Post-Islamism
A New Phase or Ideological Delusions?

Editor
Dr. Mohammad Abu Rumman
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AbuRumman, Mohammad Suliman

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Foreword

Tim Petschulat
Resident Director of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Jordan and Iraq

In 2007 the Jordan Office of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) started a series of non-profit-publications on Political Islam. Within the last 11 years 19 books were published as part of this series. Our interest for this particular area of research is based on the fact that Political Islam plays an important role in Jordan and the region and will – in one form or another - continue to do so.

It is my belief that understanding history, developments and current debates within the movements of Political Islam are crucial to the understanding of Arab and Muslim societies. I am also convinced that a sound knowledge of key developments in this field are of importance not only for academics of Social Sciences but for everybody engaged in development - or governance related - work in Jordan and other predominantly Muslim countries.

Our latest addition to our series on Political Islam tackles the phenomenon of Post-Islamism from a variety of perspectives. It summarizes the key inputs of an international conference on “Post Political Islam”, which the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) and FES conducted in May 2018 in Amman.
While the terms “Post-Islamism” and “Post-Political Islam” are controversial for a good reason, we still decided to use them in the absence of a more fitting label to describe:

- A new, pragmatic and democratic form of Political Islam that is ready to leave some of the classic goals of the movement behind - such as the establishment of an Islamic state or the call to confront secularism.

- Political parties like the Tunisian Ennahda, which show some resemblance to the family of Christian Democratic Parties in Europe.

- A movement that strives for Islamic values within and in favour of a democratic framework.

The articles in this book shed some light on this rather complex phenomenon.

It is my hope that it might serve as useful resource to you.

I am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Abu Rumman for his very inspiring and active role both during the conference and as editor of this publication. I want to express my thanks to all scholars who contributed to this academic endeavour as well as to all involved colleagues both from CSS and FES.

FES aims to contribute with its research and its programs to a democratic transformation of Jordan along the lines His Majesty King Abdullah II envisioned in his Discussion Papers, which were released between 2011 and 2017.
Introduction

Although usage of the term “post-Islamism” dates back decades, in particular to the 1990s, it has once again returned to the spotlight, more prominently now than ever, as several Islamist movements are advancing further on the path to accepting democracy, political pluralism, and power sharing. Several Islamist movements in the Arab and Islamic world today are announcing an embrace of public and individual freedoms, then advocating a separation of religion and politics and starting to think about this principle.

We noted this trend in Islamic movements and orientations in clear terms at the last annual conference, convened by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Amman under the title “The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region: Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges.”¹ Thus, we (at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan) thought it appropriate to build on that work and try to do more study and deeper analysis of this trend, which is evolving toward a more pragmatic and political course, stripping from electoral campaigns timeworn slogans like “Islam is the solution” and tending toward acceptance of ideas and principles that depart from Islamism’s language and ideology in previous decades.

These evolving of a pragmatic, democratic political Islam necessitates a return to the concept of “post-Islamism” or, more precisely, a “transition” to a post-Islamist stage. This means the abandonment by Islamist movements of many of the slogans, goals, and philosophies on which they were founded and which formed the core of their political and religious thought and rhetoric in recent decades. Some examples include: establishing an Islamic state, Islamizing society, confronting secularism, and stating that Islam is the solution. These movements are transitioning to accepting democracy as the ultimate form of governance; religious, cultural and political pluralism; and a separation of religion and politics, i.e. a transformation into professional political parties within the democratic political game. This also means an abandonment of the “utopia” of establishing an Islamic state governed by the tenets of Sharia as conceptualized in radical Islamism. All of this means that practically speaking, the sphere of religion, preaching, and jurisprudence is distinct from the sphere of politics and party work, as can be deduced from intellectual transformations and jurisprudential and religious reconsiderations within these movements.

Necessarily, there is no precise, specific definition of “post-Islamism,” or of its conditions, contexts, indicators, and causes, recognized by researchers and scholars, in particular those who had a role in introducing and framing the concept, such as Olivier Roy and Olivier Carré, who used the term (at the beginning of the 1990s) to refer to the failure of the Islamist experiment and the inability of political Islam to provide answers to problems of governance and the economy. The premises of Islamism were thus left behind in favor of a return to the process of separating the religious and political spheres, as was the case in previous centuries before the emergence of modern Islamist movements that ideologized and politicized Islamic discourse.

