Envisioning a Future Security Sector for Syria

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This security needs assessment aims to contribute to open access information on good governance and security sector reform in Syria. It was specifically designed to understand citizens’ needs and identify entry points for citizen-oriented security sector reform efforts. It analyses how the Syrian security system would need to change in order for Syrians to feel safe and secure in post-war Syria.

The survey’s online questionnaire consists of 63 questions in Modern Standard Arabic. Between March and August 2018, 619 Syrians living in Germany completed the questionnaire. They came from all 14 Syrian governorates. On average, participants were 29 years old (born in 1989).

This working paper is part of a series. For an overview of the survey’s objectives, content, and participants, please refer to the Introduction to the Survey and Sample Group Composition, which may be found along with all other working papers by scanning the QR code or accessing the link below:

https://www.lanosec.de/ssr-survey-syria/

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Executive Summary

This working paper examines the criteria and characteristics that define the functionality of a security sector from a citizen-centred perspective. Furthermore, it presents the expectations of Syrians towards the structure and principles of the post-war Syrian security sector, as well as the role of civilian actors within it.

Survey results

The characteristics attributed by survey participants to a generally well-functioning security sector are manifold. However, they placed importance on overarching principles such as accountability, rule of law, oversight, and serving the population, rather than on technical issues such as effectiveness and efficiency.

Respondents have fairly clear ideas on how to deal with the current security sector after the end of the war. The vast majority thinks the security sector needs to be reformed or even rebuilt from scratch. Many participants advocate completely dismantling the security forces, and nearly all say that all militias need to hand over their weapons once the war is over. These results highlight the extent to which Syrians reject the status quo of the current security sector.

Regarding the future security sector, survey participants responded to different predefined statements. Security providers that respond to the needs of all citizens are clearly preferred. As such, the police should be the entity responsible for providing security for citizens. Syrians envisioned that their future security institutions would reflect gender equality. However, not all participants would allow their own daughters to work in the security sector. Although survey participants perceived the role of intelligence agencies as very negative before and during the war, a slight majority acknowledged that they play an important role for the security of the state in general. Nearly two thirds of participants are against having specific security providers who only serve to protect the president in post-war Syria.

Nearly all survey participants agree that the future security sector needs to be put under civilian oversight. Most participants would prefer civil society or the parliament to take on this role.

Survey participants showed a preference for civilian entities and groups to lead a future security sector reform process, such as the Ministry of Justice, citizens, the parliament, and civil society. Responding to the question of external assistance for rebuilding Syria’s post-war security sector, survey participants would prefer multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union to provide support, rather than individual countries, such as the United States or Russia.

Conclusions

Current political developments in Syria, and the likelihood that the regime will win the war militarily, limit the prospects for comprehensively reforming the Syrian security sector. However, it is important for international actors working in and on Syria to keep in mind how Syrians envisage an ideal security sector for post-war Syria. Without taking this into consideration, long-term stability and peace will be doomed to fail. This, therefore, prompts several recommendations for further academic research as well as policy analysis and development:

- Map all security institutions and non-state armed groups in Syria and conduct further research on their roles, responsibilities, and involvement in grave human rights violations. The results of this research and mapping are essential for any future trust-building scheme among conflict parties in Syria.

- Plan ahead to develop the police into a security provider trusted by all citizens through anticipating a future window of opportunity for citizen-centred security sector reform. Core security providers may have been militarised, especially during the war, resulting in the dissolution of boundaries between police
and military roles. Specific training programmes need to be designed to reorient the police to service delivery and citizen-orientation.

» **Conduct further surveys and focus group discussions on the needs of citizens in terms of security provision in different environments** (cities, villages, refugee camps), even though citizen-centred security sector reform interventions inside Syria seem unattainable in the near future. Discussions should involve all parts of society, especially women and youth, as well as important Syrian diaspora groups; for example, those living in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.

» **Strengthen the participation of women and girls in shaping a future security sector.** Specific awareness-raising programmes on gender equality should be developed addressing all parts of society. In addition, women and girls should be encouraged to share their security needs with stakeholders through specially designed programmes.

» **Foster capacities of civil society actors** to assume an active role in defining citizen-centred positions and objectives, and to effectively engage in civilian oversight of the security sector. All civilian actors, especially civil society and the media, need to be aware of their different roles and responsibilities regarding oversight of the security sector. To accompany any future reform process, dialogue platforms should be set up. They can provide citizens, including diaspora groups in their host countries, with a forum to share their experiences and concerns, as well as address concrete grievances they may have regarding any future security sector reform process for Syria.

