Us vs. Them in Central and Eastern Europe
Populism, the Refugee Other and the Re-Consideration of National Identity

JENNA ALTHOFF • VERONIKA JÓŹWIAK • RAHELA JURKOVIĆ • ANNA KYRIAzi • CHIARA MILAN • ED: ANDRÁS SZALAI
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- Jenna Althoff’s contribution uses quantitative methods to investigate how the media in two key states, Austria and Hungary, have contributed to the framing of the migration crisis. Specifically, she raises the crucial question which role media can play in turning migration into a security issue, thereby severely limiting the kind of policy answers that are imaginable.

- Veronika Jóźwiak offers a snapshot of how Poland, an EU member state that is hostile to migration despite not being its target, formulates a political coalition along the refugee issue. Largely focused on the Visegrád 4 group with vocal opponents of migration such as Hungary, this coalition will have a say in how the EU develops in the near future.

- Rahela Jurković’s analysis also offers a glimpse into how refugees see their difficult journey to Europe, as well as the societies they pass through. Using qualitative interviews, she contrasts the frequently hostile rhetoric of Croatian politicians with the deeply personal stories of refugees on their way to Austria.

- Anna Kyriazi is comparing the Greek bailout referendum on economic reform and the Hungarian migrant quota referendum on the relocation quotas proposed by the European Union. The study shows that populists on both end of the political spectrum can use growing Euroscepticism for political gains.

- Chiara Milan takes us back to the field: she finds that the refugee situation of 2015 has given birth to a remarkable strength of solidarity in the post-Yugoslav states of the Balkan route. The paper analyses the phenomenon and reveals the factors that fostered local solidarity initiatives.
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Preface
András Szalai

The European Union (EU) faced an unprecedented challenge in 2015. Commonly described as the migration crisis, a strong influx of refugees arrived to the continent. These refugees mostly came through the Balkan route, which spans from the Turkish-Greek border all the way to Austria and Germany. The sudden arrival of more than a million people put the EU and its member states under considerable political and administrative stress, producing a multitude of politicized—and in many cases securitized—narratives on what the crisis was about, and what was at stake. Disagreement has been mounting among member states, and to this day a common, union-wide policy answer is lacking.

The political and policy problem of mass migration will continue to present a significant test for European institutions, and is a worthy topic for academic investigation. However, the authors of this volume believe that an exclusive focus on the European Union on the one hand, and on the politicization of migration on the other, underplays the complexity of the issue and also keeps many important voices silent, most notably those of the refugees themselves. This limited, and in some sense navel-gazing approach to the issue at hand is already visible in the terminology that by now we have come to accept as: the “migration crisis”. Whose crisis is this complex, global phenomenon? Certainly not that of Europe alone. But even if we focus on Europe and the EU, is this a political, policy, institutional or humanitarian crisis? What is at stake here? And can we still refer to something as a crisis more than two years after it started?

The European political discourse around migration is even more limited than its academic counterpart. The current politics of migration can be seen as a framing war between two extreme narratives that often seem mutually exclusive, making common policy solutions hard to come by. One depicts migration – people are referred to as illegal migrants – towards Europe as a security problem, mostly connected to terrorism and an identity challenge to a perceived Christian European culture. This narrative opposes migration, advocates for stricter border control, and rejects multiculturalism. The other sees the migration issue – people are rather referred to as refugees – as a humanitarian crisis and emphasizes the moral responsibility of the nations of Europe towards refugees. In the past two years, EU member states have landed on one of these narratives, creating a new political cleavage that might have far-reaching consequences not only for migration policy, but also for the European integration project in general.

This publication seeks to offer a somber, analytical take beyond these stark divisions. It contains a collection of essays presented at the two conferences ‘Us vs. them: Populism, the Refugee Other and the Re-consideration of National Identity in Central and Eastern Europe’ and ‘An Occasional Alliance or a New Power in Europe? The V4’s Coalition Building along the Refugee Issue’ in 2017. They were organized together by the Center for European Neighborhood Studies at CEU and the regional project “Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe” of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Written by five scholars, the essays offer new ideas presented through the most up-to-date methods in political science and migration studies.

Anna Kyriazi’s study enables us to see some of the complexity of the migration issue, and its role in contemporary European politics. Comparing the recent referenda in Greece and Hungary, she shows that populists on both end of the political spectrum can use growing Euroskepticism for political gains. Though the Greek ballot was about economic reform, and the Hungarian about the relocation quotas proposed by the European Commission, the two campaigns leading up to the referenda show striking similarities. Thus, Kyriazi suggests that the discourse around the migration issue is not simply about tailoring effective and democratic policy responses to a well-defined problem, but also about the future of the European project itself.

Next, Chiara Milan takes us back to the field: she finds that the refugee situation of 2015 has given birth to a remarkable strength of solidarity in the post-Yugoslav states of the Balkan route. Her in-
In-depth analysis of the phenomenon reveals that two factors fostered local solidarity initiatives. First, the identification of the locals with the migrants, stemming from their personal experiences during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Second, the transitory nature of the phenomenon, which weakened the perception of migration as a threat to these societies.

Rahela Jurković’s analysis also offers a glimpse into how refugees see their difficult journey to Europe, as well as the societies they pass through. Using qualitative interviews, she contrasts the frequently hostile rhetoric of Croatian politicians with the deeply personal stories of refugees on their way to Austria.

Jenna Althoff’s contribution uses quantitative methods to investigate how the media in two key states, Austria and Hungary, have contributed to the framing of the migration crisis. Specifically, she raises the crucial question which role media can play in turning migration into a security issue, thereby severely limiting the kind of policy answers that are imaginable.

Finally, Veronika Jóźwiak offers a snapshot of how Poland, an EU member state that is hostile to migration despite not being its target, formulates a political coalition along the refugee issue. Largely focused on the Visegrád 4 group with vocal opponents of migration such as Hungary, this coalition will have a say in how the EU develops in the near future.

The structural forces that fuel migration towards Europe are here to say. The Balkan route may very well stay mostly closed for the foreseeable future, but the states of the European Union will have to accommodate the idea mass migration in some form. Such a complex issue demands complex answers, and the authors of this publication strongly believe that critical analysis and new ideas are the first necessary step.
Constructing National and Supranational Identities in Times of Crisis: A Comparison between the Greek “Bailout” Referendum and the Hungarian “Migrant Quota” Referendum
Anna Kyriazi

Abstract

This paper seeks to advance understanding of the recent rejuvenation of the idiom of nationalism and national self-determination in Europe, in conjunction with the increased appeal of populism as a political style. It does so by comparing two recent referendums challenging the European Union: the Greek “Bailout” Referendum and the Hungarian “Migrant Quota” Referendum. These instances of heightened mobilization represent points of entry into the broader problem of how political communities are constructed and imagined in times of eroding borders and increasing global interconnections. More specifically, the paper maps up and evaluates the positions and framing strategies employed by the major Greek and Hungarian political parties during the campaigns leading up to the ballots – similar in that they both posed a “challenge” to the European Union, but different in their focus on the economy and culture, respectively. I place special emphasis on the communication the two charismatic Prime Ministers who initiated the referendums, Alexis Tsipras (Syriza) in Greece and Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) in Hungary. I find that, despite their ideological distance and the different substantive issues at hand, their discursive and framing strategies were similar in that they evoked images of national grandeur and pride, using also a populist repertoire of expression. Further, neither Tsipras nor Orbán were unequivocally opposed to the idea of European integration. Instead, they employed a version of Euroskepticism that was supposed to make them (and their “people”) more rather than less “European”. I argue that this strategy can be best understood as an attempt to assert a positive identity in times of social and political upheaval with the aim of recovering “peripheral” countries’ place in the cultural – if not geographic, economic, or political – “core” of Europe.

Introduction

For decades, the majority of national referendums across Europe have endorsed European Union (EU) membership and treaties (Tilindyte 2016). However, in a recent round of consecutive ballots, the European cause has not fared as well as before. This tendency is symptomatic of the political conflict emerging under the shadow of the large-scale structural transformation engendered by the increasingly free movement of goods, capital, services, people, technology and information on a global scale. As the interdependence of states increases and borders become more porous, they also become more politicised (Kriesi et al. 2006). Accordingly, opposition to supranational integration in Europe (Euroscepticism), which was once a fringe phenomenon and typically the domain of the far left and right, has made inroads to the political mainstream, while also diffusing among the broader publics across the continent (Brack and Startin 2015).

Amidst the multiple crises facing Europe, from the financial meltdown to the refugee and migrant emergency, the idiom of nationalism and the idea of national self-determination have been rejuvenated, in tandem with the increased appeal of populism as a political style. Referendums, in particular, are especially well-suited for populist projects because they encompass, by design, some of the rudimentary elements of populism, including the apotheosis of the volonté general as well as a dichotomous view of complex issues (Mudde 2016; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). This makes EU-related referendums unique points of entry into the discursive construction of political communities in the context of European re-structuration, which constitutes the broader theoretical problem this paper explores. Specifically, the paper presents the frame analysis of two national ballots, the referendum to decide whether Greece was to accept the bailout conditions proposed by the Troika (commonly referred to as the “bailout” referendum), held in July 2015, and the referendum related to the EU’s migrant relocation plans in Hungary (the so-called “migrant quota” referendum), held in October 2016. Through the lens of the campaigns leading up to these ballots it is possible to map
up and evaluate the various domestic reactions to the erosion of national sovereignty. Moreover, since the Greek case centred on the economy and the Hungarian one around culture, this pair of cases offers an opportunity to examine whether group discourses differ depending on the overarching issue category in question, and if yes, how.

I find that the discursive and framing strategies of the two actors calling referendums (Syriza in Greece and Fidesz in Hungary), though rooted in nationalist and populist imagery, were generally not opposed to the idea of European integration. However, they expressed a version of Euroscepticism that is supposed to make those who propagate it more rather than less "European", while the meaning of the term itself was adapted to the particular structural circumstances of Hungary and Greece, as well as the political strategies and ideologies of Fidesz and Syriza. Even though this pattern is close to reformist or "soft" Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001), it constitutes a project of a different kind. For it does not seek to improve the EU, but rather, to redefine it, with the aim of recovering peripheral countries’ place in the cultural – if not geographic, economic, or political – core of Europe. It does so by using the symbolic imagery of national valour and grandeur, such as the trope of "the birthplace of democracy" in Greece or the "bulwark of Christianity" in Hungary, with the aim of casting the "nation" as the repository of "true European values" and, ultimately, asserting a positive identity in times of social and political upheaval. The paper also suggests that varieties of Euroscepticism are regionally patterned and that therefore analyses of opposition to European integration based on European macro-regions constitute a fruitful avenue for research.

Between integration and demarcation

The project of European unification has sought to de-couple political from national identities (Díez Medrano 2003). However, nations and nationalism are anything but disappearing. The pressures of globalization and regional integration are still predominantly dealt with domestically, and – despite transfers of sovereignty and interdependence – the nation-state remains firmly rooted as the primary locus of political authority. The emerging cleavage between the "losers" and the "winners" of this restructuring – those who favour demarcation (fixing boundaries and limiting cross-national flows) as opposed to integration, respectively – is likewise assimilated in the existing patterns of political competition on the level of the nation-state (Kriesi et al. 2006).

The actors that respond to the political potential created by the "losers" of globalization are typically located on the far left and right of the political spectrum, reaching, however, increasingly also to the mainstream. Despite isomorphic positions, these actors’ opposition to European integration has different underlying rationales. Namely, the far left tends to challenge the EU’s neoliberal bias advocating economic and social protectionism against the exploitation of the working class. This stance sometimes mixes with nationalism, as an objection, for example, to great powers meddling in domestic affairs to satisfy imperialist ambitions (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). The far right, conversely, is most uncomfortable with the changing image of the nation as a cultural unit, and therefore vocally opposed to cultural forms of competition and identity-threat, including also the diffusion of liberal values and attitudes (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). This is typically associated with anti-immigrant and anti-minority positions as well as economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism.

Another distinctive attribute of these political formations is a populist political style. Populism constitutes "a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be the expression of the volonté general [...]" (Mudde 2016, 68). Given their endorsement of direct democracy, popular sovereignty and majority rule, populist actors are enthusiastic supporters also of referendums, which seem, in turn, to benefit populist projects (Cano-van 1999; see also: Qvortrup 2013; Mendez et al. 2014). By focusing on a single issue, referendums lead to intensive, dichotomous framing, encouraging identity-politics. Moreover, referendums also
augment the voice of otherwise marginal players, offering them a seat at the table and granting them disproportionate, for their electoral numbers, visibility.

Tangentially to the said large-scale structural change and the growing appeal of populism are crisis dynamics. Namely, the multiple crises that were initiated by the Great Recession of 2008 led to the destabilization of the existing patterns of party competition (Hutter and Kriesi forthcoming). Furthermore, the way the integration/demarcation conflict plays out depends on contextual characteristics too, including the distinctive geopolitical vulnerability of small states located in the European periphery (Brubaker 2017). This is not to suggest that populism, nationalism, and Euroscepticism only prevail in these regions (Leconte 2015). But it is reasonable to expect that the legacies of peripheral development and patterns of uneven modernization contribute to anti-integration backlashes, especially in times of social and political upheaval.

Referendums challenging the EU: a growing trend?

Since 1972, 56 referendums relating to European integration have been held in Europe (including ballots in neighbouring EFTA countries) on EU membership, ratification of treaties and various policy issues (Tilindyte 2016). Table 1 lists the most recent referendums that took place in the past three years posing an EU-related question. Among these only the Danish referendum of February 2014 yielded a pro-EU result. All other cases are examples of national referendums challenging the EU, or, in the extreme case of Great Britain, rejecting membership in it altogether. Governments make use of referendums to a varying degree, whose rules also differ greatly, depending on the domestic institutional structure and other variables, which, however, fall outside of the scope of this paper.

Taking a closer look on the results of these ballots, it is noteworthy that three out of the six referendums with a negative – for the EU – outcome, were almost tied, with slightly more voters favouring the option of not endorsing the EU line in Switzerland, Denmark and the UK. Arguably, as evidenced by polls, the results could have gone either way in all three cases. The difference is larger in the case of the Dutch referendum on the EU’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% of votes contrary to EU line</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Invalid/blank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary: Mandatory migrant relocation quotas</td>
<td>Oct 2016</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK: EU membership</td>
<td>Jun 2016</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands: Association agreement with Ukraine</td>
<td>Apr 2016</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark: Opt-outs from the EU</td>
<td>Dec 2015</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece: Bailout conditions</td>
<td>Jul 2015</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland: EU-Switzerland free movement agreement</td>
<td>Feb 2014</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark: Unified Patent Court membership</td>
<td>Feb 2014</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. National referendums on issues with EU consequences
association agreement with Ukraine, where the majority of voters rejected the agreement.

The two remaining referendums listed in Table 1 were held in Hungary and Greece and offer an excellent opportunity for comparison, given their temporal proximity as well as the large difference with which the EU challengers won (though the Hungarian referendum was invalid due to low turnout). Hungary and Greece are the only peripheral countries to have held an EU-related referendum in the past three years. Further, these referendums were in both cases initiated by governments arguing that they had arrived to a point of indissoluble disagreement with their European partners: the right-wing Fidesz in Hungary and the left-wing Syriza in Greece, both generally labelled populist in the related literature (Enyedi 2015; Pappas and Aslanidis 2015). Additional similarities can be found in the institutional structures and party-systems of the two states, which Pappas (2015) has termed “populist democracies” (for further similarities, see also: Kyriazi 2016). Note-worthy is the strikingly high number of invalid or blank votes, making up approximately 6 per cent in both cases. The motives underlying this behaviour are complex and would merit a treatment on their own. It is, however, plausible that abstention and blank votes can be taken as criticism of the incumbent and should be interpreted as pro-EU behaviour. They can also be a result of the contested and ambivalent discourse of the Syriza and Fidesz. Alternatively, they might signal that the range of concerns raised in relation to both ballots, about whether such issues should be put to a referendum as well as the wording of the questions themselves, might have been justified.

In terms of dissimilarities, while the two ballots were framed in explicitly European terms, they revolved around different issues: the migrant and refugee emergency in Hungary and the economy in Greece. The comparison between the two offers, therefore, an opportunity to map the different patterns of opposition to and support for European integration within and between countries as well as across the broad issue categories of culture and the economy. This issue choice is not unrelated to the political ideologies of Fidesz and Syriza, located on the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, which is also an important difference to keep in mind.

Framing Europe

This study fits into a line of research that explores cross-national variation in the ways political actors frame “Europe”, as well as the causes and consequences of such framing (e.g. Diez Medrano 2006; Kriesi 2007; Grande et al. 2016). Frames direct attention to the relevance not only of issue positions, but also of the ways meaning is created and mental processes are organized. A frame is a conceptual tool that orders perception and interpretation (Goffman 1972; Lakoff 2009) by emphasizing one among many potential perspectives on an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007). Through framing people develop a particular conceptualization of a problem and/or (re)orient their thinking about it (Ibid., 104). Political actors actively construct and promote certain types of frames in order to improve their position in political competitions (Hanggli and Kriesi 2012).

My analysis of the referendum campaigns in Greece and Hungary is exploratory. I want to allow for frames, arguments and other discursive elements to emerge freely from the data. That said, I do have some general expectations deriving from the existing literature and from ad hoc observations prior to systematic analysis. First, I expect to find orientations on European integration ranging between two options: one that is sympathetic (Europhilic) and one that is not (Euro sceptic). I define Euroscepticism broadly as a stance that opposes European unification (ranging from categorical rejection to partial or qualified opposition) and puts the national interest above European solidarity (Taggart 1998; Conti 2003; Rovny 2004; Vasilopoulou 2013). Second, I hypothesize that mainstream parties will generally advocate the former, while parties located at the fringes of the political spectrum the latter option. Third, I expect that left wing actors will favour more economic framing than right wing actors, as the latter’s espoused ideology makes them more prone to cast politics in terms of national identity and culture. Finally, I also anticipate cross-case variation to be associ-
ated with cultural traditions and historical experiences in each context.

I begin by discussing the two referendum campaigns successively, first in Greece, and then in Hungary, presenting the positions and framing strategies of political parties, captured through publicly-available mass media and party documents. While I also briefly refer to extra-parliamentary actors, who have been vocal especially in Hungary, the main focus is on parties with representation in parliament at the time of the campaigns. I also zoom in on the framing strategies employed by the two prime ministers (PMs) calling for the referendums: Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Alexis Tsipras in Greece. Specifically, I perform in-depth text analysis on a corpus composed by three highly publicized key discursive events in each case: the speech in which the PMs announced the referendums, the speech in which they evaluated the results, and one additional address, each taking place during the campaign, which in my judgment epitomizes their rhetoric. For Tsipras this is the speech he delivered in Syntagma Square at a massive rally, for Orbán this is his yearly “State of the Nation” address (for specific information, see the Appendix). All translations are mine.

