially the U. S., have provided military assistances for Chad for many years, which will be discussed in detail in the next section. The weapons Western countries provided are being funneled from Chad into Darfur to support rebels who have refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement.¹³ Meanwhile, with scores of Chadian soldiers defected to the rebel militias, they raise the horrific possibility that American military equipment and expertise could end up going to men aligned with the *Janjaweed*. In that case, United States military assistance to Chad, far from containing political anarchy, would only add to it.¹⁴

Fourth, Darfur crisis is not a single phenomenon, but one has close links with the instability of Sudan as a whole, especially with the Southern Sudan. Sudan is an incredibly complex country. Wars and coups have marked its history since it gained independence in 1956. The country is littered with killing fields, some localized and some with national and regional implications. In 2005, to end the two decades North-South war, Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM) have signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). However, the CPA is not fully implemented by almost all parts, especially in the oil rich region of Abyei — Sudan’s “Kashmir” — astride the boundary between North and South roughly 500

¹¹ There are a lot of literatures discussed such a shameful feeling among the Western countries, see for example, Ann-Louise Colgan, "A Tale of Two Genocides: The Failed U.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur," *Africa Action Report*, September 9, 2006; Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001; Evelin Gerda Lindner, *The Psychology of Humiliation: Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and Hitler's Germany*, Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the University of Oslo, Department of Psychology, October 31, 2000, pp. 339-355; On comparison Darfur crisis with Rwanda, see Richard S. Williamson, "Darfur: Genocide in Slow Motion," *UNA-USA Occasional Paper*, No. 1, 17 (April 2006).

¹² Joschka Fischer, "The EU must act in Darfur," *The Guardian*, April 29, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4803&l=1>; Chris Patten, "Sudan's Crimes against Humanity Need Real EU Action, Not Empty Words," *The Irish Times*, March 28, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4744&l=1>.

¹³ "Sudan: Arms Being Funnelled From Chad Into Darfur – Report," *The East African* (Nairobi), October 23, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200610231060.html>.

¹⁴ Raffi Khatchadourian, "Blowback in Africa," *New York Times*, April 28, 2006.

miles southwest of Khartoum.¹⁵ International community should pay attention to the political, security and social situations of Sudan as a whole when they are trying to find a comprehensive solution for Darfur crisis. It is an arduous task for Sudan and international community to link Darfur crisis and the Southern Sudan and even not so outstanding Eastern Sudan together to find an ‘All-Sudan solution’.¹⁶

Finally, because of the neighboring countries’ importance, international efforts should include them into. Chad is the most important one of them, as stated above, Zagawa tribesmen live across the Chad-Sudan border, and weapons received from the U.S. usually enter into Sudan through this border and this part of population. Complicated by Zagawa refugees from Sudan entering into Chad and current Chadian internal conflict between government and Zagawa insurgents, this region has emerged a ‘proxy war’ that worsen further the instable security situation.¹⁷ In addition to this, there still other neighboring countries have influences on Sudanese domestic conflict. Including all relevant neighboring countries into the negotiating process will help greatly the fair and sustainability of the final solution.

To find the cooperation space between China and EU on Darfur issue, we need to analysis their different interests there, the foreign policy challenges posed by Darfur crisis for two parties, review their diplomatic efforts first, which are the aim of the next sections.

III. China and the EU in Sudan: Interests vs. Challenges

The crisis lasted for 5 years in Greater Darfur has posed great challenges for the whole world, especially for those countries that have direct interests there. However, for different countries, the challenges are different because of the different interests there. As far as China and the EU’s interests are concerned, there are fundamental differences between their interests in Sudan as following.

Economically, China has strong links with Sudan; although its share in China’s external economic relations are very limited. The most important field of China-Sudan economic relation is oil industry. With the rapid development of Chinese economy, the needs for oil have been increasing. China took the place of Japan to be the second large oil importer and consumer of the world in 2003, next to the U.S. China’s oil import dependency has increased from 30% in 2000 to 41% in 2004, to 47% in 2006, it is predicted that this figure will rise up to 50% in 2010, and 60% in 2020.¹⁸ To diversify oil import sources, China has turned her eyes to Africa, including Sudan. Since the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) entered the Sudan

¹⁵ Roger Winter and John Prendergast, “An All-Sudan Solution: Linking Darfur and the South,” ENOUGH Strategy Paper #9, November 2007. www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/allsudan_20071114.pdf; Roger Winter and John Prendergast, “Abyei: Sudan’s ‘Kashmir’,” ENOUGH Strategy Paper #11, January 2008, [http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1\(2\).pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1(2).pdf); Eric Reeves, “Darfur enters the Abyss: Khartoum renews massive assaults on civilians,” *Sudan Tribune*, February 13, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25943>.

¹⁶ See Roger Winter and John Prendergast, “An All-Sudan Solution: Linking Darfur and the South,” *Enough Strategy Paper*, No. 9 (November 2007).

¹⁷ See “Echo effects: Chadian instability and the Darfur conflict,” *Sudan Issue Briefs*, No. 9 (February 2008); “Sudan-Chad Proxy War may Destabilize the Region – UN,” *Sudan Tribune*, February 8, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25884>.

¹⁸ “It is predicted that China’s Oil Import Dependency will reach 50%,” *China News*, July 18, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-07/18/content_4848759.htm.

oil industry for the first time in 1995, China's oil interests in Sudan has been continuously enlarged (see map 1, 2). Today, CNPC holds 40% shares in block 1, 2 and 4 (Operated by GNPOC), a 41% of block 3 and 7 (Operated by PDOC), 35% of Block 15 (Operated by Petronas) and 95% of block 6 (Operated by CNPCIS).¹⁹

EU's oil interests in Sudan are smaller than that of China. Such a situation is not caused by China's competition, but by EU's following the U.S. sanctions on Sudanese government. In this regard, the EU's interests in Sudan oil industry are still very significant. There are several big EU oil companies operating in Sudan, for example: Lundin Petroleum (Sweden/Switzerland) has a 24,5% interest in block 5B (Operated by WNPOC-2); Total (France/Belgium) has a 32,5% interest in block B (Operated by Total); Cliveden, a Swiss company has a 37% interest in block C, and 10% in block 15. In addition to that, among the total 12 subcontractors, there are 6 from EU, including Bentini SpA (Italy), Royal Dutch/Shell (Netherlands/UK), Saras (Italy), Siemens (Germany), Trafigura (Netherlands/UK/Switzerland) and Weir Pumps Ltd. (UK); while china only participates into one, that is MMC (Malaysia/China/Oman).²⁰

Besides oil industry, both China and EU have relatively close trade relationship with Sudan. Because of the same reason of following American sanction, China-Sudan trade volume is bigger than that of EU-Sudan (see table 1).

Table 1: Sudan trade relations with China and EU (2002-2006) (Value in million US\$)

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Import					
China	254.5	310.1	558.8	1316.2	1662.4
EU	531.7	621.9	999.2	1847.3	2181.3
Export					
China	940.2	1616.1	2319.4	3323.8	4324.3
EU	148.3	183.6	172.1	209.4	129.9

Source: UNcomtrade.

Politically, both China and Sudan have suffered the ill-effects of the colonial era. This shared experience underlies the ideas of equality and respect for sovereignty that each highlight in their approach to international relations. China hopes that Sudan will not intervene into our domestic affairs, such as the Taiwan, Tibet and others. Meanwhile, China does not agree with the view that Darfur situation should be described as "genocide". China has consistently opposed economic sanctions on Sudan. China

¹⁹ European Coalition on Oil in Sudan,
<http://www.ecosonline.org/index.cfm?event=showcompanies&page=companies>.

²⁰ Ibid.

believes the Darfur issue is an issue related to development, where sanctions would only bring more trouble to the region. Since the Darfur issue is a conflict between different Sudanese peoples, and nation building is a difficult process for any country, the international community has to give Sudan some time to solve this problem.²¹

The end of the Cold War provided the European Community/Union (EC/EU) with the opportunity to realise its ambition to become a key international actor.²² To realise such an ambition, the discourse regarding the EU's policy towards Africa has taken place in two strands. The first strand of this discourse has been within the frameworks of EU's development cooperation with ACP²³ states and humanitarian assistance. The second strand of this discourse was parallel to the EU's development cooperation. This was when European institutions were making efforts, in the early 1990s, towards establishing ways of preventing conflicts in Africa.²⁴ Bretherton and Vogler note, in this period, many actors were particularly lobbying strongly for reinforcement of the EU's international position through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),²⁵ which has now become an important instrument in this regard. Thus, Sudan has become a touchstone of EU's key international actor ambition.

Parallel to political interests, EU also has important ideological interests in Sudan. EU foreign policy has so strong ideology tendency that Robert Kagan argues that Europeans are from 'Venus'. 'Europe has moved beyond power into a self-contained world of laws, rules, and negotiation, while America operates in a "Hobbesian" world where rules and laws are unreliable and military force is often necessary.'²⁶ The recent issue of *International Affairs*, published by Chatham House, has a series of papers on European 'ethical power'. This project was initiated with a conference held at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, in 2005. A workshop was subsequently held at Chatham House, London, in September 2007 to discuss more specifically the various articles that make up this issue. In the beginning of the 'Introduction', the author quoted Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP and ESDP, that:

The peaceful unification of our continent has been our great achievement, and now our main challenge is to act as a credible force for good. From a continental agenda, we should move to a global agenda. From building peace in Europe to being a peace-builder in the world.²⁷

Such an ideological tendency has been demonstrated by EU leaders' speech,

²¹ Li Anshan, "China and Africa: Policy and Challenges," *China Security*, Vol. 3 No. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 75-76.

²² See C. Hill and M. Smith, "International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues," in C. Hill and M. Smith eds., *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford University Press, 2005); F. Cameron, "The EU as a Global Actor: Far from Pushing its Political Weight Around," in C. Rhodes ed., *The EU in the World Community* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp.19-44.

²³ The abbreviation 'ACP' refers to Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, which at present, constitutes 78 countries, including 48 of the 54 African States. The 5 Mediterranean States belong to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (1995) and South Africa has signed a specific Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 2000. The agreement is formally passed between the ACP group and the EC, as the EU has no legal personality yet.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ P. Kimunguyi, "From Lome to Cotonou: An Assessment of the European Union's Trade Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries," *Journal of International Relations*, No. 33:1-2 (July 2006).

²⁶ See Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

²⁷ Lisbeth Aggestam, "Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?," *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (2008), p. 1.

especially those referred to Darfur crisis. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in October 2004 that ‘... The international focus will not go away while this situation remains outstanding’. And Javier Solana said in May 2006:

‘The long-suffering people of Darfur need help - not next week, or next month, but today. The violence that has long terrorized the civilian population is persisting. Extreme human rights violations are continuing ... Consequently, the humanitarian situation is the worst on the planet.

‘This humanitarian and political crisis is unacceptable, an affront to our conscience. Standing by is not an option.’²⁸

Compared with the EU, China has abandoned ideology tendency of current foreign policy since early 1980s when Chinese government adopted an independent foreign policy. Thus there is no ideological interest at all.

Given the fact of different interests in Sudan, the challenges posed by Darfur crisis for China and the EU are also different.

Economically, Darfur crisis raised serious questions on how to protect both parties’ overseas interests. The difference is that such challenges are both short-term and mid-long-term for China, while mainly mid-long-term for the EU. As map 1 show, China’s oil interests in Sudan mainly concentrate in Darfur and Southern Sudan where security situation is not so optimistic because of civil conflicts there. Besides that, Darfur insurgents threatened repeatedly that they will destroy the oil infrastructure and kidnap Chinese oil workers.²⁹ On the other hand, with the advocacy of the EU and the U.S., the UNSC has passed several resolutions to sanction Sudan government targeting its oil industry, which will bring negative impacts on China’s oil interests there.³⁰ The real intention of these sanctions is that Western oil companies want to re-entry Sudan, which will erode Chinese companies’ advantages there. Besides the negative impacts on oil industry, Darfur crisis also raises serious consular protection challenges for Chinese government because of a large number of Chinese civilians and companies in Sudan.

For the EU, the protection of overseas economic interests in Sudan is not so urgent due to its small shares in its whole overseas economic operations. However, if the Darfur crisis will not be solved in the near future, it will create a negative environment for EU oil companies to re-entry into Sudan and other sectors to occupy the Sudan market. Obviously, this is a long-term challenge in nature.

Politically, Darfur crisis posed serious challenges for Chinese government from two ways. The first is how to balance the principle of non-intervention of domestic affairs and take part into the process of mediating Darfur crisis. China always insists the principle of non-intervention into other’s domestic affairs, however, with her

²⁸ Nick Grono, “Darfur: What Should the EU Do?”, Nick Grono,” Speech at the Conference on Darfur, Landstingssalen, Copenhagen, February 28, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4683&l=1>.

²⁹ “Darfur rebel leader plans attacks on Chinese oil firms,” *Sudan Tribune*, December 8, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25075>.

³⁰ WANG Meng, “Darfur Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for Chinese Foreign Policy Transformation,” *World Economy and Politics (Chinese)*, No. 6, 2005, p. 5.

international status rising, the calls for actions are higher than ever. To become a responsible stakeholder and a responsible big power of international system, it is necessary to join into international efforts for mediating international crisis and hot issues. Actually, China has been an active member for some hot issues, such as the six party talks for realizing the nuclear-free of North Korea, international cooperation on anti-terrorism, etc.. Here raised the dilemma of how to influence other country's decision without intervention into its domestic affairs. In the case of Darfur crisis, such a dilemma intensified by Western countries' pressures that ask China to compel Sudanese government to create conditions for the deployment of of a UN and African Union (AU) 'hybrid peacekeeping force' in Darfur for implementing the Resolution 1769 adopted the UN Security Council On July 31, 2007, taking ground of China's economic links with Sudan.

The second is how to deal with the pressures posed by some international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that links Darfur crisis with the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. After four years of tireless efforts, Darfur advocacy groups have had little success in pressuring the Bush administration or any other Western government to move decisively against the Sudanese government for its atrocities in Darfur. So, these groups focused instead on the '2Cs strategy' of humanitarian advocacy—China and celebrities—as a remedy.³¹

The first wave operation of such a strategy is in February 2007: Eric Reeves, a professor of English Language and Literature at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, published an open letter that claimed 'It's time, now, to begin shaming China'.³² Ms. Mia Farrow, a good-will ambassador for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNCF), also has played a crucial role, starting a campaign at the same month to label the Games in Beijing the "Genocide Olympics" and calling on corporate sponsors and even Mr. Spielberg, who is an potential artistic adviser to China for the Games, to publicly exhort China to do something about Darfur. In a March 28, 2007 op-ed article in *The Wall Street Journal*, she warned Mr. Spielberg that he could 'go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games,' a reference to a German filmmaker who made Nazi propaganda films.³³ This forced Mr. Spielberg to send a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao four days later, in which he condemns the killings in Darfur and asks the Chinese government to use its influence in the region 'to bring an end to the human suffering there'.³⁴

The second wave of this strategy begun early this year through Mr. Spielberg's 'quit' his position of artistic adviser of the 2008, although he had not signed the recruitment letter sent by the Beijing Olympic organizing committee till May 10, 2007 and thus he has never been an artistic director to the Beijing Olympic games.³⁵

Although all these charges and accusations are not enough evidence, '2Cs strategy' of

³¹ See the website of 'Olympic Dream For Darfur', <http://www.dreamfordarfur.org/>.

³² Eric Reeves, "On China and the 2008 Olympic Games: An Open Letter to Darfur Activists and Advocates," February 10, 2007, <http://www.sudanreeves.org/Page-10.html>.

³³ Helene Cooper, "Darfur Collides With Olympics, and China Yields," *New York Times*, April 13, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.

³⁴ "Darfur Activists Push Spielberg to Pressure China," <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12204096>.

³⁵ Scott Baldauf, Peter Ford, and Laura J. Winter, "China Speaks Out on Darfur Crisis," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 25, 2008, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0225/p01s03-woap.html>.