» **Assess the position of Syrians regarding external assistance for rebuilding the security sector.** As shown in this survey, opinions on this question differ greatly. If citizens refuse interventions by external actors, such as multilateral organisations or individual countries, trust in reforms could be at stake from the very beginning.
Envisioning a Future Security Sector for Syria

Security sectors traditionally serve two core purposes: the protection of the public against crime and other dangers; and the protection of the state and its political institutions against institutional disruptions. These purposes partly overlap and can sometimes be at odds with one another (e.g., protecting civil rights vs. protecting the state through the surveillance of its citizens). Understanding citizens’ expectations towards the security sector illuminates the perspective of a central recipient of state security provision. How citizens, in return, assess the functionality of the security sector may differ from the state’s assessment and provide insights into citizens’ needs and priorities.

The most important characteristics of a functioning security sector

Survey participants rated the importance of different characteristics and principles of a functioning security sector, such as accountability, oversight, rule of law, serving the population, accessibility, transparency, and the way in which security providers operate (see Figure 1). Although all variables are perceived as important characteristics of a functioning security sector, the results show a clear focus on overarching principles such as accountability, rule of law, oversight, and serving the population. When looking only at very important answers, the two variables Security providers can be held accountable for their actions and Security providers abide by the rule of law are the two most important characteristics. This reflects the requirement that security institutions act according to the law and, if they do not, they can be held accountable for their actions. It also means citizens can enforce their rights in the event of violations carried out by security institutions.

![Figure 1: The most important characteristics of a functioning security sector for me are:](chart)

- Very important
- Important
- Less important
- Not important at all
- I don’t know
- No answer
Effectiveness and efficiency received the lowest numbers of very important answers, but still came very close to the general average of 85% when taken together. International actors often emphasise improving the effectiveness and efficiency of national security institutions through enabling and enhancing activities, such as the provision of equipment or training on standard operating procedures and basic technical skills. These measures form an important part of security sector reform, very often with the aim of developing short-term repairs for operational deficiencies. However, the implementation of such interventions should always be embedded in an overarching strategic approach that defines the kind of purpose these operational improvements should fulfil. Survey results demonstrate that participants rated overarching principles and norms of a citizen-oriented security sector to be more important than the mere ability of the institutions to fulfil their tasks. Fostering these fundamental principles goes hand-in-hand with a long-term support strategy for security sectors, as their implementation usually requires a considerable amount of trust-building and time. Focusing exclusively on operational deficits of security institutions in a security sector reform process for Syria would not be sufficient.

The variable Security providers are ensuring the integrity of the political leadership received the highest number of negative responses (18% for not important at all and less important answers combined). That means nearly one fifth of survey participants rejected the idea of having security institutions that only serve the political leadership. This indicates that this group opposes the politicisation of security institutions. It could also mean these respondents reject the security institutions being used exclusively for the benefit of specific actors.

How to deal with the existing security sector

Four questions focused on the fate of the existing Syrian security sector after the end of the war. Participants gave their approval or disapproval to predefined statements on how to deal with the current security sector as it is. The majority of respondents shared similar point of views on post-war security sector reform, dismantling of security forces, and disarmament of militias.

The vast majority of survey participants confirmed that the security sector in Syria needs to be reformed (92% fully agreed; see Figure 2) or even rebuilt from scratch (91% fully agreed; see Figure 3). These responses clearly show that survey participants are unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the status quo of the Syrian security sector.
91% of all survey participants agreed there was a need to dismantle all security forces after the end of the war (see Figure 4), though only 75% of them fully agreed. While the majority of participants would want the security sector to be rebuilt from scratch, many also called for dismantling all security forces, though what would come after such a step remains to be seen. These results reflect yet again a strong distrust in the current Syrian security institutions.

Responses to this statement differ according to the last area of residence of survey participants in Syria (see Table 1). On average, more participants from the Governorate of Aleppo would want to see all security forces dismantled after the end of the war. One explanation could be the trauma experienced during the battle for Aleppo, which lasted five years until government forces recaptured rebel-held eastern Aleppo in 2016. Large parts of Aleppo, Syria’s biggest city before the war, were completely destroyed. Civilians suffered tremendously during the long years of heavy fighting.