The Greek "bailout referendum"

Background

In Summer 2015, in the fifth year of crisis management and austerity in Greece, negotiations between the Syriza-led government and the Troika about the conditions of the country’s third bailout agreement had reached a deadlock. In the early morning of June 27 Alexis Tsipras called for a referendum on the bailout offer to be held on the 5th of July the same year. Following Tsipras’ announcement the Eurozone rejected the request to extend the bailout and the European Central Bank refused to raise the country’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance, the result being bank closures and the imposition of capital controls. The same day Parliament voted on the government’s proposed bailout referendum, with Syriza, ANEL and Golden Dawn in favour and Pasok, ND, River and KKE against (for the full names and the positions of these parties, see Table 2). PASOK, POTAMI and ND voiced legality concerns against the referendum, as did the Greek Bar Association. Greece’s highest court dismissed these objections only two days before the referendum was held.

The ballot brought a landslide victory for the “No” camp. The majority of voters (over 61 percent) rejected the bailout conditions, while turnout was relatively high (63 percent) despite the sudden announcement and the short campaigning period. This led to the resignation of opposition leader Antonis Samaras as the president of ND. Unexpectedly, the minister of finance, Yanis Varoufakis, was also removed from office. In the meantime, negotiations with the Troika resumed, and by mid-July the Greek government accepted a bailout package containing very similar measures to those rejected in the referendum. Changes occurred also inside Syriza. On August 21, 25 MPs left Syriza to establish Popular Unity (PU), criticizing the government for ignoring the popular verdict. Tsipras called for snap elections in September, which he eventually won, while PU did not pass the electoral threshold. Though to form a government Syriza entered into a coalition agreement again with the right-wing populist ANEL, overall the party came out stronger from the episode of the referendum, now rid of those MPs who had persistently voted against its proposals beforehand (Altiparmakis undated).

The campaign

In the short and intense referendum campaign the government coalition (SYRIZA, ANEL), the far right (GD) and the far left (KKE) mobilized in favour of the “No” result, while mainstream, Europhile forces (PASOK, ND, River) campaigned in favour of the “Yes” outcome (see Table 2).

The No camp

The two right-wing parties advocating for the “No” framed this choice in populist-nationalist terms, the difference being in the intensity of their rhetoric rather than in substance. A central reference in ANEL’s discourse was national pride and self-determination:
“[...] the dilemma is between national dignity or relinquishing the national independence of our homeland [...]. Against every effort we made, on the other side the message they wanted to send is that they will humiliate a whole people and a whole country. That they will abolish the Europe of nations. The Greek people will give the answer with a “no” on July 5th. With the same “no” that Tassos Papadopoulos replied to the Annan Plan, with the same “no” that the Greeks said in 1940. The history of this place was written only with “no-s.”

The party’s reference to “the Europe of nations” is a typical way to frame opposition to European integration on grounds of national independence – also alluded to in the party’s name. ANEL cast the referendum predominantly in terms of national identity, citing what are commonly understood as historical examples of heroic resistance to great but malevolent powers (the Cyprus reunification plan and the ultimatum whose rejection initiated the Greco-Italian war in 1940), presenting defiance as the essence of “Greekness”.

Like ANEL, the ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn unequivocally positioned itself in the “No” camp, referring to national self-determination, but using more radical language than ANEL. In a proclamation2, party leader Nikos Michaloliakos phrased this as follows:

“Golden Dawn will say NO, will say NO to national submission, will say NO to the Memorandum, will say NO to the Junker proposal. [...] The ‘yes’ in the referendum will be, in fact, a ‘yes’ to submission, a ‘yes’ to placing our Fatherland to the mercy of foreign usurers.” (emphasis in the original)

Table 1: Background information for the Greek “bailout referendum”

| Question | “Should the agreement plan submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund to the Eurogroup of 25 June 2015, and comprised of two parts which make up their joint proposal, be accepted? The first document is titled “Reforms For The Completion Of The Current Program And Beyond” and the second “Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election results</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Invalid/Blank</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2,245,537</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3,558,450</td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid/Blank</td>
<td>357,153</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>6,161,140</td>
<td>(63%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The positions of Greek parliamentary parties on the “bailout referendum”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No camp</th>
<th>Yes camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)</td>
<td>Centre-left to left-wing (government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Greeks (ANEL)</td>
<td>Right-wing (coalition partner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Dawn (GD)</td>
<td>Far right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party (KKE)</td>
<td>Far left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Michaloliakos also called the Greeks to resist the subjection of Greece to “English law”, arguing that this would transform the country into a “debt colony”. His discourse blended together economic-utilitarian and cultural-identitarian elements, but the latter clearly predominated. It was from the national condition that all other arguments derived, making the involvement of any foreign powers in domestic policy-making perverse: “Only the Greeks can save Greece.” – he asserted.

The thematic of foreign domination was also present in the discourse of the KKE, but in this case the capitalist boss replaced the ultra-nationalist image of the usurer. Faithful to its constant position and arguments, KKE associated the EU with notions such as “capital” and “capitalism”, “monopoly” and “dominion”. The party’s message remained focused on class struggle and the economic hardship facing Greeks, juxtaposing the martyrdom of the ordinary people to the powerful interests of elites, with which the EU was equated: “The Greek people have to shout out more decisively: WE WILL NOT LIVE IN POVERTY – WE HAVE SHED ENOUGH BLOOD FOR PLUTOCRACY – LET IT BE OVER, WE DO NOT TRUST YOU, WE CAN DO IT WITHOUT YOU” – reads the Central Committee’s declaration regarding the referendum3 (emphasis in the original).

Yes camp

ND, the largest opposition party in the country, led by former PM Antonis Samaras attacked the referendum as unconstitutional and depicted it as a ballot not on the conditions of the bailout, but on membership in the EU and the Eurozone. ND based its campaign on cautioning about the unpredictable, at minimum, and catastrophic, at maximum, consequences of an imminent ‘Grexit,’ criticizing Syriza in the harshest terms. In doing so, ND put forth some economic arguments in favour of a “Yes” vote, referring for example to the benefits of EU structural funds and subsidies. But despite the economic nature of the issue, cultural-identitarian references were overwhelming. Samaras sought to connect the Greek national essence with Europeanness. He argued that Greece’s EU membership was a historic accomplishment:

“For us, European identity is an achievement of Greece, the most important achievement for this place after the restoration of democracy. Inclusion in the Euro fully assures our European identity. Why, then, are you bringing national division upon this precious national element when there are nations […] who are anxious and struggling and fighting to join the European Union?”4

This framing depicted the EU as a protective and cooperative force; it was the government that endangered the national interest: the “lobby of the Drachma” leading the country towards “Armageddon; a Biblical catastrophe without precedent in times of peace.”

PASOK positioned itself also in the “Yes” camp: “We say a non-negotiable ‘yes’ to the euro, ‘yes’ to the country’s European prospects, ‘yes’ to Europe.”5 Similar to New Democracy, PASOK harshly criticized Syriza for being irresponsible. As a socialist party, PASOK attempted to detach its endorsement of the “Yes” from the concrete bailout proposal, casting the referendum as a ballot not about austerity but about the country’s future in the EU. However, PASOK was also more critical of the creditors than ND, referring to the “neoliberal obsessions of certain conservative circles” while also touching on issues of national pride: the need to “change the relationships in Europe” and “the equal and active participation of Greece in Europe and the Eurozone.” It is noteworthy, however, that PASOK made use of cultural-identitarian frames only to a very limited extent, casting the referendum in an almost purely economic-utilitarian light.

Similar to New Democracy and PASOK, River, a small centrist party framed the question of the referendum as “yes or no to the European Union,

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3 Announcement of the KKE Central Committee on the referendum, 28 June 2015, available online at: https://www.902.gr/edidis/politiki/70482/diaikiyo-kes-ke-toy-kke-gia-ti-diorganos-toy-dmopsifmatos

4 Excerpts from Antonis Samaras’ speech at the plenary session of the Greek National Assembly, 27 June 2015 (minutes available online at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriasis-Obomeleias?sessionRecord=a9243dc6-b448-428a-addb-a4c500479316)

5 Statement of PASOK regarding the referendum, 29 June 2015, available online at: http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=717960
yes or no to the Euro’. In a confrontational, provocative style, party leader Stavros Theodorakis used both economic and cultural frames to argue in favour of the “Yes.”6 Uniquely among all parties discussed in this paper, he evoked the stereotype of Greece as a small, weak, backward country, backsliding to the troubles that only with the help of the EU it had been able to surpass.

“In the past few hours thousands of boys and thousands of girls, who until yesterday did not have anything to do with politics, are coming forth today saying “enough!” This is the “ERASMUS” generation. It is the generation that has learned to look at the map and to not see borders. What are we, then, going to tell these kids? That they are now losing Europe, but that there remains the Balkans? And that in a few years you will have to beg for a positive vote from Skopje and Albania to get a little help for Greece.”

The image of a borderless Europe is a clear reference to integration as the only path forward.

The Hungarian “migrant quota” referendum

Background

The Fidesz government initiated a referendum related to the EU’s migrant relocation plans, which was held in Hungary on October 2, 2016. While an overwhelming majority of voters rejected the quotas, turnout was too low to make the poll valid (see Box 2). More specifically, Hungary was supposed to receive 1294 refugees as per the agreement of the EU’s interior ministers a year before, in September 2015. According to this plan 120,000 asylum seekers were to be relocated over two years from the frontline states Italy, Greece and Hungary to all other EU countries. Hungary did not approve of this plan, and appealed first to the European Court of Justice. In February 2016, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced that Hungary would hold a referendum on whether to accept the EU’s plan.

Fidesz and KDNP7 lawmakers passed the initiative in parliament on May 10, 2016 also with the support of Jobbik, while the majority of left-wing opposition boycotted the plenary session.

Four unsuccessful appeals were made to the Constitutional Court against the referendum. Even though turnout (at 44 percent) was too low for the results to be valid, a remarkable 3.4 million people voted for the “No”. Moreover, while turnout was worse than expected, it was generally in line with the general tendency of the electorate not to show up to vote in referendums. Still, the low turnout warns not to overestimate the success of Fidesz, given that most opposition parties advocated for a boycott. Further, invalid ballots reached 6 percent, higher than ever. While not necessarily endorsing the Europhile position, a large number of voters saw casting an invalid vote as an opportunity for self-expression and resistance to the politics of Fidesz, prompted also by the extra-parliamentary joke party Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (TTDP), to which I return below. In the aftermath of the referendum the popularity of parties changed moderately, with Fidesz gaining and the far right Jobbik (the largest opposition party) conceding a few percentage points. During the long campaign xenophobic and racist attitudes peaked in the country; nonetheless, the Hungarian public remains generally pro-EU (Bíró-Nagy 2017, p. 39 ff.)

The campaign

As Table 3 shows, the “No” campaign was led by the right-wing Fidesz-KDNP and the far right Jobbik, while the opposition encouraged voters to boycott the referendum.

The No Camp

Having announced the ballot, the Fidesz-led Hungarian government initiated a campaign against both refugees and “Brussels”, which the party communicated predominantly in the idiom of nationalism. The government set up giant billboards with messages challenging the EU’s authority to impose resettlement quotas ("Let’s send the mes-

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6 Excerpts from Stavros Theodorakis’ speech at the plenary session of the Greek National Assembly, 27 June 2015 (minutes available online at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?sessionRecord=a9243dcb-b448-428a-ad4b-a4c500479316)

7 The Christian democratic KDNP is Fidesz’s permanent coalition partner, but it does not have an electoral presence of its own (Bátory 2010).
sage to Brussels so that they finally get it!). The campaign also included xenophobic vilification of migrants and refugees, with billboards featuring messages such as: “Did you know? More than 300 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in Europe since the start of the migrant crisis”, “Did you know? Brussels wants the forced resettling of a city’s worth of illegal immigrants into Hungary”, and “Did you know? Since the start of the immigration crisis, sexual harassment of women has increased in Europe?” Moving closer to the date of the referendum, fear mongering continued, with posters painted in national tri-colour calling Hungarians not to “jeopardize” Hungary’s future, and to vote “No”. Before returning to the discourse of Viktor Orbán in a separate section below I first provide an overview of the positions of the major political parties regarding the referendum.

Beyond Fidesz, Jobbik also welcomed the ballot and unequivocally positioned itself on the “No” side, given its ownership of the issues of cultural diversity, opposition to European integration and law and order. True to its ultranationalist-populist ideology the party framed the referendum as pertaining to national identity, legitimacy and self-determination, interweaving it also with the purported threat that migration poses to the integrity of the nation. Expressing a typical Eurosceptic stance, Jobbik spokesperson Ádám Mirkóczki stated that his party opposes the mandatory resettlement quotas just as it opposes “every senseless dictate coming from Brussels.”

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8 Reaction to the announcement of the quota referendum, 6 July 2016, available online at: https://jobbik.hu/hireink/reagalas-kiirasara
US VS. THEM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE – POPULISM, THE REFUGEE OTHER AND THE RE-CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Yes/boycott/invalid

The MLP, a minor political force, was the only one to directly advocate for the "Yes". In an open letter⁹ written to the left-liberal opposition, party-leader Gábor Fodor argued along mainly economic lines, warning that the Hungarian economy would sink "immediately into crisis without EU funds" referring also to the free movement of people for work and study as the advantages of EU membership. The party argued for the necessity to "stand up for European values, Hungary’s belonging to Europe, European solidarity." Apart from such generic messages the party’s campaign mainly focused on conveying an anti-Orbán, anti-Fidesz message. It accused the government of "putting the future of Hungary and Europe in jeopardy" for domestic political gains. MLP’s strategy was criticized on the grounds that it was legitimizing the unacceptable, for many, question posed by the government.

This is why most opposition parties advocated boycotting the referendum, which was framed as a vote about Hungary’s belonging to the EU. The centre-left PM conveyed a message of solidarity and mutual obligation, both towards the EU and refugees, while also criticizing the Fidesz-led government: "If you are fed up with being treated as a fool as well as being exploited, then on October 2nd, instead of going to vote, come and protest with us for a solidary, European Hungary, without aggression and corruption!" Together campaigned along with PM and the Modern Hungary Movement (MOMA) a conservative-liberal formation without parliamentary representation. The three parties’ joint slogan was "Who stays at home, votes for Europe."⁸

Similar to PM, Together argued as follows:

“[E]ven though the European Union currently is not perfect, it is in the interest of the Hungarian nation to build with it an ever closer connection and to work together in order to make it better. It is necessary to work for a European Union that is able to protect everyone from such a power as the Prime Minister’s oppressive and corrupt governance.”¹²

Framing the EU as a protector of Hungarian democracy expresses a strong current among Hungarians who tend to have more trust in European than domestic institutions.¹³

MSZP also propagated boycotting the referendum, framing the country’s EU membership as an important historical achievement that should not be lightly thrown away:

“Our parents and grandparents secretly listened to Free Europe Radio, and back in those days they were secretly dreaming of the Europe that radio broadcast stood for. It is as if today these young men were throwing away the dreams of their parents and grandparents, as if they were trying to drive the country out of the EU.”¹⁴

The assessment of Ferenc Gyurcsány, former PM and leader of the DK, another left-wing opposition party was that the referendum served as a distraction from the country’s “real” problems. He criticized Fidesz for distancing the country from the EU. He called the electorate to repudiate fear, since “[i]t is inconceivable for a thousand-year-old Hungary to be frightened by a couple of thousand ill-fated people.” Expressing a unequivocally pro-European stance, he argued that:

“Hungary is our country, and Europe is our home. [...] Europe is an incredibly strong cultural community that needs a similarly strong common political institution system. I am not afraid that sooner or later we will have a European government and a European prime minister.”

¹³ Eurobarometer data show that trust in the European Commission and the European Parliament in the country is much higher (even though its has decreased slightly) than trust in the national government and parliament.
¹⁴ Statement of MSZP party leader Gyula Molnár, 9 July 2016, available online at: http://mszp.hu/hir/a_kvotanepszavazas_buta_uzenet_brusszelnek
LMP was not entirely clear on its position, though months after the announcement of the referendum party-leaders, Bernadett Szél and Ákos Hadházy, declared that they would not go to vote, arguing that "both the quota system and the referendum against it are bad solutions."16

Though not a parliamentary party, the counter-campaign launched by the joke political party Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (TTDP) should also be mentioned. The TTDP urged voters to cast invalid ballots. This organization printed out more than 100,000 posters in various versions and exhibited them throughout the country. Among the most memorable of these were the Did you know? billboards and posters that featured exaggerated versions of the government campaign, reducing Fidesz’s nationalist arguments to absurdity (Did you know? During the Olympics, the biggest danger to Hungarian participants came from foreign competitors.), drawing parallels between refugees and Hungarian emigrants (Did you know? 1 million Hungarians want to emigrate to Europe.) or conveying a humanitarian message (Did you know? There is war in Syria). Various NGOs as well as the Hungarian Helsinki Committee also advocated for invalid, referring the government campaign as ‘senseless’ and ‘inhuman’.17

Syriza and Fidesz: More European then the Europeans

The protagonists of the two referendum campaigns were without doubt the two charismatic PMs, Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Alexis Tsipras in Greece. It was they who initiated the referendums, arguing that further dialogue with the countries’ European partners was not possible and that therefore it was up to the people to decide whether they should accept the policy advocated by the EU or not.

Tsipras argued that a ‘No’ vote would strengthen the Greek negotiating position, sending a strong signal to creditors that the Greek society opposes austerity and the terms of the bailout, but not Europe itself. He denied multiple times that the referendum was about the country’s membership in the EU and the Eurozone (which was the assessment of his critics both domestically and abroad). This ambiguity was, to a large extent, part of a deliberate strategy: Tsipras avoided taking a position in either the pro-European or the anti-European camp, forging a third intermediate option. As the word-cloud in Figure 1 and the word frequency table (Table 4) show, Tsipras put a great emphasis on the “will” of the Greek people, as required by democracy and justice. “Dignity”, the regaining of Greece’s lost esteem was also a salient theme in his speeches. Tsipras framed the “No” vote not as a rejection of European ideals, but as their rejuvenation. According to his narrative, the brave defiance of the Greeks would bring back Europe to its lost principles: democracy, social justice and solidarity. To convey his message, Tsipras often made historical references, evoking the image of “Greece as the birthplace of democracy” and “cradle of European civilization”, in statements such as this: “[…] on Sunday, we are not deciding about staying in Europe. We are deciding about living with dignity in Europe, working and prospering in Europe. And believe me, no one has the right to threaten us that they will cut Greece off from its natural, geographical home. No one has the right to threaten, to divide Europe. Greece, our country, was, is and will remain the cradle of European civilization. According to mythology, it was from this very place that Zeus abducted Europe. It is from this very place that the austerity technocrats want to abduct Europe again. NO. We tell them NO on Sunday. We will not leave Europe in the hands of those who want to abduct it from its democratic tradition.”