NGOs has posed evident challenges for China's foreign policy, and had significant negative effects on Chinese national images.

For the EU, political challenges posed by Darfur also have ideological dimensions, related to how to balance humanitarian motivation and ambition of playing role of key international actor, and how to keep the credibility of the EU as a single international actor. If the EU let alone Darfur crisis and keep non-action like the case of Rwanda in 1994, then its 'ethical power' position will bankrupt totally. However, because of historical links, the EU returning Sudan is not only driven by ideological intension, but also by realistic motivation – to ensure continued access to raw materials and natural resources, and to protect economic investments already made or bring contemplated in what was now newly independent states (Ojo, 1996).³⁶ It is the dilemma of balancing ideological intension and realistic motivation that keeps EU 'no real action, but empty words'.³⁷

IV. Efforts of China and the EU for Solving Darfur Crisis

In the past 5 years, relative parties, including China and the EU, have made great efforts to push Darfur crisis progress, although some of them failed. While China's role becomes increasingly positive, the EU pursues an approach similar to the U.S. basically, with more substantive assistance provided for the peacekeeping mission there than that of America.

China's efforts mainly fall into two aspects, one aimed at solving the long-term fundamental roots of Darfur crisis, the other aimed at playing a 'bridge' and 'messenger', or a 'honest broker' between Sudan and international community.

Firstly, China fully understands that Darfur is a development issue in itself that its ultimate solution is to develop Sudanese economy and to improve standards of life, thus China made great effort to address these issues.

As a resourceful country, Sudan has proven oil reserves totaling 563 million barrels, and its oil reserves are estimated at between 600 million and 1.2 billion barrels with recoverable reserves estimated at greater than 800 million barrels. The country is also rich in natural gas with reserves estimated at 3 trillion cubic feet (tcf).³⁸ However, for lacking of fund and technology, Sudan can't build its own oil industry independently. An Italian oil company and the Royal Dutch/Shell Group had done some exploration in North Sudan but failed in 1950s. After Jaafar al Nimeiri became the president of Sudan in late 1960s, he requested Chinese to help Sudan explore its oil potential. The Chinese told Nimeri at that time that it will be better if Sudan resorted to the USA, which possesses the required technology and financial abilities which China did not have. One should remember that this advice was given to Sudan at the time of the Cold War. That also explains why Nimeiri resorted to the USA for a company which will explore oil for Sudan. It was Chevron which was able to prove the presence of oil in Sudan.³⁹ Unfortunately, with the sanction posed by the U.S., Chevron had to close

³⁶ See for example, Oladeji O. Ojo, *Africa and Europe: The Changing Economic Relationship* (London: Zed Books, 1996).

³⁷ Chris Patten, "Sudan's Crimes against Humanity Need Real EU Action, Not Empty Words".

³⁸ "Oil and Gas," Sudan Development Program, <http://www.sdpsummit.org/sp/industry/oilgas.htm>.

³⁹ Ali Abdalla Ali, "EU, China and Africa: The Sudanese Experience," *Sudan Tribune*, July 10, 2007,

down and the oil wells remained sealed until the starting of oil exploration in 1999 by the present government. Thus, Sudan remained as an oil importer till 2001 even they know there are abundant oil resources underground.

Sudan President Omar al Bashir asked China to help Sudan explore its oil potential again during his Beijing visit of 1995.⁴⁰ Since then, energy cooperation between Sudan and China has been developing rapidly, which helped greatly the development of Sudan oil industry and its social-economic progress. With CNPC entering into Sudan, the volumes of Sudanese proved oil and gas reserves are increasingly mounted up, all the blocks CNPC joint venues have put into production. Meanwhile, the oil exploration and production of other blocks are much smaller than these CNPC's blocks, which is one of the reasons why the Western States always attack China on Sudan and Darfur crisis.

China not only helps Sudan's oil production and exports, but also its oil industry as a whole. In 2007, China's oil investments in Sudan reached 150 billion USD. China-Sudan oil cooperation, which began in 1995, has come to include crude oil exploration and development, shipping oil pipelines, oil refining, petrochemicals and all the other oil industry system integration in between. CNPC and Sudanese government's Ministry of Energy & Mining (MEM) has concluded an agreement on building the Sudan Khartoum Refinery Company (KRC) that finished in 2000. In July 2006, CNPC announced the completion of the Khartoum Refinery Expansion Project, which doubled the refinery's capacity from 50,000 bbl/d to 100,000 bbl/d. The Khartoum refinery processes Nile blend crude, which has a low sulfur content and high fuel-yield. The additional refinery capacity from the expansion should help alleviate the short supply of refined products available in Sudan, while giving the country some additional export capacity.⁴¹

Energy cooperation between China and Sudan has expanded into other social-economic fields that helped Sudan to build a more comprehensive and balanced national economy. The El Gaili Power Station is a large gas and oil-fired power plant planned by the Sudanese MEM and Sudan National Electricity Corporation. This power station was to be built over four phases. For the first phase, the total contract value was \$149 million and the installed capacity 200,000 kw. When it went into service in August 2004, its generation capacity accounted for approximately one third of Sudan's national total at the time. Today, the second phase of the project with the same installed capacity of the first phase was finished in late 2007, which will meet the electricity needs of the whole Khartoum City.⁴² The Merowe Dam Project, which is to produce 1,250 megawatts of electricity, is also helped by Chinese companies and will be finished in 2008. The Merowe Dam is intended to roughly double Sudan's power supply and help irrigate land that is now barely arable.⁴³

<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22783>.

⁴⁰ "Decades Oil Dream of Sudanese," CNPC website, <http://www.cnpc.com.cn/CNPC/xwzx/shzs/hzfpj>.

⁴¹ "Sudan's Khartoum Refinery Expanded, Sees Gasoline Exports," *Sudan Tribune*, July 10, 2006,

<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article16587>.

⁴² "Sudan Oil Minister Says Energy Cooperation with China Fruitful," *Sudan Tribune*, July 16, 2007,

<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22865>.

⁴³ "Sudanese People are the Most Beneficiaries of China-Sudan Energy Cooperation," Khartoum, Xinhua Net, January 17, 2007, <http://www.cnpc.com.cn/cnadc/hzygy/jlhz>. Marc Lacey, "MEROWE DAM - A race Against Time to Save Sudan's Past from Progress," *The New York Times*, May 31, 2005.

Most importantly, as Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Awad Ahmed Al-Jaz said that,

The Chinese Government and a batch of Chinese enterprises, represented by the CNPC, have established a unique model of cooperation with the Sudanese Government and enterprises over time. Under this model, the Chinese Government and enterprises not only provide capital, technology and equipment for Sudan, but also attach great importance to Sudan's human resources development.⁴⁴

In fact, all the projects that the Chinese companies have invested in so far around Sudan are actively training and employing local Sudanese employees, to translate into action the consensus of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation on human resources development. The China-Sudan Energy Cooperation has provided more than 100,000 job opportunities for local people directly. According to a report in October 2007, Sudanese workers in the oil field constitute now more than: 90% in GNPOC consortium; 87% in Petrodar; 67% in Khartoum refinery.⁴⁵ With 50:50 shares with MEM, CNPC takes charge of KRC's management. By gradual trainings of Sudanese staffs, the Khartoum Refinery has stably localized since its operation in 2000, and the number of Chinese staffs also has step down simultaneously.⁴⁶ Chinese enterprises pay high attention to training of Sudanese workers and staffs. CNPC has elected 35 Sudanese students to enter into universities of Beijing City, costing 1.5 million US\$. Now, they all have gained their undergraduate, Master, or Ph. D. degree.⁴⁷

In the past several years, CNPC donated about 2.7 million US dollars, to build up the KRC Friendship Hospital, Fula Hospital and Palouge Hospital etc., which consequently improved greatly the medical conditions of the local people. CNPC through its subsidiary companies built 22 schools and 156 water pools for local dwellers. And recently CNPC contributed 10 million US dollars to Sudanese government for the construction of the Maravi Bridge on Nile River. According to an undercount statistic, over 1.5 million Sudan residents benefited from all these welfare establishments.⁴⁸

Secondly, Chinese government also fully realized the emergency of finding a comprehensive solution for Darfur crisis, want to extend a 'helping hand', towards solving the Darfur conflict, and 'ready to cooperate with the government of Sudan, the United Nations, the AU (African Union), regional countries and all the other important stakeholders', for a permanent solution to the conflict.⁴⁹

Ending the Darfur conflict requires much more than what China alone can offer. The Western states and NGOs put too high hopes on China, as well as they exaggerated China's limited arms sale to Sudan.⁵⁰ As some Western scholars and observers noted,

⁴⁴ "Sudan Oil Minister Says Energy Cooperation with China Fruitful".

⁴⁵ "Sudanization of Oil Jobs," *Sudan Inside*, October 26, 2007, <http://sudaninside.com/category/economy>.

⁴⁶ "CNPC in Sudan".

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ "Envoy Liu Guijin Said China Would be External Bridge for Sudan," *Zaobao*, February 24, 2008, http://realtime.zaobao.com/2008/02/080224_35.shtml.

⁵⁰ "Media Exaggerate China's Limited Arms Sale to Sudan – Envoy," *Sudan Tribune*, February 23, 2008,

in regard to Western NGOs' '2Cs strategy', that:

Yes, China has the economic leverage to gain the ear of President Bashir, but that hardly means it has the ability to bully him into accepting a large U.N. peacekeeping contingent in Darfur...And, even if China was capable of delivering Bashir, the Sudanese Government is not the only impediment to an effective peace process. Nowadays, more people may well be dying from tribal clashes than from marauding janjaweed or government forces. The infighting of fractured rebel groups and the sheer number of displaced people with no homes to return to are also immediate and significant obstacles to peace. But China has little influence over the rebel movements and is ill-positioned to act as a mediator between them.⁵¹

Additionally, the fragmentation of the rebel groups has greatly impeded the Darfur peace process. Of the five key Darfur rebel groups, only two have agreed to unify their positions and join the peace talks, stalled since the failed summit in Libya in October 2007. Meanwhile, the two key rebel factions, the JEM – the biggest military group — and the SLM led by Abdel-Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, were still putting conditions on attending any talks.⁵²

Even though, Chinese government still responsibly mediates between Sudan and the Western states.

1. China has been working closely with the United Nations to resolve the Darfur crisis through political means, said the ambassador. On July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1769, authorizing the deployment a hybrid UN and African Union (AU) force in Darfur, which marks a great achievement in the settlement of the crisis there. China helped push forward the Sudanese government, the AU and the UN reaching consensus on the resolution on the hybrid force to Darfur. From mid-2006, Chinese government began to persuade President Bashir to moderate his position. In their two times of meeting, at the first China-Africa Summit in November 2006 and Chinese President Hu Jintao's Sudan visit in February 2007, Hu talked to President Bashir about Chinese concerns of Darfur crisis, and hoped Sudan Government to accept the arrangement of a hybrid UN-AU forces.⁵³ Sudan Government agreed to accept it in mid 2007, which did not come easily and Chinese efforts have been applauded by the international community. China has contributed 315 engineers for supporting that force.

2. The Chinese government has also maintained sound communication with the Sudanese Government, held discussions with it on the basis of respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. China sees to it that the concerns of the

<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26094>.

⁵¹ Morton Abramowitz, Jonathan Kolieb, "Why China Won't Save Darfur," *Foreign Policy*, June 2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3847; Alex de Waal, "China and Sudan: Defining the Turning Point," *Sudan Tribune*, February 24, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26089>.

⁵² Victor Tanner and Jerome Tubiana, *Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007); "Chinese envoy urges pressure on Darfur rebels," *Sudan Tribune*, February 27, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26168>.

⁵³ Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg, "China and Darfur: 'Signs of Transition'," *Guardian Unlimited*, June 11, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4891&l=1>.

Sudanese Government are heard, while conveying to the government the international community's concern over Darfur. In May 2007, Chinese Government appointed Ambassador Liu Guijin, one of the top Africanists, as a special envoy - very rare in its foreign policy structure - for Darfur, in order to promote its early solution. The dual-track strategy, initiated by China, is designed to push forward political negotiations and the peacekeeping mission in Darfur in a balanced manner.

3. In order to improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur, China has provided material assistance worth 100 million RMB (about 13.8 million U.S. dollars) to Darfur, 1.8 million U.S. dollars aid to African Union, and 500,000 U.S. dollars donation to the U.N. fund for solving Darfur issue, and Chinese firms have also offered help.⁵⁴

In February 2008, when the 'resignation' of Mr. Spielberg caused international attention, Chinese government decided to use this opportunity to let international community understand Darfur situation more truly and concretely. Chinese envoy Liu visited Sudan and its former suzerain British to exchange views. During these visits, ambassador Liu has put forward some constructive plans and suggestions for solving Darfur crisis. He pointed out that, the progress of hybrid mission and solution of Darfur crisis need multilateral efforts: firstly, Sudanese Government should cooperate further with international community, and show more flexibility on some technical issues; secondly, rebel groups of Darfur area should return to the negotiation table; thirdly, international community, including some Western countries, should use their influence to persuade relevant forces respectively; fourth, as two important players of a tripartite mechanism, U.N. and the AU should strengthen consultation with Sudanese government, exchange views with it more frequently, and take more pro-active attitudes to find solutions for specific problems.⁵⁵

The EU also made great efforts for solving Darfur crisis. Firstly, to promote its idealistic goals and become an 'ethical power', the EU put heavy pressures to bully Sudanese government because of its sympathism to the 'weaker' in Darfur. The EU Parliament has passed several resolutions to address the Darfur crisis, accusing that it was the Sudanese Government' support to Arab militia Janjaweed that worsen the security situation, block the deployment of UN-AU hybrid force, and failed the international humanitarian assistances.⁵⁶ To put greater pressures on Sudanese Government, the EU actively pushed the UNSC to pass various resolutions. On March 31, 2005, UNSC passed resolution No. 1593(2005) to,

1. *Decides* to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;
2. *Decides* that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to

⁵⁴ "China Makes Constant Efforts to Resolve Crisis in Darfur – Envoy," Sudan Tribune, February 17, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25995> ; "China provides more humanitarian aid to Darfur," Sudan Tribune, February 26, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26144>.

⁵⁵ "China not Seeking Expediency from Darfur Issue," *China Daily* (Chinese), February 25, 2008, p. 3.

⁵⁶ "European Parliament resolution on the situation in Darfur," *Sudan Tribune*, February 15, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20312>.

the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all states and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;

3. *Invites* the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity.⁵⁷

It is important to note here that the EU is the main advocate for refer the Darfur situation to ICC.⁵⁸ According to resolutions of UNSC and its own, the EU has posed arms embargo upon Sudanese Government and sanction on 4 individuals.⁵⁹

Secondly, the EU also provided great support for peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The EU has made active support for the Abuja peace talks leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). From its early involvement, when it helped broker the N'djamena ceasefire, the EU has steadily increased its diplomatic activity in relation to Sudan, as well as its operational support to AMIS (see details below). The EU, which has been assigned a specific role in the agreement, will continue to play a crucial part in its implementation - notably in the *Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation* (DDDC) process and in the *Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission*, and by providing assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. The EU also appointed its Special Representative for Sudan, Mr Torben Brylle, in May 2007, to ensure coordination and coherence of the EU's contributions to AMIS. The EU has made the greatest contribution to AMIS by committing over €435m in total, and deployed almost 100 personnel in support of the military component of AMIS and a further 50 in support of the civilian police component.⁶⁰

Thirdly, the EU has provided around €1 billion for alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Most resources have been provided for humanitarian assistance, including food aid and aid to Darfur refugees in neighbouring Chad. The European Commission alone has allocated €282 million in humanitarian support. EU Member States have provided around €12 million in support of the political process. Contributions to the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) amount to approximately €325 million, including funding from the African Peace Facility of €212 million.⁶¹

Both China and EU have made great efforts to promote the solving of Darfur crisis. Given the difficulties of cooperation caused by different perspectives on the roots and nature of the crisis, and different approaches and principles, it is necessary to find the

⁵⁷ S/RES/1593(2005), Security Council, United Nations, March 31, 2005,

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵⁸ "European Union Response to the Darfur Crisis," European Union Factsheet, December 2007,

<http://www.eurunion.org/newsweb/HotTopics/DarfurEUFactsheetDec2007.doc>.