Gilles Kepel’s writings on the failure of political Islam do not differ from the above. Therefore, according to this perspective, the post-Islamist stage is reached either by breaking off from Islamist movements
and moving beyond their religious ideologizing, or it reflects their failure and inability to achieve their goals, and thus the headlong rush toward “post-Islamism.”

Other researchers and scholars disagree with this analytical framework, foremost among them the French researcher François Burgat, who thoroughly questions assertions of political Islam’s failure. It also differs with the thesis offered by Asef Bayat, who sees post-Islamism not as an inversion of Islam but rather as a trend that turns Islamist concepts and ideas upside down; prioritizes rights over duties, pluralism, and historicism; and merges rights, religiosity, faith, and freedoms. These are the consequences of “electoral Islam” adapting and adjusting to the democratic process, leading to the occurrence of major changes within Islamist movements themselves.2

If we are to frame the theoretical approaches in interpreting and defining “post-Islamism,” we will find before us three main perspectives:

The first perspective sees in political Islam an essentialist structure that does not evolve. Therefore, post-Islamism is a result of the failure of political Islam itself and society's search for other options and alternatives.

The second perspective argues that political Islam is linked to specific contexts rather than to a single essence. It evolves in its rhetoric, ideas, and attitudes. From this standpoint, post-Islamism can be a result

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2 To follow up on this discussion, dialogue, and controversy among experts and researchers about the concept of post-Islamism, see:
of the evolving movements of Islamist parties themselves or other Islamist phenomena.

The third perspective views “post-Islamism” as a stage as well, and an outcome, not for political Islam itself but rather for social or cultural Islam, meaning that it arises separate from Islamists and their political movements, such as the new proselytizers, social piety policies, or liberal Islam. Some see Sufist movements as a post-Islamist model.3

In this book (which includes the conference papers), we will test the concept of “post-Islamism” for legitimacy and credibility as a fundamental shift in Islamists’ rhetoric and behavior, as well as the causes leading to it and the conditions, obstacles, and realistic models for this concept or its approximates, both in the Arab or Muslim world, and both Sunni or Shiite.

1. Post-political Islam: the Concept’s Legitimacy

The Iranian-American intellectual Asef Bayat defines post-Islamism as internal and external shifts in Islamism’s ideas, approaches, and practices.4 As an example, Bayat cites shifts from Islamist to “post-Islamist” parties in Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, then the Ennahda and Justice and Development parties in Tunisia and Morocco, because they have been integrated into the national democratic and political realm and abandoned many of the slogans and ideas associated with Islamist movements, such as the establishment of a caliphate or of an Islamic Sharia state and the Islamization of society, etc. Those parties — as described by Bayat — became closer to “democratic entities” in Islamic societies.5

Subsequently, we have found that there are other movements and Islamist trends linked to those parties and movements and tending toward

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5 Ibid., p. 1.
greater acceptance of the principle of democracy, rotation of power, and political, religious and cultural pluralism. They are relinquishing the “Islamic state” project that dominated the Islamist imagination in decades past in favor of accepting democracy as an ultimate form of governance, not just a waypoint or a temporary stop on the road to establishing an Islamic state or a classical caliphate, which were the goals that Islamist movements were founded, generally speaking, to achieve.

Despite these developments and the shifts in Islamists’ rhetoric and political practices, a stream of Western and Arab politicians researchers question the credibility of this rhetoric and behavior. In their view, these occurrences are still at the stage of tactics for gaining power. They agree that Islamists, however much they differ in their ideologies and ideas, have tried to feign acceptance of democracy and pluralism or to claim to accept even the civil state and separation between religion and politics. But at the end of the day, the Islamists are still thinking about achieving their goals by establishing an Islamic state or Islamic society. This current skepticism of the legitimacy of the “post-Islamism” concept today includes many Arab governments, Arab intellectuals, and Western think tanks that collectively continue to insist on denying any real, fundamental evolution in Islamist thinking, especially after the Muslim Brotherhood’s overthrow in Egypt (July 2013). And indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist group in several Arab countries.

