Current Situation and Future Prospects of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation

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"For Social Justice and International Understanding"

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Editors: Katharina Hofmann / Katja Meyer / Yan Yu
Preface

Improved European-Asian Dialogue: Challenges and Chances for a Partnership on Global Security Issues

The Fifth Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance took place in January 2007 and was jointly organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Shanghai and its partner, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). European and Asian perspectives were given by 50 high-ranking stakeholders and experts from eleven countries (China, Germany, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Korea, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy). The workshop series had been initiated in 2003 as a forum on foreign and security policy and has developed since as an institution which features open political dialogue on the non-governmental or track-two level and aims to contribute to inner-Asian and Euro-Asian exchange and cooperation.

Against the background of the growing partnership between Germany and China on the bilateral level as well as on the partnership between the European Union (EU), China and other Asian countries on the multilateral level, some key questions for a future perspective of Euro-Asian security cooperation are: how much common ground do we have for an effective multilateralism, and what are future prospects for enhanced security cooperation between Asia and Europe? The FES Shanghai and the SIIS intended to provide a platform for an open debate on the “Current Situation and Future Prospects of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation” that would analyze the current state of Asia-Europe security cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral level; identify common ground between Asia and Europe’s security strategies and areas for future inner-Asian and Eurasian exchange and cooperation.

The security situation in contemporary Asia has improved, but has also become more complex. Asia as a world-region has been experiencing a region-wide geo-political change. China’s peaceful rise to one of the most powerful global players and India’s attractive rise as well as Japan’s enduring strength are positive developments to name. New developing forms of regional cooperation, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the East Asian Summit (EAS), reflect the new pattern of Asian architecture. The ASEAN-Plus-Processes as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have intensified the economic, but also political and cultural ties between the ASEAN members and China.

Still, long-standing conflicts like the situation on the Korean Peninsula continue to feed new threats. New transnational security challenges – such as the increased trafficking of drugs and arms, terrorism, the spread of infectious diseases as well as the scarcity of resources in certain areas – have to be addressed jointly by politicians and think tanks in the area. The links between economic development, good governance and security are crucial for building peace and cooperation in the region. China as a rising player is increasingly interested in regional and multilateral solutions. The sheer size of China, its economic accomplishments and political strength make it indispensable to any meaningful process of cooperative or even collective security.

As an important step in this direction the first East Asia Summit is a promising new mid-level-structure between the sub-regional ASEAN and the APEC. Other regional mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and closer China-US cooperation as well as improved Sino-Japanese relations are promising preventive
strategies for a peaceful cooperation in this region and beyond. Asian leaders have widely recognized the need for building a regional community as a fundamental solution to an effective conflict management.

As for the European side, there certainly is a long tradition in security cooperation within the NATO and OSCE framework. But the EU did not have a security or defense policy until the end of the 1990s. Security cooperation was a transatlantic project until the end of the cold war. Since the mid 1990s there is a growing trend towards an Europeanization of security cooperation. Despite the crisis of integration since the failed Constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands, security cooperation is now one of the few areas where significant progress is taking place. At the heart of the European approach lies the idea of combining hard and soft power. This approach goes beyond the political-military dimension of security, yet military instruments still play an important role. The third element of an emerging European “security culture” is effective multilateralism. The commitment to multilateralism, international law and cooperation is a traditional tenet of EU policy.

EU-Asian relations have been gradually tightened and are today involving cooperation in an increasing number of sectors. Security cooperation is playing one prominent role on the dialogue agenda. Still, there certainly remain divergences in interests, perceptions, definitions and strategies on security policies on both sides. While Asian-European Security Cooperation is still quite an abstract undertaking, both sides are without doubt interested in a stronger cooperation on global and security issues. Although the participants perceived the actual state of cooperation very differently, all of them agreed that Asian-European dialogue is an essential element for an efficient management of the prospective environment of international security. The participants underlined the necessity to tackle environmental, energy and security issues from a more pragmatic stance and enhance cooperation especially in the fields of human security issues.

The workshop papers cover a wide range of important issues in current international politics including reports on the current situation and future prospects of Asia-Europe security cooperation, regional security cooperation strategies of major Asian and European countries, regional security cooperation strategies of major Asian and European security organizations, Asia-Europe cooperation and Sino-European relations, as well as Asia-Europe security cooperation and global governance.

In part one the state of the Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Countries is analyzed. Johannes Pflug, Member of the German Parliament, clearly names the challenge for the coming years which would be a comprehensive, explicit security agenda that involves the European and Asian states equally. Apart from the classic topics of limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation, this will involve action on issues that will be crucial in the future, such as global climate change and energy supply. Zhang Tiejun, Director of European Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) formulates the criteria for a strategic partnership: China and the EU need to define what it should be like and what criteria constitute it. The difference between stated and real strategic cooperation on security matters is also true for the South Asian region, claims Varun Sahni from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi arguing that there is no security cooperation in the South Asian region so far and that India as the regional power has not been able to pacify its region nor make it cohere. Besides India as a rising power in the region, Chinese-Japanese relations are not only important to the two countries but have regional and
global significance as well. The Taiwan conflict, as well as the nuclear conflict with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), are security threats that require a common approach from China and Japan, emphasizes Rear Admiral Yang Yi, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies from the National Defence University of Beijing.

Regional security cooperation within Europe is a growing trend since the mid 1990s towards the Europeanization of security and security cooperation, explains Stefanie Flechtner from the Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Berlin in her paper. Global ambitions of the EU states are a key message of the European Security Strategy (2003) stating that the EU has to be “ready to share in the responsibility for global security”. At the heart of the European approach lies the idea of combining hard and soft power. This approach goes beyond the political-military dimension of security, yet military instruments still play an important role. A special case within the European enlargement and integration process of the new member states challenging the EU security cooperation, has been Poland’s Atlanticism which can be explained by its exclusion from the decision-making process in European security matters, as Marcin Zaborowski from the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, argues in his article.

Part two Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Security Organizations describes the possibilities of how regional actors address current security threats and what they could learn from each other by building regional security strategies. In comparing the regional security cooperation strategies of major Asian and European countries, one has to consider that although Asia can in part draw experiences from European states and consider the EU as an inspiration, it is also important to note that the East Asian states miss such an institutional framework that developed in Europe after the second world war. “How do ASEAN and ARF fit into the concept of a security community?” asks Bob S. Hadiwinata from the Department of International Relations at the University of Parahyangan, Indonesia in his outline on the roles of ASEAN and ARF in regional security architecture. Another regional security cooperation organization is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is an intergovernmental international organization founded in 2001. As Lu Gang, Director of the Department of Russian-Central Asian Studies of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies points out, to maintain regional stability and peace is now focusing on the border disputes between China and Russia plus Central Asia (bilaterally) and SCO holds an active role in supporting the war against terrorism. “NATO has become an attractive framework and tool for supporting conflict resolution in Europe and beyond” emphasizes Hans J. Giessmann, Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg. The successful transformation of the transatlantic alliance from a system of collective defense into a “hybrid” system that complements defense for all members with both institutionalized collective security building elements and multilateral military cooperation between members and interested partner countries has become the true secret of NATO’s survival.

Part three deals with the current characteristics of Asian-European Cooperation and Sino-European Relations. Is ASEM a channel for Sino-European cooperation? “It is an institution that generates and manages interdependencies in a globalizing world “, states Sebastian Bersick from the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels. The ASEM process demonstrates the demand for governance on the inter- and intra-regional level. Special attention within the Asia-Europe Cooperation should be given to the field

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of peace building, argues Toshiya Hoshino, *Minister-Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations*. If the purpose of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation includes not just the promotion of peace and security but also the enhancement of mutual engagement in the strategic partnership to deal with the issues of global governance, the cooperation in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding should be given a high priority since most of today’s conflicts are by character internal rather than inter-state wars.

Analyzing the case of the EU arms embargo against China, Chen Zhimin *from the Fudan University in Shanghai*, argues that the EU was not yet a complete strategic actor. According to Zhimin, the EU still has to develop an operational strategy on hard security issues, to avail itself of the necessary resources and effective policy-making mechanisms. From a European perspective the strategic partnership between the EU and China “is hampered by different interpretations of similar terminologies and rhetoric on the so-called “new security concepts”, and different views on the international system, the own desired role and the role of the US” analyzes May-Britt Stumboam *from the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP) in Berlin*. Three years after the declaration of the strategic partnership, the questions remaining are, if the EU and China do share the same paradigms, goals and priorities.

Finally, part four examines *Asian-European Security Cooperation and Global Governance* on different and common perceptions of security issues as well chances and limitations for further cooperation. What can be done and has been done in fields such as in Development, Energy Security, African relationships and Peacekeeping? After a certain Sino-European euphoria in 2004/2005, “the honeymoon is over”, states Bernt Berger. The scholar from the *Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH)* in Hamburg sees a more practical approach in the relationship developing. Jaewoo Choo *from the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University in Korea* identifies a strong need for energy security cooperation among European and Northeast Asian states. Only a common approach would allow the two major consumers of energy to maintain a stable energy market and delivery system. Ye Jiang, *Director of the Department of International Relations at Jiaotong University*, stresses the importance of Asia-Europe cooperation in the context of global governance.

We hereby thank all participants and organizers of the 5th Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance very warmly for their enriching contributions to this important debate!

*Katharina Hofmann / Katja Meyer*

*Shanghai, June 2007*
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Dialogue on Globalization
Current Situation and Future Prospects of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation

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1. EU Global Role and Inter-regionalism

As a global player, the European Union has four different forms of foreign policy: enlargement in the core area of Europe; stabilization in the neighborhood area; bilateralism with great powers; and inter-regionalism with other organized regions. In the last decade, inter-regional cooperation has become an important component of EU foreign policy and external relations.

The EU external policy has been characterized in sharply contrasting ways, from a distinctly European idealism to traditional national interest’s policies hidden behind rhetoric. The type of power exercised by the EU is of the “soft” rather than the “hard” type, and is based on economic instruments; dialog and diplomacy, but even this kind of power can be used in different ways. According to Bjorn Hettne, a distinction is made between “civilian power” and “soft imperialism”: the former implies power without the hard option, the latter refers to soft power applied in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialog or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of a genuine dialog.

Inter-regionalism is here understood as an idea or belief on constructing institutionalized and formal relations between two regions. The degree of inter-regional cohesion is termed as inter-regionness, which, in turn, is judged by political, economic and socio-cultural connections between two given regions. The main characteristics of inter-regionalism are considered as inter-regional equality and the search of both two given regions for the institutionalization of inter-regional cooperation. In my mind, it needs also to be emphasized that analysis on inter-regional cooperation should be on three levels, i.e. the region-region level (like Asia and Europe), the region-country level (between one region like Europe and a country in the other region such as China), and country-country level (between a country in one region and another country in the other region); though the latter two levels cannot be viewed as inter-regional cooperation in the precise sense, they are nonetheless promoting inter-regional cooperation by and large.

Both civilian power and soft imperialism are helpful in explaining EU inter-regional relations towards Africa, Latin America and Asia. The relevance of these two models is closely linked to the relative strength of the counterpart region. It is particularly interesting to note the various ways in which the EU promotes inter-regionalism towards different counterpart regions. In the case of ASEM, there is a pragmatic

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2. Region is, in turn, defined as “world region” and not sub-national region.
approach based on civilian power consisting of a reasonably symmetric dialog among “equals” in combination with a cautious stress on norms and good governance, at least to less significant states like Myanmar. This sharply contrasts with the EU-African relations that are more asymmetrical, dominated by the strong and built on conditionalities and imposition of norms for material self-interests. Thus, civilian power may have the most relevance in the case of ASEM and soft imperialism describes EU foreign policy relationships towards Africa, while EU-Latin American (such as Mercosur) relations lie in between.

2. Sino-European Strategic Partnership

Both the European Union and China are facing an uncertain world as a result of major changes to the global environment since the end of the Cold War: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the US as the sole superpower; 9/11; greater terrorist threats, etc.

The last decade has seen the EU and China grow in increasing importance in world affairs, with both undergoing processes of profound transformation such as EU enlargement and China’s rapid economic development. This underpins the need for greater strategic cooperation between the EU and China.

The EU’s overriding challenge for the next decade is to find ways for promoting further regional integration rekindle economic growth and stabilize its neighborhood. China’s overriding challenge for the next ten years is to main sustainable growth and creating “harmony society” domestically. The EU is now China’s main trading partner and for the EU, China ranks second to the US.

The EU is set to enlarge further while strengthening its institutional structures. China is set to maintain its extraordinary growth record and has its eyes firmly set on the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. It hopes to demonstrate its continuing “peaceful rise” through the successful holding of these two showcase events.

2.1. Criteria for a Strategic Partnership and the Chinese Practice

China and the EU both claim that they have formed a strategic partnership, but neither defines what it should be like and what criteria constitute it. In order to analyze this so-called strategic partnership, it is important to at least make a brief outline about what are the criteria for such.

The first thing comes to my mind is its distinctive features as compared with either alliance or normal inter-state relationships. From this understanding, we would be able to confine the range of this kind of special relationship. What makes it different from normal inter-state relations is that this kind of special relationship should contain critical implications, both for the constituent parties and for the wider world. The factor that makes it different from alliance is that it does not necessarily targeting at a third party, and if so, certainly not in alliance form.

Secondly, being strategic, the partnership should be long-term oriented.
Thirdly, a strategic partnership formed on the basis that the constituent parties share at least the basic values about how the domestic society and international community should be organized.

Lastly, a true partnership should be built on the basis of mutual equality, and no political or other types of discrimination should be placed between the two parties. From the Chinese side, the term of “strategic partnership” is a creation by Jiang Zemin, former president of China.

China first formed strategic cooperative partnership with Russia, with obvious orientation of creating a multipolar world, and that was in 1996, when Jiang visited Moscow and had Jiang-Yeltsin Summit. Soon after that, during Jiang’s visit to Pakistan and India, China formed exactly the same term of Partnership with both countries, “Constructive Partnership of Cooperation Oriented toward the 21st Century (and later after 9/11, upgraded with both to Strategic Partnership).

In the next year (1997), China formed with the US, France and the ASEAN partnerships, only Sino-US one contained the word of strategic. China-US relations certainly include a lot of strategic matters. Later, Bush, however, thinking more of the negative or conflicting aspects of it, and refused to use the term.

In 1998, China formed “Long Term and Stable Mutual Trust Partnership” with the EU (later upgraded to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership). In the same year, China also formed partnerships with the UK (Comprehensive Partnership), South Korea (Cooperative Partnership) and Japan (Friendly Cooperative Partnership).

Since the beginning of this century, China has continued to form various types of Strategic Partnership, including with big countries like Brazil and small ones like Portugal. Among all these Partnerships/Strategic Partnerships, the most clearly defined was the Sino-Russian one, with the aims of creating a multipolar world, and more concrete cooperation in military affairs and tackling separatism and terrorism in Central Asia. In the first aspect, there is a true dimension of targeting at a third party (the US), though not in the alliance format. Sino-EU strategic partnership has not been defined clearly so far. This fact itself speaks for the inadequacy of it.

2.2. China-Europe: A Strategic Partnership yet to be realized

Judged from the criteria listed earlier, China-Europe relations meet the first three ones. This relationship is critical for both parties, and the evolution of it has significant impacts on the current world (the first—being critical), that is also why David Shambaugh termed the present China-Europe relations as an Axis, though not “Axis of Evil”. The important dimension of this relationship lies not only at present, but more on the potential. China is still not strong enough to be a full-fledged global player, and Europe is still not united sufficiently to be such either.

Then it is only natural that both seek long-term partnership between each other (the second—long term orientation). China and Europe do share some basic values concerning how the world should be organized, partly because China has become more and more confident in regional multilateral cooperation and appreciate
increasingly of multilateralism in international relations, and partly due to both parties want to play larger roles on the world stage. It is not multipolarity (how the world power structure is) but multilateralism (or how the globe should be governed) that partially puts them together. Concerning the convergence of value, there is a sharp distinction between Europe and China on how domestic society should be organized. The difference here is that Europe believes that both the international and domestic societies should be democratized, while China for the time being regards only the desirability of the former (here we are talking about the third criteria).

Though claimed by leaders of both sides to build bilateral relations on the basis of mutual equality, there is still insufficiency here, notably regarding the arms embargo issue. And this issue has much to do with divergent views between China and Europe regarding human rights (Chinese domestic political situation) and sovereignty (the Taiwan issue).

Judging from the four criteria, therefore, China-Europe relations are far short of the third, while also not satisfactory of the last. In contrast to its relations with the US, China acknowledges that its relationship with the EU is free of strategic competition and rivalry. As far as Beijing is concerned, EU-China relations are characterized by “steadiness” and “pragmatism”.

From the Chinese perspective, cooperation in jointly developing the Galileo satellite navigation system falls under the strategic partnership. Many Chinese authors and the Chinese government maintain that the partnership should also serve to promote “global multilateralism”, the “democratization of international relations” and what is being referred to as “global multipolarization”.

China appreciates Europe’s achievements with regard to political and economic integration, and acknowledges that some elements of EU-style integration, policies and strategies could be applicable in the Chinese and Asian context. In fact, China compares its own “peaceful rise” with the peaceful rise of the European Union, maintaining that the EU and China will become “global balancing forces” pursuing similar international policy strategies. China is also keen to secure market-economy status from the EU, arguing that the rising number of anti-dumping charges and cases against Chinese companies stands in the way of implementing a strategic partnership. More significantly, China sees the arms embargo issue as both out-dated and politically discriminated. A true strategic partnership would certainly be awkward with the arms embargo in place, which is now targeted at only very few countries.

2.3. China and Europe: Constructing Strategic Partnership

There are a lot need to be done before a true strategic partnership can be established between China and Europe.

The first is regarding the mutual expectation. A strategic partnership does not have to be based on targeting at a third party, like in the case of Sino-Russian strategic partnership when it was formed in 1996 (changed to a certain extent after Putin came to power, who is more realistic, and also the simultaneous change of attitudes in China). China has had too high expectation of Europe, especially in (earlier) promoting multipolarity, and (presently) opposing unilateralism.
Secondly, constructing the strategic partnership between China and Europe requires both parties to view the partnership more for their own term, the Chinese too high expectation on Europe with regard to the US, and Europe’s too much consideration of the US the other way round, are both not conducive to the construction of the partnership.

Lastly, regarding what concrete matter need to be done, the list of areas are as follows: mutually promoting global governance; enhancing economic and social sustainability; having dialogs on East Asian regional security and stability, and on the basis of all the above is promoting mutual understanding.

3. China and Europe in Africa

Here we need to distinguish between “good governance” and “effective governance”. The former is a value-based approach, and sometimes idealized, more in the case of modeling the democratic governance of Western democracies into all other countries. The foreign aid policies of Europe to Africa, to a large extent, reflect such a trend. The latter (effective governance) is an end-oriented approach. The Chinese engagement in Africa is a case here.

In foreign aid, China prefers much the language of mutually beneficial economic cooperation to that of “aid” or development assistance. Nevertheless, it does have a “Department of Foreign Aid” within the Ministry of Commerce, and each year the China Commerce Yearbook contains a very brief report from the Director General of this Department on “China’s Aid to Foreign Countries”. By contrast, the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation is concerned both with inward investment to China and with the role of China’s foreign direct investment overseas, especially engineering contracts, and with the role of China’s “labor cooperation”. Overall, the almost 1000-page annual volume from the Ministry of Commerce has very little that is explicitly on aid or what in OECD countries would be termed officially official development aid (ODA).

Thus, there are just two short paragraphs, which are specifically about “Aid to African Countries”, but those are, significantly, embedded in a report on “Economic and Trade Relations between China and African countries”. And this report is just one of a series of 14 reports on these same Economic and Trade Relations between China and different world regions or major countries. In other words, the language about aid is a very tiny element in a much more pervasive discourse about economic and trade cooperation and exchange.

However, when China does pronounce about development cooperation, it avoids the language of donor and recipient. Instead, the discourse has a strong emphasis on solidarity, deriving from a claim about China and Africa’s shared “developing country” status, and it is weathered by several decades of working together. The following, taken from the earlier Beijing declaration of 2000, produced by the first ministerial meeting of the forum on China-Africa Cooperation, typically affirms China’s preference for the language of South-South cooperation and symmetry: “We also emphasize that China and African countries are developing countries with common fundamental interests; and believe that close consultation between the two
sides on international affairs is of great importance to consolidating the solidarity among developing countries and facilitating the establishment of a new international order”.

From the perspectives of the African aid-recipient countries, this framing of language is felt comfort, since it probably gives an alternative to African countries, than the mere Western donation. The Chinese re-engagement with Africa is a result of growing national interests need and the pragmatic diplomacy. On how China is approaching Africa, current global economic power structure explains a lot. One of the greatest concerns for China in Africa is China’s increasing energy need. The existing global energy regime is largely designed by industrialized world and oil exporting countries. As a late-comer, China does not have sufficient sources of energy supply if it does not go to those so-called rogue states.

While taking care of its legitimate national interests needs, China does care about world peace and stability, and how unstable regions and countries could cause harm to them. At issue here is that while we all agree that poor performance in both economic and governmental aspects lead to the problems in Africa. The Chinese approach to Africa shows that China believes that the problem of Africa is more the lack of development than lack of better governance. Contrary to European approach is that Sino-African relations are not based on conditionalities, except for the Taiwan issue. Chinese workers build infrastructure for many African countries, and help African countries to develop their own manufacturing capacity.

China believes that with development more effective governance might follow, and when people are starving, it is too luxury to talk about good governance.
Bomb attacks on Bali, in the Philippines, in Madrid, in London have left hundreds dead and many more injured. The painful experiences of the Asian states and the European Union have taught them that no country can afford the illusion it is safe from international terrorism. It has become clear that we are facing an apparently faceless enemy who operates in small, but networked groups to achieve what he regards as exalted aims.

It will be difficult to defeat this enemy with armies and symmetrically conceived military strategies: the terror cells are too widely scattered, they operate too independently. A look at Afghanistan confirms the complexity of the situation. But we must not give into the misapprehension that there is nothing we can do about all this. What we need is a comprehensive, explicit security agenda that involves the European and Asian states equally.

Certainly, we have recognised this imperative. For some years now, there have been more parallels between Asia and the EU in the field of security policy, such as the ongoing efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the struggle against terrorism. Over time, the EU and the Asian states have established a range of cooperative arrangements that have markedly improved communication in the security field. At this point, I would like to particularly highlight the ASIA-EUROPE MEETING (or ASEM), which was set up in 1996 by Singapore with French support and now brings together 45 partners from Europe and Asia. At the expert level, there is lively dialogue on the fight against terrorism and action to combat cross-border crime. One positive example of this comprehensive sharing of knowledge in the field of security cooperation was the anti-terrorism conference held in Berlin in 2004. The ASEAN Regional Forum (or ARF), which was established in 1994 as a result of a decision taken by the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Bangkok, is the only permanent security forum for the Asia-Pacific region and also offers far-reaching opportunities in the security field, with strong involvement on the part of the EU. Personally, I regard the ARF as a significant form of cooperation, if one that requires further consolidation. Until now, as a result of its heterogeneous composition, it has not been in a position to act as a decision-making body responsible for security policy in the Asia-Pacific region, but it does offer the EU, in particular, a framework within which to canvass support for security policy concepts among its Asian partners. From the development of preventive diplomatic approaches and traditional confidence building measures to events that allow the ARF to learn from the OSCE’s experience – the Forum offers the EU a wealth of opportunities. This is one of the reasons why the German Federal Government has been so actively committed to its activities with the Forum over the years.

We can put it on the record: the forms of cooperation initiated by the Asian and European sides have proved their worth over the years. Bilateral relations have been deepened, partnerships strengthened, trust created. The fundamental thinking behind
these cooperative arrangements has been confirmed. But the global political situation has changed dramatically since the early days of these cooperative efforts. We might think of the attacks in New York and Washington, which filled the world’s television screens with images of international terror. We might think of the attacks on Bali, in the Philippines, in Madrid and London, which showed us that terror had reached Asia and Europe as well – and that it was not something that could be rooted out easily or quickly. The policy concerns and core themes addressed by these bodies must be adapted more effectively to the global situation and current security issues and concerns in Asia and Europe. Apart from the classic topics of arms limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation, this will involve action on issues that will be crucial in future, such as global climate change and energy supply. Only forward-looking planning and cooperation will enable us to avoid predatory and destructive international competition, economic catastrophes, global crises and political tensions that could even result in warfare.

Should the participating states prove incapable of dealing with these challenges, or unwilling to address them, the cooperative European-Asian security arrangements will become futile and insignificant. We are on the right path, a path that is worth pursuing further. But at a time when no country is immune from international terrorism and its attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, security policy considerations must play an even more prominent role in parallel to our economic activities. Trade agreements and a focus on shared economic interests are of immense importance. However, terrorist attacks and secretive nuclear weapons tests make it essential for us not to lose sight of our shared security objectives, but develop them further.

What are the EU’s concrete goals in this respect? In the autumn of last year, I had the honour to accompany the German Federal Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on a tour of the Central Asian republics. It became clear to me on this trip that Central Asia is growing into a region of immense strategic significance. Due particularly to their direct proximity to Afghanistan, the Central Asian states have become transit countries for opium and other drugs – and found themselves being turned into consumer countries as well. The smuggling of contraband goods, human trafficking and organised crime all have to be dealt with. Not only that, the Central Asian states are being targeted with Islamist ideas from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other countries. Nonetheless, they also represent a link between Europe and East Asia. Above all, this region possesses the greatest energy reserves in the world. However, there is as good as no cooperation between these countries; the conflicts between the oil and gas-producing states, on the one hand, and the states that control water resources, on the other, are increasing in severity. A stable Central Asia would have a massive impact throughout Asia. The “stan countries” could also take on a central role in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately the Central Asian states are still fundamentally unstable, and their understanding of basic democratic values is in its infancy.

Despite all the difficulties there, this trip strengthened the Federal Foreign Minister in his determination to carry on pressing for the EU to make a greater commitment in the region. In the months to come, the discussion process that has begun about a deepening of cooperation between the EU and Central Asia will be pushed ahead under the German EU Presidency. We must exploit this opportunity to support the
Central Asian countries on their way to democracy. In doing so, we must place them in a position to have a stabilising effect on a region that has been rocked by a series of crises. In this respect, we undoubtedly need the assistance of our Asian partners, China and India in particular. As the chairman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Friendship Group, I naturally have a particular interest in China’s role in the field of security policy. The good diplomatic relations between the EU and China that have now lasted for 30 years were underlined once more in December of last year: The conclusions of the Council of Ministers on the European Commission’s strategy paper Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities were published on 11 December 2006. The open tone of the communication, which gives an account of our successes, failings and common challenges, reflects the intensity of European-Chinese relations.

China’s extraordinary significance for Asian security policy is shown by the active, constructive role that Peking is playing in the talks set up to resolve the North Korean crisis. China’s mediating role in the six-party negotiations on North Korea will be of crucial significance for the region in future as well. It is not just the neighbouring Asian countries, but the whole world that is relying on China as a go-between in the nuclear dispute. Just like the EU, China has been stressing that Pyongyang should completely and verifiably renounce its nuclear programme. Without China’s influence, the problem would have the potential to escalate out of control. China is on the way to becoming a world power, politically and economically. Its key role in the North Korean crisis and increasing willingness to shoulder international responsibility, as in the negotiations with its partners about the Security Council resolutions on Iran and Lebanon, show the country’s growing status.

The EU appreciates the significance of European-Chinese relations. Nevertheless, the situation seems to be bogged down in some respects. To begin with, European-Asian relations were mainly economic in nature, shaped as they were by a wide variety of trade agreements, which established a basis of trust. However, this appeared to stagnate as soon as the political level was touched upon. With the elaboration of its Security Strategy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has grown into an important pillar of the EU, Europe has shown that, at the global level, it aspires to be perceived not just as an economic power, but above all as a political actor. This has enormous significance as far as its relations with China are concerned. Many questions that influence the security policy agenda there, such as non-proliferation and terrorism, affect us as well. But the EU must demonstrate its expertise in the field of security cooperation more clearly. It has to show the Chinese leadership that it can represent and defend European positions outside the economic domain as well. The European Council and the Commission must draw up a coherent policy towards China that does justice to the transatlantic context. We Germans will have to work on this over the next six months. For its part, China should signal to the Europeans that they are respected as security policy partners, and also allow European points of view to be incorporated into any decision-making processes that may take place. There will be plenty of opportunities for concerted action to reduce tension in Asia.

The crisis in North Korea is certainly not over. New tests are to be feared and the nuclear muscle flexing is continuing. It is doubtful whether Pyongyang would ever use the bomb against another country, and also whether it actually has the technology that would be needed to carry out such an operation.
We must pool our resources to prevent North Korea from being able to pass on even just parts of this technology to third parties. If terrorists were to gain possession of the bomb, attacks like those on Bali and in Madrid would not just be associated with memories of horrific crimes, but also with the agonising feeling that the wrong countermeasures had been taken. If this were to happen, every terrorist attack would truly be an attack on the whole of human civilisation.

Of course, China cannot cope with this situation alone, but needs the help and support of the other Asian countries, the EU and the United States. In this respect, bodies such as the ASEM and the ARF can serve as forums for discussion and dialogue. The example of North Korea clears once again that we cannot look at the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in isolation: the two issues go hand in hand and can only be controlled by means of consistent cooperation. This is not a question of constructing all-encompassing military alliances, but real security partnerships that will prove durable in future and can be continuously adjusted to take account of changing international realities. Both China and India must develop an awareness of their special position in this process. If they manage to get the Asian states together around one table with the Europeans and the Americans to draw up plans for sustainable security cooperation, they will be able to justify the increased and increasing significance of their role in political terms. They will be able to show that they have the capacity, and a desire, to take on responsibility for other states. Even though the new threats call on our attention, we have to be aware of the old, the continuing security problems. Among those are problems which automatically rise with the possession of weapons of mass destruction. These also affect the People’s Republic of China. Not only that China does possess nuclear weapons, but it continues to steadily modernise them, while developing more and more missile carrier-systems. Non-nuclear powers like the Federal Republic of Germany do expect the Chinese government to aggravate efforts to control and reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal. In addition, it would be considerably desirable if China chose to join the Ottawa-Treaty of a ban on anti-personnel mines. Precisely because China is a world power and a major player in the region, reservation in the military sector would be a constructive step towards the sedation of the international situation. Furthermore, this would take the wind out of the sails of the debate the USA has kicked off about involving NATO in Asian security policy in future. I think it would be fundamentally wrong for NATO to start taking action beyond its geographical area of operations. If China and India do more to live up to their shared responsibilities as regional policemen and mediators, ideas of this kind will become superfluous and unnecessary.

All of us here today are aware of the dangers we face from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Let us take advantage of the opportunities open to us and make a success of European-Asian security cooperation by strengthening existing institutions and constantly sharing new information and knowledge. We have an opportunity to work together to make this world a safer place. We should make the most of this opportunity – we have a duty to do so.
Chapter 1
Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Countries

Strategic approach needed to mend ties

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China-Japan relations are not only important to the two countries but have regional and global significance as well. It is therefore necessary to approach the China-Japan relationship from a strategic perspective. Asia and Northeast Asia in particular, is faced with traditional security threats more than other areas of the world, while it is also up against non-traditional security threats such as terrorism. The desperate acts of the secessionist elements in China's Taiwan Province, for example, could lead to military conflicts across the Taiwan Straits. The tension triggered by the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) could get out of control. China and Japan, in spite of their disputes and feuds, have common interests in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Straits, and a stable and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the increasing interdependence of the Chinese and Japanese economies is vitally important to promoting growth. China and Japan have different political systems and are hamstrung by problems such as the feud over the Diaoyu Islands and by historical issues. The terminology "historical issues" primarily refers to Japanese leaders paying homage to the Yasukuni Shrine where Japan's war dead, including 14 Class A war criminals, are honoured. It also refers to some Japanese efforts to whitewash militarists' war crimes. Some of the problems are left over by history and others have emerged recently as the relative strength of the two countries has grown and declined. All these problems are not expected to be settled in the short term. Acknowledging this reality, the two countries ought to seek co-operation in the political, economic and military fields, instead of confrontation, which would make both losers. It follows logically that the two nations establish a strategic relationship that benefits both.

Five factors are involved in introducing this kind of mutually beneficial strategic relationship. First, both countries should accurately define their strategic roles relative to each other. In the post-World War II years, Japan has stuck to a peaceful constitution, engaging in economic development and trying to steer clear of the old militarist road. Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, some Japanese politicians have begun to entertain dreams of big-power status, under the cover of being a "normal country." How to reap the biggest possible benefits from China's fast development and avoid negative impact also poses an important strategic task for Japan. Correctly defining each other's strategic role means that China and Japan should acknowledge each other's legitimate rights, refrain from challenging each other's core strategic interests and interfering in each other's internal affairs as well as strive to bring about a win-win situation for both countries in the bilateral and multi-lateral co-operative frameworks. Second, the two countries should get out of the historical shadows and look forward to the future. Friendship and co-operation
constitute the mainstream of the 2,000-year-old exchanges between China and Japan. The devastating war, which wrought havoc on both China and Japan, should be blamed on a handful of Japanese militarists, instead of the Japanese people. How to look at the crimes committed by the Japanese militarists during World War II goes beyond the area of Japan's internal affairs. Instead, it involves Japan's credibility among Asian countries and also whether or not Japan will move forward forever on the road of peaceful development. Japanese politicians, therefore, ought to settle this problem once and for all. China is pushing to resolve this question purely to use history as a mirror so that historical wrongs can be avoided in the future, with no intention to occupy a "moral high ground" or hold Japan's younger generation responsible for a war waged 60 years ago.

Third, what attitude should be adopted towards China's peaceful development and military modernization? Peaceful development is now China's basic national policy and the country is fulfilling its political pledges. As a responsible big country, China is supposed to make bigger contributions to the international community. This calls for strong military strength in keeping with the country's international standing as a big country. The physical military strength of a country is not a yardstick that can be used to judge whether or not this country poses a threat to others. The crux of the matter is its strategic intention and in which way it is going to use its military might. China's military strategy is defensive by nature and this strategy will remain in place forever. On the part of Japan, recognizing China's reasonable rights and refraining from crying about a "China threat" will help create a good climate for improving bilateral relations.

Fourth, the two countries should try to avoid being trapped in a box of mutual strategic rivalry. Japan has been the leader of the "V" formation of Asian countries since the Meiji Reform, which started in the late 1860s, maintaining substantial advantage over all others politically, economically and militarily. However, China's fast development over the last three decades and the rise of its international standing, have brought a sense of crisis to Japan. Japan feels that its own strategic space is being eroded and its role as leader threatened. It should be admitted that Japan's aid and help contributed substantially to China's rapid growth. Conversely, the high-speed development of the Chinese economy has also provided opportunities to Japan's economic recovery in recent years.

So the two economies are complementary to each other. Politically, there is no reason for the two nations to be necessarily counterposed to each other. The old mentality that "no rival tigers can exist in the same mountain" should be done away with and the two countries, in the course of promoting regional co-operation, should become the "twin engines" in powering the development of Northeast Asia. Fifth, bilateral exchanges should be conducted at various levels and between different social groups. Since Shinzo Abe became Japanese prime minister in September, Chinese President Hu Jintao has met with him twice, during Abe's China visit and at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum in Vietnam last month. This signals that bilateral relations are taking a turn for the better.
Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of South Asian Countries  
(Especially India)¹

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To analyze the regional security cooperation strategies of the South Asian Countries is an extremely easy task because one could end the discussion prematurely by simply asserting that no such strategies do in fact exist. In other words, there is no security cooperation in the South Asian region. In this paper, we will not be tempted to take this easy line of argument. Instead, we will develop four interconnected themes:

First, we will explore why South Asia does not cohere as a region by examining its internal configuration, specifically the poisonous India-Pakistan relationship.

Second, we will analyze how (and why) the countries of the region, even in the face of extra-regional involvement, do not share a common perception of external threats.

Third, we will study how India, as the regional power, could promote regional security cooperation in the future by focusing on non-traditional security issues such as pandemic control and disaster management, and thereby try to build regional cooperation around critical non-zero-sum issues.

Fourth, we will assess how India’s attempt to ‘break out’ of the South Asian straitjacket through both sub-regional (‘undercutting’) and continental (‘transcending’) strategies.

However, let us first be conceptually clear about what ‘regional security’ is.

Regional Security: A Hybrid Concept

It is clear that regional security involves more than merely situating national security within the regional context, i.e., relating the regional configuration of power to the national security problématiques of the states that constitute it. Rather, the location of security at the regional level does more than just create an intermediate level between international security and national security, for the simple reason that ‘security’ has very distinct meanings at the three levels. By ‘international security’ we conventionally mean the prevention of war, particularly systemic war, in the international system. ‘National security’, on the other hand, usually alludes to protection from existential threats, actual or potential, perceived or imagined. ‘Regional security’, it would appear, is a hybrid concept containing both meanings of security.

In other words, regional security simultaneously implies the absence of war within the region and the protection of the region from extra-regional threats. In that sense, the formation of a cohesive region requires not only the resolution of internal conflicts but also the binding influence of a common external threat. The European Union, product of Franco-German amity and the Soviet menace, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), resulting from the end of the Indonesia-Malaysia konfrontasi and the shared Chinese threat, are powerful empirical evidence in favor of this conceptual understanding of regional security.

It follows, therefore, that regional security has both an internal and external dimension. And thus, when studying a region, the following questions need to be asked: What is the geo-strategic configuration of each region? What is the distribution of power resources in each region? What are the historic patterns of amity and enmity (alliance structure) in each region? What is the history of extra-regional intervention in each region? In what ways has the regional configuration of power evolved? What is the respective level of regional cohesion? Does each region have an ongoing process of regional cooperation and integration? And how successful is this process? These regional characteristics are closely related to the attributes of power of each emerging power, as well as its policy perspective vis-à-vis its neighbors.

The Internal Dimension: No Regional Peace

The principal factor is any analysis of regional security must be the distribution of capabilities among the regional states. The leading state in a region – the regional power – can be expected to enjoy a position of primacy, dominance or supremacy within its region. Primacy suggests a situation of primus inter pares (first among equals); dominance suggests the lack of a convincing regional rival; and supremacy, the untrammeled ability to set the regional agenda. What is the position of India within South Asia?

Any calculus of relative power in a region should account for both military capability and socioeconomic levels, for the following reason. Military capability is zero-sum or negative-sum in nature, and therefore tends to be divisive at the regional level. Faced with the concentration of military power in a region, the weaker states seek to balance their powerful neighbor. Thus, analyzing the regional distribution of capabilities solely on the basis of military prowess creates a distorted picture of regional rupture. A high socioeconomic level, on the other hand, is attractive. Regional states tend to build links with a wealthy neighbor, which increases regional cohesion. While regional power, based on the distribution of military capabilities, is inherently divisive, regional leadership depends upon attracting the neighbors toward a cohesive regional project. As we will see, while India is clearly the regional power in South Asia, it does not enjoy leadership within its region.

India clearly dominates its region, but only in military terms. India’s population, GDP and military expenditure are three times larger than those of all its neighbors combined. Its military and paramilitary forces vastly outnumber those of its neighbors, as do the weapon systems and platforms in its arsenal. The only categories of weapons in which India is outgunned are armored personnel carriers and patrol and coastal vessels – a lack of numbers that is more than compensated by India’s crushing superiority in armored infantry fighting vehicles, capital ships and submarines.
However, India’s depressingly low socioeconomic level remains its Achilles’ heel. Despite its enormously larger land area, population and GDP, India’s GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, life expectancy figures and female adult illiteracy rate are similar to those of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal, and significantly worse than those of Sri Lanka and Maldives. India’s consistent socioeconomic under-performance, both in absolute and relative terms, explains why it does not enjoy regional supremacy: while none of its neighbors – not even Pakistan – can convincingly challenge India’s domination of South Asia, they are nevertheless unwilling to concede regional leadership to India. For the other countries in the region, the only factor in India’s favor is its size. This is true not only of elite opinion but also of public opinion in general: apart from democracy, there is no other attribute of India that is worth emulating. As the Indian economy grows and becomes a dynamic part of the global economy, close engagement with India is inevitably becoming a more attractive policy option for its regional neighbors.

Since the India-Pakistan war of 1971, which led to the creation of Bangladesh, South Asia as a region has remained prey to ‘structural insecurity’. The Indo-centric nature of South Asia is a fact of history and geography, a structural element that India cannot avoid and its neighbors cannot afford to ignore. Geographically, India forms the core of South Asia, and its neighbors, the periphery. India shares borders with each of the other countries in the region, while none of its neighbors share a land border with any South Asian country other than India. [The formal entry of Afghanistan into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) will, for the first time since 1971 – and perhaps since 1947 – bring into the region a country that does not share a border with India.] Indian military power in conventional terms far outweighs the collective power of all its regional neighbors. Thus, the only way the other countries of South Asia could contend with Indian power was by resorting to external balancing – seeking extra-regional intervention – which India resolutely opposes. Until Pakistan’s nuclear tests in June 1998, there seemed to be no way out of this security dilemma. However, by gaining strategic parity with India, Pakistan has shattered the structural insecurity that has plagued South Asia and opened the possibility of durable peace in the region.

India’s Relations with Pakistan

It is important to emphasize that India-Pakistan antagonism is distinct from the structural insecurity problem outlined above. India’s conflict with Pakistan has its roots in ideology and identity rather than in an asymmetry of power. Indeed, among important sections of the Pakistani policy elite, the obsession of parity with India – a country eight times larger than their own – has a certain hallucinatory quality. A central problem for India-Pakistan relations remains the ‘original sin’ of the ‘two nation theory’, a divisive ideology that conferred distinct national identities on Hindus and Muslims, thereby leading to the Partition of India and the foundation of Pakistan in 1947. While nuclearization gives Pakistan strategic parity with India and thereby security in perpetuity, it does not diminish the power asymmetry that exists between the two countries.

The configuration of relative power in South Asia in the post-Cold War period is characterized by Indian dominance, Pakistani defiance, and overt bilateral
nuclearization leading to strategic parity between the two. While India and Pakistan have officially been at peace since 1971, their armed forces continue to fight each other. In the Kashmir valley and further afield, Pakistan is pursuing a low cost, moderately effective strategy of supporting insurgent groups against New Delhi. India officially describes the Kashmir insurgency as ‘cross-border terrorism’, an epithet that successfully captures Pakistan’s role in organizing, arming and financing the insurgent groups but belies the endogenous reasons for widespread Kashmiri discontent.

A fundamental security problem that India currently confronts is the construction of a deterrence relationship with Pakistan. As states that have only very recently acquired overt nuclear weapons capability, both countries are still learning the basics of nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately, nuclear deterrence is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ business, in which all nuclear dyads are subject to the same systemic constraints and hence behave in similar if not identical ways. It makes much more sense to view each nuclear dyad as *sui generis* in which a deterrence relationship is created *ab initio*. In other words, the experience of others does not ultimately matter; instead, we have ‘learning by doing’. The military mobilization crisis of 2002 would indicate that both India and Pakistan are on a steep learning curve when it comes to building a robust deterrence relationship, which must necessarily be based on the notion of partnership with the adversary to prevent and manage conflict. As an indispensable starting point, nuclear risk-reduction measures (NRRMs) and direct communications between the national command authorities are urgently needed. Unfortunately, Pakistan has tended to drag its feet on this issue, since a larger nuclear ‘comfort zone’ for India is understandably not in Pakistan’s interest. This would suggest that as long as Pakistani policy is predicated on nuclear compellence (leveraging its nuclear capability to ‘internationalize’ Kashmir in order to force a settlement upon India), a stable deterrence relationship is unlikely to emerge between the two states.

It is undoubtedly true that Pakistani insecurity, *vis-à-vis* India, lies at the heart of the regional security *problématique* in South Asia. However, a more secure Pakistan is a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for durable peace in South Asia. Without going into further details, we can list some of the other factors standing in the way of regional peace:

1. Religious radicalization: Throughout South Asia, there are clear signs that radical ideas are permeating religious groups, often on the lines of inter-generational cleavages. This phenomenon is most pronounced in Islamic communities, but is present in all religions. For instance, the ‘Talibanization’ of Bangladesh, however exaggerated, has become a pressing concern for India.
2. Ethnic self-determination movements: All the countries of South Asia face centrifugal and fissiparous tendencies, often as a result of years of misgovernment and maladministration. Often, neighboring countries have played a role in establishing and supporting these movements. A prime example is the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) group in Sri Lanka, which was first supported and later combatted by India.
3. Ideological violence: Although some variant of democracy is now seen as the best form of government across most of the globe, many South Asian countries – perhaps because they lack democracy – still suffer from the violence of groups wishing to overthrow the state for ideological reasons. The Maoist movement in Nepal is an excellent example. Again, the linkages between Nepal’s Maoists and India’s many Naxalite groups in self-evident and has huge security implications.
What seems notable regarding the above list is the extent to which these security concerns, although supposedly internal, have pronounced cross-border linkages and thereby involves the neighboring countries. While India has a multitude of internal security concerns of its own, its central location in the region ensures that it cannot isolate itself from the spillover effects and explicit linkages that arise from the internal security challenges of its neighbors. Finally, it is also worth noting that there is little or no security cooperation between the countries of South Asia to deal with these security threats, challenges and concerns.

The External Dimension: No Regional Cohesion

A common identity emerges out of a sense of sharing – of victories, defeats and, most importantly, vulnerabilities. As we have seen in the last section, South Asia is hopelessly divided internally. Nevertheless, as soon as South Asians travel outside their own region, they instantly identify with one another and are likewise identified as being together by others. It is the common experience of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans and Nepalis to be identified as ‘Indians’ in New York, Nagoya and Nairobi. Similarly, any South Asian subjected to racial attack in the UK has the epithet ‘Paki’ hurled at them. Why does this experience at the human level not coalesce into a shared regional feeling – a South Asian identity – at the political level?

A simple answer to this profound question is that throughout the history of South Asia, internal differences have always been more important than external threats. The history of how European powers slowly colonized the Indian subcontinent is a tale of neighbor betraying neighbor. Yet this is an unsatisfactory explanation because it is based on some supposedly South Asian cultural attributes. The fact that power in Europe was divided among a host of sovereign territorial states since the Peace of Westphalia did not stand in the way of eventual European Union.

Perhaps a more convincing explanation lies in the early days of South Asia after the withdrawal of British colonial presence. It is likely that the Partition of India introduced a zero-sum political logic in the way the two successor states to British India, India and Pakistan, viewed the external world. The fact is that no external presence in the region was ever perceived by either state in similar terms:

1. Immediately after the victory of the People’s Revolution in China, India tried to build strong ties with the Chinese Communist leadership while Pakistan was drawn into the US alliance structure to contain the Soviet Union and the PRC. India viewed the US alliance structure as a threat to the region, a perspective that Pakistan, as a US ally, obviously did not share.

2. Later, as India’s relations with China deteriorated, leading to the border war of 1962 between the two Asian giants, Pakistan’s relations with China improved dramatically, culminating in the ‘all-weather friendship’ between Beijing and Islamabad. Pakistan was one of the few countries with which China maintained close diplomatic and political relations even during the Cultural Revolution period.

3. After the Sino-Soviet rift, India moved to cement its relations with Moscow, over time becoming a close friend of the Soviet Union. After the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, the two countries became virtual allies. Although the Indian leadership was greatly perturbed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, India did not oppose the invasion.
publicly. Pakistan meanwhile became the frontline state through which the US and other Western powers funneled billions of dollars to the anti-Soviet mujahideen. Thus, even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not seen in South Asia as an external threat shared by the entire region.

4. After the 9/11 attacks upon the US, Pakistan – after a brief moment of hesitation – chose once again to become a frontline state and partner of the US, this time against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Ostensibly, both India and Pakistan have been on the same side of the ‘Global War on Terror’ since 2001. In reality, they are deeply suspicious of each other. Thus, a cohesive South Asian view has once again not evolved.

From the analysis above it should be clear that the countries of South Asia – or, at any rate, India and Pakistan – have never viewed an external presence in the region in even slightly similar ways. This is principally because the cardinal relationship in the region is still driven by a zero-sum perception. However, another factor of importance is that it isn’t always easy to identify an ‘external presence’. In particular, is China extra-regional in the South Asian context or not?

Clearly, China is not a part of South Asia; the Himalayas have for five millenia defined the northern limits of the region. Nevertheless, China is a critical element in South Asian regional security. Geo-strategically, China is at the very heart of Asia. Indeed, China defines Asia; there can be no Asia without China. Thus, any geo-strategic (as opposed to merely geographic) definition of South Asia must necessarily include China.

Viewed from New Delhi, in particular, this is a totally defensible proposition. China is a country against which India has fought – and lost – a war in 1962. Nearly half a million Indian soldiers are deployed on India’s disputed northern border with China. Indian policymakers have repeatedly expressed their concern about nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan. However, many analysts of South Asia persistently ignore the ‘China factor’ in India’s security planning, and continue to draw a spurious and artificial equation only between India and Pakistan. India, with a population of 1.1 billion, is nearly 85 per cent of China’s size (population of 1.3 billion) and eight times larger than Pakistan (population of 147 million). Nevertheless, India’s attempt to contend with China is seen as hopelessly ambitious, while Pakistan’s determination to match India step-for-step is seen as perfectly natural. This flawed perception of an India-Pakistan equation lies at the root of the security problematic in South Asia.

The basic points being made in this section and the previous one are hopefully clear. As a region, South Asia is neither peaceful internally nor cohesive externally. Or to put the matter even more pointedly, India as the regional power has not been able to pacify its region nor make it cohere.

The Cooperative Potential of Pandemics and Earthquakes

If regional security cooperation in the traditional sphere of state-centric military security seems impossible in South Asia, what is the way forward for India’s regional security policy? In this context, two very different possibilities open up. The first, which we will highlight in this section, relates to new issues: India could begin to
emphasize the importance of ‘non-traditional’ threats and try to create new and distinct arenas for regional security cooperation. This would involve focusing exclusively on non-zero-sum issues at the regional level, thereby setting aside divisive zero-sum security issues for resolution at the bilateral level. Such a development could take the following forms:

1. India could play a proactive role in setting up regional pandemic control initiatives. During the SARS crisis, the SAARC countries had, on the initiative of Maldives, discussed ways to tackle the potential epidemic cooperatively. During the Avian Flu crisis, not much happened at the regional level. India should not wait for the next potential epidemic to emerge, nor should it rely on one of the smaller neighbors to initiate regional cooperation. India has the infrastructure and resources to set up regional epidemic crisis centers.

2. India is itself beset with a major epidemic crisis. Over a period of 17 years, India’s HIV-infected population has shot up from two persons to 5.1 million. According to official figures, which for methodological reasons almost certainly underestimate the problem, nearly one per cent of India’s adult population is now carrying the deadly virus, according to official sources. While India’s HIV/AIDS infection rate has perhaps not yet reached the statistically and epidemiologically important one per cent mark among the general population, some Indian cities and regions are already reporting more than five per cent infection rates. It is therefore extremely important for India to set up regional cooperation mechanisms to combat HIV/AIDS through programs of prevention and prophylactics.

3. Indian naval vessels played an enormously important humanitarian role during the December 2004 Asian tsunami, especially off Sri Lanka and Indonesia. During the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, India opened up several points along the Line of Control (LoC) to pass on relief materials to the Pakistani side of the LoC. India even offered Pakistan its military helicopters for search and rescue (SAR) missions, an offer that Pakistan eventually turned down. India is in the process of setting up a regional disaster management and preparedness centre in which regular region-wide training courses are planned.

Thus, one way in which India could promote regional security cooperation in South Asia would be to focus on the non-traditional areas highlighted above. However, it must also be recognized that India is losing patience with the zero-sum dynamics in South Asia and is seeking to define new regional frameworks in which it can function more effectively.

The Subversive Possibility of Discovering Other Regions

Frustrated with the lack of progress in SAARC, India is now seeking to ‘break out’ of its region. This is happening at several levels simultaneously:

1. India is emphasizing the bilateral cooperation route; the most significant example is the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA). This is much more than an economic agreement; it underscores Sri Lanka’s high ‘comfort level’ vis-à-vis its much larger neighbor. A fundamental basis on ISLFTA is security: the Sri Lankan political establishment has come to realize that India is in fact the most important guarantor that the Tamil Tigers will not be able to establish a breakaway state in northern Sri Lanka.
2. India has begun to focus on sub-regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) initiative.
3. India has started to explore the notion of an ‘extended neighborhood’ that includes Central Asia and Southeast Asia; in naval terms, a strategic perimeter that extends from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca. Afghanistan’s membership of SAARC is a sign that India’s neighborhood is indeed being extended beyond its traditional South Asian neighbors.
4. India is beginning to emerge as a factor and player in continental (pan-Asian) contexts. Its participation in the East Asian Summit is evidence that this is perhaps inevitable over time, particularly if India is able to reach sustained annual 10 per cent growth.

Given the above, it is more than likely that India could try to find a new regional framework for itself. This would involve a new emphasis on sub-regional security cooperation as well as super-regional (i.e., pan-Asian) security cooperation. Although this idea may seem speculative at first glance, India is in fact already beginning to move in both directions at once.

Firstly, India is now trying to undercut South Asia, a regional frame of reference in which it has encountered only stubborn hostility not only from its most important neighbors, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but also from its smaller neighbors. India is now putting considerable diplomatic energy into sub-regional initiatives, of which BIMSTEC is perhaps the most important because it involves Thailand and Myanmar, thereby giving India an access into Southeast Asian developments and ASEAN dynamics. MGC is important because it potentially links India not only to peninsular Southeast Asia but also to Yunnan province of China. However, it currently seems that MGC has currently taken a backseat to the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-financed Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), which does not include India.

However, even more exciting is the game that is opening up for India at the pan-Asian scale. This is a development that would permit India to transcend South Asia. Slowly but surely, the map of Asia is changing. For perhaps the first time in Asian history, and certainly for the first time since European colonialism, a security architecture that is continent-wide in character is finally arriving in the Asia-Pacific. This continent-wide security interdependence is linked quite clearly to the rise of China. In other words, China is converting Asia into a region: if a rising China didn’t exist, there would be no Asia – in geopolitical terms.

How will the rest of Asia – and India in particular – respond to the rise of China? China is working hard to signal to its neighbors that its rise is ‘peaceful,’ the odyssey of a large country on the road to development rather than the onward march of a rising power. Would China succeed in convincing its neighbors that its rise is not the twenty-first century version of Wilhelmine Germany seeking its place in the sun? That would depend not only on China’s behavior, but also on how countries like the US, Japan, India (and Indonesia, Vietnam and Australia) respond to China’s rise.

But should we even analyze Asian responses to China’s rise in balancing terms? Many Asian scholars, such as Kishore Mahbubani, argue that Europe’s past will not be Asia’s future: the rise of China would merely indicate reversion to a pre-modern and
pre-European Asian order based on notions of hierarchy and tributary relationship with China that all Asians recognize and understand. If deep historical memory of Chinese ascendance truly exists in much of Asia, India does not share that memory: the Himalayas stood in the way. Between the world historic transmission of Buddhism from India to China and the planting of tea in the Himalayan foothills, interaction between China and India was sparse across the centuries, limited largely to merchant caravans, itinerant pilgrims and cultural miscegenation in Indo-China. China and India met when Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru met; in other words, the first real encounter between the two countries was as sovereign territorial postcolonial states.

Thus, Asia does have to take a cue from the historical processes that over time wrought a region out of the European continent. Without aping or mimicking Europe, what can we learn from European history that is relevant to Asia? Three moments in European history are interesting: the Peace of Westphalia, the Congress of Vienna and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Helsinki. Broadly speaking, three security futures could be envisaged for Asia: a region of opposing axes and balances (the logic of Westphalia), a region managed by a directoire of great powers (a la the Concert of Europe that emerged from the Congress of Vienna), or a region enmeshed in a cooperative security arrangement (the Helsinki process).

The political logic of realism, with its power balances and security dilemmas, continues to drive inter-state politics in large parts of Asia. Two opposing axes of power in Asia would emerge due to the rise of China and American attempts to contain Chinese power. We can be reasonably certain about New Delhi’s policy preferences regarding a possible Washington-Beijing bipolarity in the future. India will not be drawn into the containment of China. The principal reason is that India is too large to be a member of America’s security community. Also, it’s a security community that has not considered India’s security interests as its own interests. Thus, there is a great deal of asymmetry in the way the security community of the liberal democracies continues to treat India. But India will not become a party to an Asian alliance against the West, for the simple reason that such an axis would be led by China. India is unlikely to trade in American global hegemony for Chinese continental hegemony.

Thus, if an Asian security architecture of opposing axes were to emerge, we can foresee a new non-alignment for India. India would be a fence sitter; let us remember that India is good at fence sitting. However, this new nonalignment would be much more difficult than the first round of non-alignment was for India. One of the poles of the new bipolar order, China, would be a neighbor with which India shares a huge and as yet unresolved border. Also, fence sitting is going to be very difficult for New Delhi to pull off this time, for the simple reason that India, like China and the US, would also have system shaping capabilities. India would be too big to hide but not sufficiently powerful to transcend, unwilling to bandwagon with China but also unwilling to get involved in the American balancing game. Thus, there are compelling reasons why an Asia of opposing axes and balances is going to be bad news for India. If that shape of Asia does emerge, India will once again be not just on the fence, but on the sidelines.