⁵⁹ Nick Grono, "Darfur: What Should the EU Do?," Speech at the Conference on Darfur, Landstingsalen, Copenhagen, February 28, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4683&l=1>.

⁶⁰ "European Union Response to the Darfur Crisis".

⁶¹ Ibid.

common space for cooperation between two parties.

V. Conclusion: The Space for Cooperation

Given the facts that Darfur situation is still unstable and the UN-AU hybrid force has not been fully deployed, there is still a relatively long way to go to reach a comprehensive solution for Darfur crisis and diplomatic efforts of every part need to be improved further.

As far as Chinese diplomatic efforts in Darfur issue are concerned, there are at least two aspects needed to be improved. Firstly, Chinese Government needs to give more publicity of its foreign policy; in other words, China should increase propaganda or transparency of its foreign policy. To a great extent, Chinese approach for solving Darfur crisis is correct and has the potential of providing the long-term solution for it. It is a pity that Chinese government often publicizes these efforts after the Western States and NGOs attacks, especially linking the Darfur crisis with Beijing Olympic Games. Such a response often gives the Western States and NGOs an impression that '2Cs strategy' is effective and encourages them to continue it.⁶²

Secondly, Chinese government should enhance cooperation with other relevant parties. China insists in persuading and influencing and opposes coercive measures because of adherence to non-intervention principle, which isolates China from the Western states. Without effective propaganda, the result is that Chinese government fights alone without any support of the Western countries. Furthermore, because the EU and the U.S. has similar standpoints on Darfur crisis that didn't proved their effectiveness, this provided for them a good opportunity to accused China without any negative effects on their own political image.

As to the EU's efforts, there are two deficiencies, too. Firstly, the EU usually talks more than acts mainly attribute to its idealistic and ideological goals. Secondly, the EU's coercive approach proved not working. One determinant factor is the EU's short of political will and physical capability to enforce sanction, the other is Sudan has relatively enough 'alternative' strategy. Thus, the EU should do more concrete things and show more flexible attitude.

To solve Darfur crisis effectively, both China and the EU need to cooperate with each other, and improve their diplomatic approach respectively according to the 'should-be' solution described above. Thus, we can find that there are several potential fields for China-EU cooperation:

Firstly, both China and the EU should reach consensus on how to solve the Darfur crisis, and persuade the U.S. join into their common efforts. Such an approach should be a political, peaceful and non-coercive way by using influence of soft power but not hard power.

Secondly, both China and the EU have important economic interests there; therefore have large political influence on Sudan Government and even the rebel groups. Both

⁶² Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg, "China and Darfur: 'Signs of Transition'," *Guardian Unlimited*, June 11, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4891&l=1>.

parties should cooperate to promote Sudan Government and rebel groups to conclude and abide by a comprehensive peace accord in greater Darfur area.

Thirdly, China and the EU should push forward together a strategy of facilitating integration of Sudan domestic cultures, ethnics and races, which is the natural need of the fact that Darfur crisis is an indispensable component of the internal turbulence of Sudan as a whole. Both China and the EU are examples of multiculturalism, their experiences and lessons will contribute to Sudan's cultural and ethnical integration, and therefore its peace and stability. Moreover, if such a strategy can be successful, it will be generalized to apply to all domestic turbulent states on the African continent, or at least provide important reference.

Fourth, both parties should promote together the communication between Sudan and relevant international organizations, especially the AU and UN. Because of its regional influences, such effort will create friendly conditions for Darfur issue, particularly for stability of Chad-Sudan border.

Finally, but not the last, Sudan's instability has deeper roots of unfair distribution of wealth and natural resources that often puzzled those newly modernized countries. In this regard, the EU has realized modernization for a long time and China is underway of that process, experiences and lessons of the EU and China will contribute a lot for Sudan and other African countries' modernization process.


Cooperation between China and the EU on Darfur crisis has very profound meanings for both sides. For China, it will promote our foreign propaganda, improve our national image, and set an example for future cooperation with other parties. For the EU, it functions as a medium to hide its ideological and realistic goals, a show of flexibility, and a real action but not just talking in Darfur. We have enough reasons to hope its bright future.

Map 1: Oil in Sudan



Source: European Coalition on Oil in Sudan,
http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf_reports/Maps/Soedan%20A5%20zw.pdf.

Map 2: CNPC in Sudan



China's Aid to Africa: Oil Oriented or Not

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Abstract: China's aid to Africa is generally defined by Western voices as oil-oriented, which is largely because of the international oil competition on the African Continent. Taking account of the 50-year history of China's aid to Africa, we can find such allegations are not true. Furthermore, when we check the characteristics of China's aid and the comparative advantages of China-Africa trade, we also find such allegations are not true. The nature of China's aid is to help Africa to achieve development, improve bilateral cooperation, and consequently realize the aim of common prosperity.

Key words: Africa, Aid, Development

In recent years there have been some negative views in the international community on China's "neo-colonialism", claiming that China offers aid to Africa in return for energy. Some Western scholars believe that China's unconditioned energy-oriented aid to Africa may offset international efforts against such autocratic countries as Sudan in that it allows room for maneuver for those "problem" states.¹ An objective evaluation of China's aid to Africa will have to take into consideration the evolution of China-Africa relation, the fundamental purposes served by China's aid to Africa, and the reasons cited by international doubters.

I. The Root Cause of the Energy Orientation Argument in China's Aid to Africa

China's aid to Africa is challenged mainly for the energy orientation. It is believed that China offers aid to Africa in exchange for energy as well as influence. There are two main objectives for China's energy policy in Africa: to meet domestic demand in the short term and to gain footing in the international energy market in the long run.² Some Western Scholars even define China's energy development and market entry in Africa as "neo-colonialism," comparing China's aid to Africa to "oriental cowboy capitalism," or in other words, gaining energy at any cost while ignoring local political issues like the ones in Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe.³

1. The root cause for the challenge lies in energy competition in Africa among powers

The dispute over China-Africa energy cooperation reflects a practical issue: in the grim situation of global energy security Africa has become a major target of contention among powers, and as a result China's energy development and cooperation in the region have unavoidably aroused Western powers' attention and alert. Some Western scholars have pointed out that China threatens the US objectives

¹ Kevin Matthews, *China's Clout in Africa*, UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, Sept.9,2006.

² Ian Taylor, *Unpacking China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa*, Current African Issues, No.35, The Nordic Africa Institute,2007,p.10-11.

³ Ernest Wilson, *China, Africa and the U.S.: Something Old, Something New*, American Abroad Notes on the Foreign Affairs, Jan 29th, 2006, <http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2006/1/29/235734/457>.

and visions for the region by abundant diplomatic, financial and military aids in Africa resulting in rapidly expanding influence, and by providing aids to such autocratic countries as Sudan and Zimbabwe.⁴

In fact, the size and history of China's energy investment are dwarfed by Western investments in non-energy areas in Africa. The reason why the China-Africa Energy Cooperation became a focal point is that the overall enhancement of China's influence in Africa and the steady growth of China-Africa cooperation have challenged the existent international order as well as interest distribution. China's aid to and energy cooperation with "problem" states like Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe in particular have challenged Western countries' strategy of promoting their own values of human rights and democracy, and getting more energy for their own sake. In summary, energy issue in Africa has become an issue in international politics, affecting all aspects of China-Africa cooperation, including aid.

2. China's unconditioned aid to Africa triggers challenges

Unlike Western aids, China's aid to Africa does not come with any political conditions. China disapproves of adding issues like human rights to aids or disrupting aids and imposing sanctions at every turn. The reason why the US stresses the energy orientation in China's aid is that China has not followed suit in sanctioning some problem states in Africa like Sudan. Instead China helps Sudan build dams and exploit energy. It makes the US uneasy that China offers an alternative to the Sudanese government, thereby undermining its sanction.

However, it is simplistic and unrealistic to draw a conclusion that China's aid to and investment in such African countries as Sudan and Zimbabwe is energy-oriented just because China has not followed the US in imposing sanctions on these countries. It is a fundamental principle in China's aid to Africa to respect the sovereignty of the recipient country and not to interfere with the internal affairs there. As early as 1964 Premier Zhou Enlai proposed eight principles for China's foreign aid, the second of which states clearly that, "In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges." China's African Policy Paper issued in early 2006 reiterates, "China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached." Therefore, political equality and the absence of political strings attached are two outstanding features of China's African aid policy, and also a major foundation of the China-Africa aid relationship.

Nevertheless, we can't ignore that fact that, owing to the Taiwan issue, there are foreign scholars who believe that the One-China principle is the political string attached to China's aid to African countries. At present, four African countries are maintaining "diplomatic relationship" with Taiwan: Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Gambia, San Tome and Principe (see Table 1). Among them, Burkina Faso, Gambia, San Tome and Principe had established diplomatic ties with China before getting lured back to Taiwan by the latter's offer of assistance. The Chinese Government has renounced its diplomatic relations with these three countries. Swaziland has never had any

⁴ Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, *China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States*, Published by the Heritage Foundation, No.1916, February 22, 2006, p.1.

diplomatic tie with China.

Table 1 China's Aid to Five African Countries with Which It has No Diplomatic relations

Country	Time to Establish Diplomatic relations with China	Time to Resume or Establish "Diplomatic relations" with Taiwan	Time for Chinese Government to Renounce Diplomatic relations	China's Aid When There Was Diplomatic relations
Burkina Faso	Sept. 1973	Resumed on Feb. 2, 1994	Feb. 4, 1994	Hospitals, government offices, stadiums, etc. 23 students accepted by China. Nine medical teams of 163 members in total dispatched to the country.
Gambia	Dec. 14, 1974	Resumed on July 13, 1995	July 25, 1995	Independence Stadium, Friendship Dormitory, Health Center, etc.
San Tome and Principe	July 12, 1975	Established on May 6, 1997	July 11, 1997	Built and transferred six projects including the People's Palace, Training Center for Bamboo & Grass Handicraft.
Swaziland	/	Established on Sept. 6, 1968	/	/

Source: Summarized from data provided by the Department of West Asian and African Affairs

A basic principle in international law is that the acknowledgement of a country is the prerequisite and basis for bilateral relations. To acknowledge Taiwan is to deny China's unique status in international law. Sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are essential to any country and a basic requirement for an independent country to conduct international exchanges. By establishing official relations and carrying out official exchanges with Taiwan, the few African countries violate the mutual respect

that is prerequisite for bilateral relations, thereby making bilateral cooperation including aids impossible. From the viewpoint of international law, diplomatic relationship between countries should be based on the mutual acknowledgement of sovereignty and unity. Therefore, the One-China principle is a prerequisite for China's foreign aids, not an additional political string.

II. There Is a Lack of Historical Basis in Claiming Energy Orientation in China's Aid to Africa

Unlike official development assistance provided by developed countries, China's aid to Africa is mutual help among developing countries on the basis of equal partnership. There is no political string attached. It will help us to have a comprehensive and objective understanding of the objectives of China's aid to Africa by reviewing the history of China's African aid.

1. Phase I (from 1956, when China established diplomatic relations with Egypt, to late 1970s)

Phase I of China's aid to Africa started on May 30, 1956 when it established diplomatic relations with Egypt and ended in late 1970s. By the end of 1970s, China has established diplomatic relations with 20 African Countries, about a half of all independent countries in Africa at that time. It offered assistance to all of these countries to a certain extent. During the Cold War, the major recipients of China's foreign aid were African countries who gained independence after WWII. Mao Zedong pointed out at the time that "people who have attained victory in their revolution should help those who are still struggling for liberation. It is our obligation to internationalism."⁵ During his three visits to Africa between 1963 and 1965, Premier Zhou Enlai put forward the eight principles in foreign aid⁶, which later became the core of China's foreign aid policy. Among the eight principles the African countries praised highly the mutual respect for sovereignty without any conditions. An aid theory with Chinese characteristics came into being.

During this phase, China's aid to Africa, circumscribed by the international situation and China's financial strength, was gratis in nature as it built Friendship Palaces or stadiums symbolic of the China-African friendship. China built Friendship Palaces or stadiums in almost all African countries with which it had diplomatic relations. The

⁵ "Mao Zedong: Speech Made When Receiving African Friends". August 9, 1963, *People's Daily*.

⁶ *Eight Principles in China's Aid to Foreign Countries*: a. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. b. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges. c. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible. d. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development. e. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital. f. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them. g. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique. h. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

best case in point is the over 1,800-kilometer long Tanzam Railway, which took ten years to build and became known as the “Freedom Railway”, a major symbol of China-African friendship. It could well be said that China’s early aids to Africa are an important testimony of China-African friendship.

2. Phase II (from early 1980s to mid-1990s)

After the reform and opening in 1978, China’s aid to Africa was aimed more at African development and capability building. In early 1980s China put forward four guiding principles regarding China-Africa economic and technological cooperation, which were “equality and mutual benefit, multiple forms, effectiveness and common development.” When President Jiang Zemin visited Africa in 1996, he put forward a five-point proposal for the development of a 21st century-oriented long-term stable China-Africa relationship of all-round cooperation. The proposal includes the following points: to foster a sincere friendship between the two sides and become each other’s reliable “all-weather friends”; to treat each other as equals and respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs; to seek common development on the basis of mutual benefit; to enhance consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and to look into the future and create a more splendid world. His proposal highlighted cooperation on equal footing and common development.

During this period, China started to exploit the possibility of assistance cooperation, confirmed the philosophy of equality and mutual benefit in assistance, diversified the ways of assistance focusing on small-to-medium-sized projects needed by recipient countries and backed by local resources. It combined its aid with UN multilateral assistance, assistance from international financial community as well as the third country. It improved aid effectiveness by technological cooperation, management cooperation, joint venture operations, etc.. It started preliminary reforms in the administrative system for foreign aid and rolled out contracted responsibility for aid programs.⁷

3. Phase III (from mid-1990s till now)

As economic reform in China went further and deeper in the 1990s, China’s aid to Africa transitioned from a phase of tentative reform to a phase of full-scale development, which is best facilitated by encouraging Chinese companies to participate in the initiation, management and operation of foreign aid programs. The most significant achievement during this period is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation since 2000, in whose framework China forgave 10.5 billion *yuan* in debts of Least-Developed Countries in Africa, granted zero tariff treatment on commodities from 28 Least-Developed African countries, trained approximately 10,000 Africans,⁸ and made 16 African countries tourist destination for Chinese citizens. China’s *African Policy Paper* issued in January 2001 delineated the overall principle and objective of China’s African policy. It also contained clear statements on debt forgiving, economic assistance, medical cooperation, disaster reduction, disaster relief,

⁷ Xin Houyuan: “Speed Up Industrialization and Internationalization Through Reform in Foreign Aid,” *International Economic Cooperation*, Issue 2, 1996; Xu Jianping, “On Combining Foreign Economic Assistance with Reciprocal Cooperation,” *International Economic Cooperation*, Issue 3, 1996.

⁸ China announced at the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit that the number of commodities from lesser-developed African countries enjoying zero tariff treatment would extend from 190 to over 440.

humanitarian aid, conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions. By then the overall policy framework for China's Africa policy had been clarified, and the aid to Africa had been more targeted. Moreover, assistance had been expanded to a wider area including humanitarian aid, environmental protection and HIV/AIDS prevention.

Generally speaking, China's aid to Africa has been adjusted as times change to better suit African countries' needs. At the same time, China has been consistent in basing its aid policy to Africa on equality and common development. Judging by the history of China-Africa relation, it's apparently unfounded to define China's aid to Africa as "neo-colonialism."