There is another trend among scholars and politicians that does not ignore these major transformations but at the same time chooses to avoid overstatement and alarmism regarding their magnitude and extent, believing that they represent a limited current or minor sphere within political Islam. Meanwhile, in contrast, the most ascendant and influential trend today is the fundamentalist, radical strain that believes in armed action and the establishment of an Islamic state, in addition to the traditional revivalist orientation within Islamist movements that is still active and effective around the “old dream,” fighting for the sake of not giving up completely on the “Islamist approach.”

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6 On the debates and discussions on the legitimacy of the concept of “post-Islamism,” see, e.g.,
Based on the above, the function of this book is to discuss earlier arguments and ideas and to unpack the legitimate controversy around the concept of “post-Islamism.” Chapter 1: Post-Islamism: The Knowledge Map and Practical Contexts addresses three main topics. The first study, by the Jordanian researcher Hassan Abu Hanieh, addresses the general framework within which the term “post-Islamism” was born, the considerations and controversies surrounding it, and the diverging tendencies in dealing with its legitimacy and credibility. The second study is presented by Dr. Luz García Gómez, who dives deeper into the discussion and debate about the legitimacy of the concept of post-Islamism and dissects the concept from an epistemological perspective. She compares views on the concept, particularly within the French school between Roy, Kepel, and Carré on the one hand and Burget on the other, and critiques the neo-Orientalist school. Meanwhile, Dr. Abdul Ghani Imad discusses the arguments for political Islam’s failure, the various attitudes toward the term post-Islamism, the theoretical approaches regarding the fates of political Islam, and what it actually means to say we are “post-” anything.

2. Contexts and Pathways: The Outcome of Failure or Evolution?

Beyond discussion on the controversy around the concept’s very legitimacy, there are other debates around the contexts and paths that are leading to the birth and ascendance of post-Islamism, and we find more than one perspective and analysis before us here.

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- Markus Holdo, “Post-Islamism and fields of contention after the Arab Spring: feminism, Salafism and the revolutionary youth,” Third World Quarterly, 38, 8, (1800)
- Crossref
The first perspective is that the concept of “post-Islamism” is linked to the end of political Islam and its successive failures and disappointments. After Islamist movements were unable to achieve their hopes and dreams, post-Islamist projects and ideas emerged, declaring the failure of those movements and the entry to a new stage.

The second perspective is that “post-Islamism” is the outcome of political Islam’s natural evolution and a new historical stage. In recent decades, Islamists have moved from rejecting the democratic game to accept it in part, then in full. Then their view of democracy evolved to accept pluralism and the rotation of power, and finally to advocating the separation of religion from politics and the civil state. This means that they transitioned gradually, while involved in the political and democratic process, from conservative religious entities to entities that believe more in the democratic process. We are not, therefore, at the stage of political Islam’s retreat and collapse on an ideological, political, or popular level. On the contrary, we are at an advanced point on the linear path that these intentional Islamist movements have traveled, or facing one of the important trends in political Islam today. It is anticipated that other Islamist movements and parties will reach the same end points.

The two previous hypotheses - that the birth of post-Islamism is either a result of failure and retreat, or a natural evolution - may resemble the two sides of the same coin. On balance, we have before us movements and transformations that have shifted from Islamist movements to “post-Islamism.” They have abandoned much of political Islam’s discourse and transitioned to something closer to political parties involved in the democratic game, just as Christian democratic parties did previously in Europe.

In this regard, we find that both Nader Hashemi and Nathan Brown, two eminent researchers in religions and Islamist movements, are eager to assert that Islamist movements are not static or stagnant, nor essentialist. Rather, they are linked to historical, social, and cultural contexts, and they go through stages and undergo ideological and political phases. They will ultimately reach a stage of becoming professional
democratic parties, meaning that they will shed — practically speaking — the cloak of post-Islamism and don other attire suitable for democratic conditions and realities.⁷

Chapter 2 of the book discusses the contexts, conditions, and considerations surrounding the process of transformation and transition from Islamism to post-Islamism, or a study of the road between the two stages and situations. Dr. Khalil Al-Anani, associate professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, addresses the Muslim Brotherhood’s crisis as an entry point to “post-Islamism,” presenting their experiment in governing Egypt, internal self-criticism processes, and the experiment’s consequences in the subsequent period, i.e. after the Army intervened and ended the rule of President Mohammad Morsi in 2013.