The second future is of India as member of the board, the future directoire in Asia. The essential notion in this scenario is of a few leading states together taking
responsibility for order and stability in the Asia-Pacific. One the face of it, this is an eminently sensible idea, but there are three serious problems with it. The first problem with a directoire is that it either ‘freezes up’ the security architecture in a manner that does not reflect dynamic changes in capabilities and interests, or alternately that it gets divided internally on the question of change versus stability. Secondly, if the directoire is constructed minus the United States, it would effectively be an anti-US axis led by China, an outcome that India would be very hesitant about. There is, however, a third problem with the directoire, and this flows out from India’s own experience in South Asia. Smaller states in this period of world history are autonomous actors, much more so than they were in nineteenth century Europe. We should therefore problematize the entire notion that there can be a directoire in the Asia-Pacific.

What’s the third future for Asia? India’s global role in the third Asian future would be as the designer of the next generation of hardware and software, or as the architect of the new Asian security architecture. We can also conceive of a cooperative security arrangement in Asia: an Asian Helsinki process. Obviously, an Asian Helsinki process coming into being would depend crucially on China, which has the capacity to either make or break the process. While there could be no Helsinki process on the Asian landmass without China, India could play a very important role in signaling and nudging China in that direction. Indeed, in the years to come we may well find China well disposed towards an Asian Helsinki process, particularly if the only option is bipolarity and containment.

As was the case in the first two security architectures, Asia has a lot to gain from the experience of Europe in constructing a cooperative security arrangement. The Helsinki process had many ‘baskets’ of issues, some pertaining to inter-state relations, other to matters within sovereign boundaries. Thus, mutual and balanced force reductions and concerns about human rights violations were both a part of the Helsinki process. In Asia, it is easy to see that the internal aspect of the Helsinki process may be considerably less acceptable to Asian states than it was even to the states of eastern and central Europe. This is for two reasons. First, the states of Asia are, with some notable exceptions, young states, many of them postcolonial. Thus, these states are likely to guard their sovereignty with far greater zeal than did the long consolidated and somewhat tired states of Europe. Secondly, it is argued in some quarters than Asian cultures privilege the group over the individual, order over liberty and obligations over rights. While the latter argument is clearly a contentious one, we should not be surprised if many states in Asia resist the intrusive nature of the Helsinki process in what they regard as their ‘internal affairs’.

Constructing an Asian Helsinki process is not going to be easy, but neither was the original Helsinki process. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) today is the end point of a long-drawn, contentious and tortuous process. There is no reason to assume that the construction of a cooperative security arrangement in Asia is going to be any easier. However, it would be well worth the effort. It would reduce the size of arsenals in Asia. It would enmesh American and Chinese, as also Indian and Japanese, capabilities in Asia within a larger cooperative process. Over time, it would lead, perhaps, to the evolution of a new and authentic Asian identity. It would build habits of cooperative behavior on the Asian continent. Clearly, there is a lot riding in a possible reconfiguration of Asia over time in a more
cooperative structure. This process could unfold over a ten to fifteen year time horizon. Since this would be the time period in which US capabilities would probably be beginning to decline in relative terms, it would therefore be an opportune moment in which to actually imagine the US getting enmeshed in this new cooperative security process. By building robust political and economic links with both China and the US, India could end up playing an important catalytic role in bringing both countries together in a new cooperative Asia.
Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Western European Countries (Germany, France and the U.K.)

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I. The Europeanisation of Security

- Western Europe has a very long tradition of security cooperation that started in the late 1940s with the creation of the Western European Union (WEU, 1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1949). However, up to the end of the Cold War period, security cooperation in Western Europe was a transatlantic project, not a European one. This is also underlined by the fact that the European Union (as the core institution of political cooperation/integration in Europe) did not have a security or defense policy dimension until the end of the 1990s (though the ‘peace project’ of European integration was always very much about security – e.g. reconciliation of Western Europe after WWII and stabilisation of the “Wider Europe” after 1989 via EU Eastern enlargement).

- Yet, since the mid 1990s there is a strong and growing trend towards the Europeanisation of security and security cooperation. 1993: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established as the second pillar of the EU, with the stated objectives (amongst others) “to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways” and “to preserve peace and strengthen international security”. Yet, CFSP still missed distinct security capabilities and institutions. 1997: Institutional consolidation of CFSP by establishment of a High Representative for CFSP and the Policy Planning and Early Warning unit (Political Unit); Integration of the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) in the EU treaty. 1998: British-French declaration (St. Malo declaration): “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” => break-through for project of independent and operational European security cooperation

1999: European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) established within the CFSP framework. Adoption of military and civilian “Headline Goals” (capability objectives). 2003: first ESDP missions in Bosnia and Hercegovina (police), Macedonia (military), and Congo (military). Adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS). Up to today 16 crisis management/peace-keeping missions on three continents have been carried out under the ESDP framework.

- Though security cooperation came last in the European integration project it is now the most dynamic field of EU integration and one of the few areas where there is still significant progress despite the crisis of integration since the failed Constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands.

II. Where does the drive towards Europeanisation result from?

- In order to understand the process of Europeanisation in security one should look at Europe’s “Big Three” (UK, F, D) and the changes in their respective regional
security cooperation strategies - because without these three assenting, there is no progress in European security cooperation; and also because the way these three actors adapted their cooperation strategies explains some of the characteristics of present European security project.

- However, one should also note that the Europeanisation of security has been so far more a re-active than a pro-active process. That means, the main driving forces behind this process originated from outside the “Big Three” and the EU in general. Two factors can be seen as key drivers:
  
  - Political focus of US in security increasingly shifting away from Europe and NATO in the Post-Cold-War world (emerging new powers; “axis of evil”; asymmetric threats). Threat of being sidelined by the US as a strategic partner in security because of a growing capabilities gap (resulting in interoperability problems).
  
  - The Balkan wars show European inability to manage security on their own as long as Europe lacks an autonomous military and institutional capacity for regional security cooperation.

- This resulted in a growing determination on the part of European Member States to take responsibility for European security and to develop a distinct European competence and capacity in security.

- This determination lead to some modifications in the cooperation strategies of France and Germany.

  - Germany and France have been both been long-time promoters of security policy integration within the EU framework. However, their resolve did not originate so much from a security but rather an integration argument. The integration of security and defence was considered as a/the crucial step towards a “Political Union” (and thus as the realisation of the federalist conception of European integration).
  
  - With ESDP France and Germany modifized their strategies in so far as they compromised on the integration agenda (ESDP as an intergovernmental not supranational project).

- Moreover, Europeanisation means an important strategic shift in the UK regional security cooperation strategy.

  - Unlike France and Germany, the UK traditionally rejected security policy integration within the EU because of fear of institutional competition with NATO and its strict opposition to the idea of a “Political Union”. St. Malo can thus be seen as a real turning point in the UK’s security cooperation strategy.
  
  - Still, the UK was only agreeing to ESDP on 3 preconditions: 1. ESDP must remain strictly intergovernmental; 2. ESDP must be compatible with NATO and 3. ESDP must be based on ‘credible’ military capabilities (thus also hoping to foster the process of military transformation in Europe the US had been demanding for years). Though EU security policy institutions and structures have developed considerably since St. Malo, these conditions are still valid and mark the character of ESDP to the present.

### III. Common Principles of European Security Policy

The process of Europeanisation does not necessarily suggest a comprehensive synchronization of security policy principles and strategies in Europe. Up to now, important differences in between the various national security cultures remain. Looking at core documents of European security policy (above all the European Security Strategy) as well as ESDP policies on the ground, a certain set of common principles in European security policy can be distinguished.

**EU as a global security actor**

- A key message of the European Security Strategy (2003) is that the EU has to
be ‘ready to share in the responsibility for global security’ – however, these global ambitions are still a very recent trend in European security (the original conception of ESDP was geographically much more limited). If the EU can really live up to this ambition remains to be seen.

Integrating ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power

- At the heart of the European approach to security lies the idea of combining a broad range of external policies and integrating them under a common security agenda. This approach goes far beyond the politico-military dimension of security, yet military instruments still play an important role. The strive for integrating ‘hard’ and ‘soft power’ follows not only from the analysis of threats and risks (particularly European awareness of the ‘inherently multidimensional nature of security itself’) but also from the perception that the comprehensive approach to security is an ‘added value’ of the EU.

Effective multilateralism as a security policy principle

- The commitment to multilateralism, international law and cooperation is a traditional tenet of EU policy. The United Nations and specifically the UN Security Council are at the centre of the European vision of an effective multilateral world order, but other elements like the transatlantic relationship and regional organisations are also important elements. The firm European commitment to multilateralism is the one aspect that most clearly distinguishes the European from the US security strategy. This three principles can be seen as the first elements of an emerging European “security culture”. However, the fundament of this common security culture is still rather fragile (as seen in the Iraq war). The gradual development of a coherent European “security culture” will be the great challenge of the coming years and decades.

IV. Towards a Common Security Policy in Europe – Problems and Debates ahead

On the path towards a truly common security policy in Europe, important challenges and unresolved questions remain.

- Institutional challenges: Due to the fragmented nature of the institutional structure, EU security policy is often incoherent. The intergovernmental nature of ESDP makes decision-making a cumbersome process (with now 27 veto players involved). Furthermore, the democratic legitimacy of European security policy is weak, particularly in terms of parliamentary participation and control.

- Capability gaps: Capabilities are seen as a further serious weak point of European security policy. The EU has a wide range of civilian capabilities at its disposal, but is still seen as a politico-military ‘dwarf’. Due to capability deficiencies in strategic airlift, command and control systems and intelligence, the EU has no real strategic autonomy but will continue to depend for the foreseeable future on third party assistance and/or cooperation.

- The unresolved strategic and political nature of the European security project: What is the European security project about? Europeanist v. Atlanticist concepts of European security cooperation. Is European security cooperation about enhancing the European capacity as a “strategic partner” of the US (including a more equal balancing of “rights and duties” within the transatlantic security partnership) or about gaining “strategic autonomy” (possibly developing into a “counter-balance” to US dominance in security)?

ESDP as a selective or a collective security project: What is the strategic rational behind ESDP? Is European security policy primarily directed at defending the
European homeland or rather at securing international peace and order?

Concerning these conceptional questions the answers still differ widely within Europe, not only in between but also within Member States. The Europeanisation of security constitutes one of the most decisive political developments in Europe. However, there are still important limits to the European security project, in terms of institutions and capabilities but, above all, in terms of the political and strategic identity of European security policy.
The European Union as a Security Actor
The Polish Perspective

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Introduction
Since Poland embarked on the road to EU membership both the international environment and the EU have been transformed. One of the most profound and far-reaching aspects of this transformation has been the emergence of the EU as a security actor. Since the initial articulation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht in 1992, to the St. Malo declaration of 1998, which gave rise to ESDP, through to the launch of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, the EU's aspirations to become a serious security actor have grown. For Poland such developments have not always been easy to digest. Described as ‘idyllic’ and unproblematic in the run up to EU accession¹, the CFSP chapter was closed relatively quickly and easily with all East Central European states, including Poland, principally because it involved mostly ‘rhetoric’ and not much ‘action’ and because of this attracted little controversy when compared with much thornier accession issues such as agriculture and EU structural funds.² However, towards the end of the 1990s the foreign policy role of the EU entered a period of change and diversification in response to various external and internal impulses and challenges, rendering CFSP a far more complex and contentious issue in the context of enlargement.

As a large state, since gaining independence in 1989 and acquiring NATO membership in 1999, Poland has consistently demonstrated that it will not be a bystander in matters relating to Euro-Atlantic security, but will seek to influence and shape institutions and policies as an ‘agenda setter’. In essence, Poland wants to be taken seriously as a middle-sized power with significant global as well as regional interests and to stand out from the rest of the new EU member states. To this end, as well as supporting US policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Warsaw has been a keen contributor to collective peacekeeping missions beyond Europe’s borders. Poland has also sought to play the role of ‘regional leader’ by acting as chief advocate of reforms in Eastern Europe and particularly in support of Ukraine’s anchorage in the West, including its membership in the WTO, European Union and NATO.³ Finally, unlike most other EU newcomers, who reformed their defence sectors to develop niche specialisations, Poland has sought to maintain a large armed force equipped with wide ranging military capacities.⁴

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¹ Jean-Luc Dehaene and Pal Dunay (2001) ‘Boxes: Why CFSP and CESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries’ Policy Papers, RSC No.01/5 p.11
Poland’s ambitious outlook and approach has been particularly marked in the context of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy, an area where Poland, like other East Central European states, responded ‘late and defensively’.¹ In the early stages of ESDP development and prior to EU enlargement in 2004, Poland’s policy was preoccupied with overcoming its status as an 'outsider', but was also and because of its Atlanticism, overtly sceptical towards the ESDP project. Thus whilst Warsaw strived to enter the decision making realm and to lead the other non-EU NATO member states in this pursuit, Polish policy remained overall less than enthusiastic about ESDP. Consequently, every opportunity was used to stress that the EU’s efforts should be limited and should not seek to duplicate or negate the alliance’s pre- eminent role.

Like other East Central European states, Poland saw the functions of NATO and the EU and their integration into them in rather conservative and rigid terms or in discrete ‘boxes’, moreover, the United States was regarded as the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s security. In one ‘box’ NATO performed the task of delivering the all-important hard-security guarantees; whilst in another ‘box’ the EU was about broader political, social and economic issues.² In this context Poland was not inspired when the functions of the EU began to transform, and as it seemed, to encroach negatively upon the remit of the Alliance. At the same time, however, with EU enlargement on the horizon, Poland and the other soon to be member states did not want to be in a position where they were seen to overly critical of ESDP and challenge the EU head on and thus tried to steer the evolution of ESDP according to their Atlanticist preferences.³

This overall scepticism and rigid conception of the EU's role, was, however, about to change due to a combination of factors. As this chapter will show, whilst the goal of limiting the scope of ESDP certainly led Warsaw’s policy up until 2003 and arguably remains still true to some degree, the experience of Iraq and its aftermath, coupled with Poland’s entry into the EU has given way to a palpably more positive approach to ESDP. In retrospect, this evolution saw Poland's Iraqi policy as a high point or 'crossroads' in Polish Atlanticism.⁴ After that a reappraisal occurred, which led in Warsaw, like in most other European capitals to a willingness to improve Europe's collective capacities and voice in security matters. This is not to say that Poland's Atlanticism was abandoned as a result of EU membership and Iraq, as was arguably the case in Spain after the election, but rather that by 2004 it became tempered with Warsaw beginning to accept the idea of an autonomous ESDP of sorts with a constructive role in it for Poland.

Exclusion Fuelling Scepticism: Poland and ESDP 1998-2003

Being part of the first wave of NATO’s eastern enlargement in March 1999, and having previously secured the status of associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), it seemed that the days of Poland’s exclusion from core decisions

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² Jean-Luc Dehaene and Pal Dunay (2001) ‘Boxes: Why CFSP and CESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries’ Policy Papers, RSC No.01/5
³ Jean-Luc Dehaene and Pal Dunay (2001) ibid. p.20
⁴ Olaf Osica (2002) Defence Studies Vol.2 No.2
concerning European security were finally over. However, only three months later it appeared that this was about to be reversed when, against the backdrop of war in Kosovo and building upon earlier blueprints set out at Portsatch and St Malo, the Cologne European Council articulated plans to create an autonomous European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) as the military arm of the CFSP.1

In its initial design, ESDP would have left the non-EU European NATO states, like Poland, 'consulted' but essentially excluded from the decision-making process.2 Warsaw simply did not like these kinds of ideas emerging during the German EU presidency, and was not at all shy to say so. The Polish response was, unsurprisingly, agitated and unconvinced echoing the kind of concerns voiced by the Clinton administration and the so-called ‘three D’s’.3 For Poland, any attempt to strengthen Europe's capacities in this field should be aimed at reinforcing the transatlantic link and America's presence in Europe, in short, bolstering NATO's pivotal role. Some Polish commentators went as far as arguing that the ESDP would lead to America's withdrawal from Europe and would ignite the return of inter-war instability to the continent.4 Warsaw's reservation about ESDP at this time derived from two main concerns. First, like Washington, Warsaw argued that Europeans should develop their defence capabilities within NATO's existing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), otherwise the EU would simply be duplicating existing structures, which would weaken the alliance. Second, Warsaw argued that ESDP would be too exclusive and discriminatory, since those states which were currently not EU members, but already in NATO would be left out.5 Despite protestations from Warsaw and other non-EU capitals especially Ankara, the EU pressed ahead and in Helsinki in December the 'headline goals' for the creation of a 50-60,000-strong rapid reaction force to carry out EU-led Petersberg tasks were outlined.6

Whilst Helsinki marked considerable progress in the realisation of the EU's security ambitions, it also served to exacerbate the concerns of the non-EU European NATO members. Although the summit's conclusion stressed that the so called 'six' would be able to contribute militarily to EU crisis management missions, and indeed a number of them, including Poland did decide to dedicate troops to the headline goals, the formula lacked any real decision-making implications, kept the 'six' at a distance and was consequently viewed as inadequate. Furthermore, the summit essentially failed to differentiate between the six and other 'interested states', including Russia and Ukraine. The notion that Russia should have an equal say in European security affairs was clearly always going to be unacceptable to the Poles and other former Soviet satellite states. Not only, therefore, were Polish fears of exclusion seemingly

2 Poland, Turkey, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia
3 The concerns of the Clinton administration were communicated in the notion of ‘no decoupling’, ‘no duplication’ and ‘no discrimination’.
4 Jan Nowak-Jezioranski,‘Czy NATO jest zagrozone’, Rzeczpospolita,15.05.2001
confirmed in the Helsinki configuration, but also the wording of the Presidency's conclusions gave rise to speculation that ESDP could become a platform for Russia's influence in European security.¹ Such concerns were apparent in the negative Polish responses to ESDP developments. Polish Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz criticised the EU plan as unclear and lacking in military and operational viability,² whilst in his annual address of Parliament, foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek expressed disappointment with the EU for effectively excluding the six from core ESDP decision-making mechanisms. Geremek also called for a further strengthening of transatlantic ties, for which purpose, he argued, Europeans should concentrate on the actual 'requirements of security' rather than on creating new institutions.³ A similar criticism came from the Polish military which assessed the EU's plans to create a rapid reaction force as being either unrealistic or, worse, potentially weakening NATO's military cohesion.⁴

In the months following the Helsinki summit, tension between the EU and the group of six grew substantially with especially Warsaw and Ankara vociferous in their criticism of ESDP. Intransigence appeared to set in as France pushed for the EU to develop a planning capacity independent of NATO, to which Turkey responded by threatening to veto any possible use of NATO assets by future EU forces.⁵ This deadlock was not seriously tackled until the Feira summit in June 2000, on which occasion Poland submitted a proposal for the fuller involvement of the six in ESDP.⁶ Supported by the UK, most of Poland's proposals were subsequently agreed to and as a result modalities for '15+6' discussions were created with the express purpose of discussing ESDP issues between EU member states and the non-EU European NATO members.⁷ As part of this formula the six were also given an opportunity to take part in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) - the liaison mechanism between ESDP and broader CFSP⁸ and to establish channels of communication with the EU military committee (EUMC) and military staff (EUMS).⁹ Provision was also created for the fuller consultation, involvement and participation, to be ensured through a decision at the Council level, of the six in future EU-led operations.¹⁰

The post-Feira re-building of confidence between the EU and the 'six' was bolstered further by agreements reached at Nice in December 2000. By providing greater clarity to the relationship between the EU and NATO and essentially how the latter would remain superior, how the two institutions would function in the event of a crisis and importantly how, when NATO as a whole was not involved, the participation of

¹ Nowak-Jezioranski, 'Czy NATO jest zagrozone', Rzeczpospolita, 15.05.2001
³ Speech given by Bronislaw Geremek, at the 78th Session of the Parliament on May 9th, 2000: www.msz.gov.pl
⁴ Trzaskowski, ' Poland', p.20.
⁵ ' Poland Feels Torn Between 2 Alliances', IHT, June 6, 2000
⁶ 'Propozycje praktycznego rozwiniecia postanowien z Feira w zakresie wspolpracy pomiedzy UE i non-EU European Allies', www.msz.gov.pl
⁸ 'Propozycje praktycznego rozwiniecia postanowien z Feira w zakresie wspolpracy pomiedzy UE i non-EU European Allies', www.msz.gov.pl
¹⁰ Jean-Yves Haine ‘Berlin Plus’ www.iss-eu.org
European NATO states in ESDP missions could be brought in, Polish concerns were by and large set aside. However, it took a further two years for the Nice provisions on Berlin-plus to be adopted. By the end of 2002 however, the Nice provisions on Berlin-Plus were finally approved, a development aided by the Copenhagen decision on EU enlargement and the change of government in Turkey, giving rise to a set of permanent agreements between NATO and the EU.¹

Despite this emerging Modus Vivendi the Polish perspective towards ESDP continued to be reserved and to be guided by both a 'NATO-first' policy and the drive to avoid discrimination, as seen in a number of speeches throughout early 2001 and a year later in the context of the Convention on the Future of Europe. In May 2001, the Polish Foreign Minister Bartoszewski delivered a speech at Warsaw University presenting Poland's view on EU security policy. The speech was part of a series of set-addresses aimed at presenting Poland as a nation committed to European integration to help alleviate the negative concerns of some existing EU states about what kind of member Poland would make. With this objective in mind, Bartoszewski called for Poland's active engagement in European security and argued that failing to do so had cost Poland dearly in the past. He also denied that Warsaw's approach to ESDP was sceptical. However, at the same time, the Foreign Minister restated well-worn lines of Polish diplomacy arguing strongly against the development of ESDP beyond a limited remit. Bartoszewski argued that the term 'Defence' should be dropped from ESDP, second, he saw that ESDP should only ever complement and never duplicate NATO, third, ESDP should be as inclusive as possible with all non-EU European NATO members fully integrated, finally, rather than focusing on new institutions, EU member states should concentrate on capacity building and enhancing their real military capabilities.²

Europe Fractures: Poland, ESDP and the War on Terror

At the time it did not seem to matter much to Warsaw when both the EU's ambitions to become a security actor and NATO as a platform for collective action fell foul of US unilateralism in the war on terror, indeed, Poland emerged as one of the United State's key allies in the wake of 9/11 and seemed to thrive on the 're-nationalisation' of security policy.³ Essentially, Polish diplomacy fell in line with US policy on virtually every count and it was in this context that Poland’s role as the US’s protégé in the East was cemented.⁴

Polish support for US policy and its flip-side, a desire to limit the development of ESDP was further strengthened by the subsequent efforts of the UK, Germany and France, acting without the EU Presidency, to work out a co-ordinated agenda for the EU to respond to 9/11.⁵ Although this initiative ultimately stalled after the three states subsequently diverged over Iraq, the mere prospect of an exclusive Western European Directoire or 'steering committee' leading the EU foreign policy agenda was

¹ Jean-Yves Haine ‘Berlin Plus’ www.iss-eu.org
³ 'Power to the Capitals' Financial Times 15 October 2001
⁵ 'Guess who wasn't coming to dinner?' Economist 10 November 2001
unacceptable to the Poles and helped reaffirm Polish Atlanticism. ESDP by Directoire smacked of nothing more than an arrangement where decisions could be made over Poland's head. Warsaw feared that should the US lose interest in Europe, a self-appointed exclusive club of privileged and powerful European states would seek to replace it and in doing so marginalise Poland's voice and influence. Thus the threat of a Directoire-led ESDP and the potential this brought for a dislocation of American and European security structures helped propel Warsaw's readiness to join the US-led coalition of the willing.

Warsaw’s pro-US leaning became increasingly more entrenched once the bombing in Afghanistan began, with Warsaw quick to get aligned behind the US and to stress that Poland would not remain a 'passive' participant in the anti-terror coalition. The events of September 11th also gave rise to a renewed impetus for Poland to act as a conduit for those countries in Eastern Europe aspiring to join Western institutions. Speaking in November President Kwasniewski argued that Poland’s place in the post-11th September world order was to ‘act as a leader to coax eastern nations into the Western camp and to persuade the West to accept them'. In this newly cast role as regional leader Warsaw convened an Anti-Terrorism conference with leaders from Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe on November 6th 2001, an event which led not only to a significant tightening of regional security co-operation but also demonstrated Poland’s aspiring leadership qualities and commitment to the American-led campaign. Thus it was not perhaps surprising when there was little hesitation on the part of Kwasniewski to respond positively to President Bush’s request at the end of November for troops. Beginning in early January the Polish contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom was not insubstantial, amounting to around 300 troops, including some 87 elite special forces from the GROM unit, plus the logistics ship The Xavery.

Poland - America's Protégé

Having bagged the credentials of being one of America’s principal allies in Afghanistan and new 'best friend' in Central Europe, when the US administration shifted its focus towards Iraq with the stated objective of regime change, Warsaw's policy remained consonant with that of Washington. Indeed, developments between the two countries since Afghanistan had had the effect of binding Polish foreign policy even closer to that of the United States when at the end of 2002 the US Congress approved a loan of $3.8 billion dollars for Poland to purchase 48 F-16 aircraft from Lockheed Martin. The significance of the loan was far reaching and manifold and not just because of its size. The loan entailed a projected $1.5 billion of

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3 ‘Poland wants to take active part in antiterrorist coalition’ BBC Monitoring, UK, November 13 Ft.com; ‘Defence Minister ready for Polish troops to Afghanistan request by US’ BBC Monitoring Services, UK, November 15, ft.com
direct investment into Poland and because of the various lock-in effects the loan would cement the Polish defence sector to that of the United States for some time to come.  

Bitterness within Europe over the Polish procurement decision rumbled on into 2003 reaching a crescendo in the run up to war in Iraq. Although Polish participation in the Iraqi operation was by far the most sensational undertaking in Polish security policy of the last fifteen years, at the same time the decision to participate was fully consistent with the pro-Americanism and Atlanticism of Polish foreign policy as it had evolved since 1989. Polish Iraqi policy essentially flowed from the belief at the heart of Polish thinking that the US remained the ultimate guarantor of Poland's security. Consequently, in the context of the emerging transatlantic and intra-European rift in the run up to the war, Poland sided fully with the United States, and expressed this view alongside others in the 'letter of the eight' of January 2003. Followed in quick succession by the ‘letter of the ten’ these statements affirmed transatlantic solidarity between the signatories and the United States, helped sanction the US route to war in Iraq and essentially unseated the Franco-German motor as the only driving force behind EU foreign policy. The letters also contributed to wider fissures across Europe, already ignited by Donald Rumsfeld's reference to ‘Old’ Europe and ‘New Europe’, which had erupted in February 2003 after French President Jacques Chirac lambasted the Poles and other East European states for supporting US policy. By siding with the United States these countries, in Chirac's eyes, had misbehaved and had missed an opportunity to 'keep quiet'. EU Commission President Romano Prodi also signalled his sadness at the candidate countries behaviour which, he saw revealed an inability on the part of the applicant states to realise that the EU was not just about economic union but also shared political values and consensus. 

Ultimately what these spats demonstrated was that the perennial dispute within the European Union, between Atlanticists and Europeanists and on another level ‘intergovernmentalists’ versus ‘communitarists’ lived on and had gained a new intensity in the context of EU enlargement. Iraq also brought into focus the question of whether, as some quarters assumed, it should be the older and larger member states speaking for the EU, and that acceding states should accept a subservient back seat role in developing the EU’s foreign affairs.

‘Status and Role’: The Polish Rationale for Going to War

Against this stormy landscape of European disharmony and US tenacity to oust Saddam Hussein, by force and by overriding the UN, if necessary, the decision to send Polish troops to Iraq was made. Compared to the case of the United Kingdom the domestic context of debate and decision making over Iraq was a rather uncomplicated

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3 ‘Europe and America Must Stand United’ London 30 January 2003
4 www.cm.com/2003/world/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac
6 Polish contingent to Iraq numbered about 184, composed of 54 from the GROM, logistical support ship Xawery Czarniecki with a crew of 50 and a FORMOZA navy commando unit, plus 74 anti-chemical contamination troops.
and muted affair in Poland. This suggests that the key driving force behind Polish policy was to do with status and role and chiefly a desire to demonstrate Poland's loyalty as 'America's model ally'.

What characterised the Polish discussion on Iraq was its lack of detail and consideration of what Poland's interests in the region actually were. Such issues were not debated at an elite level, and neither did they pervade a broader public discussion. Instead much was assumed and was led by reflexive Atlanticism and support for the United States as unquestioned guiding principles. Significantly, there was no justification of Poland's involvement in the campaign in terms of responding to a direct threat, there simply was no suggestion that Iraq presented a 'clear and present' danger. Subsequently, in contrast to the American and British discourses, it was never envisaged that Polish territory was actually under threat by the proposed hidden Iraqi nuclear arsenal. Justification for Polish involvement was instead built upon a number of factors including a conviction that the invasion was a necessary means to bring about an end to a malevolent regime. The argument also flowed that an invasion was necessary to ignite the spread of democracy, which as both the Polish President and Foreign Minister argued, Poland had a special responsibility to support the spread of democracy in other parts of the world, due to its own past as a communist state.

The Polish discourse was also explicit about the need to preserve transatlantic bonds thus the notion ran that Poland’s involvement in Iraq was crucial to prevent a serious fissure from emerging across the Atlantic as well as the US's withdrawal from Europe. The actual Polish decision to deploy troops was explicitly linked to a desire on the part of Kwasniewski and the Government to enhance Poland's profile as a serious global actor with international prestige.

Expectations of material profits for the Polish Government and industry emanating from the post-war reconstruction of Iraq were initially rare in the justification for going to war, though as will be demonstrated later, such matters grew in importance. Again, in contrast to the situation in Spain and to a degree in the UK, Polish politics was not caught up in a dispute over the war to any notable extent, which resulted in a stable consensus, as seen in Parliament’s approval of the Polish deployment. The main opposition parties supported the government's decision to send troops to Iraq with objections voiced only by the fringe parties, the populist Samoobrona (Self-defence) and the far-right LPR (League of Polish Families).

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2 See transcript from President's press conference following the beginning of invasion of Iraq: 'Prezydent RP o działaniach w Iraku' 20.03.2004: www.president.pl
3 See the article by foreign minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz 'Irak to takze nasza sprawa', Gazeta Wyborcza, 13.05.2004 and President Kwasniewski's interview for Der Tagesspiegel, 29.09.2002.
7 328 in support and 71 against
8 'Sejm: Miller o udziale Polakow w silach sojuszniczych w Iraku', Gazeta Wyborcza, 26.03.2003.
9 'Debata o Iraku w Sejmie: szczyty absurdu', Gazeta Wyborcza, 01.04.2004

Dialogue on Globalization
This elite level consensus was also underpinned by a broader permissive domestic environment. In the absence of a national discussion about Iraq, there was scant public interest and engagement with the issue. Whilst public opinion was divided over the war elsewhere in Europe, Poland experienced no mass anti-war demonstrations and certainly nothing on a scale remotely comparable with other European supporters of Washington's policy, such as Britain or Spain.\(^1\) It was not therefore initially controversial when the decision was taken in June 2003 for Poland to stay on in Iraq to participate in the post-war stabilisation project. Moreover, the plan for Poland to have formal responsibility for one of the occupation zones was fully in keeping with the Polish decision to go to war in the first place and importantly took forward the goal of enhancing Poland’s role and status as a serious security player and partner of the United States.\(^2\)

*The Emergence of a Public Debate*

Despite Poland’s feisty determination to play a significant and visible role in the US-led invasion of Iraq and subsequently in the post-war reconstruction project, in the course of 2003 Polish policy became palpably less resolute and much more reflective. The previous permissive consensus gradually weakened as domestic criticism slowly began to unfold. Ongoing international speculation and criticism of Polish policy were further factors contributing to this gradual reappraisal and seemed to have been taken up a gear when one of the most ardent supporters of Poland's Atlanticist orientation, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, expressed criticism regarding what he called 'a too-excessive and divisive demonstration of loyalty', which he saw as unnecessary and damaging to Poland's relations with Germany and France.\(^3\) The potency of this view, which added to the now widespread notion that Poland was fast becoming 'America's Trojan donkey',\(^4\) were also taking root in the context of the fast approaching enlargement of the EU.

It was perhaps when the first Polish casualty occurred in November 2003 that public opinion finally woke up to Iraq and a broader consideration of the merits of the operation and Poland’s role in it began to feature in party politics. These developments helped unleash a steady stream of calls for Polish governments to withdraw its troops.\(^5\) With the governing coalition weak and under stress, the question of the continuation of Poland’s role in Iraq gained salience in the Sejm and

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2. The Polish zone amounted to around 29,000km² and was located south of Baghdad incorporating the city of Karbala, since September 2003 some 2400 troops were stationed there in the first instance. Subsequent to the initial Polish decision to remain in Iraq, the Polish Government invited Germany to play a role in the occupation zone, a request which was subsequently rejected. However, NATO aided the Polish-led zone by helping to establish headquarters, communications and other logistics. Although a ‘Polish zone’ troops from a range of other countries including Ukraine and Bulgaria were also deployed.
4. ‘Is Poland America's donkey or could it become NATO's horse?’, *The Economist*, May 10th 2003.
5. The first death was Lieutenant Colonel Hieronim Kupczyk, killed on 6 November 2003, significant for a number of reasons not least because it was the first case of direct deadly fire on over 50 years of Poland's participation in peace missions. Maria Wagrowska (2004) Polish Participation in the Armed Intervention and Stabilization Mission in Iraq Reports and Analysis 08/04 Center for International Relations, Warsaw [www.csm.org.pl](http://www.csm.org.pl) p.4
the broader public arena, exposing the Government’s position even further. Such pressures ultimately compelled the Government, led by Prime Minister Marek Belka, to pledge that a reduction in the size of the Polish contingent from the beginning of 2005 to around 1500 troops would occur, though at the same time he maintained that Poland would remain an occupying power until the full expiration of the UN mandate (resolution 1546) in December 2005.\(^1\) Over a year after Poland took responsibility for the occupation zone in Iraq much of the government’s early confidence and optimism had become subdued. Iraq continued to be highly unstable, a growing number of Polish troops had been killed and very few benefits had materialised. In September 2004 the vast majority of Poles, over 70%, wanted Polish troops to be fully pulled out of Iraq.\(^2\) By this time the issue had become an even more salient factor in party politics and had moved beyond the fringe element. Whilst in Autumn 2004 a basic cross-party consensus still held on staying in Iraq, the issue was fast becoming politically charged with some opposition parties (not only the LPR and Samoobrona but also the PSL-Polish Popular Alliance and perhaps even the co-governing UP-Labour Union) demonstrating a preparedness to mobilise the issue during the forthcoming election.\(^3\) Furthermore, the centre-right parties, PO (Civic Platform) and PiS (Law and Justice) in opposition at the time and which had voted in favour of sending troops to Iraq began to criticise the government’s failure to secure any tangible benefits from Poland's involvement in Iraq.\(^4\)

Arguably the most significant force shaping the Polish discourse at this time was the effect of public opinion, which as argued earlier, began to wake up to Iraq only in late 2003 and had played little role in challenging or questioning the route to war. Polish public opinion was recalibrated in late 2003 which led to something of a domestic backlash over Iraq but also, as will be discussed later, contributed in no small way to a reorientation of Polish foreign policy towards the EU. By 2004 not only did public opinion arrive at the position of wanting the troops out, but also came to support the notion that Europe’s foreign policy profile should be boosted to become a ‘superpower’.\(^5\) In the context of a continuously bad situation in Iraq negative public opinion was spurred on by two particular issues. First, the low level of involvement of Polish firms and businesses in Iraqi reconstruction projects were a disappointment to a domestic audience keen to see some tangible benefits from participating in the US-led war. Indeed only a handful of Polish companies were involved in Iraq and when a major Polish arms company, 'Bumar', lost in the notoriously intransparent bidding process for the armament of the new Iraqi force, widespread disenchantment set in and calls for a withdrawal only rose. The second issue was that of Visas. Despite Poland’s close adherence to US policy since 2001, Poles became subject to the US Government’s decision to maintain and strengthen its visa regime, thus making it even harder for Polish people to travel to the United States.\(^6\) As the situation in Iraq

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\(^3\) The co-governing UP argued in favour of the troops withdrawal till the end of 2004 (see: ‘Jaruga-Nowacka:powrot z Iraku w 2004’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 6.05.2004) whilst the PSL turned its opposition to Polish presence in Iraq into a central point of its campaign (see: PSL zbiera podpisy przeciwko obecnosci w Iraku, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29.08.2004)


\(^5\) See Transatlantic Trends 2004, German Marshall Fund of the US.

worsened these pragmatic issues moved to the forefront of the Polish debate. Reacting to this domestic criticism, the Polish President and Government sought to exercise some direct pressure on Washington. But when Kwasniewski raised the visa issue with George W. Bush, it was made clear to him that his query was bordering on the inappropriate and that no change of policy was going to transpire. Disappointed, Kwasniewski then argued that he was ‘hurt’ by the visa decision and that as ‘a friend of America’ he did not understand it. He also appealed for a more ‘gracious’ and ‘less divisive’ America. 1

But, perhaps even more devastatingly for the Polish Government, was the way in which developments since the beginning of the Iraqi war seem to undermine the validity of some of the historical and moral arguments, as outlined above, which had guided Poland's policy choices in 2003. There is, for example, little evidence that Polish and British loyalty to the US prevented a split in the transatlantic alliance and helped to sustain America's commitment to European security. 2 In the meantime, the US announced plans for massive reductions in its military presence in Europe. Also, the initially strong line of argument about bringing democracy and human rights to Iraq appeared jaded in the light of ongoing violence and scandals about the abuse of Iraqi prisoners. The Government responded to this situation by declaring that Polish troops would be withdrawn at the end of 2005 to coincide with the expiration of the UN mandate, irrespective of the situation on the ground in Iraq. However, after the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in Poland in Autumn, Marek Belka’s pledge proved elusive; one of the first proclamations made by the new Government was that Polish troops, albeit at a reduced number, would remain in Iraq until the ‘mission was accomplished’ and that Poland was not a nation of ‘deserters’. The new government’s allegiance to the United States was also manifest in the Polish decision to continue with the plan for Poland’s inclusion in the US missile defence system, a plan which has now reached a critical stage.

Despite the renewed commitment of the Conservative government to stay on in Iraq, the experience of going to war and of being an occupying power clearly prompted a further evolution of Polish foreign policy. The period between mid 2003 and 2004 saw the emergence not only of a growing weariness and scepticism towards US unilateralism but also a sharp downturn in popular support and confidence in Polish policy. Significantly, this had a mild cathartic effect and contributed to a reappraisal of Poland’s role in European security and perspectives towards CFSP and ESDP in particular. 3

Recalibrating Polish Policy after Iraq: The Growing Relevance of ESDP

The European Security and Defence Policy proceeded on two levels after September 11th 2001. On the one hand the diminution of multilateral fora after 9/11 and the lack of a coherent European voice thereafter seemed to expose the innate fragility of the EU’s foreign policy, calling into question the whole ESDP project. Moreover early initiatives led by France and Germany to re-group and take ESDP forward did not initially inspire broad support from across the EU and in many ways helped entrench

10.08.2004.
2 ‘Niemcy-Rząd wyklucza udział trojstronnego korpusu w Iraku’ PAP, 07.05.2004
the prevailing ‘old/new Europe’ divide. From a Polish point of view the idea of establishing a collective defence alliance within the EU through ‘closer co-operation’, as proposed by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg in April 2003 was unacceptable. As was the notion of ‘structured co-operation’, which was believed to be a Franco-German attempt to sideline the pro-American new EU-member states by setting up military criteria they could never hope to meet. However, paradoxically perhaps given the general disarray in Europe at this time from around May 2003 ESDP was taken forward in significant ways and began to cohere through actual EU-led military deployments, the formulation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and by the end of the year nascent agreements about institutional arrangements based on proposals coming out of the Convention on the Future of Europe. On many of these developments and innovations Polish policy came round to an increasingly positive and constructive disposition.

A number of mutually reinforcing factors and drivers contributed to this change. First, as already described, the Iraq factor, coupled with a perceived lack of rewards in either material or political terms for Poland after participating in the campaign undermined Warsaw’s earlier confidence and belief that an elevation of Poland’s role and status would be forthcoming. Second, Poland’s proximity to the EU edged closer as membership came into view and with it much of the scepticism towards ESDP which had derived from Poland’s ‘outsider’ status, was therefore abating. Also contributing to this transformation in Polish perspectives was the fact that ESDP was becoming more elaborate and had been proved in action. Whereas at its inception ESDP remained largely ‘declaratory’ – an aspiration with ill-defined priorities, arguably making it difficult for non-EU members to actually affirm their commitment, over the course of 2003 the nature of what type of foreign and security policy actor the EU could be, together with the ESDP ‘mission’ and purpose became clearer.

2003 effectively saw the launch of ESDP. The EU became engaged in three missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in each case Polish troops were involved. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) launched in January took over from the United Nations International Police Task Force and aimed at establishing local law enforcement capabilities to aid the stabilisation of the region. In EUPM the Polish contribution amounted to some 12 Police Officers, a number roughly similar to that of the Greek and Danish contribution. At the end of March 2003 the EU launched its first ever military mission in the form of operation ‘Concordia’ in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which took over from the NATO mission ‘Operation Allied Harmony’. Led by France as the ‘framework nation’ and utilising NATO assets and capabilities the operation was the first and successful test-case of the Berlin-plus agreement. Again, Polish troops were present, numbering 17, on a par to Spanish and Swedish contributions. The third mission of 2003 was ‘Operation Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this short mission again led by the French was significant by the fact that it took the EU outside of Europe and its periphery, demonstrating that the EU could ‘go global’ but also that the United Nations now viewed the EU as a serious security actor. Although arguably uncontentroversial, limited in scope and heavily reliant upon the leadership of a large ‘old’ EU state as well as NATO assets, ESDP missions in 2003 represented a breakthrough and have been followed up further EU deployments, involving both EU and third states.
An important effect of this was that in Warsaw, as well as in other East Central European capitals, the functions of NATO and the EU were no longer viewed in terms of discrete ‘boxes’, as had been the case a few years earlier. Crucially, the growing relevance of EU security policy in the face of rising concerns over Iraq was bringing into focus the significant overlap and blurring of functions that was now occurring between the roles of NATO and the European Union.

**Thinking ‘Outside the Box’: Poland and ESDP after 2003**

Alongside the proliferation of EU-led missions, the institutional elaboration of ESDP was being taken forward from 2002 onwards in the context of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Whilst disagreements over Iraq were threatening to dismember EU foreign policy, the Convention was getting to grips with some fundamental and forward looking questions about CFSP/ESDP.

In the early phase of Convention deliberations in 2002, Poland, like other soon to be members, kept a relatively low profile and stuck with the mainstream of opinion. With EU membership on the horizon CFSP-related questions were pushed down the agenda by more immediate and pressing concerns involved in the accession process. As well as some specific policy and sectoral issues, which were still outstanding in the negotiation process, Polish diplomacy was also, as discussed earlier, preoccupied with the Convention’s proposals for a new voting system, which would have reduced Poland’s voting weight and voice as had been previously envisaged at Nice. With these larger concerns to contend with, the contributions from Polish Governmental and Parliamentary representatives to the CFSP and Defence working groups reflected uncontroversial concerns which were constant themes in Polish foreign policy, namely that ESDP should not be developed to rival NATO, which should remain the core security institution in Europe and second, that ESDP should be developed as an ‘inclusive’ entity with equality for all participating states no matter their size nor whether they are EU members or not. However, as the Convention rolled forward and against the backdrop of Iraq, Polish engagement in the Convention’s proposals on foreign and security issues was taken up a notch and began to take on a more embracing approach. It was in March 2003 that Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz called for the EU to deepen integration in the CFSP area, although this was no doubt a response to accusations flying around at the time that Poland was being disloyal to the EU, Cimoszewicz’s call did demonstrate that Polish thinking on ESDP had travelled a significant distance and importantly it indicated that a more articulate and detailed policy stance could emerge.

**A Positive Approach to New Constitutional Proposals**

In its subsequent pronouncements the Polish Government welcomed the pro-integrationist proposals that emerged from the context of the Convention. The government was particularly forthcoming in the CFSP area and supported all major initiatives put forward by Luc Dehaene’s working group, including the idea of a ‘double-hatted’ foreign minister, with enhanced authority and a foot in the Council and the Commission. Warsaw also supported the notion of empowering the EU with a legal personality and establishing an EU diplomatic service. Finally, in opposition to

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1 Future of the CFSP* lecture by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Włodzimiesz Cimoszewicz at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin, 12 March 2003 [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)

2 Remarks by Mrs Danuta Huebner, Minister for European Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the
many other candidate states, Warsaw also endorsed the idea of developing an EU security strategy.¹

Warsaw's attitude towards the proposals that came up in the context of Michel Barnier's working group on ESDP was more qualified, though still overall forthcoming. Thus Warsaw supported the creation of an EU Armaments and Research Agency and the inclusion of a mutual defence (solidarity) clause. Some reservations have emerged in the context of discussions concerning the idea of enhanced co-operation, where Warsaw stressed the need for the inclusive character of this proposal, yet again Poland was more accepting of the notion than other Central and East European candidates.² Whilst Poland consistently stressed the need for respecting and maintaining the role of NATO it made several pronouncements suggesting its openness towards the idea of enhancing EU autonomous planning capacities and supported the British proposal to install a European planning cell at the NATO headquarters (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.³ Overall there was a clear recognition amongst the Polish delegates that the EU needs its own defence capabilities, which, although complementary with NATO, should be deployable autonomously of the United States.⁴

Taking ESDP Forwards – the European Security Strategy

The growing embrace of CFSP and ESDP by Poland was also apparent with regards to the EU Security Strategy (ESS). The reception of the ESS demonstrated a discernible shift from scepticism to a realisation that the EU could be a credible security actor. In particular it was the combination of political role, economic carrot without neglecting the importance of the military stick which appealed to Warsaw. The strategy was generally welcomed in Poland receiving praise for its bold language, its holistic approach to security and its appreciation of the value of transatlantic relations. The Poles were also satisfied with what appeared to be the prospect of the EU becoming a global actor, not shying away from international activity, including the use of force. In fact, the view in Poland prevailed that the provisions envisaging the use of force should be strengthened to the effect that the notion becomes disengaged from the mandate of the UN Security Council. Warsaw also pushed, unsuccessfully, for an inclusion of a separate paragraph on transatlantic relations.⁵ However, despite these reservations there is a clear recognition in Poland that the strategy promotes a stronger and internationally more active EU, which is increasingly seen as compatible with Poland's interests. This view is strongly supported by public opinion, 77 per cent of which, believed in 2004 that Europe should acquire more military power to be able to protect its interests separately from the United States.⁶ The future evolution of Warsaw's attitude towards CFSP and ESDP will, to an important extent, depend on the further development of flexible

Conference on New Scenarios for European CFSP, 23 September 2003
² ibid.
³ Remarks by Mrs Danuta Huebner, Minister for European Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the Conference on New Scenarios for European CFSP, 23 September 2003
⁴ Cameron and Primatarova, Enlargement, CFSP and the Convention.
⁵ Olaf Osica, 'A Secure Poland in a Better Union? EUSS as Seen by Poland' paper submitted to the on-line series of Trier University on national perspectives on EU Security Strategy.
⁶ 'Transatlantic Trends 2004', German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004
integration in these areas and Poland’s position on issues such as structured cooperation or enhanced cooperation or indeed any other security and defence related initiatives proposed outside the remits of the existing treaties.¹

**Rethinking the Polish Position on a Directoire?**

Polish policy was traditionally opposed to the principle of flexible integration on the grounds that it would create ‘a union within the union’ and was likely to serve as an instrument of excluding new member states from vital decisions within the EU. Hence Poland’s initial reluctance to endorse the proposals emerging in the context of the Convention for the Future of the EU, which, like the passarole clause or enhanced co-operation, served to accommodate greater flexibility. It was also not insignificant in this context that a threat of a ‘two-speed Europe’ was often used by other member states, Germany in particular, to pressurise Warsaw into accepting a double-majority voting system as designed in the Convention.² As argued earlier, Warsaw also reacted with scepticism towards the prospect of an emerging Franco-British-German Directoire as a leading group in European security matters. Poland’s scepticism towards the notion was apparent over the trio’s initiative in Iran, which, according to the Poles, should have also included Secretary General High Representative Javier Solana.³

However, Poland’s attitude towards the idea of flexible integration or closer co-operation amongst a group of bigger member states began to evolve as soon as it became clear that Poland could actually be one of the ‘ins’. Ironically, perhaps, the event that proved to bring about a change in Poland’s attitude was its prominent role in Iraq, which nurtured a realisation that Poland could play in Europe’s ‘first league’. At the same time other member states, whilst often irritated by Poland’s behaviour, came to see Warsaw as a natural member of a European avant-garde. Together, these two factors prompted a turn-about in Poland’s attitude towards the idea of Structured Co-operation, with expectations being voiced that Poland could be amongst the elite group of member states launching the initiative. Poland also welcomed the Council’s suggestion to create ‘battle groups’ and moved swiftly with the Germans to form a joint battle group by 2007.⁴

In addition to these formal arrangements emerging in the context of the EU there is also a growing possibility of Poland’s involvement in informal arrangements set out within the group of biggest member states. In June 2004 France’s finance minister and likely presidential contender in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, stirred controversy by arguing that France must move away from an ‘exclusive’ dialogue with Germany and work with other big counties including the UK, Spain, Italy as well as Poland.⁵ A similar view was also expressed by the leader of the German CSU, Edmund Stoiber in 2004.⁶ Whilst Poland has not officially endorsed these ideas, not least because during the row

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² ‘Flexible Integration in the Area of CFSP/ESDP’, p.20.

³ Confidential interviews, Brussels, October 2004.

⁴ It is also likely that the group will be joined by Slovakia offering 200-300 troops. Confidential interviews, Brussels, October 2004.

⁵ ‘Sarkozy questions axis with Germany’, Financial Times, 22.06.2004

over the voting system it portrayed itself as a champion of smaller states, it nonetheless readily participates in informal consultations within the above mentioned group of the six biggest states.

It is, however, important to stress that Poland's general predisposition towards flexibility and co-operation with big member states is likely to be marked by ambivalence in the foreseeable future. This will continue to be the case for two reasons: Poland's size and its economic weakness. With just under 40 million inhabitants Poland is the biggest new member state, however, in the context of an EU of 25 members it is just a medium-size power. It is also clear that due to its economic weakness Poland will continue to opt for a larger budget for the EU, a stance in conflict with the richer member states, including the big four. This combination of Poland's size and its economic weakness will also mean that, unlike the big four, Poland is not a natural inter-governmentalist and supporter of a stronger Council of Ministers. For example as far as the EU's budget is concerned it is the Commission that is Poland's natural ally.

On the other hand, whilst Poland's general predisposition towards teaming up with the big four may be more problematic that it seems, the same does not necessarily apply to second pillar issues - the CFSP and ESDP - where indeed the prospects of closer co-operation with the big four are more likely. Much however will depend here on Poland's actual military capabilities and ability to reform its armed forces. So far Poland still lacks the necessary strategic air-lift capacities, necessary for it to act as a ‘framework nation’ in EU's missions. Although the number of Polish troops based in Iraq or indeed in other parts of the world (altogether around 10000) is considerable by European standards, it is important to point out that in most cases Poland relied on other countries' transport capacities. The same reason hindered Poland's ability to form its own battle group or act as a framework nation in such an initiative. However, with the support of public opinion in Poland for the growth in levels of defence spending, the Polish government is relatively free to modernise its armed forces.

The European Union as a Security Actor – An Evolving Polish Perspective

This survey of the EU’s development into a security actor and the Polish response would seem to confirm the notion expressed elsewhere that by the time of EU enlargement Poland had moved from being a ‘critical observer’ to ‘prudent participant’ in ESDP, and had begun to make the shift from being ‘America’s protégé’ to resembling something closer to a constructive European.

Poland's Atlanticism was a reaction against being excluded from the decision-making process in European security matters. This issue was an essential factor motivating Warsaw's initial attitude towards CFSP/ESDP. Whilst Warsaw's early reticence towards the initiative originated chiefly from its concerns about the implications of

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1 Confidential interviews, Brussels, October 2004.
2 According to recent opinion polls 41% of the Poles are in favour of increasing defence spending, which is by far the highest such proportion in Europe with the next one in line, United Kingdom, registering 28% of population in favour of larger spending in 2004. See: ‘Transatlantic Trends 2004’, German Marshall Found for the US, 2004.
3 Olaf Osica ‘A Secure Poland in a Better Union? The ESS as Seen from Warsaw’s Perspective’ www.deutschaussenpolitik.de
ESDP for the cohesion of transatlantic relations, it was only strengthened by the EU's initial decision to exclude Poland and other Central Europeans from some vital aspects of the policy. However, as the arrangements for accommodating the accession states were reached in Feira, and as Poland was progressively drawn into the internal working of the EU, particularly in the context of the Convention on the Future of the EU, Warsaw's attitude towards a stronger CFSP and ESDP became more constructive and accepting – an approach which has largely endured.

A question arising here relates to the likely effects of Poland's EU membership. Clearly, since joining the EU, Poland's status fundamentally changed, and one of the major rationales for Poland's Atlanticism - its exclusion from West European decision-making bodies disappeared. Apart from the domestic impact of EU enlargement another factor that is likely to influence the further evolution of Polish foreign and security policy is the future development of the EU’s Eastern policy.

It was argued here that Poland supported the institutional strengthening of CFSP, including the extension of QMV, but its position on ESDP was more conservative, focused on enhancing capabilities and in favour of retaining the strictly intergovernmental character of the initiative. Poland is, however, likely to support a flexible approach towards the use of force, being in favour of a more active and potentially interventionist EU. Polish policy is now well disposed towards closer co-operation amongst the six biggest EU member states in security and foreign policy matters, although, it remains unclear whether Poland would be able to offer adequate capabilities to join this group as a real key player in the near future. Should the EU evolve into a more coherent and more robust security actor, with Poland’s voice being adequately represented in it, it is likely that in the medium-term future Warsaw would come to see European initiatives as more relevant than NATO in meeting its security interests.
Chapter 2

Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Security Organizations

ASEAN and the ARF: the Building Up of Security Community in Southeast Asia and Beyond

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Introduction
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN’s identity has always been subject to queries and misunderstandings. The frequently asked questions, among others, are: is ASEAN a collective defense alliance or security regime? Is ASEAN a political or economic community? Scholars disagreed in many respects on what they think ASEAN is or should be. Philippine political scientist, Estrella Solidum, for example, was so sure that with the commitment to pursue peace, freedom, stability, prosperity, rule of law and security in the region, ASEAN was established to carry out security tasks. She strongly believes that current security condition in Southeast Asia is indelibly an ASEAN product. Other scholars dismissed the idea of ASEAN as security actor. David M. Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, both Australian political scientists, cynically argued that ASEAN is neither a security nor an economic community, either in being or in prospect. For them, ASEAN is no more than an imitation community which establish itself through bogus elections or military coups, wield unrestrained power over the ruling elite. They went on to say that insecurity within respective member states was translated to a regional level producing a rhetorical and institutional shell.

Misunderstandings on ASEAN’s identity may come from high expectation that the regional association should be more committed to tackling outstanding problems in the region. During the 1997 financial crisis in Southeast Asia region, for example, ASEAN was roundly criticized for being unable to respond urgently and cohesively to address the devastating consequences of the crisis that threatened the economies of many member countries. Despite some trivial attempts to mend the damage, including rescue package by Singapore to provide financial support to crisis-stricken members, such as Indonesia and Thailand, ASEAN’s responses were widely regarded as generally inadequate and insignificant. In March 2005, ASEAN faced yet another criticism for being mute in the heated border conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Animosity between the two countries flared after Petronas (a Malaysian oil company) awarded Exxon Mobil an oil exploration in East Ambalat (a disputed block of maritime space in the Sulawesi Sea). The contract generated outrage in Indonesia to the extent that various civil society organizations began to carry out “crush Malaysia!” (ganyang Malaysia) campaign. In his essay, Rizal Sukma, a leading scholar in the Indonesian circle of the ASEAN-ISIS noted that the lack of significant efforts from ASEAN to help diffuse the tension and “the silence of ASEAN” had once again demonstrated the growing irrelevance of the association.1

The lack of clarity in the concept of regional security may also contribute to the misunderstanding of ASEAN’s identity. Amitav Acharya’s path-breaking book *Constructing Security Community in Southeast Asia* (2001) may help us to get a better understanding of what kind of security arrangement ASEAN is or at least in the process of being. Combining Karl Deutsch and constructivist approaches, Acharya brought the idea of “pluralistic security community” that can be differentiated from security regime, collective defense, or collective security. In his view, unlike the other security arrangements, pluralistic security community is a “transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”.2 Two characteristics of a security community stand out: (1) the absence of war; and (2) the absence of significant preparations for war vis-à-vis any other members.3 The absence of war, or preparation of it, however, does not mean the absence of differences, disputes or conflicts. In a pluralistic security community, the sense of aggression and deterrence are absent, thus, disputes and conflicts are resolved through peaceful means (dialogue, negotiation, third party mediation, and international court).