Among all four statements, the declaration that all militias needed to hand over their weapons after the end of the war in Syria (see Figure 5) reached the strongest and most unanimous consent (99% either fully agreed or somewhat agreed). That almost all participants would call for the disarmament of all militias after the end of the war might be linked to a fear of, and personal experience with, violence and repression by such militias, including non-state armed groups in Syria (see Working Paper 2: Insecurity and Injustice in Syria before and during the War). Moreover, survey participants did not perceive non-state armed groups as belonging to a security sector (see Working Paper 6: General Notions of Ideal Security Provision) and, as shown in Figure 5, should not be allowed to carry arms.
Leading a future security sector reform process in Syria

Having looked at the status quo of the security sector, the following sections deal with perspectives on Syria’s post-war security sector. Survey participants indicated which institutions would be most important to lead a potential security sector reform process from their perspective (see Figure 6).

The Ministry of Justice (88%) is the most preferred institution; followed by citizens (83%), the parliament (83%), civil society (82%), the media (77%), and the Ministry of Interior (68%). All these institutions and entities are civilian-led. Therefore, survey participants selected only those institutions or actors that generally manage core security providers (i.e., ministries) or oversee them (i.e., parliament, civil society, and the media).

Survey participants showed the most disparity regarding the role of intelligence agencies. 32% attributed high importance to their role in leading a future security sector reform process. At the same time, 39% did not want intelligence agencies to play any role in this at all (value: not important at all). Looking closer at the answers for very important and not important at all results differed according to level of education and area of residence in Syria (see Table 2). The higher the level of education, the fewer participants wanted the intelligence agencies to lead a future security sector reform process. Furthermore, participants from the Governorate of Aleppo attributed higher importance to the intelligence agencies; on average they were less likely to select not important at all than participants from the Governorate of Damascus or other governorates. This is especially surprising as they were often more critical towards state security providers than participants from the Governorate of Damascus or other governorates in the survey. Additional research could help shed further light on this finding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: Intelligence agencies</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school without certificate</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baccalaureate</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical diploma</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area of residence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Aleppo</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Damascus</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elements of an ideal Syrian security sector

The six questions of this section dealt with predefined statements regarding different elements of an ideal Syrian security sector: the objective of security provision, gender equality, a special protection force for the president, as well as the role of the police and intelligence agencies. The results allow for conclusions to be drawn about how Syrians would want the post-war Syrian security sector to be.
First, 98% of all survey participants agreed that security providers should respond to the needs of all citizens in post-war Syria (see Figure 7). Accordingly, survey participants want their security needs to be identified and recognised. They also want security providers to operate based on these needs and to deliver security to all Syrians including women, men, girls, and boys. A citizen-centred security provision strongly contradicts repression and violence by security institutions.

Second, 99% of respondents want the police to be the entity responsible for providing security for citizens (see Figure 8) in post-war Syria. This means that nearly all survey participants support the idea of a centralisation of citizen-oriented security services provided for by the police. This is despite the fact that participants also view the police as responsible for repression and violence before and during the war (see Working Paper 2: Insecurity and Injustice in Syria before and during the War). It demonstrates that survey participants were able to differentiate between the experiences they have had with the actual Syrian police force and the visions they have for the future police institution. For further information on questions relevant to the police, please refer to Working Paper 9: The Syrian Police.

The third and fourth questions of this section dealt with gender equality in the post-war Syrian security sector. 89% of all survey participants welcomed equal participation of men and women in the security forces (see Figure 9). Only 3% fully disagreed with the statement; all of whom were men. Overall, more women responded positively to the statement than men (see Table 3).
While 66% of respondents fully agreed that equal participation of men and women in the security forces would be important (see Figure 9), only 34% would actually allow their daughters to work in the security forces (Figure 10). Here, participants’ answers varied strongly and were less homogeneous: while one third would allow their daughters to work in the security forces, another third would rather not. It appears survey participants thought of gender equality in more abstract terms. As shown in this section, they expressed the necessity of security providers responding to the needs of all citizens. Increasing the number of women in security forces is key to achieving this objective. When women are not encouraged to work in the security sector, or are even prevented from doing so, it is hard to achieve gender-sensitive service provision.

If survey participants would allow their daughters to work in the security forces depended on sex, age, and the level of education (see Table 4). On average, women were more likely than men to respond positively to the statement. The same applied to older respondents in comparison to younger ones. Participants that attended secondary school without obtaining a certificate stated most frequently that they would allow their daughters to seek employment in the security forces. One explanation for this could be that, for example, working at the police force is considered a reasonable job option and source of income.
Table 4: I would allow my daughter to work in the security forces. [Q40]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive answers</th>
<th>Negative answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fully agree</td>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born before 1980</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1994</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born after 1997</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school without certificate</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baccalaureate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fifth, the role of intelligence agencies in post-war Syria is highly disputed (Figure 11): 58% of participants responded positively and 40% negatively to the statement that intelligence agencies play a crucial role for the security of the state. In all questions relevant to security providers throughout the survey, intelligence agencies received the harshest criticism for their actions before and during the war. Survey participants identified intelligence agencies as most responsible for repression and violence in Syria, both before and during the war (see Working Paper 2: Insecurity and Injustice in Syria before and during the War). Consequently, one might assume it could be difficult for respondents to perceive intelligence agencies as security providers that can play a legitimate role in protecting society, particularly when considering actual examples of the Syrian intelligence services. However, the majority appears to see a raison d’être for intelligence agencies in an ideal security sector, although many respondents have negative perceptions and experiences of them.