Dr. Rachid Mouqtadir, professor of international law and political science at the University of Hassan II, provides a model for these transformations from within the framework of Moroccan political Islam, specifically the Justice and Development Party, which represents – in the view of researchers and politicians – a clear model of the concept of “post-Islamism.” He presents the party’s platform and an evaluation of its performance in government. Finally, the researcher Nabil Al-Bukairi, from Yemen, addresses the changes that have impacted Yemen’s situation and takes a look at what has transpired with key Islamist forces: the reform movement in the Al-Islah Party and the Salafist movement in the Zaidi movement.

3. Various Models: Indonesia, Iran, and Iraq

The developments and transformations that have occurred among Islamist movements and pushed them toward the post-Islamist stage are

not limited to Arab states and societies. There are experiments and experiences that have been shaped in the Islamic world and that have already moved far beyond the Arab models. Most prominent of these, perhaps, is the Turkish model of the Justice and Development Party. Not only has it declared (since its formation in 2001) its acceptance of secularism and democracy and the abandonment of Islamic slogans and discourse, the party has redefined itself as a “conservative democratic party,” similar to European conservative parties (“conservative” here meaning morally, not politically). The Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) has become an evolving example of the outcomes for Islamist parties that are moving towards democracy and pluralism, and of the “post-Islamist” stage.

In another case, the Indonesian experience provides another model of the evolving discourse and movements of liberal and progressive Islam, which have come a long way in intellectual and philosophical approaches towards democracy and liberalism, as well as the acceptance of others and of pluralism and modernity.

Such transformation is not limited only to the Sunni arena. The Shiite sphere has witnessed similar developments and shifts moving closer to post-Islamism, especially with currents and religious authorities that have abandoned the principle of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (vi-
layet-e faqih) and are trending more toward accepting democracy, pluralism, and secularism. We can mention here the well-known Shiite authority Hussein Montazeri, Mehdi Shamseddine in Lebanon, and some of the views of Ayatollah Sistani, who rejects the principle of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.

In this chapter, Dr. Ihsan Ali Fauzi, from Indonesia, offers an in-depth reading of manifestations of post-Islamism and maps out the Islamist currents and trends and the debates happening there. Dr. Emad Abshenas, a researcher and the editor-in-chief of Iran Diplomatic Newspaper, offers an analytical reading of the evolution of jurisprudence and political debates around the country among the tendencies constituting the Iranian political landscape, in particular between leftists and conserva-
tives in the past, and between reformists and fundamentalists today. Dr. Ali Taher, a professor of sociology at the University of Baghdad, analyzes the Iraqi Shiite model through the evolving state of the Dawa Party (which is the Iraqi Shiite version of political Islam) and the divisions and tensions that have shaken the party as an ideology and a movement. He paints a picture that brings post-Islamism into focus with its potential, contexts, and challenges there.

5. Political Islam and Beyond: Jordan

To what extent can it be said that there are indications and trends that have reached the “post-Islamist” stage in Jordan?

In the book From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan After the Arab Spring, the authors Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman and Dr. Neven Bondokji deal with new parties in which the founding leaders and some of their young members emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front, going on to found the Partnership and Rescue Party and the Jordanian National Conference Party (Zamzam), as well as the new Muslim Brotherhood. They describe these parties as belonging to the “post-Islamist” stage, having thrown off the Islamist cloak with its well-known Islamist slogans and the idea of establishing an Islamic state. They have taken to calling for a civil, pluralistic, democratic state, and demands for full commitment to Shariah, in the sense known from historical Islamist movements, have turned into advocacy for protecting “the values of Muslim societies.”

Meanwhile, it seems clear that there are re-examinations going on within the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood, with some Brotherhood leaders declaring that they accept separating religion from politics and the civil state. It is clear that these headlines are still the subject of dispute and discussion among Brotherhood factions and are not definitively settled.