The formation of the ARF in 1993 set the pointer of the future direction of ASEAN in building security community in the region. The objective of the ARF was to maintain the security viability of the region and to prevent regional disorder. Rather than performing as a collective defense mechanism to face external threats, the forum was inward-oriented, that is, encouraging constructive dialogue between nations to maintain regional security and order.4 ARF is unique in some respects. It does not fit the established models of security multilateralism, such as collective security, collective defense, or even the common security model developed in Europe. The ARF as Asia’s security multilateralism, according to Acharya, is interesting precisely because it challenges, rather than conforms to, our understanding of how multilateral institutions emerge and function, especially how (under certain conditions) a group of weaker states can offer normative leadership in building an institution whose membership includes all the great powers of the current international system.5

This paper examines the roles of ASEAN and the ARF in shaping the regional security architecture in Asia. It argues that through the formation of ARF, ASEAN

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3 Ibid.
attempts to establish what Acharya terms pluralistic security community encompassing the Asia-Pacific region. With ASEAN in the driver’s seat, the ARF moves on according to the ASEAN way focusing on informality, incremental change, and non-interference with member’s domestic affairs. The discussion will be divided into three sections. The first section will touch upon the concept of security community and examine how this concept fit into the Asian context. The second section will examine the evolution of ASEAN and the ARF as security arrangements in the region. It deals with the question of how ASEAN and ARF fit into the concept of security community. The final section will examine the norms and values that shape the identity of ASEAN and the ARF; and how these norms proceed and endure challenges.

**Understanding Security Community**

Traditional model of security arrangements based on the notion that security should be promoted against potential or actual enemies. In this context, security tends to be approached in competitive zero-sum terms. While the notion of security arrangement was oriented towards external threats and enemies and that traditional security issue is by nature zero-sum, one can think of a general pattern of security arrangement which tries to develop security “against others”, instead of “with others”. The most preferred model of security arrangement after the Second World War was indeed a collective defense arrangement (bilateral or multilateral) with the principles of reciprocity and mutual defense. The classic example of a collective defense arrangement is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was concluded during the Cold War to preserve the territorial status quo in Europe by defending Western European security from Soviet communism.

In the past few years, there has been a tendency of departure from such a traditional view of security arrangement. More recent interpretation of security arrangement puts more emphasis on cooperation, non-aggression, inclusiveness, non-zero-sum nature, and self-restraints. To mark the departure from the traditional approach of security, security experts began to introduce a new term, “security community”, instead of collective military defense or collective security. In his book, Acharya eloquently depicts security community as the attainment of a sense of community who share a common acceptance of the absence of a competitive military build-up or arms race involving their members. Within a security community, he argued, “war among prospective partners comes to be considered as illegitimate” and “serious preparations for it no longer command popular support”. Members of a security community usually restrain from engaging in contingency planning and war-oriented resource mobilization against other actors within the community.

Rather than focusing on making joint efforts to face external threats and enemies, a security community tends to be more dialog-oriented and seeks to promote standard

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of international norms. Unlike traditional collective defense which attempts to tackle specific problems, security community aims at promoting a habit of dialogue among the participants and to promote confidence-building and possibly preventive-diplomacy measures. Right from the outset, the ARF was formulated to bring together countries in a grouping that has an inclusive membership regardless of regime differences. Its ultimate goal is to promote economic growth and to maintain continuing economic interdependence in the region without the risk of war.

Most East Asian leaders felt uncomfortable with a European model of security cooperation. They failed to accept a rigidly structured and complex form of multilateralism. Various Southeast Asian states would never engage in cooperation which is strictly multilateral, given that some of them depend on bilateral relations with major powers to ensure their respective security. For example, Singapore has relied on its bilateral agreement with the United States as a countervailing source of military power in the region. For this reason, the city state declared in January 1998 that the U.S. aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year 2000. Similarly, despite attempt in 1992 to lessen military dependence on the United States, Philippines remained dependent on its bilateral security arrangement with the super power, especially in dealing with terrorist threats in Mindanao. In late January 2002, for example, the Bush administration deployed around 1,000 soldiers to provide training, advice and logistical assistance to the Philippine armed forces in combating terrorism linked with Abu Sayyaf networks.

For greater powers in East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea), a security cooperation focusing on dialogue, confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy, rather than an overly structured security arrangement putting emphasis on resource-mobilization for war against external enemies is more acceptable for several reasons. First, given the existing sensitive problems in the Asia region (Taiwan Straits, South China Sea, North Korea’s Nuclear threats, dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, growing China-Japan tension, and so forth), most Asian countries are more comfortable with the concept of security community due to its emphasis to reduce tension, rather than pushing conflicting parties to go for an immediate solution. Thus, avoiding sensitive issues to be addressed in a multilateral forum seems to be reason for some Asian countries to engage in a security community.

Second, a loose and flexible multilateral arrangement will give place for differences in interest, types of regime, norms, and so on. Thus, given the high level of differences of countries in the Asian region, a security community which does not oblige the adoption of a common norms or values is the only plausible choice. Third, a multilateral arrangement with broad agenda will suit members who will utilize it according to their respective interests. Some countries used ARF as a means to engage greater powers in order to let them develop more bilateral security relations in order to ensure their domestic security. Others simply join ARF to increase their political profile in the region. Fourth, one must take into account that most of participating members of ARF are a growing economy which puts priority on economic growth and interdependence at the absence of war. At the same time, economic growth and economic interdependence can only be maintained if there is confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy to avoid extreme resource-mobilization for war. They are not interested in resource-mobilization for war because it is uneconomical and financially costly. Thus, a security community which avoids military mobilization
The Evolution of ASEAN and the ARF

The ARF evolved from the need of ASEAN countries to create a regional order based not only on their own norms, but also on the relatively new norm of inclusiveness, which is central to the idea of cooperative security. Cooperative security may be compared to the concept of collective security because it is intended to be comprehensive in membership, with security arrangements aimed at obtaining intramural objectives. The ASEAN states adopted the notion of comprehensive security in the 1970s, as illustrated by the principle of national and regional resilience. The 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord at the Bali summit formally proposed the adoption of the principle of resilience as a common approach to domestic and regional security.

The ARF was formed as the first intraregional security arrangement encompassing the Asia-Pacific region. The first working session convened in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 included eighteen founding members: ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines), the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, Russia, China, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, and Laos. Three other countries (Myanmar, Cambodia and India) subsequently joined the group in 1997. North Korea was admitted in 2000, which increased ARF members into twenty-two.

From the very beginning, ASEAN sought to set the pace and control the direction of the ARF while at the same time fully aware of the interests of outside powers. For many ASEAN members, engaging major powers will ensure the creation of stability and order in the Asia-Pacific region, which is crucial to sustain economic growth and trade relations. Being in the driver’s seat, ASEAN found its way to impose several aspects of the “ASEAN Way” in the ARF. The first was the way in which ASEAN members managed to put forward aversion to rigid institutionalism within the ARF. Under ASEAN’s direction – strongly backed by China – the ARF deliberately avoid a rigid roadmap by introducing minimal institutional structure consisting primarily of its annual foreign ministers conclave and the Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM). This arrangement is very similar with that of ASEAN that adopts a minimal organizational structure.

The second was the cautious and incremental approach in dealing with security matters in the region. At the second ARF meeting in Brunei in August 1995, the concept paper (which served as the blue-print of the forum) envisaged three categories of cooperation: confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution (later changed to “elaboration of approaches to conflict” as a concession to China which had warned against rapid institutionalization of the ARF). The third was the preference on informality and flexibility as the main approach in dealing with existing problems in the region. This flexibility has allowed members to combine

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1 Ibid., p.173.
3 ASEAN at that time comprised of six member states, while others (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) joined later on.
multilateralism and bilateralism in dealing with security problems and in settling conflicts. For example, Malaysia and Indonesia preferred to use bilateral mechanism in settling Indonesian illegal migrants in 2002 and the conflict over Ambalat Bloc in 2005.

Although most non-Asian members considered the ASEAN Way to be the major hindrance of further institutionalization of the ARF, Asian members (especially China), however, prefer the ARF to be kept at its current pace. Thus, countries such as China, Japan and South Korea are supportive in keeping ASEAN in the driver’s seat of the forum. For China, the forum should be in no hurry to implement security cooperation beyond exploring overlaps between confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy measures. China is especially reluctant in turning the ARF into a conflict resolution forum, which may entail interference to its internal affairs. Japan may be the only Asian country which is – together with non-Asian countries – not very pleased with the ARF’s slow pace and evolutionary approach. For Tokyo, slow and incremental institutional progress may work against the forum’s ability to respond effectively to regional contingencies. However, Japan has been most vocal in pushing preventive diplomacy measures into ARF’s agenda.

Against this backdrop, the ARF has been moving forward of becoming a security community. Thus far, there are two stages of evolutionary progress of the ARF. First, as indicated in the declaration during the first meeting in Bangkok in 1994, the ARF was assigned to “foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern” in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, by the second ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995, the forum adopted a more ambitious project by proposing a three-staged approach in enhancing security community: (1) confidence-building measures (CBMs); (2) preventive diplomacy; and (3) conflict resolution (it was renamed “approaches to conflict resolution” at China’s insistence).

There is no standard definition of what confidence-building measures (CBMs) refer to. However, a group of ASEAN security specialists at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technology University, Singapore, tried to come up with a definition. Referring to the early work on the subject by James McIntosh (1990), they defined CBMs as: “attempts to make clear to concerned states, through the use of variety measures, the true nature of potentially threatening military activities”. The scope of CBMs can be wide as they may include demand for transparency, information exchange, and advanced notification of military exercises and military deployments to the monitoring body of a regional arms agreement. These may occur within formal or informal contexts and can either be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral in kind. In the context of the ARF, CBMs are aimed at achieving the following targets: (1) reducing tensions and suspicions; (2) reducing the risk of accidental war or war by miscalculation; (3) fostering communication and cooperation in a way that de-emphasizes the use of military force; (4) bringing about a better

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understanding of one another’s security problems and defense priorities; and (5) Developing a greater sense of strategic confidence in the region. Table 1 describes three types of general measures in the CBMs.

Table 1 Type of Measures in the CBMs

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<tr>
<th><strong>Principles/Declaratory Measures</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• Generalized statements of interests, norms and beliefs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Statements can be formal (declarations and treaties) or informal (communiques)</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Transparency Measures</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• Defense White Papers publications</td>
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<td>• Calendar of military activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Exchange of military information</td>
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<td>• Military-to-military contacts</td>
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<td>• Arms registry</td>
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<td>• Military personnel and student exchanges</td>
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<td>• Mandatory consultation on unusual dangerous military activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Advance notification of military movements and activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Access to military observers</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Access to surveillance and control zones</td>
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<td>• Open skies</td>
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<th><strong>Constraining Measures</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• Prevention of dangerous military activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Incidents at sea agreements</td>
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<td>• Air and maritime keep-out zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-free zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Limits on military deployment (by geographical area or numbers)</td>
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There has been substantive development within the ARF in terms of CBMs. As early as 1993, ARF members agreed to adopt ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace and Neutrality). A year later, the ARF participated in the UN Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR) and the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC). At the same time, ARF member agreed to publish defense White Papers. In 1995, the ARF proposed the formation of regional arms register and a regional security studies centre. Members also encouraged the promotion of transparency in military doctrine, prior notification of military activities, and greater openness in defense planning and budgeting. In 2001, the ARF encouraged the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) members to sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty.

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With respect to preventive diplomacy measures, the ARF has also made impressive progress. From a general point of view, preventive diplomacy measures can be defined as “attempts to prevent the outbreak of war or other types of armed conflicts by using peaceful diplomatic means”. Meanwhile, the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* report by the then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, defined preventive diplomacy as: “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”. In its *Concept Paper on Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy* (2001), the ARF defined preventive diplomacy as consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with consent of all directly involved parties: (1) to help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between states that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability; (2) to help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and (3) to help minimize the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region.

Table 2 describes preventive diplomacy measures which denote two types of responses: peace-time and crisis-time responses.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Peace-time Responses</th>
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<tr>
<td>• dialogue, exchange of information and avoidance of incidents at sea</td>
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<td>• institution-building: developing principles of conduct, generating regularized</td>
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<tr>
<td>consultations, and trust building</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Providing Early Warning (EW) of events that may disturb regional peace and stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Encouraging the use of arbitration and judicial settlement by third parties in settling disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cooperating on preventive action on transnational issues (drug trafficking, disposal nuclear waste, migration, and so forth).</td>
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<tr>
<th>Crisis-time Responses</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Fact-finding missions</td>
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<td>• Crisis management for reducing the immediate possibility of violent action in a conflict situation</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Preventive deployment of troops to prevent conflict escalation, whether with or without mutual consent of rival parties</td>
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At its early stages, the ARF attempted to take on preventive diplomacy by focusing on three broad themes. First, the ARF focused on the question of how members could most usefully define the concept that would provide a workable solution to regional problems. Second, the ARF had a lot of discussions on whether specific threats to

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regional peace and stability amenable to preventive diplomacy could be identified. Third, the ARF spent much time in discussing whether the meetings could identify specific mechanisms, frameworks and measures which might enable joint efforts at preventive diplomacy. Despite insistence by China to discuss specific issues, the ARF managed to address potential sources of threats and conflicts in the region, which included territorial disputes, proliferation of conventional weapons and WMD, inter-state conflicts such as those in the Korean peninsula, intra-state conflicts such as between Cambodia and Myanmar, drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental degradation, maritime security and piracy, illegal migrants, and so on.

In 1999, the CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific) – the Track Two arm of the ARF – proposed a list of key principles of preventive diplomacy, which included: (1) persuasion; (2) voluntary; (3) non-coercive activity; (4) compliance to international law; (5) respect state sovereignty and non-interference; and (6) timeliness. In 2001, the ARF (through the CSCAP) proposed the establishment of consultative committee of Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and a register of experts as an attempt to expand the diplomatic course to include Track Two diplomacy. ARF move towards the adoption of principles of conflict resolution has not been very impressive. Despite several seminars and meetings – especially at the Track Two level – the ARF has not yet delivered substantial results in this area. Avoidance to touch upon sensitive issues has been the major hindrance for the ARF to carry out its conflict resolution agenda.

**Norms, Principles and Rules of the ARF**

The hope for a possible cooperation between states resurfaced when the liberal-institutionalists brought the concept of “regime” that can presumably bring different states into the same commitment to cooperate with one another in political, security and economic matters. One of the main proponents of liberal-institutionalism, Ernst B. Haas, defined regime as: “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. Cooperation between states, according to this interpretation, would evolve from a set of principles, norms and rules that each state prepares to commit and support. Principles refer to beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. For the liberal-institutionalists, the formation of regimes that may lead to cooperation between states must be preceded by the existence of a mutually coherent set of principles, norms and rules, as Haas argued: “the politics of collaboration are seen as evolving alongside the evolution of consciousness itself, though not necessarily as an expression of biological evolution”. The Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations may illustrate how a collaborative regime was formed on the basis of agreed principles, norms and rules. For decades, states had agreed on the norm of maximum open access at sea (outside the territorial sea). With this agreed norm, the LOS managed to set out the rules which included fisheries conservation zones, pollution-free-zones,

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restrictions on transit, and international controls on the mining of the deep sea.

In the context of the ARF, ideational forces seem to have been central to the evolution of the regional institution. Looking at the background of regional security cooperation in Asia, Acharya argued: “regional norms developed during the early post-war intra-Asian interactions have been crucial in shaping security multilateralism in later years, as in ASEAN and the ARF”. The chief impact of these norms on the security cooperation has been the adoption of the Wesphalian principle of non-interference, focus on the pursuance of intramural interests instead of directed against external enemies, inclusiveness with consciousness attempt to engage major powers in the Asia Pacific, and flexibility in tackling problems combining multilateralism and bilateralism.

The non-interference doctrine has been treated as the most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism, as one ASEAN foreign minister put it in 1997: “non interference in the affairs of another country was … the key factor as to why no military conflict had broken out between any two member states since 1967”. In operational terms, the obligations imposed by ASEAN doctrine of non-interference consist of four major elements: (1) refraining from criticizing the action of a member government towards its own people, including violation of human rights, and from making the domestic political system of states and the political styles of government a basis for deciding their membership in ASEAN; (2) criticizing the action of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference principle; (3) denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighboring state; and (4) providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilizing activities.

Up until 1990s, when the level of democracy in the Southeast Asia region was still low, most ASEAN members had been receptive towards the doctrine of non-interference. Realizing that discussing domestic problems may lead to foreign interference, the internationalization of domestic issues, and even demand for change in the way of handling domestic problems, ASEAN members unanimously accepted non-interference as the basic norm of the association. In the context of the ARF, countries such as China and North Korea would undoubtedly support the adoption the non-interference doctrine into ARF’s basic norms due to their reluctance to expose their respective domestic affairs that may invite foreign interference.

Since the late 1990s, however, some members of ASEAN such as the Thailand and Indonesia have been enduring a transition to democracy joining the Philippines. As a result, standards of how to treat citizens and how to build political communication began to change. This change may have an impact on the way in which ASEAN treats the non-interference doctrine. Increasingly, ASEAN members began to violate the doctrine by making comments on each other’s internal affairs. For example, in October 1998 President Habibie of Indonesia and President Estrada of the Philippines openly criticized Malaysian government over the treatment of former Deputy Prime

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Minister Anwar Ibrahim who was dismissed and jailed by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. These intrusive comments were expressed at the bilateral meeting between Indonesia and the Philippines during the APEC Summit in Kuala Lumpur. A few months later, Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called on Indonesia to hold fair and legitimate elections at the aftermath of the political turmoil that marked the collapse of the authoritarian regime.

A new proposal was made by Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to modify the non-interference doctrine. In 1997, the Thai initiative called “flexible engagement” sought to allow ASEAN members to comment on each other’s domestic affairs and develop cooperative approaches to address them if such domestic affairs have international consequences. This proposal was opposed by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. The term “flexible engagement” was then diluted into a far less intrusive approach called “enhanced interaction”, and ASEAN’s decision to develop a diplomatic mechanism for crisis management (labeled an “ASEAN Troika”) seems to reflect a modest concession to the principle of sovereignty. This modified non-interference seems to be acceptable for most ARF members.

The second crucial norm espoused by the ARF was indeed its inward-looking character based on the principle of regional resilience. As mentioned earlier, the ARF was not formed to face external threats or enemies. Rather, it was formed to increase resilience. The principle of resilience stemmed from ASEAN’s understanding of security which put emphasis on national and regional resilience. The 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord formally proposed the principle of resilience as a common approach to domestic and regional security. At the 1976 Bali Summit, for example, Indonesia’s President, Suharto, emphasized: “Our concept of security is inward-looking, namely to establish an orderly, peaceful, and stable condition within each territory, free from any subversive elements and infiltration, wherever their origins may be”.¹ A security expert at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technology University, Singapore, Ralf Emmers, believes that the concept of resilience entered into ASEAN’s vocabulary as a translation of an Indonesian term, Ketahanan Nasional (national resilience).² Treated as the main comprehensive security doctrine by Suharto’s New Order government, Indonesian version of national resilience consisted of six major elements: ideological resilience, political resilience, economic resilience, social resilience, cultural resilience, and defense-and-security resilience. The ASEAN leaders, according to Emmers, had anticipated that resilient states in the region would lead to regional resilience, which would constitute in the longer run a foundation against external threats.³

The third lucid principle that seems to shape ARF’s basic norms was indeed inclusiveness. Although the ARF was initiated by the then ASEAN six members, it also actively engaged countries from outside the Southeast Asia region to join the security arrangement. The ARF introduced the norm of inclusiveness through the promotion of dialogue among both like-minded and non-like minded states. Relatively new to ASEAN, inclusiveness demands that the ARF not be a dialogue only among

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¹ President Suharto’s address at the opening of the summit of the ASEAN heads of state in Bali, 23 February 1976, as quoted in Estrella D. Solidum (1982). Bilateral Summity in ASEAN. Manila: Foreign Service Institute, p.31.
³ Ibid.
the like-minded; it must engage all principal regional actors with different perhaps conflicting perspectives and views on regional security issues. Perhaps the informality and non-rigid institutionalization as embedded in the ASEAN Way has allowed the ARF to be able to settle differences and move on with the agenda.

Deliberate avoidance to touch upon sensitive issues (human rights violations by member countries, South China Sea, the Korean peninsula, and so forth) may help the ARF concentrate on pursuing its agenda of CBMs and preventive diplomacy. However, the cautious and slow-motion ASEAN Way has frustrated some Western members, notably Australia, Canada and the United States, who would like the ARF develop quickly and adopt more concrete measures. Critics doubt whether the lessons of the ASEAN Way in managing inter-state conflicts in a sub-regional context during the Cold War era will still be relevant to the management of post-Cold War security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. While the demand for more institutionalization within the ARF is increasing, most members – except Japan – are not yet ready to give more commitment to expedite the institutionalization of the ARF.

The fourth standing norm in the ARF was the flexibility to combine multilateralism and bilateralism. What made ASEAN members felt compelled to form a multilateral security arrangement in the early 1990s was indeed the concern that the absence of traditional balance of power in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union may run the risk of instability and power disorder in the region. As such, the primary principle underlining the formation of the ARF was indeed a multilateral security arrangement that can bring a balance of power, regional security, stability, tranquility and conflict prevention through cooperation between multi-actors. Greater powers in the Asia-Pacific region supported a multilateral security arrangement for various reasons. China’s support was probably based on the assumption that multilateralism would undercut the U.S.-led alliance system and enhance its own significance. Meanwhile, the United States saw multilateralism as a complement to its much-preferred strategy of bilateral security arrangements with different actors in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Japan perceived a multilateral security arrangement as a means to increase its political profile, especially against its major Asian counterpart, China. Similarly, South Korea viewed a multilateral security arrangement as a way to entice North Korea.

Despite agreement that security cooperation must be based on the principle of multilateralism, one cannot deny that the overwhelming pattern of security and defense cooperations within Asia has been bilateral. There are two main patterns of security-defense bilateralism in Asia. The first was the “hub-and-spoke” pattern of U.S. alliances; and the second was the “spider-web” pattern of bilateralism that can be found in ASEAN. Limited space would not allow us to go into details about the two models. We can however argue that the ARF allowed “spider-web” security-defense bilateralism to take shape, such as existing bilateral collaboration between the national defense forces of the ASEAN six (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei), including the exchange of information, cross-border agreements, training exercises, and naval operations against piracy. The result was a web of overlapping bilateral and multilateral cooperations that in the end contribute to confidence building and stability in the Southeast Asia region. In fact, bilateralism

1 Sisowath Doung Chanto (2003) “The ASEAN Regional Forum ... op cit., p.42.
may at times prove to be effective in settling disputes. A number of disputes such as illegal migrants (between Indonesia and Malaysia, between Malaysia and the Philippines, and between Thailand and Cambodia) and border disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia over the Ambalat Bloc were settled through bilateral mechanism.

With these four standing norms, the ARF is able to survive for quite sometime. It may not yet carry out all of its tasks as a security community to satisfy the needs of all members, but it certainly has the capacity to bring the like-minded and the non-like minded states together. It can put aside different perceptions and orientations and put more focus on its main agenda of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and preventive diplomacy. The ARF is unique in itself. Not only that it was conceived out of a common realization of the need to form a security community, but it also offers a new perspective of understanding security arrangement where a group of smaller powers can take a leading role in a multilateral security community involving greater powers.

**Conclusion**

This paper has discussed the way in which ASEAN and the ARF have evolved as what Acharya calls pluralistic security community. The formation of the ARF in 1993 had marked the direction of ASEAN to play a major role in a pluralistic security community encompassing the Asia-Pacific region. The evolution of the ARF shows us how a security arrangement based on informal arrangement, a slow pace of institutionalization, putting much respect on state sovereignty, deliberately avoiding sensitive issues, focusing on dialogue and self-restraint, and a mixed between multilateral and bilateral cooperations can bring like-minded and non-like minded together. The ability of the ARF to put aside differences and focus on its agenda of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy has enticed greater powers outside the Southeast Asia to maintain their support toward the forum.

Although the ARF is currently facing a challenge – the impatience of its Western members such as Australia, Canada and the United States of its slow-motion toward a conflict resolution mechanism and the lack of concrete actions – the ARF has been successful in completing its duty as a pluralistic security community in the Asia-pacific region. One must admit that the ARF had managed to create a situation which serves as the most important characteristics of a security community: the absence of war and the absence of significant preparations for war. This success has much to do with the ARF ability to pursue its agenda of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy measures.

The ARF provides an important lesson for us on how to view a regional security arrangement. Against the conventional wisdom that a regional security arrangement tends to be dominated by major powers, the ARF shows that a group of smaller states can play a leading role in setting the norms and agenda for a regional security community whose membership include greater powers. The ARF has survived with its four standing norms: non-interference doctrine, inward-looking character based on the principle of regional resilience, inclusiveness (actively engaging countries from outside the Southeast Asia region), and flexibility to combine multilateralism in dialogue and bilateralism in cooperation and settling disputes.
References


The Role of the SCO in Regional Security Architecture

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上合组织在地区安全架构中的作用

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上合组织成员国主要由欧亚地区的国家组成，横跨欧亚大陆，包括中俄两个地区大国以及四个中亚地区国家。上合组织的前身是上海五国，其最初目的是解决中国与前苏联框架下的俄罗斯和中亚国家之间的边界问题，以便建立边境军事互信关系。因此中国都与上海五国其他成员边界接壤，解决问题的框架是以中国为一方，俄、哈、吉、塔为另一方的双边安全对话构架，其指导思想就是中国所倡导的新安全观，其核心就是“互信、互利、平等、协作”

随着边界问题的解决，以及不与中国接壤的乌兹别克斯坦成为观察员国，上海五国成员的重点逐渐移向中亚地区，其主要任务就是如何保持中亚地区的安全与稳定，如何促进中亚地区的繁荣与发展。因此，上海五国自然演化为上海合作组织。上合组织在维护中亚地区稳定、保障欧亚大陆中部的安全扮演着非常突出的作用。

一、维护地区安全与稳定的三大作用

1、解决了中国与俄罗斯和中亚邻国的边界问题，消除了欧亚大陆一个重要的不稳定因素。中国和其他上合组织成员国的关系实质上是从中苏关系演变而来的，而边界问题一直是困扰着中苏关系正常发展的主要因素之一。众所周知，中苏拥有5000多公里的漫长边界线。在中苏关系恶化时期，边界问题成为两国矛盾的焦点一度还发生了流血冲突事件。邓小平提出中苏关系恢复的三个条件之一就是苏联从边界撤军。1989年戈尔巴乔夫访华，中苏关系恢复正常。正当中苏边界谈判顺利进行时，苏联解体了，但双方边界谈判照样进行，只不过苏联转化成俄罗斯和中亚三国，边界谈判的架构依然是双边性质。由于中俄双边体现出来的诚意，以及中亚国家的积极响应，双方在上海五国（后为上海合作组织）的平台上，边界问题顺利解决，双方签订了一系列的协定和条约，包括《关于在边境地区加强军事领域信任的协定》和《关于在边境地区相互裁减军事力量的协定》

作者系上海国际问题研究所俄罗斯中亚研究室主任，上海合作组织论坛常务理事
等。从此，长期以来一直影响欧亚地区安全架构的主要因素之一边界问题，在上合组织成员国的积极努力下得以成功地解决，为地区关系的发展开创了一个很好的先例。如果没有上合组织这样的独特平台，边界问题可能继续困扰成员国之间的双边关系，而其他地区安全架构，如集体安全条约、欧安会或者东亚共同体都无法将这些成员国聚合在一起，为平稳地解决边界问题提供现成的方案。

2、积极配合国际社会反恐，遏制“三股势力”的扩张。中亚的地缘政治特征非常复杂，一是地理位置处于欧亚大陆中央，容易成为各种跨界势力自由穿越的走廊；二是宗教民族构成复杂，文化多元特性明显；三是该地区隐藏丰富的油气资源，地区外的各种力量对此虎视眈眈；四是中亚建立历史很短，地区治理经验欠缺。五是上存在很多历史遗留问题，这些问题的根源可能要追溯到19世纪。

这些地缘政治的特征导致该地区成为恐怖主义、宗教极端主义和民族分裂主义的活跃地带。上合组织一直把地区安全视为己任，把反对本地区“三股势力” 的斗争作为安全合作的重要内容。还在911事件发生之前，上合组织就提出了打击恐怖主义的口号。911事件发生后，上合组织成员国积极与国际社会合作，建立旨在针对国际恐怖主义的反恐联盟，特别在阿富汗战争中提供了重要的援助。同时上合组织于2002年建立了自己的常设机构——地区反恐机构。该中心成立以来有效地开展工作，举行过3次联合反恐演习、培训专家以及围绕着打击“三股势力”交流经验，以提高各成员国反恐部队应对恐怖活动突发事件的行动能力。机构还对本地区恐怖分子名单进行及时收集、整理和更新，建立由成员国安全部门共同参与的统一通缉中心，并在互联网上发布了部分恐怖组织和恐怖分子的信息。

3、为应付非传统安全威胁提供了稳定的长效机制。中亚地区属于不发达地区，虽然形势总体保持稳定，但各种传统和非传统安全威胁因素相互交织，特别是毒品泛滥、跨国犯罪等非传统安全威胁问题仍比较突出。众所周知，阿富汗是世界上最主要的毒品来源地。据联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室称，阿富汗2006年的鸦片产量将达到创纪录的6100吨，较2005年增加49%，占全世界供应量的92%。阿富汗的毒品主要通过中亚地区销往欧洲，最近正发展取到新疆销往中国内地，严重危害了国际安全体系，引起上合组织的高度重视。

上海合作组织成员国已于2004年塔什干峰会上签署了上合组织禁毒合作协议，并积极协助阿富汗政府反毒禁毒。2 上海合作组织同阿富汗建立了联络

1 阿富汗毒品的输出有两大动脉：一是北线，经巴基斯坦、中亚和俄罗斯，分成两路，一部分经印度和中国、蒙古到达亚太地区，另一部分也是最主要的一部分经俄罗斯抵达北欧、中欧、西，二是南线，即经伊朗、乌兹别克、土库曼、高加索和土耳其等国，运抵欧洲东部和中南部，再转向南方抵达非洲，向西越过大洋，到达南、北美洲。

2 中国外交部长助理李辉表达了中国的官方立场。他认为，阿富汗是本地区主要的毒品来源地，
组，正在研究向阿富汗开放上述禁毒合作协定。上海峰会之所以特别邀请阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊作为主席国客人与会，除了反恐考虑外，更重要的是为了促进欧亚地区的反毒禁毒工作。由中国公安部牵头的上合组织首次禁毒研讨会于 2006 年 4 月 20 日在北京召开，来自上合组织成员国和上海合作组织秘书处、地区反恐怖机构执行委员会的代表参加了会议。上合组织观察员国巴基斯坦、印度及特邀国阿富汗等国代表列席了会议。可以想象，如果没有上合组织这样强大的地区合作组织的密切配合，严厉打击来自阿富汗的毒品走私，要根除全球最大的毒品生产和输出基地几乎是不可能的。

二、中亚地区安全机制建设问题

中亚地区是亚洲安全体系的重要组成部分，中亚地区的不稳定或者发生动乱，不仅导致产生更多的失败国家，扩大欧亚中东结合部的破碎地带，增加“三股势力”和毒品走私、跨国犯罪等非传统安全威胁，影响中国、印度等亚洲国家的经济发展，而且也会阻挠欧洲和亚洲的交流和沟通，扩大两地多元文明之间的鸿沟与距离，甚至造成冷战时代东方和西方的那种意识形态与地缘政治合二为一的两极对立。因此，塑造中亚地区安全机制，并使其与整个亚洲地区的安全架构融合，成为不可分割的一部分，是上合组织面临的重要任务和责任，完成这个任务并非轻松容易，上合组织安全合作以及该地区安全机制建设度存在一些问题，值得引起重视。

1、安全合作的行动能力不足。行动能力是决定一个区域组织是否具有强大生命力的重要标志。上合组织安全合作的特点是协议和会议多，但具体行动能力偏弱，内部缺乏有效的安全合作机制，成员国在许多核心安全问题上缺乏共识。虽然上海合作组织把打击“三股势力”作为安全合作的主要内容，为此在塔什干设立了地区反恐中心机构，然而由于上合组织缺乏对其它安全问题的协调机制，也没有公认的安全部合作理念，因此一旦面临超越反恐以外的安全合作问题时，上海合作组织显得有点无所适从。与中亚的其它区域安全组织相比，上海合作组织的安全合作机制偏于松散。而欧安会本身存在一个转型问题。它的先天不足在于产生于冷战岁月，主要协调传统的东西方关系。对于新型地区安全问题，欧安会既有现成的理论也没有强有力的行动能力予以应付，或者它容易陷入东西方意识形态的两分法，这次吉尔吉斯斯坦的“颜色革命”暴露了这一弱点。

2、多边合作机制尚待完善。上合组织合作机制建设面临着艰巨的任务。该组织多边合作机制尚未健全。成员国之间的合作主要依靠双边框架，以多边方式开展合作的情形较为少见，其本质是成员国之间的互信没有达到一个高度。这是影响上合组织扩大和成长的一个内在机制性问题。特别是中亚国家，虽然在苏联时期

上海合作组织成员国都是毒品犯罪的最大受害者。因此，上合组织愿积极参与在阿富汗周边建立“反毒带”的国际努力，也曾在上海合作组织－阿富汗联络组框架内与阿富汗方面开展禁毒合作。参见《人民日报》，2006 年 06 月 13 日。
与俄罗斯曾经在一个大家庭中生活，其相互关系不是自然形成的，而是依靠行政权力维持的。此外，地区、国家和文明之间的差异以及历史遗留问题，都可能影响到成员国互信和多边合作。这些问题不解决就会影响到上合组织的发展。而上合组织与其它地区组织在安全方面开展多边合作的行为更为少见。在某种意义上，上合组织与这些地区或区域外的区域组织存在着二种竞争关系。应该说，上合组织与集体安全条约组织或欧亚经济共同体的合作关系容易建立，两者都建立在对俄罗斯地区影响力肯定的基础之上，然而双方实质性的安全合作几乎没有出现。而上合组织与这一地区的其它区域安全组织包括欧安会、北约的关系更为微妙甚至某种程度的紧张，例如上合组织与欧安会、北约没有建立对话机制；上合组织没有接纳美国成为观察员；上合阿斯塔纳峰会要求美国提出中亚撤军的时间表；美国提出“大中亚合作计划”，旨在消弱上合组织和中俄的影响等。这一现象的背后是中美俄欧大国在中亚地区的博弈，值得引起高度关注。

3、本地区安全合作理论尚未形成。理论对实践的指导作用是毋庸置疑的。没有理论的指导，任何实践就容易出现盲目性。上合组织成员国处于不同的文明体系和发展阶段，这些差异性导致成员国对任何理论体系建构的相对独立性。在安全合作领域，上合组织缺乏成员国一致公认的安全合作理论。目前不仅没有共同的上合组织安全合作理论，而且各成员国本身也没有针对于上合组织安全合作的理论框架。对于上合组织安全合作的理论阐述主要来自成员国的一般理论，而且成员国之间的认识差距还是很大的。例如，中国主张和平共处五项原则，主张不结盟政策，而俄罗斯的战略理论中结盟是其核心内容，中亚则处于理论的探索过程之中。这是上合组织安全合作理论难以形成的关键所在。同样欧美也没有提出系统的、令人信服的本地区安全合作理论。前苏联影像和 911 事件的冲击波，加上对能源等紧缺资源的渴求，构成了美国对中亚政策的主要动力和认识基础。欧洲在这一地区基本上扮演美国追随者的角色，既没有独立的中亚战略也没有独具特色的安全合作理论。决定美国中亚战略的理论是所谓的“民主稳定论”，认为民主国家之间不会有冲突和战争。美国决心运用“民主改造战略”，把中东和中亚国家改造成为“民主国家”，欧洲也支持美国的做法。在这一理念驱使下，欧美无法与上合组织成员国共同探讨适合本地区发展的安全合作理论。于是我们发现，没有理论共识，只有利益交织，双方的安全架构又互不包容，这将是威胁中亚地区未来安全与稳定的重要因素。

三、上合组织与欧盟会安全合作的前景
1、共同探讨本地区安全合作理论。中国和欧洲都是文明大国，两者非常重视理
论对外交实践的指导作用。比较而言，中国在国际关系理论研究方面起步较晚，而欧洲已经出现一批理论专家甚至是世界公认的大师，他们在安全合作领域已经提出了一些理论或观念，构成了所谓的欧洲价值观。欧安会正是在这个基础上在世各地包括中亚地区开展工作。中国虽然起步较晚，但富于创新精神。它凭着深厚的文化底蕴和恢宏的胸怀气度，已经就本地区的安全合作提出了一些新观念，如“新安全观”、“上海精神”与“和谐地区”，并得到本地区及周边地区国家的认同与支持。因此，中欧双方已经具备了理论合作的基础。

不管怎样，目前中亚地区的安全形势是前所未有的，而上合组织与欧安会在这一地区的安全合作是一个全新的课题，没有现成的理论方案可套用。所以，必须加强两个组织对本地区安全合作问题与理论的研究，尤其要加强双方安全合作理论的相互协调，以便大家达成共识，制定协商一致的安全合作政策，从而更好地提高双方在本地区采取安全合作行动的能力。无论是欧洲的价值观还是中国的价值观都需要学术界进行深入研究，频繁交流，然后根据当前本地区的具体情况发展，逐渐形成本地区安全合作理论的基本框架，并随着实践的发展不断地丰富、充实和完善，从而为本地区的安全合作实践提供最有力的理论支撑。

2. 找准本地区安全合作的关键穴位。中欧双方国际价值观的核心是，主张以对话取代对抗，以合作谋求发展，反对冷战思维和武力解决争端，因此双方在中亚地区合作的空间相当充裕，关键要找准穴位，然后以点带面，深入发展，扩大合作基础，形成共赢互利、和谐相处的理想状况。

那么合作的穴位或切入点在哪里呢？从实际情况看来，中亚地区的局势由于历史文化、宗教民族、油气资源和大国博弈等因素的交互作用，变得十分复杂。同时，中亚建国时间很短，治理能力较弱，经济发展极不平衡，整个地区极端的贫穷落后，这一切造成了中亚极度的脆弱性。如果处置不当，导致中亚乱局，其危害程度远远超过伊拉克和阿富汗，成为整个世界无法收拾的烂摊子，这是中欧双方都不愿意看到的局面。所以在中亚地区，稳定压倒一切；发展成为优先。对中国和欧洲而言，应该充分利用上合组织和欧安会这样多边合作的平台，努力在中亚地区争取一种稳定与安定的局面。目前对中亚稳定破坏最大的因素是“三股势力”和毒品走私。后者比前者更难控制。所以，上合组织可以选择建立打击毒品走私机制作为与欧安会合作的首要领域。在合作机制建设中，上合组织与欧安会做到优势互补，增信释疑，逐渐形成一套安全合作的模式和做法1，并通过学者之间的讨论交流提升至理论层面，然后再扩大到其他领域。在反毒合作机制尚

1 这些设想包括由上合组织与欧安会共同出资，在塔吉克斯坦建立防范毒品走私中心和一些戒毒所；可以由双方协商设立费尔干纳盆地综合安全治理项目，把消除恐怖主义根源与治理贫困结合起来；可以建立双方参与的本地区公共事务危机快速反应机制，科学处理公共事务突发事件；可以建立应对网络恐怖主义的信息预警机制，做到双方信息共享，统一处理涉及网络安全方面的事务。
未建立之前,上合组织与欧安会的合作并无必要加入新的内容。只要进入了这个门槛，才有可能进行其他领域的合作包括反恐与公民社会建构。

3、共同维护本地区的安全架构。通过上述探讨我们可以得出一个结论，尽管上合组织与欧安会存在历史的、利益的甚至价值观的种种差异，但这并不妨碍两者在中亚地区的共同合作以维护地区的安全架构，因为本地区的安全与稳定、繁荣与发展是符合所有相关大国利益的，也与其价值观是并行不悖的。关键在于双方要求同存异、扩大共同合作的基础并上升到机制化的层面。这里必须遵循的原则是，大国要尊重小国、强国要礼遇弱国，发达国家要照顾落后国家。反之亦然。只有这样，地区安全合作的框架才能够建立。就上合组织与欧安会来说，可以如下与事宜进行合作并使之机制化。

第一，就“恐怖主义”或“三股势力”的定义问题开展讨论，并从学术层面与政策层面有一个统一的认识标准，以利于双方在反恐方面采取共同行动。911以来，无论是上合组织成员国还是欧安会成员国，一致谴责国际恐怖主义，并建立了国际反恐联盟。这是美国发动阿富汗战争的合法性来源，也是美国在中亚驻军的合法性来源。然而随着时间的推移及阿富汗战事的平息，上合组织与部分欧美国家在界定“恐怖主义”或“三股势力”时出现分歧，甚至有双重标准的状况，这是不利于国际反恐事业的。如何解决这个问题？争吵无济于事，需要双方相关学者和官员利用各种场合进行讨论，统一各自的认识，拟定出关于“恐怖主义”、“三股势力”的标准化定义。

第二，就中亚地区的发展道路与区域合作进行讨论，使双方对各自的立场和观点有比较深入的了解，至少避免不必要的误解。中亚地区发展道路方向是关系到本地区安全架构稳定的重大课题。上合组织与欧安会在这个问题上有分歧，这个分歧不解决，可能比恐怖主义问题更加影响到本地区的安全稳定。欧安会认为中亚国家是独裁专制政权，因此希望中亚进行民主改造，推动公民社会进程，必要时甚至借用街头斗争的方式改变政权，如吉尔吉斯斯坦的“颜色革命”。而上合组织主张在中亚稳定压倒一切，中亚国家有权利选择自己的发展道路，外部势力包括中俄美欧都不能对中亚的内部事务进行干预。究竟谁是正确的有待实践检验。但是伊拉克政局已经提供了深刻的教训。民主发展不能超越阶段，特别是在民族宗教关系错综复杂的地区更是如此。否则所谓现代化的民主改造就会变成血腥的宗教派别屠杀。欧盟主张以和平对话方式解决各类争端是非常聪明的做法。我在乌兹别克斯坦看到了艾伯特基金会中亚协调办公室所做的工作是非常有益的，是中亚国家所能接受的。现在需要中国学者与欧洲学者共同研究一些问题，对于中亚发展模式不能简单停留在是否搞民主化的口号上，而是涉及政治、法律、经济、贸易、金融、文化、教育和民族宗教等各个层面的问题，最后能够总结出几条符合中亚国情、符合人类共同价值观的发展经验，例如是否需要在中亚地区
建立自由贸易区或者共同市场等，供中亚国家选择。

总之，中亚地区建立安全架构是非常重要的也是非常艰巨的任务，需要上合组织与欧安会等利益攸关方通力合作，共同建设，上策是把该地区建设成为“和谐地区”；中策是促使该地区成为“稳定地区”；下策是由于大国的博弈导致恐怖主义、极端主义的泛滥，从而使中亚地区成为欧亚大陆的“破碎地带”。现在到了需要做出选择的时候了。
The Roles of EU and OSCE in Regional Security Architecture

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My task in the Council Secretariat is dealing with relations with the OSCE in the framework of CFSP and ESDP, our Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy, as our alphabet soup wants it.

I here would limit myself to a description of recent developments in the relations between the EU and the OSCE; with a small historic introduction. When I add my assessments and touch upon possible future developments, these words will be my own.

The EU

The two organisations share what is most important, a common set of values. Regarding security, both hold that for any country, true, long-term stability is only achieved through the development and consolidation of the rule of law and democracy. And the same goes for lasting peace between them. The EU's very inception was founded on a radically new vision on relations between States, after the old "balance of power" system had failed us so catastrophically in the first half of the last century. The EU started as an economic community only (then the EEC), but in the eyes of the "founding fathers", economic entwining was but the means for an end: preventing war forever in Europe. The European continent achieved stability and peace in growing unity on this new principle of consensus, not conquest, a process that culminated after the fall of the Iron Curtain with enlargement, or better the reunification of Europe. Once this had happened, it was only natural for the EU to apply the same principles to its new-born foreign policy. CFSP and ESDP are acronyms that hardly any European citizen knows, but all polls show that a vast majority of them, including citizens of traditional (ex) great powers like the UK or France, support a European foreign policy on the world stage. Governments are sometimes slower to come round to this idea. Of course, the small ones have more to gain, but even the big ones start to realise by now that they will not forcibly lose out by the growth of a European foreign policy, by the 27 represented by the Presidency and by High Representative Solana. In other words, it dawns on them that for Europe foreign policy is not a zero sum game.

The influence and capacity to act of the EU is fast-growing. Just two examples: On the Balkans, the outbreak of a brutal civil war on our very doorstep, after the "end of history", made us realise that this capacity to act together was a bitter necessity. ESDP was born out of the failure to prevent that tragedy. Now it is a good example of a region where the common EU approach has superseded the old national rivalry. About a hundred years late, we learnt the lesson of Sarajevo 1914. We're not there yet – the results of the Serbian elections just now are not quite as we'd wish – there will be bumps on the road ahead, but in the medium run I believe we can be optimistic. The Israel-Palestine conflict is another good example. The EU has slowly but steadily built up a credibility with both parties in the Israeli-Palestine conflict that other actors, such as the US or Russia, cannot match. The conflict is particularly intractable, but if
a solution will be sighted one day it will probably be on the basis of the two-state approach that the EU has long defended, and I hope we will play a key role as broker. Both in the Balkans and there, the quiet, unglamorous, non-nationalistic and long-term approach that the EU stands for could work, just as it did for ourselves: to put an end to war through state-building and economic (later political) integration.

The CSCE, later OSCE
Back to Europe, or rather Eurasia: When the EU was still small, exclusively dealing with economic matters and very much inward-looking; when the Cold War was still dominating all international relations; then, in 1975 in Helsinki, a forum for "détente" was born, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), that aimed to lessen tensions through dialogue, and to achieve arms reduction between the Soviet bloc and the West. It was based in Vienna, then neutral ground between East and West. At the insistence of the US and the European States, from the outset the CSCE included a "Human Dimension" basket, dealing mainly with Human Rights. To the dismay of the Soviet Union, this was grasped by the dissidents all over Central and Eastern Europe to protest against the system and undermine it from inside, especially in the Soviet Union itself: the so-called Helsinki Groups.

Eventually the system disintegrated. Historians will assess the role and the merits of the CSCE in that; it has not been negligible. All ex-Soviet republics became members of the CSCE (later rechristened OSCE), initially with great enthusiasm for most. Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov recently called this phase "our romantic period". But the end of the Soviet Union had not all been peaceful. In three regions vicious wars broke out: Transnistria and South Ossetia / Abkhazia, both opposing new States, Moldova and Georgia, to their Russian minorities, supported by Russia; and Nagorno-Karabakh, a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All resulted in a stalemate, and are referred to as "frozen conflicts", an ominous term.

Interaction, evolution
In 1991, these conflicts were scarcely the concern of the EU, which hardly had a foreign policy yet and was busy enough dealing with German reunification, the introduction of the euro, and looming unprecedented enlargement after the seismic shock at its Eastern border. But they poisoned the relations in the OSCE, though the organisation did start a mediation role that has over the last 15 years contributed a lot to prevent re-ignition of these "mini Cold Wars".

For the OSCE had to re-invent itself. With the end of the Cold War, the military dimension became less important, especially disarmament, taken over by other fora. The OSCE found its new vocation in the promotion of security in the broad, European sense, in all these new, often shaky countries: that is, by helping in the construction of States built on the role of law and democracy. In the Balkans, the OSCE had (and has) a large and efficient presence in the field, instructing the police forces, the judiciary, fighting corruption, mediating between bitterly antagonistic parties in every village; in excellent collaboration with the EU and the UN. And it kept working also in all states of the former Soviet Union, often practically alone. Its sub-organisation ODIHR, the Organisation for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, grew and acquired a professional know-how and thus authoritativeness in the observing of elections that started to worry those participating States where democracy was perceived as dangerous for stability by the ruling party or elites.
The reporting by ODIHR on the 2004 elections in Ukraine showed serious manipulation of the results by the government. Mass protests (the 'Orange Revolution') brought about a second round, (again monitored by ODIHR, and judged broadly free and fair) and the victory of the opposition. Russia openly disavowed the organisation, stated it was a tool for "regime change", and requested that the field missions and ODIHR be brought under the control of the participating States, and allowed to operate only with the consent of, and in close collaboration with the State in question. Russia got support from Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and initially also from Armenia and Kazakhstan.

By now, however, the EU had a foreign policy. On Russia's request mainly, in Vienna, round the table with all 56 participating States, we have spent two years negotiating on what Russia calls "reform" of the OSCE, but what we define as just "enhancing its efficiency", for we believe it works very well indeed - and that's precisely what Russia is concerned about - , and stands in no need of profound changes. The OSCE, as said before, defends the very same approach to security as we do: long-term stability through the promotion of the rule of law and democracy. It is tiny in terms of budget compared to us, but it is much more nimble and flexible. It is not stagnating and still capable of excellent work. Just one example: in 2006 it played a key role in defusing the potentially very dangerous conflict between Russia and Georgia triggered by the arrest of four alleged Russian spies in Tbilisi. The OSCE reacted faster than we and obtained the liberation of the Russian officials, to the relief of all parties.

The EU now makes up about half of the OSCE: 27 States out of 56, to which one must add the like-minded, such as Norway and Switzerland, but also several Balkan countries, Moldova and last but not least Ukraine, who all align to many of the EU's common statements and ensuing policies in Vienna. We contribute 70% to its budget and 80% to its personnel. Between the two other big players, Russia and the US, we often have a mediating role. We want the organisation to continue its work in all three "baskets", called the politico-military, economic-environmental and human dimension. But always from a security angle, to avoid duplication with others (UN, Council of Europe, or indeed ourselves).
And the OSCE is the only security forum we share with Russia and the US. That is too precious an asset to jeopardise, and we believe at bottom Russia agrees on that.

Where to? The future of the OSCE
The OSCE prepares the ground for the enlarging EU in building stable States. Once the aim is reached, it can fold up its field mission, as it did in the Baltic States, and possibly soon in Croatia. Gradually, before that, the EU has already stepped in, with its huge budget and comprehensive programme of integration. The sometimes long "overlap phases" need to be managed carefully. At the moment, we are discussing on our future respective roles in Kosovo. But our experience is that though there is sometimes some friction at headquarters level, collaboration in the field is always excellent. The aims are the same, there is more than enough to do for all, we do it together.

So probably, the focus of the OSCE will move East, to States which will not in the foreseeable future belong to the EU. To the South Caucasus (nation-building and the
frozen conflicts) and to Central Asia, where much remains to be done. "OSCE values are not Western values, but universal values." These are not our words, but Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev's, when he presented the candidature of his country for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009. We couldn't agree more, and welcomed the candidature warmly. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan stands out for its fast economic growth, but also for its interethnic and religious harmony. The EU, however, believes that a Chair of such an organisation should exemplify or at least actively pursue all of its values. Regrettably, in 2006, there has been little progress in fields such as freedom of political parties and the media; and the last elections were less than perfect. We believe Kazakhstan has understood and accepted the OSCE's December decision, namely to postpone the decision on their Chairmanship for one year. We're convinced that even the most sceptic participating States, such as the US but also several EU Member States, are really hoping that this year some decisive steps will be taken by Kazakhstan, that will allow us all to have this first Central Asian Chairmanship, be it in 2009, or 2011, if evolution is slower. It would be a victory for Kazakhstan itself, but in a much larger sense for the vitality of the OSCE as a whole, reinventing its role in Eurasia once more. And we believe it would be in the interest of China too: you want stable, well-ruled neighbours (especially if they sit on huge reserves of oil and gas), not volatile and isolated autocracies (there's still a few around in Asia, in and outside "OSCE territory"). Kazakhstan may, if successful, serve as an example for some of its neighbours, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The OSCE and the SCO have rather different approaches to security. They overlap in Central Asia. Kazakhstan sets value on both, as shown by its OSCE Chair bid, while at the same time the new Secretary General of the SCO is Kazakh. There is no collaboration between the two yet. The SCO plays a role in the fight against terrorism: I believe that as long as this does not go at the expense of OSCE values, Kazakhstan may profit from both.

In its poetic imagery, the following story by a foreign diplomat in Brussels to a colleague of mine may well have its roots in China. It applies to the EU but surely to the OSCE too. In observing for several years our consensual but messy decision-making, so difficult to reconcile with spectacular results such as the euro or enlargement, he said: "I recall my long walks along the river in autumn. Looking up, I would notice a large swarm of birds, swirling around wildly up and down, apparently aimlessly and in chaos, separating, regrouping, some of them heading off suddenly and then returning, never moving from the spot altogether. I would walk on and come back hours later. The swarm was still swirling about as before; only it had somehow moved three miles upstream."
The Role of NATO in the Regional Security Architecture

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1. NATO – What is it about?
Today the western alliance consists of 26 members. The enlarged NATO reaches from the west coast of the US across the Atlantic to Russia’s western border. However, more self-declared members-to-be are waiting at NATO’s doorstep, including the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia. In accordance with its founding treaty (Washington 1949) the fundamental purpose of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. In the eyes of its members NATO has always been more than a system of collective defense. NATO is considered an alliance of values, based on democracy, liberty, the rule of law and the (peaceful) resolution of disputes.1

The bedrock of NATO is and remains its transatlantic dimension. The principal US security guarantee was as important for Western Europe’s security after the Second World War as was the promise of an enduring US protective umbrella for the Eastern European countries after the demise of the Soviet empire. Security guarantees from across the Atlantic remain the most important incentive for states to become members of the alliance, and many states believe that the sooner they join, the better.

In the last decade NATO has expanded not only the number of its members but also the geopolitical scope of its activities. Although its operational focus has not become intentionally global, the former distinction between ‘area’ and ‘out-of-area’ has become obsolete. In principle, NATO could offer its military capabilities to the UN for peace operations, then launch and carry out far distant NATO missions within this framework. However, such operations could be carried out only with the consent of all members. This requirement for political consensus among all members, combined with the limited resources assigned to NATO, make it unlikely that the alliance will adopt the role of global policeman. In fact NATO members have only once ever (after 9/11) invoked the core Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more members of NATO would be considered an attack against all. And even in this case, some of NATO’s military operations since 2001 have been carried out not within the NATO framework but rather on the basis of bilateral arrangements between the United States and individual member states. Ironically, even though NATO is more than ever considered to be the strongest and most effective military organization globally, an important part of its daily role is to act as a catalyst for generating the political consensus required and the military forces necessary for operations which the member states could not – or would prefer not to – undertake on their own. Yet even when a collective political decision has been made, individual members still decide whether or not they will provide personnel or equipment for operations under the joint command.

Since the specific arguments for carrying out an operation often go beyond the task of collective defense against an armed attack--i.e., they include individual motives for

using military means in order to support political ends other than allied defense—it is increasingly difficult to find a consensual platform for collective action. The debate among the allies over the Iraq war provided only the most recent striking conflict in this respect.

If the expansion of membership makes it inevitably even more difficult to reach common positions, as the above premise states, why have NATO members recently risked inviting even more states to become members? Two answers can be given. Firstly, if NATO members understand their alliance to be an association of states with common values, why should they miss the chance to expand this association if others who share their values want to join? Secondly, and in support of the first reason, the political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe opened a window of opportunity to put an end to the centuries-long era of intra-European hostilities and hatred. It would have been a dramatic mistake, against the background of a new chance for a unified Europe, not to seize this opportunity. Moreover, a third, rather hidden, motivation within NATO also played a role. The legitimacy of NATO’s existence was called into question the moment the reason for its founding—the Soviet Empire and the Warsaw Pact—disappeared. NATO had to either go out of area, or go out of business. This became the symbolic expression for the need to reach out toward new tasks and missions.

Why was (and is) NATO attractive to other states, both in and beyond Europe? The motivations may differ among the new members and members-to-be. Poland may have different priorities, for example compared with Slovakia, if both look at how NATO is important to them. For countries like Poland or Estonia the alliance is considered primarily a shield against a “return of history.” The institutionalized security guarantee given by the United States appears to them more important than the military alliance with their European neighbors. For other new members, which may not feel equally under pressure from the East, membership is primarily considered the required ticket to join the world of sustained democracy, freedom and economic prosperity.

This being said, however, NATO is attractive to its members not simply in its defensive role. NATO has also become an attractive partner for supporting conflict resolution in Europe and beyond. The alliance’s flag promises a combined political commitment and military capability of the strongest coalition of states on the globe. The successful transformation of the transatlantic alliance from a system of collective defense into a “hybrid” system that complements defense for all members with both institutionalized collective security building elements and multilateral military cooperation between members and interested partner countries has become the true secret of NATO’s survival. The Partnership-for-Peace-Programme, originally designed as a waiting room only for candidate states, has helped overcome previous Cold War divisions in Europe. Meanwhile more than 40 states have become involved in PfP. In addition, the framework partnerships with Russia and the Ukraine, the bilateral cooperation agreements with other European states, the Mediterranean Dialogue Programme and NATO’s broader Middle East initiative all complement one another and have opened up the idea of security partnerships to other nations in and beyond

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1 As a reflection of this Poland for example strongly opposes a strengthening of a EUmilitary role, because particularly Poland seems to be afraid of a comparably diminishing role for NATO and for the US in Europe.
Europe, independent of their status as member-candidates or non-members. Therefore, ironically, NATO’s attractiveness, while it is still based on the idea of collective defense against any military threat from the outside, can be better explained today with tasks and operations which at first glance seem to be peripheral, but which have actually become core assets of daily activity: organizing collective security among nations irrespective of their membership status.

Is there legitimacy for a military alliance in a unified Europe?