Note the ambiguity deriving from the various uses, literal and metaphorical, of the word ‘Europe’: as a political community, a physical location, a civilizational unit, and a mythological figure. Greece, it is implied, has not simply the right, but the moral obligation, to salvage Europe, depicted as a vulnerable woman, subject to the whims of an almighty

16 http://index.hu/belfold/2016/07/27/az_lmp_vezetoi_bojkottaljak_orban_kvotanepszavazasat/
17 http://kettosmerce.blog.hu/2016/09/14/22_civil_szervezet_keri_a_polgaroktol_szavazzanak_ervenytelenul_vagy_bojkottaljak_a_nepsza_vazast
aggressor. The capitalized “No” has a special importance in the Greek context, where every year the nation celebrates Ohi Day (the day of the No), commemorating the rejection by Ioannis Metaxas of the ultimatum made by Benito Mussolini in 1940 demanding the cession of Greek territory. The allusion to the Second World War subtly invokes the memory not only of Greek heroic resistance, but also of foreign, and especially German, aggression. Tsipras’ oft reference to the “ultimatum” posed by the European partners wilfully fed into this frame, in quotes like the one below:

“Following five months of tough negotiations, our partners submitted a proposal-ultimatum at the Eurogroup meeting, taking aim at Greek democracy and the Greek people. An ultimatum that contravenes Europe’s founding principles and values. The values of our common European project.”

Similar to Tsipras, Orbán also had a lot to say about the “people” and their “will” (see Figure 1 and Table 4). Unlike Tsipras, however, he made much fewer references to “democracy”, using the words “referendum” and “decision”, instead. Orbán argued that “the quotas would redraw the ethnic, cultural and religious map of Hungary and of Europe” and that “neither the EU, nor Brussels, nor the leaders of Europe have the authority to do this.” He casted the Fidesz-led government, specifically, and Hungary, more generally, as safeguarding European values, which he defined through a list of binary oppositions:

“Europe is where Christian, free and independent nations coexist. Common roots, common values, common history, geographic and geopolitical interdependence. Equality between men and women, freedom and responsibility, fair competition and solidarity, pride and humility, justice and mercy. This is us, this is Europe. Europe is Hellas, not Persia; Rome and not Carthage; Christianity and not the Caliphate.”

The purported civilizational clash and inherent incompatibility between the Hungarians and the refugees was complemented by a second fault line, that between the European elites and the European people:

“[…] in Brussels and some European capitals the political and intellectual elite see themselves as citizens of the world — in contrast to the majority of people, who have a strong sense of nationhood […] This means that the real problem is not outside Europe, but inside Europe. Those who do most to endanger the future of Europe are not those who want to come here, but the political, economic and intellectual leaders who are trying to reshape Europe against the will of the people of Europe. This is how, for the planned transport to Europe of many millions of migrants, there came into existence the most bizarre coalition in world history: the people smugglers, the human rights activists and Europe’s top leaders.”

Despite the critical tone, however, Orbán’s discourse was based on concept stretching and ambiguity rather than unequivocal opposition to the EU. Instrumental in this was the strategic use of the word “Europe” in positive contexts and “Brussels” whenever criticism was in order, in phrases such as: “The impotence of Brussels is causing increasing chaos.” and “We cannot afford to allow Brussels to place itself above the law.” As aforementioned, Orbán made relatively few references to democracy, and when he did, this was at times accompanied with a subtle edge of irony, as in the following excerpt:

“I suggest that we rely on the ancient source of European democracy: the will of the people. […] After all, the European Union is based on the foundations of democracy. This means that we must not make decisions which will dramatically change people’s lives without consulting people and against their will.”
Stop words (articles, propositions, etc.) have been filtered out from this list as they convey little semantic information. Note, however, that the word “will” in the English language is used as both a noun (“the will of the people”) and an auxiliary verb (“we will decide”). As it is impossible, with this methodology, to distinguish between the two variants, Table 4 lists both, which explains the high frequency of this word. I have also filtered out from the Orbán speeches the expression “ladies and gentlemen”, which, due to its frequent repetition, distorted the results.

Table 4. List of most frequently used words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alexis Tsipras, Greece</th>
<th>Viktor Orbán, Hungary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek/Greece</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe/European</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>will*</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>people</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>democracy/democratic</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>today</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>citizen</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>want</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>austerity</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dignity</td>
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<tr>
<td>decide</td>
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<td>justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>time</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>ultimatum</td>
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<tr>
<td>celebrate</td>
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<tr>
<td>proposal</td>
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<td>social</td>
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<td>history</td>
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<td>crisis</td>
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<td>country</td>
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<td>negotiation</td>
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</table>
Such passages demonstrate Orbán’s strategy to discursively conflate democratic legitimacy with the will of the nation, as well as to naturalize as common-sense an actually narrow vision of shared European cultural identity, while casting his government as the protector of both.

Discussion

(1) Two positions but three main frames on Europe and European integration

Referendums typically demand a choice between two alternatives. However, the ways this choice can be framed are multiple. This paper has uncovered three broad frames pertaining to European integration through the lens of two referendums on EU matters. The first stance is the typical example of principled opposition to the EU as a supranational neo-liberal project, framed as harmful to the national interest. Consistent also with the findings of Halikiopoulou et al. 2012, this way of thinking is propagated by both the far left and the far right and gains expression in tropes such as the “Europe of nations” (ANEL and GD in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary) or resistance to imperialist and capitalist exploitation (KKE). Confirming my initial expectation, the frames employed by these formations are typically cultural, except from KKE that put forth predominantly economic arguments against the EU. In that discourse, too, identity plays a role, based not on culture, but class.

In the second family belong conventional Europhile views that typically convey an enthusiastic approval of European integration, but that can also be combined with some degree of criticism towards the EU. As expected, centrist mainstream parties voiced such positions, framing Europe as a positive force, typically the guarantor of democracy and prosperity. The most Europhile among all parties discussed in this paper is the Greek River, framing Europe as a “civilizing” force, while criticizing Greek backwardness and the ruinous tradition of populist politics that can only be overcome through the imitation of Western European models of good governance and economic orthodoxy.

The third type of framing is linked to the actors initiating the referendums, the Fidesz and Syriza-led governments. Constrained by the European partners and their own electorates, both refused to unequivocally position themselves either as Eurosceptic or Europhile. Rather than a wholesale rejection of the European idea, their campaigns reflected a desire for a more equitable form of discourse and treatment and, even, a claim that they will lead Europe back to its – variably defined but invariably presented as lost – values and ideals.

(2) The interweaving of cultural-identitarian and the economic-utilitarian frames

Another key finding relates specifically to the use of cultural-identitarian as opposed to economic-utilitarian framing. On the one hand, as expected, populist-nationalist parties, including Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary and ANEL and GD in Greece framed the referendums in nationalist terms, irrespective of whether the question was about border control or the economy. On the other hand, parties on the left (KKE in Greece and MSZP in Hungary) cast the campaigns in a predominantly economic-utilitarian light.

Further, it is also noteworthy that ND and River in Greece also framed their pro-EU positions predominantly in terms of national identity, which corroborates the findings of Grande et al. (2016) that the populist right does not exclusively own cultural-identitarian frames. Most interesting is the interweaving of economic and cultural issues, which is a common characteristic of the discourse of both Syriza and Fidesz. Thus, while the Fidesz campaign revolved around the familiar tropes of the preservation of the culture and values of Hungary as well as Europe, averting an all-encompassing existential threat and so on, Syriza also employed cultural and historical references to convince Greeks regarding an economic issue.

(3) Nationalist and historical references on both the left and the right

This brings me to my third and final point about the use of profound symbolism and national imagery that both Tsipras and Orbán draw on. In the first case, this was predominantly the trope of "Greece
as the birthplace of democracy” and “cradle of European civilization” complemented by allusions to heroic resistance in the Second World War. Orbán’s references to Christianity, “the trinity of God, homeland and family” and the identity-threat posed by the “aggressive demands for the assertion of different morals and different customs” played on the deep-seated national myth of “Hungary as the Bulwark of Christianity”, i.e. a country courageously defending the frontiers of Christian Europe from the intrusion of Islam. Despite differences in content, these conceptual tools had similar uses: (1) to emphasize national worth and pride in a context of diminishing national sovereignty cast as “humiliation”, (2) to showcase that both Greece and Hungary have constituted and still constitute integral part of Europe and a repository of European values, (3) and to express ‘chosenness’ and national destiny (see: Smith 1999) by casting the referendums as Hungarians’ and Greeks’ heroic attempts to lead Europe back to its lost democratic values and ideals.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that framing Europe goes beyond the binary of Euroscepticism and Europhilia. In the cases I have examined, centrist political parties were explicitly Europhilic; forces on the far left and right were explicitly Euro sceptic; but the governments initiating the referendums, Syriza in Greece and Fidesz in Hungary, took elements from both. Namely, instead of unequivocally positioning themselves in either one of these camps as all other parties did, they opted for the wholesale redefinition of the meaning of “Europe”. Despite their ideological distance and the different substantive questions at hand, both parties and their leaders employed a highly emotive discourse replete with cultural and historical references. By turning the established roles of “good” and “bad” Europeans on their head, Orbán and Tsipras were able to assert a positive image of resistance and authenticity. The referendum campaigns which they announced, coordinated and eventually won, offered a unique opportunity to present their own visions and versions of the European idea and to construct a positive self-image, while also expressing a desire for a more equitable form of discourse and treatment. Free from the choice between either principled opposition or principled acceptance, Fidesz and Syriza fused both options into a winning combination of heroism and compromise.
References


Appendix

Speeches by PMs:

Viktor Orbán's press conference (24/2/2016)
Viktor Orbán's press conference after the announcement of referendum results (3/10/2016)
Viktor Orbán's State of the Nation Address (28/2/2016) – shortened
Alexis Tsipras' address at the No rally in Syntagma Square (4/7/2015)
Alexis Tsipras' address concerning the referendum to be held on the 5th of July (27/6/2015)
Alexis Tsipras' address concerning the referendum results (5/7/2016)

Five of the six speeches are available in English translation on the websites of the Greek and Hungarian Governments (http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches and http://www.primeminister.gov.gr/english). I myself translated Tsipras' third speech following the referendum, which is only available in Greek. Note that I also shortened Viktor Orbán's State of the Nation Address, taking out from this hour-long analysis the parts that specifically dealt with the referendum.
Refugees Like Us: Solidarity in Transition along the Western Balkan Route
Chiara Milan

Abstract

The so-called European migrant crisis which began in 2015 represented an unprecedented circumstance for the Yugoslav successor states. Notwithstanding their long history of dealing with refugees escaping from the neighbouring countries in the 1990s, in 2015 the former Yugoslav countries were affected for the first time by the mass inflow of people fleeing mostly from the Middle East. In response, a number of individuals, local and grassroots groups mobilized in solidarity with individuals crossing the Balkan territory during their journey towards the EU. An in-depth analysis of the phenomenon reveals that two factors in particular fostered local solidarity initiatives. First, the identification of the locals with the migrants, stemmed from their personal experience of displacement during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Second, the transience of the phenomenon, which weakened the perception of migrants as constituting a severe economic threat for the local population. This stemmed from the peculiar position that the Yugoslav successor states occupy in the geography of migration, which compelled them to be seen as merely transit countries rather than countries of destination.

Introduction

The countries of the post-Yugoslav space have a long history of dealing with refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and people forced to flee their countries to seek a safe haven in neighbouring nations during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. However, the European migrant crisis which started in 2015 represented an unprecedented phenomenon for the Yugoslav successor states, affected for the first time by a massive inflow of refugees fleeing mostly from the Middle East. The European Commission estimates that nearly 700,000 people had travelled along the Western Balkans migratory route by the end of October 2015, a figure that peaked to 760,000 by the end of December of the same year (European Commission 2016). In an attempt to help the huge numbers of people crossing the Balkan territory in an effort to reach Central and Northern Europe, a number of individuals, local and grassroots groups mobilized in their support. The type of civic response was diversified over time and space, and included advocacy-oriented type of intervention, stop-gap self-organized initiatives, as well as small-scale demonstrative type of actions.

This paper investigates the ways in which local civil society mobilized in support of migrants along the Western-Balkan migratory route during the period that lasted from summer 2015, the peak of the “crisis” to summer 2016, a couple of months after the shutdown of the Western-Balkan corridor. The analysis focuses in particular on two factors that favoured solidarity initiatives toward migrants: the identification of the local population with refugees in transit, derived from their personal experience of displacement during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, and the position that the Yugoslav successor states occupy in the geography of migration, which compelled them to be perceived as merely transit countries rather than countries of destination. As a consequence, migrants were not perceived as constituting a severe threat to the local population, thus facilitating mobilization in their support.

The paper relies on in-depth qualitative interviews with key informants (activists, journalists and volunteers) engaged in pro-refugee activism during the period lasting from spring 2015 to summer 2016, conducted in the framework of the ERC-funded project “Collective action and the refugee crisis.”

The first conceptual section clarifies the difference between the notions of refugee and asylum seek-

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18 At the Scuola Normale Superiore of Florence. The project description is available at http://cosmos.sns.it/collective-action-and-the-refugee-crisis/
er, distinguishing also between the terms "Balkan route" and "Balkan corridor". Second comes an analysis of the grassroots response to the increased influx of refugees in FYROM19, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, while a final section examines the factors that contributed to fostering solidarity initiatives in support of migrants along the Western-Balkan route.

From the Balkan route to the Balkan corridor

While mass-media reports usually adopt the term "refugee" to refer to a person who flees his country in search of a better future abroad, the notion of "asylum seeker" would be more appropriate when talking about the 2015 European migrant crisis. The latter identifies a person who flees his/her country and applies for the right to international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees on the ground that "if he is returned to his country of origin he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political belief or membership of a particular social group" (UNHCR 1951). Essentially, an asylum seeker can be considered a "refugee" only once his or her application has been successful. However, for the sake of brevity, throughout this paper I will not distinguish strictly between the two terms, but rather use them interchangeably.

Another important distinction worth making is between the notion of "Western Balkans route" and "Western Balkans corridor". The former refers to the informal migratory path shaped over the years by movements of migrants striving to make their way across the borders of Europe, often with the help of human traffickers; the latter denotes the temporarily-legalized, state-sponsored passage-way known as the Western Balkan corridor, which allowed migrants to move from the Turkish coast and Greek islands over the Balkans to Northern Europe from the period between October 2015 and March 2016. During the period in which it was open, the Western-Balkan corridor allowed thousands of migrants hailing mostly from Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, but also from Pakistan, Eritrea, Somalia and Palestine to pass across previously closed borders of Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria, and to reach central Europe in a relatively safe manner (Santer and Wriedt 2017).

The entry point of the Western-Balkan corridor was located in the village of Gevgelija in southern Macedonia (close to the Greek border and few kilometres from the Greek camp of Idomeni). From there, migrants crossed the states of Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia (after the closure of the Serbian-Hungarian border in September 2015), and Slovenia, from where they entered Austria. In the majority of cases, migrants either lodged an asylum application in Austria, or moved onward towards Germany and other countries of Northern Europe, which represented their final destination. Until mid-September 2015, however, the migratory path passed through Hungary. Following the decision of the Hungarian government to erect a razor-wire fence along the Serbian and Croatian border, migrants were rerouted towards Croatia and Slovenia. Throughout the period in which it was open, the corridor was partially closed and entry progressively restricted to certain nationalities. As of mid-November 2015 individuals not coming from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (the so-called SIA countries) were denied entry. The corridor was shut down on March 9th, 2016 following a series of meetings between the Austrian government and its Western-Balkan counterparts. After that date, only those in possession of a valid visa were allowed to travel across the former Yugoslav states, as officials of the states located along the migratory route announced the re-introduction of the Schengen Border Code. This decision marked the temporary reinstatement of border controls at the internal borders of the European Union (EU) as of March 8th.

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19 Throughout the paper I refer to the country interchangeably as Macedonia or FYROM, acronym for “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, provisional name of the country used by international organizations and states until the solution of the controversy with Greece regarding the naming of the country.

20 The Schengen Borders Code provides Member States with the ability to temporarily reintroduce border controls at internal borders in the event that a serious threat to public policy or internal security has been established (European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs).
The grassroots response to the refugee crisis

Macedonia, the entry point

In April 2015, 14 young migrants were struck by a train while walking along railway tracks near the city of Veles, 50 km from the capital Skopje (Associated Press in Skopje 2015). The victims, of Somali and Afghani origin, were trying to reach the northern area of the country on foot. At that point, the asylum law of the country did not allow migrants to claim asylum at the borders, but only once physically in the capital, Skopje. Before reaching Skopje, they were considered to be illegally transiting across the country and, as such, were likely to be arrested and detained. In order to keep away from the police while crossing the country, migrants avoided public transport, opting instead to walk along the railway lines after sunset.

The episode had a high media resonance all over the country, to the extent that almost all interviewees reported it as marking an important turning point in raising public awareness of the refugee cause. A few days after the tragic event, several individuals created a Facebook page called “Help the refugees in Macedonia”, a virtual platform used to coordinate the distribution of food, clothes and sanitary supplies to migrants on a daily basis and in different locations.

Organized actors such as NGOs mobilized in support of the migrants as well. The members of “Legis”, a non-governmental organization advocating for the rights of refugees in Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina (among others), started to reach out to migrants in the streets, providing them with food supplies in the city of Veles and along the railway tracks. Together with the Macedonian Young Lawyers Association (MYLA), already engaged in offering legal aid to asylum seekers in the country since 2010, “Legis” started to offer legal support to refugees crossing the country. Both NGOs also got involved in advocating for a change in the country’s asylum law, putting their expertise at the service of the government. Also some members of the left-wing organization Solidarnost (Solidarity) pressured the government to amend the asylum law, while others volunteered at the borders, and organized a protest march in Skopje in December 2015 to raise awareness about the situation of what they called “people on the move” rather than “refugees and migrants” since these terms, in their opinion, “belong to the dominant hegemonic discourse which aims at dividing humans”.

Upon the amendment of the asylum law in June 2015, which allowed migrants to enter the country legally upon expressing their intention to lodge an asylum claim at the Macedonian border or at the nearest police station, migrants were permitted to use public transportation (although paying a higher price than the locals). A registration document issued by the local authorities enabled them to transit across the country and to leave it within 72 hours if they did not register an asylum claim.

Allegedly unable to cope with the inflow of migrants from Greece, in August 2015 the government of FYROM declared a state of emergency, deployed the army and security forces to beat the migrants back at the Greek border with truncheons and riot shields (BBC news 2015). On November 18, 2015 Macedonia also introduced a “nationality screening program” that limited entry to the country exclusively to SIA nationals (Šelo Šabić and Borić 2016, 6). Ten days later, local authorities ordered the erection of a fence along the Greek border in an attempt to stem the migration influx from that country, before closing the entry point in Gevgelija in March 2016.

Serbia, the bottleneck

In May 2015, Serbia witnessed an increase in the number of migrants transiting across its territory. In July 2015 the flow soared, leading to the closure of the Hungarian border and the decision of the Hungarian government to initiate constructing

21 Interview with one of the administrators of Help the Refugees Macedonia FB page, 13 June 2016, via Viber
22 Interview with NGO Legis, 20 July 2016, Skopje
23 Interview with a spokesperson of MYLA, 21 July 2016, Skopje
24 Interview with a member of Solidarnost, 22 July 2016, Skopje
25 The refugees had to pay for their own transportation to the Serbian border, and the price of the railway ticket was increased from 7 to 25 euros, allowing the Macedonian railway company to make millions in profits.
a fence along the Serbian border (completed in mid-September 2015). After restricting entry to only SIA nationals in late November 2015, those unable to prove Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan citizenship attempted to enter Serbia from across the Bulgarian frontier. Serbia thus became the transit point for migrants arriving both from Macedonia and Bulgaria. The country became the bottleneck of the migration route after the closure of the Western Balkan corridor in March 2016. In fact, migrants who did not intend to seek asylum in Serbia remained trapped inside the country, as both the Croatian and Hungarian borders were sealed.