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This part of the book from the conference, “Political Islam and Beyond: Jordan,” will be devoted to reviewing developments in the Jordanian situation and the parties that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood’s parent organization. Ghaith Al-Qudah takes us through the experience of the Partnership and Rescue Party and the causes that prompted some young Islamists to leave the Brotherhood and start a new party experiment that researchers view as belonging to the “post-Islamist” stage. Dr. Hassan Barari, a professor of political science at the University of Jordan, offers an analysis of developments and shifts that have occurred in recent years within the Brotherhood and that have led to internal schisms and tensions, along with accompanying intellectual and political debates.
CHAPTER 1

Post-Islamism: Problems of the Term and Concept
From Islamism to Post-Islamism: An Examination of Concepts and Theses

Hassan Abu Hanieh

As it has been since its emergence more than two and a half decades ago, the concept of “post-Islamism” is still widely controversial in Western as well as Arab academic circles with regard to its definition, application, and validity because of its limited explanatory power, weak predictive effects, and modest intellectual impact in the phenomenon’s homeland in the Arab-Islamic world. The research efforts made toward developing the theoretical framework for the post-Islamist phase and propagating post-Islamism as an effective and useful analytical tool from the standpoint of social and political terminology have now been overtaken by the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011. The Arab revolutions challenged the theoretical foundations that served as a solid basis for post-Islamist discourse, which argued with definite certainty for the hypothesis of Islamism’s decline as a viable political alternative amid globalization and the fragmentation of the sacred. The individual’s experience of Islam shifted against the background of a new, globalized system based on the defense of civil rights and the separation of political and religious spheres.

The results of elections held in the Arab world following the Arab Spring revolutions have demonstrated the strength and diversity of “Islamist” movements and the difficulty of subjecting them to the taxonomical approaches and analytical stakes of “post-ism” discourse. The term “post-Islamism” emerged out of the sterility and feebleness of the discourse surrounding the term “Islamism” and the shallowness of its analytical, explanatory, and predictive power. In the European-American context, confidence in the great narratives of modernity’s premises and
Post-Islamism discourse perished with the arrival of a “post-modernist” era amid the rise of neo-liberal globalism, which involves strategic American hegemony based on the principles of economic control in the field of development, technical control in the field of science, and network control in the field of communications. The prefix “post-” indicates a transformation within a framework of continuity. Its dynamics proliferate as if we are realizing in a very old world that we are falling behind or chasing a, according to Brice Couturier, because we can no longer lay claim to newness. As a result, we arrive at the “post-” stage, and we continue what preceded us, but we strip what comes next of its character and color, and we impugn it, as the “post-” contradicts what is said more than it is based upon it.

It is indisputable that the potential for “post-” is embodied in the Western (American-European) case after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the socialist system, the end of the Cold War, and delight in the “end of history” ideology, which definitively preached the ascendance and dominance of liberal democracy. This created a conceptual, intellectual, strategic, and political crisis in the American-European sphere, where the term “post-democratic” has emerged because of the feebleness and backsliding in the concept of “democracy” in the West. Post-democracy is a system where decision-making has been ripped from the hands of the electorate and given to unelected and unaccountable institutions. “Post-secularism” considers that the world is not trending away from religion, as the Europeans supposed; “post-modernism” declares that the project of modernity and the Enlightenment has failed; and “post-colonialism” identifies a historical trajectory by which colonized lands and the colonized peoples who live in the shadow of a colonial system.

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11 Francis Fukuyama was the first missionary for the end of history. He stressed that “the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the communist system not only put an end to traditional conflict, it also put an end to history, which has to date been a history of bitter and devastating conflicts. With that end, is tending to settle on global capitalism and Western liberal democracy as an optimal global political system.” See: Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, translation by Hussein Ahmed Amin, Al-Ahram Translation and Publishing Center, 1992, p. 62.
transform themselves into residents of a system that is post-colonial in place and time, where the sequential historical character of this phenomenon is provided by the logical influence of the colonization process itself.