Ironically NATO became after its “victory” in the Cold War confronted with most striking strains and rifts ever since its founding. First of all cohesion was challenged by the simple fact, that the former enemy had not only disappeared by either declared the wish to join the alliance or to closely cooperate with it. If defense was at the core of the alliance what it should be for after the common enemy had vanished? Of course, the member states still had their threat perceptions, but different from the past, the hierarchy of perceived threats was not any longer the same from member to member. Not any “old” European member, perhaps apart from Turkey for national reasons, perceived any longer the threat of becoming attacked. The first years of the 1990ies NATO members muddled through – they wanted to keep NATO alive without not clearly knowing what to do about it in its function as a system of collective defense. Enlargement and transfer of military stability to other parts of Europe became the two key expressions for a temporary legitimacy leeway. However, the euphoria that came with the end of the Cold War has quickly run its course. The enlargement strategy had its peak with the accession of the Baltic States (by crossing Russia’s “red-line”), the stability transfer strategy with the Dayton Peace Accord. The political disaster in Kosovo made clear that military power alone could not give a sufficient answer to the question of common sense and political cohesion among the alliance. Although NATO adopted the new concept of going out of area at the anniversary summit in 1999 the political challenge of re-creating a common ground of the alliance was not met. It became rather replaced by cool calculation, shifting coalitions based on self-interest, and, finally, a politics of the lowest common denominator. After the pre-Iraq rift, shocking for all members (yet partly for different reasons), the allies have made strong efforts to reshape a new consensus and basically they have been successful for the reason that they have recognized that a split does not serve the interest of any member and also not of the alliance as a whole. The rift, however, has became over-painted, not eliminated from scratch. As far as Europe is concerned it has become clear that the intra-European conflicts over the future of European integration – the future of the EU – have a decisive impact as well on the future role of NATO as a regional European institution.

Although NATO and EU enlargement have occurred almost simultaneously, and although – with the exception of Malta and Cyprus – all the new members are states in Central and Eastern Europe, the goals and consequences of the two processes are different. The European Union is an institution sui generis: a community of nations dedicated to peaceful mutual relations, whose essence, based on the rule of law, consists in the close structural integration of both the contracting states and their constituent societies. One aspect of this is the willingness of members to voluntarily transfer elements of national sovereignty to the community to secure mutual benefits. Ever-tighter EU integration is gradually transforming state borders into mere demarcation lines of residual national influence. Until 1999 (Kosovo crisis) a EU’s
military component had played subordinate role.

The “awakening” over Kosovo led to both a parallel conceptual and practical acceleration of a military pillar for the EU. But instead of growing political consent this effort brought about new suspicions and conflicts, on the side of the US who was afraid of US-led NATO to become less important for the Europeans, and on the side of the new EU-members, who feared that

Defining the function of this military component and integrating it in the overall context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is one of the most important challenges of the coming years – a collective challenge that needs to be faced by all members – old and new.

The 2002 Prague Summit Declaration’s rose-tinted description of NATO as an alliance for “peace, democracy and security” stands in stark contrast to the abject disunity displayed at the same time by the Alliance’s members on the UN Security Council regarding the proper course to pursue against the Iraqi regime. The formation of rival coalitions both within NATO and between NATO members and third parties against fellow NATO members presented a remarkable picture of internal strife and discord. The political conflict over the Iraq War was the climax of the more general crisis that developed within the Organisation following the USA’s declaration of a “global war on terrorism” in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. And, of course, the origins of this crisis are to be found in the unsatisfactory answers given to questions on the future shape of the global security system, the role of military might, and the role of a collective-security alliance after the end of the Cold War.

NATO has adapted both its Strategic Concept and its structure several times since 1991. Its least controversial role has always been as an instrument of security policy in and for Europe. This has – with the exception of the problems caused by the unilateral course taken in Kosovo – also worked to the advantage of the Alliance’s external partners. Instruments of co-operation whose value has been proved over years have made a vital contribution to building military confidence in Europe beyond NATO’s boundaries and promoting security-sector reform in transition countries. These include, in particular, the Enhanced Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the NATO-Russia Council. No current member has any interest in the dissolution of the Alliance, while additional states are interested in becoming members. Nevertheless – and this could weaken the Alliance’s cohesiveness in the long run – old and new members, and accession countries alike, all invest the Alliance with different expectations. Some states wish to see the USA continue in a strong leadership role, which they consider a guarantee of their security, while others are interested in a partnership with America based on equal rights and responsibilities. Some support a reformulation of the division of labour between NATO and the EU based on the principle of equality, while others argue that NATO should take a leadership role with regard to the EU’s security policy. While some countries see one of the Alliance’s tasks as being to “tame” and restrain Germany, yet others are demanding Germany to assume greater leadership responsibility. Nor does unanimity

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1. NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 19, at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/ p02-127e.htm
prevail with regard to the extent and intensity of co-operation with Russia and of the Alliance’s out-of-area military commitments in the contexts of collective security and crisis management. The smaller member states, in particular, expect NATO to provide political support as they try to promote their interests in disputes with larger member states or non-members. Finally, there are differences of opinion concerning the division of tasks and responsibilities within the Alliance itself.

The elimination of the external conditions that originally led to the formation of NATO – the threat of a war of aggression – has not only allowed other interests in the continued existence of the Alliance to come to the fore but has also removed the requirement for unity at any price – something that depended on collective interest in protection from a common enemy. NATO’s cohesion therefore no longer consists in its ability to provide for the collective defence of its territory against a threatened attack but rather from the fact that its collective military and political functions broadly correspond with other shared (but also competing) interests of its members. But while NATO continues to defend its members’ interests as an important instrument of collective security, the fact that it is no longer compelled to do so by external pressure fundamentally changes the basis of its existence. As soon as there is no longer a collective threat that necessitates concerted action, there is in principle no need to reach consensus in disputes between members.

Occasional disputes between members are therefore now rarely hammered out within the NATO framework. But nor are they put aside in the name of the greater good, as would have been the case in the Cold War. Rather, they are left to smoulder while members look outside the Alliance to pursue interests that conflict with those of other members.

At NATO’s Jubilee Summit in Washington, which coincided with the war against Yugoslavia, the conflict of interests between the partners on future activities outside the scope of collective defence was only overcome by a last-minute formal compromise. This only remained in place until September 11, 2001. In response to the attacks of that day, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (stating that an attack against one member is an attack against all), the first time it had done so in the Alliance’s more than 50-year history. When, however, the USA, in order to preserve its unrestricted freedom of action and decision-making autonomy, decided to rely not on the Alliance but on a “coalition of the willing”, NATO became, in the eyes of one observer: “the chief victim of September 11”. This may be an exaggeration, but it contains a prophetic insight: Whoever places individual or group interests above everything takes an axe to the very roots of the community.

Donald Rumsfeld’s dictum that: “The mission defines the coalition” amounted to more than a rhetorical exclusion of NATO from the front line of future US security policy. It expresses clearly that the USA will not tolerate any restriction on its ability

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1 Helga Haftendorn, Das Ende der Alten NATO [The End of the Old NATO], in: Internationale Politik, Vol. 57 No. 4/2002, p. 49. [author’s translation].

to pursue its national interest – not even from its own allies. It may not have been put quite so dramatically, but recent disagreements between European states also serve to demonstrate that while NATO is one possible collective-security instrument, it is not the only one. The debate over the future of (the enlarged) NATO thus reflects less a fundamental transatlantic disagreement than the return of national strategic preferences in response to the removal of a clearly defined collective threat.

The unique value placed by individual NATO members on their relations with the USA arises from the role and influence it has as the Alliance’s leading power. When NATO’s leading power expresses its scepticism about the Alliance’s role as a platform for collective security it has a much longer-lasting effect on the alliance than when the same view is uttered by a smaller member state. Only with the mutual agreement of Germany and France over the impending war in Iraq did it become a genuine transatlantic dispute for NATO. Attempts at damage limitation by both sides were only initiated after the start of the war, and the disagreement has not been fully resolved to this day. In the event of further unilateral action, it could return with greater force and could even cause NATO fundamental damage. Whether NATO’s assumption of leadership under a United Nations (ISAF) mandate of the stabilisation mission in Afghanistan can postpone this in the long term is uncertain, as is the possibility of NATO assuming – as is currently being discussed – a greater operational role in Iraq. The problems have nothing to do with the Alliance’s military effectiveness. They are rooted in the difficulty of harmonising NATO’s new role as a “global security provider” – rather than a system of collective defence – with the its members’ divergent interests.

Europe’s NATO members urgently need to make critical decisions about the future. They are, however, ill prepared to make them, while enlargement will raise more questions than it will provide answers. Some Europeans criticise the USA for its unilateralism while offering no convincing answers to the questions of how to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fight the global danger posed by terrorism and stop the flagrant abuse of human rights by autocratic regimes. Criticism that offers no positive alternatives is no more likely to change NATO’s course – determined as this is by the Alliance’s leading power – than silent or even willing acceptance of imperial hegemony. If attempts to promote greater sharing of responsibility for decision-making are to succeed, a fundamentally different approach is needed – one that takes into account both collective and individual needs. Such constructive alternatives should meet with plenty of support in the USA where doubt regarding the correctness of Bush administration’s course has been growing in recent months, driven primarily by the situation in Iraq. This debate shows once more that we are not dealing here with a transatlantic disagreement, but with a struggle over policies and strategies – one that is being fiercely contested on both sides of the Atlantic, but has no exclusively transatlantic dimension.

Consequently, the solution does not lie in the currently much discussed elimination of the transatlantic asymmetry in military capacities. Overcoming what is often referred to as Europe’s military “capability gap” by starting an arms race in which one part of NATO competes against another would be the wrong course on political as well as financial and economic grounds. Europe’s and America’s respective strengths are and will in the future remain unequally distributed. The Alliance’s ability to generate synergies is its most important productive resource. At the end of the day, it is not
NATO’s absolute military superiority to any conceivable military threat that is decisive, but rather the political flexibility and the availability of instruments that allow it to react appropriately to a range of different security risks. And for NATO, the causes of security risks are not only – and certainly not primarily – military. Of course, European NATO members have their part to play in joint efforts to contain military security risks. A judicious division of labour can, however, be sustained despite structural inequalities in the strengths of American and European military forces – and even despite US hegemony within the Alliance – as long as the military component is part of a collective, coherent concept of security that complies with international law and within which European strengths are taken as seriously as American weaknesses, and vice versa.

The issue of NATO’s future is much more a political matter than a simple question of military operations. One has to consider both the shared and the divergent interests “old” and “new” member states have in enlargement as well as the interests of states that remain outside the Alliance in the short or long term. The shared interests of the “old” members includes the desire to secure the stability of the entire NATO territory both militarily and in terms of security policy, the transfer or export of stability to the areas where NATO is engaging in structural co-operation with partner countries, the consolidation of the transatlantic community, ensuring a stable and co-operative partnership with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the efficient, cost-effective provision of arrangements for collective defence, the elimination of security risks at the periphery of the Alliance’s territory and the alleviation and/or elimination of existing or potential security risks outside the NATO area that are of serious consequences for the Alliance’s security, such as arms proliferation and terrorist violence. While they share most of these aims, NATO’s “new” members also have their own interests, which largely stem from their specific histories as the victims of a divided Europe. They regard their membership of the Western Alliance as an insurance policy against the return of Russian imperial hegemony to Central and Eastern Europe, and they are far more sceptical than their Western partners towards the goal of a close partnership with Moscow. They hope that their status as Alliance members will bring them more economic and financial support as well as improving their chances of furthering their own economic interests through co-operation or export activities. For their part, the “old” members see the enlarged Alliance as a means of accessing new markets – although they are unwilling to simply give up their existing lucrative arrangements. Moreover, the newcomers appear to find a direct guarantee of US protection more important than the possibility of strengthening a self-confident but US-friendly Europe. Those countries that remain outside NATO for the meantime are making every effort to avoid being left out of future decision-making on basic questions of European and global security. Russia, in particular, insists on its special status and fears marginalization in terms of its role as a major actor both on the global stage and in Europe specifically. All countries excluded from enlargement share the concern that the creation of a “closed” security sphere will lead to their being excluded from the dynamic economic development within this zone.

Balancing all these different interests is a major challenge for all concerned. Moreover, the course NATO chooses will have repercussions on the overall shape of the future world order. Areas that will be affected include: the role and evolution of international law, the weight given to and the implementation of multilateral decisions, the function
of military forces in the context of “non-traditional security risks”, Europe’s future global political responsibilities, and the future balance of collective and national interest politics.

None of these questions has so far received an adequate answer. The accession countries appear – individual nuances apart – to support a course for NATO that can be summed up as subordination to US hegemony, an emphasis on NATO’s military functions, a comparatively weak role for the ESDP, and preferential links with the US defence industry. Enlargement, it is clear, has not made it easier to answer the key questions. Nor, however, can enlargement be held responsible for the fact that so few answers have so far been found. Europe was too slow in preparing for enlargement: While the USA developed a full strategic concept very early on in the process, the EU’s security strategy came along too late in the game. Not only that, but because of inadequate consultation with the USA, it was seen as a competing version – something that only makes it harder to carry out the desperately necessary task of agreeing a common NATO position. What remains clear is that the problems detailed here are not solved; NATO is threatened with marginalization – no matter how many members it has.
Chapter 3
Asia-Europe Cooperation and Sino-European Relations

Retrospect, Prospects and Suggestions for Asia-Europe Cooperation:
A Retrospect of the 2006 ASEM and Vision and Suggestions for the 2008 Asia-Europe Cooperation

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1. Introduction
In September 2006, the 6th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Helsinki, Finland. ASEM was established eleven years ago to offer heads of state and government from Europe and Asia a platform for a free and informal exchange of views. ASEM has since grown in size to de facto 45 members and now generates 50% of the world’s GDP, represents 58% of the world population and is responsible for 60% of world trade. In Helsinki it was agreed to enlarge ASEM to include Bulgaria and Romania as well as India, Pakistan, Mongolia and the ASEAN Secretariat.

Since its foundation, ASEM has evolved into the central platform for communication between Asia and Europe. In addition to the meetings of heads of state and government that are held every two years, encounters also take place at minister and civil servant level. The content of the consultations and projects range from questions of facilitating trade and investment to the discussion of issues of faith and religion in an especially established dialogue forum and social policy issues, such as work/employment and education, which have been discussed on ministerial level last year for the first time. The distinctive feature of the ASEM process is that ASEM partners meet as part of their respective region. While that may be accepted as perfectly natural from the European perspective, it only applies to a limited extent for the Asian participants.

The ASEM process has been inaugurated as a process that enables the Asian and the European region to overcome as well old as possible new resentments and to cooperate on an equal basis and in consensus in order to develop common ground and common interests. The comparative advantage of the ASEM process lies in the very openness of the rules, principles and norms that the state actors and the EU have developed so far. ASEM is an institution that generates and manages interdependencies in a globalizing world. The ASEM process demonstrates the demand for governance on the inter- and intra-regional level. This demand has increased across the board in the first decade of ASEM’s existence. Nobody had anticipated this dynamic development when the first ASEM Summit was conceptualized in the mid 90s of the last century.

Consequently the latest ASEM Summit in Helsinki can’t be looked at in isolation. In

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1 The Heads of State and Government summits, held every second year, give the overall political impetus to the ASEM process. Foreign Ministers and their senior officials have an overall coordinating role and are assisted by so called ASEM Coordinators. There is also a wide range of several ministerial and other meetings and activities at the working level.
order to analyze the impact of ASEM on Asia-Europe relations and EU-China relations respectively ASEM needs to be understood as a process. For that purpose ASEM will be modeled as a security regime\(^1\) - its issue-area being the danger of instability of the international system after the end of the systemic bipolarity. The following questions shall guide the analysis: What are the current characteristics of Asian-European cooperation and Sino-European relations within the ASEM context? What can be said about the effectiveness of the cooperation? Which direction is ASEM going?

In my paper I will firstly discuss general principles and patterns that structure the ASEM process by focussing on the policies of the EU and China\(^2\). I will then discuss the effectiveness of the ASEM regime by analysing the implementation, the compliance and the persistence of the regime. For this purpose the concept of open regionalism will be operationalized. ‘Open regionalism’ being defined as a strategy that facilitates and makes possible an interregional management of interdependencies. The strategy is based on the minimizing of relative gains-calculations and has four dimensions: a socio-political one, a normative-institutional one, a content one and a participative one.\(^3\) Finally the prospects of the cooperation between Asia and Europe shall be discussed by focussing on the enlargement of the ASEM process.

2. Cooperation à l’ASEM

The policy of the EU towards the East Asia region is a multilevel engagement policy. Furthermore, it is a mixture of bilateral and multilateral approaches. Besides meetings on the bilateral level the EU and its member states meet their Asian counterparts in fora like the ASEAN Regional Forum or through the ASEM process. Thereby it is a central aim of the actors to increase international cooperation not only bilaterally but multilaterally. The assumption that institution building on the intraregional and interregional level will facilitate shaping the context for future policy choices when interacting with East Asian actors and especially China is an inherent element of this approach.

Though ASEM stands for ‘Asia-Europe Meeting’ not all countries of Asia and Europe take part in the cooperation process. For example Russia does not belong to the ASEM regime. It consists de jure of 38 state actors, namely 13 Asian ones and twenty-five member states of the European Union (EU) plus the European Union. The latter is represented by the European Commission and the Presidency of the European Council. During the recent ASEM Summit in Helsinki it has been agreed that on the occasion of the seventh ASEM Summit in Beijing in 2008 Bulgaria and Romania will join the ASEM process on the European side while India, Pakistan, Mongolia and the ASEAN Secretariat will become an official ASEM member on the European side. Since January 2007 the new members are allowed to already participate in the ASEM

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\(^1\) A regime is defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.’ See Krasner, Stephen D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1983, p. 2.

\(^2\) In this paper “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China.

\(^3\) While this part of the analysis will make use of the liberal-institutional paradigm of international relations’ theory, the compliance will be analysed by a neo-realist’s and the persistence by a constructivist’s approach. See: Bersick, Sebastian, Auf dem Weg in eine neue Weltoordnung? Zur Politik der interregionalen Beziehungen am Beispiel des ASEM-Prozesses Towards a New World Order? On the Politics of Interregional Relations: The Example of the ASEM process BadenBaden 2004, pp. 52.
context. They will thus participate for the first time in the coming ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hamburg in May 2007.

The large number of actors makes the coordination of the involved interests extremely difficult. Apart from state actors non-state actors, i.e. the private sector and, increasingly, civil society, participate as well. In order to solve the resulting problem of cooperation and conflict between the ASEM participants the process has been conceptualized and structured as an interregional one.

2.1. European Principles of Engaging East Asia
Because of the ASEM process interregional cooperation has become a specific element of the EU’s approach to East Asia. This approach is based on two fundamental principles: 1. multilateralism, 2. regionalism. In this context it is necessary to conceptualize the ASEM process as taking place on the level of state-to-state interaction and on the level of region-to-region interaction. The ASEM regime thus plays a particular role because its interregional setting enables the actors to develop, coordinate and implement policies in a multilateral framework and to cooperate on the state-to-state level as well.

2.2. Institutional Asymmetry
Apart from the desire to intensify the economic cooperation, which Europeans and Asians have shared from the very beginning, actors of both regions had at least two additional and region-specific motives to start a cooperative venture that put the impetus on the cooperation between regions. On the one side, the Asian participants intended to use the ASEM process as a diplomatic mechanism that enables the Asian actors to cooperate (bilaterally) on a state-to-state formula with the member states of the EU. Furthermore, especially the ASEAN countries hoped that the participation of China would strengthen their position when dealing with the Europeans. On the other side, European actors and especially the European Commission intended to further strengthen a common European approach towards the Asian region. Therefore the ASEM process from its very beginning onwards has been confronted with a conflict between two different perceptions of interregional cooperation, which materializes in the form of an institutional asymmetry. The Asian side thought of interregionalism as an intergovernmental modus that promotes and renders possible the cooperation between both regions on a state-to-state basis, whereas the European side intended ASEM to be a cooperation mechanism that enhances the development of two collective actors: one European and one Asian. This is why in the case of ASEM the heterogeneity and the difference between the participants is, inter alia, related to different forms of intraregional cooperation and regionalization. Member states of the EU agreed to a loss of sovereignty and created supranational institutions and political actors like the European Commission, the European Council or the European Parliament. Because there was – in contrast to the European side – no functional equivalent, no institutionalised regional actor on the Asian side, an institutional asymmetry existed between the ASEM actors. Yet, the institutional asymmetry is dynamic and in flux. The most eminent example for this development is the political will on the side of the ASEAN to create an ASEAN Charter and the related issue of

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1 According to the EU-Asia Strategy, the main reason for closer political relations with Asia (being defined as consisting of 26 different countries in East-, Southeast- and South Asia) is the task of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. See: Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat. Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Asien-Strategie. KOM(94) 314 endg./2, Brüssel 27.07.1994.
re-defining the role of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in each others internal affairs.

2.3. China and ASEM

In its first actor-specific policy paper, i.e. ‘China’s EU Policy Paper’ from October 2003, the Chinese government formulates that “China and the EU should work together to make ASEM a role model for inter-continental cooperation on the basis of equality, a channel for oriental and occidental civilizations and a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political and economic order”. The PR China is one of the most important actors of the ASEM regime and its de facto hegemon. This is for two reasons. Firstly, a reason for the formation of the ASEM process has been to engage China, or, to put it in the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat, "to coax China into the mainstream of world affairs”. However, the Chinese input was very low at the beginning. Secondly, the interests of the Chinese government towards ASEM changed dramatically and can be differentiated into those before the Asian financial crisis (1997/1998) and those that developed within the new socio-economic and political context after the financial crisis. Shen Guoliang, Senior Research Fellow at the ‘China Institute for International Strategic Studies’, describes Beijing’s interest in the ASEM in four clusters: 1. Because of the imperialistic history between Asia and Europe the establishing of cooperation on an equal footing in the fields of economy, politics and culture ASEM is a historic event. 2. ASEM will further a process of multipolarization and by this help to establish a new political and economic world order. 3. ASEM shall counter-balance the influence of the USA. 4. ASEM lays the basis for an Asian-European partnership that shall lead to common interests and common positions. According to Shen there are conflicts of interests as well: Asia and Europe do not agree on issues like values, the role of the political dialogue and of security issues in the ASEM process, the liberalization of trade and investments. Zhang Yunling, Director at the ‘Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ in Beijing, furthermore underlines the importance of European technology, which the Chinese government hopes to acquire with the help of the ASEM process. Beijing, for instance, took the lead on the ‘Study Group on Enhancing Technological Exchanges and Cooperation’, and hosted ‘Asia-Europe Experts’ Meetings on Technological Cooperation’.

According to Wu Xingtang, former Secretary General of the ‘Chinese Association for International Understanding’ the most important aspect of the ASEM process is that the USA does not participate in it. The Chinese interest in ASEM is also expressed by senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Communist Party. Diplomats and cadres alike stress the importance of the ASEM process as a mechanism that allows for interregional cooperation with the Europeans without the participation of the USA. The absence of the USA explains why the Chinese government is convinced of the politico-strategic relevance of the Politics of Interregional Relations. As the Second Secretary of the ‘International Liaison Department’ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China put it: “The absence of the USA in ASEM is good. There are three poles: North America, Asia and Europe. The USA does not want to recognize this. ASEM marks the end of a 50 year long phase in which the USA monopolized the Asian economies. The non-existence of the ASEM process would have a negative influence on the evolving of a new world order – especially in the political realm. Europe and Asia want to balance the influence of the USA.” Shi Mingde, Director of the Department of Policy Research in
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasizes the politico-strategic importance of the ASEM process as well. In that context he defines multipolarity as the „growing importance of Asia and Europe“. According to Shi the rising willingness of the Asian ASEM actors to cooperate on an intraregional level does have an impact on the cooperation between Europe and China. He goes on to explain that when Chinese and European actors meet within the ASEM context not only bilateral issues are part of the agenda. „The common interest of Asia comes first. China’s interests are second“. In that context the director of the ASEM-Division of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that ASEM’s strategic relevance results from its aim to foster multipolarity through the strengthening of interdependencies between Asia and Europe.

The increasing interest of Beijing in ASEM results in a rising role of China in the overall process. China has been host of several meetings on the ministerial and senior official level and acted for instance as a co-sponsor in all ”key ASEM initiatives” for the ASEM Summit in Copenhagen. During the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kyoto in May 2005 the Chinese government offered to host the seventh ASEM summit in 2008 – the year of the Olympic Games in Beijing. As a consequence of this engagement policy the PR China learns to practice multilateralism on the regional and interregional level.

3. The Effectiveness of Cooperation à l’ASEM

In the following the effectiveness of the cooperation within the ASEM context shall be analysed by focusing on the implementation, the compliance and the persistence of the ASEM regime. The question shall be answered whether the operation of the ASEM regime alleviated the problem that led to its formation.

Implementation of the ASEM regime

An analysis of the socio-political dimension of open regionalism within the ASEM context shows that Asian ASEM actors had been willing to accept the formation of a new common Asian institution in order to foster interregional relations with the European side. Out of this informal grouping, which for the first time in history aimed at enabling Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian state actors to develop common positions, the ASEAN+3 mechanism evolved later on. Furthermore, the behavior of the Chinese government is a function of the socio-political dimension of open regionalism. Because of the rising interest and engagement of Beijing in ASEM affairs the Asian ASEM side does consist of an increasingly powerful actor. China has thus been successfully engaged in an East Asian multilateral process of cooperation. In addition the socio-political dimension of open regionalism fosters a reduction of interest-related asymmetries among the cooperating actors. Apart from that ASEM actors have developed normative behavior patterns that facilitate the implementation of the ASEM regime. Along with the ASEM regime implicit norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures have evolved which allow for the management of the growing interdependence between the actors.

With regard to the content dimension of open regionalism it can be stated that the different policy areas and the variety of issues that are being dealt with in the ASEM

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1 See: Fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Chair Statement, Madrid, 6-7 June 2002, paragraphs 6 and 7, mimeo.
2 For the following see Bersick 2004.
process clearly foster the implementation of the ASEM regime. Since the so called Asian financial crisis political interests have increasingly dominated the actors’ economic interests. Issues of transnational terrorism have even accelerated the change from a process of economic inter-regionalizing to a process of political inter-regionalizing. Analyzing the participatory dimension of open regionalism shows that political criteria rather than economic criteria decide on who is allowed to join the process. The Chinese intention to hinder actors which are ideologically close to the USA from becoming ASEM members has largely been successful. Australia has not become an ASEM member. The participation of India indicates a change in this respect. Furthermore, civil society actors (such as Human-Rights-NGOs) are, to a limited extent, allowed to participate as well.

Compliance of the ASEM regime
Considering the strategic importance of the ASEM process it can be stated that the interest of the Chinese government to participate in the process has grown strongly. Beijing uses the ASEM process to establish itself as a leading Asian power. The Asian participants’ intention was to balance the relationship vis-à-vis the USA (which had been regarded as “too dependent”) by increasing cooperation with Europe. As Japan has favored bilateral cooperation rather than multilateral cooperation its interest in ASEM had been decreasing while China’s interest increased. Furthermore, the importance of the ASEM process has grown since 9/11 2001. The participating actors use the process to formulate security policies. Hereby, an interregional consensus concerning security issues is being developed – even against US interests as in the case of the DPRK.

In accordance with the theory of hegemonic stability it is revealed that the ASEAN countries do not guarantee the compliance of the ASEM regime anymore. It is the strategic interest in closer relations with China that makes ASEAN countries to intensify their cooperation with China. Rather a passive member in the beginning China has thus become the benign hegemon of ASEM and accounts for regime compliance. This development refers to the establishment of a new strategic order within East Asia and the international system after the end of systemic bipolarity.

The ASEM actors cooperate on several levels. Besides multilateral efforts they increasingly engage in bilateral state-to-state cooperation. Consequently, two processes of interregional cooperation can be identified: first, bilateral cooperation, second, cooperation between two collective actors (EU and East Asia). By applying the region-to-region formula Asian actors can formulate their common interests. Therefore, the Asian ASEM region is not only defined by geographical criteria but also by functional criteria.

Persistence of the ASEM regime
The persistence of the regime can be explained by the development of a collective identity and collective interests within the ASEM context. The collective identity is a function of the regional perception-asymmetry. When the ASEM process began the Asian side did perceive interregional cooperation as a form of interregional multilateralism (that should not develop into a so called block-to-block format) whereas the European side did perceive it as a form of interregional bilateralism. However, this pattern is in flux and changing as Asian actors start to perceive interregional cooperation as a form of interregional bilateralism and EU member
states make use of ASEM’s interregional format in order to increasingly pursue their national interests. Thus, it is one of the functions of the ASEM regime to adjust differing perceptions of its actors. ASEM actors permanently adopt their originally varying perceptions of interregional cooperation. Thereby the original region-specific perceptual asymmetry between both sides is overcome. Consequently a new identity, an ASEM identity is developing.

As common positions are being developed in the ASEM context, actors have begun to share positions on security issues. Common positions concerning WTO negotiations have not been developed yet. Collective interests have been generated because common positions have been developed.

Further social constructivist analysis of the regime’s consistency reveals that the politics of interregional relations fosters the evolutionary overcoming of anarchy in the international system. ASEM has developed overarching intersubjective structures. Its persistence can be explained by the development of a collective identity and collective interests. The ASEM regime has the function to develop an intersubjective structure that constitutes a context of interaction that allows for the formation of a collective identity on the interregional level. Therefore the ASEM regime is an example of a socializing process of state actors into an interregional structure.

The results of the analysis show that the operation of the ASEM regime alleviated the problem that led to its formation. In that sense the ASEM regime is effective.

4. Prospects: Enlargement
According to the Finish presidency the priorities of the Helsinki Summit have been: support for the multilateral international system, addressing security threats (including global health threats such as the avian flu), questions related to energy security and climate change, commitment to resume as soon as possible the WTO Doha Development talks suspended in July 2006, questions relating to globalization, competitiveness and structural changes in the global economy and intercultural dialogue. Among the results of the last ASEM Summit in Helsinki¹ two developments are of particular importance. Both are related to the participative dimension of open regionalism: 1. the agreement of the leaders to accept new ASEM members; 2. the close interaction between and among state and non-state actors. Both developments will impact on the prospects of ASEM and its relevance for Asia-Europe cooperation and Sino-European relations.

4.1. Enlargement: The state-actors’ dimension
The agreed participation of new official ASEM members needs to be contextualized within the region and community building processes in Europe and Asia. Whereas Bulgaria and Romania have become de facto ASEM members because of the enlargement of the EU² India, Pakistan, Mongolia³ and the ASEAN Secretariat have

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¹ For all decisions that have been made in Helsinki by the leaders see the following three documents: Chairman’s Statement of the Sixth Asia-Europe Meeting Helsinki, 10-11 September 2006; ASEM 6 Declaration on Climate Change Helsinki, 10-11 September 2006; Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM, 10-11 September 2006. See: http://www.asem6.fi/events/summit/en_GB/summit/
² This is because all EU member states must be ASEM members – according to the interests of the EU.
³ For the role of Mongolia in ASEM see: Bersick, Sebastian, Proceedings of the EIAS Luncheon Briefing ‘Mongolia: From Chinggis Khaan to ASEM’, 23 November 2006, Co-organized by the
become *de facto* members solely because of the enlargement of (the European side of) ASEM. The enlargement of ASEM thus demonstrates the community building function of interregional cooperation. The ASEM process can thus facilitate community building processes in Asia that would not happen without it. Yet, the formation of this new Asian ASEM group overlaps with other mechanisms of community building in East Asia: The new Asian ASEM group, the ASEAN+3 mechanism and the East Asia Summit (EAS) do all consist of different members.¹

It remains to be seen whether the widening of the Asian ASEM side will facilitate or hamper the community building process among the new Asian ASEM members. The original (de facto) ASEAN+3 format of ASEM, which has been most instrumental in making the institutionalization of the ASEAN+3 mechanism possible, is ceasing to exist within the ASEM context because of the latest enlargement decision.

Yet, the accession to ASEM offers the opportunity to a given country to multilateralize its relations with other participating countries. It can do so for instance by investing resources into ASEM initiatives. Within the ASEM process an individual member state can take the lead by providing practical input on the policy level and vision with regard to the normative and institutional level. ASEM thus creates “multiple channels of contact”² that render possible the management of the increasing interdependencies between Asian and European stakeholders. The ASEM regime has the capacity to serve that function on the interregional level. It has done so for the last 12 years. But it is a regime and doesn’t have the power to act in its own right. In order to live up to the increasing responsibility of the involved actors in a plethora of policy fields ASEM needs thus to be further institutionalized.³

4.2. Enlargement: the non-state actors’ dimension

Within the ASEM context, non-state actors are having a decisive impact on the development of the normative and institutional basis of cooperation.⁴ In the ASEM context the role of civil society is currently indicating a similar trend, as the top-down structure of the process is becoming porous.⁵ While the influence of NGOs on the overall ASEM process is small as they have been excluded from processes of agenda-setting and decision-making, the ASEM regime is in a transition process that

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¹ For a systematical empirical discussion of Southeast Asian and East Asian processes of regionalization and community building see Rudolfo C. Severino, ‘Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community. Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-General’, Singapore 2006.


is transforming its elitist format to a more participatory one which allows for vertical dialogues and agenda-setting, as the example of the holding of the first ministerial meeting on labour and employment issues in September 2006 in Potsdam shows which dealt with the “Social Dimension of Globalization”. The ASEM process is thus developing a social pillar.

However, civil society has not become one of the three “prime actors” of ASEM, as stated by the ‘Asia Europe Cooperation Framework 2000’. Though the annex to the ‘Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM’ emphasises the need for “visibility, public awareness and links with stakeholders” the Asia-Europe Peoples’ Forum (AEPF) is not mentioned as one of them. Instead the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) is asked to continue “to play a key role in further developing the interlinkages between the Asia-Europe cooperation and the different civil society actors”.

Within this context it had been a new and potentially important development that delegates of the AEPF in Helsinki, which took place five days prior to the ASEM Summit, and members of the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), which took place back-to-back with the ASEM Summit, as well as representatives of governments, participated, for the first time, together in a conference which was co-organized by the Asia-Europe Foundation. Furthermore, the delegates of the Asia-Europe Peoples’ Forum and of the Asia-Europe Business Forum, agreed informally to continue their cooperation. In that sense ASEM events saw in Helsinki a first convergence of state and non-state actors’ interests that could add to the development of Asia-Europe cooperation by further transforming ASEM’s top-down format to a more participatory one.

5. Conclusion
Via the ASEM process the EU has been instrumental in encouraging regional cooperation in East Asia and the integration of the ever more assertive actor China into indigenous region building processes. The EU is thus facing new responsibilities with respect to the future development of East Asian region and community building processes. In order to further facilitate intra-regional cooperation in East Asia and the integration of China into the region successfully, the EU should therefore strengthen its inter-regional interaction with China within the ASEM regime. The enlargement of ASEM offers new opportunities in this respect as the enlargement will allow for the projection of the EU’s values into a new regional institution that consists of several emerging powers.

A policy of ASEMainstreaming, that is a policy that aims at opening up the ASEM process to the citizens and the legislators of Europe and Asia, should guide the post-Helsinki Summit decade. In addition to the EU’s and the Member States’ relations with the respective governments in Asia (and the ASEAN Secretariat), the EU should continue to engage and expand its support for concrete projects with all

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2 The conference ‘ASEM@10: Connecting Civil Societies of Asia and Europe’ was jointly organized by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) in collaboration with the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) and the Japan Centre for International Exchange (JCIE). For further information see: www.eias.org.
stakeholders of Asia's civil societies that aim at raising awareness, sharing information and exchanging best practices. NGO's, for example, have unique access to the ground rules of the countries they operate in. Their knowledge can be vital value-added for the conceptional phase that precedes any official negotiations and for policy implementation by ensuring complimentarity and ownership. Their inclusion can also contribute to the consolidation of Asia’s fledgling civil societies.

It is now up to the Chinese government to allow the Beijing ASEM Summit in 2008 to further contribute to the openness of the ASEM process thereby making the coming Beijing Summit a benchmark in Asia-Europe and Sino-European relations.
Shared Responsibility for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding—One Crucial Aspect of the Asia-Europe Cooperation with Global Relevance

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Introduction
If the purpose of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation includes not just the promotion of peace and security in respective region but also the enhancement of mutual engagement in the strategic partnership to deal with the issues of global relevance, the cooperation in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding should be given a high priority. Post-conflict peacebuilding here means, in a word, the efforts by the government and people of the country emerging from the severest of conflict to cut the cycle of violence and hatred and create a new social structure that can avoid the country to relapse into conflict. It is easy to talk about the importance of these efforts. But in actuality, it is a daunting task to bring together the communities of people who experienced the insidious and violent battles among neighbors, reconstruct physical infrastructure, and to reconfigure a governance structure. Peacebuilding is different form the more-commonly known concept of peacekeeping. While the latter usually relies on the third party, such as United Nations peacekeeping forces, to maintain ceasefire by letting the PKO forces to playing the role of the buffer. This type of remedy, though important and useful, does not necessarily change the status quo. But peacebuilding is an effort to go beyond the status quo and to create a new nation and society that are resilient to the pressure to go back to war.

In Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq, Sri Lanka; the African countries of the Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan; from Haiti in the Caribbean to Bosnia and Kosovo in Southeast Europe, nations all over the world are trying to move away from a history of insurgency, violent upheaval, and civil strife. As these cases represent, many of the serious conflicts in today’s world is internal rather than inter-state ones, although we know that there are serious state-to-state conflicts that need to be managed and resolved. But what we are witnessing today are the countries that are taking the first steps toward peacebuilding and are trying to forge a new path to a better future. And they need our help.

It should be made clear at the very outset that the primary responsibility of building the peace, first and foremost, falls on the government and people themselves in the local country. But it is the role of international community to support the local efforts whenever and wherever the needs are. In fact, in this era of globalization, helping those people who are aspiring to emerge from the conflict as much directly serves the interest of broader international community as the reflection of the moral imperative. The fate of Afghanistan was a clear testimony. It was a story of a fragile state, suffered from waves of interventions when its strategic location was believed an asset of the big power, but often neglected, and became the hot bed of international terrorist group. Ignoring the voices of people who are struggling to emerge from conflicts is akin to create “another Afghanistan under the Taliban’s rule.” The needs for supporting

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peacebuilding are crucial when nearly half of the conflict, unless proper efforts for post-conflict peacebuilding are taken, relapse into the violent conflict within five years from the signing of peace agreement. In East Timor, for example, a fragile peace was broken into pieces in late April 2006, a little less than four years since its hard won independence of May 2002, although it is more of a breach of stability than a complete return to a full-scale conflict. Nonetheless it was an unfortunate turn of event as both the local people and international community jointly had made a series of strenuous efforts to build peace on this new-born nation. There are number of other examples of more direct return to violence, particularly when international attentions and support tended to cease, out of a premature relief, upon the conclusion of ceasefire and peace agreements.

A comprehensive strategy is needed to bring about a more durable peace in the post-conflict societies. So, the new inter-governmental body called the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established at the United Nations, in December 2005 and has started two concurrent peacebuilding support projects in Burundi and Sierra Leone since October 2006. There are other examples, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, at which the international efforts are underway, to stabilize and promote reconstruction. If the countries as well as citizens in Asia and Europe are looking for an area of joint interest and cooperation, the field of post-conflict peacebuilding will be a key candidate. It is also an area directly related to the promotion of global governance as governance in global scope cannot be fully achieved unless and until the governance of each and individual country has been properly managed, including those post-conflict states.

**Mending the Gaps**

In a nutshell, what is most required to do in supporting the local peacebuilding efforts is to bridge the multiple gaps in the post-conflict transitional period. At the aftermath of a war, everything is in chaos. All the social infrastructures are damaged. The government structure might be defunct. Numbers of lives are lost. And those who have survived have difficulty getting rid of the sense of antagonism and political rivalry with the fresh memory of the conflict. But people have to make a fresh start however hard it may be to create a better future. For this purpose, international community should extend whatever assistance to bridge this gap from conflict to more normal state of sustainable development.

In the post-conflict countries, this gap takes many forms. The absence of governance structure, public security and public security apparatus, rule of law and judicial system, capacity of local people, both in government and in private sector, housing and job opportunities for people, including former combatants and former refugees, etc. From the viewpoint of international community, it is important to fill the attention gap and financial gap to helping those local people who have chosen to pursue the path to peace. It is important to recognize because the level of international attention, together with the financial and material support, to the local people and situation declines dramatically once a peace agreement, or ceasefire agreement, is concluded. But in fact, from the day one after the peace agreement, the most difficult process of reconciliation and reconstruction begin.

Then, what we need to ask is the question: what are the most effective and efficient ways to proceed with peacebuilding within a nation (and also to coordinated
international peacebuilding support efforts). The real work of the PBC still lies ahead, but peacebuilding in the broad sense has already begun in a variety of projects in different places. As for Japan, in Sydney in May 2002 Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro gave a speech in which he laid out the principles of “consolidation of peace and nation-building,” and afterward it was noted that peacebuilding would be one of the main tasks of ODA (overseas development assistance). Already, as far as conditions permit, Japan is contributing to international peace efforts by sending Self-Defense Forces contingents, civil police, and civilian personnel to assist with monitoring elections, engaging in humanitarian and reconstruction operations among others.

**Three Practical Practices**

In my own view, among basic measures that could be effective, I would like to outline three concrete ways that promise to contribute to the success of peacebuilding. The first is to build a foundation where peace can take root among the people in countries emerging from conflict; it is a “package” consisting of development, security, and human rights, all three elements of which are necessary and equally important. This idea was clearly expressed in the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s March 2005 report, *In Larger Freedom*, that covered the UN reforms such as the establishment of the PBC. The same approach is noted in important UN documents, also, such as the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit. It is also important to recognize that these three important areas of development, security, and human rights also constitute the three pillars of *human security*, an idea and approach to enhance and secure protection and empowerment of people under dehumanizing insecurity.

Second is the principle of “integration,” of doing away as much as possible with the vertical, mutually exclusive, compartmentalized operations of organizations and agencies working in separation from each other. The PBC approaches are planning on a country-specific basis. They formulate integrated strategy and priorities for peacebuilding in a way that jointly involves the host government and supporting countries (including its Organizational Committee members from 31 countries selected from among members of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the General Assembly as well as major troop contributing and financial contributing countries), together with key regional countries and international organizations, including international financial institutions, i.e. the World Bank and IMF. The input of NGOs is also important. Already in Burundi and Sierra Leone, what are called Integrated Offices each headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General have been established as UN Special Political Missions. Now, if the PBC framework can be put to practical use to further integrate the local U.N. team, the host country’s government, the World Bank, the IMF, and NGOs operating in the country, it would be possible to create in the host country a horizontal, inter-agency “peacebuilding architecture” corresponding to the New York-based PBC.

Third is the idea of a “compact,” or an explicit political agreement between the post-conflict country and international society with the determination to restore peace with local ownership and international partnership. Today, under the Bonn Agreement, Afghanistan and the international community have entered into a concrete accord aimed at restoring government and socioeconomic institutions, and they are working on ways to establish such an accord to help Iraq recover, as well. This idea for a compact, though it is not a mandatory legal document, would highlight the importance
of a political commitment by the local people to take responsibility themselves to unite and to peacefully work toward building a democratic state, while the international community makes a tangible commitment to give support and aid in that endeavor. This, I believe a reflection of a new sense of “shared responsibility” to bring about peace both for the benefit of local people and international community.

Investment in the Future

At the bare-bones level, the two absolutely indispensable elements in peacebuilding are human security and reconstruction of government—restoring the functions of a nation. In other words, this is the realization of two set of sovereignty. One of people’s own sovereignty and the other, state sovereignty. And both of these two are indispensable.

Only when the people themselves create a new post-conflict environment based on an internalized, self-motivated commitment to peace will it be possible to prevent a recurrence of conflict. That means securing the life of every individual and insuring an environment that offers the freedom and opportunities to draw on their full potential. It requires, in short, the guarantee of human security. Since the nation (the government) has a primary responsibility to provide that guarantee of human security to everyone, the government itself is bound to incorporate freedom and democratic functions for the state into its reconstruction. In addition to its internal needs, the reconstruction of a functioning state has an important external implication. That is, today’s international order remains rooted in the system of sovereign states, and so from the point of view of maintaining the basic international order, also, reconstructing a functional government adds up to the most rational option.

In sum, peacebuilding has to be a project that goes beyond conceptualizing and becomes a concrete project designed and implemented for a specific country. Certainly, the success and failure of peacebuilding is also determined, sometimes pre-determined, by the substance of peace agreement (or the terms of political settlement). Even if a political settlement is made, when significant amount of frustrations remain, the foundation of peace cannot be maintained. So even before engaging in post-conflict peacebuilding support begins, international community has to work seriously to help the parties to the conflict come to agree with a balanced peace agreement.

The people and governments in Asia and Europe have gone through our own experience of war and reconstruction. We’ve had our share of trials and errors. But at the same time, we have achieved a significant progress in terms of reconciliation and reconstruction. It is, therefore, most useful and important, to give an extra and special attention to the area of post-conflict peacebuilding, particularly in many parts of the world. I believe that this is one of the crucial areas of strategic partnership of Asia-Europe security cooperation.

As a nation committed to peace, as a candidate for permanent member of the Security Council, and as a member of the PBC, there is no reason why Japan should not play an especially valuable role in this important field of security cooperation. And this cooperative efforts for the promotion of peacebuilding will significantly move forward if the countries and people in Asia and Europe combine their visions and resources.
The Limits of EU as a Strategic Actor: the Case of Ending EU’s Arms Embargo on China

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Introduction:
Since the launching of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, the European Union has established itself as influential actor in international politics. Yet, EU is still an incomplete strategic actor, in terms of its internal capacity to pursue a full-fledged strategy and its influence in hard security and other critical matters around the world. This article will aims to explore this aspect of EU’s international actorness, and how it affects EU-China relations, by using the case of the protracted negotiation between EU and China aiming to lifting EU’s decade long arms embargo against China. The article argues that, as the Chinese side raised her expectations toward EU after EU promised to build a strategic partnership with China, EU’s inability to remove the discriminatory arms embargo produced a reality-expectation gap in the EU-China relations. The article will also discuss the two possible approaches to narrow that gap, the upward approach that needs EU to improve its capacity of strategic decision-making, and the downward approach that requires the Chinese side to lower its expectation toward EU.

Since the launching of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, the European Union has established itself as an influential actor in international politics. Yet, the EU is still an incomplete strategic actor, in terms of its internal capacity to pursue a full-fledged strategy and its influence in hard security and other critical matters around the world. As EU-China relationship enters the new stage of so-called “strategic partnership”, EU’s incomplete capacity of strategic decision-making is becoming a problem in the process of turning the rhetoric of strategic partnership into substance. This article will address this issue, and use the EU-China negotiation on lifting EU’s arms embargo against China as a testing case.

1. EU as an Incomplete Strategic Actor

1.1 EU as an international actor
The European Union and its predecessor, the European Community, originated as an international economic actor with the launching of its common commercial policy and its association agreements with former colonies of the member states. From the beginning of 1970s, member states developed the new foreign policy coordination mechanism, the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which enabled EC to play a new although mostly marginal role in world politics. By contrast, as Bjorn Hettne And Fredrik Soderbaum argue, “today's EU has emerged as a global actor and a force in world politics, especially in trade, development cooperation, the promotion of regional integration, democracy and good governance, human rights, and to an increasing extent also in security policies”.

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It was the end of the Cold War that gave the member states both new incentives and opportunities to seek a closer cooperation in their foreign policies. The Maastricht Treaty gave birth to a new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with clearly specified aims, institutions, procedures, and more forceful policy instruments. The CFSP mechanism was further strengthened with the signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, which allowed the EU to decide and lead the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”, such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, although it was still up to the Western European Union (WEU) to carry out the operations. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the Helsinki EU summit in December 1999 decided to establish a new European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as an integral part of the CFSP, but with some specific features of its own. ESDP calls for the merger of all WEU functions (except the homeland defense) into EU, and in doing so, transformed the EU into a nascent military actor. EU thus can develop its own military capacity, and is able to decide, lead and carry out military operations by its own.

According to Bretherton and Vogler, there are five basic requirements for actorness: shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles; the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system; the availability of and capacity to utilize, policy instruments; domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy. Judging from these criteria, with a view of what EU has achieved in developing a common foreign policy mechanism since 1993, we can definitely argue that EU has acquired some important aspects of international actorness.

1.2 EU as a burgeoning Strategic actor

A strategic actor has two dimensions of its meaning. On the one hand, it refers to a key feature of the actor itself, that is, the capacity of that actor to pursue and carry out a long term and systemic plan of actions designed to accomplish the objectives of that actor in international affairs. On the other hand, a strategic actor refers to the actor’s importance in international affairs. A strategic actor is one who can display an independent and highly important or essential role in shaping international affairs, such as shifting the international power balance, deciding peace and war, building and transforming international institutions, etc.

With this understanding, we could describe EU as burgeoning strategic actor. Firstly, the Union has developed its own diplomatic and security strategy. The Amsterdam Treaty specified five fundamental objectives of CFSP: 1) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; 2) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; 3) to preserve peace and strengthen international security; 4) to promote international co-operation; 5) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These objectives outline the long-term interests of the Union in international affairs, and they cover all the key aspects of the Union’s concerns, from economic, diplomatic to security aspects.

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1 See C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (KoxiWeAge, London, 1999), pp.38-42.
In December 2003, the Union put forward its first European Security Strategy (ESS), laying out in detail its aims and means to promote a safer and better world. The ESS identified terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime as the key threats to the Union’s security, and called on the union to address the threats; to build security in EU’s neighborhood; and to construct an international order based on effective multilateralism. For that purpose, EU should be more active, more coherent, more capable and to work with others.¹

Secondly, EU has managed to make use of its various instruments to pursue its strategic aims. For decades, EU has been skillful in relying on its non-military means to pursue its aims, emerging in international stage as a “civilian power”.² EU has gradually politicized EC’s external relations, using EC’s trade policy and foreign aid to serve its political and strategic aim, producing a situation where “EU as actor, EC as agent”.³ EU also used enlargement process to transform the domestic systems and inter-state relations of its European neighbors. Furthermore, EU has established itself as a zone of peace and stability, turning itself into a normative power⁴, which enhanced EU’s influence in the world by providing an attractive model of domestic and regional governance. In recent years, the development of ESDP equipped EU with new military instruments to pursue its strategic goals, a step going beyond the civilian power concept and transforming EU into an infant military power.

Thirdly, as EU built up its internal capacity to pursue strategic goals, it has displayed itself in international politics as an important player. EU has expanded to East Europe, and its political-economic influence in its neighborhood and Africa is only matched by the United States. As the biggest trading power and most generous development aid provider, EU also extended its influence to Asia and Latin America. As ESS stated, “the European Union is inevitably a global player…… Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”.⁵

1.3 The Limits of EU as a full-fledged Strategic Actor

Nevertheless, a full-fledged strategic actor requires the actor to reach high level at least in the following three aspects: full availability of its policy means and resources, high capacity of strategic decision making, representation and negotiation; significant influence on critical issues of international politics. If we judge from these criteria, EU is certainly facing many deficiencies in turning itself into a credible strategic actor.

² In Kenneth Twitchett’s words, a civilian power is “an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able to exercise influence on states, global and regional organization, international corporations and other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and legal factors”. Quoted from P. Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy? Gower: Aldershot, 1987, p.62.
First of all, EU is yet to avail itself of all the potential means and resources. EU does have made significant progress in availing of itself the wide range of economic leverages wielded by the EC to support its foreign policy objectives. For example, since the Maastricht Treaty, economic sanctions can be used as a leverage of the CFSP. On the inducement side, EC distributed €6.9 billion (2004) development aid, about 10% of world total official development aid. This aid can also be employed by the Union to support its foreign policy, although we have to notice that EU member states operate their individual ODA programs, mainly on their own with loose Union-level coordination, which amounted to € 27.4 billion in 2004, more than four times as much as EC aid.\(^1\) EC also developed its own diplomatic means, with a worldwide network of 118 Delegations in third countries and 5 Delegations to international organizations (such as OECD, OSCE, UN and WTO), employing a total of about 4,900 officials, including contractual staff and local agents.\(^2\) However, these are just a small part of the Union-wide diplomatic resources mainly controlled by member states. For example, in 1998, 15 EU member states had 443 diplomatic staff in their respective embassies in Washington, DC, while EC delegation had only 22 staff.\(^3\) In terms of military resources, only from 1999, EU has aimed to develop a 60000-strong military force that could be deployed within 60 days and to perform a one-year task (which required up to 150000-200 000 troops) from 2003 on. Although this size is only a small portion of total military force of the member states, as Frederic Charillon noticed, “When it became clear that the EU would not succeed in creating a force of this numerical strength, the numbers were scaled down considerably”.\(^4\)

Secondly, while EU has developed a CFSP mechanism to advance its foreign policy, it constantly encountered major difficulties in making the policy mechanism more consistent, coherent and effective. As a basically intergovernmental pillar of the European construction, the successful functioning of the CFSP mechanism relies on the cooperation and convergence of interests or preferences of the member states. The requirement of unanimity in decision-making gives every member state veto power to any common policy. Such a decision-making rule tends to make CFSP as well as ESDP very inflexible, rigid, and difficult to adopt new policies, especially when the issue is of vital importance. Meanwhile, once a policy is there, it is equally difficult to revise the policy in order to adapt to new strategic policy environment.

In terms of representation and negotiation, EU is also ill equipped. While big member states, such as France, Britain and Germany, do possess stronger leverages and wide interests around the world, legally, they have to share their say in the CFSP/ESDP process with all other smaller members on equal basis. Externally, EU is represented by a troika system, at summit level, comprising of the Commission president, the High Representative for foreign policy (Javier Solana) and the prime minister of the country holding the EU’s rotating presidency. Under this system, big members seldom

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\(^3\) The figure for the German, UK and French embassy was respectively 86, 74, and 62. See Michael Bruter, “Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission”, Journal of European Public Policy 6:2 June 1999. p.189.

are represented in EU’s external dialogue and negotiation, which decreases the credibility of EU representation, and makes strategic dialogue unable to conduct. ¹

Thirdly, EU’s role in international politics is also limited in several ways. EU’s role is still mostly confined to its neighborhood. It is a crucial actor in Eastern Europe, North Africa and to a lesser extent, in the Middle East and other former European colonies around the world. EU role is mostly restricted to tackling those disputes and problems without the presence of armed conflicts. Even in the European continent, EU has failed to solve the civil wars in Bosnia and in Kosovo, and had to rely on the military power of the United States to produce a peace pact. Furthermore, EU’s global influence is not crucial in those issues around which the world politics is shaped, such as the reform of the UN, managing the hegemonic American power and the rise of China. On these issues, the lack of internal consensus, the inability to fully command union-wide resources, render the union unable to pursue a common and effective policy.

2. The Rising Expectation of a EU-China Strategic Relationship

2.1 EU’s Engagement Strategy
Since the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of Cold War, after a short period of economic sanction and suspension of political dialogue, the European states has fashioned a strategy of constructive engagement towards China since 1994.

EU and its member states encourage China to integrate its economy into world economy, and support China’s involvement in multilateral institution, such as WTO, human rights regimes and Kyoto protocol. EU also develops comprehensive bilateral dialogue mechanism with China at all levels of government and in most functional areas. Furthermore, EU is particular keen to fund and support various capacity-building programs in China, to support the social and economic reform, environmental protection and sustainable development, good governance and rule of law. Between 2002 and 2004, the European Commission allocated about €260 million for 40 projects in above-mentioned areas.

EU’s approach towards China reflects EU and its member states’ overall foreign policy approach, as well as their particular understanding of the benefits of cooperation with China. Constructive engagement is a manifestation of EU’s civilian power strategy, with an emphasis on the value of non-military, inductive and soft power in shaping China’s domestic system and its relations with the rest world. EU hopes that those institutional webs it encouraged China to participate multilaterally and bilaterally will in the end transform China into a more liberal economy, and more democratic society based on the rule of law, and become a responsible player in Asia and beyond. Therefore, EU has refrained itself not to follow the American China policy, which is more often resort to pressure and coercion.

The end of Cold War also provided a unique opportunity for EU and China to develop a more autonomous and close relationship. In the Cold War era, EU-China relationship was largely a derivative of each side’s relationship with the two superpowers. Thus, “the relationship never developed its own independent dynamics,

but was reactive to changes in US-Soviet relations." The end of Cold War gave tremendous space for the two sides to develop a bilateral relationship on its own right. Such a relationship is helped with an almost complete lack of mutual interests conflicts. China supported German unification, EU integration and enlargement, while EU has no vital political and strategic interests in East Asia which conflicts with China, and EU also adheres to the one-China principle, not letting Taiwan issue to complicate the bilateral relations. Most importantly, the constructive engagement strategy reflects EU’s strong interests in the cooperation with China. Economically, China’s rapid economic development provides with EU an indispensable foreign market for EU export, and lucrative place for EU direct investment. Politically, EU and China share many views on post-Cold War international issues. They both support the strengthening of UN and other regional and global institutions; they both advocate the use of political means to solve international disputes; they both stress the importance of addressing the difficulties faced by the developing countries; and so on. In a word, EU and its member states have an increasingly converged view about China and have able to develop a constructive engagement strategy towards China over the last decade.