In the sixth question, survey participants object to specific security providers serving only to protect the president (Figure 12) in post-war Syria: two thirds responded negatively to the statement. It might be that participants would fear for the independence of the security sector if there were a specific force dedicated only to serving the president, particularly because such a force could also persecute political opponents of the president and the president’s office. Another possibility is that participants reject a further fragmentation of the security sector, preferring fewer institutions with clear mandates. It could also be that survey participants reject the idea of offering special protection to a political leader while many of them continue to live in insecurity themselves.
Interestingly, in percentage terms, more women fully disagreed with the statement than men (see Table 5). Further research is required to better understand this observation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: In post-war Syria, there should be specific security providers serving only to protect the president. [Q51]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive answers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Requesting help from external actors**

Security sectors are at the heart of state security. Asking for external assistance thus has a strategic dimension to it and strongly reflects political positions. As different external actors vary greatly in their approach towards national security, their involvement can influence the shape, culture, and ultimate purpose of the security sector they intend to reform. Considering the complex situation in Syria and the direct and indirect involvement in the conflict of numerous actors, such as Iran, Russia, Turkey, and the United States, this issue is all the more critical.

Survey participants selected their preferred potential actors for involvement in rebuilding Syria’s post-war security sector (see Figure 13). Multilateral organisations received the highest endorsement: 50% of respondents would seek assistance from the European Union and 43% from the United Nations. Only few survey participants would want individual countries to support security sector reform in post-war Syria: 12% selected the United States and 1% Iran. Russia, which already actively trains and equips the security forces of the Syrian regime, reached only 3%. In contrast, 30% of participants would seek no assistance from any of the listed actors.
62 participants (10%) used the open-ended section of the question and added actors of their own choice. 45% of these participants did not want any external actor to be involved in rebuilding the security sector, only Syrians themselves. 19% would seek assistance from Turkey and 6% from Germany. 3% wanted states with no involvement in the war to rebuild the security sector.

The results for this question reflect considerable dissent among survey participants. Multilateral organisations received the strongest consensus by a large margin. However, only half of participants would seek assistance from them. Even fewer participants would trust an individual state to support the rebuilding of Syria’s security sector after the end of the war. One third indicated not wanting to ask any of the listed entities for help. This means that the involvement of one or several external actors in supporting security sector reform in Syria can have a strong influence on the trust of citizens in the reform processes. It is, therefore, crucial to involve Syrian citizens in decision-making processes when seeking external assistance, perhaps through the process of a national dialogue. It is equally important to deal transparently with any kind of foreign involvement in a security sector reform process.

**Overseeing a future security sector**

Rebuilding a citizen-centred security sector requires the establishment of an efficient and effective oversight system. Civilian oversight is one form which aims to ensure that citizens’ perspectives are incorporated in internal and external security provision. It involves the active participation of civil society both in defining security policies and overseeing security providers. Its inclusive character supports local ownership and increases legitimacy, leading to more sustainability. 97% of all survey participants agreed to the statement (fully agree and somewhat agree answers combined) that security providers should operate under civilian oversight in post-war Syria (see Figure 14).

The question regarding which entity should be in charge of overseeing the security sector (see Figure 15) confirms the strong support for civilian actors to take on this role. 76% wanted civil society to be in charge of oversight; 73% selected the parliament. Among government institutions, the most preferred was the Ministry of Interior (37%). The results show that survey participants are wary of oversight that is not carried...
out by civil society or the parliament. In a system where civil and parliamentary oversight is preferred, both the parliament and civil society need to be well aware of their oversight roles. In this context, it is necessary to assess whether they have sufficient capacities to exercise this oversight role or if further training is required. Among state actors, only the Ministry of Interior was considered another suitable actor for oversight. Overall, and although civilian and parliamentary oversight are important, oversight on all levels is key to gain the trust of citizens in a reformed security sector.