III. The Current China-Africa Trade Pattern Is Determined by Comparative Advantages

A major argument advanced by Western countries who accuse China's aid to Africa of being energy oriented is that all ten largest trading partners of China's in Africa, except for South Africa, are oil producing countries (see data provided by IMF in Table 2) However, an examination of the overall trade structure between Africa and the rest of the world will show that energy, especially oil, is a major African export. Africa exports most of its oil to the US and European countries (see Table 3) Close to 50% of investment in Africa by the US, the EU and Japan is in the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, especially such basic products as oil, minerals and timber, while another 20% is invested in infrastructure and service sector.⁹ At present, Africa boasts a proven oil reserve of over 95 billion barrels, eight percent of the world total, thereby the world's third largest oil producing region after the Middle East and Latin America. The daily crude oil output in Africa exceeds eight million barrels, about 11% of the world's daily output. This proportion is expected to grow to 15% in 2020. In the next ten years Africa's oil output will grow drastically to a daily amount of 13 million barrels.¹⁰ Therefore, factor endowment dictates that Africa will have to export energy to other countries including China. Besides, economic growth in Africa has been sustained for years thanks to price hikes in resources. In the fiscal year 2006, 15 non-oil producing African countries realized an economic growth rate of 5.3%, the tenth year of moderate growth.¹¹

In recent years China-Africa trade has been growing rapidly in a balanced way. The trade volume doubled between 2001 and 2006, with an average annual growth rate of over 30%.¹² The China-Africa bilateral trade is by no means limited to energy. We should also notice the fact that China's textiles, garments, light industry products, house appliances, cars, planes and satellites have been sold to Africa, while automobile parts from South Africa, electronics from Tunisia, marble from Egypt, coffee from Cote d'Ivoire, tobacco from Zimbabwe, peanuts from Senegal, cotton from Mali and cassava from Nigeria are seen more often in China. It is imaginable that, with economic development in Africa, more non-energy products will be exported.

⁹ "Reflections on How to Expand Investment in Africa by Studying Western Practices," July 5, 2006, Department of Western Asian and African Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China, <http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/h/200607/20060702586489.html>.

¹⁰ "Highlights in African Development," *People's Daily*, Jan. 16, 2006.

¹¹ P.30, *World Bank Report 2006*, News Bureau of the Department of External Affairs.

¹² Source: Department of Western Asian and African Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China, <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zhengcejd/bn/200708/20070804946648.html>.

Table 2: China's Ten Largest Trading Partners in Africa, 2004

Import into China	Import Value (million USD)	Percentage in China-African Trade (%)
Angola	3422.63	27.4
South Africa	2567.96	20.6
Sudan	1678060	13.4
Congo (B)	1224.74	9.8
Equatorial Guinea	787.96	6.3
Gabon	415.39	3.3
Nigeria	372.91	3.0
Algeria	216.11	1.7
Morocco	208.69	1.7
Chad	148.73	1.2
Total	11043.72	88.4

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington DC: 2005.

Table 3: Africa's Major Oil Trading Partners in 2004

(thousand barrels per day)

Origin Destination	North Africa		West Africa		Southeast Africa		Africa	
	Million tons	thousand barrels per day	Million tons	thousand barrels per day	Million tons	thousand barrels per day	Million tons	thousand barrels per day
USA	23.3	476	81.6	1637	-	-	104.9	2113
Canada	7.0	140	0.8	16	-	-	7.8	156
Mexico	0.5	10	-	-	-	-	0.5	10
Latin America	5.6	112	12.9	258	-	-	18.5	370
Europe	95.5	1924	27.0	542	1.3	26	123.8	2492
Australia	-	-	0.1	2	-	-	0.1	2
Africa	3.9	79	4.7	94	-	-	8.6	173
China	2.1	42	27.5	551	5.8	116	35.4	709
Japan	0.4	8	4.8	96	3.8	76	9.0	180
Other Countries in Asia Pacific	5.8	117	42.5	851	1.3	27	49.6	995
Other Countries in the World	0.4	8	-	-	-	-	0.4	8
Total	144.5	2917	201.9	4047	12.2	245	358.6	7209

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005, page19.

IV. The ultimate Purpose of China's Aid to Africa Is Attaining Common Development

China is an active advocate and practitioner of South-South Cooperation, while Africa has the largest number of developing countries, which makes African aid an important part of China's efforts in participating in and promoting South-South Cooperation. The ultimate purpose of China's aid to Africa is to promote development there through assistance, to promote cooperation through development, and to eventually realize common development.

1. Assistance Focused on Promoting Economic Growth in African Countries

Since the dawn of the 21st century, China's aid to Africa has been growing rapidly in amount and devoted to such areas as trade, debt forgiving, new loans and infrastructure development that are closely related to economic development. In September 2005, China proposed five measures in helping developing countries accelerate development at the Meeting on Financing for Development of the UN's 60th Anniversary Summit, the major beneficiary of which is Africa:

(1) China decided to accord zero tariff treatment for certain products to all the 39 Least-Developed Countries having diplomatic relations with China, covering most commodities exported by these countries to China;

(2) China will further expand aid to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and LDCs through bilateral channels, exempt or cancel in other ways within the next two years of all the outstanding interest-free and low-interest government loans due as of the end of 2004 owed by all HIPC's having diplomatic relations with China;

(3) Within the next three years, China will provide US\$10 billion in preferential loans and preferential export buyer's credit to developing countries to help them strengthen the construction of infrastructure, promote enterprises of both sides to carry out joint venture cooperation;

(4) Within the next three years, China will increase aid to developing countries, particularly aid to African countries in related areas, provide to them medicines including effective drugs to prevent malaria, help them build and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel;

(5) And in the next three years, China will train 30,000 persons of various professions from the developing countries and help relevant countries expedite the training of talented people.

In November 2006 the Chinese Government further proposed eight policy measures to promote and help development in African countries at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit:

(1) Doubling its aid to Africa by 2009;

(2) Providing 3 billion US dollars in preferential loans and 2 billion US dollars in preferential buyer's credits to African countries in the next three years;

- (3) Setting up a China-Africa development fund which will reach 5 billion U.S. dollars to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them;
- (4) Building a conference center for the African Union to support African countries in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and support;
- (5) Exempting all the outstanding interest-free government loans due as of the end of 2005 owed by all HIPCs and LDCs having diplomatic relations with China;
- (6) Further opening China's markets to exports from Africa's least developed countries by increasing the number of products receiving zero-tariff treatment from 190 to 440;
- (7) Building three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years;
- (8) Training 15,000 African professionals in the next three years. All the aid-related measures above, including debt exemption, zero-tariff treatment, and human resources training, focus on strengthening Africa's own abilities, whereas the zero-tariff treatment effectively enhances LDCs' export to China. Only by helping African countries develop their economies steadily can poverty and backwardness in Africa be changed, can African countries no longer be dependent on international assistance solely and get integrated into economic integration.

2. Promoting China-Africa Economic Cooperation through Aid to Africa

Although limited in size, China's aid programs to Africa always give priority to local needs and wishes. A close look into the specifics of China's aid programs to Africa will reveal that most of the earlier projects were roads, sports facilities, hydraulic power stations, hospitals, textile mills, office complexes and training in farming technology. Since the beginning of the 21st century, within the framework of China-Africa Forum, China has stepped up assistance in turnkey projects, roads, schools, hospitals, stadiums, etc., exempted RMB-denominated debts owed by HIPCs and LDCs in Africa, established framework agreement on preferential loans, and invested more on training. China provides the assistance based on the needs of African countries and bilateral consultations, helping greatly in promoting African development and China-Africa cooperation. By treating African countries as equals and refusing to place itself above the latter, China has won the trust and friendship of African countries, laying a solid foundation for the smooth implementation of China-Africa economic cooperation.

By now China has overtaken UK to become Africa's third largest trading partner, after the US and France. The China-Africa trade stood at US\$55 billion in 2006, making China Africa's third largest trading partner after EU and the US. At the same time, China's investment in Africa has also grown considerably. At the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit, China pledged a further investment of US\$1.9 billion to Africa.¹³ By the end of 2005, China had an accumulative

¹³ Sanusha Naidu, *China-Africa Relationships in the 21st Century: A "Win-Win" Relationship*, Current African Issues, No.35, The Nordic Africa Institute, 2007, p.41.

investment of US\$6.27 billion in Africa. So far China has signed trade protection agreements with 28 African countries, and tax treaties with eight African countries. 17 African countries including Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Namibia have become tourist destinations for Chinese citizens. According to the Nigerian Foreign Minister, “Thanks to China-Africa economic cooperation, FDI into Africa exceeded development assistance for the first time in history. Africa has come round to a new age.”¹⁴ To sum up, common development is the original intention of China’s aid to Africa, and an important part of China-Africa cooperation.

V. Conclusion

China’s African aid, an important part of South-South Cooperation, is mutual assistance on equal footing among developing countries. The claim that China’s aid to Africa is energy oriented arose because, as globalization takes in Africa, the competition for room and opportunity for growth has grown fiercer than before between developed and developing countries. The challenge faced by China in Africa is an epitome of the North-South relation in general, or more precisely put, a part of the North-South relation confronting both China and African countries.

Over the past 50 years, China has put into place a unique way of development for South-South Cooperation in its aid to Africa. However, with the deepening of China-Africa relationship higher requirements have been set for China’s aid to Africa as well as China-Africa cooperation. First of all, that both China and African countries and developing countries may draw the two closer, but also give rise to conflicts. For example, with the deepening of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation, there might be more serious frictions like the ones already seen in the trade of textiles and garments. It is worthy of attention to consider how to handle possible economic frictions in the future and how to balance competition and cooperation. Secondly, China and Africa face some common challenges in economic development, such as how to utilize energy and other resources more effectively while exploiting them, how to come up with energy efficient technologies and develop circular economy. Finally, China’s aid to Africa will go on playing an important role for a long time to come in promoting the socio-economic development in Africa and China-Africa cooperation. It is also a topic worth researching, how lessons could be learned from Western assistance experiences.

¹⁴ Huang Qing, “China Opportunity in Africa,” *People’s Daily*, 8/29/2006.

关于中国对非洲援助能源导向的观点分析

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内容提要：受大国竞争非洲能源的影响，中国对非援助受到能源导向的质疑。对此，本文从中国对非援助的历史发展、特点和中非贸易的比较优势进行了分析。中国对非援助从根本上讲是以援助促发展，以发展促合作，最终实现中非共同发展。

关键词：非洲、援助、发展

近年来，国际舆论出现了关于中国“新殖民主义”的论调，认为中国对非洲援助的目的是为了获取非洲的能源，给中国对非援助带来消极影响。西方有学者认为中国对非援助的主要目的是为了获取能源，中国提供的不附加政治条件的援助为非洲一些“问题国家”提供了回旋余地，而这将带来可怕的结果，使得在诸如苏丹这些独裁国家的国际努力付之东流。¹ 如何客观认识和评价中国对非援助，一方面需要把中国对非援助放在中非关系的历史发展进程中来看，另一方面要从中国对非援助的根本目的和产生国际质疑的根据进行分析。

一、中国对非援助能源导向观点产生的根源

关于中国对非洲援助的质疑和批评集中在能源资源导向，认为中国对非洲的援助，除了增加中国的影响力，一个很重要的目的就是获取能源资源。中国在非洲的能源政策主要是出于两个目标：短期可以满足中国国内市场的需要，长期可以奠定中国在世界能源市场中的地位。² 有西方学者甚至将中国在非洲的能源开发和市场进入定义为“新殖民主义”，将中国对非洲的援助看作是“东方牛仔资本主义”，也就是说不计任何代价的获取资源，无视当地的政治问题，比如苏丹、安哥拉和津巴布韦。³

1、大国对非洲能源竞争是质疑产生的本质根源

中非能源合作所引起的争议反映出这样一个现实问题，也就是在全球能源安全形势严峻的情况下，非洲已成为大国争夺的重要目标，中国在该地区的能源开发与合作不可避免地引起西方大国的关注和戒备。西方已经有学者直接指出，中国通过丰富的外交、财政和军事援助迅速扩张在非洲的影响力，为苏丹和津巴布韦这些独裁国家提供援助，危及到美国在该地区的目标和愿景。⁴

实际上，与西方国家大规模的对非能源投资相比，中国的能源投资规模和投

¹ Kevin Matthews, *China's Clout in Africa*, UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, Sept.9,2006.

² Ian Taylor, *Unpacking China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa*, Current African Issues, No.35, The Nordic Africa Institute,2007,p.10-11.

³ Ernest Wilson, *China, Africa and the U.S.: Something Old, Something New*, American Abroad Notes on the Foreign Affairs, Jan 29th, 2006, <http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2006/1/29/235734/457>.

⁴ Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, *China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States*, Published by the Heritage Foundation, No.1916, February 22,2006, p.1.

资历史都是无法企及的。中非合作开发能源的问题，之所以成为焦点问题，关键在于中国在非洲影响力的全面上升，以及中非合作的稳步发展，挑战了既有的国际秩序和利益格局。尤其是，中国对西方国家眼里的“问题国家”如苏丹、安哥拉和津巴布韦等进行援助和开展能源资源项目的合作，挑战了西方国家在全球推行西方人权和民主价值观的战略意图和占有更多能源资源的利益诉求。总而言之，非洲能源问题的国际政治化趋势明显，影响到中非合作的各个方面，包括中国对非援助。

2、 中国对非援助不附加政治条件是引发质疑的导火索

与西方国家的援助不同，中国对非援助不附加任何政治条件。中国不赞成将人权等问题作为援助附加条件，动辄就中断援助，进行制裁。美国之所以极力鼓吹中国援助能源导向的观点，主要是因为中国没有跟随其制裁非洲一些问题国家例如苏丹政府，相反中国帮助苏丹修水坝，开采能源。让美国感到不快的是中国给苏丹政府提供的替代选择，削弱了其制裁力量。

但是，以中国不跟随美国共同实施对苏丹、津巴布韦等非洲国家的制裁为由，将中国在这些国家的援助和投资归入谋取能源利益的判断，是忽视中国对外援助基本准则的简单推断，不符实际。尊重受援国主权，从不对非洲国家内政进行干涉，是中国对非援助的基本原则之一。早在 1964 年，周恩来总理访问亚非国家时提出中国援外八项原则，其中第二项原则明确指出：“中国政府在对外提供援助的时候，严格尊重受援国的主权，绝不附带任何条件，绝不要求任何特权。”2006 年初发布的《中国对非洲政策文件》再次重申“中国政府将根据自身财力和经济发展状况，继续向非洲国家提供并逐步增加力所能及和不附加政治条件的援助。”所以，政治上平等相待和不附加政治条件是中国对非洲援助政策最突出的特点，也是中非援助关系的重要政治基础。

但是，我们也不能忽视由于台湾问题的存在，国外有学者认为一个中国原则就是中国对非洲国家提供援助的政治条件。目前，非洲有 4 个国家与台湾保持所谓“外交关系”：斯威士兰、布基纳法索、冈比亚、圣多美和普林西比（具体情况见表 1）。其中，布基纳法索、冈比亚和圣多美和普林西比都曾经与中国建交，但是在援助诱惑下又与台湾建立了“外交关系”，中国政府已经宣布中止与这三个非洲国家的外交关系。斯威士兰尚未与中国建立过外交关系。

表 1 中国对没有建立外交关系的 5 个非洲国家的援助情况

国家	与中国建交时间	与台湾“复交”或“建交”时间	中国宣布中止外交关系时间	保持外交关系时间 中国对其援助
布基纳法索	1973 年 9 月	1994 年 2 月 2 日“复交”	1994 年 2 月 4 日	医院、政府办公楼、体育场等项目。接受 23 名布留学生。向布派出 9 批医疗队，共计 163 人。
冈比亚	1974 年 12 月 14 日	1995 年 7 月 13 日“复交”	1995 年 7 月 25 日	独立体育场、友谊宿舍、卫生中心等项目。
圣多美和普林西比	1975 年 7 月 12 日	1997 年 5 月 6 日“建交”	1997 年 7 月 11 日	建成并移交人民宫、竹草编培训中心等 6 个项目。
斯威士兰	/	1968 年 9 月 6 日“建交”	/	/