In the summer of 2015, when thousands of migrants populated the parks of the capital, Belgrade was transformed into “the focal point where thousands of people came to ask for information, rest and to get some help” (Refugee Aid Miksalište 2016, 2). The green areas surrounding the train and bus stations were the main places where unregistered migrants could rest and sleep overnight, looking for contacts with smugglers helping them to cross the borders. Together with the stranded migrants, the parks were also populated by those who had been pushed back to Serbia from neighbouring countries. They also waited in the parks looking for a way to leave the country, while several volunteers provided them daily with food, clothes, and information. While the parks of Belgrade had been partially emptied during winter 2015-16, with the new policy starting in March 2016 Belgrade again became a crucial nexus for all those striving to reach Hungary or Croatia. This situation dragged on until the end of July 2016, when the municipality ploughed and fenced the parks of Belgrade in which mostly Afghani nationals used to gather. The action was in line with the statement of the then-prime-minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, who had repeated on many occasions that “Serbia won’t serve as a parking lot for refugees that the EU does not accept” (B92.net 2016).

Various actors got involved in Serbia to support refugees in the area surrounding the train and bus stations of Belgrade. At first the local initiative “Info Park” distributed hot meals using as its base a wooden kiosk in one of the parks. In the summer of 2015, the people of Mikser House, a cultural hub located in the popular river bank neighborhood Sava Mala, opened a distribution centre and welcome point “Miksalište” as “an ad-hoc response to the growing number of people present in Belgrade” (Refugee Aid Miksalište 2016). Initially hosted inside a warehouse, in the Miksalište hub migrants could rest, receive information, and get some stop-gap help. The initiators already had experience in first aid, having been active in providing emergency support during the 2014 floods that hit the region. On that occasion they organized events to gather food and clothes, and distributed the donations in the flooded cities. Over summer 2015, several migrants sought shelter in a warehouse in the vicinity of Miksalište, which they occupied with the support of the local and international No border group activists, renaming it the “No border hostel” (Open Borders 2016; Marinković 2016).

After the demolition of Miksalište and of the No border hostel in April 2016, officially to make room for the contested “Belgrade Waterfront Project” (No border Serbia 2016), the City of Belgrade offered an alternative location near the previous premises (Corritore 2016). The new building, renamed “Miksalište 2.0”, served as a space for distributing clothes and food. Inside its premises, several local and international NGOs provided different kinds of social, medical and psychological support, aimed especially at women and children.

Following the shutdown of the corridor, Belgrade lost its role as a transit city, becoming a place in which migrants remained for longer periods. Although the influx of people to the Balkans had dropped since March 2016, hundreds of migrants continued to populate the area around the train station of Belgrade, finding shelters in occupied warehouses without access to any facility, until they were evicted en masse in May 2017 (Bjelica and van Bijlert 2016; Deutsche Welle 2017).

**Croatia, a forced transit country**

During the summer of 2015 Croatia was not involved in the migratory crisis, as the refugees strove to enter the Schengen Zone by travelling to Hungary. Following the decision of the Hungarian
government to seal its borders, the flow of people swerved to Croatia. As a member of the Croatia’s Welcome! Initiative\footnote{Interview with a member of the Center for Peace Studies and one of the founder of the Welcome! Initiative. Via Skype, 1 August 2016.} explains, the presence of migrants became visible in the country as of mid-August 2015. As had happened in both FYROM and Serbia, Croatia only served as a country of transit; almost all the refugees did not intend to seek asylum in the state. Once in Croatia, migrants were transported free of charge\footnote{Unlike the non-EU countries, in Croatia transport was state-organized.} to the registration centres located in different parts of Croatia.

In a similar fashion to the other Balkan countries, several civic organizations became involved in helping the refugees on their arrival in Croatia from the beginning of the crisis.\footnote{Interview with a member of Are you Syrious?, Zagreb, 2 August 2016.} Amongst them, in August 2015 the Centre for Peace Studies (Centar za mirovne studije) launched the advocacy platform “Welcome! Initiative”, aimed at gathering and coordinating different individuals and actors to provide information and assistance to volunteers and refugees in different languages. However, the legal insecurity and uncertainty about the situation at the borders made it difficult to provide correct information and legal support to refugees. A group emerging from the refugee crisis in Croatia is the “Are you Syrious?” (AYS) group, created by a group of friends and later registered as an organization in order to get access to the state-run transit and registration camps. The AYS experience began at the end of August 2015 when a fund-raising concert named “Are you Syrious” was organized in Zagreb to collect donations for refugees stuck in Röszke, at the Hungarian border, (Miller 2015). As was the case in Belgrade, some of the activists had previously been involved in emergency activities during the flood that affected the region in May 2014. After the successful concert, AYS also established a station with food supplies for transit migrants, and a service of transportation to deliver aid, weeks before the Croatian government organized transport for refugees (Miller 2015). Although officially registered as NGO, AYS functioned in an unstructured way, resembling an “informal, friend-based network”\footnote{Interview with a member of Are you Syrious?, Zagreb, 2 August 2016.} that kept in contact with almost all the organizations active along the Western Balkan route. Some of the AYS volunteers later became involved in the Mobile Kitchen project, active inside the state-run camps for asylum seekers in Croatia. AYS became widely known in particular for the daily newsletter issued in English language, run on voluntary basis by journalists, which provides daily news digests from the field. The project aimed at informing volunteers, refugees, journalists and all those interested in the events along the Western Balkan route.\footnote{AYS newsletter available at: https://medium.com/@AreYouSyrious.}

**Slovenia, the last transit hub**

Following the sealing of the Hungarian border in September 2015, migrants were rerouted to Slovenia. In the meantime, railway passenger traffic between Hungary and Croatia had also been suspended to prevent their passage. As with other Western-Balkan countries, Slovenia was also perceived as a transit hub, in which few migrants lodged an asylum claim. In mid-November 2015, the flow of migrants transiting the country increased while the government decided to begin construction of a barbed wire fence at the Croatian border. On November 27, Austria also “began installing physical obstacles along its border with Slovenia” (Šelo Šabić and Borić 2016, 15), and few days later the entrance to the corridor was restricted to SIA nationals only. For those allowed to access the Western Balkans passageway, transport to Austria was organized free of charge by the Slovenian state either via bus or train. Four trains a day reached the Slovenian town of Dobova (at the Croatian border) and Šentilj (at the Austrian one) from the Croatian registration camp in Slavonski Brod. From the northern border crossing of Šentilj, the migrants walked to Austria through the village of Spielfeld. As was the case in other countries, a temporary pass allowed the migrants to legally cross Slovenian territory. For most of them, Austria or Germany represented the final destination. On November 28, 2015 Slovenia closed the borders to migrants not in possession of registration papers stating Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq as countries of origin (Santer and Wriedt 2017).
Atia, Serbia and Macedonia subsequently applied the same discrimination, which lead to the gradual closure of the corridor.

Among the actors supporting the refugee cause in Slovenia, the “Anti-racist front Without Borders” (Protirasistična Fronta Brez Meja) was an informal, self-organized group hosted inside the Rog squat in Ljubljana. In the past, the squat used to serve as a bike factory and, even before the migratory crisis of 2015, it acted as “a central node for migrant organizing” (Razsa and Kurnik 2015). The Rog activists responded first to the increased influx of refugees, as they had been monitoring the situation since its beginning weeks earlier, and had previously established contacts with informal groups and activists supporting migrants along the route. Following the border closure, the activists focused their activities in Ljubljana. In particular, the “Anti-racist front Without Borders” dealt with first aid and support to refugees, counting also on their long tradition of fighting for migrants and citizenship rights. Some of its members had been previously involved in political struggles related to unskilled and undocumented migrants in Slovenia, in grassroots groups like the Invisible Workers of Slovenia32 and the Movement of the Erased.33 Between 2015 and 2016, activists engaged with a group of refugees accommodated in the Ljubljana Asylum Home. Decisions on what activities to organize in the former factory space were taken together with activists in a participatory way, based on self-organization and discussion in public assemblies that took place once a week. Since December 2016, the space in which migrants and activists gather has been known as “The Second Home”.

Explaining pro-refugee solidarity initiatives

Despite limited means and restricted opportunities, individuals and groups along the Western Balkan route reacted to the growing influx of refugees in their territories by mobilizing a wide range of resources. In-depth analysis of the refugee solidarity initiatives in the area reveals that two factors in particular facilitated the emergence of grassroots solidarity initiatives. From the interviews, it emerged that in several cases the local population identified with the migrants transiting across their territories owing to the experience of displacement they had personally lived through in the past. The majority of pro-refugee activists interviewed justified their commitment with references to their personal biographical experience and an “emotional affinity” stemming from the perception of having undergone a similar traumatic experience in the past, as persons forcibly displaced during the Yugoslav wars of the 90s, or growing up during the wars which ravaged the former Yugoslavia. In their view, the decision to engage in collective action in support of refugees was informed by this biographical experience, which drove them to engage in pro-refugee activism. “They are refugees like us, like we were in the 90s”, several interviewees claimed.

The second factor accounting for the engagement of a wide number of people in pro-refugee activism along the Western-Balkan route concerns the spatial and temporary aspect of the migratory movement. Migration being a spatial phenomenon, the position a country holds in the migratory space shapes the dynamics of citizens’ response to the phenomenon. The particular location that the Yugoslav successor states occupy in the geography of migration compels them to be first and foremost countries of transit rather than countries of destination. Owing to their position at the borders of the European Union, during the 2015 European migrant crisis the Balkan states played the role of short-term transit countries: Only an insignificant number of refugees intended to settle in any of their territories, and mainly crossed them in an attempt to reach Northern Europe. Domestic state authorities, in their public discourses, often justified their welcoming policy towards migrants by stating that migrants would not settle in their territories. These discursive practices reinforced the perception of the inflow of people as a temporary phenomenon, fostering the idea that migrants
did not constitute a severe threat to a local population already affected by a dire economic situation and high unemployment rates. The perceived temporary nature of the migration influx is said to have contributed also to containing anti-migrant reactions, limiting anti-migrant protests to some sporadic initiatives.

Conclusions

While the so-called refugee crisis is said to have negatively impacted relations between former Yugoslav countries which found themselves on the main migration route (Šelo Šabić and Borić 2016), accentuating also the lack of cooperation among policy-makers, grassroots solidarity initiatives showed an opposite trend. Local groups and associations were the first to mobilize in support of migrants, at times filling a void created by the absence of a timely response by state authorities. Not only did pre-existing groups mobilize, while already-extant ones shifted their focus to meet the refugees’ immediate needs, but new ones also emerged, together with alliances and collaborative networks at both the national and transnational level.

To conclude, the analysis reveals that, firstly, the identification of locals with the migrants fostered solidarity initiatives in their support, and the emergence of a public discourse that framed the “collective we” as uniting both refugees and their supporters. Furthermore, the specific position of the Yugoslav successor states in the migration route fuelled a feeling of empathy towards migrants, as the latter were perceived as merely transiting across the territory and, thus, not representing a substantial threat to the local population. Although the closure of the Western Balkan corridor and the progressive militarization of the borders restricted opportunities for local groups to mobilize in support of refugees, some continued their solidarity initiatives by other means, even after the shutdown.
References


Political Discourse on Refugees Compared to Refugees’ Individual Stories: The Case of Croatia
Rahela Jurković

Abstract

When discussing nationalist practices, Ghasan Hage (2000) introduces a story about ants to explain the actions of those seeking to protect national territory: People start to perceive ants as “undesirable” or “too many” only when these ants are seen as invaders of spaces where humans find their presence harmful, such as in their houses or on their plates. Otherwise, they accept ants, though at the same time perceiving them as a different and inferior species. This comparison easily applies to the discourse of Croatian politicians from mid-September 2015, when the country found itself taking part in the so-called European Refugee Crisis, to early 2017. As most of the rhetoric presented in the media from that time suggests, refugees did not want to stay in Croatia. Although the Balkan migration route was closed, in 2016 and early 2017 Croatia experienced an increase in the number of refugees arriving. Many were sent back from Austria, Slovenia and other countries to Croatia, and are now residing at the reception centre for asylum seekers in Zagreb. The aim of this paper is to analyse the media discourse of Croatian politicians about refugees and compare it to “real” refugees’ personal, individual stories. The latter was done by conducting qualitative interviews with people who were sent from Austria to Croatia and who were waiting for the asylum decision in the Zagreb’s reception centre, the so-called Hotel Porin. Contrasting these two perspectives allows us to get a more informed insight on how representations of refugees in the rhetoric of political elites correspond to the lived experiences of individual refugees.

Introduction

On the website of one of the most popular Croatian newspapers an article was published April 2017, entitled “The refugee wave that nobody talks about: within a year, hundreds of refugees came to Croatia, but from the opposite direction”34. The article describes the situation of a Syrian-Egyptian asylum-seeking couple and their one-year-old son, who were forcibly deported from Slovenia to Croatia in March 2017. The family first agreed to talk to journalists but then cancelled the interview, as they explained, because of the difficult psychological situation of the woman, who was suffering from depression. An employee of the Red Cross who works at the Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers in Zagreb, the so-called Hotel Porin35, said that the family was traumatised and could see no way out of the situation they were in. Namely, that after more than a year of staying in Slovenia and searching for asylum there, the Slovenian Government decided to transfer them to Croatia, on the basis of one of the Dublin Regulations, so-called Dublin III, which “establishes the Member State responsible for the examination of the asylum application. The criteria for establishing responsibility run, in hierarchical order, from family considerations, to recent possession of visa or residence permit in a Member State, to whether the applicant has entered the European Union (EU) regularly or irregularly”36. Furthermore, Dublin III “contains sound procedures for the protection of asylum applicants and improves the system’s efficiency”37. The quoted article from a Croatian newspaper further reports that over the course of the last year, and based on the Dublin III Regulation, around 750 people were deported to Croatia from other European countries, mostly from Austria and Germany, but also Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Greece. However, according to some non-governmental organisations, it was not clear how these countries chose the people they deported to Croatia, especially bearing in

35 The reception centre building served several years ago as a hotel. Nowadays, in different parts of Zagreb there are still signs pointing the way to the former 3-star Hotel Porin that actually has not existed since 2011. However, the building is still called by that name, but under a new meaning: The asylum seekers’ reception centre.
37 Ibid.
mind that around 600,000 refugees and asylum seekers passed through Croatia when the "Balkan migration route" was open, from September 2015 to March 2016. Among those refugees deported to Croatia the majority were from Afghanistan, followed by Syrians and Iraqis. Those deported included separated family members (mothers with children and pregnant women), sick people and the elderly. In the same article it was also reported that people were transferred to Croatia based on the fact that they entered Croatia irregularly.

This paper investigates how the narratives of these refugees, i.e. asylum seekers deported from Western European countries to Croatia, correspond to the political rhetoric of Croatian politicians published in media articles. The main research questions are: who, in politicians’ views, are refugees? Who are the real refugees seeking asylum in Croatia in early 2017? And how well do the discourses of politicians and the discourses of refugees correspond to one another?

The paper will firstly expose the relevant theoretical framework, including studies of deportation and representations of the "other". It will then proceed to politicians' narratives as expressed in Croatian media and narratives of asylum seekers, as collected during the interviews that I conducted with them in April and May 2017. My research was inspired by the ethnography of the particular, as a "powerful tool for unsettling the culture concept and subverting the process of "othering"" (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 144) and hence the main focus of this paper is the lived experience of individual asylum seekers who passed through the Balkan migration route, came to Austria, and then were deported back to Croatia, where they were waiting for asylum in early 2017.

Theoretical framework

As De Genova (2013: 1180-1181) suggests, “deportable non-citizens are pervasively subjected to myriad conditions of social degradation, globally”, no matter whether they are "merely economic" migrants seeking employment, or refugees seeking asylum. In my research, the case of interviewed asylum seekers showed what De Genova further argued, that "the criteria for granting asylum tend to be so stringent, so completely predicated upon suspicions, that it is perfectly reasonable to contend that what asylum regimes really produce is a mass of purportedly "bogus" asylum seekers". Furthermore, he argues that "asylum regimes disproportionately disqualify asylum seekers, converting them into "illegal" and deportable "migrants". All such officially "unwanted" or "undesirable" non-citizens are stigmatized with allegations of opportunism, duplicity and "undeservingness." This was shown to be true for both of my research areas: Croatian political discourse on refugees, and the process of deportation of Afghan asylum seekers from Austria to Croatia, though that was not a deportation in the sense in which that term is usually used in immigration and deportation studies. As Coutin (2015) argues, the field of deportation studies was born in the early 2000s, when scholars began to question the reasons and impacts of the growing deportation-enforcement regime. According to Coutin (2015: 672), "deportation is forcible rather than voluntary, the decision to deport is in the hands of the state rather than that of individual migrants, the direction of movement is from so-called "receiving" country to "sending" country". In the case of asylum seekers deported from Austria to Croatia this definition of deportation is operative in all elements except one: the direction of movement is not from the "receiving" to the "sending" country, but from the "receiving" to the "intermediate" or "in-between" country, as Croatia was neither a "receiving" nor a "sending" country. For asylum seekers whom I interviewed and based my research upon, Austria was supposed to be the "receiving" country, while the "sending" country was Afghanistan. This suggests that a new type of deportation has been emerging in Europe since 2016, an intra-EU (European Union) deportation of asylum seekers, and this paper sheds light on that form of deportation.

While questioning the terminology related to deportation policies and practices, Anderson (2015) argues that deportation is strongly associated with criminality, while the term removal, which she uses interchangeably with deportation, is applied to people who have entered illegally, overstayed, or
violated the conditions of their visa. Though these definitions cannot be connected with the act of returning asylum seekers from Austria to Croatia, I would agree with Anderson when she argues that "deportation captures the spectacular manifestation of state power on the body more effectively than the bureaucratically-sounding "removal" (Anderson 2015: 117) and hence I am using the term 'deportation' to refer to the act officially referred to in EU Dublin III as "transfer of a third-country national or a stateless person".