The terms “Islamism” and “post-Islamism” are commonly used to define a historical trajectory that marks the start and end of the Islamist condition and project. Post-Islamism is a vision of a new era, when Islamism shifts to settlement and localization within a nation-state through Islamism dismantling itself, as the end of Islamism necessarily leads to the entry into post-Islamism. The term sprang from a Western context, outside the scope of Arabic and Islamic pragmatics and semantics, making it imposed rather than premised on events, trends, forces, and movements that reject labeling strategies linked to hegemony and control. Furthermore, the approaches to analyzing Islamism and post-Islamism extend beyond intellectual and epistemological frameworks and take on ideological and strategic formulations, highlighting the importance of the deliberative field, because it is based on a philosophy that sets aside the elements of Western-centrism or any other universal tendency. In the view of Taha Abdurrahman, the deliberative field creates time and space for communication and interaction to occur. It is difficult to understand the nature of our deliberative field without leaving behind the stereotypes of Western thought and returning Western thought to its deliberative fundamentals.

The term “political Islam” initially appeared as a softened version of the term “Islamism” in Western pragmatics after the Iranian revolution in 1979. It became widespread in the Arab and Muslim worlds and a very common theme in the semantics of contemporary political discourse. The term was coined by Olivier Roy to describe an allegedly new phenomenon demonstrating the existence of political movements led by Muslim scholars and intellectuals calling for the “re-Islamization” of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim communities in other places. In their

view, these places had ceased to be sufficiently Islamic, and these movements promoted Shariah through new forms of popular mobilization. They adopted a mixed organizational structure, where the traditional Sufi order, in which members pass through different steps of promotion, intersected with the modern political party. The Islamists pursued two paths: strengthening a social movement that could engage with community organizations and charitable associations; and establishing a political movement to compete in elections and place their members inside the state bureaucracy.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928 and was subsequently able to establish branches for itself throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, is the first and foremost representative of Sunni Islamism. The Iranian revolution, the scholars of which are affiliated with Shiite Islam, tempted Sunni Islamism with the possibility of reproducing the experiment in controlling and Islamizing a state. This prompted exertions that led to schisms within political Islam around modalities of dominance and control. Radical, revolutionary tendencies emerged, embracing armed force to create change. Conservative, peaceful approaches also appeared, setting up within the framework of the nation-state, working through its systems and institutions, and benefiting from democratic spaces and climates of freedom.13

Given the pragmatic dispute and the link between the term “political Islam” with the European-American space, as well as the term’s political and ideological dimensions and Western-centric bent, Ridwan Al-Sayyid has criticized the term and replaced it with “revivalism.” Fahmi Jadan, meanwhile, sees the term as a modern ideological fad and a deviation from Islam. And let us not overlook Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawi’s efforts to assail this term by any means and via all intellectual and media channels. Conversely, we find a number of well-known scholars, such as Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, rebutting accusations of Islamism and refut-

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ing the error of dividing Islam into divergent types such as moral Islam and social Islam, and that politics is an integral part of Shariah.\textsuperscript{14}

In the early 1990s, Olivier Roy announced political Islam’s defeat in his book “The Failure of Political Islam,” attempting to explore the shortcomings that marred it. These shortcomings ultimately showed the movement to be devoid of substance, and it became a new Salafism, concerned only with the application of Islamic law, without innovating new political forms, causing its downfall and failure. Roy emphasized that Islamism lost its original drive and initial impetus and was no longer advancing a model for a new society or a bright tomorrow.\textsuperscript{15} This led to the birth of the term post-Islamism. The Arab Spring revolutions have belied the theories of failure and decline, but they also have summoned forth the term post-Islamism.

\textbf{The Birth of the “Post-Islamism” Term}

The term post-Islamism rose from the ruins of the term “Islamism.” Olivier Roy had used the term post-Islamism, as had Olivier Carré in 1991, despite their disagreements around objectives and Carré believed that from the 10th to the 19th centuries, Shiite and Sunni Islam both “separated the political-military world from the religious world, both in theory and in practice.” Carré defined that period as “post-Islamist” because this type of Islam was overtaken in the 20th century by a new Hanbalism. We are now witnessing a return to the post-Islamist age, which is understood as a return to the classical age of Islam.

According to Carré, post-Islamism is Islamic social and political thought’s only option for escaping from the trap it found itself in during the 1920s. The Islam of “post-Islamism” could facilitate the return of the traditions of the grand Islam that began to ebb in the 14th century. In

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Carré’s words, it seems as though the 21st century will give birth to a post-Islamist Islam that will spring from the “great forgotten tradition.”