资料来源：根据中华人民共和国外交部西亚非洲司的资料，整理归纳。

从国际法的基本原则来看，对一个国家的承认是开展双边关系的前提和基础，承认台湾等于否认中国的唯一国际法地位。主权统一和领土完整是国家的核心利益，是一个独立国家开展国际交往的基本前提。个别非洲国家同中国台湾建立官方关系和发展官方往来，有违相互尊重主权的双边交往前提，所以也无从谈及包括援助在内的双边合作。从国际法的角度来看，国家间外交关系是建立在相互承认主权独立的基础上，所以坚持一个中国原则是中国对外援助的基本前提，而不是中国对外援助的附加政治条件。

二、中国对非援助能源导向的判断缺乏历史根据

中国对非洲援助不同于发达国家的官方发展援助，是发展中国家之间的一种互助型援助，建立在平等伙伴关系的基础上，不附加政治条件。回顾中国对非援助的发展历程，有助于我们全面客观认识中国对非援助的目的。

1、第一阶段（1956 年与埃及建交到 20 世纪 70 年代末）

从 1956 年 5 月 30 日中国与埃及建立外交关系开始，到 20 世纪 70 年代末是中国对非洲援助的第一阶段。到 1970 年底，中国已经同 20 个非洲国家建立了外

交关系,约占当时非洲独立国家的一半,对这些非洲国家中国都提供了不同幅度的援助。冷战背景下,中国主要援助对象是二战后获得独立的非洲国家。毛泽东当时曾指出“已经获得革命胜利的人民,应该援助正在争取解放的人民的斗争,这是我们的国际主义义务。”⁵ 1963年至1965年,周恩来总理三访非洲,提出了对外援助的八项原则⁶,成为中国对外援助政策的核心。其中,互相尊重主权和不附带任何条件受到非洲国家的广泛赞誉,并由此树立了中国特色的援助理论。

这一时期的中国对非援助,受当时的国际大环境和中国经济实力的限制,援助主要以无偿援助为主,以修建象征中非友好关系的友谊宫和体育馆为主要形式。中国几乎在每一个与中国建交的非洲国家都修建了友谊宫或者是体育馆,其中最具代表性的是坦赞铁路,全长1800多公里,历时10年,被誉为“自由之路”,是中非友谊的重要象征。可以说,中国早期的对非援助是见证中非友好关系的重要媒介。

2、第二阶段(20世纪80年代初至90年代中期)

1978年改革开放后,中国对非洲援助开始更多关注非洲发展和“造血”能力建设。80年代初,中国提出了与非洲国家进行经济技术合作四原则,即“平等互利、形式多样、讲求实效、共同发展”,成为这一阶段对非洲援助的指导性原则。1996年江泽民主席访非时提出了发展面向21世纪长期稳定、全面合作的中非关系的五点建议,即“真诚友好、平等相待、团结合作、共同发展、面向未来”,突出强调了与非洲国家平等合作与共同发展。

这一时期,中国对非援助开始探索援助合作,并逐渐确立了平等互利的援助理念,援助方式也开始向多样化,主要以帮助非洲受援国发展当地有需要又有资源的中小型项目;将中国援助同联合国多边援助、国际金融组织、以及第三国援助等相结合;采取技术合作、管理合作、合资经营等方式,提高援助效益;进行援外管理体制的初步改革,逐步开始试行援助项目的承包责任制。⁷

3、第三阶段(20世纪90年代中期至今)

90年代中期以来随着中国国内经济体制改革的全面推进,对非援助逐步从改革探索阶段进入到全面发展的第三阶段,集中体现在鼓励更多中国企业参与到援外项目的建设、管理和经营中。这一阶段最显著的成果是2000年建立了“中非合作论坛”。在该论坛框架下,中国免除了31个非洲重债穷国和最不发达国家部

⁵ 《毛泽东: 接见非洲朋友时的谈话》,《人民日报》,1963年8月9日。

⁶ 《中国对外经济技术援助的八项原则》:(1) 中国政府一贯根据平等互利的原则对外提供援助,从来不把这种援助看作是单方面的赐予,而认为援助是相互的。(2) 中国政府在对外提供援助的时候,严格尊重受援国的主权,绝不附带任何条件,绝不要求任何特权。(3) 中国政府以无息和低息贷款的方式提供经济援助,在需要的时候延长还款期限,以尽量减少受援国的负担。(4) 中国政府对外提供援助的目的,不是造成受援国对中国的依赖,而是帮助受援国逐步走上自力更生、经济上独立发展的道路。(5) 中国政府帮助受援国建设的项目,力求投资少、收效快,使受援国政府能够增加收入,积累资金。(6) 中国政府提供自己所能生产的、质量最好的设备和物资,并且根据国际市场的价格议价。如果中国政府所提供的设备和物资不合乎商定的规格和质量,中国政府保证退换。(7) 中国政府对外提供任何一种技术援助的时候,保证做到使受援国的人员充分掌握这种技术。(8) 中国政府派到受援国帮助进行建设的专家,同受援国自己的专家享受同样的物质待遇,不容许有任何特殊要求和享受。

⁷ 邢厚媛:《以援外改革为契机加速实业化国际化》,《国际经济合作》,1996年第2期;徐建平:《论对外经济援助与互利合作相结合》,《国际经济合作》,1996年第3期。

分欠华到期债务共 105 亿元人民币，对非洲 28 个最不发达国家部分输华商品实施免关税待遇⁸，为非洲培训各类人员近万人次，16 个非洲国家成为中国公民旅游目的地国。2006 年 1 月中国发布《中国对非洲政策文件》，提出中国对非政策的总体原则和目标，并专门就减免债务、经济援助、医疗卫生合作、减灾、救灾和人道主义援助以及冲突解决及维和行动做出了明确阐述。至此，中国对非援助的整体政策框架已经十分清晰，对非援助也更有针对性，并且开始关注更广泛的援助议题，比如人道主义援助、环境保护、艾滋病防治等。

总的来看，中国对非洲的援助是随着时代背景和非洲国家的切实需要，适时做出了相应的调整。同时，中国始终坚持平等相待和共同发展的援助理念，体现了对非洲援助政策的连续性和稳定性。从中非关系的发展历程来看，如果把中国对非援助的目的定义为攫取能源利益的“新殖民主义”，显然缺乏历史根据。

三、中国和非洲现有的贸易格局是由比较优势客观决定的

西方国家批评中国对非援助的能源导向主要根据在于，中国在非洲最大的十个贸易伙伴中，除南非外都是石油生产国（参见 IMF 的统计数据表 2）。但是，如果从非洲对全球的总体贸易结构来看，能源尤其是石油是最主要的出口商品。非洲最大的石油出口国家是美国和欧洲国家（参见表 3）。美国、欧盟、加拿大、日本等对非洲投资的近 50% 是用于在自然资源勘探和开发上，特别是石油、矿产、木材等基础产品方面；20% 投向基础设施和服务领域。⁹ 目前，非洲已探明的石油储量超过 950 亿桶，约占世界总储量的 8%，是继中东和拉美之后的第三大产油区。非洲原油日产量超过 800 万桶，约占世界日产总量的 11%，预计到 2020 年这一比例将达到 15%。今后 10 年非洲的石油产量将大幅增长，石油日产量可望达到 1300 万桶。¹⁰ 所以，非洲出口能源是由其要素禀赋决定的，而且中国只是出口对象国之一。另外，我们也看到正是受益于能源等资源品价格上涨，非洲经济实现了持续多年的经济增长，不包括石油产出国在内的非洲 15 个国家 2006 财年经济增长达到 5.3%，延续了长达 10 年的中速增长。¹¹

近年来，中非贸易在基本平衡的基础上快速增长，2001-2006 年五年间中非贸易翻两番，年均增长 30% 以上。¹² 中非双边贸易并不仅仅局限于能源贸易，我们也应该注意到中国的纺织服装、轻工、家电、汽车、飞机、卫星都已进入非洲。南非的汽车配件、突尼斯的电子产品、埃及的大理石、科特迪瓦的咖啡、津巴布韦的烟草、塞内加尔的花生、马里的棉花、尼日利亚的木薯等产品越来越多地进入中国。可以想见，随着非洲的经济发展，非能源产品的出口会逐步增加。

⁸ 中国在 2006 年中非合作论坛北京峰会上宣布，把同中国有外交关系的非洲最不发达国家输华商品零关税待遇受惠商品由 190 个税目扩大到 440 多个。

⁹ 中华人民共和国商务部西亚非洲司：《从西方国家对非洲投资做法看我如何扩大对非投资》，2006 年 7 月 5 日，<http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/h/200607/20060702586489.html>

¹⁰ 《非洲发展亮点多》，《人民日报》，2006 年 1 月 16 日。

¹¹ 《世界银行 2006 年度报告》，对外事务部出版局，2006 年版，第 30 页。

¹² 数据来源：中华人民共和国商务部西亚非洲司，<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zhengcejid/bn/200708/20070804946648.html>

表2 中国在非洲的十大贸易伙伴国，2004年

中国进口	进口量（百万美元）	在中非贸易额中占比（%）
安哥拉	3422.63	27.4
南非	2567.96	20.6
苏丹	1678060	13.4
刚果布	1224.74	9.8
赤道几内亚	787.96	6.3
加蓬	415.39	3.3
尼日利亚	372.91	3.0
阿尔及利亚	216.11	1.7
摩洛哥	208.69	1.7
乍得	148.73	1.2
总计	11043.72	88.4

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington DC: 2005.

表3: 2004年非洲地区石油出口的主要贸易伙伴

		(千桶/日)						
输出地 输入地	北非地区		西非地区		东南非地区		全非洲	
	百万吨	千桶/日	百万吨	千桶/日	百万吨	千桶/日	百万吨	千桶/日
美国	23.3	476	81.6	1637	-	-	104.9	2113
加拿大	7.0	140	0.8	16	-	-	7.8	156
墨西哥	0.5	10	-	-	-	-	0.5	10
拉丁美洲	5.6	112	12.9	258	-	-	18.5	370
欧洲	95.5	1924	27.0	542	1.3	26	123.8	2492
澳大利亚	-	-	0.1	2	-	-	0.1	2
非洲	3.9	79	4.7	94	-	-	8.6	173
中国	2.1	42	27.5	551	5.8	116	35.4	709
日本	0.4	8	4.8	96	3.8	76	9.0	180
亚太其他国家	5.8	117	42.5	851	1.3	27	49.6	995
世界其他国家	0.4	8	-	-	-	-	0.4	8
总计	144.5	2917	201.9	4047	12.2	245	358.6	7209

资料来源: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005, page19.

四、中国对非洲援助的根本目的是实现共同发展

中国是南南合作的积极倡导者和实践者，非洲是发展中国家最集中的大陆，所以对非援助是中国参与和推进南南合作的重要组成部分。中国对非援助从根本上来讲是以援助促发展，以发展促合作，最终实现中非共同发展。

1、以促进非洲国家经济发展为核心的援助

进入 21 世纪以来，中国对非洲援助的数额增长迅速，并且主要投向与非洲经济发展密切相关的贸易、免债、新增贷款和基础设施建设等领域。2005 年 9 月，在联合国成立 60 周年首脑会议发展筹资高级别会议上，中国提出了帮助发展中国家加快发展的五项举措，非洲是最主要的受益地区：

(1) 中国决定给予所有同中国建交的 39 个最不发达国家部分商品零关税待遇，优惠范围将包括这些国家的多数对华出口商品。

(2) 中国将进一步扩大对重债穷国和最不发达国家的援助规模，并通过双边渠道，在今后两年内免除或以其他处理方式消除所有同中国有外交关系的重债穷国 2004 年底前对华到期未还的全部无息和低息政府贷款。

(3) 中国将在今后 3 年内向发展中国家提供 100 亿美元优惠贷款及优惠出口买方信贷，用以帮助发展中国家加强基础设施建设，推动双方企业开展合资合作。

(4) 中国将在今后 3 年内增加对发展中国家特别是非洲国家的相关援助，为其提供包括防疟特效药在内的药物，帮助他们建立和改善医疗设施、培训医疗人员。具体通过中非合作论坛等机制及双边渠道落实。

(5) 中国将在今后 3 年内为发展中国家培训培养 3 万名各类人才，帮助有关国家加快人才培养。

2006 年 11 月，中非合作论坛北京峰会上，中国政府又进一步提出了八个方面的政策措施来促进和帮助非洲国家发展。

(1) 扩大对非洲援助规模，到 2009 年使中国对非洲国家的援助规模比 2006 年增加 1 倍。

(2) 今后 3 年内向非洲国家提供 30 亿美元的优惠贷款和 20 亿美元的优惠出口买方信贷。

(3) 鼓励和支持中国企业到非洲投资，设立中非发展基金，基金总额逐步达到 50 亿美元。

(4) 为支持非洲国家联合自强和一体化进程，援助建设非洲联盟会议中心。

(5) 免除同中国有外交关系的所有非洲重债穷国和最不发达国家截至 2005 年底到期的政府无息贷款债务。

(6) 进一步向非洲开放市场，把同中国有外交关系的非洲最不发达国家输华商品零关税待遇受惠商品由 190 个税目扩大到 440 多个。

(7) 今后 3 年内在非洲国家建立 3—5 个境外经济贸易合作区。

(8) 今后 3 年内为非洲培训培养 15000 名各类人才等。上述与援助有关的举措，无论是减免债务、零关税待遇还是人力资源培训等，都把重点放在了增强非洲自身“造血”能力建设上，其中零关税举措有力促进了最不发达国家的对华出口。只有帮助非洲国家实现经济稳步发展，才能从根本上解决目前非洲严重依赖国际援助的贫困落后局面，并逐步融入经济全球化进程中。

2、以援助非洲发展促中非经济合作

中国的援助数量虽然有限,但是在确定具体援助项目上一般是优先考虑非洲国家的需要并尊重对方的意愿。从中国对非洲国家的具体援助项目来看,早期以修建公路、体育文化设施、水利工程、医院、纺织厂、办公大楼以及农业技术培训等为主。进入 21 世纪以来,在中非论坛框架下,中国增加了在成套项目、公路、学校、医院和体育场等方面的援助;免除非洲重债穷国和最不发达国家人民币债务;优惠贷款框架协议和培训等方面的援助。中国提供的这些援助,主要依据非洲国家需要,通过双方协商确定,对促进非洲发展和中非合作起到了积极作用。中国援助的平等性和不凌驾于非洲国家之上的谦和态度赢得了非洲国家的信任和友谊,为中非经济合作的顺利开展奠定了坚实的基础。

目前,中国已超越英国成为排在美国和法国之后非洲的第三大贸易伙伴,2006 年中非贸易额达到 550 亿美元,中国成为继欧盟和美国之后的非洲第三大贸易伙伴。同时,中国对非洲的投资也出现大幅度增长,2006 年中非合作论坛北京峰会上,中国承诺将向非洲增加投资 19 亿美元。¹³ 截至 2005 年底,中国对非洲国家投资累计达 62.7 亿美元。中国迄今已与 28 个非洲国家签订了投资保护协定,与 8 个非洲国家签订避免双重征税协定。中国还将肯尼亚、南非、坦桑尼亚、纳米比亚等 17 个非洲国家同被列为中国公民出境旅游目的地国。尼日利亚外长评价:“由于中非经济合作,在非洲历史上,以经济投资形式流入的资金首次超过了以发展援助形式流入的资金。非洲拐了个弯,这是新时代的开始。”¹⁴ 综上所述,实现共同发展是中国对非洲援助的初衷,也是中非合作的重要内涵。

五、总结

中国对非援助是南南合作的重要组成部分,其本质是发展中国家之间的平等互助性援助。之所以会有质疑中国对非洲援助能源导向的观点,问题的关键在于全球化向非洲大陆拓展的进程中,发达国家和发展中国家在争取发展空间和发展机遇上的竞争呈现出激烈化的趋势。今天中国在非洲所面临的质疑实质上是更广泛意义上的南北关系的一个缩影,更确切地说应该是中国和非洲国家共同面临的南北关系问题的一部分。

50 多年来,中国对非洲援助走出了一条南南合作的独特发展道路。但是,中非关系的深化对完善中国对非援助以及中非合作又提出了更高的要求。首先,中国和非洲国家都是发展中国家,这个相同点是拉近中非关系的重要基础,但是也有可能成为中非矛盾的激发点。例如,随着中非经贸合作的深入展开,双方的经济摩擦有加剧的可能,目前在纺织品和服装等产品上的贸易摩擦已初见端倪。如何应对未来可能发生的经济摩擦,处理好竞争与合作的关系,是发展中非合作和完善中国对非洲援助需要考虑的问题。其次,中国和非洲在经济发展中面临一些共同的挑战,例如在开发能源和资源的同时,如何有效利用能源和资源,探索节能技术,发展循环经济。最后,展望未来,中国对非洲援助还将在很长一段时期内为促进非洲社会 and 经济发展,以及推动中非合作发挥重要作用。如何在借鉴其它西方国家的援助经验基础上,完善中国对非援助也是值得深入研究的课题。

¹³ Sanusha Naidu, *China-Africa Relationships in the 21st Century: A “Win-Win” Relationship*, Current African Issues, No.35, The Nordic Africa Institute, 2007, p.41.