My research work on deportation as presented in this paper was actually a supplement to my first research intention, toanalyse the discourse of Croatian politicians on contemporary refugees and to contrast it with the stories of the real and not imagined refugees, as they were portrayed in politicians’ views expressed in the media. While interviewing refugees for that purpose, the fact that they had all been transferred or deported from Austria to Croatia arose as an additional topic of research. Both research themes: politicians’ discourse on refugees, and the deportation processes that refugees had to pass through, have something in common, which can be connected with a story that Hage (2000: 37-38) introduced while discussing nationalist practices. It is a story of ants that well explains the actions of those intent on protecting national territory: "Most humans perceive ants as a different species, and certainly as an inferior species. Yet this belief alone is not sufficient for them to perceive ants as "undesirable" or as "too many". They do so only when these ants are seen to have invaded spaces where humans find their presence harmful, such as in their houses or on their plates. And it is only in such situations that practices of violence are directed against them’. Hage further argued that a fear of "too many" "others" is not related only to a wish for preservation of a "race", "ethnicity" or "culture", "but also to a wish to construct or preserve "an imagined privileged relation between the imagined "race", "ethnicity" or "culture" and the national space conceived as its own". The research presented in this paper confirms this story in the sense that only when confronted with a so-called "refugee wave" or "refugee crisis", did Croatian politicians begin to notice the existence of refugees, and what they saw was that there were too many of them, while at the same time, or as a consequence of what they saw, they began creating an image of these refugees as not fitting into the national space that belongs to them, politicians, i.e. to "us," Croatians.

As Spitalnik (1993: 295) argued, the most pervasive paradigm of the mass communication process has been the linear model consisting of three discrete stages: message production, message transmission and message reception, where the message is seen as the key unit of cultural meaning, a powerful refraction or reproduction of a society's dominant ideologies. In the case examined in this paper, one can argue that a mass-communicated message from the Croatian president about refugees tends to be represented as the mainstream political view of how leading politicians see or should see this society and how they view "otherness". In that respect, we can recall Hall (1997: 225) who put forward the following questions: How do we represent people and places that are significantly different from us? Why is "otherness" such an attractive topic and contested area of representation? What typical forms and representation practices are used to represent "difference" in today's popular culture, and where did all these stereotypes come from? People who are in any way different from the majority ("them" vs. "us"), are frequently exposed to the binary form of representation: "Through sharply opposed, polarized, binary extremes – good/bad, civilized/primitive, ugly/excessively attractive, repellant-because-different/attractive-because–strange-and-exotic." (Ibid. 229). Attitudes towards refugees as "others", but in negative forms of representation, have recently been shown to be the dominant views of the Croatian president about most refugees now seeking asylum in Europe. To these stereotypes I will contrast the views of "real", individual refugees, who were, like ping-pong balls, transferred first overland from Greece to Austria, then flown back to Croatia. Some might be transferred to Austria again, while others will be faced with some still-unknown forms of deportation, or another fate.

Furthermore, while writing about fantasies of White supremacy in a multicultural society, Hage (2000: 45-46) deconstructs power relations found
in the behaviour and discourse of those who consider themselves entitled to be managers of the national space. According to him, there are at least two modes of belonging to the national home: the first is **passive belonging**, the other **governmental belonging**. The mode of **passive belonging** involves the belief that one “belongs to a nation” in the sense of being part of it and therefore expecting to have the right to benefit from the nation’s resources, to “fit into it” or “feel at home” within it. “I belong to a nation” is an attitude common among such inhabitants of national space. On the other hand, **governmental belonging** (which is not equivalent to formal state or “government” power) involves the belief that one has a right over the nation, including the right to contribute (even if only by having a **legitimate** opinion on internal and external politics of the nation) to its management such that it remains “one’s home”. “This is my nation” is, according to Hag, an expression of this feeling of governmental belonging. “This is my nation” or “this nation belongs to me” and therefore: I am entitled to express views that I find relevant for the whole nation. This is definitely an attitude that I discovered during my research, and will be described in a further section of the paper. That attitude can be shown to have had a crucial influence on lives of my interviewees, who had spent more than 12 months waiting to be recognised as refugees; first in Austria, and then in Croatia. 

How do Croatian politicians imagine refugees?

The research I have conducted demonstrates that Croatian politicians have certain common representations of refugees. The general rhetoric centres around the view that refugees do not want to come or stay in Croatia, or that politicians are just, in public, expressing the number of refugees that Croatia could receive, without going into any further details about them. For example, during meeting with the German chancellor in Berlin in December 2016, the Croatian prime minister said that Croatia could accept 1,600 refugees. By comparison, since the first refugee was granted asylum in Croatia in 2006, around 300 people had been granted asylum by early 2017, while there were also around 600-700 people waiting at two Croatian reception centres for a response to their asylum applications.

But in January 2017 one media article mentioning refugees was different, as it expressed some clear views on refugees. The article reported on an interview which the Croatian president gave to journalists from the Austrian newspaper *Kleine Zeitung*, which was occasioned by a celebration of the 25th anniversary of international recognition of Croatia as an independent state. In that interview the Croatian president expressed her views on refugees and the “refugee crisis”, emphasising that one should fight the causes of the crisis. She also said that the “refugee wave” brought to Europe mainly men capable for fighting and asked: “And what about mothers? that stayed in Aleppo, what about children? They really need our help!” The article further quotes: “Croatian president thinks that we “accepted the wrong refugees” and views the entire situation as hypocri- sy.” She also stated this: “Believe me, every war can be stopped!”. Furthermore, she indirectly pleaded against refugee quotas for EU member states, stating that “every country should decide how many people it will accept” and also expressed her concern regarding the reception of refugees and the threats to “the human rights of women in Europe”. She said: “Maybe it is not politically correct, but we are terribly wrong if we think that people who have spent their lives in Afghanistan, learning in school and hearing from religious authorities that women are less valuable than men, will acquire our values overnight”. She finished that part of her interview by...
saying that she was angry because in Europe “there are ghettos from which the state has withdrawn”.

In some other interviews the Croatian president also stated that around 80 percent of people “from the refugee wave” that she “talked to” (not mentioning any details about these meetings or encounters) were economic migrants who did not come from Syria or Iraq. The president, it is worth noting, stated that at that time the asylum seeking procedures of the people in question had not even started yet. Thus we find ourselves now deep in the realm of stereotypes, a feature of which is “precisely the practice of “closure” and exclusion. It symbolically fixes boundaries and excludes everything which does not belong” (Hall 1997: 258). In this case, during short encounters with a few refugees, the Croatian president was able to conclude that almost all of them were unacceptable “others”. Some of these “others” are the people I interviewed, and their experiences of fleeing their countries of origin and seeking refuge in Europe are presented in the next section.

What do the “real” refugees think, and what have they gone through?

Based on the views about refugees expressed in media articles (mostly in the aforementioned interview with the Croatian president), I conducted my own semi-structured interviews with several people from Afghanistan now residing in the Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers in Zagreb and awaiting a decision on their asylum applications. The aim of interviewing “real” refugees was to confront – by ethnographies of the particular – the generalisations about refugees, as described in the previous section. I conducted interviews with five people in total, over two sessions. Some of the views were expressed by interviewees as common (some did not speak English, the language in which we conducted the interviews, fluently), while some of the views expressed are those of two particular men, which I will henceforth refer to as Interviewee A and Interviewee B. I asked all the interviewees questions confronting the views of the Croatian president as quoted in the above-cited newspaper’s article. Furthermore, I talked with them about deportation from Austria, as they were all participants of that process. In order to protect their identity, I will not disclose many of their personal details. However, they had something in common: they were all from Afghanistan and all had spent several months in Austria, where they applied for asylum before being deported, against their will, from Austria to Croatia, where according to Austrian authorities they should have been able to successfully gain asylum.

All my interviewees had fled Afghanistan where they had various problems, and where their lives were in danger. They took irregular routes to Europe that led them through Iran, Turkey, Greece, and then to Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria. They actually heard about Croatia for the first time when they were in Austria, when the Austrian administration told them that they would be deported to Croatia. They then searched for Croatia on the map and found some information about the country. “The country’s president, but not much, nothing about refugees.” Some of their acquaintances were already in Croatia. They said it was good here, but not like in Austria, in terms of “food, money, clothes, and some other things”. In Austria they got a financial support of 40 euros per month and in Croatia they get 100 HRK (around 13 euros). Also, when compared to more than half a million of refugees who like them passed through Croatia, they do not know why they were among relatively small group of people who had to leave Austria and come to Croatia, where they were just registered during a few hours spent in transit, in trains or buses, not even knowing which country they were passing through. They think it probably happened because “they were honest”. Namely, on being questioned by Austrian authorities on how they came to Austria, they mentioned the Balkan route, while other people told them that they did not know the route by which they arrived in Austria. “Most people lied: ‘we do not know, we were in a truck...’, but in case of my interviewees, the truth brought them here: “Telling the truth was not good”.

While talking about their reasons for leaving their country, the interviewees said that they had to flee their homes because of problems with the Taliban and other terrorist groups, and because of religious problems. They added that some other people, not Afghans, had been waging war in their country. The Government was not protecting them against Taliban groups and they could not understand why, with all the international support it received, that same Government could not put an end to the Taliban terrorist attacks and the killing of innocent people. Interviewee A said: “The government maybe works with the Taliban as the Taliban does not have many members. If the Government wants to kill them, they can do that in one day because Talibans are now not so many people”. Interviewee B added:

The Taliban – they are in the Government. They are normal people during the day and during the night they have guns, they are attacking, everything... they can bribe the Government; they can bribe the police station. They say: “Tonight we are going to pass the car from here, let us pass”, and they bribe everybody. It is really complicated... The Taliban attack the police station in the centre of Kabul. It is hard to believe that they are attacking a big police station in Kabul unless the Government is cooperating with them, is helping them.

Why? It’s politics, because of money, there are foreigners who are benefiting from this war, they are doing all that stuff... They are creating these groups, building these groups, supporting these groups...

I don’t know, the Taliban is a small group...

All Europe is in Afghanistan, fighting with them, America is there fighting with them, this NATO army – they are fighting against them, a small group, for 10 years – how is it possible?

They are even stronger than before. How is it possible? You see...This is politics, they do not want to end this war, they want to continue...

When compared to the discourse of Croatian politicians, this statement brings into light facts which were, on one hand, not present in Croatian media, and that, on the other hand, question the economic reasons that were, according to Croatian president, the refugees’ motivation for arriving in Europe. In this respect, the interviewees also added that if there was peace and if they could live a normal life in Afghanistan, they would never have left their country, as their families and friends were there and as they knew the culture and the language; it was their country. Interviewee B added:

*Europe is returning refugees to Afghanistan and they are saying that there is no war there, that it is at peace... I do not know why they are saying that... if they think we are liars, that we do not say the truth, they can see every day and night in the news about the war in Afghanistan.*

All the interviewees had to pay for their trip from Afghanistan to Turkey to smugglers who were, according to them, everywhere; they each paid around 3,000-4,000 euros. When they came to Greece, they were told: “You come with us to Germany. The government took our papers and said it was bringing us to Germany” and then they travelled by buses and trains and arrived in Austria. Interviewee A said: “the government brought us to Austria”, and on my question to clarify which government he was talking about, he replied: “the government of Europe”. After reaching Greece via islands, they took the Balkan route: by bus to Macedonia and then by train. They also walked to the border with Serbia and then took taxis and buses. They were just passing through all these countries, passing the borders, and perhaps only for few hours or a night if they stopped in some camp. They paid for their travel through Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia, while through Slovenia the transport was free. In Austria they were stopped and asked: “Would you like to stay here or go to Germany?” They said they wanted to stay. One wanted to continue to Germany, but it was not possible for him, although for the others it was possible, as he recalls. But all recall that at the border exiting Greece, they had to say that they wanted to go to Germany or Austria. If they said
some other country, they would be returned back to Greece. Interviewee A explained:

*Even in Austria, one said: I want to go Switzerland, and they returned him to Slovenia. Another day he came and said: I want to stay in Austria, and they let him enter Austria. There was no choice: you should say Germany or Austria. If you said some other country, they would send you one border back.*

Immediately after their arrival in Austria, some were informed that they had to go back to Croatia as they came “that way” to Austria. They had just been registered in Croatia, and because of the registration paper in Croatia they were sent back from Austria to Croatia, based on Dublin III Regulation. “And most of us did not ask for asylum here, we did not even know that Croatia is a country that accepts refugees.”

On their comment that “the government” brought them that way to Austria, they heard this reply from Austrian authorities: “Why do you say that? No, you came into Austria illegally, and you must go back to Croatia”. The police told them that they had to wait for the Croatian government’s response, “to see whether you can stay in Austria or must return back. If they say: no, return him back, we need to return you back to Croatia”. They were also told that they had ‘fingerprints’ in Croatia, though some interviewees said it was not true, they were just registered in Croatia. Interviewee A explained:

*I said: I do not have a fingerprint, show me that paper I have a fingerprint from Croatia. They said: it is not our problem if you have it or not, but it is a law. It is a Dublin law. If you have it or not, you must go back to Croatia.*

Then they spent several months in transfer camps, one or several months in one camp and then were transferred to other camps. According to one interviewee, they were called transfer camps because they were “camps for waiting”.

After several months of, in their case, waiting for the answer from the Croatian government, the Austrian police informed them that they had to go back to Croatia. And again, if they asked for a document that attested the Croatian Government’s decision, Austrian authorities told them: “No, we do not have that paper, just you must go”. Interviewee A pointed out:

*I said: I do not want to go, why do you do it like this? They say: ok, stay in your room, we will give you an answer after ten days. I said ok.*

Then (after 10 days) they sent the police to my room, they kicked the door in, the police had some guns, and a spray, and they caught me like a criminal. And they say it is a law. I did not know about the Austrian law...I do not know why.

He and others were then brought to one or two jails where they spent one, two or more nights, and “then police came and took me like a criminal and put me in a closed car”.

They were deported by plane from Vienna to Zagreb. Each was escorted by several police (or security) persons and the plane was filled with around 12 asylum seekers and from 13 to 17 police or security guards.

Other people who arrived the same way to Austria, stayed and got “papers” that allowed them to work, and it was (again) unclear to my interviewees why they had to go back to Croatia. While still in Austria, Interviewee A asked Austrian lawyers who worked in the refugee camp about the reason why some people could stay in Austria and others had to leave. The lawyer’s answer was the following: “the Government has two eyes: one eye is working and one eye is not working. If the Government sees you with the eye that is not working, you can stay”. Interviewee A concluded: “If they do not look at you, they leave you in Austria”. He explained that these lawyers worked for the Austrian Government and were answering the questions of refugees. They came to the camp once a week: “they just come, eat something or drink, and then they go”. He asked one of the lawyers to do something for him, as he wanted to stay in Austria, but he just told him: “It is not my job”. Interviewee A
worked for several months in the camp kitchen and got ‘the paper’, a kind of recommendation letter, from the humanitarian organisation he worked with in the kitchen. When he showed that paper to the lawyer, thinking it might help as it testified he was voluntary working and helping in Austria, that person said: “It is not my problem. I do not care about that”. Then Interviewee A tore up the recommendation letter and threw it in the garbage.

He and other interviewees also pointed out that the ethnic origin of translators employed by Austrian Government greatly influenced the decision of which people stayed in Austria and which were deported to Croatia. They also warned that nobody paid attention to or questioned the bias of translators towards refugees of ethnic backgrounds other than the translators’ own. This confirms De Genova’s (2013) argument that asylum seekers are un-wanted non-citizens, stigmatised with undeservingness, as manifested here through a lack of adequate translators that would make clear that asylum seekers are clearly and accurately understood by the administration that grants asylum. This recalls also what Kalir (2017: 13) argued while researching the desertion of “out-of-procedure” asylum seekers by Dutch authorities: that the logic underpinning the state’s desertion (and here, deportation from a central to a border state of the European Union) “is one that has its roots in the founding of the modern nation-state as a mirror image of the colonial state, where natives were not considered to be political subjects. As these subjects make their way into the metropolis, the modern European state reactivates its boundaries-making mechanism… by selectively authorizing the political existence of some, while completely denying it to others”.

Although I did not ask the interviewees what will happen if Croatia does not grant them asylum, one of them (Interviewee A) gave an unprompted answer, as a way of expressing his view on the attitudes of the European governments towards him:

If they do not want to accept me in Croatia, I do not want to go to another country, I will go back to Afghanistan or Iran because I cannot lose all my years in European countries... Because if one country does not accept you and you go to another country and wait there, it is like a loss of your time.

But some others thought that they might be transferred back to Austria, as had happened already to some asylum seekers who complained against their transfer to Croatia and were deported back to Austria, by plane or bus. However, they said that they heard how one of these people was put in jail for a few days, after being transferred back to Austria, without knowing the reason for his imprisonment.

Before arriving in Europe, the interviewees thought that people in European countries would help and accept them; that they could go to schools and universities and maybe have a good future in Europe. But after the experiences they had gone through, they were not sure what to think about their future in Europe.

Before arriving in Europe, they thought that there was freedom in Europe, that people were free to do anything they wanted and that there was democracy, real democracy in Europe, not democracy “on paper”. Interviewee B explained it in following words:

And they say you, Asians, you do not have culture, you are bad, you are always fighting, you are a problem, you are terrible. And we Europeans we are Western people, we are perfect. We are good people, we are well-educated... Yes, it is, they are right, they are a good country, economy, science, industry, OK... But when I saw these human beings, human rights, democracy, this well-educated people – this is just in the books, in the movies, on TV, but in reality: no.

They are not well educated...

For example, they say: it is democracy. What is democracy? What do you mean by democracy? You are not doing the things you say.
On the TV they say human rights, human beings, they care about refugees. But just on TV and in newspapers. They take photos of people, they show pictures; ah, oh... Afghanistan in war, Syria in war, it is not good, we have to do something. But in reality: nothing.

They just say: oh, sorry, sorry, but in reality: do something, do some actions...

They are just speaking at conferences: this and this problem. But you have the power; do something if you really want to. Do not tell people: OK, we are sorry...

They can do anything because they are powerful. They are countries who can influence...

The picture that I had about Europe is most of the time wrong.

I also asked them why there were so many men among refugees and not many women and children who came to Europe, as the Croatian president pointed out. They told me that their "illegal" travels through Afghanistan and Iran were very dangerous and that women and children could not make it. They walked for about three days through the mountains of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. They were walking through snow and swimming in cold rivers. Smugglers put up to 15 or 17 people in one private car and travelled like that for three or more hours. Interviewee A explained:

Before the border of Iran and Turkey, first I went to the water, and snow was also there, and after the water I slept for some 45 minutes in the snow, and my clothes were not dry, and then the car came and took us to Turkey. And the women can’t come like this: walking, swimming... it is a very dangerous way. The only easy way was from Greece to Germany, because the government helped.

Many people were killed on the way before reaching Turkey and nobody, according to my interviewees, reported it. It was dangerous to undertake such a journey from Afghanistan to Europe. Women and girls were lost and raped and nobody dared to take his family with him. Besides, women and children were not in such danger in Afghanistan as men were. "Normally, the Taliban, terrorist groups, they do not kill women, but they definitely kill men. That’s why men are in more danger than women ".

When I asked them about the position of women in their society, they all agreed with the view of Interviewee A expressed in the following way:

Afghanistan is a religious and traditional country. We are respectful of women. According to our religion, women have rules and need to respect them. If there is a woman on a bus, no matter her age, you need to give your place to her. Of course, there is discrimination and they are not free, but we cannot do much against these religious and traditional rules.