2.2 Progressive Europeanization of Member States’ China Policy

With the strong push from key member states, such as Germany and France, European Commission issued a policy paper on China, A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, in 1995. In the paper’s view, China “is increasingly strong in both the military-political and the economic spheres”, and the developments in China “not only have a far-reaching impact on itself, but also have global and regional implications”. Therefore, EU’s china policy should aim to promote “the fullest possible Chinese involvement in the international arena, whether on security, political, environmental, social or economic issues”.  

As a general EU China policy guideline in place, in the following two years, with the leading of some key member states, EU also shifted its human rights policy towards China. Since 1989, EU member states had persistently cosponsored a motion against China annually in the United Nations Commission on Human Right (UNCHR). But in 1997, France, supported by Italy, Germany, Greece and Spain, decided to break away with the past practice, refused to cosponsor a similar resolution. While other ten states continued to table and cosponsor the anti-China resolution, in the next year, the French view prevailed. The result was another constructive Europeanization of some member states’ China policy. On 14 March 1998, EU’s General Affairs Council (GAC) decided that, EU would “neither propose, nor endorse” any resolution criticizing China. Instead, EU will extend its constructive approach to the human rights area, and set up EU-China human right dialogue mechanism. The following 1998 Commission paper, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, codified this decision, and proposed to upgrade EU-China dialogue to summit level.

In September 2003, the Commission released its last policy paper on China, A Maturing Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations. In 

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the context of upcoming EU Eastern enlargement, the negotiation of EU constitutional treaty, the American invasion of Iraq and China’s rapid rise of political and economic influence, the new policy paper called for a EU-China strategic partnership, stating that “it is in the clear interest of the EU and China to work as strategic partners on the international scene…. Through a further reinforcement of their cooperation, the EU and China will be better able to shore up their joint security and other interests in Asia and elsewhere”.

2.3 China’s Rising Expectation towards EU
In October 2003, apparently as a direct reply to the EU’s September China policy paper, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a policy paper on the EU, China’s EU Policy Paper. This is an unprecedented move, because the Chinese government has never published any policy paper of its kind towards a country or regional group, a fact fully demonstrating the high importance, which China attached to its relationship with EU.

The paper point out that, “despite its difficulties and challenges ahead, the European integration process is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs”. With regard to bilateral relations, the paper stated that, “there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other.”; and the “China-EU relations now are better than any time in history”. Interestingly, the paper did not describe EU-China relationship as a strategic one. Only in the last part of paper regarding the military aspect, the paper called to “develop and improve, step by step, a strategic security consultation mechanism”. Nevertheless, the paper expressed strong commitment from the Chinese government to strengthen and enhance China-EU relations as “an important component of China’s foreign policy”, and to build a “long-term, stable and full partnership with the EU”.

Both EU and China’s policy papers gave EU-China relations a big boost in the following months.
- EU and China signed a new agreement on cooperation in the EU’s central Galileo satellite navigation programme in 2003;
- In 2004, the agreement granting Approved Destination Status (ADS) came into effect, which allows Chinese tourists to benefit from easier procedures to visit Europe.
- In 2004, an agreement covering joint research on the peaceful use of nuclear energy signed at the 7th EU-China Summit.
- In 2004, EU-China Science and Technology Agreement was renewed.
- In 2004, both Chinese president and premier visited Europe, and premier Wen made two trips.
- In 2004, EU-China two-way trade amounted to 177.3 billion US dollars, making EU the biggest trading partner of China, and China as the second largest trading partner of EU, only after the United States. EU is also the biggest technology supplier to China, and fourth-biggest foreign direct investor, with a realized volume of investment of 42.5 billion US dollars at the end of 2004.

All these rhetoric and real achievements reinforced the rising expectation in China

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towards the EU. A “honeymoon” between EU and China is in the making. In that context, China explicitly raised the issue of lifting the decade-long EU arms embargo on China in China’s EU policy paper, and proactively requested EU for a quick solution.

3. The Protracted Negotiation over Ending the Arms Embargo

3.1 EU’s Arms Embargo against China

The EU embargo is based upon a one sentence in a political declaration issued by the European Council in June 1989. It simply states that EU members will impose “an embargo on trade in arms with China”. The declaration is not a legally binding agreement, and it was issued four years ago when a Common Foreign and Security Policy was in place. The CSFP has been provided with different legal instruments, like Common Positions and Joint Actions, which could be used to impose embargoes. But the embargo on China is never based on these legal instruments. Therefore, Anthony even argued that, “from a legal perspective, there is not one arms embargo against China but a series of national arms embargoes established under national laws and regulations”.¹ As the declaration did not specify exactly what “arms” means, member states are allowed to adopt their own interpretation of embargo. For example, a number of them, Like United Kingdom, interpreted the embargo to cover lethal military items, but not non-lethal items to China such as avionics and radars. Therefore, member states are still able to grant export licenses of military-related equipments or components.

Having said that, EU states seemed to agree that to lift the embargo, they need to reach a new consensus, thus give veto power to every member states, and imposes a serious hurdle for those wanting to lift the embargo.

In 1998, EU member states signed the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. In essence, the Code is also not a legally binding document, but a political agreement among the EU’s ember states about the conditions under which they will authorize arms exports to third countries. While it does impose a requirement for coordination and consultation, the legal framework on export decisions remains at the national level. Compared with the vague embargo against China, the Code set up rules to supervise, and sometimes block, high-tech and dual-use exports to China. It also specifies eight criteria that member states should take into account before authorizing arms export licenses, several of which are relevant for exports to China. These include the recipient country’s respect for human rights; the likelihood of its re-exporting the product or technology; the danger that the sale might negatively affect regional peace, security, and stability; and the risk that the export might negatively affect the security of other EU member states or allied and friendly countries²

Under the Code, EU states have the obligation to report their arms export annually. As the EU reports indicate, several EU members granted export licenses to China with total value of 209.8 millions, 461.2 millions and 340.7 millions of Euros respectively

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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>79.5</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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3.2 The Twists and Turns of the Negotiation

Shortly after the publication of China’s EU policy paper, during the visits of French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to China in November and December, they both publicly supported a reexamination of the EU’s arms embargo policy against China. EU Commission president Prodi, Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and External Commissioner Chris Patent also gave their support. On December 12, 2003, EU summit meeting agreed to reconsider EU’s fourteen years-long arms embargo against China.

Initially, some observers had pondered that, “if a critical mass of EU members publicly starts Campaigning to lift the embargo, few of the remaining members will want to be singled out as the active opponents. Once that critical mass starts to take shape, a decision could come quickly”. However, the following developments indicated that this view was too sanguine.

In January 2004, during Chinese President Hu Jingtao’s visit to France, French President Jacques Chirac told his Chinese counterpart in Paris that the 15-year-long embargo, slapped on China after 1989 "makes no more sense today", and hoped the ban would be scrapped "in the coming months". French Defense Minister Ms Alliot-Marie also argued that lifting the embargo was largely a symbolic move to further normalize EU-China Relations. "The embargo was made about 15 years ago, and the evolution of China and of its international relations have been very significant since then," she said. "We cannot have relationships with China in all these fields - economic, medical, research and so on - and conserve the embargo as it is today.”

As ten new members were set to join the EU in May, supporters of lifting the embargo had hoped that a decision could be made before that, in order to avoid more complicated internal bargaining. However, although the French policy gained support from vast majority of the fifteen member states, a consensus was not reached before May, and the issue had to be handed over to the Dutch Presidency.

In October, EU foreign ministers made another attempt, but failed too. Some Nordic countries linked the issue to China’s human rights record; some new member states and UK were sensitive to strong pressures from the American government. In early

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1 Ibid.
December, the annual EU-China summit was held in Hague. Before the summit, Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing made very clear that China is not interested in buying European weapons, but that it is opposed to the ban in principle, especially as the EU and China have named their relationship a "strategic partnership". In Li’s words, "China's position is very clear. What we are not in favor of and are opposed to is in fact that this ban involves and reflects political discrimination". He insisted that this political discrimination is not conducive to cooperation, and “it is totally useless and should be abandoned” 1

With the new Chinese push and assurance, the following EU summit made an important step in the direction of lifting the embargo. In the president’s conclusion, "the European Council (of EU leaders) reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo," and it "invited the next presidency to finalize the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision". Truly, the document sent a “positive signal” to China and left opens the possibility of an agreement in the next Luxemburg presidency.

The hope of lifting the embargo during the Luxemburg presidency waned out in June 2005. After a summit meeting, the presidency conclusion tuned down its position, only saying that, “the European Council also recalls its conclusions of 16 and 17 December 2004. It welcomes the progress made on the revision of the code of conduct and the "toolbox", and invites the Council to continue its work on that basis". Indeed, the diplomatic exchanges between EU and China within that half-year were very intensive. As UK apparently did not want to see a postponing of this issue to its presidency in the latter half of 2005, the Luxemburg presidency was under great pressure to break a deal. Yet, although Mr. Chirac and Mr. Schroeder both continued to strongly lobby other members to end the embargo, they both faced new difficulties at home. While Chirac strongly backed the new EU Constitutional Treaty, the French referendum of 29 May rejected the treaty with a clear majority, which seriously hurt Chirac’s political authority and credibility in France and in Europe. In Germany, Mr. Schroeder’s foreign minister, Joschka Fisher from the Green Party, was reluctant to see the embargo to be lifted. Also, in May, Schroeder’s SPD was defeated in Germany’s largest state election, Northern-Westfalen. As the major European proponents of lifting the embargo encountered big political problems, those opponents raised the issue of the new Chinese Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People’s Congress in March 2005, accusing that the law "aggravates the situation across the Straits in an unjustified way," 4

The following British and Austrian presidency did not put the embargo issue on top of its agenda. The defeat of Mr. Schroeder’s SPD in the general election further weakened the camp of the proponents. The new German chancellor, Ms. Menkel, is not keen to follow her predecessor’s policy on the embargo issue. At the moment, the diplomatic interactions within EU and between EU and China aiming to find a quick

solution have lost much of its momentum. During Chinese president Hu Jintao’s
four-nation visit to Europe in November, the arms embargo almost disappeared from
the agenda of his meetings with European leaders.

3.3 The stakes Involved
During the years-long negotiation over lifting EU’s arms embargo on China, it
became increasingly clearer that such a decision is mainly a “symbolic one”, does not
mean, in the words of European council’s presidency conclusion in December 2004,
“an increase of arms exports from EU Member States to China, neither in quantitative
nor qualitative terms”. However, even under that framework, EU countries still are
unable to come to a common agreement. So what went wrong over the last three
years?

For the proponents of lifting the embargo, they think it is no longer appropriate to put
China into the same category as Zimbabwe or Myanmar, countries that are also
subject to EU’s arms embargo. Getting ride of the arms embargo is seen as the last
step of normalizing relations with China rather than as a reward for anything. EU
wants to move on with its relationship with China and sees lifting the embargo as a
necessary measure on the way forward. Furthermore, such a lifting is mainly a
symbolic move without practical implications for arms sale. In this realm, the relevant
actors are still the member states. Even if the EU embargo on China is removed, those
national export controls will still be applicable. Besides, a strengthened “EU Code of
Conduct on Arms Exports” could be as binding as the embargo. ¹

This position was challenged by two different considerations, human rights and
geopolitical interests. The human rights camp which includes active human rights
NGOs, the European parliament and some Nordic countries insist that, the arms
embargo was put into place out of human rights concerns, and China’s human rights
record has not met the EU criteria, and thus should not be lifted, or at least on the
condition that China ratifies the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, which China signed in 1998 but not ratified.

However, the strongest opposition is from the United States out of its strategic
consideration. In David Shambaugh’s words, these interests include, “maintaining
stability in the Taiwan Strait, the security of Taiwan, and preventing China from
possessing European arms that might potentially used in battle against American
forces”. ² To protect these American and its allies’ interests, the United States has
conducted a fierce diplomatic campaign to thwart EU from lifting the arms embargo
through dialogue, persuasion and threat of punishments. The United States not only
opposes any decision to lift the embargo, which has “largely prevented the flow of
lethal weapons and weapon platforms to China”, some like Shambaugh also argued
that, such an embargo should be further “strengthened”, to prevent the flow of defense

¹ Gudran Wacker, “Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: U.S. and EU Positions”, in Bates Gill and
Gudrun Watcher (eds.), China’s Rise: Diverging U.S.-EU Perceptions and Approaches (Berlin: German
² David Shambaugh, “Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: An American Perspective”, in Bates
Also see David Shambaugh, “The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China’s
technologies to China. Shambaugh and others also doubt on EU’s ability to use a revised “Code of Conduct” to prevent the flow of arms and technologies to China, do not accept EU’s argument that EU will not sell arms to China in the post-embargo period with the existence of a revised “Code of Conduct”.

These strong American opinions were brought into the EU internal debates by those new member states that have strong pro-U.S. Atlanticist foreign policy orientations. Together with the human rights camp, the United States and its close allies within EU blocked the Union to make a quick decision on the embargo issue.

4. Wither the “Reality-Expectation Gap”?

4.1 The Realty-expectation Gap
Christopher Hill introduced the idea of “capacities-expectations gap” (CEG), to describe a key problem of CFSP, that is, the persistent presence of a gap between expectations and capacities. CEG emerged along the birth of CFSP. It pointed to the rising expectation of internal and external expectation of the newly born CFSP, and the enduring insufficient capacity of the union to fulfill those expectations. Hill once summarized six expectations of EU in international affairs: A replacement for the Russia in the world balance of power; a regional pacifier; a global intervenor; a mediator of conflicts; a bridge between the rich and the poor; a joint supervisor of the world economy. Since CFSP was not equipped with strong capacities to meet these expectations in the Maastricht Treaty, CEG often caused serious frustrations within and beyond the union. The whole efforts of the new treaty negotiations, to a large part, were devoted to close the gap, to make CFSP more credible and be able to live up to those expectations.

To borrow Hill’s metaphor, we could identify that a similar “reality-expectation gap” (REG) is emerging in the EU-China relations. The Chinese government as well as its public has raised their expectation of the relationship, as both sides agreed to the notion of a “strategic relationship”. They believe that, by categorizing the EU-China relationship as a “strategic” one, EU should treat China as a strategic partner, and take a strategic decision to end its outdated and discriminatory arms embargo against China, which put China in the same category as Zimbabwe, Myanmar. Even North Korea is not subjected to EU arms embargo. But the reality is, after nearly three years, EU is still yet to come to a decision. Such a reality is frustrating to Chinese, as Gu Junli, an expert with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, expressed that, "the EU should value the strategic partnership with China and make the right decision soon to ensure a more stable development of bilateral relations." It also hurts EU’s credibility in China. Commenting on the EU-China disputes over the arms embargo and textile trade, former EU commissioner of External Relations, Mr. Chris Patten, lamented in Financial Times that, “for some years, China has appeared to believe more strongly in Europe’s role as a serious player on the world stage than we do ourselves. It is difficult to believe that this is still true”.

We might identify three-set of reasons that explain EU’s indecision on the issue. The

first reason could be termed as EU’s inability to develop a substantial and operational strategy in security and military-related domains. After ten years of functioning of the CFSP, EU did produce a common security strategy and a China policy paper, which both vowed to build a strategic partnership with China. Yet, as Simon Duke observed that European Security Strategy is not identical to the American National Security Strategy, which aims to provide ‘a fairly detailed and concrete programme statement on behalf of a single sovereign entity’, whereas the EU security strategy document sounds more like ‘an inspirational sketch’ designed to draw EU members back together after the divisions over Iraq and to ‘show the world that they mean business’. Therefore, the EU security strategy is more like a ‘concept’ rather than a strategy per se.1 Such a strategy did not provide operational guidance for member states to make further decisions to substantiate the strategic relationship with China.

The second reason relates to EU’s weak policy institutions in the field of CFSP. Although member states agreed to import some of the community methods in the policy process of CFSP, neither the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) nor the European Commission occupies a major role in the process. Member states and unanimity still holds the key in the policymaking. Any single country is entitled to veto and block a union policy, either to adopt a new policy or to adjust a previous policy. Therefore, CFSP in essence is biased against new policy initiatives, especially on more contentious issues.

The third reason is CFSP is still subject to external influence, particularly the influence from the United States. Although all member states agree that the Atlantic alliance remains irreplaceable to the safeguarding of European interests, but that does not mean every EU states agree to grant the United States the veto power over any EU policy. However, on important issues, the American influence is still ubiquitous, either subjecting EU policy to the American policy preference, or simply blocking the common policy through its close allies within the union.

4.2 Narrowing the Gap: the Upward Approach
Under such a context, how can we narrow, if not to say close, the REG? Generally speaking, we could have two approaches, an upward one and a downward one. The upward approach is to improve the reality to meet the already raised expectation. As EU and China both aspire to establish a strategic relationship, it is more desirable that the two sides could improve the relationship towards a more credible strategic one. To narrow the REG in this way, the task mainly rests on the EU side. This requires EU to further upgrade its CFSP and ESDP policy mechanism, to develop more detailed and guiding strategy, and to fashion a more autonomous European policy towards China.

In 2004, EU did make a historical move to substantially improve the CFSP mechanism through the successful conclusion of the negotiation of EU constitutional treaty. In that historical treaty, EU is to obtain a formal legal personality for itself; to install a permanent EU Council president and a foreign minister to replace the rotating presidency; to integrate EC’s external relations with CFSP by appointing the foreign minister as the vice president of the European Commission; and to turn the EC delegations into EU diplomatic missions, etc. Although unanimity would continue to dominate the decision-making in CFSP, all these changes would enhance EU’s

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capacity to conduct more consistent, coherent and effective diplomacy. Nevertheless, in 2005, the two failed referendums in France and Netherlands to ratify the treaty gave an almost fatal blow to the fate the constitutional treaty, thus dashed the hope of a significant improvement of the CFSP mechanism in the short run. We may envisage some minor improvements in that direction on an intergovernmental basis in the following years, but the hope of major improvement is now becoming increasingly in doubts.

If we could not see a major upgrading of EU’s CFSP mechanism, then is it conceivable that EU could strengthen its strategic actorness with its current or slightly modified policy mechanism? That could happen only if there is a convergence of member states’ policy preferences. As the paper already argued, it is a very difficult process because of the apparently divergent interests among the member states. One scholar once asked: “after the defeat of Schroeder and Chirac will the embargo issue still remain only a matter of time?” Nevertheless, the possibility is always there. In terms of enhancing the EU-China strategic relations and specifically removing the arms embargo, continued exchange of views among EU states and between EU and China shall be conducive to address the concerns of every side, in order to facilitate a final decision on the EU side. Furthermore, as China’s influence grows and as well as extends into the traditional European zones of influence, like in Africa and Middle East, European states will find increasingly necessary to lift the embargo to ensure wider cooperation from China in those regions and on those issues which are of great concerns to Europe.

4.3 Narrowing the Gap: The Downward Approach
While we still hold the hope that there is a possibility of an upward narrowing the REG, we also have to think about the alternative approach of a downward approach, to lower our expectation to fit the reality from the Chinese side.

This approach denotes that the high expectation that China placed on EU is a false one. Given the nature of EU’s CFSP mechanism and the overwhelming US influence on the EU policy, it is not a realist approach to depict EU as a full-fledged strategic actor on security and contentious issues. Therefore, EU should be understood as what it is. Because of the major setbacks EU faced in its deepening process, the understanding of what EU is in reality is more important than the prospect of what EU will be, and that understanding should be our starting point of China’s EU policy.

With that understanding, China should focus on EU's role as a mainly civilian power, using its economic, diplomatic and political means to exert its influence in the world. With the launching of ESDP, EU is able to pursue a more credible role in the world affairs with a new although small military instrument. Such a mainly civilian power can be a strategic actor, particularly in the economic, political and diplomatic domains, and in EU’s neighborhood. The strategic actorness of EU is growing, although in a gradual way and with its limitations. Therefore, China should continue to work with EU to promote comprehensive cooperation, and to build a strategic relationship where EU is capable to do. Meanwhile, China should be aware of the fact that, EU at this stage is not yet a full-fledged strategic actor, and be conscious of the limitations EU

faces in its efforts to become a global strategic actor.

The second possible aspect of the downward approach is reemphasizing the importance of the bilateral relations between China and EU member states. On strategic issues, there are several EU states could be seen as truly international strategic actors, many of them have already established strategic or comprehensive partnerships with China. Developing and strengthening these important bilateral relationships could fill the vacuum of EU-China strategic relations on the core issues that have overall impacts on global peace and stability. Chinese government and scholars generally are aware of EU’s multi-level nature of its foreign policy. However, because of EU’s successful policy in raising EU’s profile in China, the conclusion of the constitutional treaty and the EU leaders’ sanguine promise of a strategic partnership with China, EU’s rhetoric and the current shadow of EU’s future let Chinese shift more focus on the EU level, less on the level of member states. While it is correct that EU should be given more attentions than before, at least on the strategic matters, a reinvention of bilateral relations with some member states is necessary and warranted under current circumstances.

Conclusion

David Shambaugh in recent years has been promoting an idea that, as EU-China relations becomes closer, a new “EU-China Axis” is emerging, and is giving birth to an new EU-China-U.S. strategic triangle. It is a fancy idea with partial truth. As this paper shows, EU is not yet a complete strategic actor, as demonstrated by EU’s indecision to remove the decade-long arms embargo on China. EU is still yet to develop an operational strategy on hard security issues, to avail itself of the necessary resources and effective policy-making mechanism. The failure of the ratification of EU’s constitutional treaty further exposes EU’s limitations as a strategic actor. For China, while China has to lower its high expectation towards EU in the context of leadership change in some EU countries and the failed ratification process of the constitutional treaty, a strategic relationship with EU remains a key component of its foreign policy. Therefore, it is more desirable for China to find realistic ways to narrow the REG in an upward approach. To make EU-China strategic relations more credible, China needs to build more vibrant bilateral relations with member states while strengthening its strategic dialogue with EU-level institutions, particularly in hard security policy domains. As EU decision-makers and general public are better informed through these mechanisms, and as EU-China bilateral relations and China’s global influence enters to a new stage, the time for an EU consensus on the need to lift the arms embargo and of a stronger EU-China strategic relationship will eventually come, even in the context of EU’s current mainly intergovernmental foreign policy framework.

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diplomacy studies, Chinese foreign policy and EU studies. His major recent publications in Chinese include: *International Political Economy and China’s Globalization* (Shanghai: Sanlian, 2006, co-edited with David Zweig); *Foreign Policy Integration in European Union: An Mission Impossible* (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2003, with Gustaaf Geeraerts); *Subnational Governments and Foreign Affairs* (Beijing, Changzheng Publishing House, 2001). He also published several articles in English, such as “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Feb. 2005; “NATO, APEC and ASEM: Interregionalism and Global Order”, *Asia Europe Journal*, Autumn, 2005. Professor Chen was a visiting fellow at Harvard University (1996-1997), also visiting scholar at Queen’s University, University of Durham, Lund University and Keio University. He was named *Chevalier dans L’Ordre des Palmes Academiques* by French Government in 2006.
In the framework of an ever-closer relationship – expressed in the “strategic partnership” as declared in 2003 - between the European Union and the People’s Republic of China, co-operation in the field of security has repeatedly been part of the EU-China agenda. Yet, an implementation of this part of the strategic partnership is hampered by different interpretations of shared terminologies and rhetoric on the so-called “new security concepts,” and different views on the international system, the own desired role and, last but not least, the perceived role of the United States of America. Co-operation in the security field will hence remain fragmented and rather marginal in practice and will be most feasible in areas where no “hostile actor” is involved, such as (environmental) disaster management and coping with pandemics.

Since the declaration of the strategic partnership on occasion of the 6th EU – China summit three years ago, a lot of resources were invested in order to turn the declaration into deeds and to substantiate the demanded strategic partnership. Yet, the ambitious goals have not been met and a process of ‘sobering up’ after the Sino-European ‘honeymoon’ has been paving its way on both sides of the strategic partnership. The recently published communication of the European Commission sheds light on a not too harmonious marriage and on the manifold areas where the two partners still need to go a long way. Three years after the declaration of the strategic partnership, this paper aims to take a closer look on the underlying conditions for an ever closer cooperation in the field of security: Do we share the same paradigms? Do we share the same priorities? Do we share the same goals?

The paper critically assesses the possibilities, prospects and difficulties of Sino-European co-operation in the field of security. It discusses the signed EU-China Strategic Partnership and identifies commonalities and differences between the European Union and China in both their respective security concepts and in their general paradigms on the international system - and hence their perspectives on the role of the US. This chapter will conclude that although there are numerous commonalities and common approaches to international issues and problems on paper, the EU and China differ too much in their interpretations of the defined security concepts, their preferred international system, and their positioning towards the US. Given these basic differences, co-operation is likely to be successful in fields such as the environment and pandemics, but will remain very limited in security areas such as non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, conflict prevention, and energy security.

The Strategic Partnership – Documents, Aims & Tools

In the business area, strategic partnerships are formed for a limited time period to achieve a goal by combining the differing strengths of the two companies, two companies that are based on the same market principles. The Sino-European strategic partnership aims at the cooperation between a block of democratic countries, the EU and a single, autocratic state, China. Yet it remains to be seen if the fundamental differences in the political systems per se exclude, limit or do not impact at all the implementation of a genuine strategic partnership. To what extent do the countries need to share the same paradigm and hence congruent connotations of key principles to establish and implement a sustainable and lasting strategic partnership?

Almost three years have passed since the EU called for the implementation of a ‘strategic partnership’ with China in its December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS)\(^1\), its first ever comprehensive security strategy paper.\(^2\) Following the first notion of China as a strategic partner in June 2003 draft of the ESS, the European Union referred to China as a strategic partner already in September 2003, when the EU Council adopted the EU Commission’s paper on EU-China relations, entitled ‘A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations.’\(^3\)

During the following 6\(^{th}\) EU-China summit on 30 October 2003, leaders from both sides “stressed their resolve to further expand and deepen China-EU relations, guided by the two policy papers\(^4\), which promote the development of an overall strategic partnership between China and the EU.”\(^5\) For the first time, the summit was upgraded by a concurrent bilateral meeting with the Chinese president, Hu Jintao. Both sides expressed their intention to deepen cooperation on multilateral issues and global challenges, strengthen economic ties, launch numerous new sectoral dialogues and agreements and pursue their scientific, technical and development cooperation.

Over the following three years, great diplomatic resources were invested in the implementation of the EU-China ‘strategic partnership’, establishing respectively envisaging about 22 “sectoral dialogues”\(^6\). In order to promote and implement ‘global’/‘effective’ multilateralism, ‘democracy’ and ‘global peace and stability’, the EU Commission co-hosted and co-sponsored a number of EU-China conferences,

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6 These sectoral dialogue range from competition policy and education & culture to energy and space cooperation. For a list of the EU’s sectoral dialogue, please take a look at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/intro/sect.htm
roundtables, workshops and seminars to create momentum in the aftermath of the ambitious declaration\(^1\), discussing the envisioned EU-China ‘strategic partnership’ with academics, analysts, journalists and the general public.

**The Strategic Partnership and Cooperation in the Security Field**

As this paper deals with the perspectives for a Sino-European strategic partnership in the realm of security cooperation, it is necessary to outline the different perceptions of the new security environment, the respective definition of security itself and the particular connotations of the used terminology. The EU’s foreign and security policies are still mainly decided and implemented by the individual EU Member States, not by EU institutions. Hence, in this context it becomes necessary to also take into account the security concepts and approaches to regional and international security of the Europe’s so-called “Big Three”: Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

**Perception of the New Security Environment – Challenges, Opportunities and “Comprehensive Security” Concepts**

Both papers, the “European Security Strategy”\(^2\) (ESS) as well as “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept” (CPP), start off by referring to the violence of the two world wars and the conviction that the use of force alone will not fundamentally resolve disputes in the long term. However, already the introductions illustrate how differently the two parties perceive the situation today: According to the CPP, China, having become a power with global political and economic influence over the last decade, considers the current international security environment to be an opportunity to “discard the old way of thinking and replace it with new concepts and means to seek and safeguard security.”\(^3\) Europe, having been in a position of stability, peace and prosperity for the last 50 years, perceives the new challenges primarily as threats – hence the ESS emphasises that “Europe still faces security threats and challenges.”\(^4\)

After September 11\(^{th}\) and in response to the spreading impact of globalisation in the field of security, China as well as the European Union and its Member States have adjusted and extended their security concepts. During the Cold War, territorial defence against a conventional attack from a sovereign state was perceived as the primal threat. This perception has changed to include an expanded security concept which appears to be similar in nature in both parts of the world. Terms for this new concept range from the “New Security Concept”\(^5\) to “comprehensive security”\(^6\) and an “extended

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\(^1\) Among other initiatives, the Commission conducted with the EU Member States a follow-up seminar to the 6\(^{th}\) EU-China summit in February 2004 in Beijing in order to draft an Action Plan for implementing the summit declaration’s goals.


\(^3\) CPP, p. 1s

\(^4\) ESS, p. 1


\(^6\) This term was used for the first time already by the Japanese Prime Minister Ohira in the 1970s, see i.e. as quoted in Raymond Feddema, Akio Igarashi, Kurt Radtke (eds.)(1998), “Comprehensive Security in Asia: Views from Asia and the West on a Changing Security Environment”, Brill: Leiden
security term” (“erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff”). All of these new concepts emphasise the changing nature of risks and threats in the 21st century, underlining the pre-eminence of international terrorism, the influence of non-governmental actors and the asymmetrical character of new confrontations. They also include challenges that go far beyond purely military concerns, such as demographic shifts, spreading pandemics and securing natural resources. Furthermore, they all agree that the challenges of today are global in nature and require concerted responses by the international community. In other words, they necessitate extensive international co-operation. The “New Security Concept” as laid out by the Chinese government even insists that in this “world of diversity […] security co-operation is not just something for countries with similar or identical views and mode of development, it also includes co-operation between countries whose views and mode of development differ.”

In view of the China’s historical memories of foreign invasion and occupation by foreign troops, defending against foreign invasions and safeguarding territorial integrity still play the central roles in China’s security concept. Moreover, the emphasis on (a peaceful resolution of) territorial and border disputes reveals a worldview that is dominated by traditional security concerns. In Europe, which has seen half a century of integration and increasing economic, political and security interdependence, intra-European military conflicts are now considered highly unlikely if not altogether impossible. Threats are “more diverse, less visible and less predictable,” as outlined in the December 2003 ESS. All of the Big Three agree with this assessment, underlining that “the risks posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are starker [than before], as are the risks to wider security posed by failed or failing states.” In addition, for Germany traditional territorial defence has lost its significance, and international conflicts, asymmetrical threats, terrorism and WMD are now the focus of German security interests. France points out the increasing vulnerability of societies due to the “spectacular propagation of information technology” and other technologies as well as to the concentration of populations in vast urban societies. France hence adds to this list of security concerns non-military threats such as the possible neutralisation of decision-making centres, possible action against distribution and communication networks, and possible direct actions taken to influence public opinion via these new technologies.

While perceived challenges seem to be of the same nature in their respective security strategies, China and Europe do not necessarily share the same vision of what shape the international system should take. With the European Union being built on the ceding of sovereignty and China still suffering from a trauma of forced foreign

1 as used by the German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier in his inaugural speech on 23 November 2005 in Berlin, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2005/051123-SteinmeierAmtsueber nahme.html.
2 CPP, p. 2
3 CPP, p. 1
4 ESS, p. 2
6 “Die Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien“, German Ministry of Defence, Berlin, 21 May 2003

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influence, both sides differ fundamentally in their views on issues such as sovereignty, intervention, so-called ‘interference in internal affairs of other nations’ and global governance. They also face differences in the approaches towards non-military threats: While the European Union is only slowly getting used to the idea of an “Energy Foreign Policy,” China’s rapid economic growth and steadily rising demand for energy (above all crude oil) has made China prioritise the hunt for energy and raw materials over a broader political agenda. Facing criticism for accommodating with dictatorships and autocratic regimes for the sake of securing their supply of crude oil and other commodities, the government typically refers to the principle of non-interference. Although criticism from the EU is still restrained in this context, this example nevertheless sheds light on the deviating approaches of Brussels and Beijing towards global governance.

China’s 2003 EU Strategy Paper called for ‘high-level military exchanges’, a ‘strategic security dialogue mechanism,’ training and defence studies co-operation. Security issues such as non-proliferation, terrorism, international peacekeeping, conflict management, the prevention of people trafficking and illegal migration, etc., are now being discussed either within the framework of the EU’s so-called ‘political dialogue’ or in the framework of the EU-China “sectoral dialogues.”

Besides the European Union, many EU Member States, in particular the “Big Three”, but also states like Sweden, undertake joint manoeuvres, trainings and mutual visits of high-level militaries on a bilateral basis. The UK and France are already holding joint military naval exercises with the Chinese navy on a regular basis and Germany has been conducting annual seminars on the level of generals since 2005. In regard to peacekeeping, the EU, being a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping operations with its member states’ activities combined, has in recent years welcomed and encouraged China’s growing contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. Currently, China participates in ten UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is one of the areas where the EU and China could indeed expand their bilateral co-operation to make a visible and measurable joint contribution to international security.

The Strategic Partnership and the Limits in Security Cooperation

In order to identify areas for potential cooperation between China and the European Union in security affairs, it is necessary to identify common aims as well as to define

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2 However, an implementation of these measures is hampered by the still existing EU arms embargo towards China.
3 In December 2006, China has been the 13th-largest contributor of U.N. peacekeepers, providing 1,648 soldiers, police officers and military observers to 10 nations, mostly in African countries, including Congo, Liberia and southern Sudan. But its activities reach well beyond Africa. Chinese riot police have been sent to Haiti to quell unrest. In November 2006, Beijing offered to send 1,000 peacekeepers to southern Lebanon to help enforce a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah. The United Nations accepted less than half. See Colum Lynch, ‘Beijing expands role as world peacekeeper’, Mercury News, 14 Dec 2006, http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/16237116.htm. See also the website of the EU delegation in Beijing at: http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/Solana170304
what is understood by the used terminology on both sides of the partnership.

**Terrorism**

In all reviewed concepts terrorism is now at the top of the list of threats. September 11 was a world-wide signal that the end of the Cold War did not stand for the ‘end of history’ as Francis Fukuyama predicted at the beginning of the 1990s, but instead released anger, hate and frustration that had been frozen by Cold War realities. This resulted in asymmetrical attacks from diverse, decentralised, well-resourced terrorist groups that make efficient use of electronic networks and are aiming to cause mass casualties. Focusing on the fact that today’s most prominent form of terrorism is global in scope and linked to violent religious extremism, the EU argues that terrorism is a phenomenon arising out of complex causes, including the “pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.”

The uneven process of globalisation, which still excludes the majority of the global population from the benefits of globalisation, is aggravating this trend. The French prospectus points out that “as globalisation progresses, the disparities in economic development and the unequal distribution of wealth could, if they become more pronounced, increase frustration.” An interpretation of the most influential countries’ actions in issues relating to business, the environment or pollution as hegemonic behaviour may result in certain groups adopting a radical form of protest against market-based economies and globalisation per se. As a result, “these interpretations of modernity may lead to violent acts and increase terrorism, especially if they are based on religious motives.”

The Europeans perceive this phenomenon as a part of European society, with Europe being both target and base for terrorism. They also see a need to consider and address the root causes of these threats, beyond the symptoms and the actual acts of terrorism.

The Chinese side shares, albeit to a lesser extent, the European perspective that terrorism is a problem caused by economic and social disparity. It hence originates in less developed parts of the world, and requires comprehensive policies including development aid and what Beijing refers to as the promotion of ‘cultural understanding.’ Fighting terrorism is one of the prime goals of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO / “Shanghai 5”), a regional forum in which China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Kazakhstan discuss Central Asian security issues. The CPP points out that the “Shanghai 5” has taken the lead in making an unequivocal stand and proposition of combating “terrorism, separatism and extremism” by signing “The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” and “The Agreement on regional Counter-terrorism Agency.” However, the SCO’s international credibility is controversial with the SCO’s member states are mainly autocratic regimes with still questionable human

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2 ESS, p. 3
3 „The 30 Year Prospective Plan: A Summary”, p. 6
4 See “Delivering Security in a Changing World”, p. 4 for the need to address the underlying causes of these threats by working with other Government Departments; also Steinmeier: .....quote on co-operation with Department of Development
5 The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation is the follow up organisation to the „Shanghai 5” process launched in 1996 and includes the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Kazakhstan.
6 CPP, p. 3

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rights records. The definitions of who is to be labelled a “terrorist” differ between Europe and the People’s Republic of China. Accordingly, despite both China and the EU having terrorism high on their agendas, joint declarations and action plans have not been followed-up with sustainable joint actions.

**Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Along with the threat of terrorism, the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have gained importance for China and the EU. The ESS goes as far as to claim that the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to Europe’s security.”

The dispersion of weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the increased military potential due to an arms race-like build-up of military forces, in particular in the Middle East and in East Asia, has not only spurred the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic, tactical and cruise missiles and small arms. It has also increased the (legal and illegal) transfer of technical know-how in this area. Hence the French and the British concepts label the prevention of the potential passage of WMD knowledge or weapons from states to terrorist groups as a key part of the counter-proliferation challenge.

In order to stress that the EU considers the prevention of the proliferation of WMDs to be a foreign and security policy priority, it published a strategy paper dealing with the proliferation of WMDs. China, too, considers the prevention of the proliferation of WMD to be one of the major threats to global peace and stability and has issued a specific policy paper on the topic. Beijing and Brussels signed a joint declaration on non-proliferation and arms control and an agreement on joint research into the peaceful use of nuclear energy at the EU-China Summit in The Hague in December 2004. However, even though Beijing now officially commits itself to actively (with and without the EU) promoting nuclear non-proliferation, its track record of nuclear proliferation, including assistance for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and missile technology exports to Iran, remain a cause for concern and call into question the probability of implementation of the recent joint declaration with the EU. In 2003, the US thrice imposed non-proliferation-related sanctions against China for missile-related sales. China’s missile technology-related sales to Pakistan and Iran in recent years also led the US to veto China’s application for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2004. Furthermore, Beijing has (unlike the majority of EU Member states) decided not to participate in the 2003 US-initiated Proliferation

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1 A matter of discussion e.g. is the differing perception of separatist movements of the Uygur minority in Xinjiang province. However, the phenomenon that someone is labelled a terrorist to one actor and a freedom fighter to another actor is a general problem in international relations.
2 ESS, p. 3
3 See „Delivering Security in A Changing World“, p. 4 and “30 Years Prospectus: A Summary”, p. 6
4 See EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs); http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf
5 „Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control“, EU-China Summit, December 2004
6 See e.g. Paul, T.V., ‘China-Pakistani nuclear/missile tries and balance of power politics; in: Nonproliferation Review Vo.10, No.2 2003, pp. 21-29
Security Initiative (PSI) arguing that ‘proliferation issues should be resolved within the legal frameworks by political and diplomatic means.’ China’s refusal to endorse the US-initiated PSI is understandable against the background that it was above all North Korea and its proliferation record which triggered the US initiative. China, North Korea’s solely remaining ally and the biggest foreign investor in North Korea does neither favour a nuclear North Korea nor joining in a US-led confrontational course towards Pyongyang. Beijing has yet not signed the “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” which is up to date signed by more than 90 countries.

Even if China does no longer supply states\(^1\) with complete ballistic missiles, it still provides Pakistan with missile technology which is a ‘legitimate area for study and concern, the more insofar as they represent Chinese strategic support for Pakistan’s goals rather than purely commercial motives.’\(^2\)

The CPP outlines the desire to “conduct effective disarmament and arms control with broad participation in line with the principle of justice, comprehensiveness, rationality and balance” and to “uphold the current international arms control and disarmament regime.” The phrasing of this paragraph indicates that China remains sceptical about the feasibility of “fair” conduct of non-proliferation policies and regimes. Both sides, the European and the Chinese, lack credibility on nuclear disarmament with neither the European nuclear powers (UK and France) nor China currently striving to reduce their own nuclear weapons arsenals.

Located in a region where arms expenditures have risen by an average of 22 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (compared to 3% world-wide),\(^3\) China emphasises that it has no interest in getting involved in an arms race in East Asia and beyond.\(^4\) However, over the last 15 years China has increased its defence expenditures at a rate of between 15 and 17% per year,\(^5\) with the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces spurring the intensifying so-called ‘security dilemma’ in Asia.\(^6\) In addition, there is a growing consensus amongst analysts that China’s ‘real’ or non-official defence budget could be up to two times higher than Beijing’s official one.\(^7\) China’s rising military expenditures are a concern in the region and beyond, although Beijing argues that more than 30% of the defence budget is being spent on rapidly growing personnel costs. Hence, the ever more increasing defence expenditures along with the visible modernisation of China’s armed forces will continue to be closely watched by the US, Japan and last but not least Taiwan.

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\(^{1}\) including Pakistan, according to publicly available information.
\(^{2}\) Alyson Bailes (2006), ibid
\(^{4}\) CPP, p. 1
\(^{5}\) Amongst many others see China’s defence budget up 14.7% in 2006;in: China View, Xinhuanet.com at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-03/04/content_4256232.htm China’s military budget jumps 14.7%, BBC Newshttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4773358.stm;
\(^{7}\) including scholars from London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
Instabilities, Regional Conflicts and Failing States

The ethnically motivated war in the Balkans in the 1990s was a wake-up call for the Europeans. The Kosovo war triggered the formulation and implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Consequently, regional conflicts are at the very heart of European security concerns as they “destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights.”1 Furthermore, as pointed out in the British Defence White Paper, these conflicts can trigger mass population movements and consequently add to pressures on countries neighbouring the European Union or “emerge as a surge in migration to Europe” itself.2 In the ESS’ view, regional instability can spur extremism, terrorism and state failure, provide favourable conditions for organised crime, and fuel demands for WMD. These trends can be observed today in the Middle East and on the conflict ridden continent Africa. Focusing on the proximate areas first, European decision-makers are particularly concerned about those states located on NATO’s borders and in Africa that are characterised by political mismanagement, ethnic and religiously motivated tensions and economic breakdown. As the British white paper emphasises, these states contain areas of ungoverned territory which might draw neighbouring states into competition for control and influence over these territories and their resources.3 They can also provide potential havens and resources for the support of terrorist groups and criminal networks involved in drug production and trafficking, illegal arms trading or the plundering of natural resources.4 The desire to stabilise these regions in order to avoid having to deal with the consequences of failing states and destabilisation has become a cornerstone of European security policy. The shift from the priority of territorial defence to meeting challenges where they occur was famously depicted by the former German Defence Minister in his comment that “German interests are defended at the Hindukush.” Almost all operations in the framework of the European Defence and Security Policy can be viewed in this context.

The Chinese and the European side agree that they are primarily faced with intra-state conflicts which destroy infrastructure, encourage criminality, deter investment and make normal economic activity – the basis for our well-being – impossible.5 Coping with instability, failing states and regional conflicts seems therefore to be a field favourable for co-operation. Co-operation in this field would be particularly beneficial since operations such as stabilisation efforts need long term, troop-intensive and costly commitments, as illustrated by past experiences. Having economic development as its top priority, China, too, depends on a stable environment around and within the People’s Republic as well as in the states from which it is retrieving its resources. However, considering the two countries’ different political systems, and their consequently differing interpretations of the sources of instability, and keeping in mind the fact that most of the countries rich in natural resources are also some of the

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1 ESS, p. 4
3 A recent example being the military action in Somalia where the different parties are supported by Eritrea and Ethiopia, see “Äthiopien meldet Tod von bis zu tausend Islamisten in Somalia”, 26/12/2006, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,456587,00.html
5 Also see Chen Bo, „Contrast of the Security Concepts between China and the EU: A PLA Officer’s Perspective“, p. 12
most problematic areas in the world, it yet remains to be seen how meaningful and result-oriented EU-Chinese security co-operation in this context will be in the near future.

**Organised Crime**

Failing states, open borders and demographic pressures favour organised crime. For example, 90 percent of the heroin in Europe originates in poppy fields in Afghanistan, where the money is used to sustain private armies, thereby undermining the democratisation efforts and aims of the European states that operate ISAF in Afghanistan. Europe is also a prime target for cross-trafficking of not only drugs and weapons, but also illegal migrants and women: 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world-wide are smuggled through criminal networks in the Balkans. An additional concern is maritime piracy, which causes rising costs by intercepting trade flows. Maritime piracy - i.e. in the Strait of Malacca - presents an increasing problem, as does the spread of corruption due to criminal activities. European-Chinese co-operation could make a valuable contribution to combating cross-border criminal activities, in a bilateral framework as well as in international initiatives.

**Environmental issues & pandemics**

Apart from those military and policy related issues, the extended security concept also encompasses the dangers that arise from a deteriorating environment and reoccurring outbreaks of pandemics. Being less influenced by the differences in the political systems and the respective basic values, these areas offer the greatest potential for co-operation and have illustrated the most immediate need and also the most considerable successes so far. In recent years, pandemics with global repercussions such as SARS and the Avian Flu originated in China. Lacking a health system capable of sufficiently responding to these pandemics, China was dependent on external help to cope with the situation. Precious time was lost due to the PRC’s attempt to treat the disease as a domestic as opposed to an international issue. Considering far too long foreign assistance in tackling SARS as ‘interference’ in China’s internal affairs, the Chinese authorities informed the international community too late about the extent and intensity of the SARS problem. SARS turned out to be a challenge where global co-operation and transparency was a necessity in order to stop the world-wide spread of the disease. Yet, the willingness of the Chinese government to learn was proven by the second outbreak in 2004 that was rapidly – with foreign assistance – brought under control.

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1 see, for example, “Schwere Vorwürfe gegen die ISAF”, Der Tagesspiegel, 03/12/2006, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/nachrichten/afghanistan/83175.asp
2 see ESS, p.3
3 e.g. see Dana Robert Dillon (2000) ‘Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade’, The Heritage Foundation, June 22, 2000, Backgrounder #1379
SARS and the Avian Flu demonstrated that challenges emerging in a distant country are nevertheless a security concern for Europe when they reached the Old Continent with serious consequences. Environmental concerns also have a global impact, as shown by the negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol—which neither the US nor China signed. With twenty of the world’s thirty most polluted cities located in China,¹ there is a clear need for the Chinese to cope with environmental decline and pollution. Yet, these challenges are not outlined in the CPP.² On the European side, the ESS points to the challenges ahead due to poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS, both of which can cause the breakdown of societies. It also emphasises the increasing migration pressure that will emerge from a declining environment. “Competition for natural resources—notably water—which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.”³

Although these issues are not mentioned in the Chinese paper, they might present the areas where the EU and China could indeed (given the political will on both sides) co-operate most promisingly in the future.

**Securing resources**

In order to put its rapidly growing economy on a sustainable path over the next few decades,⁴ China has made securing access to natural resources, including raw materials and primarily energy, its first priority. For China, access to natural resources as well as foreign markets is essential for its economic growth. The People’s Republic relies heavily on securing sea lanes as well as entertaining good relationships with states that are exporters of the desired resources. China has extended its economic and diplomatic presence in the most important sea lanes, such as the Suez and Panama Canals, and has built up a “string of pearls” of naval bases from South China up to Iran.⁵ Moreover, China is actively expanding its relations with countries in the Middle East, Africa⁶ and Latin America to ensure a supply of energy, primarily crude oil. Also the ESS states that “energy dependence is a special

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² Apart from the general reference that the new security concept’s contents extend „from military and political to economic, science and technology, environment, culture and many other areas“; CPP, p. 1
³ ESS, p. 3
⁴ The CPP therefore pays a great deal of attention on the fostering of economic exchange in “multi-channel, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted new economic co-operation” and emphasises the role of regional economic co-operation mechanisms such as the 10+3 co-operation in East Asia; CPP, p. 2
⁵ The ESS refers to the economic part of security co-operation by referring to the extension of member of “key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions”; ESS, p. 9
⁷ From 3 - 5 November 2006, more than 40 heads of state and ministers of 45 African countries attended the China-Africa summit in Beijing. Even the leaders of the five countries that acknowledge Taiwan were invited as observers, but abstained. About 2,500 business deals were under discussion during the three-day-summit. See “Trade to top China-Africa summit”, BBC News, 03/11/2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6112360.stm
concern for Europe.” The European Union is the world’s largest importer of energy, with 80 percent of its energy based on coal, oil and gas, as well as the world’s second largest consumer of energy. Currently, the EU imports 50% of its energy needs. This share is expected to rise to 70% by the year 2030, with most energy imports coming from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.1

Yet, it remains questionable to what extent Europe and China will co-operate in this area, as they are not only competitors in the quest for energy but also have different approaches and policies towards dictatorships in energy-rich countries in Africa and the Middle East. Even if EU policies towards dictatorships in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere are not free from contradictions and hypocrisy, it has become obvious that China so far puts ‘business over principles’ as far as its global energy security policies are concerned.

Finally, even leaving the issue of democracy aside, there are still fundamental differences with regard to the rule of law,2 the definition and functions of human rights, freedom of speech and other issues that have remained largely non-addressed during EU-China meetings and summits3 over the last three years4, but are crucial in building up a genuine strategic partnership.

**Different Mindsets: Multilateralism, global governance and the principle of non-interference**

In his speech on 6 May 2004, entitled “Vigorously developing comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the European Union,”5 prime minister Wen Jiabao pointed out that “‘comprehensive’ […] meant that co-operation between both sides is all-round, wide-ranging and multi-level” and that a ‘partnership’ requires the co-operation to be based on “equality, mutual benefit and win-win result […] on the basis of mutual respect and mutual trust.” A “strategic” partnership hence means that the “bilateral co-operation is of an overall, long-term and stable nature, transcends the differences in ideology and social system and is free from the interference of a single event that occurs in a certain period of time.” While the last remark obviously refers to the Tiananmen massacre, it remains highly questionable to what extent differences in ideology and social systems can be ‘transcended’ in order to implement a genuine EU-China “strategic partnership.” Ideology is a set of beliefs, values, and opinions that forms the paradigm through which the world and the own country’s situation is perceived. When speaking about co-operation in the realm of security, it is important that the actors identify the background against which security strategies have been developed, what ultimate goal shall be achieved through this strategy and hence to

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2 E.g. differences remain between the Chinese concept of “rule by law” and the Western concept of “rule of law”.
3 In the Commissions 2006 Communication, the lack of results from the human rights dialogue has been – for the first time - explicitly pointed out. COM (2006) 631 final, ‘EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities’, p. 4
4 See e.g. Berkofsky, Axel, EU-China Relations-Strategic Partners or Partners of Convenience?: German-Chinese Relations-Trade Promotion or Something Else?: in: Maull, Hanns W. (ed.) German Foreign Policy in Dialogue Deutsche Aussenpolitik.de-Gateway to German Foreign Policy June 2005; see also Crossick, Stanley, Cameron, Fraser, Berkofsky, Axel, EU-China Relations-Towards a Strategic Partnership; EPC Working Paper July 2005
5 See China Daily, 7 May 2004
what extent and intensity co-operation could be realistically possible. The EU and China have yet not taken these steps.

The Chinese scholar Xinning Song argues that the “EU and China have more similar ideas and ways of thinking” than compared to the US as they both favour multilateralism and peaceful means of solving disputes and because they do not compete strategically with each other. However, the connotations of “multilateralism” differ and it remains an open question if the prioritisation of multilateralism provides sufficient ground for a strategic partnership. ‘Favouring multilateralism’ is a noble concept that on paper the EU has in common with many other countries and blocs of countries as well. It is true that the EU and China are not (unlike the US and China) so-called ‘strategic rivals’ or ‘strategic competitors’ as George W. Bush suggested at the beginning of 2001. But Brussels and Beijing do not have the same approaches, e.g. towards the use of military force. Whereas Brussels does (so far) exclude the use of military force to solve territorial issues, China does not exclude military means as a way of solving the so-called ‘Taiwan question.’

Unfortunately, EU policymakers fail to openly point out this fundamental difference even if it was outspoken in its stark criticism of last year’s ‘Anti-Secession Law’, through which Beijing authorises itself to invade Taiwan militarily should it declare independence. Beijing’s preparedness in principle to ‘re-unify’ Taiwan with the mainland using military force illustrates a stark contrast between the EU and China’s security policy approaches, at least so far.

Both the European Union and China perceive themselves as emerging global actors that should naturally expand their reach and influence. The ESS speaks of the EU as a “more credible and effective actor” that should be ready to “share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” With reference to its accumulating power and influence, China also makes its claim as an emerging global power. As the scholar Chen Bo puts it, “it is understandable that a big country or a big country bloc usually has [a] strong wish to influence the world when its comprehensive strength increases. Both the unified EU and [a] fast growing China now have new expectations in shaping a new world order. By doing so, they will undoubtedly contribute to the change of forces in the international system.” However, in practice the paradigms shaping the international system seen from the EU and China are perceived and defined differently. The European and Chinese

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1 Xinning Song, “EU-China Strategic Partnership: Domestic and International Perspectives, paper presented at the international Conference on “International Politics of EU-China Relations”, 20 – 21 April 2006, London, UK
2 See e.g. Berkofsky, Axel, EU-Taiwan Relations should be about more than business; in: Europe’s World June 2006; at http://www.europesworld.org/PDFs/Issue3/ADVERTORIAL_Taiwan.pdf#search=’axel%20berkofskya
3 However, this difference in approach, and indeed the cross-strait relations themselves, hardly make it onto the EU-China agenda. Apart from encouraging both Taiwan and China to solve the issue peacefully, the EU does not essentially get involved in cross-strait relations, leaving the impression that the so-called ‘Taiwan question’ is none of Brussels’ business.
4 ESS, p. 2
approaches towards and definitions of multilateralism, the so-called ‘principle of non-interference’ and the so-called ‘preventive action’ differ in their very essence.

**Chinese Multilateralism vs. European Multilateralism?**

The ESS as well as the CPP emphasise the priority of “effective multilateralism.” On the European side, the “fundamental framework of international relations is the United Nations Charter”\(^1\) with the United Nations Security Council has been assigned the primary responsibility for keeping global peace and stability. The CPP also underlines that co-operation should be conducted on the basis of the UN charter while giving full play to the leading role of the United Nations. However, their interpretations of multilateralism differ: While the EU wants to become a major player in the current international system – including the acceptance and support of a ‘benign hegemon,’ the US - and wants to strengthen multilateralism, China wants to “promote the democratisation of international relations” and thus aims at reshaping the international system towards a multipolar world with the PRC as one of the major players and ‘poles’ of power. Judging by Chinese political rhetoric of recent years, it seems that the terms ‘multilateralism’ and ‘multipolarity’ are quasi-synonyms rather than two distinct concepts.\(^2\)

After initial confusion created by French president Jacques Chirac, who seemed to have supported and embraced Chinese rhetoric on the need to create a ‘multipolar world,’\(^3\) the EU has repeatedly made it clear that it is ‘multilateralism’ or ‘effective multilateralism’ and not ‘multipolarity’ it seeks to implement and promote.

Albeit using the same term, the EU and China obviously apply different interpretations to the term. Consequently, where and how the EU and China are planning to jointly implement multilateral policies has remained largely non-defined so far. However, China as a unitary state (like the US and unlike the EU) is an actor that naturally prefers bilateralism over multilateralism on a regional and global level, avoiding constraints to sovereign action that multilateral agreements bring about, while the European Union is a multilateral institution in itself.

**Intervention vs. Non-Interference?**

European integration is structurally built on the interference in each other’s affairs and the willingness to cede sovereignty to a supranational organisation. China on the other hand emphasises the principle of non-interference as one (if not the main) guiding principle of its regional and global foreign and security policies. Foreign advice (critical, ‘well-meant’ or both) e.g. on how to deal with the so-called ‘Taiwan question’ or recent criticism on China’s global and controversial policies to secure its energy supply is in Beijing typically being referred to and dismissed as ‘interference’ in China’s internal affairs.

In line with determining the UN Charter as the main global reference for international security policies, the Chinese Position Paper also emphasises the “Five Principles of

\(^1\) ESS, p. 9
\(^3\) also see in this aspect the ‘Sino-French Joint Declaration’, 16 May 1997, www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/chfr0597.htm
Peaceful Coexistence” as the guiding lines for international co-operation. Co-crafted with India in 1954, the five principles encompass mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. These principles, in particular the first and the third, underscore the importance of national sovereignty and integrity to the Chinese. However, they are in clear contrast to the EU’s approach, adopted in 2003, of “preventive engagement” in order to counter threats such as instability, proliferation and ‘human emergencies’ before they arise and would have direct consequences on the European Union. Following the US approach of ‘meeting challenges where they arise’, the EU has been aiming to set up more active policies to counter the new dynamic threats, to provide crisis management and conflict prevention and to develop “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”¹ The “robust mandates” apply to the EU Mission “EUFOR RD CONGO,” which supports the UN Mission MONUC in Congo under Resolution 1671, as well as to the French, Irish, Italian, and Polish troops and the German navy which are patrolling the Lebanese coasts as part of the UNIFIL mission. These missions are first, tentative steps towards this new, robust strategic culture.

The EU Arms Embargo - Setback for the Strategic Partnership

Ever since the declaration of an EU-China ‘strategic partnership’ in 2003, Brussels has been facing difficulties in explaining to Beijing why the EU arms embargo imposed on China in 1989 was kept in place in an desired ‘ever closer relationship’. Objectively seen it is understandable that Beijing continuously stresses that a partnership can hardly be called ‘strategic’ when such a key area of defence and technology is omitted from it by generally blocking the transfer of weapons technology. Hence, in 2004 and 2005, Chinese officials intensified their arguments towards the EU to lift the embargo, albeit not to open up the Chinese market to European weapons manufacturers.² Chinese officials claimed instead the need to create the political bilateral environment to get serious about the ‘strategic partnership’. Every single workshop, conference and or official EU-China encounter taking place featured the arms embargo on its agenda.