¹⁴ 黄晴.:《非洲的中国机遇论》,《人民日报》,2006 年 08 月 29 日。

Approach and Influence of China's Aid to Africa¹

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Abstract: Aid to Africa has been an important part of China-Africa cooperation over half a century. The form and content of the aid have been enriched with changes in situation. However, China has been sticking to the same approach towards African aid. In contrast to Western countries, China doesn't attach any political strings to its aid to Africa. In other words, it doesn't interfere with other countries' internal affairs. There is profound theoretical basis for China's approach towards aid to Africa. It respects the tenet and principles in the Charter of the United Nations, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as well as other internationally recognized norms of conduct. It embodies China's independent foreign policy for peace. China's approach to African aid is in line with its own interests and those of African countries, winning acknowledgement and praise by the latter, promoting greatly the healthy steady development of China-Africa relationship. On issues related to African aid, China is fully prepared to communicate and cooperate with other countries on the basis of mutual respect, equality and consultation while taking full account of African interests.

Key Words: China's approach to African aid, no political strings attached, non-interference with internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, good governance

China's approach to African aid is not only a major feature of sustained China-Africa friendship, but also a topic Western countries dwell on. So far in China no academic paper has been published on this issue. This author will put forward his humble thoughts to stimulate academic discussion.

I. China's Unique Approach to African Aid

Aid to Africa has been an important part of China-Africa cooperation since the two sides established diplomatic relations over half a century ago. The form and content of the aid have been enriched with changes in situation. As early as in the 1950s and 1960s, China's aid to Africa took the form of project construction, material assistance, and the dispatching of experts. As China started reform and opening up in 1978, while African countries readjusted their economic structures as well, China's aid to Africa was diversified and enriched, with great importance attached to the economic benefits of assistance. During this period, donations, interest-free loans, preferential loans, technical assistance, project construction, factory building, expert guidance, labor services, people development and technical training were all forms of assistance or cooperation. Since the 1990s, China's aid to Africa has been further diversified,

¹ Gratitude goes to Mr. Li Weijian and Mr. Zhu Ming for their constructive feedback.

stressing exchanges and cooperation in technology, management expertise, preferential loans, building of trade and investment promotion centers, canceling or reducing debts owed by heavily indebted poor countries, training and economic and trade officials, and emergency relief during natural disasters.

Although the forms and content of China's aid to Africa have been changing with the time, the approach has remained basically unchanged. When compared with aid by Western countries, China's has some distinctive characteristics: a) China treats African countries as equals, while Western countries often try to impose its own values and concepts onto the latter; b) China doesn't attach any political string to its aid to Africa, while Western countries try to sell "package plans for reform" to Africa on the preconditions of good governance and democracy; c) The implementation procedure of China's aid programs is simpler and more efficient than that of Western countries. For example, when African countries cooperate with EU, it has to consult each of EU's 27 member states individually, and each member state has the veto power, thereby causing uncertainty in program implementation. Among the three, the key and the most controversial in Western countries is that China abides by the principle of not attaching any political string to its aid to Africa, or the principle of non-interference with internal affairs.

This principle was officially announced to the world as early as the 1960s, when Premier Zhou Enlai visited Africa. When interviewed by a reporter from Ghana News Agency during his visit to Ghana in January 1964, Zhou Enlai proposed the eight principles in China's economic and technical assistance to foreign countries,² the second of which states that "In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges." This principle is still a basic principle for China to abide by when it develops relations with African countries, and it is often included in important declarations and documents. *The Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation* in October 2000 stresses that "politicalizing the issue of human rights and attaching human rights conditions to economic aid are themselves violations of human rights, and therefore should be firmly opposed." In January 2006 the Chinese Government published its first ever African Policy Paper, proposing to "establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange." The Paper also reiterates that "In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached."

In November the same year, this principle was again included in the consensus between Chinese and African leaders at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

² Ai Zhouchang & Mu Tao: *A History of China-Africa Relationship*, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 1996, pp.242-243.

Beijing Summit. According to *The Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, “China has been supporting steadfastly national liberation and nation building in Africa without attaching any political strings.”

II. Theoretical Basis of China’s Approach to African Aid

There is profound theoretical basis for China’s aid to Africa without any political strings attached. It respects the tenet and principles in the Charter of the United Nations, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as well as other internationally recognized norm of conduct. It embodies China’s independent foreign policy for peace.

Not attaching any political strings is in essence not to interfere with internal affairs of other countries. The modern concept of sovereignty was advanced by Jean Bodin, a Frenchman, in *Six Books of the Commonwealth*. According to Bodin, sovereignty is the supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law. Sovereignty covers a wide range of issues including at least the following eight: 1) the power to make laws; 2) the power to declare war and make peace; 3) the power to appoint senior officials; 4) the supreme power of judgment; 5) immunity; 6) the power to accept allegiance and oaths by officials upon induction; 7) the power to levy tax and monetization; 8) the supreme title. Sovereignty is absolute and indivisible in nature, and has to rest with one person or one institution. In other words, sovereignty is characterized by absoluteness, perpetuity and indivisibility.³ The theory of sovereignty, Bodin’s greatest contribution to political science, is still significant today. Sovereignty refers not only the supreme power over domestic affairs, but also the legitimate rights, the independent and equal status in external relations. Countries in the world, big or small, strong or weak, should respect each other, treat each other as equals and live together peacefully. Different civilizations and modes of development should learn from each other, reinforce each other, and exist peacefully together. It is part of the tenet of the UN Charter and internationally recognized rules governing international relationship to respect sovereignty and refrain from interfering with other countries’ internal affairs. The UN Charter stresses that “All States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

The principle of non-interference with internal affairs is included in the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence advocated by China. On December 31, 1953, when Premier Zhou Enlai received an Indian government delegation, he said, “We believe China-India relations will improve day by day. Some mature pending issues will be resolved smoothly. The New China put forward principles guiding China-India relations immediately after its founding, namely mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each

³ Pan Xingzu & Hong Tao, *A History of Western Political Science*, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1999, p.151.

other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence.”⁴ These five principles were later written into *the Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India* on April 29, 1954. ⁵ The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, unanimously approved by delegates from Asian and African countries at the Bandung Conference, became the basis of the Ten Principles of Bandung Conference, ⁶guiding Asian and African countries in peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation. The Ten Principles of Bandung Conference put emphasis on the respect for sovereignty and non-interference. The second, third and fourth principles are, respectively, “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations,” “recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small,” and “abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country”.

In December 1963, when Premier Zhou Enlai visited Algeria, he proposed five principles guiding China's relations with the Arab countries and African countries in the spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Ten Principles of Bandung Conference, the fifth of which is “the sovereignty of the Arab and African countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed.” ⁷

The most essential idea of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Ten Principles of Bandung Conference, and the five principles guiding China's relations with Arab and African countries is non-interference with the internal affairs of other countries, of which providing economic and technical assistance without attaching any political string is the best case in point. The principle of non-inference does not only apply to Asian and African countries, but to international relations in general. Deng Xiaoping once pointed out that “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence provide the best way to handle the relations between nations. Other ways like ‘the big family’, ‘clique rules’ and ‘sphere of influence’ will all provoke conflicts and aggravate international relations.”⁸ In his address to the UN's 50th Anniversary Special Assembly in 1995, Jiang Zemin pointed out that “only when we respect each other, seek common ground while preserve differences, live peacefully together, and promote each other's development can we create a world of varied colors.” ⁹

Today China strives to develop a harmonious society within its borders and a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. To this end, China believes that we “should uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, observe international law and universally recognized norms of international

⁴ *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy*, Central Party Literature Press, 1990, p.63.

⁵ *A Collection of Treaties of the People's Republic of China*, Volume III, 1954, Law Press, 1958, p.1.

⁶ Wang Shengzu (ed.), *A History of International Relations*, Volume VIII, World Affairs Press, 1995, p.249.

⁷ Ai Zhouchang & Mu Tao: *A History of China-Africa Relationship*, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 1996, p.242.

⁸ *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume III, People's Press, 1993, p.96.

⁹ Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, *Jiang Zemin on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*, Central Party Literature Press, 2002, p. 539.

relations, and promote democracy, harmony, collaboration and win-win solutions in international relations. Politically, all countries should respect each other and conduct consultations on an equal footing in a common endeavor to promote democracy in international relations. Economically, they should cooperate with each other; draw on each other's strengths and work together to advance economic globalization in the direction of balanced development, shared benefits and win-win progress. Culturally, they should learn from each other in the spirit of seeking common ground while shelving differences, respect the diversity of the world and make joint efforts to advance human civilization. In the area of security, they should trust each other, strengthen cooperation, settle international disputes by peaceful means rather than by war, and work together to safeguard peace and stability in the world. On environmental issues, they should assist and cooperate with each other in conservation efforts to take good care of the Earth, the only home of human beings.”¹⁰ Respect for national sovereignty and non-interference with internal affairs are recognized rules guiding international relations. Only by abiding by these rules can democracy, harmony, collaboration and win-win spirit be promoted in international relations, can countries respect each other and consult each other as equals, can joint efforts be made to help democratize international relations. Therefore, the non-interference-oriented Chinese approach towards African aid can find theoretical justifications in the theory of harmonious world.

III. African Countries Are the Ultimate Judges of Different Approaches to African Aid

How effective are different models of assistance? African countries should be the ultimate judges. Comparatively speaking, the Chinese approach towards assistance to Africa is more popular with African countries, a fact acknowledged by Western countries. *Financial Times* in Britain wrote that “So far Africa’s views on rapid expanding Chinese influence have been very positive.”¹¹

Over the past half century China has offered Africa assistance within its means. China has undertaken close to 900 projects in Africa, many of which, like the Tanzania Railway, Friendship Harbor in Mauritania, have become important hubs for the local economy. China has dispatched a cumulative number of 19,000 medical workers to Africa who have treated about 240 million patients. In recent years, within the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China has cancelled or exempted RMB ¥10.9 billion debts owed by 31 heavily indebted countries and least developed countries in Africa, granted zero-tariff treatment to 190 commodities exported from 30 least developed African countries to China, and trained 14,600 African professionals. When extending aid to Africa, China has always stuck to the principle of non-interference with internal affairs. It doesn’t attach any political strings or impose its ideology, values and modes of development on African countries.

¹⁰ Hu Jintao’s Report at the 17th CPC Congress.

¹¹ *Financial Times*, Feb 15, 2008.

Besides, China is able to build dams, roads and bridges at a faster speed and lower cost, to provide consumer products better suited to African needs. China's aid to Africa focuses on improving the well-being of local people.

The sincerity demonstrated in China's aid to Africa is greatly appreciated by African countries and peoples. Former President Benjamin William Mkapa of Tanzania said, "China's aid to Africa is more effective than that of Western countries. Assistance from Western Europe, the World Bank, the EU, etc. entails high administrative costs. By contrast, the administrative costs incurred in China's aid are much lower."¹² President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal wrote in a recent article for *Financial Times* that "China's approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and non-governmental organizations. In fact, the Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much to teach Africa."¹³ Joseph Bonesha, Rwanda's Ambassador to the EU said that although Europe enjoys advantages in its relationship with Africa because of historical reasons, China's popularity as an investor should not be overlooked. He said, "their prices are usually more competitive than Europe's, their contracts for construction are often subsidized, their aid is not tied to conditions, and their loans are often interest free or low interest."¹⁴

China's aid to Africa not only tightens economic and trade relations between China and Africa, but also enhances political mutual trust. Moreover, there is more communication over political positions and better coordination in diplomatic actions between the two sides. African countries helped China defeat anti-China motions at the UN Human Rights Council and Taiwan's attempt to "return to the UN"¹⁵ 13 times at the UN General Assembly, as well as win the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games and the 2010 World Expo. President Hu Jintao pointed out at the Opening Ceremony at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit, "our friendship has endured the test of time and changes in the world. This is because we have never strayed from the principle of enhancing friendship, treating each other as equals, extending mutual support and promoting common development in building our ties."

When Western countries offer aid to Africa they would try to sell "a package plan" on preconditions such as good governance and democracy. In the early 1980s, the World Bank issued the *Guideline for Accelerated Development in Sub-Sahara Africa*, in which it attributed African economic crisis to bad decisions made by African countries on economic development and called on economic restructuring in Africa. As the World Bank and IMF extend restructuring loans they have clear policy requirements: "1.) Liberalize the market and let the supply and demand in the market

¹² Zeng Aiping, "Former President Benjamin William Mkapa of Tanzania on China-Africa Relations and Situation in Africa," *Western Asia and Africa*, Issue 12, 2007.

¹³ *Financial Times*, Feb 29, 2008.

¹⁴ *International Herald Tribune* Dec 7, 2007.

¹⁵ Wang Yunze (edit.), *Taking the Journey Together—A Portrait of China-Africa Friendship*, World Affairs Press, 2006, p.58.

decide pricing; 2.) Privatize state-owned enterprises; 3.) Improve the efficiency of the government; 4.) Carry out system reforms, create new financial systems and other systems.”¹⁶ After the Cold War, Western countries step up intervention in Africa, linking economic assistance with Western-style democracy, imposing such political values as Western-style democracy, freedom and human rights. Both the African Growth and Opportunity Act passed during the Clinton Administration and the “Millennium Challenge Account” proposed by the Bush Administration attach stringent political strings of democracy, freedom and human rights to each and every US development aid. Europe tries to maintain its control over Africa through institutions like the British Commonwealth, France-Africa Summit and Europe-Africa Summit, to which Africans object, “the West holds double standards in Africa. We’re tired of its always attempting to impose Western viewpoints on Africans.”¹⁷ The international community doesn’t embrace whole-heartedly the Western approach towards aids to Africa. The UN Conference on Trade and Development pointed out in the 2006 Africa Economic Development Report that the current assistance mechanism at the World Bank and IMF can’t meet or adapt to the objective and need to double aid to African. The report went on to suggest replacing the current decentralized and chaotic bilateral African assistance with a multilateral assistance system administrated by the UN, and focusing assistance on areas urgently needed in African national economic development.

IV. The Reasons Why Western Countries Are Concerned with China’s Approach to African Aid

In the 21st century, with the rapid development of China-Africa relations, especially with the establishment of a new strategic China-Africa partnership, the West is quite concerned with China-Africa relations. There are quite some discussions on China’s approach towards African aid, some being fair and positive, others expressing “worries” or even claiming that “China’s not attaching any political string to its aid to Africa is not conducive to good governance there.” Comments by Prof. Robert Kappel, Chairman of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies in May 2007, are quite typical. He said, “Because China’s major partners are ‘authoritarian states’ the Western society tried to isolate and exert pressure on, Chinese policies undermine the international community’s contribution to democratization in Africa.”¹⁸

Having established diplomatic relations with 49 African countries, China’s cooperation with Africa is by no means limited to few countries. China-Africa relationship is characterized by universality. At the November 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit, heads of state, government leaders or senior representatives from 48 African countries having diplomatic ties with China

¹⁶ Shu Yunguo, *Failed Reforms: An Assessment of Structural Adjustments in Sub-Sahara African Countries in the End of the 20th Century*, Jinlin People’s Press, 2004, p. 82.