For the interviewees it was normal that women go to school. According to them, only the Taliban, a minority, disagreed with that, while majority of Afghan people thought that women should go to school, to universities, that they should work, and be teachers, doctors, directors; whatever they wish. A comparison of these views with the stated political discourse of the Croatian president brings us back to the realm of stereotypes, where all Afghans are seen as not respecting women nor their rights.

While explaining why they could not stay in Iran or in Turkey, they said that Afghan people could not stay in Iran because the Iranian Government did not accept them; they could live there only in hiding. But in Turkey, "it is good, the government accepts all refugees. The first day they make for you everything: papers, and tomorrow you can go to work. But they do not give passports to refugees... there you must live alone. You must forget about everything... you cannot bring your family, you cannot go back to your country to see your family... and you cannot stay in the camps there for more than 3 days; you need to find some work and a place when you can live, without papers, but you can work without papers."
Conclusion

In his novel “The Night in Lisbon” from 1961, Erich Maria Remarque described the lives of refugees at the start of the World War II, who came to Portugal in order to escape the war in Europe and were trying to flee to America. He wrote that Portugal "was the gate to America. If you couldn't reach it, you were lost, condemned to bleed away in a jungle of consulates, police stations and government offices, where visas were refused and work and residence permits unobtainable, a jungle of internment camps, bureaucratic red tape, loneliness, homesickness, and withering universal indifference. As usual in times of war, fear, and affliction, the individual human being had ceased to exist; only one thing counted: a valid passport.” (Remarque 2014: 4). This situation is comparable to what is now going on with people seeking asylum in Europe, as presented in this paper. Though we are not living in a time of war or affliction in Europe (though we certainly live in a time of at least occasional fear), some individual human beings – asylum seekers – have ceased to exist and for them only one thing counts: to get asylum and a permit to stay, something which they are not sure they will be able to obtain.

This paper has presented Croatian politicians’ representations of asylum seekers as presented in the media, and confronted these views with the discourse of asylum seekers who were deported from Austria to Croatia. They were among the deported ones, and not among the ones who could stay in Austria, because the Austrian Government looked at them with the “working” eye, and not with a blind eye, as one of the interviewees said that an Austrian lawyer explained to him. Political discourse on asylum seekers in Croatia and the lived experiences of individual asylum seekers from Afghanistan are shown to have little or nothing in common.

Though the aim of the paper was not to thoroughly examine the background and whole story behind described deportations of asylum seekers within the countries of the European Union, it is certainly an area that demands attention and more in-depth research, especially as regards respecting human rights and the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. Interviewing the lawyers and the police officers who participated in these actions of deportation would also shed light on what was going on; for example, in terms of solidarity among people, which is one of the core European values, as expressed in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. My research also showed what Herzfeld (1992: 45) argued about bureaucrats: that they are “skilled actors” who “put a face of unemotional neutrality on their every action.” Interviewing people in the Austrian administration who have participated in these deportation procedures would show that Herzfeld’s subsequent argument was equally true: that “it is only when one makes a conscious effort to contrast their practices with those of everyday sociality that the systematic oddity of what they do begins to emerge with any clarity” (Ibid.).
References


Abstract

This paper looks at three major events from the “refugee crisis” of 2015 and how they have been covered in the two main TV news outlets of Austria and Hungary respectively. The three events under scrutiny are the discovery of the abandoned “death van” on an Austrian highway (August 27, 2015), the “refugee march” towards the Austrian border (September 4, 2015), the border closure between Serbia and Hungary and the ensuing clashes between refugees and Hungarian police at the Hungarian border town of Röszke (September 15-16, 2015).

By examining a selection of 459 TV news items, we extract particular patterns of media representation of actors and expertise, topics and framings, or labels and descriptions of insecurity, feeding into a more nuanced understanding of how migration is presented as an issue of security on these different channels. Complementing these findings with observations of the media landscape in both countries, we want to raise the question of the specific role of the media in turning migration into an issue of security; a perspective that we argue is largely missing from such analyses.

By tracking the differing presentations of migration – which in this case involves close scrutiny of the public (media) discursive framings with their inclusion of expert voices, differing representation of actors and framings, and the competing language of insecurity used by political actors – we furthermore aim to demonstrate the promising potential of media analysis for the fields of both Security and Migration Studies.43

Introduction

In the summer of 2015, the topic of migratory dynamics and refugee movements towards and within Europe came to dominate media and public discourse, and has remained at the center of attention ever since. Migration surfaced repeatedly in political discourse during the preceding decades, for example in Europe when new migratory dynamics arose after the end of the cold war, or with the uprooting of people during the Yugoslav wars. Political parties and figures use it to sharpen their profiles, and discourse has at times hindered or propelled the integration of those arriving in Europe, as well as adjusting to new migratory developments and realities.

This attention may thus be seen as a political and/or societal interest in mobility issues but can also be described as an increase in the media attention towards it; with the notable increase in media coverage of events as they unfolded during the year 2015, both compared to previous years but also with regard to later stages of the movement and arrival of high numbers of asylum seekers, and issues such as housing, relocation, or integration.

What we want to examine is the role of the media in this discourse, taking seriously its potential as the fourth estate, and its responsibility to provide an independent and well-informed voice with balanced coverage.

One way to provide for this may be to include a diversity of voices and perspectives, another may be to include experts who have a thorough understanding of what is going on and are not tied to public approval (e.g. in the need to win votes, as politicians do). For migration scholars it is striking, however, how little the existing body of knowledge of their field seems to feed into public discourse and be acknowledged in policy debate and formulation. A welcome contribution shedding light on the uses of expert knowledge in policy has been put forward by Christina Boswell (Boswell, 2008; Boswell, 2009; Boswell, 2017). This is important because introducing expert knowledge and sound analysis may, among other things, counter a securitizing language and help create solidarity (Hafez, 2016). Migration scholars themselves have there-

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43 I want to thank particularly Dumitrita Holdis for developing the idea to this paper with me and putting in countless hours of work analyzing the Hungarian part of our sample as well as her time discussing the paper at various stages – without her, it would not have been written. I would also like to thank Vera Messing and Benjamin De Cleen for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Andras Szalai for a comprehensive and much-needed review. All shortcomings and errors, however, are still of course my own.
fore taken it upon themselves to make the case for more balanced reporting on migration (for example Triandafyllidou, 2017).

Having been given the opportunity to work with an extensive data sample on the media representation of migrants/refugees in Hungary and Austria, this paper aims to look at whether and how expert knowledge is presented in the media, both by journalists and by those given a voice in the various channels. It will present a well-grounded description of the media representation of migration expertise and of the competing input of political actors in Austria and Hungary respectively.

Securitization is a term in International Relations that refers to a topic being turned into a matter of security and hence an existential problem for the state (which it may not necessarily be). While classical Security Studies focus on material dispositions, this constructivist approach rather focuses on the discursive process of constructing the “threat”. It requires that the issue under “securitization” receives disproportionate attention and enables extraordinary responses by the state, such as the heavy employment of police forces or even the declaration of a state of emergency. For this paper, it is also noteworthy that it requires an audience, which needs to be convinced that an issue is a security threat – in our case, this audience equals the audience of the TV channels in our sample. The paper therefore involves an analysis of the securitizing moves made by politicians and the government, but is equally concerned with the role of the media in enabling (or possibly amplifying or distorting) them.

Based on a separate re-examination of a subset of the original dataset (Messing & Bernáth, 2016), we will be able to track the different characteristics of securitization in both countries, the use/non-use of expert knowledge in mediated discourse, the competing languages of insecurity used by politicians and the government, but is equally concerned with the role of the media in enabling (or possibly amplifying or distorting) them.

A Study of the Media Framing of Migration

The attention that migration receives in public discourse and how it is represented as a topic in the media can be broadly characterized as contested. For touching upon the very question of the identity of the individual and the polity the individual inhabits, it is grounds for heated debate, populist discourse, emotional responses, and at times even hate speech and violence. Following the experience of the “long summer of migration” in 2015 for example, it can also bring out benevolent actions in which (again both) the individual and the larger community assert their identity in a more positive embrace of the arrival of “others”.

In media discourse, it is often apparent how these different responses are pronounced by a variety

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44 This dataset was originally used by Vera Messing and Gabor Bernáth (Messing and Bernáth (2016)). The authors want to thank the Center for Media, Data, and Society at Central European Union’s School of Public Policy for generously allowing the further use of this dataset.

45 I want to thank the reviewer for pointing out already-extant literature on this subject, namely Villumsen Berling (Villumsen Berling (2011)) who questions whether securitization theory has adequately addressed the issue of context and points to the science as co-determining the status of a securitizing actor and thus its influences on the authority of the speaker in specific fields.
of actors to varying degrees. These two sides, the securitizing and the humanitarian response, are also at the heart of the data, which we are examining. Based on an original dataset, compiled for a study by Messing & Bernáth (2016)\(^{46}\), the increasing dominance of a securitizing media discourse – and the corresponding “crowding out” of a humanitarian discourse – have been shown in three events in our sample during the “long summer of migration” of 2015. We are following up on the realization of the omission of the role of expertise and expert voices in their original study of the media representation of migration. So this paper seeks to put special attention on the potential role of experts, their representation and speaking time (‘share of voice’) in the media, and the context, particularly how they fare in comparison to political actors and if we can detect a distinct expert “voice” and influence in media discourse.

Securitization of Migration & Expertise

The role of expertise or expert knowledge and how it informs political debate and policy decisions has garnered some attention in (migration) scholarship in recent years ((Barnett & Finnemore, 2004); (Fischer, Miller, & Sidney, 2007), Chapter 9; (Sending, 2015); (Stehr & Grundmann, 2011); (Littoz-Monnet, 2017), e.g. (Haas, 2017) or (Bosswell, 2017); (van Nispen, Frans K. M. & Scholten, 2017}). Stemming from a different source, yet still based on an accepted form of authority, expertise can certainly bring a different angle to a (political/public) debate, in providing facts, narratives, and novel perspectives from someone who is (or is claimed to be) an expert on the topic under debate. More broadly, it seems evident that in an increasingly complex and professionalized environment both politicians and the public rely on experts to explain complex knowledge and deliver sound judgement. (How facts and fact-based evidence relate to larger narratives, and how these narratives may be politically used will be discussed further below.)

In securitizing a certain topic, in this case refugees, the state not only frames an issue in a certain way, but by presenting a security issue – i.e. by securitizing it – the state also brings into question its own sovereignty while simultaneously presenting a raison d’être for its very existence; the securitization of an issue is hence coupled with the sovereignty of the state and its legitimacy as a political authority (and thus links the security issue to the issue of the political itself.) This securitization can include a form of othering of the migrant/refugee. “Immigrants and refugees are not simply seen to be disturbing ordinary life of a number of individuals […] Rather, they are portrayed as endangering a collective way of life that defines a community of people” (Huysmans, 2006: 46).

Concerning the strongly apparent securitizing debate/securitization pointed out by Messing & Bernáth (Messing & Bernáth, 2016) and the observation of an underappreciation of expertise, Huysmans (Huysmans, 2006) notes that discursive approaches “tend to undervalue the importance of security experts in framing domains of insecurity” (Huysmans, 2006: 8). Yet, in bureaucratic and professionalized societies, [...] both technology and experts play an extremely important role in modulating social and political practice (Huysmans, 2006: 9, emphasis added). Accordingly, Huysmans underlines the importance of a technocratic interpretation of insecurity.
The framing of an event in existential terms, the creation of unease and fear, and the ‘politics of insecurity’ are here the steps by which security turns from a referent object into a technique of government, and the use of (security) experts may be regarded as an existential part of this technique. By drawing upon experts and their authority, e.g. a security expert, precisely these steps can be achieved. How politicians, and for that matter the media, include expertise and experts in the process of securitizing immigration hence deserves closer scrutiny.

Beyond the link between expertise and securitization, migration scholarship is concerned with the role of facts and narratives, and the politicization of the debate around migration. Boswell (Boswell, 2009) has pointed out the ways in which expert knowledge is politically used to inform, legitimate or substantiate policies on migration. In politicized debates, such as the one surrounding migratory and refugee movements, appealing to “non-political scientific curiosity” can be a means for both politicians and experts to disseminate facts to an otherwise unreachable audience (Chu, 2017).

Anti-immigrant sentiment may arise not only from a lack of information, but also from an underlying sentiment of anxiety and fear that cannot be properly addressed with data or statistics. This is where positive narratives and images may be the way forward “in trying to persuade a skeptical public that immigration is not the threat many of them perceive it to be” (Boswell & Hampshire, 2017; see also Boswell, 2011, Boswell, Geddes, & Scholten, 2011). Narratives on immigration can be shaped by political elites by “invoking background ideas about what sort of approaches are feasible and legitimate” (Boswell & Hampshire, 2017). In a negative perspective on narratives, Pécoud (Pécoud, 2015) denounces the depoliticizing jargon used in International Migration Narratives (IMNs) for presenting human mobility as a technical problem which is ultimately addressable (and solvable) in managerial terms, yet omitting fundamental (capitalist) contradictions. Meanwhile, Guiraudon argues against the politicization of the topic being counterproductive if one seeks to limit the impact of security framing. An integral part of politicizing immigration however, is “the expansion of participants in the debate on migration […] to larger constituencies” (in Huysmans, 2006: 119): Next to the political elites, and the media, the larger constituencies themselves are instrumental in the securitization of migration.

Furthermore, the absence of expertise is troubling in several regards: sound information and knowledge, as well as positive narratives of the sort that can be provided by experts, would help create solidarity with those seeking (international) protection by raising empathy (Hafez, 2016; Boswell & Hampshire, 2017). The non-use of expert knowledge, the disregard for facts, and ultimately evidence-based policy-making, may indicate reliance on charisma or governance knowledge, and possibly a prevalence of ideology. However, while these authors point at the potentially positive contributions that both facts and narratives can have on discourse, the inverse may also be assumed for information and narratives: They can also present a deliberately negative input or spin to the public discourse.

Media & Expertise

The data collected by the initial research of Messing & Bernáth (2016) included significant material related to the analysis of actors and their voices. However, a specific analysis of “expertise” was missing. “Experts” were identified as potential actors during coding, but the variable referred strictly to technical experts. However, the “long summer of migration” as it took place in Hungary and Austria in 2015, saw a series of prominent actors intervening in the public space as advisors, managers and authority figures, defining and providing solutions to a phenomenon that seemed almost immediately defined as a crisis.

Why is it relevant to look at the representation of actors in the media? The media's portrayal of these actors is significant because, on the one hand, actors represented in correlation with specific themes, such as national security, cultural conflicts, health, and mobility contributed to the depiction of phenomena like migration as a crisis not for the mobile groups but for the autochthonous population. On the other hand, once certain forms of “authority” or
“knowledge” are summoned and depicted as the type of intervention necessary to manage a phenomenon, the reverse mechanism of delineation will occur. We therefore assume that experts are vital in the provision of facts & narratives, and hence in shaping the discourse along the solidarity-security-axis. (Experts or expertise is to be understood in a more general sense here, we are looking at academics, professionals and practitioners who have significant experience in their fields and can give insight into a situation that is beyond the general knowledge of the journalist. We took the labelling in the media items, e.g. of a “transport expert”, at face value and did not develop a more sophisticated categorization.) These observations beg the question of how much expert knowledge in the media representation of the “refugee crisis” is actually used. The focus of the following paragraphs will therefore be on the role of expertise against the backdrop of the securitization of migration as found by Messing & Bernáth (Messing & Bernáth, 2016). For the purpose of this research, the dataset has kindly been made available by the Center for Media, Data and Society. The media has an important responsibility to employ a degree of discretion (even under time and resource constraints) and to include certain voices providing a narrative on an issue. They “play a key role in the construction of political questions and in mediating between politicians and the public” (Huysmans, 2006: 120). By casting migration in a clichéd way “they [the media] tend to highlight the involvement of immigrants and refugees in violence and other forms of illegal or illegitimate practices. In a context of stereotypical media coverage and with an electorate that seems rather receptive to xenophobic arguments, electoral concerns push many politicians to support a restriction of migration. Expanding the scope of the debate also allows the participation of political actors, in this case especially anti-immigration parties and movements, who do not have immediate access to the restricted policy venues of more technocratic decision-making” (Guiraudon, 1998a: 290-293, in Huysmans, 2006: 120).

A distinct/dominant media narrative can be formative of public opinion, and hence public response, towards the issue in question. The media is therefore attributed a capacity to decisively steer a society towards solidarity, and in this particular case towards migrants and refugees. While the foci of media attention, framings in voice and visuals fall under contemporary style and changes – and in this sense mass media is dependent on social actors (politicians, social movements, populists, radicals) to which they react particularly well – the creation of such solidarity can be furthered either by evoking empathy with “the other” (e.g. via analogies) or by representing the “we group” acting in solidarity. The steering of activities of the population by the media follows the framing of the events, including the reasoning for the causes (root causes of migration, refugee movements) and the presentation of solutions (Hafez, 2016).

As Martiniello (Martiniello, 2017) points out, migration scholarship still has ample potential to learn and benefit from embracing Media and Communication Studies – and this pertains to the perspective it provides as well as the approaches and methods this discipline has to offer. While we are not going to focus on particular visual depictions of (expertise on) migration, we can certainly imagine how certain visualization might support and deepen the securitization of an issue. In our data sample we noticed certain motives, with particular differences in some groups of actors being depicted (“shown in the picture”) and given voice, while others, namely the army and migrants, where shown much more often but given much less voice. However, we did not follow up on it systemically, so we cannot present out a specific pattern.

Having briefly introduced the debate on securitizing migration, we have pointed to the functions of experts and expertise as well as the role of the media in gathering and presenting political discourse and information, which guides the analysis in the following chapter.
The Media Landscape in Austria and Hungary

As an important complement to our analysis of the media representation of migration expertise, the media landscape of the two case countries Austria and Hungary will briefly be explained below. This exercise serves to outline characteristics and/or structural implications of media production that are particular to the two case countries and may have an influence on the media coverage of a topic itself.

Austria has had a dual public-private media system since 2001. This has resulted in a proliferation of private broadcasters, to the detriment of the national public broadcaster’s audience. Regional and local newspapers are very popular, as are local broadcasters. Online media is gaining increased market share with many print media outlets having an online platform as well. ORF is the national broadcasting television (market share of 11% in 2015) and Puls4 is one of the most popular commercial channels in Austria, owned by the Pro Sieben group (market share of 3% in 2015). European University Institute’s Media Pluralism Monitor qualifies risks to the Austrian media as “primarily due to the lack of protection for the right to information, the politicization of control over media outlets, political bias in the media, the concentration and lack of transparency in media ownership, influence over the financing of publicly supported media, limited access to the media of different social and cultural groups, and the tendency to the centralization of the media system. There are also insufficiencies in broadband coverage” (Media Pluralism Monitor, report on Austria, October 2015: http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2015/results/austria/).