However, the conditions for the lifting of the embargo are seen very differently from both parties: The PRC insists on Brussels to lift the embargo and in return Beijing agrees to expand its relations with the EU on all levels, including co-operation in the area of security. On the European side, however, the lifting of the embargo is linked to a number of EU demands such as the ratification of the UN Convention on Political and Civil Rights, the release of prisoners jailed during and after the Tiananmen massacre and last but not least verifiable evidence of the improvement of the human rights situation in China.

While the EU in 2005 announced in official statements ‘to promise to work towards the lifting of the embargo,’ China understood that the EU ‘promised’ to lift the

¹ ESS, p. 11
embargo, overlooking the fact that the lift would be an intergovernmental decision by all Member States.\(^1\) Former EU Commission President Romano Prodi, the EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana but also the German and the French head of state have in their talks with their Chinese counterparts at times been less than clear about the fact that the lifting of the embargo is subject to a number of European (albeit non-official) pre-conditions to be met by the Chinese side and a common decision of all Member States. Furthermore, the embargo will not be lifted until the EU has adopted a new and improved EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The existing code was agreed on in 1998 and is only politically binding.

The controversy about the arms embargo did not only highlight the lack of unity within the Union and hence its lack of influence, but it also lightened the differences in perception – while the Chinese side continues to point out the (bilateral) logical reasons for lifting the embargo, the Europeans ask on a rather parallel than common track of dialogue for more understanding of the constraints applied on them by the structure of the EU’s system and by the necessity to find a solution within the broader context of the EU’s external relations: The debacle taught the Europeans the lesson that their decisions as an emerging global actor do have repercussions in their relations with third parties, first and foremost the United States.

The ‘US Factor’ in EU-China Relations

As outlined above, an analysis of the envisioned EU-China strategic partnership is incomplete without taking the ‘US factor’ into account as bilateral relations between Brussels and Beijing are influenced by their respective relations with Washington. During the very public transatlantic controversy over the lifting or non-lifting of the EU arms embargo imposed on China in 1989, it became clear that Washington is wary of the quantitative and qualitative expansion of EU-China relations, especially in the area of security. Even if Brussels is neither ready nor willing to expand its relations at the expense of its primal relationship with Washington, concerns amongst US policymakers remained.

The US, a vital supporter of European integration from the very start through the successful Marshall Plan, has over the last decades been perceived as Europe’s closest and most important ally. For China, the US as the only remaining superpower with a global sphere of interest is China’s number one foreign policy priority as well as a competitor – in terms of economic and political influence in the region and in the world as well as in terms of ideology. Consequently, Chinese policies aim at counterbalancing and diminishing US power and influence, thus establishing what has been coined as a ‘multipolar’ world by Chinese authorities over recent years. In France, as mentioned before, China temporarily found an ally supporting this approach, even if the approach was never fleshed out and was not supported on the EU level. Until the EU’s demonstration of weakness when it was divided over the prospects of war on Iraq, the Chinese side set great hopes on the EU developing into a possible future alternative to the US and a way for hedging the only remaining superpower. Chinese scholars point out that there has been a ‘new thinking’ on the EU in China suggesting that the EU is not only the most important trade partner for China,

\(^1\) Numerous conversations with Brussels-based Chinese diplomats, conducted by Axel Berkofsky, confirmed that Beijing was expecting to lift the embargo in accordance with the ‘promise’ to do so.
but that the EU is also “moving quite rapidly towards a political power, as it now begins to invest considerable energy in making a truly common foreign and security policy” and, first and foremost, that the EU has become an “‘independent strategic force’ which has increasingly shown its political willingness to challenge the American policies in the world.”

In reality, however, the EU recognises that the EU has neither the capabilities nor the political will to challenge or counterbalance US global influence. The ESS calls the transatlantic relationship ‘irreplaceable’. “One of the core elements of the international system” the ESS reads, “is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole.”

Also the security strategies of the ‘Big Three’, that is Germany, the United Kingdom and France, state the relationship with the US as a cornerstone in their respective foreign policy strategies. Although France seems rhetorically to be closer to the Chinese perspectives, there is no tendency for even this country to deviate too radically from the “US first” policy. However, the two entities have in common that “both EU and China do not regard their counterparts as the most important partners,” but keep the US as the first foreign policy priority – a decisive factor that does weaken the prospects for a genuine “strategic partnership” in practice. Although Beijing does acknowledge the importance of the EU’s relations with Washington, it was and is concerned about the establishment of the EU-US ‘Strategic Dialogue on East Asia’ in September 2004 and considered this dialogue hardly more than an US attempt to pressure the EU not to lift the weapons embargo. Indeed, it remains questionable whether the US would have dedicated resources and energy to discussing Asian security issues with Brussels without the controversies of the embargo.

The term ‘strategic’ in the US view has above all a military connotation and led to the fear by some US-American analysts and policymakers that the EU and China were about to launch an inter-regional military alliance aimed at reducing US strategic military influence in Europe and above all in Asia. Yet, such fears did not resonate significantly as it remains difficult to envision EU-China hard security or military security co-operation resembling e.g. US-Japanese or US-South Korean security co-operation. Indeed, discussions (beyond joint declarations expressing concern about the volatile security situation on the Korean Peninsula) on Asian regional security issues have hardly taken place between the EU and China so far and were not followed up by action. This suggests two things: a.) Beijing may not be seeing a necessity to involve its alleged strategic partners in Brussels in Asian strategic and geo-political issues; and b.) Brussels for its part may indeed not be interested in getting involved with its emerging security identity being firstly targeted on the near

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1 See e.g. FENG Zhongping (2006), „China’s Policy towards Europe: Between the EU and the Big Three“, paper presented at the „international Politics of EU-China relations“ conference, London, 20 – 21 April 2006, p. 3
2 ESS, p. 9
3 Xinmin Song (2006), p. 6-7
4 Concerns were repeatedly pointed out by Chinese scholars and officials, e.g. at the 3rd EU-China Roundtable at The European Policy Centre, 9 – 10 October 2006, Brussels
5 For the official view on China’s relations with the EU see China’s October 2003 EU Policy Paper; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China; http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xos/dqzywtt/t27708.htm; see also “Opening New Phases of China-EU Friendly Co-operation; http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wenJiabaocezihoh/t174793.htm
abroad and secondly, is only slowly widening its horizon beyond the business realm concerning more distant regions.

**Different Statehoods – Different Paradigms – Common Strategy?**

Last but not least the different nature of the two players needs to be taken into account when discussing the opportunities and limits of a strategic partnership. The People’s Republic of China is a nation-state, governed by a central government and hence provided with the possibility to forge policies across different policy fields, ranging from security to economics and development. The European Union is a *sui generis* confederation of states, set on a stumbling path towards a supranational state that will most probably not become a comparable nation-state in the near future – the discussion about the “finalité” of European integration, that was once more triggered off by the former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer¹ and mirrored in the debates about the constitutional treaty, has still not and probably will never be concluded. Consequently, the European Union is a global actor in the making, where decisions concerning security are made in the intergovernmental second pillar, between the Member States’ governments, excluding the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Decisions in the field of aid and trade are made in the first pillar, including all above mentioned supranational institutions and their competencies. Finally the national foreign policies of the individual Member States contribute to the complex picture of a European foreign and security policy. These divisions of competences and power could, if applied skillfully, contribute to pursuing successfully European interests. Taking into account the diversity of interests between the EU Member States alone and the EU institutions, history has proven so far that the dispersion of competencies has rather led to a weakening of the European Union – and to a less predictable partner for China in an envisaged strategic partnership.

**Conclusion: “Common Wording, Differing Meanings” – More Declarations than Deeds**

The above analysis of the security concepts of China, the European Union and the ‘Big Three’ has shown that despite a congruence in terminology, the underlying ideologies and paradigms in each group cause differing interpretations of these terms and undermine efforts to turn declarations into deeds, to apply theory to the practice of day-to-day international relations. When it comes to security – and hence to the core of states’ and the governing class’ interests: survival - a “strategic partnership” can only be of limited practical value precisely because it is not able to “transcend the difference in ideology and social system” as desired by the Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao.

For both sides, fighting terrorism is a foreign and security policy priority, but European and Chinese decision-makers differ in their perceptions of who is to be labelled a terrorist – Europeans feel uncomfortable with the SCO’s equation of “terrorism, separatism and extremism” and view the Uygurs in Xinjiang province

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differently than their Chinese counterparts do. They also differ in their perceptions of the root causes of terrorism, with the European side putting heavy emphasis on its intra-societal roots and the influence of a low level of development on its spread. Consequently, the targets as well as the strategies against these enemies differ.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of major concern for both sides and has even led to the signing of a joint paper on non-proliferation. However, with a closer look the interests of the two sides differ again too much to provide valid ground for any further activities: The Europeans follow to a great extent the US-American policies, including joining the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PRC for its part is determined to catch up in terms of military hardware and technology with the West, rapidly and significantly increasing its own defence spending. Being subject to an EU and US weapons embargo, Beijing imports more than 90% of its weapons and weapon technology from Russia, while pursuing sales to Pakistan and Iran.

There are also fundamental differences to how the EU and China view North Korea. While China remains North Korea’s most important ally, having in recent years turned into Pyongyang’s most important supplier of energy and significantly increased its investments on the peninsula, the Europeans are above all concerned about Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programmes. Even though the EU is – like China and despite the nuclear and missile crisis -- committed to its economic engagement course towards North Korea, Brussels and Beijing mostly pursue different strategies regarding how to achieve this engagement with a regime that has demonstrated its determination and desperation with its October nuclear test. The impression that China sees no real role for the EU in the field of security in Asia is supported by the fact that China - like the other participating countries - has not advocated EU participation in the Six-Party Talks seeking to negotiate a solution to North Korea’s nuclear crisis. EU – China security co-operation on Asian security is hardly on the agenda of neither Beijing’s nor Brussels’ policymakers.

EU-China co-operation in coping with instabilities, regional conflicts and failing states will increase multilaterally due to the increasing number of UN operations in this area, but will remain nevertheless limited bilaterally by the two sides’ fundamentally different perceptions of the causes of and cures for instabilities. Furthermore, co-operation will also be overridden by more important foreign policy priorities – as long as China is willing to co-operate with dictatorial regimes and failing states in Africa and the Middle East in order to secure its access to natural resources, a common approach in dealing with failing states is not a realistic issue on the agenda of EU-China relations.

The most realistic area for EU-China security co-operation could be in dealing with the so-called “new challenges” that deviate from the traditional notion of security and are part of what is commonly being referred to as “human security”: disaster management and disaster relief in the course of pandemics and environmental catastrophes offer promising common ground for co-operation. SARS and the Avian Flu were striking examples of epidemics breaking out in one country and having an impact beyond national borders, thus requiring joint efforts by the international community to deal with the crisis and its aftermath.
Why can ideology not be transcended in the other areas, as suggested by Chinese Premier Wen Jinbao? As mentioned above, security refers to the very core of states’ interest: survival – not only survival of the state, but also survival of the ruling class and survival of the system of governance. Hence, security strategies are always a part of a comprehensive ideology which envisages a state of “finalité” in the undetermined future. Security cooperation needs to be based on trust that derives from a common world view. The Europeans have subscribed to a “Western view” of international society, with the end goal being democratically governed states with a high status for the rights of the individual, including human rights – as stated in the European Charter on Fundamental Rights and in every European state’s constitution. Furthermore, despite all quarrel about distance from and proximity to the only remaining superpower, Europe (‘old’ and ‘new’) has aligned itself with the United States and shares to a great extent its priorities and paradigms. With the US being the natural counterpart to China as an emerging global power that perceives the world in a more traditional power politics system, this alignment prevents closer co-operation in the core area of security.

Even in the area where Europeans and Chinese seem to be much closer than US-Americans and Europeans - in their preference for multilateralism - their perceptions of multilateralism differ to the extent that the paradigms differ. For Europeans, being shaped by the multilateral EU policy-process, multilateralism means finding compromises between weaker and stronger states and backing these solutions with the legitimacy provided by an assembly of almost all nation states on the globe. For China, regionalism offers a chance to create a benign environment for its economic development, while multilateralism offers a chance to pursue power politics in the UN Security Council at eye level with the US without being as strong as the US. The differences in ideology also lead to the different connotation in each country’s terminology.

Putting all these factors together, Europe and China do share numerous security concerns on paper, but the differences in paradigms and ideology - and hence the connotations of these terms - will continue to stand in the way of closer comprehensive co-operation in the field of security. Most cooperation will be achieved in the “new security” challenges such as pandemics and environmental disasters. The differences, however, will de-facto exclude far-reaching security co-operation in most other areas from the envisioned EU-China strategic partnership.
Chapter 4
Asia-Europe Security Cooperation and Global Governance

Major Areas and Goals of Asia-Europe Energy Security Cooperation

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1. Introduction

Europe and Northeast Asia are the two largest consumers of oil and gas in the world. Mainly driven by China, Northeast Asia is projected to continue to lead the growth in world’s demand for both crude oil and natural gas until 2030. Without presentation of detailed numbers of the regional states’ proportion to the world consumption, sheer rankings of their import and consumption of oil speak volumes: This is a region comprised of nations whose energy imports rank second (China), third (Japan), and sixth (Korea) in the world, and whose total consumption rank second (China), third (Japan), and seventh (Korea). Despite continuous efforts to restructure the energy fuel mix, the members of the European Union (EU) seem to have to rely on traditional sources of energy (e.g. oil and gas) for some time for the foreseeable future.

EU is not faring any better than the Northeast Asian states in terms of reliance on imports for oil and gas as well as dependency on oil and gas for energy needs. The EU consumes about 18% of global oil consumption and 19% of gas produced. It is reported that 80% of the energy consumed by the member states is provided by oil, natural gas and coal. And the EU imports approximately 50% of its energy needs. It is also expected that the rise could be close to 70% by 2030. While the Northeast Asian states heavily rely on a single source for oil, namely the Middle East, (i.e. Japan 89%, Korea 78%, China 45% and Northeast Asia total was 74% in 2004), the EU depends on Russia for more than 50% of oil and natural gas import.

Apart from their ever rising demand for oil and gas and maturing domestic production, coupled with steadily rising price of oil, the cause of concern for both regions are China and Russia factors. China is allegedly a factor behind the rising oil price: contributing 38% to the cause. Moreover, by 2025, it is estimated that China will probably import 75% of its crude and consume 10.6% of the world’s oil. Natural gas consumption is expected to more than triple to 3.6 trillion cubic feet annually. China’s aggressive hunt for energy resources is raising alarm to western competitors

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1 A portion of this paper was drawn from the article written by the author and to be published under the title, “Energy Cooperation Problems in Northeast Asia: Unfolding the Reality,” in East Asia: An International Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 91-106.
in the industry. Western competitors, predominantly European multinational corporations, are already feeling a heated competition coming from the Chinese counterparts in the fields of development, exploration, production, and logistics. With concern to Russia, both EU and Northeast Asia are particularly concerned with the future prospects on its reliability as an energy supplier. Such concern was only fuelled by Russia’s toying with the supply of natural gas to gas pipeline transit nations (i.e. Ukraine and Belarus) as well as with the delivery routes of its Far East crude oil and gas to Northeast Asia (i.e. China line vs. Japan line).

Common sense tells us that states with a permanent handicap in terms of energy resources would benefit from cooperation to the extent that their foremost priority would be energy security. However, their respective long-term energy policies and strategies tells a different story, i.e., that a desire for cooperation at the regional level is simply not there.

They do all agree on the importance of cooperation in improving energy efficiency and energy structure. The European and Northeast Asian states have actively pursued ties with other subregions at individual level, e.g., Southeast Asia and Central Asia, and with external organizations, e.g. ASEAN and APEC. However, these cooperation activities have been limited to discussing various aspects of transnational energy-related issues, ranging from environment to technology transfer, information sharing to data base building, clean energy to renewable energy, and from energy efficiency to energy structure.

Yet, the possibility of cooperating in terms of energy security has been a recent phenomenon. It would not be until a few years ago that some of the Northeast Asian states (i.e. China) would start thinking their energy interests in strategic thinking and term. Japan is expected to come up with an energy security policy in the near future. Korea is a distant player. The EU in 2006 has finally produced a so-called “Green Paper” to outline policy option for a common European strategy for energy security. Furthermore, a strategic energy review is expected to be formalized so as to forge a fundamental framework for a collective energy policy and strategy.

What is critically absent in these governmental outlooks is that it does not engage and envision energy in terms of security, not to mention cooperation in security sense. They try to blur the concept of energy security cooperation (ESC) with what I might term it as “general energy cooperation” (GEC). The support for the idea of cooperation at such venues as ASEAN+3 and APEC,¹ and EU is misleading for two reasons. First, are the conceptual differences between GEC and ESC. The former is much broader while energy security is tent to be regarded as inclusive. In other words, while GEC may include energy security issue within its ambit, the reverse cannot be true because energy security does not supplement the interests of other energy areas, e.g., renewable energy, energy technology, and environment, etc.

Second, it is the target dimension of cooperation: cooperation with states that only either produce energy resources or have access to transit routes for the delivery of

these resources, or with energy related international organizations. From each state’s long-term energy policy programmes, it is apparent that they are not ready to cooperate. They still prefer to act on their own, either unilaterally or perhaps bilaterally. Their focus is on how to nurture a relationship with the lone regional energy supplier, i.e. Russia and the transit nation, i.e. again, Russia.

The author does not wish to appear prejudiced nor biased about the prospects for energy security cooperation between the EU and Northeast Asia. Instead, this article is an attempt to seek common interests and areas conducive to inducing cooperation between the two regions in the areas of their energy security concerns. Thus, it begins by clarifying the concept of energy cooperation and energy security, denying any seeming interchangeability. Then, through content analysis of long-term energy policies, an attempt is made to study China’s, Japan’s, Russia’s, and EU’s basic stance on cooperation in the energy security realm. The conclusion offers some areas with potential for energy security cooperation between the EU and Northeast Asia.

2. Conceptual Clarification: GEC and ESC

GEC and ESC are fundamentally different. Yet, in drafting their long-term energy policy statements, the governments in question have tended to use them interchangeably. Improperly understood and ill-defined concepts (ideas) inevitably and easily result in misconceived policy direction, orientation, and implementation. Finding a common ground for cooperation is difficult, making the idea of cooperation unthinkable, if not impossible, among these states. Thus, we may believe that the regional states do not actually want any energy cooperation.

The term “energy security” essentially means the maintenance of sufficient energy supplies, prices commensurate with purchasing power, and guaranteed safe delivery of energy resources. On the other hand, energy cooperation is often more concerned with the provision of energy services through improved management of international energy markets, wider availability and higher quality of energy resources and expansion of choices in order to achieve sustainable growth. It thus incorporates the notion of reliable ample supplies energy resources, ranging from fossil fuels to renewables and nuclear power.

In other words, energy policy-making and cooperation are now pursued for a much larger end than before, namely, sustainable growth. In recent years, the scope of energy policy goals has been expanded and enlarged by the demand and desire to achieve sustainable growth at the local, regional, and global levels. Table 1 outlines the shifting paradigm of energy cooperation.

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Table 1: Shifting Paradigm of Energy Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Paradigm</th>
<th>Emerging Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy considered primarily as a sectoral issue</td>
<td>Greater consideration of social, economic, and environmental impacts of energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations on fossil fuels</td>
<td>Limitations on the assimilative capacity of the earth and its atmosphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on expanding supplies of fossil fuels</td>
<td>Emphasis on developing a wider portfolio of energy resources and on cleaner energy technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External social and environmental costs of energy use largely ignored</td>
<td>Finding ways to address the negative externalities associated with energy use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth accorded highest priority (even in prosperous economies)</td>
<td>Understanding of the links between economy and ecology, and of the cost-effectiveness of addressing environmental impacts early on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to focus on local pollution</td>
<td>Recognition of the need to address environmental impacts of all kinds and at all scales (local to global)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on increasing energy supply</td>
<td>Emphasis on expanding energy services, widening access, and increasing efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern with ourselves and our present needs</td>
<td>Recognition of our common future and of the welfare of future generations</td>
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While the ultimate goal of a state’s energy policy is to achieve sustainable growth at the national level, and thereby contribute to growth at the global level, there are many other interests that the state must take into consideration. And these interests are now more effectively realized by means of cooperation for a variety of reasons. Technological discrepancies between developed and developing states in the oil refinery industry, for instance, must be overcome by cooperation because failure to do so only perpetuates energy and environmental problems. A widening gap in energy refinery technology not only leads to increased wastage of energy, but also pollution due to the combustion of low quality energy products and the transnational character of air pollution. Hence, the scope and range of a state’s energy interests are more extensive than ever because of their deepening interconnectedness.

For a state to secure a wide variety of interests that are interconnected, cooperation is widely perceived to be the best means. According to this view, these interests can be more effectively and sufficiently secured through systematic arrangements at both the regional and global levels. For a region greatly concerned with not only its own energy interests, but also transnational energy problems, including the environment and supply security, cooperation seems to offer “an array of powerful incentives.” Linking energy infrastructure, for example, can “create synergies and market efficiencies as well as improve the cost and access to foreign capital”,¹ which are

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often critical to the development of the region’s overseas energy exploration and production activities, not to mention improving energy structure and efficiency. Furthermore, GEC at the regional level can help facilitate the materialization of interests in other energy-related areas, such as the environment and clean and renewable energy, by fully utilizing the region’s capacity in capital, technology, knowledge, information, etc. In the same vein, common regional practice of energy activities may eventually foster formal structure and informal norms that could broaden cooperation in the region. Thus, the potential benefits from this sort of cooperation are expected to be political trust, lower costs, economic development, deregulation, environmental improvements, decreased political reliance on oil exporters and increased national security.

Many people approach the subject with an economic mind set rather than a security and/or international relations one. One of the most prominent arguments suggested by the proponents of cooperation is that sustainable energy supply will be realized by cooperation. It is not, however, applicable to the thinking of strategic planners in pursuit of strategic interests because they require a certain degree of engagement by non-economic and non-technological area, namely, the security realm, i.e., when imports of oil exceed one hundred million tons per year, a state must rely on all types of available measures including military ones.

Thus, energy security interests are no longer merely economic interests, but also national security interests. Japan has long perceived energy interests to be an integral part of national security interests. Indeed, the country’s need for energy was one of the main reasons for starting World War II in Asia. Following WW II, the US undertook a series of initiatives with respect to the conceptualization of ‘energy security.’ In 1979, former US president Jimmy Carter publicly proclaimed the ‘energy threat’ as a threat to national security. China was a latecomer in realizing the security aspect, not bringing it to light until the so-called ‘New Energy Policy’ in 1997. Through further articulation and elaboration, it succeeded in securitizing energy interests at the national level, thereby formalizing, inventing, or reviving all energy-related state systems, mechanisms and relevant apparatus. To meet the challenges arising from energy security, the work of shaping China’s energy policy is no longer confined to energy institutions (i.e., the electricity and water resources departments, and the energy bureau). Other bodies, such as state-owned oil companies, the State Development and Reform Commission, the Development Research Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc., have now also been brought into play.


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By securitizing energy interests, any economic value from cooperation has lost ground in the foreign-policy decision making communities of the regional states. What should be thought of in terms of relative gains is instead, now being looked at in terms of zero-sum game.\textsuperscript{1} The political rivalry and distrust among the regional states is such that one state’s advancement in securing oil resources, i.e., incurred a gain, makes the other states perceive they have incurred a loss. In Northeast Asia, especially China and Japan, there may never be any energy cooperation unless a clear line is drawn between the concepts of cooperation for energy security and energy cooperation.

As noted by many, “When major powers that are also the most voracious oil consumers compete over scarce resources, they find it difficult to coexist.”\textsuperscript{2} What makes the competition in Northeast Asia worse is that there is a supplier with a regional major power status that has to rely on its energy resources for fast and effective recovery of its economy. From the supplier’s dimension, they tend to seek cooperation to secure and enhance their market access at a competitive price so as to maximize the return. Their desire to maximize the return is generating high competition among the purchasers and the situation is exacerbated due to the lack of any cooperative framework such as a market.

The concept of energy security is a fundamentally different from that of energy cooperation in general. It is wrong to think they are complementary with each other. One is not going to lead to the other. GEC does not necessarily have to lead to ESC, and ESC is not necessarily going to guarantee the realization of GEC because it would depend on the outcome of the former. If the regional states could acquire their much needed oil and gas at a cheaper price and through a stable group of diverse suppliers, then, it could have a converse effect on the prospect for GEC. The regional states might become less interested in GEC because their supply is guaranteed in their desired form. Unless there is another goal to achieve economic development in more efficient way, perhaps only selective issues in the area of GEC such as environment may be cooperative.

3. Review of Policies
The conceptual confusion between energy cooperation and energy security is clear in the national energy policies of the Northeast Asian regional states. Their expressed desire for cooperation is not with the regional states, but with energy suppliers, producers, and transit nations. None of the official documents mention cooperation at the regional level. This lack of commitment on the part of the member nations may, perhaps, be attributed to the open characteristic of regionalism embedded in these

\textsuperscript{1} Niklas Swanstrom, “An Asian Oil and Gas Union: Prospects and Problems”, p. 86. The concept of zero-sum game needs some clarification in the context of state’s strategic calculation and perception. It does not mean that if someone takes one barrel of oil, this would mean one less barrel for others, because the petroleum market is a global one and oil and gas can be purchased at cost-effective prices. However, for many energy strategic planners and policy makers heavily dependent on imports of oil and gas, a competitor’s advantage or preoccupation with energy-producing states means losing ground in competitions over favourable treatment (i.e., lower taxes, lower tariffs, cheaper prices, first service, favourable quotas, etc.) for competing states. For a critique of the zero-sum argument, see Xu Yi-chong, “China’s Energy Security”, 275.

frameworks, at least up to now. Another important fact about their statements at these meetings is that they are one-dimensional and focus heavily on the economic aspects of cooperation.

(1) China
Although China became an oil product importer in 1993 and a crude oil importer in 1996, the energy issue failed to catch the attention of the top leadership in a highly hierarchical bureaucracy until 1997. That year, Premier Li Peng delivered the first national energy policy, “New Energy Policy (Xin nengyuan zhengce),” in which he proposed that “development in the petroleum sector should rely on two markets (domestic and overseas) and two resources (oil and gas).” To achieve this goal, China adopted a ‘going-out (zouchuqu)’ strategy. In short, the New Policy addressed the importance of expanding China’s involvement in domestic and overseas exploration and production of oil and gas, and encouraging its oil companies to share overseas oil and gas resources. This strategy was re-visited in 1998 by then premier Zhu Rongji as part of the broader policy of global engagement. The government also listed “three strategic regions” for the Chinese oil companies to target: Central Asia and Russia, the Middle East and North Africa, and South America.1 At that time, China’s energy policy had been couched more in economic terms, than strategic or geopolitical terms. However, at the turn of the century, China began to identify its energy security with strategic thinking. This is simply the result of Beijing’s realization of the importance of energy supplies for sustainable economic development, and feeling the urgent need to seriously consider the effects of mismanaging energy in the long run. Especially in the wake of the 9.11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the subsequent retaliatory measures undertaken by the US, China was quick to learn the “high politics” aspect of and rising strategic interest concerns about energy security policy. Finally in 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao formalized seven small research groups (yanjiu xiaozhu)1 to prepare for the first time a long-term ‘energy security’ strategy at the national level. Since then, energy security has been prioritised by the Beijing leadership as a national security issue. The present situation is summarized well by Lieberthal and Herberg:

In short, China’s domestic energy supply-demand gap poses challenges to ongoing rapid economic growth. As this problem becomes more acute over time, energy imports will play an increasing role in China’s economy. Put simply, energy security has become an issue of the “high politics” of national security, not just the “low politics” of domestic economic policy.2

From an economic perspective, Chinese strategic thinking was underscored by two factors. First, the almost doubling of crude oil imports from 26.6 million tons to 70.2 million in 2000.3 Second, China’s total energy consumption growth rate since 2000 has exceeded its GDP growth rate by as much as five per cent. Thus, China’s energy security is not solely about securing foreign supplies, but also about managing...
domestic demand.\(^1\) For example, in 2004, as a result of the rapid rise in consumption and climbing oil prices, Beijing had to spend an extra US$7 billion in foreign exchange, with payment totalling over US$43 billion.\(^2\) Crude oil and oil products became the country’s largest single import item. This expenditure not only had a negative impact on consumption, investment, exports and imports, but it also caused a 0.8 per cent decline in China’s GDP.\(^3\)

In these pressing circumstances, Beijing began to realize the compelling need to plan for sufficient fuel to permit continued long-term sustainable economic growth, and alleviate ensuing changes in its social (i.e., rising car ownership) and energy industry structure. In order to meet these challenges, long-term energy policy and strategy reports were drafted starting in 2001. The different emphases of these reports reveal the limited capacity of the government and competing energy interests to pursue national energy security. They turned out more to be indicative than effective ‘grand plans.’\(^4\) While both the 2001 and 2003 reports focused on oil and gas, the 2005 report primarily targeted domestic supply and demand, i.e., maximizing domestic supply and improving energy conservation, both of which require better planning and better coordination among different sectors of the economy. It called for a centralized ‘authoritative institution’ to make national energy policy.

Despite the numerous efforts, there is one underlying significant problem in all these reports: the goals are laid out without direction, priority, and orientation. It is indeed difficult to incorporate all the necessary criteria in a long-term energy policy, but the Chinese government is not generous in giving attention to the issue of cooperating with other needy countries, either regional neighbours or distant transit nations. When it comes to the names of potential cooperative partners, its emphasis on cooperation is narrow and selective in scope. Most ‘partners’ are current energy producers, countries with energy production potential, or transit nations which are within its geographical proximity, i.e., Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India, ASEAN, and Russia.\(^5\) None of the long-term reports on Chinese energy security addresses the issue of cooperation with regional states. Thus, despite the chronicled rhetoric by Chinese officials about the necessity for energy cooperation at ASEAN, APEC, and Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Chinese words and action do not tally.

The last time China made explicit reference to regional cooperation in an official document was perhaps in 1999, with nothing similar thereafter.\(^6\) Since then, the official policy has been self-oriented, self-centric, self-helping, and to an extent selfish by neglecting the calls for cooperation at governmental level made by other regional players. In 2004, for instance, when China was invited to an inaugural

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3. Ibid.
ministerial level talk on energy cooperation at the regional level initiated by the Korean government, it totally neglected the cooperation aspect and gave no explanation. (Japan did the same. See below).

As such, many Chinese and foreign energy observers believe that such behaviour is not going to “get China anywhere until it can develop some consensus on what it wants in its energy development.” In order to meet the challenges stemming from the complex web of interconnected goals and priorities of energy security, a ministerial-level group, known as the “National Energy Leading Small Group” (Guojia nengyuan lingdao xiaozhu), was founded in May 2005. It is to be in charge of developing a national energy strategy for the development and conservation of energy resources, energy security and emergency responses, and energy cooperation with other countries.

The formation of this Group indicates an enhanced awareness about energy security at the top levels of China’s leadership. In March 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that “energy is an important strategic issue concerning China’s economic growth, social stability and national security.” Also, the 2006 Working Report (Gongzuo baogao), delivered by Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan to the People’s Congress in March 2006 summarized China’s potential and existing energy challenges as in follows:

- sustained strong energy demand that places pressure on supply;
- shortage in resources that limits the growth of the energy industry;
- coal-centred supply structure that is detrimental to the environment;
- backward technologies that inhibit efficient supply of energy;
- international market fluctuations that negatively impact domestic energy supply.

1 The Korean Ministry of Industry and Natural Resources, in collaboration with the UN ESCAP initiated the meeting in 2004. Only South and North Korea, Mongolia, and Russia were represented by their respective ministers. The second meeting in November 2005, in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, however, was represented by high governmental officials from the four nations while China, Japan, and the US came as observers. The meeting was held under the “First Session of Senior Officials Committee on Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” In the end, it officially launched an “Inter-governmental Collaborative Mechanism on Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” The meeting also produced the so-called “Working Group on Energy Planning and Policy (WG-EPP)” that was held in May 2006 in Thailand, with official participation from South and North Korea, Mongolia and Russia, with China and the US as observers. See ENB Newscenter, 16 May 16, 2006 [http://www.ebn.co.kr/search/s_view.html?id=244955&keys=%C0%FC%C3%BC%B4%BA%BD%B A&kind] (June 19, 2006). Jaewoo Choo, “Energy Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” Korea Journal of International Studies, 44:1 (2004), 213.


3 Ibid., 265-286


6 Wenran Jiang, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Energy Security”.

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To overcome these challenges, the Report listed these strategies: (1) develop multiple oil import sources and import locations by increasing imports from Russia and Central Asia; (2) raise the proportion of crude oil imports from areas other than the Middle East so as to achieve diversification of energy suppliers; (3) prepare against unexpected interruption of oil supplies by building strategic oil reserves; (4) promote and strengthen regional and bilateral energy cooperation with energy-producing nations; and (5) participate in the Energy Charter Treaty. Once again, China’s attitudes regarding cooperation in Northeast Asia are conspicuously missing. At the governmental level or Track-I level, China is simply not interested in cooperating with the Northeast Asian oil importing nations.

There are perhaps several causal factors. China’s desire to counteract the rapid growth in oil consumption and demand may be the top priority. Beijing may think it can secure energy resources more efficiently through strengthening relationships with energy-producing nations on its own, rather than trying to collaborate with rivals. Perhaps, without a formal ministry, China has had difficulties in learning about cooperation possibilities and may thus inadvertently ignore them. Without redefining and re-conceptualizing the idea and meaning of energy cooperation in Northeast Asia, regional cooperation in any realm is impossible without China’s active participation.

(2) Japan
In June 2006, based on The Basic Energy Plan of 2003 and The Basic Energy Policy of 2004, Japan finally released its first long-term national energy policy entitled “New National Energy Strategy (NNES).” ¹ It was prepared out of concerns about the future scarcity of fossil fuels and against the peak-production-theory. It posits firstly that Japan will face the strong possibility that “fossil fuel supplies and energy politics will be fraught in the coming years”, ² and secondly that global oil output “will peak in 2050 and natural gas output will reach its zenith in 2100.”³ Due to external and internal factors that will cause energy prices to rise, a “very tight squeeze” between demand and supply will be protracted.⁴ Driven by the spectre of another oil crisis, the global rush for energy resources and a simmering gas dispute with China, the NNES was published amid fear about whether the nation will be able to ensure oil and other energy supplies to fuel its economy.⁵

The aims of the NNES are threefold: (1) to establish energy security measures that the Japanese people can trust; (2) to establish a foundation for sustainable development through a comprehensive solution combining both energy and environmental issues;

⁴ The internal factors were the unusually cold weather and subsequent rise in the cost of heating oil, winter vegetables and other products. The external factors were systemic problems such as the robust economic growth of two large states (China and India), the shrinking margins of spare production capacity by the major oil producers, and economic challenges to developing new resources. See Hisane Masaki, “Japan’s New Energy Strategy”.
and (3) to commit to assist Asian and world nations address the energy problem.\textsuperscript{1} Other goals are to boost upstream investment, add refined products to the government’s strategic oil stockpiles, and reduce the country’s oil dependency.\textsuperscript{2} There are three points the report emphasizes as fundamental: First, the establishing of a state-of-the-art energy supply-demand structure. Second, the goals are expected to be realized by strengthening diplomatic efforts and comprehensive measures to address energy and environmental issues. Third, improving emergency measures is critical. By coordinating public and private organizations, the following five specific long-term targets are to be attained jointly by the government and private entities: \textsuperscript{3}

- Another 30 per cent improvement in efficiency by 2030.
- Reduction of dependence on petroleum to lower than 40 per cent in 2030.
- Maintain nuclear power as a proportion of total power production at 30 to 40 per cent until 2030 or beyond.
- Increase the self-development ratio of overseas natural resources development to around 40 per cent by 2030.

In addition, various programs to be actively pursued at the national level were reviewed and evaluated, including: energy-conservation frontrunner plan, transport energy evolvement plan, new energy innovation plan, nuclear power national plan, energy and natural resources securing strategy, Asia energy environment cooperation strategy, reinforcement of emergency countermeasures, and energy technology transfer.\textsuperscript{4} In light of the energy and natural resources securing strategy, the NNES notes that this goal will be realized by actively pursuing more equity production through strengthening relations with oil/gas producing countries. One of the most prominent measures adopted by the NNES is the provision of technical assistance beyond the energy sector (i.e., official development assistance and economic cooperation) as well as by increasing overall “investment” in those countries.\textsuperscript{5} To enhance the investment capacity of the Japanese firms in the equity participation of foreign energy sources and companies, the Japanese government is now aiming to raise the participation limits on the government-owned Japan Oil and Gas and Metal National Corporation


\textsuperscript{4} “New National Energy Strategy”.

\textsuperscript{5} Takeo Kumagai, “Japan Finalizes New Energy Strategy to 2030”; 6.
in upstream projects from the current 50 per cent.\(^1\) In addition, it has also been steering Japan’s overseas upstream investment policy towards more proactive participation by Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) in exploration and development overseas for a percentage of production.\(^2\)

One salient example is when Japanese gas companies Osaka Gas, Tokyo Gas and Chubu Electric were able to purchase gas from the Chevron-led Gordon LNG project in Australia, which was already being lined up by the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). The case was entangled in a heated competition in which CNOOC appeared to be closing in as the favourite. However in the end, Japan was able to “steal in secure” supply of their Chinese rivals.\(^3\) As Japan prepares to offset the dominance of oil against cleaner-burning natural gas and raise the proportion of natural gas in the total energy supply from 13.5 per cent in 2000 to 17.8 per cent in 2030, the competition between the two countries to secure natural gas has recently intensified.

Japan’s fierce rivalry with China over securing energy resources in Northeast Asia is also apparent in their tug of war over Russian and Siberian oil and natural gas. Japan appeared to be the winner after the announcement by the Kremlin of its decision to lay a pipeline to Nahodka, which is the end point of the pipeline that Japan has long sought. Nonetheless, Japan will not feel satisfied until the plans are executed.

Japan’s unilateral pursuits for energy resources are also clear in the East China Sea. In 2005, for instance, Japan decided to build the country’s first surveying ship for offshore oil deposits. This was to counter China’s alleged drilling of the Chunhao gas fields in the region. The government also allocated 8.2 million yen in its fiscal 2006 defence budget to increase the nation’s ability to cope with submarines and armed spy ships in seas close to Japan.\(^4\) This is also believed to be a countermeasure in response to the intrusion of a Chinese submarine in its public waters in 2004. Furthermore, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) coalition introduced a bill to create off-limits zones near structures set up for resource exploration and development in the Japanese EEZ.\(^5\) These are actually to target potential conflict with the Chinese and Koreans in such areas as Diaoyu dao (Senkaku Islands) in the East China Sea and the Dok-do Islands (Takeshima Islands) in the East Sea (Japan Sea), respectively. Although China and Japan have held five rounds of talks since October 2004 on energy disputes in the East China Sea area, they have yet to make any noteworthy progress.

As reflected in the contents of the long-term energy policy, Japan does indeed seem to regard domestic measures as more viable than foreign ones. Its foreign activities in relation to energy security have been somewhat unorthodox: engaging in steep

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\(^1\) Ibid.


\(^3\) As a result, Osaka Gas and Chubu Electric will each get 1.5 million tons/year over 25 years beginning around 2010, and Tokyo Gas will get 1.2 million tons/year. “Tokyo’s Global LNG Ambitions,” *Petroleum Economist*, February 2006, 1.


\(^5\) According to a draft of the bill, trespassers are to be punished with prison terms of up to one year and fines worth 500,000 yen. This is already widely believed to be a protective measure for Teikoku Oil’s experimental drilling in the East China Sea. It was granted concessions in the summer of 2005. Hisane Masaki, *Ibid.*
competition with rivals, notably China, and apathetic to cooperation for territorial sovereignty reasons. Apart from some cases of energy technology cooperation for the enhancement of energy efficiency and environmental cooperation, Japan has been relying on a unilateral approach to secure untapped energy resources in Northeast Asia.

The NNES and other related documents seem also to limit the scope of cooperation with energy producing nations and regions. Whether deliberate or not, omitting mention of cooperation with regional rivals to secure better energy supply from Russia is a clear indication of Japan’s current stance on this issue. What is more perplexing in the eyes of many observers is the contrasting support for regional institutions at a broader regional level. For example, Japan has been proactive in promoting energy cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps the territorial dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands is the major obstacle impeding regional energy cooperation in Northeast Asia. Until it is settled, perhaps Japan does not want a third party’s involvement in its handling of energy issues with Russia and Siberia in particular. It may still prefer to deal with Russia in bilateral terms. Thus, Japan’s energy security interests seem to be dealt with in the broader context of security.

(3) Russia
Russia’s position as an energy supplier is fundamentally different from that of the other regional states which are heavy importers. While it may be a well calculated policy on Russia’s part to reclaim its position in the regional international order by manipulating the needs of the regional states, many in Northeast Asia fear that such reassertions could unilaterally enhance its geopolitical leverage and influence in the regional affairs.

After having undergone several major revisions since 2000, Russia’s long-term energy strategy, “The Energy Strategy to 2020 (“the Strategy”, hereafter)” was finally approved by the Duma in August 2003. It constitutes the Russian government’s official, long-term energy security plan, direction and goals. Much of it deals with energy production forecasts. The development of the energy sector is still treated with utmost priority. The importance of the energy sector development is underscored by the fact that Russia’s substantial energy resources are the foundation of its economic development, accounting for quarter of its GDP, a third of the total industrial production and about half of the federal budget, exports and currency return.

Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the government recognizes the imperative of using the energy resources to maximum efficiency so as to achieve maximum economic growth and improvements to the quality of life of the Russian people.

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3 “Russia’s Energy Strategy.”
Thus, the Strategy focuses on a stable domestic energy market, cost-efficient energy system, secure financial market, and environmental acceptability of the production structure. Economic success will depend on whether it can create a rational market environment. Under this assumption, the Strategy lays down two different scenarios for Russia’s future economic development based on the “optimistic” and “temperate” outcome of the implementation of intensive reform measures and rapid liberalization of prices and tariffs on goods and services of natural monopolies as recommended by the Strategy. Although a strong variation is expected by the two scenarios, to achieve either, Russia will require cooperation not only within the government and market, but also with the foreign nations.

Russia needs to advance cooperation with the outside world. All of its energy development projects are expensive and the costs seem continually to rise above the original estimates. For example, it was originally estimated to cost around $10 billion to build a pipeline from to Nakhodka, but this has risen to US$16 billion. According to the Strategy, to meet the global and domestic demand for energy, Russia will need about US$170-200 billion for the gas industry, Us$230-240 billion for the oil complex, Us$120-170 billion for the power industry, Us$100-140 for modernization of the generative outputs, US$20 billion for the coal-mining industry, and US$50-70 for the energy-saving reform measures. All in all, total capital investment in the reconstruction and development of the power sector ranges from US$260 to $300 billion in 2001-2010 and from US$400 to $510 billion in the following decade.¹

Against this background, Russia’s energy strategy to 2020 has two main objectives. First, it proposes to diversify energy exports, accessing new oil and gas markets in the Asia-Pacific region, Northeast Asia in particular.² Exports have been predominantly destined for Europe (more than 80 per cent of Russian oil exports and more than 60 per cent of natural gas exports are delivered to Europe),³ and it would like to expand its market simultaneously with the expected rise in both production and demand. Second, it would like to diversify energy supplies to the “north, east and south,” implying its desire to promote energy production in new, capital-intensive environments including Eastern Siberia, the Far Eastern region, the Arctic and continental shelf of the northern and Caspian seas.⁴ Despite possible fluctuations in the potential production capacity of these regions, pending their feasibility, the Strategy makes a bold prediction of rapidly increasing energy supplies to the Asia-Pacific region. It forecasts that Russia’s oil exports to this region will rise from the current 3 per cent of the total volume to 30 per cent in 2020, reaching 105 million tons a year, whereas those to Europe will stand at 150-160 million tons per year.

With respect to Russia’s natural gas exports, Europe is expected to remain the major market, absorbing about 60 per cent of its total annual production. Nonetheless, the prospects for the Asia-Pacific market for Russian natural gas will be enhanced as it

¹ Vladimir I. Ivanov, “Russian Energy Strategy 2020: Balancing Europe with the Asia-Pacific Region,” ² Other benefits from the Asia-Pacific market taken into Russian consideration are: (1) its desire to reduce dependence on transit routes and therefore, additional transit fees to European markets; and (2) the routes’ accessibility to other additional, and potential, Asia-Pacific markets such as the U.S. ³ Vladimir I. Ivanov, “Russian Energy Strategy 2020”. ⁴ Russian Federation Ministry of Energy, “Summary of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of Up to 2020” (2003), 10-11 and 14-16.
plans to ship 35 billion cubic metres by 2020, accounting for 25 per cent of Russia’s total exports. These figures translate into 30 per cent of the Asia-Pacific oil market and 15 per cent of natural gas market.

The driving force behind Russia’s desire to expand its foreign market is the notion of energy partnership which Russia has tried to forge in its relationship with those states seeking greater energy cooperation. The government “aims to improve investment opportunities in Russia’s energy sector in order to upgrade infrastructure, promote efficient and environmental friendly technologies and enhance energy conservation.” So far, Russia has succeeded in forging energy partnerships with the EU, the US, China, Japan and Korea, to name a few. Nonetheless, diplomatic rhetoric and symbolism are not a cure for development of Russia’s energy economy. It needs to equip itself with proper transportation infrastructure in order to generate needed capital, as well as to attract foreign investment. One of the reasons why Russia has not been able to uncap the Asia-Pacific market is due to the absence of transport infrastructure, including pipelines.²

Realizing this, the Kremlin began to re-assert control over local governments, i.e., returning to the centralism after the regionalism that prevailed in the 1990s as a result of former president Yeltsin’s concession of maximum autonomy to the country’s 89 regional governors.³ Equipped with full autonomy, authority and power, the local governments became infamous for their uncooperativeness and corruption. Under these circumstances, the Kremlin lost its ability to guarantee the full implementation of national energy projects because they could be realized without cooperation at the local level.

Despite Putin’s efforts to regain control of the Eastern and Western regions, foreign investment and commerce seemed doomed due to their lack of confidence in Russia’s investment environment. Although a variety of reform efforts in various sectors and related areas (i.e., legal, market, price and tax reforms, etc.) have been extensively performed by the Kremlin, its indecisiveness in dealing with foreign counterparts has only undermined confidence. For example, the final destination(s) and route(s) of the transportation infrastructures leading to the Asia-Pacific region have undergone numerous changes. Although the Kremlin in 2004 seemingly announced the final decision by signing a decree to build a pipeline that would go from Eastern Siberia (Taishet) to the Pacific (Khabarovsk), it still does not solve the puzzle for China and Japan who have been competing to get the final destiny of this pipeline.⁴

As for the American factor, Russia regards the US as part of the Asia-Pacific region (market). However, the Chinese do not welcome this as they are already engaged in a heated competition with the US and its allies, notably Japan, to secure energy resources. Russia’s desire to recognize the US as an Asian market would undermine Chinese strategic thinking about Eastern Siberia because the US has a

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³ Keun-wook Paik, “Russia’s Oil and Gas Export to Northeast Asia”, 61.
⁴ Although the Kremlin’s final decision for the pipeline was recently to favour Japan’s wish to reach Nakodka, details are not released as to how and when the pipeline project will be carried out. “Politics of oil pipeline, gas pipeline,” Chosun Ilbo, May 16, 2006.
definite advantage over China when it comes to financing capital-intensive projects. This would be even more so if the US’ efforts were combined with those of the Japanese. The synergy effect of the combined efforts would simply overwhelm the Beijing leaders.

(4) European Union (EU)
In order to build a comprehensive and cohesive collective energy security policy, the EU is confronted with an imminent challenge that has deeply rooted since its inception as a union. The task is to be able to form a collective foreign policy as a whole that could serve both individual and collective interests of the member states. Thus far, the EU and its member states have long relied on their individual policy in pursuing their external relations. The case is not exceptional with their energy interest, either. Despite their long recognition of the importance of collective pursuit of energy interest as reflected in the Energy Charter Treaty, notwithstanding the founding role of energy in the birth of the Union, the member states have yet to properly engage in deep dialogue to build a common ground for a collective energy security strategy and policy.

Admittedly, it was not until the recent Russia’s exhibition of energy resources as potential diplomatic weapon that the EU finally recognized the urgency for collective action. As the EU’s reliance of Russian oil imports exceeded more than a quarter (27%) of the total imports in 2004, representing 18% of the total EU consumption of oil, the EU’s increasing dependency had to raise attention of the member states. Against this background, the EU Commission released a “Green Paper,” entitled “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy.” The Paper basically identifies several priority objectives for pursuing an energy policy in Europe and suggests several options to achieve them. Of the six priorities the Paper deemed to bear strategic value to the Union’s energy interests, one area of priority seem to be in direct concern with the concept of energy security. This area is dubbed under the subtitle of “2.6 Towards a coherent external energy policy.”

In the scope of energy security concept, this area of concern directly deals with the necessary strategic steps the EU member states would well be required to take in pursuit of energy security. In order to achieve this end, the priority deems it essential and requisite for the EU to develop a coherent external policy that is applicable to not only energy producing nations but also energy transit nations as well. To do so, the policy must meet the following requirements: (1) A clear policy on securing and diversifying energy supplies; (2) Energy partnership with producers, transit countries, and other international actors; (3) Reacting effectively to external crisis situation; (4) Integrating energy into policies with an external dimension; and (5) Energy to promote development.

4. Conclusion: Major Areas and Goals of Energy Security Cooperation

The EU and the Northeast Asian states are currently in the midst of developing own energy security policy. As of now, not a single state can claim with confidence of completion of the policy that will have a long-term impact on the well-being of the respective nations. One thing is, however, very clear now to all. That is, cooperation in the energy security realm is inevitable not only among the regional states themselves, but also with external states for their status as a key energy supplier. Furthermore, as Russia, with potential to diversify its supply to two different ends (i.e. Europe and Northeast Asia), increasingly becomes a greater supplier of energy resources, the EU and Northeast Asia will find cooperation as inevitable in their desire to balance Russia’s supply to their own region. Given China’s ever growing appetite for energy, China also becomes an inevitable variable that can at best be managed by cooperation by the two regions.

Under the circumstances, it is very much timely discuss some of the areas and goals that the two regions can potentially cooperate to better secure energy supply and delivery to their respective region. Before identifying the areas of cooperation, a common goal that could accommodate the interests of both regions must be established. Since energy security is deeply concerned with a long-term perspective of sustainable development, it should incorporate the concerns such as reliable, affordable, and stable supply of energy as well as effective delivery of energy. Thus, the goal is to cooperate to realize a stable energy market and delivery system.

To achieve this goal, the strategy for cooperation will extensively have to concern such areas as diversifying energy supplies, coordinating approaches to common suppliers, and cooperating for an effective investment return with resources development and delivery routes. Firstly, in the discourse of diversification of energy suppliers, the biggest leverage that the EU and Northeast Asia will have over the energy producing nations is economy. In allocating economic aid and assistance in exchange for affordable energy resources, the EU and Northeast Asia states would mutually benefit from cooperation. Many, if not all, energy producing nations are poverty-stricken nations and they are in devastating need for development. In extending assistance to these poor but energy rich nations, the member states of the EU and the Northeast Asian states have been operating rather on an individual basis. G-8, for instance, showed a great helping hand to the energy rich yet poor countries by deducting a significant amount of debt. Notwithstanding their benign intention and purposes, such efforts were limited to those in the Group. England and Germany, perhaps, may have received favourable treatment, if there were any, in their acquisition of energy resources as a result of their participation in the Group’s mission of their debt reduction efforts.

A similar effort was implemented by the Northeast Asian states at a similar time period without much follow-up measures for some for their lack of financial affordability. Yet, others committed uncontested amount of aid only to have a shrinking effect on the benign intention of their competitors. Hence, instead of diversifying valuable financial sources of good will for less efficacy, the EU and Northeast Asia whose combined economic might comprises roughly two-thirds of the world, must find ways in which they can cooperate in allocating financial resources, offering economic development assistance, and improving the economic condition of the energy producing and transit nations.
Secondly, a coordinated approach to Russia is in clear demand. As seen in Russia’s long-term energy policy, Russia, more than appropriately, deems its energy resources as the main source of its recovery to a Great Power status. Furthermore, its intention of utilizing energy resources could well be interpreted as to have potential to become one of the most effective diplomatic leverages in dealing with the world, given the current world trend of oil and gas dependency and consumption to prevail in the future. Thus, Russia naturally and inevitably becomes a common target of energy diplomatic target for both EU and Northeast Asia. These two regions could be hedged against one another at the will of Russia. If such case were to occur, it will generate inevitable competition between the two regions. To prevent this scenario from happening, a much more coordinated policy to Russia by the two regions should be founded and developed. The ASEM meeting would be an effective vehicle to carry both regions towards a more cohesive and collective approaches to Russia.

Thirdly, cooperation in the field of investment is highly desirable. The scope and range of investment area in energy is extensive, covering from downstream to upstream industries, from exploration to production, and from delivery to reserves. It is speculated, for instance, that an investment of 16 trillion dollars will be in demand for energy security reasons by 2030. In order for such an astronomical investment to have a better efficacy, it is highly desirable for energy consuming nations to cooperate not only in terms of finance but also in terms of technology. Most of the energy companies are predominantly western multinational corporations. Admittedly, they have the upper hand over those of the Northeast Asian states in both areas. In order for the Northeast Asian states to become free of being a prey to Russia’s energy politics against Europe, it is logical that the two regions combine their financial, technological and political forces together to retrieve best possible result; offsetting Russia’s hedging ambition as shown in the discourse of Russia’s toying with the Far East. Hence, investment cooperation would be mutually beneficial: the regions can achieve a relatively more balanced development in energy supply and delivery system at both global and regional levels.
Aspects and Limitations of Sino-European Security Cooperation

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In the short and mid-term, cooperation in security affairs between China and the EU (or European players) is inevitable. Such cooperation does not only include hard security issues that will demand a greater active commitment and engagement on side both. As emergent global players and stakeholders in all world-regions they will need to find ways to cooperate on soft issues. Particularly on the African continent conflicting interests and strategic approaches are looming, which might have lasting consequences for diplomatic relations and development on the ground. Rather, due to different traditions and varying foreign-policy past-experiences and interests, the individual approaches were not complimentary so far.

Cooperation in soft security, or the much broader task of achieving viable and effective global governance, will make it necessary for both sides to incorporate or take into account principled and practical aspects of each particular approach. Otherwise, it might not be possible to avoid major discrepancies and sustain economic, political and developmental interests on all sides being involved. The focus on soft security issues (or the extended security agenda) has several advantages and provides chances for lasting cooperation in the future. Diplomatically, mutual understanding is not only necessary in order to complement practical implementation of security and development agendas, but will also help to build mutual trust and confidence in this most sensitive field. Moreover, common efforts to improve development assistance and good governance standards (as a part of soft security initiatives), will go without major repercussions for the general world-political situation (i.e. raising suspicions among certain types of US scholars and political representatives).

Cooperation starts were dialogue is fruitful. If dialogue leads to results that can be practically put into practice on basis of a common policy agenda, lasting cooperation is possible beyond declarations of intent and expression of common principle. In order to increase the chances of achieving such a goal at least three criteria should be met.

1) It must be feasible to deal with the chosen issues.
2) The issues must be topical and of common interest in the short term and long term.
3) The dialogue partners must be capable and competent to make decisions (this would include all agenda setting agencies, particularly the Chinese MOFCOM (as well as MOFA and MoD), the European Commission as well as representatives of individual European ministries).

Generally speaking, in order to be effective, the agenda for dialogue and eventually cooperation must be practically based, be defined along current necessities and should not be mistaken as principally ethically based. Therewith it also contrasts with an academic view, which allows for extensive outlines of fields of possible cooperation

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beyond feasibility or usefulness. Although there are pressing issues particularly on the hard security agenda (i.e. non-proliferation, code of conduct and humanitarian intervention, arms- and armament-control, peace-keeping, combating terrorism) it is useful to look for the relevant multilateral fora that are already in place (i.e. in the UN-framework). Sino-European dialogues can at the outside lead to mutual and in the best case common understanding. Such dialogue is also necessary particularly in order to make out and discuss divergences and individual approaches. The first would concern issues such as the support of the Sudanese government as a party in the ongoing crisis or the dealing with good governance in general. The latter would involve themes such as the EU’s broadly defined security concept including off-territorial developmental aspects. Such approach might go too far for China, whose own developmental interests need space for manoeuvre in realising its interest and exerting its influence in the world-regions. Besides, the dealing with extended security issues necessitates intervention into domestic affairs, a practice that China has at least nominally rejected on a principled basis. By contrast, China has not yet made compatible the means of becoming a global economic power with its security and development policy goals beyond well-sounding and to-good-to-be-true principles.

The context of EU-China relations

When speaking of Sino-European Security Cooperation, it must be emphasised that this is still a highly abstract undertaking so far. The theme has been floating for several years, it has not yet been practically tackled, and yet, the re- emphasise and expressions of intent in the framework of the Sino-European strategic partnership show, that both sides are not opposed to such advance. Moreover, mutual reassertion shows that friendly relations between China and Europe are in principle wanted and appreciated.