¹⁷ An Chunying, “Passion Giving Place to Reason, Calm but Not Cool: Minutes of the International Seminar on Common Development between China and Africa,” *Western Asia and Africa*, Issue 3, 2007.

¹⁸ http://dw-club.net/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,2472854,00.html.

gathered in Beijing to celebrate friendship and discuss cooperation. China doesn't attach any political string to its aid to Africa, at the same time it also supports democratization and good governance in African countries. When political upheavals or regime changes happen in Africa, China respects the choice of the people of that country, even in waves of democratization. Therefore, the argument that "China's not attaching any political string to its African aid is not conducive to good governance in Africa" does not hold water. Of course there is no uniform standard for "good governance". For African countries, peace and development are not only preconditions for the establishment and improvement of a democratic system, but also real challenges confronting them. Africa shares similar views on this issue. Olusegun Obasanjo, a famous statesman in Africa and former President of Nigeria, pointed out that, "Good governance is in some aspects the key to eradicating poverty, instability, violence and lack of development." "There is no country in the world that is fully democratic. At least I don't know of such countries. Even those so-called developed countries are not fully democratic. I believe democracy is a process, and I also believe that most African countries are undergoing this process." ¹⁹

Great efforts made by the Chinese Government in mitigating the crisis and conflict resolution in Darfur, Sudan polish China's image as a responsible power. China helped push through UN Security Council Resolution 1769 on "hybrid" peacekeeping operations in Darfur and appointed a Special Representative on the Darfur issue in order to facilitate political settlement to the Darfur issue. It has sent peacekeeping engineer corps as well as humanitarian aid to Darfur, the amount of the latter having reached RMB ¥80 million.

In fact, what really worries the West is the great success achieved by China in Africa. In the 21st century, two-way cooperation has borne plentiful fruits in all areas on the basis of traditional friendship between China and Africa. Leaders from both sides meet more frequently, there have been over 200 visits by leaders and foreign ministers from the two sides, including over 50 visits paid by Chinese leaders to Africa. Economic and trade relations between China and Africa are growing robustly. In 2000, China-Africa trade stood at US\$10.6 billion, but the figure reached US\$73.57 billion in 2007, an increase of 32.7% over that of 2006. China is now Africa's third largest trading partner after the US and France. China has a cumulative investment in Africa of US\$6.27 billion, with over 800 non-financial- institution businesses and investment projects in 49 African countries. In cultural area there are rich exchanges and cooperation between China and Africa, like China-Africa Youth Festival and Experience Chinese Culture in Africa. In 2003 China overtook Japan to become the world's second largest oil consuming country in the world after the US. Western countries estimate that by 2010 45% of China's oil consumption will depend on import. ²⁰ Western countries feel this to be an unprecedented challenge. *Financial*

¹⁹ [Italy] Alberto Michellini, Li Fusheng(translator), *Challenges for Democracy and Development in Africa: Interview with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo*, China Renmin University Press, May 2007, p.46, p.54.

²⁰ Ian Taylor, China's oil diplomacy in Africa, *International Affairs* 82:5(2006).

Times in Britain commented that, “the contours of a new order are still being drawn, but China's growing stake in the continent has already shaken up an old and fraying one dominated by cautious western donors and former colonial powers.”²¹ The reason why Western countries have such worries is that “the West, including the US and Europe, are nervous about China’s strengthening relations with Africa, because they believe China has entered their sphere of influence, since Africa is the ‘backyard of the US and Europe.’”²²

In fact African countries, having already won their independence, are no longer within the sphere of influence of other countries. Therefore, there is no reason why China can’t work with other countries over aid to Africa, just as former President of Tanzania Mkapa said, “We do not belong to Europe; neither does Europe own us. African resources can be exploited in collaboration with both European countries and China.” “We African countries must make the EU countries (or our former suzerains) change their mindset that ‘Africa is exclusively theirs.’”²³

V. Strengthening China-Europe Cooperation, Promoting Peace and Development in Africa

There is no strategic conflict between China and Europe in Africa; neither are there factors leading to zero-sum outcome. Although the two sides may have different interests in Africa, they can still reach consensus through consultation while taking full consideration of Africa’s interests. China’s EU Policy Paper states that “There is no fundamental conflict of interests between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other. However, given their differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues.” The key is how to extend consensus and reduce divergence on the basis of mutual respect and equal consultation. China and Europe can at least strengthen communication and cooperation over the maintenance of political stability, poverty reduction, environmental protection, and the realization of sustainable development in Africa, so that they can complement each other in their joint efforts towards peace and prosperity in Africa while creating a good internal and external environment for the development of a comprehensive China-Europe strategic partnership. Certainly there is room for improvement in China’s aid to Africa, for example, the lack of transparency in aid. On the other hand, there are strengths in Europe’s aid to Africa from which China can learn. Therefore, further communication and cooperation between China and Europe over African aid are desirable.

To our gladness, Europe and the international community have come to face up with

²¹ Financial Times, Feb 15, 2008.

²² Zheng Ruolin, “Sarkozy Visits Africa to Renew France’s Ambition as a Power: Famous Africa Expert Béchir Ben. Yahmed on France-China-Africa Relations,” *Guangming Daily*, 7/27/2007.

²³ Zeng Aiping, “Former President Benjamin William Mkapa of Tanzania on China-Africa Relations and Situation in Africa,” *Western Asia and Africa*, Issue 12, 2007.

the reality and want to strengthen cooperation with China. An Africa expert in France doesn't believe there is any conflict of interest between China and France in Africa. Strengthened China-Africa economic relations will not harm France's economic interests.²⁴ Prof. Helmut Asche of the Institute of African Studies at the University of Leipzig believes that, "Right now we see in Africa a new multi-polar order in the geopolitical sense. The entire pattern is changing. The West, or Europe, can't expect to go back to the old bipolar world made up of Europe and Africa. China and other emerging industrial countries have become fully independent partners of the African continent. And frankly speaking, our African friends enjoy this diversified partnership very much."²⁵ In the recent communication *EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities*, the EU hopes to "strengthen coordination in international development" and cooperation over "sustainable development in Africa" as well as "support improvements in good governance in Africa" with China. The World Bank also wishes to cooperate with China in this matter. In December 2007, when the newly appointed World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick visited China, he discussed with relevant Chinese agencies on the feasibility of collaborative pilot projects in Africa.²⁶

In summary, over the past half century, the Chinese approach towards African aid devoid of any political strings has stood the tests of time and changes in the international environment. It has won the affirmation and praise of African countries, a strong boost to the stable growth of China-Africa relations. Of course, the Chinese approach towards African aid is in line with Chinese interests. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was in China's political interests to offer assistance to Africa to support African countries in their efforts to develop national economy, defend national independence and fight against imperialism and colonialism. Today, it is in line with the new concept of harmonious world advocated by China to keep assisting Africa in all sincerity and to establish a new strategic partnership with African countries. At the same time, China and Europe should work out differences and expand cooperation over African aid, so that both can contribute to peace and development in Africa.

²⁴ Lin Weiguang: "China-France Conflict over Africa? Merely French Hype," China Youth Daily, 11/1/2006.

²⁵ [Http://dw-club.net/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,3026481,00.html](http://dw-club.net/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,3026481,00.html).

²⁶ [Http://www.worldbank.org.cn](http://www.worldbank.org.cn).

中国对非援助模式及其影响¹

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摘要：半个多世纪以来，中国对非洲援助一直是中非合作的重要内容之一，援非形式和内容随着形势的变化也在不断地丰富和发展。但是，中国对非援助模式基本保持不变，与西方国家相比，中国在对非洲提供援助时坚持不附加任何政治条件的原则，即不干涉他国内政的原则。中国对非援助模式有着深厚的理论基础，它尊重《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则、和平共处五项原则以及其他公认的国际关系准则，体现中国独立自主的和平外交思想。中国对非援助模式符合中国与非洲国家的利益，它受到非洲国家的肯定和好评，有力地促进了中非关系稳步而健康地发展。在援助非洲问题上，中国与其他国家完全可以在相互尊重、平等协商，以及充分考虑非洲利益的基础上进行沟通与合作。

关键词：中国对非援助模式，不附加政治条件，不干涉内政，平等互利，良政

中国对非援助模式是中非友好关系持久发展中的一大特色，也是西方国家议论比较多的话题之一。对此问题国内学界目前尚无专文进行阐述，本文作者试图提出一些初步的看法，以期推动学界对该问题的关注与思考。

一、 独特的中国对非援助模式

新中国与非洲国家开启外交关系半个多世纪以来，中国对非洲援助一直是中非合作的重要内容之一，援非形式和内容也在不断丰富和发展。早在 20 世纪 50、60 年代，中国向非洲国家提供援助的形式主要有项目建设、提供实物以及派遣专家等。自 1978 年起中国开始实施改革开放政策，非洲国家也着手进行经济结构调整，根据双方各自情况出现的新变化，中国对非洲援助方式开始出现多样化，内容更加丰富，双方更加重视援助的经济效益。这一时期，无偿赠送、无息贷款、贴息贷款、技术援助、项目建设、直接建厂、专家指导、劳务服务、人员培养、技术培训等逐渐成为援助或合作的方式。自 20 世纪 90 年代以来，中国对非洲的援助形式进一步拓展，注重在技术管理指导、优惠贷款提供、投资贸易促进中心建设、重债穷国债务减免、经贸官员培训、自然灾害紧急救助等领域的交流与合

¹ 本文在写作的过程中，李伟建研究员、祝鸣同志提出过宝贵意见，并由张玫博士译成英文，在此一并表示衷心感谢。

作。

尽管中国对非洲国家的援助形式和内容随着形势的发展而变化，但是，中国对非援助模式基本保持不变。与西方国家相比，中国对非援助模式有自己的显著特色：第一，中国与非洲国家平等相待，而西方国家常常将自己的价值观和理念强加给非洲国家；第二，中国对非洲国家实行不附加任何政治条件的援助，而西方国家则以良政、民主等条件为前提，向非洲推销“一揽子改革方案”；第三，在将合作计划付诸实践时，中国落实程序简单，效率比较高，而西方国家落实援助计划时程序复杂，比如非洲国家与欧盟合作时，需要与其 27 个成员国分别磋商，而且每个成员国都有否决权，落实合作计划时存在不确定性。这其中，最关键的，也是西方国家议论比较多的是中国在对非援助时坚持不附加任何政治条件的原则，即不干涉他国内政的原则。

这一原则早在 20 世纪 60 年代周恩来总理访问非洲期间就已经正式向世界宣布。1964 年 1 月周恩来访问加纳，在回答加纳通讯社记者提问时，提出中国政府对外提供经济技术援助的时候，严格遵循的八项原则²其中第二项原则就是“中国政府在对外提供援助的时候，严格尊重受援国的主权，决不要求任何特权，绝不附带任何条件。”该项原则至今仍然是中国发展同非洲国家关系时恪守的基本准则之一，仍然经常地被写入一些重要的宣言和文件之中。2000 年 10 月发表的《中非合作论坛北京宣言》强调：“将人权问题政治化以及在提供经援时附加人权条件，本身就违反人权，应予以坚决反对”。2006 年 1 月中国政府首次发表对非洲政策文件，提出与非洲国家一道建立和发展“政治上平等互信、经济上合作共赢、文化上交流互鉴的新型战略伙伴关系。”重申“中国政府将根据自身财力和经济发展状况，继续向非洲国家提供并逐步增加力所能及和不附加政治条件的援助。”同年 11 月，这一原则在中非合作论坛第三次会议暨中非领导人北京峰会上，继续成为中非领导人的共识，《中非合作论坛北京峰会宣言》指出：“中国始终坚定支持非洲民族解放和国家建设，从不附加任何政治条件”。

二、中国对非援助模式的理论基础

以不附加任何政治条件为核心的中国对非洲援助模式有着深厚的理论基础，它尊重《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则、和平共处五项原则以及其他公认的国际关系准则，体现中国独立自主的和平外交思想。

不附加任何政治条件，其实质就是不干涉内政，就是对国家主权的尊重。现

² 艾周昌、沐涛：《中非关系史》，华东师范大学出版社 1996 年，第 242-243 页。

代意义上的国家主权概念是由法国人让·博丹（Jean Bodin）在《国家论》一书中提出来的。博丹认为，主权就是在国民之上不受法律限制的最高权力。主权的内容十分广泛，它至少包括八个方面：

- （1）法律制定权；
- （2）宣战媾和权；
- （3）高级官员任命权；
- （4）最高裁判权；
- （5）豁免权；
- （6）接受忠诚与官员就职时的宣誓权；
- （7）征税及铸造货币权；
- （8）拥有至高无上的称号。

就主权的性质而言，它是一种绝对永久、不可分，而且必须由一人或一个机构掌握的权力，即主权有三个特性：绝对性、永久性和不可分割性。³博丹对政治学的最大贡献就在于他的主权理论，这一理论在今天仍然具有现实意义。国家主权不仅是各国管理国内事务的最高权力，同时也是其对外交往的合法权利和独立、平等身份。世界各国不分大小贫富强弱应彼此尊重、平等相待、和睦相处；不同文明和发展模式应相互借鉴、相互促进、和谐共存。尊重国家主权、不干涉别国内政，这也是《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则和公认的国际关系准则。联合国宪章强调，“各会员国在其国际关系上不得使用威胁或武力，或以与联合国宗旨不符之任何其他方法，侵害任何会员国或国家之领土完整或政治独立。”

不干涉内政的原则包含在中国倡导的著名的和平共处五项原则之中。1953年12月31日，周恩来在接见印度政府代表团成员时说：“我们相信，中印两国的关系会一天一天地好起来。某些成熟的、悬而未决的问题一定会顺利地解决的。新中国成立后就确立了处理中印两国关系的原则，那就是：互相尊重领土主权、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互惠⁴和和平共处的原则。”⁵这五项原则后来正式写入中印双方于1954年4月29日达成的《关于中国西藏地方和印度之间的通商和交通协定》之中。⁶和平共处五项原则在1955年4月召开的万隆会议上得到了与会的亚非国家代表的普遍赞同，在此基础上达成的“万隆十项原则”，⁷成为亚非国家和平相处、友好合作的基本准则。万隆十项原则非常强调尊重国家主权和不干涉他国内政，其第二至第四项原则分别是“尊重一切国家的主权和领土完整”；“承认一切种族的平等，承认一切大小国家的平等”；“不干预或干涉他国内

³ 潘兴祖、洪涛主编：《西方政治学说史》，复旦大学出版社1999年，第151页。

⁴ 五项原则的措词后来稍有改变，中缅联合声明1954年6月29日改为“平等互利”。

⁵ 周恩来外交文选》，中央文献出版社1990年版，第63页。

⁶ 中华人民共和国条约集》，第三集(1954)，法律出版社1958年版，第1页。

⁷ 王绳祖主编，《国际关系史》第八卷，世界知识出版社1995年，第249页。

政”。

1963年12月，周恩来访问阿尔及利亚时，根据和平共处五项原则和万隆会议十项原则，提出了中国在处理同非洲和阿拉伯国家的关系时应该遵循的《五项立场》⁸。其中第五项立场就是“主张阿拉伯和非洲国家的主权应当得到一切其他国家的尊重，反对来自任何方面的侵略和干涉。”