Meanwhile, Hungary has a mix of state and privately owned media outlets, with media production concentrated in Budapest. The market leaders for broadcasting, print and online media are based in the capital. Private TV stations have higher audience levels than the public broadcaster. There are four public channels in Hungary that were merged into one trust fund MTVA in 2011. M1 belongs to this group with a market share of 3% in 2016. RTL Klub is the most popular private TV channel (12% market share) and is owned by a consortium (https://thetvhu.blogspot.hu/2017/01/2016-csatorna-nezettseg-tv-adok.html (retrieved 26 March, 2017). The 2014 Media Pluralism Monitor qualifies Hungary as a high risk country for media pluralism (Media Pluralism Monitor, report on Hungary, 2014: http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/results-2014/hungary/).

According to the Freedom House Freedom of the Press Report, Hungary has had a five-year decline in press freedom and now its media is qualified as ‘partially free’. The report adds, “Hungary’s media environment, which has suffered from increased state regulation and other interference since 2010, deteriorated slightly in 2014 as the government continued to exert pressure on private owners to influence coverage, and a new advertising tax disproportionately affected a major private television station.” (Freedom House, Freedom of the Press Report Hungary 2015: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/hungary). Overall, there is a risk of political bias in both media systems, where particularly Hungary is experiencing a decline in press freedom and can no longer be considered free (but “partially free”).

The media as a public service provider – state-owned and/or state-governed media companies, state-regulated media companies, etc. – does have a responsibility in how to report on an event, for example in terms of plurality of voices and “balanced” coverage of events. From the concentration of ownership and the interference of the state and the resulting political bias (again particularly in the Hungarian media), we want to raise some doubt that the media is able to represent migration issues impartially, unaffected by the dominant government position.49

Voices and Framings in the Media Representation of Migration

Against this backdrop of information regarding the potential role of experts in public discourse on migration, the role of the media in representing different voices, and the media landscape in both case countries, we will now turn to the actual data sample.

49 For a discourse analysis of the populist approach of the Hungarian government of and during the so-called refugee crisis 2015-16, see Zsolt (Zsolt (2017)).
It includes the four main TV news channels of both countries (one public and one private channel in each country) with a total of 459 news items related to three events: The “death van”, the “border march” and the border closure, or the corresponding time spans respectively. The news items in the sample ranged from under half a minute, to around nineteen minutes in length. The Hungarian sample has considerably more numerous reports, while the Austrian private channel Puls4 only made a total of 19 news items available. In all but the first table, we have therefore resorted to giving the actual numbers of representations, instead of percentages, because the sample was skewed in this regard.

As a first step, we will now be looking at the representation of actors, both in terms of how often they are shown and how often they are given a voice, and how different groups are represented, particularly experts compared to politicians and migrants. In the second step we will then look at the framing of the “migration crisis”, in terms of the framing of the “crisis” itself, the problematization of (im)migration, the corresponding solutions offered, and the employment of a “language of insecurity” used in the discourse. In this part, we will be able to point both to the difficulties of framing or defining expertise as well as possible linkages between the non-use of expert knowledge and the non-representation of certain issues/topics, both of which point toward structural implications for the media itself. An attempt to appreciate the diversity of the media coverage will finish this empirical section.

### Dominating the Discourse – Image and Voice

A broad overview of the main political and governmental appearances and their time speaking (‘share of voice’) is shown in the table below. The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>RTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister/Chancellor</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Government</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Politician</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Servant</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician: Opposition (left)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician: Extreme Right</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Decision Maker</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.0: Share of Voice of Political Actors and Migrants
table furthermore contrasts this speaking time with the representation and share of voice of migrants, with the upper line of each row signifying the percentage of overall representation, the lower line the share of voice of this representation.

This succinct overview of the data already points to the fact that members of the government and the political class usually will be speaking when they are shown; the percentage ranks between 67% and 100%. Also, foreign politicians and members of the opposition are offered the space to express themselves - even in the highly edited version of TV news. What is also striking is the great visibility of migrants and security forces in the news, but a visibility that is muted: Their share of voice ranks only between 27% to 36% for the army, and 0% to 13% for migrants. The case of the EU as an actor is interesting, as it is a dominant topic in the Hungarian news, but its representatives are almost never shown or heard.

Experts, together with the voices of migrants, of civil society groups and the local population are consistently underrepresented in our sample. The role of the "expert" in this plurality of voices is traditionally used in news media to give (an air of) objectivity and authority to the report (Hall et al. 1978) but in a broader sense, it also works as an identifier for a situation. The lack of experts in the news during the migration crisis can be explained partially by operational biases inherent to news media: sensational events are over-reported, the news media cycle is increasingly fast, journalists will generally get closer to the government line during periods of crisis, etc. There is little time and few resources to devote to analysis and expertise during a crisis. However, while these arguments may explain to an extent the lack of a plurality of voices in the news, they do not justify that lack.

Turning to experts and their representation in the media, we start by distinguishing certain "types" of experts, as well as certain patterns in voice/media representation of one type of experts over others. Here, we group certain professions into subgroups of the total-experts group in order to gain a more nuanced picture of the media representation of expert knowledge on migration.

We cluster these different types or subgroups of experts according to the presumably different functions they have in terms of why their knowledge/expertise/authority on a certain issue is represented in the media and the framings in which this knowledge can be applied. Based on the choice of events & findings of Messing & Bernáth (Messing & Bernáth, 2016) we expect expert knowledge to feed either into a securitizing or a humanitarian discourse. After having collected a first overview of the news items, we additionally allow for international experts and those contributing purely in technical terms to the discourse for reasons laid out below. Second, we will look at the frequency of the appearances of politicians, head of governments, and EU officials, to gauge how they position themselves vis-à-vis the expert groups.

The categorization into 4 subgroups is as follows:

- **International (humanitarian) experts** – expected to be the most likely contributors to a historical and geo-political contextualization of the events/time periods under examination, with an in-depth understanding of international migratory movements, interlinkages of mobility issues, and the challenges they may pose to individual states – this group contains (representatives of) international organizations such as the UNHCR

- **National security experts** – expected to be the most likely contributors to a discourse on security aspects of cross-border mobility – this group contains (representatives of) the police, the army, national and private security experts

- **National humanitarian experts** – expected to be the most likely to contribute to a humanitarian discourse – e.g. NGOs, civil society groups, church and church groups, medical staff,

- **Technical experts** – includes lawyers, business persons, political scientists.

Additionally, we assessed how often migrants and refugees were given a voice in our set of news items. Although we do not see them as "experts",...
we wanted to be able to compare the appearance of experts with that of migrants/refugees. The frequency of appearance in the media, (as shown in the table below,) is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>RTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of Items</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants/Refugees</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Experts in the Media

International experts, vital in providing historical, comparative, and geo-political contextualization, are almost absent from the media discourse in our sample. They are neither (re-)presented directly, nor referred to indirectly by other actors (e.g. politicians). Given that Vienna is home to offices of the UNHCR (one of its four headquarters and the National Office in Austria), the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), offices of the IOM (the IOM Country Office for Austria and the IOM Regional Office for South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia) and the headquarters of the International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) this result is especially troubling in the Austrian case. The international experts represented in our sample are 6x officials from the United Nations (5 of which were identified as UNHCR officials), 3x the Pope (twice on the RTL channel), and once there was an explicit reference to Amnesty International. This means that despite being based in Vienna when the “refugee crisis” of the fall of 2015 unfolded there, neither ICMPD, nor FRA, nor the IOM appeared on the main TV media channels to deliver sound information, facts and positive narratives to the Austrian public. Given the total number of news items, Austrian TV only included international expertise in their coverage of the events roughly 2.5 times more than Hungary: 3.3% and 1.3% respectively.

Another surprising finding was the high number of technical experts. These were mainly transport experts, commenting on the effect thousands of refugees have on national and international train and highway traffic. The traffic jams and interruptions along the Austro-Hungarian border were especially an issue here.

It should also be noted that the Austrian police (as part of the national security experts group) is unlikely to engage in securitizing language, but rather very technical, at times even humanitarian talk. The Austrian army is also counted among the group of security experts not engaging in securitizing discourse, this however may be linked to their special domestic status, i.e. their constitutional duties & responsibilities not to interfere with internal affairs.

Overall, the distinction into sub-groups by presumed input to the debate – e.g. either securitizing or humanitarian – have shown to be inconsequential or of little merit as the actual contributions differed from the expected ones. Given the small number of experts altogether, we were likewise unable to distinguish any particular institutional discourse (e.g. by the police, the immigration office, the Ministry of Health).

50 According to Art. 79 Paragraph 2 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG), the army can engage domestically in civil operations, i.e. in ‘Assistenzeinsätzen’, supporting domestic forces, and also in emergency situations, and in events of fundamental importance.
Second, we looked at the frequency of the appearances of politicians, head of governments, EU officials, and others belonging to the political sphere to learn how they compare to experts and migrants.

We can see from this table the total number of appearances for each of the groups of politicians. Unsurprisingly, the Hungarian government received an overwhelming voice in the Hungarian media, both in the private and on the public channel. Members of the Austrian government received a smaller (but still considerable) voice in Austrian media. Interestingly, while reference to each other (Austria-Hungary) was quite low despite the event selection, other countries also figured prominently in the media coverage; this includes Germany (chancellor Merkel’s decision to allow unregistered entry to German territory), the countries of the Balkan route, and to a lesser extent Russia (Putin), and the V4 group (which over the course of events formed a distinct anti-relocation agenda). The Hungarian public TV station M1 was also very representative of local politicians’ voices; mainly the mayors of border towns.51

Most surprising, however, was the lack of EU representation in the media discourse. As we will see in the following section, the shortcomings of the European Union were the most-identified problem in the media coverage. Yet almost no voice was given to EU officials, and even less than to international experts.

The Problematization of Immigration, Solutions, and Definitions of the ‘Crisis’

In the next step, we looked at the frequency of a ‘problematization of migration’ in the media coverage. For this, we examined areas where a certain situation was explicitly portrayed as a “problem” and to whom this “problem” was attributed. For example, if the EU is named a “problem” this is where the speaking person locates a malfunction or a deficiency, providing the answer to the question “Who or what is the problem?” We only coded this when a clear problematization occurred and arrived at 6 main topics (see table below):

What we can derive from these numbers is a clear dominance of problematizing the role of the European Union in the “refugee crisis”. However, there were clear distinctions in the language used between Hungarian and Austrian channels: While for the Hungarian media it was rather a matter of a failure of the European Union to act appropriately (in the sense of blaming the supranational level), it was clearly a matter of lack of solidarity and burden-sharing within the EU for the Austrian media.

51 Many thanks to the reviewer for pointing out that the vast majority of local politicians also belong to the governing party FIDESZ. So while different levels may be given voice, this does not necessarily mean that different perspectives or opinions are represented in the media coverage.
We can also see that the public Hungarian channel (M1) in particular also attributed the problem to the refugees themselves; some of the themes identified here were the “disorderly” movement of the people, their criminal behavior, their disruption of public order – both in technical terms (e.g. clogging of trains and transport ways) and in ontological security terms (e.g. Hungarians have a diffuse feeling of loss of safety and threat to their traditional Christian identity).

Please note that we cannot assess properly from our data sample whether this problematization should be regarded as a “news producing” mechanism inherent to the function of media itself and/or as a distinct populist anti-immigrant discourse; it may be related to both.

The surprisingly high amount of domestic problematization in both Hungarian public and Austrian private media can be attributed (especially in the Hungarian case) to rather fierce inter-party quarrels – the government and opposition parties blame each other for their handling of the situation – and complain about the lack/non-employment of domestic capacities as the main content of statements made. The treatment of refugees as a problem pertains mainly to the under-provision of refugees (with food, shelter, etc.) and only marginally to the actual conflict in Syria (or the situations in other countries of origin) pointing to a clear lack of contextualization.

The sacrifice of contextualization and, where possible, explanation, and instead a focus on domestic issues, concerns, and problems aligns with the lack of international experts and the dominance of domestic actors in a strongly populist context.

In a follow-up to this problematization, we checked whether actual solutions were provided in the same news segment.
In bringing up possible remedies or solutions to the identified problems, the Hungarian TV channels stressed the separation of refugees from the autochthonous population (e.g. via border control, housing in camps, transport in separate buses), and also explicitly called on the EU to take action (while at the same time vehemently rejecting the proposed relocation scheme/quota system). This is echoed to a lesser extent in the Austrian media – and again, also in a softer tone.

It is noteworthy that ORF was the only channel that pointed at the larger geopolitical context by singling out that addressing the root causes of the refugee movements may be a “solution”, too. Coincidentally, ORF was also the channel with the largest inclusion of international experts. However, it were not experts who provided this “solution” but the then-president of Austria Heinz Fischer, and the then-chancellor Werner Faymann.

Overall, these numbers point to the fact that even though there is a certain inclusion of international, humanitarian, and technical experts, seemingly no message of a domestic humanitarian solution has successfully been placed or developed in the media discourse. We also find that the lack of international experts (Table 1.3) correlates with the lack of “international solutions” as “addressing root causes” (Table 1.4). Complementing the previously presented data on the share of voice of certain experts and political groups, on the problematization of the events in our sample, we also wanted to see how the “crisis” is actually framed. We looked at the frequency of the word “crisis” and its connotation in each news item. Three different understandings of “crisis” emerged in the process (frequency table per TV channel below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>RTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of Items</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“refugee crisis”</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“humanitarian crisis”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“crisis of the European Union”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unspecified)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.5: Framing of the “Crisis”

It is noteworthy here that use of the word “crisis” is actually very limited, and that the crisis is variously understood either as a “migrant/refugee crisis”, a “humanitarian crisis” or an unspecified “crisis”. The Hungarian public TV leads in the employment of a “refugee crisis” terminology to describe the events. It should also be noted that the media in Austria (especially the public channel) only picked up on the “crisis” language during the second or third event. In their coverage of the “death van,” the main characterizing word used was “tragedy” or “drama” (and not “crisis”). It should also be noted that “the refugee crisis”, which seems to be something of a common-knowledge terminology now, did not seem to have this universal character in the fall of 2015, judging from our sample.

Presenting how an “international expert” may have framed large-scale movements in the summer and fall of 2015, and the various responses by European national governments and the EU itself, we draw on the work of Heather Crawley (Crawley, 2016). She is currently a Senior Research Fellow with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and has earned her doctorate from the University of Oxford. Her work focuses on international migration, asylum, refugees, or migration decision-making among others. She notes that the notion of the “crisis” may not so much arise from the actual numbers involved in the so-called “refugee crisis” – they “pale into insignificance” when taking into account the number of tourists, students, and those travelling on work visas – but an “unwillingness of politicians and policymakers to engage with research evidence on the dynamics of migration and to harness their combined resources to address the con-

sequences of conflict and underdevelopment elsewhere, speaks more strongly to the current state of the European Union than it does to the realities of contemporary migration” (Crawley, 2016: 13).

We know, however, from previous examinations of the data (Messing & Bernáth, 2016) that a distinctly securitizing discourse was detectable in Hungary as well as in Austria (albeit to a lesser extent). In order to better understand the extent of the use of language of ‘insecurity and fear’ (Huysmans 2006), we tracked the explicit use of the words ‘insecurity’, ‘fear’ and ‘threat’ and arrived at the following frequency table:

Comparing the four different channels, it becomes apparent how the Hungarian public media employs a language of insecurity that puts migrants/refugees (as the source of insecurity) at the center: Migrants are depicted as violent and criminal towards both civilians and the police. They also paint an alarming picture concerning the safety of their borders and the stability of both the nation and the European Union. The Austrian public channel ORF also employs some alarming language, yet when directly compared to M1 the tone is much weaker: While in Hungary, refugees are a direct threat to the population and the nation, in Austria it is more the generally non-orderly movement of the people that is regarded as a source of insecurity.

It is noteworthy that ORF is the only channel which also lets migrants/refugees express their sense of insecurity: including both (in)security concerns regarding their country of origin and their treatment in Hungary. We also want to underline that the inclusion of migrant voices as done by ORF in our sample – though it should be self-evident – is extraordinary within the ongoing process of othering (in the process of securitization).

RTL and Puls4 on the other hand, have very few counts of using securitizing language – interestingly the one case where a journalist presented such a language (as “migrants/refugees as a threat/source of insecurity”) he was rebuked by the interviewee who made a point of employing desecuritizing language.

Gauging the Quality of Media Coverage

Finally, based on our sample and by looking at the different voices in the media coverage, we were able to assess the diversity of media coverage of events. We decided to look for news items with three or more different actors as the benchmark for a balanced and/or diverse media representation of different perspectives and/or issues.

As we can see from the table, none of the Hungarian TV items included three or more different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Of Insecurity</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>RTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of Items</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“borders under threat”</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“migrants/refugees as threat/source of insecurity”</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/domestic instabilities</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smuggling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(voiced by refugees)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.6: Themes of the “Language of Insecurity”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources/actors</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>RTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of Items</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or more different voices</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.7: Diversity of Media Coverage
sources, while both Austrian public and private TV each had six items that displayed a particular diversity. This number has to be taken with caution, however, especially as regards Puls4: For this TV channel, we only had a fairly small sample and items had a much longer duration (up to 19 minutes long) than on the public channel ORF. Having more time at their disposal, journalist actually had the opportunity to include more actors and thus potentially give a more nuanced picture.

Assessing the number of actors that are given a voice in each news item does not in itself indicate a balanced and/or diverse media representation of different voices and perspectives – a TV channel could decide to invite three like-minded discussants for a round-table, for example. The further assessment of the Austrian sample indicates that only in some cases did the number of different voices actually present balanced coverage in the sense of covering different political views on the same topic. More often, it represents the inclusion of different types of actors who testify on different aspects.

As pointed out earlier, the actual number of different voices is not in itself a sufficient condition to determine whether media coverage is balanced or not. However, the complete lack of diversity (according to our benchmark) in the Hungarian media coverage strongly corresponds to the developments of media concentration and concentration of ownership, and the inherent partisanship, which these developments imply. It adds to the findings of a dominance of the government in the discourse, with its use of a particular framing of the “crisis” as well as the employment of a “language of insecurity”. Against the finding of the inclusion of voices of the opposition parties (Table 1.2), we conclude that further qualitative assessment is necessary to gauge the quality of media representation.

Discussion & Conclusion

Although refugee movements are an inherently inter-national phenomenon, the international level is almost absent in this sample of media representation, both in terms of what we called “inter-national expertise” and in terms of EU politicians. Given that the EU is named as a primary “solution” to the “migration crisis”, the lack of voice from the EU is all the more astonishing.

Interestingly, our findings regarding the inclusion of expertise in analysis were less conclusive than anticipated. The deproblematizing, or rather the non-securitizing language of what we classified as “security experts” opens up new questions both on the role of security experts and their embeddedness in larger institutional discourses (that may enable or prevent them from using a securitizing language) and also on their selection (the “giving a voice” to “experts” by the journalists and their respective channels more generally). The presence of “humanitarian experts”, on the other hand, did not yield the anticipated spin towards a more humanitarian discourse, which equally deserves further investigation.

The numerous appearances of migrants in the Hungarian media likewise provided little spin towards a more humanitarian discourse; possibly due to the limitation of their voice to very basic statements (such as “We want to go to Germania [sic]”). And with “International experts” being almost absent from our sample, one of the most distinct findings was the importance of the tone in the securitization of the “migration crisis” which could not be properly captured by the quantitative observations of the sample.