During the past 4 years, the relationship between the EU and China has developed into an ambiguous construct. There is neither a need here to drag up divergences, which have been widely debated in the past, nor to mention the Arms embargo or market economy status. On the one hand, both sides have gained profit from cooperation and thereby satisfied common interests. This has especially been so in trade issues, where divergences have been resolved as far as this was possible. At the same time both sides will have to get used to the fact, that they are increasingly competitors on global markets.

On the other hand, as international players, both China and Europe have transformed over the past 4 years. (That is since 2003, when both sides had drafted strategy papers vis-à-vis the other). China has evolved has a globally pro-active player with viable relations across all continents. It has bundled its trade-, foreign-, security-, and development-policies, combined energy-security strategies with ODA and ODI and has become a welcomed partner in many countries of the South.

The EU has undergone its enlargement process, which has not made internal decision-making any easier, especially where the CFSP is concerned. The bundling of European treaties in the so-called constitution, which would provide a basis for the Europe of 25 (and replace the EU of 12 based on the Treaty of Maastricht), was rejected by popular vote in France and the Netherlands. This, again, has sent a signal
to the world, that Europe might not possess the ability to act and be the reliable partner, its partners would have wished for. The EU’s CSDP has taken ambiguous directions itself. Whereas two years ago the debate was concerned with soft security issues and how to resolve them by means of development assistance in all kinds of sectors, today military aspects (EU led missions, battle groups) have gained greater attention.

These changes might also have had an impact on mutual expectation and perceptions and perhaps even the relationship among the two. European policy-makers are confronted with China in all kinds of policy-areas of its external relations and is only slowly coming to terms with the idea.

Chinese policy-makers on the other side might have become impatient with the EU, its incoherent foreign policy directions and its lack of binding decisions and decisive implementation. The “A-word”¹ needs to be mentioned in this context, starting with Schröder/Chirac’s unilateral approaches to the issue and ending with European Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s statements in Beijing this January, where she re-emphasised Human Rights as an issue in Sino-European Relations and connecting it with the issue. These, among other factors, indicate that in terms of confidence-building in security affairs there is still way to go between the Europeans and China.

This leads me to the limitations of EU-China cooperation. Limitations mean two things: Firstly, structural constraints which are posed by the individual players’ capabilities as well as by external factors. Secondly, more actively, limitations are determined by the extent how far each of them wants to go and in how far possible cooperation agendas would interfere with individual strategies.

The first set of limitations comes with the idiosyncrasies of both players. This firstly involves the capabilities and willingness to implement comprehensive policies. Ethically both sides to varying degrees maintain and convey a self-image as peaceful risers. Both are in the process of development. Institutions, self-understanding, internal and external policies undergo substantial transformations and (strategic) interests are being gradually defined. During this process policies have inevitably been guided by this fact. China’s development relies on certain internal and external necessities in order to be able to sustain its development. Besides it needs a peaceful environment (in its neighbourhood and in the external regions) and a positive image in world in order to be able to satisfy its domestic needs without any disturbances or obstacles.

Similarly, on European side the current stage of integration in its development was never thought to be easy. After gradual economic integration the functionalist idea of a spill-over into other policy areas is apparently not an automatism. The simultaneity of Foreign and Security Policy integration and the Enlargement process poses great challenges (Although contemporary challenges should not be reduced to these problems).

The capabilities and capacities of China and the EU delimit their international scope

¹ Namely the Arms embargo
of action and cooperation. In terms of security cooperation the possibilities have in the past been described as limited. At the current stage of the strategic partnership and in face of mutual issues advances are possible in the common dealing with soft security issues. Several factors speak in favour for such an approach. On the one hand, the EU’s Security Strategy set the stage for off-territorial fields of engagement and the bundling of Development and Security issues. On the other hand, China has developed the concepts of common development and mutual benefits in its South-South relations.

China has also developed a strong commitment to peace-keeping efforts and by November 2006 had approximately 1,300 peace-keepers deployed in Africa alone. Although this number might not sound high it is remarkable at this stage of China’s development towards a pro-active international actor. Within recent years the EU has worked on its military capabilities, which however, remain limited. From 2007 onward its battle-groups shall be fully operational and will be a tool in humanitarian operations and peace enforcement. So far peace-keeping can be regarded as a task mainly taken over by member-states.

Other reasons for limitation of possible security cooperation in soft security are:
- transatlantic problems which any ‘hard security’ cooperation would bring up;
  (And there is not a single opinion on the relevance of transatlantic relations in Sino-European cooperation inside Europe).
- the EU and China are confronted with different kinds of security environments;
EU is not directly involved in regional in Asian security issues (Six party talks etc) although common security interests in Central Asia must be addressed.
- although both have been defined as soft security players their security doctrines differ especially in terms of their implementation;
- confidence between the two is not fully established;
There is some uncertainty about China’s intentions motives and strategies, especially behind the underlying “Important Period of Strategic Opportunities”. The concept sets China’s international goals until 2020 and at the same time some careful considerations about how to avoid rivalry during China’s rise. However, the possible means to attain the goals on the ground and particularly within the world-regions remain dubious.

Aspects and possibilities

The field for prospective cooperation in Global Governance and in the security field are wide and I only want to focus on coming challenges that evolve if the endeavour of cooperation is being taken seriously.

After the Sino-European europhoria during 2004-05 last year the spirits suddenly became low. In view of the unresolved arms embargo and MES issues, as well as the strongly worded EU Strategy Paper in late 2007, the discussion on workshops was about the “End of a Romance” or “The honeymoon is over”. However, this development must not be a bad thing. A romance is usually not meant to be characterised by a great sense of reality. The end of a honeymoon means that a couple can finally turn back to daily routine and it will inevitably become pragmatic about the things of daily life. This might also be what happened between China and the EU.
The EU commission’s 2007 China strategy can be interpreted in many ways. However, a central point is that the new strategy takes account of China being a pro-active international player. It focuses on the rising challenges between China and the EU and can therefore be regarded as constructive and leading the way towards cooperation on mutual and common issues.

One of the great challenges to come for China and Europe, is the individual and common handling of African development. I would argue that Africa is the test-case in two respects. Firstly, both can prove whether they are reliable actors in Global Governance. Secondly, the handling of African local and regional development will show whether cooperation among China and the EU is realistic or not.

China and Europe have been on collision course in Africa, mainly because of diverging outlooks in their development strategies and means in their practical realisation. Although Europeans slowly come to terms with the ‘Chinese way’ there is a great need for dialogue in order to be able to concert efforts and making them credible in terms of good governance support and regional ownership support.

During the EU- China Helsinki summit a structured dialogue on Africa was agreed upon. The wish on side of the EU to become observer in the Forum on China African Cooperation (FOCAC) was dismissed. The first structured dialogue will take place during the second quarter of 2007. Although there is not much to expect from the first meeting, in the long run ways need to be found how to turn the positive effects of China’s engagement into sustainable development and combine them with Europe’s efforts in supporting regional organisation in Africa.

An additional field of possible cooperation and dialogue concerns central questions of international and security affairs. In the long and short run mutual (and perhaps common) understanding needs to be gained on changing security issues in an increasingly globalised world. Especially in view of international norms, topics such as the obligation to protect or interventions need to be discussed. The aim of such dialogue must not be the establishment of such measures as tools but to find ways of delimiting and controlling their use.
“全球治理”理念学术争论浅析
——兼谈亚欧会议与全球治理之间的关系

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摘要：“全球治理”理念是在冷战结束和全球化不断深化的大背景下产生的，也是对世界事务治理方式转变的新认识，但是迄今中外学术界对“全球治理”理念依然充满争论。然而，如果将其视为一种“结构”、一个“过程”和一项“分析架构”，那么“全球治理”理念还是有其相当的合理性。亚欧会议的实践从一个侧面证实了“全球治理”理念的客观性和真实性。亚欧会议作为国际关系中一种新的形式，是全球治理目标的重要承担者。亚欧会议通过参与全球治理的国际制度安排体现自身价值，从而映照全球治理的价值与发展趋势。

关键词：全球治理、亚欧会议、国际制度

经济全球化和冷战的终结推动人类社会不断地发生全球性的变革，“全球治理”的理念乃之理论在围绕全球变革的根源、程度和后果的争论中兴起，并且同样也成为引起很大争议的议题。“全球治理”的理论思考是以理解国际社会的结构变动为出发点的，是冷战后思考世界秩序的一种新视角，是对世界事务治理方式转变的新认识。在全球治理的分析框架中，不仅将各国政府和各种国家间组织作为核心因素来考察，而且还还将社会运动、非政府组织及区域性的政治组织等各种力量纳入全球治理的含义之内。然而也有相当部分的学者认为“全球治理”的理念和理论没能很好的解决“国家问题”和“权力问题”，他们深刻地质疑“全球治理”的理念，认为超越地缘政治的全球机构或跨国公民社会并不存在，“全球治理”是一个没有基础的脆弱概念。正是因为“全球治理”的理念迄今依然是一个充满争议的理念，因此本文拟就学界在这方面的争论作一些考察，进而从全球治理的结构、过程、和分析框架三个方面对“全球治理”理念作分析，并通过简析亚欧会议与全球治理之间的关系，试图从理论和实证两个层面审视全球治理视阈中的非政府组织，同时也力求反证全球治理的价值和发展趋势。
目前一般认为，“全球治理”的理念是由美国著名的国际关系学者詹姆斯·N.·罗西瑙最先提出的，在1992年出版的专著《没有政府的治理：世界政治中的秩序与变革》中罗西瑙指出：全球政治、经济乃至文化正在经历前所未有的一体化和碎片化同时并存的发展，在这样的世界政治、经济和文化大背景下，政治权威的位置发生重大的迁移，对人类社会生活的治理也因此从以国家为主体的政府治理转向多层次的治理，其中非常重要的一点就是在全球层面的治理。我国学者俞可平认为：“正是由于他（罗西瑙）把全球治理概念与评价权威在多种层次上和以领域再定位的方式联系起来，全球治理才成为几乎家喻户晓的术语。”[1] (P34)但是，实际上几乎与罗西瑙在其学术专著中开始讨论“全球治理”问题的同时，前社会民主党国际主席、德国前总理勃兰特鉴于联合国在1990~1991年海湾战争中所树立的威望，于1992年发起成立了“全球治理委员会”(the Commission on Global Governance)，该委员会的成立从实践的层面提出了“全球治理”的新理念。然而，自“全球治理”理念问世以来，对“全球治理”概念就有各种不同的理解和阐释，甚至引起很大的学术争论，以至于迄今依然对它缺乏一个可被广泛接受的界定。总体而言，国内外国际关系学界在近年来有关“全球治理”理念的讨论中大致分为肯定与否定两派，尽管在这两个相互对立的学术“阵营”中对全球治理的理解和阐释也是各不相同的，有时甚至在世界观和立场、方法上都是对立的。接下来我们先讨论肯定或赞成运用“全球治理”理念来分析理解国际关系和国际事务的新发展的观点。

凡是对“全球治理”理念持肯定态度的学者，虽然在具体阐释方面有分歧，但是基本都认为，“全球治理”的理念是建立在国际体系已经发生巨大的变化的客观基础之上的，该理念的提出是顺应国际体系和结构发生变化的必然结果。这就是说，随着全球化的深入发展，以国家为中心的国际政治体系和国际政治秩序至少已经不再能完全主导国际事务的发展方向，因此需要有一种超越传统的强调国家间政治的国际政治理念来解释和分析当前的国际关系的发展和演变。因此，“作为一种分析方法，全球治理拒绝有关世界政治和世界秩序的以国家为中心的传统概念。主要的分析单元，则是制定和执行权威性的全球的、区域的或跨国的体系。”[2] (P13)

全球治理理论的创始人之一詹姆斯·N.·罗西瑙就是在强调国际政治体系发生巨大变化的基础上提出使用“全球治理”理念来分析研究世界事务的，即“实际上，只有当罗西瑙开始探讨全球生活、全球变革的集约或微观层面的时候，他才开始使用‘全球治理’这一术语。”[1] (P35)罗西瑙甚至根本不用“国际政治”，而是用“世界政治”概念来讨论国际关系的发展和演变。1他所分析和阐释的“全球治理”理念是

1 关于在世界政治和国际关系背景下研究全球治理的不同意义和区别，“Dingwerth, Klaus; Pattberg, Philipp. Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics. Global Governance, Apr-Jun2006, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p185~203.” 一文作出了详细的阐述，这里不再赘述。
通过其世界政治的两枝世界理论（two worlds of world politics）来推演的。他认为，“世界事务可以被概念化成通过一个二分体系管理——它可以被称为世界政治的两个世界——其一是长期以来支配事件进程的国家及国家政府的国家间体系，其二是由各种类型的其它集团组成的多元中心体系……它们共同组成了一个高度复杂的全球治理体系”。[1]（P23）在这样的一个两枝世界的里，存在着权威空间（spheres of authority）、分合并存（fragmegration）[1]和全球地方化或地方全球化（glocalization）[2]的现实和发展趋势。在一个因受全球化的压力而既快速一体化又快速分裂化的世界里，即在他称之为“分合并存”的世界里，必须通过超越国家治理的全球治理才能妥善地处理各种世界事务。“分合并存还会长期地伴随我们，它的许多张力无疑还会增加……人类群体保持和运用新的水平型权威的决心并没有丧失。”[2]（P23）罗西瑙由此得出结论认为“全球治理”现在已处于有效的人类事务管理的中心位置。

美国著名的新自由制度主义理论的代表人物罗伯特·基欧汉和约瑟夫·奈对“全球治理”的理念也持肯定的态度。他们在全球治理研究上提出了很多重要的观点，提出：“在治理的诸多角色中，民族国家仍然是全球政治舞台最重要的角色，但是它已不再是惟一重要的角色；全球化的发展使得全球治理结构变得更为复杂，私人部门和第三部门并未取代民族国家，它们形成了新的相互补充的关系；将治理的主体分为三类，即政府、政府间组织；私人部门包括私人企业、企业联合会；第三部门包括非政府组织、非政府组织联合会，并指出这三类角色之间的关系不再是主导和隶属的等级制关系，而是既竞争又合作的平等关系。[3]（P1-34）

在全球化问题研究方面颇有建树的英国学者戴维·赫尔德和安东尼·麦克格鲁也从世界主义和自由主义的国际主义两个方面对“全球治理”的理念展开讨论。赫尔德认为世界主义不仅不是一种乌托邦，反而是处于第二次世界大战后法律和政治的重大发展的核心。为了在世界政治中实现更多的责任、民主和社公正，应该提倡一种世界主义的全球治理形式：“全球治理不仅意味着正式的制度和组织——国家机构、政府间合作等——制定(或不制定)和维持管理世界秩序的规则和规范，而且意味着所有的其它组织和压力团体——从多国公司、跨国社会运动到众多的非政府组织——都追求对跨国规则和权威体系产生影响的目标和对象”。[4]（P70）麦克格鲁认为自由主义的国际主义理论在解释当代全球治理模式方面继续有效。他指出，不管面临多少批评，自由主义的国际主义还是在经历着一场理论的复兴。自由主义的文献不但没有丧失其激进的规范性棱角，其对全球分配公正的论述反而是一种对全球治理和世界秩序的现存形式的彻底批评。

1 “fragmegration”一词是罗西瑙将“fragmentation”（分散化或碎片化）和“integration”（一体化）两个英语单词合并而创造出的新词汇，意思为分散于一体化的并存，目前一般翻译为“分合并存”。
2 “glocalization”一词也是罗西瑙将“globalization”（全球化）和“localization”（地方化）两个英文单词合并而成，意思为在全球化的同时出现地方化，或地方化与全球化同时并存，而这样的世界政治的发展趋势对国家的地位、作用和治理的方式都构成极大的挑战。
总体而言，在西方学术界凡是赞成运用“全球治理”理念来阐释和分析当代国际关系发展演变的学者一般都同意由全球治理委员会提出的看法：“治理是各种各样的个人、团体——公共的或个人的——处理其共同事务的总和。这是一个持续的过程。通过这一过程，各种相互冲突和不同的利益可望得到调和并采取合作行动。这个过程包括授予公认的团体或权力机关强制执行的权力以及达成得到人民或团体同意或者认为符合他们的利益的协议。”而“从全球角度来说，治理事务过去主要被视为处理政府之间的关系，而现在必须作如下理解：它还涉及非政府组织、公民的迁移、跨国公司以及全球性资本市场。伴随着这些变化，全球性的影响大大加强了”。[5] (P2)

近年来许多中国学术界对“全球治理”理念的介绍和讨论业已经有比较广泛的展开。其中不乏支持运用该理念来探讨国际关系发展演变的学者。比如俞可平教授认为：“所谓全球治理，指的是通过具有约束力的国际规制(政体)解决全球性的冲突、生态、人权、移民、毒品、走私、传染病等问题，以维持正常的国际政治经济秩序……全球治理是各国政府、国际组织、各国公民为最大限度地增加共同利益而进行的民主协商与合作，其核心内容应当是健全和发展一整套维护全人类安全、和平、发展、福利、平等和人权的新的国际政治经济秩序，包括处理国际政治经济问题的全球规则和制度”。[6] (P25) 蔡拓教授则认为：“所谓全球治理是以人类整体论和共同利益论为价值导向的，多元行为体平等对话、协商合作，共同应对全球变革和全球问题挑战的一种新的管理人类公共事务的规则、机制、方法和活动。” [7] (P95-96) 当然，需要注意的是，虽然同学者已开始将自己的视角超越“国家中心主义”，认为全球治理意味着权威在治理的不同层次之间或者不同的基础设施之间被重新划分，但是，他们仍然认为国家在全球治理中居于重要地位，也将发挥重要作用。

然而，即便越来越多的国内外学者对“全球治理”理念持支持的态度，但是还有很多学者对这一理念持怀疑态度。这些学者可以被称为对“全球治理”理念的怀疑论者。怀疑论者从总体上认为“全球治理”没能很好地解决“国家问题”和“权力问题”。同时他们否认“全球治理超越了地缘政治，或者说，全球机构或跨国公民社会在世界政治中是一些独立的权力部门。” [2] (P17)需要注意的是，在怀疑论者中间，既有传统的现实主义者，同时也有新马克思主义者。

西方传统现实主义阵营中对“全球治理”理念持怀疑态度的重要学者有斯蒂芬·克拉斯纳和罗伯特·吉尔平等。克拉斯纳认为：“全球治理不是什么新的国际政治学理论，国际规则和制度基本上都是在国家利益或者权力的基础上形成的，全球治理也是在国家之间同意的基础上才成立的。因此，根据全球化和全球治理的发展使得出国家主权受到侵蚀的见解是十分令人怀疑的。” [8] (P94) 吉尔平则认为，任何一个治理体系都必须解决所谓的“权力问题”，指出全球治理的主张“是希望通过宣布我们现在生活在一个以普遍的和人道的价值为基础的、新的也是更好的
世界里来回避这个权力问题。”[2] (P355)他强调说，全球治理的实体没有执行其决定的能力，民族国家依然是当今世界上唯一具备这种能力的实体。因此，全球治理的主张难以言之成理，令人信服。

西方新马克思主义对“全球治理”理念的批评与现实主义有异曲同工之妙：“与现实主义一样，马克思主义和新葛兰西主义理论在解释全球治理的模式和重要性是，也强调地缘政治和美国霸权。但是，它们认为这两个因素都必须放到全球资本主义的结构规则的背景下才能理解。”[9] (P66)正因为如此，西方的新马克思主义者们认为：作为资本主义霸权国家，美国有强烈的动力去扩张资本主义在全球的统治范围。全球机构是保持和加强全球公司资本主义的绝对优势的工具。在这个方面，全球治理的行动和计划是按照一条不曾公开的规则制定的，这条规则骨子里维护的乃是全球资本的利益和要求，而且经常不惜以牺牲国家和社会的福利以及自然环境为代价。此外，新马克思主义还认为，“虽然全球治理构成了在主要国家中被前所未有地制度化了的政策协调与合作形式，但是这些形式意味着从最初就推动全球资本主义发展的经济与政治冲突的延续而不是消除。”[2] (P380)

因此，西方新马克思主义者们指出，全球治理还远不是真正全球的，它只是政治统治的另一种形式。

更值得注意的是西方的现实主义者和新马克思主义者对现有的全球治理文献持强烈的批判态度，他们都认为这些文献缺乏反思性。这种怀疑态度主要是由三个考虑引起的：第一，已有的文献夸大了全球机构和公民社会组织的自主权和能力；第二，这些文献在探讨如何管理世界秩序时，在理论上是有缺陷的，因为国际秩序的有效性与全球治理的必要性并不一致，第三，在采用一种多元分析方法的时候，全球治理研究并没能透过全球政治的变化看到背后的权力机构。由于这些原因，不论是现实主义怀疑论者还是新马克思主义怀疑论者都提出，全球治理的视角作为一种描述工具也许是不恰当的，但它基本上没有解释力：总的来说，它不过是用两个概念凑成的一种理论。”[2] (P19-20)

国内也有学者对“全球治理”理念持否定的态度。有学者认为：“冷战后，国际政治系统的结构性变化推动了治理理论的兴起。治理和全球治理反映了变化中的国际政治和国际政治某些方面新的发展趋势，有助于人们对国际秩序的分析，但它建构的‘治理社会’只是一个乌托邦式的幻想。”[10] (P21-24) 并且还指出：全球化是一个乌托邦，它既不能实现国际社会的一体化(这是全球治理的条件)，也无法克服国际政治的无政府状态(这是国际政治的现实或实质)；全球化和治理并没有改变政府和政治的实质，并没有导致政治和意识形态的终结；治理并没有推进社会的民主化，它与现代民主之间存在着不可克服的矛盾。因此，全球治理是一个脆弱的概念。
从以上的介绍和分析可以看出，对“全球治理”的理念迄今依然没有同意的看法，而究竟应该对之持肯定还是否定的态度则言人人殊。然而，或许我们需要通过深入分析“全球治理”理念的构成要素，才能增强全球治理理论的说服力，才能使该理念在国际关系研究中起“令人满意”的作用。

二、“全球治理”：结构、过程、分析框架

然而，针对就“全球治理”理念所产生的学术争论，尤其是针对怀疑论者所提出的全球治理作为一个概念工具过于宽泛，它“似乎什么都是”的看法，我们似乎需要赋予“全球治理”这一概念一个更加狭窄和简约的理解。从而进一步弄清“全球治理”理念的概念意涵，并由此而在一定程度上证明该理念在国际关系研究乃至操作层面上的合理性。下面我们从三个角度来做分析，将“全球治理”概念理解为“结构”（structure）、“过程”（process）和“分析架构”（analytical framework），并在此基础上探讨“全球治理”理念的合理性。

首先，我们可以将“全球治理”理解为一种结构。当我们将“全球治理”理念视为是一种治理结构时，或许能比较有助于我们对之的理解和赞同。如果我们赞同这样的假定，即假定各种不同的政治和经济制度都是被创设出来的结构，这些结构是一些组织化的集体行动，也是允许、规定或禁止某些行动的规则，那么。在人类集体行动的过程中，存在并且被普遍认知的治理结构包括：科层体制（hierarchies）、市场 （markets）、网络（networks），以及社群（communities）等，

这些结构都各有其引导社会和经济的方法，且将解决某些治理上的问题，但同时也会引发某些治理上的问题。

值得注意的是，这些结构的同时存在致使传统的国家治理（科层体制和社群）有可能与全球治理（市场、网络等）同时并存。特别是在全球化不断深入发展的地条件下，市场和网络的治理结构会产生巨大的作用，虽然科层体制和社群治理结构并不因此而被忽视。另外，一如全球治理委员会所强调的那样，治理过去一直被视为只是政府间的关系，但实际上，它同时也与其他组织、各种公民运动、跨国公司，全球资本市场以及跨国之间的国际协调，如亚太经合组织、亚欧会议等相关联；也就是说，在全球治理的结构中，国家并不是唯一的行动者，国际政府间组织和非政府组织等非国家行为体也共同参与了规则的制定。

其次，我们还可以将“全球治理”理解为一种过程。假定治理是社会和政治行动者之间一种互动的结果，那么治理途径时常被认为比较注重过程及其动态结果。由此，随着全球化的不断发展，在当代国际体系中的政治行动者的互动就始终处于多层次的动态之中，即各种不同行为者之间的互动是在地方的、国家的和区域的乃至全球的层面上交互地展开，而这样的互动过程，很难再用地方的或国家的治理来理解。这是因为治理大多围绕着行为和经济行为的实践议题，而随着这些实践议题超越地方、国家乃至区域那么这样的治理过程就不可能仅限于地方、国家或区域，而必须用全球治理的过程来理解。

将“全球治理”理解为一种过程是与将它理解为一种结构相关联的。在各种不同的治理结构中，制度的配置有十分重要的作用，因为制度决定了许多角色在治理结构中的安排，设定国家和其它行动者在治理过程中能够扮演何种角色。但是，治理概念既涉及结构的层面，还需要考虑结构之中的各类互动关系，而正是不同层次的治理结构中的各类互动过程致使我们需要通过全球治理的概念意涵来讨论目前全球化环境中的治理问题。

最后，如果将“全球治理”理解为一种分析架构则更易于使人接受这一理念。治理作为一种理论上的分析架构，它不同于传统政治科学中的几个主要架构。政治科学只求关心政治制度及其统治能力，而治理的理念则与众不同，治理的理念不仅包含政治制度与统治能力，而且还更为注重政治制度下的各种行为主体之间的互动。更为重要的是，如果将治理概念视为分析架构，那么不仅要注重行为体之间的互动，而且要把它们以及与之相关的各种机构之间的互动性与公共政策的制定过程相连结，同时还要注意社会与治理行动的关系。上述的这一系列的相关联系将社会经由政治过程选择和追求所有目标的过程，加以连结成一个网络。

由此，作为一种分析架构，如果我们将治理的理念放在全球化这个层次上，
便能进一步观察到在全球经济、国际安全、全球环境保护等政策议题中，各类行动者之间的互动关系与这些政策议程发展的情况。于是，“全球治理”的理念也就因此而具有其合理性。在“全球治理”的分析框架下，合法性的权力不再被视为仅为各国政府所垄断，在当代的世界体系中，除各国政府以外，还有一些其它机构和组织也负责维持秩序，参加对经济和社会的调节。现在，行使这些职能的多样性的政府和非政府组织、私人企业和社会运动，它们合在一起构成国内和国际的某些政治、经济和社会方面的协调形式。全球治理强调国际关系行为体的多元性和多样性，主张将多种组织、多个层次和决策部门子系统纳入重要的政策网络，通过跨国网络处理国际关系，其基本标准是效益，即处理争议、解决问题的效益以及调和各方利益的效益。

总之，将“全球治理”理解为一种“结构”、一个“过程”和一项“分析架构”能够为我们把握“全球治理”理念的内涵提供帮助，同时，也有助于我们理解使用“全球治理”理念的合理性。

三、亚欧会议与全球治理之间的相互关系

从上述两部分的分析可见，“全球治理”的理念迄今依然是一个有争议的理念，但是，如果将“全球治理”视为当前全球化发展过程中的一种结构、过程和分析架构，那么对之的怀疑论看法似乎相对而言说服力比较小。这也就是说，“全球治理”的理念在很大程度上既是对当前全球化环境中的国际体系治理现状的反映，也是对现实的国际政治治理的分析架构。由此，”全球治理”可以被看作是一个包括国家、国际组织、跨国公司和非政府组织等多行为体参与的互动过程，是一个包含全球的、国家的、地区的、地方的等多层治理的结构。

亚欧会议的实践在很大程度上说明全球治理的理念很有说服力。早在 1994 年 7 月，欧盟制定了《走向亚洲新战略》，主张与亚洲进行更广泛的对话，建立一种建设性、稳定和平等的伙伴关系。在此背景下，新加坡总理吴作栋于 1994 年 10 月提出建立亚欧会议的倡议，得到了有关各方的积极响应。1996 年 3 月 1 日至 2 日，首届亚欧首脑会议在泰国曼谷举行。来自亚、欧两大洲的 25 国和欧盟委员会的领导人参加会议。其中，亚洲为泰国、马来西亚、菲律宾、印度尼西亚、文莱、新加坡、越南、中国、日本和韩国。欧洲为欧盟 15 个成员国，即意大利、德国、法国、荷兰、比利时、卢森堡、丹麦、爱尔兰、英国、希腊、西班牙、葡萄牙、奥地利、芬兰、瑞典以及欧盟委员会。这是亚欧国家领导人首次坐在一起共商亚欧合作大计，实际上是实践全球治理的新路径。会议确定每两年召开一次首脑会议。各方领导人主要就亚欧两大洲如何加强联系与合作进行了探讨。会议的主要议题包括亚欧会议的意义，亚欧在政治、经济、文化等领域的合作，亚欧会议的后续行动等。会议最后通过了《主席声明》。
根据首届亚欧会议通过的《主席声明》，亚欧会议的目标是在亚欧两大洲之间建立旨在促进增长的新型、全面的伙伴关系，加强相互间的对话、了解与合作，为经济和社会发展创造有利的条件，维护世界和平与稳定。亚欧会议进程应遵循以下原则：各成员国之间对话的基础应是相互尊重、平等、促进基本权利、遵守国际法规定的义务，不干涉他国的内部事务；进程应是开放和循序渐进的，后续行动应在协商一致的基础上进行；接纳新成员应由国家元首和政府首脑协商一致决定；通过对话增进相互了解和理解以确定优先领域并共同合作。亚欧会议的宗旨以及亚欧会议的原则充分体现出全球治理的精神，因为它建立起一种符合全球治理理念的新的治理结构，也成为全球治理的新的一环。

作为全球治理的新的一环，亚欧会议确定的合作领域十分广泛，主要包括三大支柱：即政治对话、经贸合作、社会文化及其他领域的交流与合作。政治对话主要涉及亚欧政治与安全形势，以及联合国作用和改革等重要国际问题。经贸合作涉及亚欧贸易、投资、金融等领域的合作。社会文化及其他领域的合作包括文化交流、人力资源开发、环保、农业、能源、交通等。根据首届亚欧会议达成的共识，亚欧会议的活动主要将以非机制化的方式在多层次上进行。主要有：首脑会议、外长会、高官会、部长级会议、其他后续行动等。

亚欧会议成员国有24.7亿人口，约占世界人口的39%，国内生产总值占世界总值的一半多。作为亚欧两大洲之间直接联系的渠道，亚欧会议的重要性不言而喻。它的成立和发展，大大增强了亚欧两大洲的直接联系并且为全球化不断发展的过程中的区域治理提供了新的模式，不仅在一定程度上证明全球治理理念的合理性，也在很大程度上丰富了全球治理的理念。亚欧会议自成立以来，根据亚欧领导人的授权，亚欧双方在政治、经济、贸易、金融、科技、司法、环境、文化和教育等领域进行了广泛合作，合作领域不断拓展，机制逐渐成熟，取得不少成果，推动了亚欧新型全面伙伴关系的深入发展。在当前国际形势下，进一步加强亚欧在政治、经济和社会文化各领域的协调合作，符合亚欧双方的共同利益，也有利于在全球化的环境中让亚欧人民更好地应对全球化的各种挑战。

四、简单的结语
“全球治理”理念虽然迄今并没有获得中外学术界一致首肯，但是，在全球化不断发展的今天，如果将“全球治理”视为一种“结构”，一个“过程”和一个“分析架构”，那么“全球治理”理念还是有其相当的合理性。应当注意的是：“全球治理”理念所表述的并不是通过建立一个超国家的组织来管理整个国际体系的理念，而是提出在全球化的国际环境中，随着国际行为体之间相互依赖的加深，国家与非国家的行为体需要通过超越地方、国家乃至地区治理的多层次、网络化的全球治理结构和过程来解决全球性公共问题。换句话说，“全球治理”的理念所强调的是：透过多元沟通管道，让不同的行为者可以进行沟通、协商，增加其信息透明
性减少交易成本，以达到追求共同利益。亚欧会议为“全球治理”理念的合理性增添很大的说服力。全球治理理念并不认为‘国家的全面退却’，但是国家的角色和权威需要依据专门的议题领域来重新定义，而且在全球化的条件下国家的统治需要不同层次的治理方式的补充，并且需要依赖于全球治理的网络其中包括亚欧会议发挥作用。

参考文献:
Comments

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东盟地区安全合作战略的发展与演变

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一、冷战时期的东盟安全合作

东盟从成立之日起就是一个结构松散的组织，这是由于成员国在民族、宗教和政治体制上各不相同，并且彼此还存在着历史、种族或领土上的纷争。反映在安全问题上，那就是东盟各国有不同的安全防范对象，不同的军事活动侧重点。另一个原因是东南亚重要的地缘战略位置，使其成为超级大国关注乃至争夺的热点地区，东盟作为中小国家的组织，即使进行地区安全合作也难以抵御任何一个超级大国。第三个原因是东盟各个成员防务力量较弱，需要大国的安全援助与承诺，在这种情况下，地区安全合作意义不大。因此在冷战时期，东盟的安全主要由两根支柱维系：一是美国与该地区一些国家签订的双边军事协定，如美菲、美泰军事同盟；二是东盟国家进行的一些双边安全合作，如维护边界安全、联合军事演习、互通军事情报等。总之，双边安全合作是当时东盟安全合作的特点。这些双边安全合作增进了相互之间关系的发展，对维护地区稳定、促进经济繁荣具有重要作用。

至于整个地区的安全合作，东盟曾提出这样一种设想，即通过建立“民族抗御力（national resilience）”来实现“地区抗御力（regional resilience）”。这是因为东盟成员国地理上相连，相互易受干扰，一国内乱，往往造成四邻不安，结果不仅国家利益受损，也殃及整个地区的利益。民族抗御力最早由当时的印尼总统苏哈托提出，是指一国抵御各种威胁和挑战的综合能力，“涉及增强一个民族在其全部发展中所有的组成要素，由此构成在意识形态、政治、经济、社会、文化和军事等领域里的抗御力”。民族抗御力是地区抗御力的基础和有机组成部

摆脱外来干涉和内部颠覆活动，以保持它们各自的民族特性”；“缔约国在努力实现本地区的繁荣和安全方面，应当在各方面进行合作，根据自信、自力更生、相互尊重、合作和团结的原则，增强本地区的抗御力。”

这一安全合作构想的实现需要本地区所有国家的支持，但由于两极的对峙，使东南亚长期处于分裂状态，连整个地区的团结都无法实现。因此地区安全合作问题始终未能在官方层面上展开讨论，东盟国家就如何实现地区安全合作没有达成一致意见。至于与地区外国家进行安全对话，东盟更是一直持谨慎态度。

二、冷战后东盟的地区安全合作战略

冷战结束后，亚太地区的一些国家提出了构建安全体系的主张，其中加拿大和澳大利亚最早倡议在亚洲建立一个类似欧安会的组织。东盟坚决反对，认为亚洲与欧洲情况不同，模仿欧洲模式将有很大危险，尤其是东南亚在社会、经济、政治及安全等方面都具有特殊性，不能照搬欧安会。除了地区情况不同这一原因外，东盟反对加、澳建议及其他有关安全构想的更深层含义，是不愿被人牵着鼻子走，希望在这个问题上掌握主动权。东盟学者就说，“东盟视自己为本地区，至少是东南亚最重要的信任与安全建立机制。不希望看到它被破坏。”

因此当东盟第四次首脑会议于 1992 年 1 月在新加坡召开时，以往一直被避免公开讨论的地区安全合作问题第一次被列入议事日程。会议强调，要在冷战后时代谋求“开拓新的安全合作领域”，促进东盟内部安全问题的会谈。会议通过的《新加坡宣言》还提出：东盟应该寻求使成员国进入新的安全合作领域的途径；欢迎所有东南亚国家签署《东南亚友好合作条约》；利用现有论坛来促进与区外国家就加强本地区的安全问题进行对话。上述各点为东盟在后冷战时代的地区安全合作定下了基调。

在这基础上，东盟形成了“综合安全观”，其主要内容为：一、独立自主和不结盟。东盟认为如果在安全上依赖某一大国，会使其操纵自己，同时也使东盟与其他大国的关系不稳定，这对不利于地区安全与发展的。二、相互平等和相互信任。《东南亚友好合作条约》明确规定：“增进和友好和在有关东南亚问题上的相互合作；”“相互尊重彼此的独立、主权、平等、领土完整和民族特征；”“每个国家有权保持其民族生存，不受外来的干涉、颠覆或压力；”“互不干涉内政”等。三、重视军事以外其它影响安全的因素。东盟认为国家安全应该主要依靠经济发展和社会稳定。马来西亚前总理马哈蒂尔曾经指出，“安全不单单是军事能力，国家安全是不能与政治稳定、经济成功与社会和谐所分离的。没有这些，世界上所有的枪炮也不能防止一国被其他敌人所征服，有时在不发一枪一弹的情
情况下敌人的野心就可以达到。泰国前总理差猜也曾指出，“经济的兴盛是长期安全的保证”。

而东盟的地区安全合作战略，主要包括内外两个方面：

一是通过地区内部整合来保证安全。东盟认为东南亚的分裂有害于地区的和平与稳定，是冲突的根源，并招致大国的干涉。冷战的结束，使两个超级大国在东南亚对抗的局面消失，这为地区整合创造了条件。东盟重申了对本地区尚未签署《东南亚友好合作条约》国家缔约的热忱欢迎，这是对东南亚的非东盟成员国加入组织的一个强有力的鼓励。越南、老挝、缅甸和柬埔寨随后相继加入东盟，10个东南亚国家结成了统一的组织，不仅使它们都被纳入东盟框架受其约束，还使东盟在亚洲发挥更大影响力。而随着东南亚所有国家全部加入东盟及接受其安全合作理念，东盟在本地区安全合作问题上遂发挥了独特的协调作用，它所提出的民族抗御力和地区抗御力亦成为覆盖整个地区安全的重要原则。其实早在1994年，东南亚10国非正式会议就在“2000年后的东南亚——关于一项设想的声明”中强调指出，为了实现东南亚共同体的设想，其中必须遵守的首要原则就是“民族的和地区的抗御力”。印度尼西亚的战略分析家优素福・瓦南迪曾指出，“如果东盟各国都能实现国家的全面发展，并克服国内的种种威胁，地区的抗御力就能以同样的方式产生，如同一条链子从其组成成分的力量中得到总体力量那样。”建立在民族抗御力基础之上的地区抗御力使东盟有充分力量让所有成员采取共同措施来解决区内安全问题和抵御外部威胁。

同时，经济全球化在冷战结束后的迅猛发展，使东盟把增强经济竞争力提升到安全合作战略的高度来考虑。东盟意识到，成员国互相的经济合作与繁荣是维护地区稳定和安全的最可行办法。东盟首脑为此在新加坡召开的第四次会议上一致同意，用15年的时间建立东盟自由贸易区，以加强东盟内部的经济合作。

二是通过与区外国家对话来保障安全。冷战结束后，为了在地区安全合作问题上掌握主导权，东盟一改以往谨慎做法，建立东盟地区论坛，与区外国家，尤其是与大国进行安全对话，就地区事务表达自己的看法，互相交流和磋商安全事宜，使大国互相牵制，以维持地区的和平与稳定。东盟地区论坛的创建，表明东盟转向采用多边主义的方式来处理地区安全问题。鉴于大国都参加了论坛，这一转向确实是东盟的一大飞跃。正如东盟学者指出，地区安全需要“主要大国之间的以及主要大国和东南亚之间的一种平衡”。而东盟利用这样一种制度安排，充当

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1 转引自陈欣之：《东南亚安全》，台北生智文化事业有限公司，1999年，第35—36页。
大国间关系的协调者，并利用大国之间的平衡来抵消任何一个大国对东南亚的支配。有人称此是“在冷战后的国际舞台上开创了‘小国领导大国’的崭新范例”\(^1\)。另外，东盟在东盟地区论坛中处于主导地位，掌握了地区安全事务上的主导权，这突出地表现在其为论坛确立了发展三阶段（促进信心建立措施、发展预防性外交、发展冲突解决机制）\(^2\)，以《东南亚友好合作条约》中的原则作为论坛各成员处理相互关系的行为准则、东盟轮值主席国即是论坛主办国等方面。东盟地区论坛建立以后，其影响超出了东南亚，“已经成为第一个真正覆盖广大亚太地区的‘多边’安全论坛，它也是今天世界上惟一的‘地区’安全框架，在这个框架内，国际体系中的所有重要参与者（包括美国、俄罗斯、日本、中国和欧盟）都出现在东盟地区论坛上。”\(^3\)

另一方面，对东盟成员来说，东盟地区论坛的建立，也为它们之间的安全合作开辟了新的渠道，使其凭借该论坛在安全问题上相互协调立场，进行有效合作。

三、本世纪东盟地区安全合作战略的发展

人类社会进入新千年以后，和平与发展成为各国的共识和时代的主题。与此同时，国际形势出现了一些新的变化：随着全球化快速发展和各国相互依赖加深，安全也变得全球化，特别是“9·11”事件后非传统安全威胁的凸显，如国际恐怖主义、跨国犯罪、疫病传播等，使安全问题更加复杂，需要多边安全合作来对付这些威胁；大国关系发生了深刻变化，冷战时期两极对峙及两个阵营对抗的情况不再出现，大国之间以战争来竞争主导权的可能性微乎其微，彼此是在合作与竞争的状态下相处；中小国家的作用在上升，它们的生存不再受到威胁，不必追随或依附某一大国，而是通过地区组织显示集体的力量，并邀请大国参与进来，让大国竞争，自己则扮演协调和桥梁的角色，从而获取更大的利益；国际组织的作用日益重要，人们对其提出的新思想、新政策和新倡议更加关注，对地区安全合作也有了更高的期望。

在这样的背景下，第九届东盟首脑会议于 2003 年10月通过了《东盟第二协议宣言》（简称《巴厘第二协议》），要求在 2020 年前建成包括经济、安全、社会—文化三个支柱在内的东盟共同体。2007年1月在菲律宾宿务召开的东盟首脑会议又决定，将东盟共同体的建成时间提前至 2015 年。东盟提出建立安全共同体，是对新世纪所面临的新任务和新挑战的明确回应，具有深远意义，首先表明东盟作为一个地区组织，希望在更高的层次上维护地区的安全与稳定，使其成员寻求东盟而不是外部的支持来保障本国和地区的安全；其次表明东盟希望通过安全共同体的建立，使其成为地区安全合作的基石，以增强对地区安全合作的主导权。

\(^1\) 陆建人编：《东盟的今天与明天——东盟的发展趋势及其在亚太地区的地位》，经济管理出版社，1999年，第5页。

\(^2\) Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia, Beyond the ASEAN Way. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p.128。

\(^3\) [加拿大]阿米塔·阿查亚：《建构安全共同体：东盟与地区秩序》，王正毅、冯怀信译，上海人民出版社，2004年，第250页。
东盟的“大国平衡”战略为此也与以往有所不同，第一是以更加积极主动地姿态邀请区外所有大国参与地区事务，保持对东南亚的关注和兴趣，使它们在本地区形成竞争优势，借此进一步构建地区均势，防止来自外部的可能挑战，使东盟继续主导地区安全合作的进程及方向，从而增强东盟的影响力和国际地位，确保地区的和平与稳定，为其成员创造一个良好的地区环境。东盟也将更加积极地支持多边安全合作，把区外大国之间稳定的平衡作为地区秩序的一个关键因素。东盟认识到，“不能设想，没有美国、日本和中国等大国在亚太地区的争夺和相互牵制，亚细安（即东盟，下同——笔者注）能有目前较大的回旋余地，作到不论是在地区经济合作方面还是在地区安全问题上有如此多的发言机会。”1 东盟必须巧妙地利用本地区特殊的国际关系环境增强自己作用。第二是两次修改《东南亚友好合作条约》2，使区外大国能够加入该条约，为地区安全合作提供一个更加广泛的共同框架。现已有 12 个区外国家加入了该条约。3 由于《东南亚友好合作条约》规定，缔约国必须遵守“互不干涉内政；”“用和平手段解决分歧或争端；”“放弃使用武力或武力威胁”等规定，4 加入条约的区外大国就自动投入了东盟为自己所打造的地区安全网络，使东南亚地区的和平、稳定与繁荣从外部得到了保证。

东盟地区安全合作战略的发展与演变，为安全合作的研究提供了一个新的研究方向和范例，它显示了一个由中小国家和发展中国家组成的地区组织，在大国利益纵横交错的安全秩序中，创立安全对话机制，并承担促进安全合作的责任，掌握和主导地区的安全的未来走向。

1 任辽远：《以大智慧看现代版“三国志”——应用系统关联的方法分析研究中日美三角关系》，新加坡《联合早报》1996 年 11 月 18 日。
2 《东南亚友好合作条约》是东盟成员国于 1976 年 2 月 24 日在印度尼西亚巴厘岛举行的东盟第一次首脑会议上签署的。条约的宗旨是“促进地区各国人民之间永久和平、友好和合作，以加强他们的实力、团结和默契关系”。条约规定，缔约各方在处理相互间关系时应遵循以下基本原则，即相互尊重独立、主权、平等、领土完整和各国的民族特性；任何国家都有免受外来干涉、颠覆和制裁，保持其民族生存的权利；互不干涉内政；和平解决分歧或争端；反对诉诸武力或以武力相威胁；缔约各国间进行有效合作。迄今东南亚 10 国已全部加入这个条约。
3 1987 年 12 月 15 日，《第一修改议定书》在原《条约》基础上增加两条，分别作为《条约》的第十八条第三款和第十四条第二款，内容分别为：“东南亚以外的国家，经过东南亚所有缔约国及文莱达鲁萨兰国的同意，也可加入”该条约和“但是，加入本条约的东南亚以外任何国家只有直接涉及以及需要通过上述地区程序解决的争端时，才适用”第十四条第一款。
4 1998 年 7 月 25 日，东盟外长在马尼拉签署了《条约》的《第二修改议定书》内容为：将《条约》第十八条第三款中“东南亚以外的国家，经过东南亚所有缔约国及文莱达鲁萨兰国的同意，也可加入”该条约和“但是，加入本条约的东南亚以外任何国家只有直接涉及以及需要通过上述地区程序解决的争端时，才适用”第十四条第一款，修改为“经东南亚所有国家，即文莱达鲁萨兰国、柬埔寨王国、印度尼西亚共和国、老挝人民民主共和国、马来西亚、缅甸联邦、菲律宾共和国、新加坡共和国、泰国共和国和越南社会主义共和国的同意，东南亚以外的国家也可加入”该条约。从而使非东南亚地区的国家也可加入《东南亚友好合作条约》。
5 新华网：《东南亚友好合作条约》。http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-06/30/content_944149.htm
6 它们分别是：中国、日本、美国、韩国、俄罗斯、新西兰、澳大利亚、巴基斯坦、巴布亚新几内亚、蒙古、法国和东帝汶。“法国东帝汶同亚细安签署友好合作条约”，新加坡《联合早报》2007 年 1 月 14 日。
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global governance: the important area of construction for a harmonious world between China and Europe

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Dialogue on Globalization

Cold war ended, globalization trend has continued to develop, not only to make all the countries mutually linked and affected, and even to the point of mutual dependence, but also to lead to many highly complex global issues, making the international relations of the countries become more and more complicated, and the interaction between the countries and non-state actors, and between various non-state actors, has been constantly strengthened. In the world today, people cannot ignore the profound changes brought to the entire planet by globalization. As economist Samuelson pointed out: Globalization is a double-edged sword, it is an effective way to speed up economic growth, spread new technologies, and improve the standard of living of the rich and poor countries; but at the same time, it is also a highly controversial process that invades national sovereignty, erodes local cultural traditions, or threatens economic and social stability.

The rapid increase and accumulation of global problems has made "global governance" (Global Governance) principle increasingly necessary and urgent. In essence, globalization and global problems are the fundamental basis of global governance, making it one of the most powerful political appeals of today's world. In international and regional cooperation, global governance is also increasingly regarded as an important content of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Similarly, in the relationship between China and the European Union, how to achieve effective cooperation in the field of global governance, and jointly maintain world peace and build a harmonious world, has also become an important issue in further developing bilateral relations.

China and the EU cooperation has a wide common interest foundation

Europe has achieved impressive results in economic and political integration over half a century. In May 2004, the 5th expansion of the EU was successfully completed. The EU has become a large region group that covers 25 countries, with a land area of about 4 million square kilometers, a population of about 450 million, and most of the member states having achieved free movement of people, most member states using a single currency, and GDP total of about 10 trillion euros. The EU continues to strive for the construction of common defense and the drafting of a common social charter, and is still striving for the construction of European common defense and the drafting of a common social charter, and is working hard to build an integrated defense and a common social charter. In international and regional cooperation, the EU is increasingly focused on implementing independent foreign policy in an overall form, forming a common policy mechanism, including common commercial policies, common foreign and security policies, foreign aid policies, and forming the foundation of the EU's overall foreign strategy. The EU emphasizes multilateral cooperation and adherence to international institutions and norms, and relies on negotiation, consultation, and economic and political means to resolve international disputes. However, after the Cold War, the United States pursued its hegemony in global affairs, and after 9·11, the United States, in order to maintain its global security interests, initiated and carried out a "pre-emptive strategy" and "solo action", adopting a strategy to achieve stability in the world under US hegemony, which not only challenged the EU's multilateral cooperation ideology, but also challenged the Cold War.