从和平共处五项原则到万隆会议十项原则以及中国在处理同非洲和阿拉伯国家的关系时的《五项立场》，最核心的思想是不干涉别国内政，而在提供经济技术援助时不附加任何政治条件则是这一原则的最好体现。不干涉原则不仅仅适用于亚非国家之间，它在国际关系上具有普遍的意义。邓小平曾经指出，“处理国与国之间关系，和平共处五项原则是最好的方式。其他方式，如‘大家庭’方式，‘集团统治’方式，‘势力范围’方式，都会带来矛盾，激化国际局势。”⁹江泽民在1995年联合国成立50周年特别纪念会的讲话中指出：“大家只有彼此尊重，求同存异，和睦相处，互相促进，才能创造百花争妍，万紫千红的世界。”¹⁰

今天，中国对内致力于构建和谐社会，对外倡导建设一个持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界。为此，在处理国际关系时“应该遵循联合国宪章宗旨和原则，恪守国际法和公认的国际关系准则，在国际关系中弘扬民主、和睦、协作、互赢精神。政治上相互尊重、平等协商，共同推进国际关系民主化；经济上相互合作、优势互补，共同推动经济全球化朝着均衡、普惠、共赢方向发展；文化上相互借鉴、求同存异，尊重世界多样性，共同促进人类文明繁荣进步；安全上相互信任，加强合作，坚持用和平方式而不是战争手段解决国际争端，共同维护世界和平稳定；环保上相互帮助、协力推进，共同呵护人类赖以存在的地球家园。”¹¹尊重国家主权和不干涉他国内政属于公认的国际关系准则，只有遵守这一原则，才能在国际关系中弘扬民主、和睦、协作、互赢精神，才能在政治上相互尊重、平等协商，共同推进国际关系民主化。所以，以不干涉内政原则为核心的中国援非模式同样在和谐世界理论中找到理论支撑。

三、对非援助模式的评判，非洲国家最有发言权

对非援助模式的效果如何？在这个问题上，最有发言权的是非洲国家。相比较而言，中国对非洲援助模式更受非洲国家的欢迎。这一点西方国家亦表示认可，

⁸ 艾周昌、沐涛：《非关系史》华东师范大学出版社1996年，第242页。

⁹ 《邓小平文选》，第3卷，人民出版社1993年，第96页。

¹⁰ 中共中央文献研究室，《江泽民论中国特色社会主义》，中央文献出版社2002年，第539页。

¹¹ 中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会报告。

英国《金融时报》载文指出，“迄今为止，对于中国影响力的迅猛膨胀，非洲方面的看法非常积极。”¹²

半个多世纪以来，中国向非洲提供了力所能及的援助。中国在非洲承担了近900个项目，中国的许多援建项目如坦赞铁路、毛里塔尼亚友谊港等已成为当地重要经济枢纽。中国先后向非洲派出医疗队员1.9万人次，诊治患者约2.4亿人次。近年来，在中非合作论坛框架下，中方减免了31个非洲重债穷国和最不发达国家109亿元人民币债务，对非洲30个最不发达国家的190项对华出口商品给予零关税待遇，为非洲培训各类人才1.46万名。中国对非提供援助的时候始终遵循不干涉别国内政的原则，不附加政治条件，不会把自己的意识形态、价值观和发展模式强加于非洲国家。此外，中国能以更快的速度和更低的成本建造水坝、公路和桥梁，还能提供更适合非洲人消费能力的消费产品，中国对非援助着眼于改善当地人民民生。

中国真诚援助非洲，受到非洲国家人民高度赞扬。坦桑尼亚前总统姆卡帕（Benjamin William Mkapa）说，“中国对非洲援助的效果要比西方的更有效。来自西欧、世界银行和欧盟等国家机构的援助，其行政管理成本非常高，相比较而言，中国援助的行政管理费用低多了。”¹³塞内加尔总统阿卜杜拉耶·瓦德（Abdoulaye Wade）不久前在英国《金融时报》上撰文盛赞中国模式，他说，“与欧洲投资者、捐赠机构和非政府组织缓慢而且有时带有施恩性质和后殖民主义方式相比，中国满足我们需求的方式更为适宜。事实上，刺激经济迅速发展的中国模式可以让非洲汲取很多经验。”¹⁴卢旺达驻欧盟大使约瑟夫·博恩沙说，尽管欧洲与非洲的历史联系令前者在发展同非洲关系时具有优势，但不可忽视中国作为一个投资方的受欢迎程度。他说：“他们的价格通常比欧洲更具竞争力，他们的建筑合同一般带有补贴，他们的援助没有附加条件，他们提供的贷款往往是无息或低息的。”¹⁵

中国对非洲的援助不仅进一步密切了中非双边经贸联系，也有力地促进了中非政治互信，并且推动中国与非洲国家之间的政治立场沟通和外交行动协调。中国11次在联合国人权会上挫败西方反华提案，联合国大会13次粉碎台湾“重返联合国”¹⁶图谋以及中国成功申办2008年奥运会和2010年世界博览会，均得到了非洲国家的鼎力相助。正如胡锦涛主席在中非合作论坛北京峰会开幕式上所指

¹² Financial Times, Feb 15, 2008.

¹³ 曾爱平：《坦桑尼亚前总统姆卡帕谈中非关系和非洲形势》，《西亚非洲》，2007年第12期。

¹⁴ Financial Times, Feb 29, 2008.

¹⁵ International Herald Tribune Dec 7, 2007.

¹⁶ 王运泽主编：《携手同行——中非人民友情写真》，世界知识出版社2006年，第58页。

出的，“中非友好之所以能够经受住历史岁月和国际风云变幻的考验，关键是我们发展相互关系中始终坚持真诚友好、平等相待、相互支持、共同发展的正确原则。”

西方国家在对非洲国家提供援助的时候，往往以良政、民主等条件为前提，向非洲推销“一揽子改革方案”。20世纪80年代初，世界银行发表了《撒哈拉以南非洲加速发展的行动纲领》，认为非洲经济危机的主要原因是非洲国家经济发展的决策失误所致，因此必须对非洲进行经济结构调整。在发放结构调整贷款时，世界银行和国际货币基金组织提出明确的政策性要求，“1、实现市场自由化，让市场充分发挥作用，价格应根据市场的供需而定；2、对国营企业实行私有化；3、提高政府的工作效率；4、进行体制改革，创建新的金融体制和其他体制。”¹⁷冷战结束后，西方国家对非洲的干预力度明显加大，将经济援助与实行西方式民主挂钩，强行向非洲国家推行西方式民主、自由和人权等政治价值观。无论是克林顿政府提出《非洲增长与机会法案》还是布什政府的“千年挑战账户”，美国对其提供的每项发展援助都附加严格的民主、自由、人权等内容的政治条件。欧洲则通过英联邦、法非首脑会议、欧非峰会等机制力图继续保持对非洲的控制。对此，非洲人不以为然，“西方对非洲实行双重标准，我们对西方的观点很厌倦，总是将自己的观点强加于非洲人身上。”¹⁸国际社会对西方国家的援非模式亦有微词，联合国贸易和发展会议在《2006年非洲经济发展报告》中指出，世界银行和国际货币基金组织现有的相关援助机制不能满足，也不适应实现对非洲援助翻倍的目标和需求。该报告建议，改变目前对非洲援助以双边形式为主的分散和混乱模式，建立由联合国管理的多边援助体制，并将援助集中于非洲国家经济发展所急需的领域。

四、西方关注中国援非模式的原因

进入新世纪以来，随着中非关系的快速发展，尤其是中非新型战略伙伴关系的建立，西方对中非关系十分关注，对中国对非援助模式议论很多，有的评论比较公允和积极，也有一些人表示“担忧”，甚至指责，声称“中国对非援助不附加任何政治条件不利于非洲良政”。2007年5月德国全球与区域研究所主席卡帕（Robert Kappel）教授的观点具有一定的代表性，他说，“由于中国的主要合作伙伴正是西方社会企图孤立和施压的‘独裁国家’，中国的政策阻碍了国际社

¹⁷ 舒运国，《失败的改革——20世纪末撒哈拉以南非洲国家结构调整评述》，吉林人民出版社2004年，第82页。

¹⁸ 安春英：《理智取代激情 冷静但不冷淡——“中国与非洲共同发展”国际学术研讨会会议纪要》，《西亚非洲》，2007年第3期。

会对非洲民主进程建设所作出的贡献”。¹⁹

中国与非洲 49 个国家建立外交关系，中国与非洲的合作并非局限于少数几个国家，中非关系具有广泛性和普遍性。2006 年 11 月中非合作论坛第三次会议暨中非领导人北京峰会，当时与中国建交的 48 个非洲国家元首、政府首脑或高级代表相聚北京，共叙友谊、共谋合作。中国对非援助时不附加任何政治条件，中国也支持非洲国家加强民主法制建设和实施良好治理。非洲在发生政治变革或政权更迭时，中国往往是尊重非洲国家人民的选择，即便是民主化浪潮中也是如此，因此，“中国对非援助不附加任何政治条件不利于非洲良政”的说法是站不住脚的。当然，对于“良政”，没有统一的标准，对于非洲国家来说，和平与发展是建立和完善民主制度的前提，也是面临的现实挑战。在这方面，非洲也不乏相似的观点。非洲著名政治家尼日利亚前总统奥巴桑乔论指出，“善治（即良好的治理）在某些方面依然是消除贫困、不稳定、暴力和欠发达状况的最关键因素。”“世界上没有任何一个国家已经达到完全民主。至少，我不知道有这样的国家，甚至是那些所谓的发达国家，它们也没有达到完全民主。我认为，民主是一个过程，我也相信非洲的大多数国家都正处在这个过程中。”²⁰

在苏丹达尔富尔问题上，中国政府为帮助缓解危机和解决问题作出了许多努力，彰显了负责任大国的良好形象。中国努力推动联合国安理会通过有关方面在达尔富尔开展混合维和行动的 1769 号决议，设立达尔富尔问题中国政府特别代表，努力促进达尔富尔问题的政治解决；向达尔富尔地区派遣维和工兵并提供人道援助，中国政府迄今已向达尔富尔地区提供了价值 8000 万人民币的人道主义援助。

其实，西方真正感到担忧的是中国在非洲的巨大成功。进入新世纪以来，在中非传统友谊的基础上，双方合作在各个领域都取得了丰硕的成果。中非高层交往越来越密切，中非领导人和外长互访达 200 多起，其中中国领导人访非 50 多起。中非经贸合作保持强劲增长，2000 年，中非贸易额为 106 亿美元，2007 年已经达到 735.7 亿美元，比 2006 年增长 32.7%。中国现在是位于美国和法国之后非洲的第三大贸易伙伴。中国累计对非各类投资达 62.7 亿美元，设立非金融类企业 800 多家，投资项目分布在 49 个非洲国家。中非在文化领域也开展了“中非青年联欢节”“中华文化非洲行”等丰富多彩的交流与合作。自 2003 年中国超过日本成为仅次于美国的第二大石油消费国后，西方国家预计到 2010 年中国

¹⁹ http://dw-club.net/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,2472854,00.html

²⁰ [意]阿尔贝托·麦克里尼著，李福胜译，《非洲的民主与发展面临的挑战——尼日利亚总统奥卢塞贡·奥巴桑乔访谈录》，中国人民大学出版社 2007 年 5 月，第 46 页、第 54 页。

消耗石油的 45%将依赖进口。²¹西方国家对此感到前所未有的挑战，英国《金融时报》评论道，“新秩序的轮廓尚在勾勒之中，但中国在非洲大陆的利益不断增长，已经撼动了由谨慎的西方捐助者和前殖民主义列强所主导的充满摩擦的旧秩序。”²²之所以，西方国家有这种担忧，是因为“西方——包括美国和欧洲——对中国加强与非洲的关系是非常紧张的。因为他们视中国进入非洲为介入了他们的势力范围，因为非洲是‘美国和欧洲的后院’”。²³

事实上，非洲国家早已赢得独立，不是别的国家的势力范围，因此，在援助非洲问题上中国与其他国家完全可以进行合作。正如坦桑尼亚前总统姆卡帕所说的，“我们并不属于欧洲，欧洲并不拥有我们。非洲的资源既可以与欧洲国家合作来开发，也可以与中国合作来开发。”“我们非洲国家必须迫使欧盟国家（即我们的前殖民宗主国）改变‘非洲是它们的独占领地’的观念和态度”。²⁴

五、加强中欧合作，共同促进非洲的和平与发展

中国和欧洲在非洲无战略冲突，双方也不存在导致“零和”结果的因素。中欧在非洲虽然有不同的利益，但其可以通过相互协商，并在充分考虑非洲利益的基础上取得一致。正如《中国对欧盟政策文件》所指出的，“中欧之间不存在根本利害冲突，互不构成威胁。由于历史文化传统，政治制度和经济发展阶段的差异，中欧在某些问题上存在不同看法和分歧是正常的。”关键是如何在相互尊重、平等协商的基础上扩大共识，缩小分歧。至少中欧可以在保持非洲的政治稳定、消除非洲贫困、保护非洲环境、实现非洲可持续发展等方面加强沟通与合作，实现优势互补，共同促进非洲的和平与繁荣，并为中欧全面战略伙伴关系的发展营造更加良好的内外环境。当然，中国在援非问题上也有值得进一步改进的地方，比如援助的透明度有待提高，欧洲援助非洲也并非一无是处，也有值得中国学习的地方。所以，在援助非洲问题上，中欧应该加强沟通与合作。

可喜的是，现在欧洲方面和国际社会开始认识到这一点，正视现实，希望加强与中国的合作。法国的非洲问题专家贝尔纳尔·卢甘认为，中法两国在非洲不存在利益冲突。中非经济关系的加强不会损害法国的经济利益。²⁵莱比锡大学非洲研究所的赫尔穆特-阿舍教授认为，“我们目前在非洲看到的是地缘政治层面上

²¹ Ian Taylor, China's oil diplomacy in Africa, *International Affairs* 82:5(2006).

²² *Financial Times*, Feb 15, 2008.

²³ 郑若麟：《萨科齐访非洲重温大国梦——著名非洲专家贝希尔·本·亚美德谈法国、中国与非洲关系》，《光明日报》，2007年7月27日。

²⁴ 曾爱平：《坦桑尼亚前总统姆卡帕谈中非关系和非洲形势》，《西亚非洲》，2007年第12期。

²⁵ 林卫光：《中法为争夺非洲产生冲突？纯属法国抄作》，《中国青年报》，2006年11月1日。

的一种新式的多极秩序。整个格局在发生变化，西方或是欧洲不能再指望回到过去的欧洲与非洲的两极世界。中国及其他新兴工业国家已是非洲大陆完全独立的伙伴。而且坦白地说，我们的非洲伙伴非常享受这种伙伴多元化的局面。”²⁶ 欧盟在最近发表的《欧盟与中国：更紧密的伙伴、承担更多责任》的对华政策文件中提出，“加强在国际发展问题上的协调”，希望在“关于非洲可持续发展”和“支持提高非洲治理”²⁷等问题上与中国加强合作。世界银行也希望在此问题上与中国进行合作，2007年12月新任世行行长佐利克访华，与中国有关方面探讨了在非洲合作开展发展项目试点的可能性。²⁸

总之，半个多世纪以来，以不附加任何政治条件为核心的中国援非模式经受住国际形势变幻和时间的考验，它得到了非洲国家的肯定和好评，有力地促进了中非关系的稳步发展。当然，中国援非模式符合中国的利益，上个世纪60、70年代，中国援助非洲，支持非洲国家发展民族经济捍卫国家的独立，共同反对帝国主义和殖民主义，符合当时中国的政治利益。今天，中国继续真诚地援助非洲，同非洲国家建立新型战略伙伴关系，符合中国倡导的和谐世界的新理念。同时，在援助非洲问题上，中欧应该消除分歧，扩大合作，共同促进非洲的和平与发展。

²⁶ [Http://dw-club.net/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,3026481,00.html](http://dw-club.net/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,3026481,00.html)

²⁷ [Http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/China/docs/com06_631_ch.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/China/docs/com06_631_ch.pdf)

²⁸ [Http://www.worldbank.org.cn](http://www.worldbank.org.cn)

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