In the open-ended variable, 26 survey participants (4%) added new elements. Among them, most participants proposed the media (42%) as well as the judiciary or the Ministry of Justice (42%) to be in charge of oversight (for further information on the role of the justice sector in security sector reform, please consult Working Paper 8: The Importance of the Justice System for Security Sector Reform in Syria).
Recommendations

Current political developments in Syria, and the likelihood that the regime will win the war militarily, limit the prospects for comprehensively reforming the Syrian security sector so as to turn it from an oppressive regime-protecting sector into one that provides security in accordance with the needs of Syrian citizens. However, it is important for international actors working in and on Syria to keep in mind how Syrians envisage an ideal security sector for post-war Syria. Without taking this into consideration, any future approach for peacebuilding and establishing stability in Syria will be doomed to fail in the long run. This, therefore, prompts several recommendations for further academic research as well as policy analysis and development:

» Conduct research on and map all security institutions in the Syrian Arab Republic, with a special focus on their roles and responsibilities, as well as their involvement in grave human rights violations. These results are essential for any future trust-building scheme among conflict parties in Syria.

» Pay special attention to the intelligence agencies when researching the Syrian security sector and assessing the actions of former security institutions. Before and during the war, the numerous intelligence agencies were involved in social control, political repression, torture, and war crimes. Their members committed gross human rights abuses. Syrians are deeply afraid of the intelligence agencies and largely distrust them (see Working Paper 2: Insecurity and Injustice in Syria before and during the War). However, many Syrians still perceive the role of intelligence agencies in general as important for the security of the state. Supporting initiatives that aim to identify common ground among all parts of society is needed in order to decide what kind of, and how many, intelligence agencies a future Syrian security sector needs. Former or current employees who committed crimes should be brought before a court and tried for their actions. Call for a zero-tolerance policy of human rights violations.

» Plan ahead to develop the police into a security provider trusted by all citizens. According to survey participants, the police should be the entity responsible for providing security for all citizens, including women, men, girls, and boys. Core security providers may have been militarised, especially during the war, resulting in the dissolution of boundaries between police and military roles. Specific training programmes would be needed to reorient the police towards service delivery and citizen orientation. Furthermore, all policies, regulations, and standard operating procedures should be reviewed and adopted according to regional and/or international best practices.

» Map all militias and other non-state armed groups that have been involved in the war, to be prepared for any demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration processes. It is crucial to know the roles they played in the conflict, for whom they work(ed) and if they were involved in any human rights violations and/or war crimes.

» Develop a strategy on how to deal with non-state security providers, such as militias, foreign terrorist fighters, private security companies, or vigilante groups, especially in areas where the government does not fully exert executive rule. These groups play an important role in the proliferation of arms and ammunition. Their movements, particularly cross-border, should be monitored closely.

» Map Syria’s civil society to understand which organisations are independent and which were politicised before and during the war. Some civil society organisations might have played negative roles in the conflict and could be counterproductive to reconciliation efforts. Others might have been attacked by state security institutions and could need protection.

» Conduct further surveys and focus group discussions on the needs of citizens in terms of security provision in different environments (cities, villages, refugee camps) and continue to do so even if citizen-centred security sector reform interventions seem impossible in the near future. Discussions should involve all parts of society from all Syrian governorates. Women and youth are especially important in these debates. Moreover, conducting focus group discussions with important Syrian diaspora groups, for example in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, should complement any research effort in this context.

» Strengthen the participation of women and girls in shaping a future security sector. Develop specific awareness-raising programmes on gender equality in all parts of society. In addition, encourage women and girls, through specific programmes, to share their security needs with stakeholders. In addition,
assess how existing security institutions worked towards achieving gender equality in the past. Strengthen positive approaches and develop new strategies where gender equality was not on the agenda of security institutions. Gender equality in the security sector should be part of an overall national strategy.

» Foster capacities and strengthen the awareness of civilian actors to assume an active role in defining citizen-centred positions and objectives, especially civil society and the media, regarding civilian oversight of the security sector, including the different oversight roles and responsibilities. Survey participants selected accountability, oversight, and the rule of law as the most important characteristics of a functioning security sector that serves the population. To accompany any future reform process, provide citizens, and especially diaspora groups in their host countries, with platforms to share their experiences and concerns, as well as to address concrete grievances they may have regarding any future security sector reform process for Syria.

» Assess the position of Syrians regarding external assistance for rebuilding the security sector. As shown in this survey, opinions on this differ greatly. If citizens object to interventions by multilateral organisations or individual countries, trust in reforms is in jeopardy from the very beginning. It is crucial to deal transparently with any kind of foreign involvement in a security sector reform process. Citizens should be involved in the discussion about foreign assistance for the security sector, for example through a national dialogue.