This seemingly inevitable securitization also raised new questions on the link between the functions of the media (such as hyping of new information instead of dwelling on older “news”, the pushing of facts to a “newsworthy” story, the focus on government discourse and the lack of inclusion of diverging voices, e.g. for lack of time for sourcing these different voices, etc.) and the process of securitization. In both our case countries the media did not seem to match up to its ideal as a fourth estate in checking government discourse and presenting balanced and diverse coverage.

As a positive surprise however, we observed quite a lot of coverage of other countries: Not so much on each other (Hungary on Austria and vice versa...
– interestingly, given the case selection of ‘common events’), but on Germany, the countries of the Balkan route, Russia, and the V4 – all of them important actors in the regional dynamics of refugee mobility and governance. This in itself seems to represent a welcome diversity in perspectives and voices, knowing that for example Germany took a very welcoming stance towards immigration (at least for a specific time period), while for example the V4 countries were vocal in their refusal to accept the EU proposal of the relocation scheme.

The Hungarian public channel M1 stood out for its heavy inclusion of government voices and security experts, which were not balanced through the inclusion of other voices. Quite to the contrary, the signs of a securitization via the media were strengthened by both the exceptional inclusion of representatives from a subnational level – in what Huysmans described as the inclusion of the larger constituency – and its strongly negative description of the refugees. The data also clearly shows that M1 led in employing “crisis” language, both in the actual use of the word “crisis” as well as in the use of a ‘language of insecurity’. This raises questions on the complicity of the media in securitizing migration, and underlines the importance of including media studies in such analyses.

In Hungary, the discourse mobilized resources and demonstrated the strength of the government as being in control and able to handle the situation. In contrast to Austria, where perceived deficiencies in governmental/administrative capacities to fully control the migratory dynamics were addressed both internally and at the border, for Hungary it became simply a matter of “keeping the chaos out”, which, from a critical perspective, may actually point at weaknesses in the administration. Seen in a larger context, this discourse complements existing strategies of nationalism, introspection, and a literal and figurative walling-off from international considerations, commitments, and callings.

Considering the articles in our sample, little is being done by either the Austrian or the Hungarian media to craft a solidarity-generating narrative. While in other national contexts such inclusive narratives were characteristic of the “long summer of migration” in 2015 (Georgi, 2016), we could find only marginal evidence of this in our studies – and notably more in the Austrian than the Hungarian case. It may hence be plausible to refocus the “long summer” as the "long media summer of migration" which ended at the latest at the moment of the new year’s events in Cologne and other German cities – following what Maximilian Popp calls the media’s “baleful inclination to destroy its own narratives” (in: Hafez, 2016). There is also a sense of a “crowding out” of expert voices along the process of securitization of migration as the events of our sample unfolded. Additional analysis would be necessary to sustain this perception.

The information on the ‘capture’ of the Hungarian media helps to explain the visibility of a strong governmental push towards securitizing migration in our study. But as Fako (Fako, 2012) points out, the securitization approach (of the Copenhagen School) may not readily be applied to non-democratic state because the prerequisite, namely power-sharing institutions and the effect of securitization that links them, is less pronounced there.

With this paper’s focus on the role of the media we also raised questions on structural implications: How does the functioning of the media per se possibly influence the media’s coverage of events, the media representation of certain themes, topics, persons, etc., and ultimately what is the role of the media itself in securitizing an issue or presenting a securitizing frame for a certain topic? While we are not able to present a thorough finding on the structural implications, we could observe certain distortions and imbalances in the media representation of migration issues. Complemented with observations on the structural shortcomings of, in particular, the Hungarian media, it strongly suggests a relationship that we would like to explore in further research.
References


The Polish Perspective on the V4's Coalition Building along the Refugee Issue

Veronika Jóźwiak

Poland did not play a key role either in building up a V4 coalition against the mandatory redistribution of asylum seekers across the EU in 2015, or in offering an alternative V4 strategy of resolving the effects of the migration crisis. While the V4's voice against the quotas was dominated by the Hungarian government, it was the Slovak presidency of the Council of the EU which developed its "effective solidarity" concept based on the idea that member states should choose how they want to contribute to managing refugee inflows. Although when this was presented to the European Council it seemed that this concept would not break through to the EU agenda, currently the EU institutions are more open to implement flexibility to the future EU asylum system. Thus, the V4, despite their confrontational stance on the refugee issue, have managed to influence the EU discourse on migration. At the same time, adopting EU level solutions to migration which reflect the V4 stance will put an end to building the group's political cooperation around this topic.

The Polish position on EU proposals and decisions on resolving the internal aspects of migration crisis

Stances of the two Polish governments in office on proposals for remodeling the EU migration and asylum strategy (presented between March 2015 – March 2016) differed significantly. Differences between them might not seem essential, as both prime ministers – Ewa Kopacz (in office from September 2014 to November 2015) and Beata Szydło (from November 2015) – contested the EU-level solutions. However, while the Kopacz cabinet eventually approved the key element of the EU strategy – the temporary relocation to Poland of some of those refugees, who had already reached Europe, the Szydło government has more firmly opposed the EU proposals and postulates the modification of decisions already taken.

The Kopacz Government took a rather reactive position in the process of outlining an EU response to the migration crisis, as it did not take part directly in its elaboration. This was on the one hand the consequence of Ewa Kopacz's weaker political position. She took over the position of prime minister from Donald Tusk, after he had become President of the European Council. Besides, the peak of the migration crisis took place in a period when the governing Civic Platform's favorability was declining before presidential and parliamentary elections. All these circumstances influenced the Polish official position on migration issues. On the one hand it emphasized the need of a coordinated and complex community response. It also acknowledged European solidarity as a decisive aspect of taking action. PM Kopacz several times underlined that Poland as a country, which in recent years had very much benefitted from European solidarity, should now show solidarity with refugees coming to Europe. On the other hand, she supported the adoption of voluntary EU relocation and resettlement programs and opposed the idea of mandatory mechanisms, especially as a permanent solution to migration. She also criticized details and technicalities of EU decisions taken, e.g. the redistribution key criteria, which did not take into account the overall condition and shape of asylum and integration systems of particular member states or their contribution to fighting illegal migration. Additionally, she was against opening talks on reforms to the Dublin Regulation.

Eventually, the Kopacz-government committed in June 2015 to accept 2,000 refugees from relocation within the framework of the first implementation package. It also did not oppose the JHA Council decision adopted in September 2015 by a qualified majority vote on the mandatory relocation of 120,000 asylum-seekers across the Member States. The Polish government declared that altogether it would accept ca. 11,000 persons within the framework of EU relocation programs.

The current government has also presented its proposals on diminishing the effects of the migration crisis in the form of joint statements of V4 prime ministers and ministers. Such declarations were signed in February and November 2016. The V4 repeated their negative stance on the automatic permanent relocation mechanism, while expressing support for EU measures concerning the external dimension of resolving the migration crisis. They have agreed on more effective protection of the EU external borders, emphasizing that it should not interfere with the sovereignty of states in this regard. They highlighted the need to reinforce cooperation with third countries, including Turkey, end conflicts in Syria and Iraq, as well as to stabilize the situation in Libya. At the same time, Western Balkan countries have been invited to hold talks in the V4+ format on migration – the Prime Minister of Bulgaria and the President of Macedonia took part in the V4 summit in Prague in February 2016.

Despite many common denominators in the positions of all four Visegrad countries, strategies and steps taken have differed in each case. The V4 have rejected the mandatory relocation system. However, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have accepted a small number of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy within the voluntary scheme. This distinguishes them from Poland and Hungary, which have not taken in any refugees, though Poland had earlier announced that it would voluntarily participate in EU relocation programs. The Czech Republic has additionally agreed to participate in the EU resettlement program (resettling Syrian refugees from Turkey).

The issue of migration in Polish domestic politics

The current government has taken a firm stance on the internal aspects of resolving the migration crisis by the European Union, based on rejecting all forms of taking in refugees from relocation. This approach has been an identity-shaping element for the PiS government, which was established in November 2015, just after the peak of the crisis. Shortly afterward the European Commission started to present its proposals to reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the structural deficits of which had become visible during the mass influx of refugees to the EU.

PiS representatives, including the party leader, portrayed “Muslims” and “migrants” in public debate during the pre-election campaign as a constant threat to Poland – both to public safety and culture. As a result, the percentage of Polish citizens against settling refugees from Africa and the Middle East in the country has significantly risen (from 53% in June 2015 to 74% in April 2017), mainly through arguments concerning security and difficulties with their integration. A recent mass demonstration in October 2017, initiated by Catholic NGOs,


gathered a few hundred thousand people praying the rosary along Poland’s borders, also against the spread of Islam influence in Europe. This event was attended also by high level state officials from the governing party, including the deputy marshal of the Sejm. Such movements prove that the migration crisis is more and more perceived by one part of the Polish society as an existential threat, in spite of the fact that the number of asylum seekers applying for asylum in Poland is one of the smallest in Europe in proportion to the population (in Q4 2016 51 persons per 1 million inhabitants). Also, the ratio of applicants, who are eventually granted the status of refugee or similar is the second lowest in Poland (after Hungary) – less than 15%64.

Hungary positioning itself as V4 leader in providing solutions for the migration crisis

Despite its firm position on the migration crisis, Poland has not played a key role in building up a V4 alliance against the mandatory quota system. It was Hungary, which has been perceived by Western member states as the initiator of joint actions of the Visegrad Group in the field of migration. Both the government’s firm position aimed at diminishing the effects of the migration crisis and the establishment of the new Polish government in November 2015 have helped Hungary to impose their own vision of V4 cooperation on their partners in the group65.

In the summer of 2015, during the inflow of a record number of migrants to Europe, Hungary found itself on one of the main migratory routes. The Hungarian authorities rejected the compulsory acceptance of refugees and took radical actions in order to limit their inflow. These actions included the construction of a fence along the border with Serbia, the amendment of national asylum regulations, and a campaign against migrants. Although this approach has been criticized by most of European leaders, it broke through to the mainstream EU discourse on migration. Together with some economic policy steps (including the goal of meeting convergence criteria, the ongoing reduction of public debt over several years, and the introduction of the lowest corporate tax rate in the EU from 2017, although with only modest GDP growth), prime minister Viktor Orbán has begun to build a model of a state, which is becoming the subject of political debate in Europe. Because of the broad European context of his actions, PM Orbán has started to present himself in the EU as the informal leader of Central Europe. Also the German and French media have begun to perceive him as such, acknowledging him as the main opponent of European Community solutions in the region. On the other hand, he might be perceived in France and Germany as a much more predictable partner to talk to than his Polish counterparts.

Cooperation with Poland has become an important element for Viktor Orbán in strengthening his position in the region. His views on many issues are very close to the position of the Polish government, which has strengthened relations with Hungary. For Hungary, these relations have become the basis of all Visegrad cooperation, because they enable prime minister Orbán to create a political opposition within the EU. The concept of the EU as a community of sovereign nation states, which would be allowed to make decisions independently from the bloc’s majority position, fits closest to the goals of the Hungarian government. As Poland is in favor of EU reform aimed at limiting the political aspirations of the European Commission, the Orbán cabinet currently sees a Polish-Hungarian alliance as a good alternative to deeper integration within the EU. Hungary wants to politicize both the V4 as a whole and its cooperation with Poland. That is why it emphasizes the symbolic dimension, instead of pragmatic goals. In the rhetoric of the Hungarian government, these goals have been largely replaced by the need to strengthen relations because of common regional identity, the similarity of political programs, and shared historical experiences, in opposition to the idea and functioning of the EU. Hungary, while it remains on this ideological level of political discourse, does not put forward new proposals for V4 action.

As a consequence, Hungary has dominated both cooperation within the V4 and relations with Po-
land. Thanks to the role it has played during the migration crisis, it has strengthened its position within the Visegrad Group, at least as seen from the outside. PM Orbán ensured that the rejection of mandatory quotas for redistributing asylum seekers was acknowledged as the unifying element of the V4. As a result, Budapest found itself in the spotlight among European political forces opposed to accepting refugees.

This distinguishes Hungary from Poland, which has failed so far to unite the group with its concepts of EU treaty reform. The Polish government’s Treaty reform initiative has been based on the conviction that the European Commission has exceeded its powers and limits the competence of member states by preparing proposals – without their direct participation – which are of crucial political importance for the EU. Another element of the Polish Treaty reform proposal has been increasing the role of the European Council and limiting the role of the European Commission in the EU decision making process. However, Poland has not found any supporters among member states for its initiative.

V4 uploading their concept to the European agenda

The history of V4 cooperation after 2004 indicates that it has achieved its biggest successes when it was more engaged in seeking community solutions on the EU level. This conception of a constructive, community-based approach which best serves V4 interests and brings benefits not only to individual Member States, but also the EU as a whole, was promoted also by Poland, at least from 2011. Deepening European integration was also part of Polish foreign policy strategy at that time. This vision of V4 cooperation proved to be successful for example during the previous MFF negotiations or in regard to the Eastern Partnership program, initiated by Poland and Sweden in 2008, and later promoted also by the V4 as a group.

At the peak of the refugee crises in 2015 it seemed that the V4 had abandoned its community-focused approach. It did not show any willingness to reach a compromise and maintained its firm position on refusing quotas, while it did not offer, in fact, any other solution instead, until the Bratislava summit in September 2016. This approach has negatively influenced the Visegrad Group’s image in the EU. It has started to be perceived as one of the sources of the EU’s weakness, contesting community decisions, and thus questioning the EU decision making process itself. Furthermore, it seemed that the EU’s inability to implement the quota-decision (although it was not only the V4 to be blamed for that) would put the whole construction of the European Union under huge pressure.

Recently, on 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed complaints by Hungary and Slovakia seeking annulment of the Council of the EU decision to relocate asylum-seekers to EU member states66. The ruling could be interpreted as a sign that the EU does not intend to give up the implementation of the relocation programs adopted in 2015, even though the original deadline for implementation was the end of September. In June 2016, the Commission announced that member states’ commitment to accept relocated asylum-seekers would not disappear after the deadline. It seemed that the judgment in the Slovakia-Hungary case would encourage the Commission to put pressure also on other states that seek to waive their obligation. Infringement proceedings have already been launched against Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Thus, the recent ECJ ruling seemed to be a signal that the EU maintains its position and is willing to implement the Council decision.

However, the most recent approach presented at the European Council in October indicates the opposite. Currently we see that the EU is gradually giving up its previous concept on the internal dimension of the refugee issue, the mandatory relocation system included. It rather emphasizes the external dimension of the crisis – including effective protection of external borders, cooperation with third countries and tackling the root causes of migration, also in the form of development aid, just like the V4 have been postulating.

Since it was the Visegrad Group, which presented during the informal European Council in September

2016 in Bratislava its concept of “flexible solidarity”, which was further developed and promoted by the Slovak EU presidency as “effective solidarity”. The V4 proposal for a possible EU response to the challenge of migration was based on the assumption that EU member states should voluntarily choose the means by which they wanted to contribute to solving the crisis. According to this concept, relocation of asylum-seekers would only be one of the possible ways of expressing solidarity. States could also make financial contributions to the Member States under migration pressure, increase contributions to EU agencies, take over responsibility for the return of applicants, whose asylum claim has been rejected or share reception facilities with neighboring countries to process and examine applications. Although relocation cannot be easily replaced by any other form of assistance, including financial support, it seems that the Commission – at first skeptical about the V4 proposal – is currently more open to adopting more flexibility to the permanent relocation mechanism. Even if, in fact, it means the postponement of a compromise on a systemic change that would provide Member States with a sustainable internal mechanism of dealing with refugees. As it takes a long time to eliminate the root causes of the crisis, the problem will remain.

Thus, the confrontational attitude adopted by the V4 concerning the refugee issue has been just as successful as the earlier constructive, compromise-seeking approaches of the group. However, it remains a question, whether it has happened due to the personal influence of PM Viktor Orbán and his policy or the AfD-, FPÖ-effect. The radical right has strengthened all over Europe, which has pushed EU leaders to moderate their positions on migration.

Occasional Alliance?

According to EC President Donald Tusk’s Leaders’ Agenda, the EC should reach an overall agreement on internal and external aspects of migration policy by the end of June 2018. Tusk also admitted that he did not see any future for the mandatory quota system and called for unity and seeking for solutions, which did not divide member states. He considers consensus possible on such migration-related matters as: protecting external borders, support for frontline countries (Italy, Greece, Spain, Bulgaria), strategy towards Africa and an adequate support for international organizations helping refugees and migrants, European management over return and readmission policy and most elements of the Dublin Regulation reform. Thus, the current European debate on the future asylum system shows that the most important EU policy priority for Member States in the field of migration is preventing the arrival of migrants with no legal rights to the EU. Germany has also announced that it will take in no more than 200,000 asylum seekers a year.

Still, Hungarian leaders quote the EU Parliament’s lead negotiator on the Dublin Regulation, who demands an automatic permanent relocation scheme. Fidesz tries to prove this way that the topic of mandatory relocations is still on the table, and use it as an argument in pre-election campaign.

If the future European asylum system did not reflect the V4 stance on migration, this issue would prevail for longer on the top of V4 agenda and could unify the group in the long run. However, if eventually a solution was adopted, which to some extent reflects the group’s approach (eg. joint solutions including securing of borders, but also helping frontline countries which carry the biggest burden of migration), that would probably settle the conflict between Member States on this issue, and also end the V4 focus on this topic.

The EU Council decision adopted on October 23, 2017 on the posted workers directive shows that the V4’s unity cannot be maintained on European policy matters, when interests diverge. That also means that regional solidarity does not exist – only pragmatic interests matter for V4 decision makers. In the upcoming debate on the future of the EU there might be more such situations. If in key questions – e.g. Eurozone reform – some of the V4 countries decided to join a group of Member States realizing further integration, while others opted out, that would split the Visegrad Group with lasting and much more serious consequences, than any other already-extant dividing lines.
References


Chase for hope and certainty within Croatian initiative "Taste Zagreb" she held a presentation "Integration of refugees in Croatia: confronting the policies and the reality"; and in November 2016, at a Conference on Migration held in Zagreb, she presented a paper entitled "Chase for hope and certainty within Croatian initiative "Taste of Home"".

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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – its mission in Hungary
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is committed to the fundamental values of social democracy: we stand by the principles of freedom, justice, solidarity, peace and cooperation. As an “advocate of social democracy” we wish to contribute to the development of democracy, the rule of law and social justice in political and public life, as well as to an understanding between the people of a common Europe. Our partners representing political life, trade unions, the media and civil society are equally committed to these core values.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Project „Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe”
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s project „Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe” was established in March 2017 with the purpose to support the development of a common European Migration and Asylum Policy. Conferences, publications and research articles will be used to support the project. The main aims of the project are:

- Monitoring national discourses on flight, migration and integration and contributing to mutual understanding among the European countries.
- Exchanging experiences concerning integration and sharing best practices in the field of integration policies.
- Developing ideas and recommendations for a Common European Migration and Asylum Policy, as well as contributing to a rapprochement of the divergent approaches towards migration policy within Europe.