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后欧盟一直追求的欧美平等盟友关系的目标背道而驰，从而导致了欧美在反弹道导弹条约、保护气候环境、对国际恐怖主义的认识、国际刑事法庭、中东和平进程及伊拉克问题上出现了严重分歧。此外，冷战后欧盟为争取对欧洲事务的主导权的努力受到美国的制约、双方在国际金融领域的利益竞争通过美元与欧元在国际会商的彼此消长而进一步加剧，欧盟扩大而产生的欧美地缘经济政治利益摩擦增加等因素，都使欧盟认识到，为了维护自身的政治经济利益，成为未来多极世界中的独立一极，必须借助其他力量，尤其是加强与其无重大利益冲突而经济政治发展潜势力巨大的亚洲的联系，有助于建立更符合欧洲利益的世界秩序。在与亚洲的交流中，欧盟认为中国在实行改革开放后的近30年时间里，已经成为全球化世界中最重要的组成部分之一，成为东亚地区的强国，必然对这一地区的经济、政治和安全结构产生重要影响。

欧盟看到中国的经济崛起已经成为不争的事实，而且中国的经济发展使其在亚洲地区事务中发挥着小巧轻重的作用。2005年，中国全年国内生产总值高达182321亿元，比上年增长9.9%；年末国家外汇储备达到8189亿美元；2006年上半年，中国经济继续平稳快速发展。国内生产总值为91443亿元，同比增长10.9%；进出口总额为7957亿美元，同比增长23.4%；到6月末，国家外汇储备为9411亿美元，比年初增加1222亿美元。中国作为世界上人口最多的国家，经济的持续高速发展必迅速将其推向国际经济、政治和外交舞台。中国一贯坚持世界多极化发展，大力推行伙伴关系外交，如与欧盟建立“全面合作战略伙伴关系”等。因此，欧盟也将中国视为亚洲经济发展的火车头，认为中国经济力量增强将推动东亚地区经济一体化进程，带动东亚地区经济总体增长。欧盟同样看到，随着经济实力的增长，中国在地区事务中的作用不断增强，并在“东盟+3”、上海合作组织、亚太经合组织、亚欧会议等多边组织中发挥日益重要的作用。

同时，欧盟也注意到中国在国力不断上升的同时，作为大国的责任感也在不断增强。中国在亚洲金融危机期间所采取的坚持人民币汇率不贬值等一系列旨在稳定这一地区金融稳定的负责任的措施，正是欧盟决定在1998年提升与中国的经济关系的最重要原因之一。中国已经签署了一系列重要的国际公约，如“联合国经济、社会和文化权公约”、“防止核扩散条约”及“防止气候变暖公约”等。因此，欧盟认为努力同中国发展与其在地区和世界上的经济和政治影响相称的长期关系，以促进中国在国际舞台上尽可能广泛地参与解决安全、政治、环境、社会及经济问题是符合欧盟长远战略的。因而，欧盟积极推动与中国之间的多种对话机制，以促进中国继续改革开放，加快建设民主政治和法治社会，促使中国更积极地参与世界多边组织的建设，承担相应的国际责任。

从中国方面来看，中欧之间不存在根本利益冲突，互不构成威胁。例如，在中国与欧盟的关系中没有历史遗留问题，欧盟与台湾或日本之间也不存诸如日美

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1新华社北京3月17日电：“关于2005年国民经济和社会发展计划执行情况与2006年国民经济和社会发展计划草案的报告”。
2中华人民共和国国家统计局新闻发言人郑京平：“2006年上半年中国经济平稳快速增长”。

http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20060718_402337710.htm

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安保同盟、美台关系法之类直接影响双边关系的政策。与此相反，中国与欧盟在国际政治、外交以及经济贸易发展等各个方面的共同观点和共同利益远远超过分歧。中国领导人提出了和平发展的战略，而欧洲和中国一样，也在走和平的发展道路。中国注意到欧盟对建立多极化世界的追求，因此在长期合作中，中国和欧盟也已一同建立起“多极共识”，双方都主张以欧盟和中国作为其中两极建立一个“多极”世界来平衡美国的力量，如德国前总理施罗德就曾提出建立一个“有效的多边主义的国际秩序”，强调合作和维护联合国权威。双方也都希望加强通过在多边机构的合作，更有效地应对全球挑战。此外，欧盟对中国崛起的反映与亚太地区的一些大国也有所不同。欧盟及其成员国对中国未来的发展持谨慎的乐观预期，而“中国威胁论”或“中国崩溃论”之类的论调则相对较少，欧盟主张以对话代替冲突，通过合作与对话方式，将中国纳入国际政治经济体系。欧盟所采取的这一对华战略，客观上会对美国遏制中国的政策产生一定的制约作用，有利于缓解中国在东亚地区面临的安全压力。中国作为世界上最大的发展中国家，通过与欧盟的合作，也可获得发展经济所必需的资金、技术和管理经验以加速自身的发展。

正是这些相辅相成的共同利益和共同的战略目标，构成了中国与欧盟关系不断得以扩大和深化的基础，也为双方在全球治理方面的合作提供了良好的条件。

### 中欧在参与全球治理的合作与成果

“全球治理”与“善治”越来越成为欧盟实施亚洲战略的重要工具。欧盟认为，随着全球化进程加快，“一个日渐相互依存的世界需要有关全球治理的公正规则”，和“更强有力、更合法的机制保证国际合作与发展，全球性机构应更负责任并为公众提供更多的信息”欧盟是全球治理与善治的积极推手。欧盟的全球治理思想强调防患于未然，强调多边合作、广泛的参与者、组织化和制度化、解决冲突的根源以及注重共同能力建设等。

从中国方面来看，全球化正在改变着中国人的一切，从生产方式到生活方式，从思考到消费，甚至包括中国人视为“稳定”的上层建筑。中国的迅速发展是全球化过程的重要组成部分，中国顺应并利用了现有的国际治理机制，保持了全球市场对中国的开放。同时，中国的发展对整个治理机制包括观念、规则和运行也构成了较大的冲击。因此，也有越来越多的中国人士和学者认为，应当以新的思维来看待全球治理理念，应对全球化带来的新挑战。为此，必须树立一系列新观念。其中也包括在“全球治理”方面开展国际合作。

中欧在全球治理方面的合作是一种全方位的合作，既是双边和多边治理机制框架的搭建，也是一种价值观和文明的对话，更有全球治理措施的实践。至于全球治理的内容，据总部设在日内瓦的世界经济论坛最近公布了一项名为《全球治

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2. 周弘编：《欧洲模式与欧美关系：2003-2004年欧洲发展报告》，中国社会科学出版社，2004年2月第一版，第99页。
3. 参阅崔宏伟：“21世纪初期欧盟对亚洲新战略与中国在其中的地位”，《世界经济研究》2003年第7期，第73–74页。
理倡议 2006 年度报告》，把全球治理分为 6 个方面：（1）和平和安全（2）贫困与饥饿（3）教育（4）健康（5）环境（6）人权。事实上，中欧之间在这些领域中的合作关系已经建立，而且在有些方面取得了相当显著有效的成果。在和平与安全合作方面，21 世纪初欧盟对亚洲的安全目标是敦促亚洲建立“有承载力的地区安全机构”，帮助亚洲建立冲突预防和快速反应的多边机制，防止地区冲突的发生。同时加强亚欧在非传统安全问题上的合作与对话，如非法偷渡、大规模武器扩散、国际恐怖主义、毒品交易、艾滋病毒及洗钱等，亚欧在这方面存在较多的共同利益。9•11 事件后，中国与欧盟都在加快适应国际新形势。2003 年 12 月欧盟通过的首份《安全战略报告》，确认中国为其“主要战略伙伴之一”。中欧比以往任何时候更需要在“战略伙伴”框架内开展合作，共同应对反恐、防扩散、跨国犯罪和其他全球性挑战。中国与欧盟及其成员国多层次的政治和战略对话不断深入，涉及面越来越广。2004 年 12 月，在第七次中欧领导人会晤中，双方重申致力于打击恐怖主义，强调联合国在反恐方面的主导作用以及普遍执行与反恐有关的所有联合国安理会决议、联合国反恐公约和议定书的重要性；双方同意在实现伊拉克重建及恢复和平与繁荣的多边努力中共同努力；双方强调他们同阿富汗政府合作以支持阿富汗重建和稳定的坚定承诺；双方赞赏彼此为推动政治解决伊朗核问题所作努力；欧盟赞扬中国在推动六方会谈进程方面起到的关键和积极作用。在会晤后发表的《防扩散和军控联合声明》，则标志着中欧安全合作取得了重要突破。对此，欧盟理事会外交代表索拉纳曾经指出，“中欧互为应对各种国际挑战的重要伙伴，双方政治和战略对话近期虽然在总体上主要是增加对彼此立场的理解和沟通，尚未上升到外交和安全领域的具体合作，但仍具有重要意义。”

消除贫困、改善落后地区的生活和生产条件，促进社会的和谐发展，是中欧双方的共同目标。中国是个发展中国家，各个地区的发展很不平衡，特别是老、少、边、穷地区的发展严重滞后。为了尽快改变这些地区贫穷落后的面貌，中欧双方在扶贫脱困方面早已开展了多个合作项目。例如，于 2001 年 6 月 11 日正式实施的“中欧白朗农村综合发展项目”涵盖了农业、畜牧、灌溉、人畜饮水、教育、医疗卫生以及社区发展等 7 个领域。经中国与欧盟联合专家组近 5 年的努力，在西藏雅鲁藏布江流域治理贫困，使该流域的贫困县——白朗县的面貌大为改观。通过在试点地区引进新的农作物、畜牧品种和新技术，建立必要的基础设施，提供基本社会服务，在可持续、可重复的基础上提高日喀则地区白郎县的发展水平。为了落实这一扶贫项目，中欧双方共为此项目投入资金 2405 万欧元，先后有近 20 人次的国际专家和 40 余名中方工作人员参与。6

发展教育也是摆脱贫困，促进社会发展的重要手段，因此，中欧双方在教育

中欧双方在改善医疗卫生条件、提高人民健康水平领域内的合作也卓有成效。双方确定并实施了多个关系人民身体健康和食品安全的合作项目。在 2003 年的“非典”横行期间，欧盟委员会主席普罗迪致函胡锦涛主席对中国抗击“非典”表示支持。许多欧盟成员国以各种方式向中国提供了援助。2004 年 5 月，欧盟投入 190 万欧元的研究费用启动“中国－欧盟非典诊断及病毒研究”项目，寻找抗非典病毒的药物和研究诊断非典的新方法。经中欧科学家联手攻关，到翌年 6 月，已成功找到 15 种能够抑制非典病毒复制的化合物，为合成非典治疗药物提供了新途径。2在中国发生禽流感疫情后，欧盟也就防治禽流感与中国展开密切的合作。鉴于艾滋病已经成为严重威胁全球人类健康的疾病，中欧领导人于 2004 年 12 月举行的第七次会晤中，强调执行 2001 年联合国大会通过的有关艾滋病宣言的重要性。欧盟欢迎中国所启动的全球基金中国艾滋病项目，而欧盟是该基金的主要捐助者，中国鼓励欧盟继续支持中国防治艾滋病的努力并大力提供资助。


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1 新华网布鲁塞尔 2005 年 9 月 28 日电：“欧盟将增加与中国教育合作投资”。
2 http://news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20050620/12415564.html
增 59%，而老年人口增加 1.48 倍。30 年里，老年人口增加了 8,346 万人，平均每年增加 260 万人。目前中国老年人口以年平均 3.2% 的速度递增，大大超过总人口 1.68% 的年均增长速度。欧洲国家 60 岁以上人口占全部欧洲人口的比例为 21.4%，而 20 岁以下人口的比例为 23.1%。人口老龄化使社会保障、养老制度变得更加重要。中国一方面借鉴欧洲社会保障的一些成功经验，提出中国养老保险改革的新目标：“广覆盖、低水平、多层次、可衔接”，确保绝大多数人的养老安全。③

由于过度开发，全球环境受到严重破坏，直接威胁到人类的生存和社会的可持续发展，因此保护环境成为中国-欧盟合作的重要领域。1999 年启动的“欧盟—中国辽宁综合环境项目”致力于改善该省的环境意识、沈阳城市规划、水资源管理、大气质量管理与机构能力建设、能源效率管理、清洁生产、工业结构调整和投资促进，现已取得多项阶段性成果。双方合作编制的《辽宁省辽河流域水污染防治“十五”计划》，被世行评价为中国最先进的流域规划，环境的改善还为沈阳“一宫两陵”申请联合国世界文化遗产做出了突出贡献。②2001 年 9 月中欧共同实施“中欧盟环境管理合作项目”（EU-China Environmental Management Cooperation Program，简称 EMCP），推动中国的环境保护和可持续性发展。整个计划总投资 1900 万欧元，其中欧方投入 1300 万欧元，中方配套 600 万欧元。2003 年 11 月，中欧签署协议建立环境对话机制，使双方的环境合作进入新阶段。在 2004 年 12 第七次中欧领导人会晤期间，双方领导人重申在环境保护方面的共同承诺，鼓励扩大和深化在该领域高层对话的努力。双方强调进一步落实世界可持续发展首脑会议后续行动，并在《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《京都议定书》方面的合作十分重要。双方欢迎《议定书》将于 2005 年生效。在 2005 年 9 月举行的第八次中欧领导人会晤中，双方还发表了《中欧气候变化联合宣言》，确定在气候变化领域建立中欧伙伴关系。2005 年 11 月，由中国国家环保总局、欧盟委员会、联合国发展计划署三方为主进行合作的“中国——欧盟生物多样性项目”启动，为期 5 年。根据协议，欧盟将向中国提供总额达 3000 万欧元的赠款，用于中国的生物多样性保护事业。加强中国履行《生物多样性公约》的能力，建立有效的监测和反馈机制。④

在人权领域，中欧对欧盟在人权问题上坚持对话、反对对抗的立场表示赞赏，愿与欧方共同努力，以战略眼光妥善处理人权问题。1997 年，中国与欧盟建立了人权对话机制，根据双方达成的协议，欧盟—中国人权对话在欧盟轮值主席国的领导下每年进行两轮，到 2006 年 5 月，中欧已进行了 21 人权对话。此外，还举行了多次司法研讨会，开展了一些人权问题研究项目的合作。通过在平等和相互尊
重基础上就人权问题开展对话及合作，达到了加深彼此了解、减少分歧、扩大共识、增进互信的目的，对推动中欧全面战略伙伴关系的发展发挥了积极的作用。2001年9月，欧盟委员会发表《加强伙伴关系的战略框架》的报告，提出了今后10年将把与中国进行的人权对话扩大到其他国家，以促进亚洲民主，并为亚洲的法制建设提供合作。在2004年12月举行的中欧领导人会晤时，双方都高度评价在人权领域中的合作，认为中欧人权对话加强了双方的相互理解，同意继续目前进行的人权对话，努力使对话及有关双边合作项目取得更有意义、更积极的实际成果。双方强调尊重有关国际人权文书中规定的国际人权标准，包括少数民族权利，致力于同联合国人权机制合作。双方领导人强调在人权领域采取实际行动的重要性，并重申双方致力于在平等和相互尊重的基础上进一步加强在人权领域合作与交流。

实际上，除了上述的各个方面以外，还有许多可以被纳入全球治理范畴的内容。例如世界的能源问题。由于全球化背景下世界各国社会经济发展导致的对能源需求的急剧增长，使中国和欧盟都面临着共同的能源挑战。欧盟对进口能源依存度将从1990年的45.5%提高到2030年的67%；1990年以来，对外石油依存度更是超过80%。中国已从20世纪90年代初的净能源出口国变为目前的净进口国，对石油的进口依存度将要超过50%。保障能源安全、控制能源使用过程中造成的环境污染和气候变化等，是中国和欧盟共同的能源与可持续发展的共同政策目标。1996年在北京举行的中欧能源合作大会上，当时的国家科委和欧盟委员会签署了关于加强中欧能源使用的联合声明。根据这个声明，双方成立了能源工作组，主要负责协调和管理双方官方支持的能源合作项目和活动，这已成为中欧之间开展能源合作交流的主要官方渠道。2

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1 朱力宇、张小劲: “中欧人权观的异同及其对中欧关系的影响”, 《国家行政学院学报》2004年第2期, 第90页。
亚欧合作评估及发展思考

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1996年3月1-2日，首届亚欧首脑会议在曼谷成功召开，与会方包括东亚10国（东盟7国及中、日、韩）、欧盟15国及欧盟委员会，成为面向21世纪亚欧新型平等伙伴关系建立的显著标志，也对整个国际格局产生重大而深远的影响。迄今，作为亚欧大陆东西两端一座对话与合作的桥梁，亚欧会议已走过10年不平凡的历程。亚欧各国成员以“突出和扩大共识，增进理解和友谊，促进和深化合作”为目标，遵循“相互尊重、平等开放、循序渐进、协商一致、不干涉内政”的原则，在政治对话、经贸合作、社会文化及其他相关领域的交流合作上开展丰富多彩、形式多样的合作，取得累累硕果，为巩固亚欧传统友谊、加强国际多边主义、促进世界和地区的和平、稳定与繁荣作出了不容低估的积极贡献，成为联结亚欧两大洲的一个重要的国际多边合作机制，树立了洲际平等对话与合作的典范。特别是2004年亚欧会议实现成员国大扩展后，成员国人口达24亿，占世界人口40%，国内生产总值超过全球一半，无疑在国际事务中将发挥更大的作用。

但我们也要看到，十年来亚欧会议合作进程在取得一系列不容磨煞的重大成就的同时，也存在一些比较突出的问题。

首先是机制化问题。亚欧会议成立后一直采取论坛形式，其通过的会议文件无约束力，会议至今也没有常设秘书处。这种非机制化的运作方式固然有其灵活性优势，有利于建立一个涵盖贸易、投资、政治对话和文化交流的合作框架，但毕竟不利于成员国间信息的快速交换，也造成了合作进程中的重复劳动和资源浪费；合作进程中必须全体一致通过的决策方式严重限制了亚欧会议整体功能的发挥，而缺乏一个常设的专门机构协调和落实会议重要倡议的后续行动，更使亚欧会议容易成为“空谈俱乐部”。由此，要求亚欧会议进一步机制化，发展成为一个名副其实的国际多边组织的呼声逐渐涌现。

其次是扩员问题。作为一个洲际跨区域多边合作平台，亚欧会议成员国自1996年曼谷峰会以来一直包括亚欧25国，即由东亚地区的东盟7国及中、日、韩和欧盟15国成员国组成。相应地，合作进程中自始就存在亚欧双方力量对比失衡的问题，欧方不仅在成员国数量上占优势，而且其总体发展水平、经济实力和区域内部一体化程度明显强于亚方，从而在亚欧会议合作框架内享有突出的“集团优势”。2004年10月于越南河内召开的第五届亚欧首脑会议上，亚欧会议实现了成员国首轮扩大，欧洲方面增加了10个欧盟新成员国，而亚洲方面增
加了柬、老、缅3个成员国。欧方成员国数量几乎是亚方的一倍，这使亚欧双方力量不对称的矛盾进一步凸现。作为一个开放性的区域对话机制，亚欧会议的不断扩大是必然趋势。由于欧盟东扩仍在继续，其新成员自然也会成为亚欧会议成员，要扭转亚欧双方力量对比失衡状况，必然要扩大亚洲部分的成员国，蒙古、印度、巴基斯坦以及俄罗斯、澳大利亚、新西兰等国已提出加入亚欧会议，但欧盟和亚洲各国在吸收新成员问题上意见不一。看来亚欧会议要妥善应对扩员问题，努力寻求一个亚欧双方均可接受的方案，如制定相关吸收新成员的程序文件，设立亚欧会议观察员国或对话伙伴国制度，从而在亚欧合作不断发展的进程中，以一种更为积极和主动的态度改变亚欧力量失衡状况。

另外亚欧会议还要解决合作效率问题。曼谷首脑会议虽然确立了亚欧会议成员国在“政治对话、经济合作和文化交流”三大支柱领域加强合作，但缺乏明确具体的目标，以致十年来亚欧会议进程中，合作内容不够深化，合作虚多实少，倡议多于行动；亚欧会议议题过于宽泛（仅在2000年亚欧会议第三次（汉城）峰会上就提出多达23项的倡议），包罗万象而没有重点，无法有效地集中合作资源，合作效率以及其在国际社会中的应有影响也由此削弱。在成员国已经扩大到38国情况下，亚欧会议合作进程的健康发展，自然要求相应改变这种合作领域广、议题多而效率不高的合作缺陷。

我认为今后几年亚欧会议框架下应该重点推动以下六个领域的合作发展。

一是加强亚欧会议的机制化建设。要根据本合作进程的实际状况，逐步、务实地扭转非机制化特征。包括建立亚欧会议常设秘书处、开设专门门户网站、拟订亚欧会议宪章、确定扩充成员国（及观察员、对话联系伙伴等）标准规定等。

二是以多边主义立场推动国际关系民主化。在联合国改革、世贸谈判、朝核和伊核等国际和地区重大事务、热点问题上，协调与确立彼此间的共识与立场，以多边主义抑制国际社会中的单边主义与强权政治，推动国际秩序向公正、合理、和谐的方向发展。

三是拓展非传统安全领域的互利协作。既包括打击恐怖主义、非法移民、毒品和武器走私等跨国犯罪活动，也包括建立防范与应对传染疾疫、金融危机和自然灾害等相应国际和地区协作机制。

四是构建投资和贸易便利化及相关争端有效处理机制。以适应经济全球化和区域集团化的形势发展，切实降低贸易保护主义的不利障碍，在理性、平等、互利、共赢的基础上寻找共同利益、实现共同发展。

五是强化能源、环保、信息等领域的科技合作。包括油气储备和运输、可再生和清洁能源开发、环境保护和生态平衡以及信息便捷安全等领域的科技开发上的合作攻关与相关援助。

六是深化文化交流与文明对话。超越意识形态和社会制度的差异，进一步挖掘彼此文明优秀遗产和宝贵资源，加强公共媒体正面报道、通过发展旅游、文体艺术和学术交流、人力资源培训和教育合作以及各种研讨会、对话会、论坛和讲座等丰富多样的形式，逐步减少和消除彼此间的盲目、误解和隔阂，在沟通对话
中求同存异，增进友谊、扩大共识。
希望通过上述重点领域集中、务实的合作，推进亚欧会议合作进程向纵深发展，
有效提升亚欧会议的凝聚力、影响力、生命力和发展力，让亚欧会议由一政府间
论坛逐步发展为国际影响日益扩大的国际多边合作组织，为中国和世界其他国家
共同建设一个持久和平与繁荣的和谐世界作出更大的实际贡献。
上海合作组织本来是中国、俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦之间为解决边界问题和提升政治互信而成立的一个机构，从成立之初谈不上太多抱负。在上述问题解决之后本来已完成历史任务，但赶上 9.11 和本地区三股势力抬头，因此被赋予了共同打击恐怖主义这一新的历史使命，得以生存下来并获得了发展的机遇。

上海合作组织基本上覆盖了中国北方的主要国家和地区。如果未来蒙古乃至印度和巴基斯坦（以及稳定后的阿富汗和伊朗）都加入这一组织的话，上海合作组织将覆盖欧亚大陆东段和中亚的所有地区，乃至一部分南亚国家。这样一来，上海合作组织对中国未来的西北和北方的安全和经济发展的重要性会日益凸现。就目前的国际形势来看，保证中亚地区的地区稳定，防止该地区宗教极端主义和分裂主义威胁中国的西部安全，是当前中国推动上海合作组织最重要的合作内容。

不过，上海合作组织面临很多不确定性，这其中包括存在于这一地区的其它地区组织的关系问题，主要是和独联体组织的关系问题。由于上海合作组织中目前的成员中除了中国之外全都是独联体的成员，因此如果独联体的经济合作在未来 5-10 年取得相当成功的话，上海合作组织成员国对于发展紧密经济联系的需求就会降低，因此上海合作组织的生命力未来主要取决于该组织能否发展成为一个能给成员国带来具体经济利益的经济合作平台。也就是说，要维持上合组织的生存与发展，最好的策略是大力推动组织内部的经济一体化。

从历史和现状来看，能源合作既是经济一体化的抓手，也将在可预见的将来成为经济合作的主要内容。因为按照国际能源机构的评估，对诸如乌兹别克斯坦和哈萨克斯坦，某种程度上还有俄罗斯来说，向世界市场出口油气资源，实际上是这些国家摆脱危机、增加国内生产总值水平的主要甚至唯一途径。而中国作为仅次于美国的第二大能源进口国，使得整个上合组织的经济结构有了强大的互补性，这种结构有利于整个上合组织的生存与发展。

但我们也应当看到，在上合组织当中，俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦与乌兹别克斯坦既是能源生产国和出口国（或者“资源国”），也是过境运输国家；而能源进口国是中国、塔吉克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦。6 个国家的能源经济利益并不一致。例如，俄罗斯在与哈萨克斯坦与乌兹别克斯坦的关系方面的问题是在能源出口市场和价格方面的竞争，以及过境服务的清算问题；俄罗斯向塔吉克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦的能源出口市场和价格方面的问题。
坦低价提供油气，是为了保住自己所谓的“近国外”传统势力范围，考虑的是主要政治而不是经济因素。而俄罗斯与中国之间的油气交易主要是通过市场贸易的方式进行的，但是规模不大，里面却包含了比较复杂的经济和政治因素，主要有

1. 在先后出台的3部能源战略当中,俄罗斯将稳定独联体国家放在第一位,对欧洲出口放在第二位,开拓美国市场放在第三位,进入包括中国、印度、日本、韩国在内的远东方向放在第四位,不是非常重视;
2. 俄将远东管线作为自己的长期规划项目，主要通过其建立东西伯利亚油气统一供给系统,从而带动整个俄东部地区经济的发展;而中方却视双方合作作为亟待解决的短期工作项目,要解决本国的能源危机和石油进口渠道多样化问题。双方的视角不同造成了两国在石油合作过程中的误解和摩擦;
3. 由于历史的原因,俄罗斯对于中国的发展一直抱有非常矛盾的心态,在俄罗斯国内防范中国崛起的“中国威胁论”仍然有很大的市场。综合上述原因,中俄能源合作也一直是雷声大雨点小,没有取得实质性的进展。但这次普京访华后,态度明显更加积极了。原因主要在于:
——中国是有着强大支付能力的能源进口大国,这是谁也不敢忽视的大市场。中国的支付能力让普京刮目相看的主要契机是中石油资助罗斯石油公司收购尤甘斯克的60亿美元事件,俄国人是心存感激的。同时,俄罗斯要依靠外国投资来帮助其保持石油产量的增长,本来盼望日本能为俄罗斯提供一个稳定的市场及其由能源驱动的经济所急需的资金。俄日之间因为领土问题,至少在普京任内不可能取得突破,而中国则完全可以取代日本的地位。当然,远东石油管道还是有条件:俄境内支线由中方出资修建。另外,中哈石油管线的建成也间接刺激了俄罗斯方面。

在上合组织的其它国家当中,哈萨克斯坦是主要的产油国,04年的产量接近6000万吨,据该国的规划,到2015年产量达到1.5亿吨(相当于3个大庆),其中规划的1亿吨来自哈萨克斯坦的里海海域。而通过中国西部建成通向亚太经济圈能源通道,更是哈萨克斯坦石油经济所期望的远景。中石油在2005年成功收购了哈PK石油公司,中哈石油管道也已经正式建成并投产。因此可以说,尽管仍然面临着许多共同的困难,中哈两国在能源合作方面取得了重大的突破与进展。至少在能源方面,哈萨克斯坦已经成为上合组织内中国对俄政策的一个重要平衡力量。

对于其它上合组织成员国而言,它们在中短期依赖俄罗斯(至少在国家安全和应对地方恐怖势力方面)的情况不会有太大变化。但是小国也有自尊,俄罗斯的大国沙文主义从沙皇时代就给这些国家留下了阴影。从地缘政治方面考虑,它们也迫切的需要在地区内和地区外寻找一切可以平衡俄罗斯的力量,而美国和中国都是它们希望借助的力量。美国可以提供政治和军事庇护(但颜色革命让他们很失望),中国则可以提供资金和经济支持,这一点也是俄罗斯担心的。

鉴于俄罗斯仍将中亚地区视为其后院和中俄关系的重要性,同时,作为拥有
上海合作组织和独联体成员双重身份的俄罗斯对于独联体的关注程度目前远大于其对上海合作组织的重视。随着俄罗斯经济的复苏和国力的回升，如果它对独联体的影响能够维持在目前的稳定水平甚至有所提升，俄罗斯对上海合作组织就没有太大的热情。独联体和上海合作组织在一定程度上功能和范围都有所重叠，但又不大可能在短期内合为一体。不过，随着形势的发展，两者中的一个功能极大弱化以至于基本上丧失而自动消失的可能性都是存在的。

在与石油、天然气相关能源资源的地缘政治中，中亚位于心脏地带。控制中亚油气，也就意味着在全球能源的战略格局中取主导动。先不提“世界岛”和“弧形地带”的术语，至少从中长期来看，中亚和远东地区是我国规避风险，提高能源安全水平的最具潜在意义的地方。从地区能源连接的角度来看，未来只有把新疆和中亚油气以及中俄之间的输油管道一并考虑，中国的西部油气东输战略才有可能实现的基础。

对于中国来说更重要的一点在于，中亚五国与新疆的维族同属土耳其语系，信奉回教，为了确保这些国家不致成为新疆分裂势力的后台。中国必须与它们保持良好关系，并通过种种手段施加影响，这也是中国在上合组织开展能源外交的最重要目的。简单的说，能源合作不是目的，而是手段，从组织内资源国进口油气，短期是为了了解国内日益严重的能源短缺，长期则是为了西部地区的长治久安。

明白了这一点，在策略上，中国应该投入更多资源，从政府到民间，通过直接投资、项目合作、贷款等经济手段，和领导人互访，干部培训，学术交流，NGO等多种方式来影响其它成员国。上合组织虽然只有6个国家，但成员复杂，包含东正教、儒家和伊斯兰教三大文明，彼此之间的了解和交流（尤其是儒家和其它两大文明之间）也只能通过经济往来和人员交流逐渐加深。

在对待俄罗斯的问题上，中国应该在组织框架内和俄罗斯开展更广泛的合作，使得目前的由中俄核心国家经济合作转向整个组织的经济一体化，这是最佳方案；但如果出现俄罗斯试图掌控上合的主导权并排挤中国的情况，那么个人认为，中国完全可以利用能源外交这一经济杠杆和其它成员国对俄罗斯的防范心理来进行回击，缺少俄罗斯的上合组织虽然并不完整，但也完全能在中国的主导下深化地区内经济合作并保障成员国安全。而缺少中国的上合组织，其命运也只能与日益衰败的独联体殊途同归了。
当前中亚地区安全挑战多元化和深刻化。同时，上海合作组织已经由初创阶段进入一个新的发展阶段。上海合作组织将在发展中国与亚欧国家之间的合作、推动亚欧合作的进程中发挥着越来越重要的作用。

一、当前中亚地区安全形势的特点

冷战结束后，中亚地区在世界政治、经济和战略上的重要性显著上升，重新成为大国竞争的焦点之一。中亚地区形势的发展对亚太地区安全和中国周边安全环境有重要影响。上海合作组织对中亚地区形势发展有重要作用。

中亚地区战略地位非常重要。中亚5国东临中国，西至里海，北起俄罗斯，南接伊朗、阿富汗等伊斯兰国家，总面积近400万平方公里，总人口5560万。该地区位于欧亚大陆中部，历史上曾是“东西方文明的桥梁”，在欧亚之间人员往来与物资流通方面发挥过重要作用的丝绸之路从这里蜿蜒而过，举世闻名的欧亚大陆桥由此向西延伸。

而且，中亚地区蕴藏着丰富的石油和天然气资源以及其他战略资源。美国能源部估计，里海地区最终可开采的石油储藏量约为2000亿桶，占世界总储量的16%。在中亚5国中，哈萨克斯坦、土库曼斯坦为里海沿岸国家。不过，国际石油工业界对这些数字有不同的观点。据《石油和天然气报》估计，里海地区到1998年为止已经探明的现有储量大约为80亿桶。英国石油公司办的《世界经济统计评论》估计，约为160亿桶。国际石油工业界所公认的该地区最终能开采的总储量（包括尚未发现的）为250亿桶到350亿桶之间，可与英国的北海油田相比较，接近世界储量的3%。尽管如此，这也是一个值得重视的新兴的石油来源。同时，中亚地区天然气储量也居世界前列。其中，土库曼斯坦已探明储量约8.4万亿立方米，估计总储量为21万亿立方米（占世界总储量的35%）；哈萨克斯坦已探明储量1.5万亿立方米。

中亚地区有色金属和稀有金属蕴藏量在世界上占有重要地位。哈萨克斯坦钨、铬储量是世界第一，铜、铝、锌储量是亚洲第一。乌兹别克斯坦黄金储量世界第五。塔吉克斯坦蕴藏丰富的铀。

正是由于地缘战略地位重要和石油等自然资源丰富，中亚地区自古以来就是
有些外部势力竭力染指的战略要冲。冷战结束后，一些大国纷纷将中亚地区列为对外战略的重要目标之一，大力增加对中亚地区的影响和发展与中亚国家安全、军事、经济、贸易等关系，在中亚地区的竞争激烈。中亚地区已成为一些大国战略利益的交叉点和博弈点。

近年来，一些大国不仅着眼于中亚地区重要的战略地位和丰富的石油等自然资源，而且在该地区极力进行渗透，企图在中亚地区处于有利的战略态势和获取重大的经济利益。“9·11”事件后，美国以反恐名义在中亚建立军事基地。近年来，许多国家的领导人和部长们纷纷访问中亚国家；一些腰缠万贯的国际巨商更是纷至沓来，到中亚地区争夺投资项目和新的市场。这些都使中亚地区在国际政治、经济、战略中的地位凸显。

当前中亚地区安全形势主要特点和趋势包括：

（一） 安全挑战多元化和深刻化。

当前中亚地区和上海合作组织面临的恐怖主义、分裂主义、极端主义的威胁有增无已。非法贩卖毒品成为这三股恶势力的重要资金来源。人员的非法流动为这三股恶势力的活动提供了便利。而且，上合组织成员国还面临恶性传染病、环境污染等挑战。

（二）地缘政治格局呈现多极化发展势头。

当前，各大国在中亚地区的竞争正在日趋激烈，但它们中没有一个具有独占中亚地区的实力。目前，中亚国家也在加强地区合作。中亚国家还奉行多元化的外交，平衡地发展与各大国的关系，在大国之间纵横捭阖，以此来维护民族的独立和国家的主权。

（三） 大国之间以及它们与中亚国家之间竞争与合作并存，存在不确定因素和潜在的不稳定因素。

各大国和中亚国家在争夺中亚和里海地区能源以及投资和投资场所方面存在着各种尖锐而复杂的矛盾，竞争是激烈的。但另一方面，这些国家中的绝大多数国家都希望能够保持地区稳定，从而能够在和平的环境中进行投资、贸易以及能源开发。因此，它们在相互进行激烈竞争的同时，也注意调整政策，并在某些问题上进行妥协，以寻求利益平衡和在可能的情况下相互之间的经济合作。目前在中亚地区已经实施的能源开发项目中，美国及西方其他主要国家、俄罗斯、土耳其、伊朗等国已介入，其中许多已形成多方参股、你中有我、我中有你、相互依存的局面。因此各国之间的竞争将会更多地以“文明有序”的方式进行，而尽量避免兵戎相见。

但也应该看到，中亚地区国家之间的关系仍处于深刻变化之中，其走向充满不确定因素和复杂因素。该地区各国存在着深刻的民族、宗教矛盾，有的国家内部政局不稳，加之外部大国的介入和争夺，该地区相对稳定的形势依然相当脆弱。

（四） 中亚地区能源开发有利于促进经济繁荣，但发展将受到多种不利因素的制约。

近年来，中亚地区的油气资源开发取得一定的进展，并吸引了大量外资。这
促进了当地经济的发展，推动中亚国家与世界经济接轨。但中亚的油气开发又受到对外运输不便等一些不利因素的阻碍。因此中亚地区油气开发不会很快给大多数中亚国家带来繁荣和给国际石油市场以重大影响。

（五）中亚国家在转型中遭遇多重困难。

中亚国家既是新建国家，又是转型国家。中亚国家都是在苏联解体后独立的，又都处于由高度集中的计划经济体制向市场经济体制转变的过程中。中亚国家处于民主选举制度的初期，西方国家千方百计加施影响，甚至在有的中亚国家策动“颜色革命”。这些因素决定了中亚国家发展很不平衡，多数国家经济落后，某些国家政局有时发生动荡。

二、上海合作组织进入新的发展阶段

上海合作组织成员国总面积 3000 多万平方公里，约占亚欧大陆的 3/5；人口近 15 亿，约占世界人口的 1/4。自 2001 年在“上海五国”基础上成立上海合作组织以来，该组织在安全、经济、人文领域的合作不断深化和务实，为维护地区和平和促进区域发展发挥了卓有成效的作用。

2006 年 6 月 15 日，在上海举行的上海合作组织峰会通过了《上海合作组织五周年宣言》等 10 份文件，涉及信息安全、反恐、教育、经贸和金融合作等领域，为上合组织的下一步发展确定了方向和任务。中国、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦等 6 个成员国，蒙古，巴基斯坦，印度等 4 个观察员国和与上合组织建立合作关系的阿富汗国家元首或代表，以及有关国际组织的领导人出席了会议。这标志着上海合作组织进入一个新的发展时期。

作为冷战结束后在国际关系领域出现的新生事物，上海合作组织经历了由早期作为在边境地区相互裁减军事力量和加强军事领域信任的谈判机制转向正式的区域性国际合作组织的发展历程。自 1996 年 4 月中、俄、哈、吉、塔五国国家元首在圣彼得堡首次会晤，上海合作组织逐步成长为新兴的区域合作组织，度过了初创的艰难，经受住了国际形势的风浪，稳定了自己的根基，进入平稳发展阶段。

（一）弘扬“上海精神”，增强相互信任。

在此次上合组织上海峰会期间，中国国家主席胡锦涛同其他成员国元首围绕弘扬“上海精神”，深化务实合作、促进和平发展的问题，签署了一系列重要文件，总结了已有经验，提出了上海合作组织发展的远景规划。

5 年多来，上合组织历经国际风云变幻的考验，走过了不平凡的道路，取得令人瞩目的成就。其成功经验归根结底，在于中国和上海合作组织其他成员国一起坚定不移地实践和弘扬互信、互利、平等、协商，尊重多样文明，谋求共同发展的“上海精神”。他们发挥各成员国地理相邻、历史相近、文化相通的优势，恪守和平与发展的宗旨，奉行对外开放政策，积极开展多种形式的对话、交流、合作。作为上合组织最重要的行为准则，“上海精神”丰富了当代国际关系理论
与实践，体现了国际社会对实现国际关系民主化的普遍要求，对国际社会探索建立新型国家关系具有重大意义。“上海精神”正越来越具有普遍的国际意义。在《上海合作组织五周年宣言》中，成员国庄严承诺：“将世代友好、永不为敌，将全面实现睦邻、互相尊重和互利合作的关系，相互支持维护国家主权、安全和领土完整的原则立场和努力，不参加损害成员国主权、安全和领土完整的联盟或国际组织，不允许利用其领土损害其他成员国主权、安全和领土完整，禁止损害其他成员国利益的组织或团伙在本国领土活动。”在胡锦涛主席的建议下，各成员国还承诺“将协商缔结本组织框架内长期睦邻友好多边法律文件”。

上海合作组织将成为一个完全新型的国际组织。他将有不同于已有其他国际组织的新安全理念、新的组织机制、新的相互关系、新的互动模式和新的目标等。

（二）加强战略协作，强化安全合作。

上合组织“一贯主张加强战略稳定和不扩散大规模杀伤性武器的国际体系，支持维护国际法律秩序”，表示“为实现上述重大任务作出自己的贡献”。上合组织成员国正在强化在国际和地区事务中的协调和合作，愿意及时协商共同应对重大国际和地区问题的措施。

2003 年上合组织峰会决定在北京和塔什干分别设立秘书处和地区反恐机构。2004 年 1 月上海合作组织秘书处在北京正式成立。同年 6 月上海合作组织地区反恐机构在塔什干正式启动。这为上合组织的机制化奠定了基础。

上合组织成员国已经就“制定本组织应对威胁地区和平、稳定和安全事件的措施机制的原则立场达成共识”，上合组织秘书处将尽快起草有关协定，“使该机制的各项措施有法可依”。

上合组织已开始打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义三股势力的共同斗争中取得进展。现在上海合作组织不仅继续将打击恐怖主义、分裂主义、极端主义的威胁作为优先工作，而且将打击非法贩卖毒品也列为优先工作。上合组织2006 年上海峰会批准了《打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义 2007 年至 2009 年合作纲要》，签署了《关于在上海合作组织成员国境内组织和举行联合反恐活动的程序协定》和《关于查明和切断在上海合作组织成员国境内参与恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义活动人员渗透渠道的协定》。这将进一步提高上海合作组织反恐合作的水平。

中俄两国 2005 年首次在中国领土上举行上合组织框架内的大规模联合军事演习，并计划 2007 年在俄罗斯境内再次举行大规模联合军演。“继续在成员国境内举行包括有防务部门参加的不同形式的联合反恐演习，对提高成员国反恐行动的效率是有益的”。

上合组织成员国领导人承诺：“当出现威胁地区和平、稳定与安全的紧急事件时，成员国将立即联系并就共同有效应对进行磋商，以最大限度地维护本组织

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1 《上海合作组织五周年宣言》，《文汇报》2006 年 6 月 15 日，第 3 版。
2 《上海合作组织五周年宣言》，《文汇报》2006 年 6 月 15 日，第 3 版。
3 《上海合作组织元首理事会第六次会议联合公报》，《人民日报》2006 年 6 月 15 日，第 3 版。
4 《上海合作组织五周年宣言》，《文汇报》2006 年 6 月 15 日，第 3 版。
5 《上海合作组织元首理事会第六次会议联合公报》，《人民日报》2006 年 6 月 15 日，第 3 版。
和成员国的利益。”

上合组织在区域安全和稳定方面发挥积极作用，有助于中亚无核武器区进程取得重要进展。

1997年9月在乌兹别克斯坦首都塔什干举行了中亚无核区国际会议，中亚五国和五个核大国的代表出席了会议。出席的还有联合国、欧盟、欧洲安全与合作组织、北约、伊斯兰会议组织等国际组织的代表。在这次会议上签署了中亚五国外长声明。声明说，核武器扩散是人类生存的主要威胁，建立中亚无核武器区是加强该地区安全的最重要手段。声明呼吁联合国安理会常任理事国及世界上所有国家对建立中亚无核武器区给予支持。

1998年夏在吉首都比什凯克举行了关于建立中亚无核武器区的“比什凯克进程”5+5+联合国会唔。1998年7月，中、哈、吉、俄、塔“上海五国”在哈萨克斯坦阿拉木图市举行会晤后发表的联合声明中，积极评价中亚国家提出的建立中亚无核区的倡议。1999年8月，中、俄、哈、吉、塔五国元首在《比什凯克声明》中，明确表示支持中亚国家建立无核武器区的努力。同年11月，中国与乌兹别克斯坦国家元首在北京签署关于进一步发展两国友好合作关系的联合声明中，中方高度评价乌关于建立中亚无核武器区的努力，愿意根据中国在无核武器区上的一贯立场，积极支持中亚五国建立中亚无核武器区。

在2000年7月中、俄、哈、吉、塔五国元首在杜尚别会晤时签署的联合声明中，支持乌兹别克斯坦关于建立中亚无核武器区的倡议，认为中亚无核区条约应符合业以实施的同类文件的原则和标准。

2006年9月8日，中亚五国在哈萨克斯坦塞米巴拉金斯克市签署中亚无核武器区条约。这证明区域稳定与国家合作在促进地区无核化进程中的重要作用。

(三)深化经济合作，促进全面发展。

上海合作组织现在主要任务之一是经济合作。上合组织2006年上海峰会成立了上海合作组织实业家委员会和上海合作组织银行联合体。这有助于进一步推动上合区经济合作的发展。成员国加强协调通过实施区域经济合作重大优先项目以落实《上海合作组织多边经贸合作纲要》。正在努力完善地区经济合作的法律框架，商签海关、交通领域的合作协议，研究签署多边投资保护协定的可行性。成员国还在努力尽快实施一批多方参与、共同受益的经济技术合作项目，特别是能源、电力、交通、电信等领域的网络性项目。中国在2004年塔什干峰会上宣布的向其他成员国提供9亿美元优惠出口买方信贷已基本落实，一些具有重要区域意义的项目即将开工。中国为其他成员国培训1500名专家和管理人才的计划正在顺利实施。

上海合作组织正在协调各方推进贸易和投资便利化，到2020年，实现成员国之间商品、资本、服务和技术的自由流动。

(四)拓展人文交流，促进文明对话。

1《上海合作组织五周年宣言》，《文汇报》2006年6月15日，第3版。
上海合作组织是包含各种文明最多的区域合作组织，它的成员国和观察员国分别属于中华文明、俄罗斯文明、伊斯兰文明、印度文明、佛教文明等。

上海合作组织一贯认为，巩固和扩大成员国友好和相互理解的社会基础，是确保该组织持久生命力的重要手段。上合组织在环保、文化、教育、体育等领域多边合作已迈出有益步伐。该组织专家论坛和组织框架内的民间外交已开始运作。上合组织正在将文化艺术、教育、体育、青年、科技、环保、旅游、传媒等领域的双边和多边合作机制化。

由于成员国拥有独特、丰富的文化遗产，因此上海合作组织的发展和成功，将促进文明对话和建立和谐世界，为不同文明的共存合作树立榜样。上海合作组织成为各种不同文明相互尊重、取长补短、共同进步的试验田和典范。多种文明的国家将通过上合组织交流与合作建构共同身份。

三、上海合作组织在亚欧合作中的作用

（一）有利于实现持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐地区。

中国建设“和谐世界”、“和谐地区”和“和谐社会”的新理念代表了和平、发展、合作的时代潮流，反映了全世界人民的共同愿望。为了贯彻这些新理念，中国高举和平发展合作的旗帜。中国和平发展必将是长期和艰巨的，将对中亚区域安全格局乃至世界战略格局产生极其深刻的影响。上海合作组织有助于中国的和平发展，有利于中亚区域的稳定与繁荣。

同时，中国提出了如何实现和谐世界的一系列主张。中国认为，和谐世界应该是民主的世界、和睦的世界、公正的世界、包容的世界。中国主张，提倡多边主义，坚持从各国人民的共同利益出发，努力扩大利益的交汇点，在沟通中增强了解，在了解中加强合作，在合作中实现共赢。中国提出了以互信、互利、平等、协作为核心的新安全观。中国主张坚持和睦互信，实现共同安全；坚持公正互利，实现共同发展；坚持包容开放，实现文明对话。上海合作组织是中国践行上述主张的重要国际机制之一。而这些新理念如能得以实行，将有助于上合组织所在地区成为持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐地区。

（二）有助于亚欧大陆的和平稳定。

中国正在坚定不移地走和平发展道路，目标是把自己国家建设成富强、民主、文明、和谐的现代化国家。中国作为一个负责任的大国，积极参加上海合作组织进程。上海合作组织其他成员国和观察员国所在地区是亚欧大陆的重要组成部分之一。上海合作组织正在成为世界政治格局中的一支重要力量。它的成员国和观察员国的人口加在一起超过 30 亿人，占世界人口多数。上海合作组织在确立合作机制和进行相互合作方面，已经达到新的水平。这一地区实现和平稳定，有利于亚欧大陆的安全。

1 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室：《中国的和平发展道路》（白皮书），《人民日报》2005 年 12 月 23 日，第 3 版。
2 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室：《中国的和平发展道路》（白皮书），《人民日报》2005 年 12 月 23 日，第 3 版。
（三）有助于建立新型全球安全架构。

冷战结束后，特别是“9·11”事件后，国际社会面临建立新型全球安全架构的重大问题。上海合作组织成员国在《上海合作组织五周年宣言》中郑重宣布: “将为建立互信、互利、平等、相互尊重的新型全球安全架构作出建设性贡献”。这一新型全球安全架构如能建立，将促进 21 世纪新型国际秩序的形成。而上海合作组织将在这一进程中发挥重要作用。中国和其他上合组织成员国“将上海合作组织视为在欧亚大陆特别是中亚地区确立和平、安全、合作的重要手段和未来建立以国际法为基础的多极世界格局的基本因素之一。”

当前，尽管美国继续推行“一超独霸”的全球战略，但世界多极化趋势仍在曲折中向前发展。上海合作组织在亚欧大陆的发展客观上促进了世界多极化趋势的进程。美国前国务卿布热津斯基认为:“欧亚大陆是全球面积最大的大陆和地缘政治中轴。主宰欧亚大陆的国家将能控制世界最先进和经济最发达的三个地区中的两个。”“对美国来说，欧亚大陆是最重要的地缘政治目标……现在美国这个非欧亚大国在这里取得了举足轻重的地位。美国能否持久、有效地保持这种地位直接影响美国对全球事务的支配。”布热津斯基指出:“欧亚大陆拥有世界人口的约 75%。它的企业和地下矿藏在全世界物质财富中占有大部分份额。欧亚大陆的国民生产总值占世界总额的约 60%。世界已知能源资源的四分之三左右也在欧亚大陆。”“欧亚大陆集中了世界上大多数在政治上非常自信和富有活力的国家。排在美国后面的六个世界经济大国都在欧亚大陆。公开的核大国只有一个是欧亚国家，不公开的核国家也只有一个不是欧亚国家。……欧亚国家的力量加在一起远远超过美国。对美国来说，幸运的是欧亚大陆太大，无法在政治上成为一个整体。”

现在，世界上正在发展的主要力量中心绝大多数在亚欧大陆。在亚欧大陆的西部，欧盟 2007 年 1 月 1 日扩大后，拥有 27 个成员国，人口接近 5 亿，总的国内生产总值达到 12 万亿美元，与美国不相上下。欧盟的内部建设也取得很大发展，正在加快独立自主防务建设步伐。这有助于使欧盟成为多极世界中重要的一极，在国际事务中发挥更大的作用。在亚欧大陆的东部及附近区域，东亚国家已经开始构建“东亚共同体”的进程。中国将与东盟国家于 2010 年建立自由贸易区。如能实现，它将是世界上人口最多的自由贸易区，总人口将达近 20 亿，经济规模将超过 2.4 万亿美元。日本与东盟签订一揽子经济合作协议，决定在 2012 年实现经济合作伙伴计划。东盟计划 2005 年与韩国签署自由贸易协定。此外，中日韩正在就三国自由贸易安排开展联合学术研究。“东亚共同体”如能建成，将形成与北美自由贸易区、欧盟三足鼎立的态势。而且，新兴大国 BRIC（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国）中有 3 个在亚欧大陆。上海合作组织成为亚欧大陆主要力量中心之一，将推进建立互信、互利、平等、相互尊重的新型全球安全架构

1 《上海合作组织五周年宣言》，《文汇报》，2006 年 6 月 15 日，第 3 版。
2 【美】兹比格纽·布热津斯基：《大棋局：美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》（中译本），上海人民出版社，1998 年第 1 版，第 42-43 页。
3 【美】兹比格纽·布热津斯基：《大棋局：美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》（中译本），上海人民出版社，1998 年第 1 版，第 42-43 页。
的进程。
亚欧会议及中欧关系评估

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亚欧会议（ASEM）历经 10 年，取得了不少成绩，促进了亚欧两洲的政治、经济、文化方面的交流与合作，但也面临着一些难题，困扰其继续发展。本文试图阐述亚欧会议的作用与局限，同时分析中欧关系现状以及如何进一步深化中欧关系。

一、亚欧会议概况

冷战结束后，世界格局发生巨大变化，经济力量和其他形式的“软实力”显得越来越重要，中国和印度等新兴大国的崛起，以及东盟等地区组织的出现，使世界向多极化道路迈进。亚洲和欧洲都表现出希望加强联系的强烈愿望。

在新加坡总理吴作栋的推动下，亚欧会议终于得以建立。1994 年 10 月，在新加坡举办的第三届世界经济论坛欧洲—东亚商业峰会上，吴作栋表示希望亚欧之间建立起类似于亚太经合组织的常规联系渠道。当月稍晚时候，吴作栋在对即将担任欧盟轮值主席国法国进行国事访问期间，正式提出此倡议，得到法国的欢迎。

亚欧各方对推动建立会议普遍态度积极，但动机却不尽相同。其中，东盟试图借亚欧会议实施平衡大国战略，避免被边缘化。欧盟渴望亚洲新兴市场，谋求通过亚欧会议“重返亚洲”。日、韩则有加强自身在本地区影响的意图。

1996 年 3 月，首届亚欧会议在泰国曼谷举行，当时共有 26 个成员。在 2004 年 10 月结束的第五届亚欧首脑会议上，10 个欧盟新成员国以及缅甸、老挝和柬埔寨 3 个东盟新成员国通过审查，成为亚欧会议的正式成员。这是亚欧会议成立以来的首次扩大。目前，亚欧会议有 39 个成员，包括亚洲 13 国（东盟 10 个成员加中国、日本和韩国）、欧盟 25 国和欧盟委员会。亚欧会议成员横跨亚欧大陆，人口占世界人口总数的 40%，GDP 占世界总量的 50%，贸易量占世界总量的 60%。

未来，保加利亚和罗马尼亚随着加入欧盟，也将成为亚欧会议成员，蒙古、印度、巴基斯坦未来也可能加入。

亚欧会议没有一般国际组织所具备的确定召开地点和常设机构，但也定期召开，有确定的参与方。亚欧会议成立以来，陆续展开了以经贸为重点的一系列后续活动，合作势头良好，反映了亚欧经济上互有所需，政治上彼此借重的战略需

1 ASEM in its Tenth Year: European Background Study, P17, University of Helsinki Network For European Studies
2 ASEM in its Tenth Year, P17, Japan Center for International Exchange and University of Helsinki Network for European Studies.
亚欧首脑会议是最高级别的会议，每两年轮流在亚洲和欧洲国家举行一次。目前，亚欧会议共举行了六次首脑峰会，分别在曼谷、伦敦、汉城、哥本哈根、河内、赫尔辛基。除首脑会议外，亚欧会议还包括一系列后续会议，包括外长会议、经济部长会议、财政部长会议、科技部长会议、环境部长会议、移民管理部长级会议和文化文明部长级会议等。亚欧会议的主体结构是三个支柱：经济支柱、政治支柱和学术、文化、人际交流支柱。

二、亚欧会议的作用

亚欧会议历经 10 年，取得了不少成绩，促进了亚欧两洲的政治、经济、文化方面的交流与合作，但也面临着一些难题，困扰其继续发展。亚欧会议的成就主要表现在：

首先，构建了欧亚多边对话平台，促进亚欧相互交流与理解。二战后，欧洲忙于内部建设，无暇顾及亚洲。冷战后，世界格局发生重大变化，亚欧两大洲都有加强彼此联系的强烈愿望。亚欧会议的建立，可以说是应各方需求而出现，为亚欧国家多边对话提供了重要平台，各国领导人和各级别官员可借此交流意见，协调立场，同时亚欧会议也为促进两大洲人民的相互了解提供了更多机会。在亚欧会议创立之前，亚洲一些国家已同欧盟建立了定期的对话制度，但基本属于双边小范围的性质，真正的亚欧多边对话机制此前并未出现。

其次，改善了亚欧经贸环境。亚欧两大经济区域，经济上彼此需要的愿望十分强烈，尤其欧洲十分看重亚洲的新兴市场。亚欧会议在推动经贸合作方面也取得了一些成果，达成了两个框架文件，分别是 1997 年的《投资促进行动计划》和 1998 年的《贸易便利行动计划》。两个行动计划反映了与会各方主张亚欧贸易、投资自由化和规则、标准规范化的愿望，也使亚欧会议各成员方展开实质性经贸合作。此外，亚欧会议还建立了经济部长会议、贸易投资高官会议、投资工作组会议和亚欧商务论坛等定期磋商机制，为各方沟通与合作构建了平台。亚欧会议还为亚欧国家讨论 WTO 议题提供了一个平台，为实施 WTO 条款提供了额外的磋商机会。①

第三，政治对话议题不断扩展，彼此互信程度增加。第一届亚欧会议政治方面的对话主要局限于人权、价值观等方面。此后，随着双方沟通与交流的增多，政治领域对话与合作议题扩展到能源、安全等领域，彼此互信不断增加。2002 年，在中国、法国和西班牙的提议下，在西班牙举办了“移民流动性管理合作”部长会议，会议同意各国就移民流动和管理相互交换信息，打击伪造证件等犯罪活动。此后移民问题也被列入亚欧会议框架之内。2003 年 10 月在意大利莱切举行的亚欧环境部长会议上，各国强调应该利用亚欧会议在有关环境的重大国际会议前，进行相互磋商，并就举办“亚欧环境论坛”达成一致意见，作为亚欧会议与社会非正式交流的平台。“9·11”之后，反恐成为亚欧会议的

① “The Asia-Europe Meeting”,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asem/other_activities/index_activities.htm#Political%20Pillar
一个优先议题。2002 年 9 月在哥本哈根举行的第四届亚欧首脑会议上，发表了《哥本哈根打击国际恐怖主义合作声明》和《哥本哈根打击国际恐怖主义合作计划》。此后，2003 年在北京，2004 年在柏林，2005 年在印度尼西亚三宝垄分别举行了反恐研讨会。

第四，在文化与人员交流方面取得突出成就。1997 年，亚欧会议在新加坡设立了亚欧基金（ASEF）。通过举办研讨会、演讲、学生交换等活动，亚欧基金有力地促进了亚欧文化、学术以及人员交流。该机构成立以来运转良好，被认为是亚欧会议的唯一 “机构”。同时，亚欧会议还成立 “亚欧教育中心”，制定 “双子奖学金计划”，推动了高校间的相互交流。到 2003 年底，共有 22 个国家的大学加入 “亚欧教育中心”，540 名各学科领域的学者得到资助。此外，2003 年在中国，2005 年在法国，还举行了两届亚欧文化与文明会议，这对于发展 “亚欧会议软实力” 十分重要。

此外，亚欧会议还促进了亚洲一体化和相互 “认同”。与欧洲一体化进程始于 “内在动力” 不同，亚欧一体化很大程度上来自亚欧会议的 “外在刺激”。亚欧会议成立之初被视为政府间论坛，但随着会议的不断举行、亚欧各自地区内的协调和一体化进程都不断深入，亚欧会议日益呈现出地区间对话的特征。亚欧会议不仅直接导致东盟和东亚三国成立 “10+3”，而且促使亚欧国家在与欧洲国家的对话中，用同一个 “身份” 看待自己。亚欧对话合作进程，也是 “亚洲意识” 生成发展过程。

三、亚欧会议的局限

在取得成绩的同时，由于亚欧会议成员多、地域广、价值观和经济发展水平差异大等特点，亚欧会议的发展也面临着两个主要问题，影响和制约着亚欧会议的进一步发展：一是虚多实少。亚欧会议虽确立了在政治、经济和文化 “三大支柱领域” 加强合作，但实际上对话多，实际成果少。比如在贸易和投资方面，亚欧会议起初被期待成为 “多边协调工具”，但实际上在这方面取得的成就有限。欧洲国家也因为会议缺乏实际成果，期待有所降低，缺乏与会动力。由于缺乏具体成果，亚欧会议不仅没能满足各方期待，也没有得到媒体的足够重视，在公众中影响有限。5 “虚多”，表明各方对亚欧会议这一沟通平台的需要，“实少”显示亚欧会议成员复杂，利益有别，关注重点不同，对具体合作目标缺乏共识。

1 “What do we do”, http://www.asef.org/
亚欧会议虽然确定了政治对话、经济合作和文化交流“三大支柱”为交流合作领域，但均无具体合作目标。

二是会议过于松散，机制建设滞后。到目前，亚欧会议仍然未设立秘书处，日常联络和协调工作由来自两洲的四个协调员承担，分别是欧盟轮值主席国、欧盟委员会、东北亚三国（中、日、韩）的代表和东盟10国的代表。亚欧会议的非正式和非机制化运作虽然有利于各方轻松对话和交流，但对于一个有39方参与的会议而言，这也给日常管理和协调带来许多困难，各方难以形成一致立场，在一定程度上也导致了会议“效率低、成果少”。“松散化”削弱了亚欧会议的影响力，但同时也需看到，亚欧是各方交流的论坛，而不是地区性组织，参与方、尤其是欧方不愿受过度机制化所带来的约束。非机制化运行在一定程度上有利于鼓励各方积极与会。

四、中欧关系

值得一提的是，亚欧会议并不是亚欧双方唯一的沟通合作平台。除此多边平台外，欧盟与亚洲国家之间、欧盟成员国与亚洲国家之间、欧盟与东盟之间都有双边合作机制。在许多情况下，亚欧会议成为了亚欧各方沟通、理解、交流的平台，在具体问题的合作上，各方更为看重双边机制。

在中欧关系方面，近年来发展十分迅速。双方彼此需要，彼此合作的愿望迫切。欧盟已经成为中国第一大贸易伙伴，第二大技术供应方，第四大投资来源地。中国是欧盟的第二大贸易伙伴，仅次于美国。中国的发展离不开欧洲，欧洲也需要中国。尤其是中国的经济发展日益依赖出口，而欧盟内部经济发展面临许多结构性问题的情况下，双方彼此需要的愿望更加强烈。除了经济因素，中国和欧盟在反恐、环保、保障能源供应安全，防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散等国际性议题上，都有共同利益，需要彼此合作。此外，欧盟和中国都是维护地区和平的重要力量，都主张以和平手段解决国际问题，反对武力和单边主义。目前，中欧双方正在协商签署一份内容广泛的合作伙伴关系协定（PCA），以取代双方1985年签署的《贸易与经济合作协定》。新协定不仅包括经贸关系，而且涉及能源、环境、农业、交通、教育和科技等多个领域。从新协议涵盖的范围来看，中欧所共同关心的议题在不断增多。要推动中欧关系深化，双方必须在这些领域建立能够切实合作的制度平台，建立沟通、合作、磋商机制，确定双方共同面对的全球性问题的解决手段，合作机制不能像亚欧会议模式一样松散。双方需要合作领域的增加，为深化中欧关系创造了有利的客观条件，双方需要抓住机会充实合作内容。

同时，我们还看到，还有一些因素在阻碍双方关系的进一步深化。主要问题有两个，一是武器禁运问题。欧盟维持对华武器禁运被中方认为是政治歧视。目前，被欧盟列为武器禁运的国家为数不多，欧盟将中国与缅甸、津巴布韦等国同等对待，让中方难以接受。中欧双方曾提出解除武器禁运，欧盟2004年曾发出积极信号，准备在2005年的欧盟理事会上推动该问题的解决，但未能成功。解禁问题未能解决主要原因并不在于《反分裂国家法》，《反分裂国家法》不过是反对
解禁的借口，真正原因是美国因素的干扰。伊拉克战争后，欧美的行为表现出加强彼此协调的愿望，布什从第二届任期开始单边主义有所收敛，欧盟意识到解决国际问题仍然有求于美国。在对华关系上，欧美的关切有所不同。美国主要是从军事角度出发，担心由于解禁导致台海军事对比失衡，引发冲突。而欧盟对安全问题不像美方那样关切，欧盟主要担心的是解禁会损害到跨大西洋关系。从这个角度看，解禁问题成了欧盟维系大西洋关系的牺牲品。解决这个问题需要加强中美欧三方的沟通与协调。尤其是中国和欧盟需要共同努力消除美方的疑虑，让美国相信解禁不会危及台海安全。武器解禁后，取而代之的将会有武器出售准则，对中国出售武器仍将受到约束。欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐前不久也表示，解禁并不会导致欧盟成员国对华军售在数量上的增加和质量上的提高。

困扰双方关系的第二个问题是市场经济地位问题。市场经济地位问题是中欧经贸摩擦问题。欧盟对华贸易逆差大，2005年为1063亿欧元，几乎相当于欧盟全部的对外贸易逆差。市场经济地位是欧盟对中国实施反倾销制裁的一个重要工具，如果承认中国的市场经济地位，欧盟的反倾销政策将大打折扣。欧盟为中国获取市场经济地位设定了五条标准，如企业行为不受政府干预，由市场力量决定人民币汇率，使用国际通用的会计准则等。欧盟以中国尚不符合这些标准为由，不承认中国的市场经济地位。但欧盟却给予了俄罗斯市场经济地位。把中国和俄罗斯相比较会发现，问题的根本并不在于是否符合标准，而是中国经济增长对欧盟的巨大冲击力。欧盟认为，中国的产品严重冲击了欧盟的市场和就业，给欧盟造成了严重压力。近年来欧盟经济形势不好，对来自外部的竞争十分敏感，保护主义倾向抬头，甚至欧盟内部成员国之间也出现了相互自我保护的现象。鉴于中国竞争力的日益增强和欧盟的发展缓慢，市场经济地位问题目前难以解决。而且，欧盟还经济上还向中国提出了更多的要求。2006年10月，欧盟发表了首份对华贸易与投资文件，要求中国进一步开放市场，保护知识产权。双方经贸摩擦的解决有赖于双方大的经济环境的改善。从欧盟方面看，需要对劳动力市场和福利体制进行改革，加大创新领域的投入，推动产业结构转型，恢复经济活力。从中国方面看，中国仍是转型中的发展中国家，已经竭尽全力履行入世承诺，对于欧盟所提出要求的承受能力有限，短期内还难于满足欧盟的诸多要求。

Source: Eurostat