Concurrently with Carré’s thesis, Olivier Roy presented his special thesis on “the failure of political Islam” as a historical fact resulting from the systemic error of Islam itself. Islamic movements, when faced with reality (whether in exercising political power in Iran, suffering repression at the hand of the Egyptian regime, or the continued condition of the Muslim minority in Europe), ultimately failed to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic state because of internal conflicts. Starting at the end of the 1980s, the world witnessed the beginnings of a new era of post-Islamism in the Muslim world, characterized by invocations of nationalist Islam or Islamic nationalism, i.e. the State’s adoption of the re-Islamization of society and the Islamists’ loss of their monopoly on religious rhetoric.

Roy’s vision of the Islamic world is comprehensive because Islam is a conceptual template that places limits on everything relevant to identity and to political, social, economic, and cultural life. Declaring that the Islamist utopia has failed does not mean, according to Roy, that one must also deny the mobilizing force that Islamist movements still retain. Nor does it mean announcing Islam’s decline; rather, it is a means of reinforcing the incremental separation between the religious and political worlds (with the former’s proposal for increasing official diversity and dedication to identity and justice issues, and the latter’s focus on the nation-state versus the Ummah and a disjointed society). This Islamic separation between the worlds of religion and politics does not necessarily mean rejecting political thought framed in religious terminology. Nor does it require removing Islamization from social practice. According to Roy, what this means is a kind of secularization that fundamentally differs from what took place in European history, since religion itself is what defines the space for secularism.

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In tandem with Islamism’s failure, Roy tracks post-Islamism’s evolution towards the new secularism. The autonomy of religious symbols vis-à-vis political symbols is governed by three distinct elements: the market, power, and rule of law, while the state is considered the primary authority in each of the three cases. The state, formerly the chief player in Islamists’ rhetoric, is losing its preeminence. The market for all things religious (clothing, entertainment, education, and health) is becoming increasingly diverse because of liberal policies implemented by the state, specifically. Cross-border networks (social organizations, schools, publishing houses, and broadcast stations) have replaced traditional religious institutions controlled by the state. Even the defense of Shariah now ignores the state and the culture, as the individual morals that this defense promotes have started becoming part of the mainstream, at the expense of cultural-societal methods, taking precedence over the dominant prohibitions in a given state. Finally, civil society is becoming increasingly decentralized, while it aspires to occupy a larger share of the public arena and to distance itself from controlling the political sphere.17

Studies subsequently proliferated that followed in the footsteps of Roy and Carré’s hypothesis, including Gilles Kepel’s study *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, in which he concludes that in the spring of 1997, there was evidence that Islamists hoped to put behind them the political impasse in which they found themselves after the failure of Islamist ideology and to ally with the bourgeois middle class and disadvantaged young people. According to Kepel, new rhetoric based on democracy and human rights began to take shape from Indonesia to Algeria.18

Asef Bayat was one of the first researchers to adopt “post-Islamism” as an analytical tool. In his 2007 book *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*, Bayat expands the definition of post-Islamism as a “project” rather than a “condition” based on a conscious attempt to apply a conceptual vision and strategy to the

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17 Ibid.
logic and methods of moving beyond Islamism in the social, political, and intellectual spheres. The post-Islamist stage, according to Bayat, is not hostile to Islam or to secularism. Rather, it represents an attempt to integrate religiosity and rights, faith and freedoms, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to transform and turn the fundamental principles of Islam upside down by emphasizing rights instead of obligations, pluralism in the field of an authoritative individual voice, historicism instead of a static holy book, and the future instead of the past.19

Bayat’s study “The Making of Post-Islamist Iran” focused on explaining the changes that hurt Iranian society in the post-Khomeini era and gave rise to a post-Islamism at odds with the ideology of a state founded on the theocracy of the Guardian Jurist. The basis of this post-Islamism was “a series of social and intellectual movements led by young people and students who broke the revolutionary organs’ dominance over their unions, women who demanded the re-evaluation of laws that limit their personal rights and their activities in the public sphere, and religious intellectuals who worked to reinterpret religious texts in light of the contemporary realities of society and the era and called for doing away with a single interpretation of the sacred. These movements expressed themselves politically with the election of the reformist Mohammad Khatami, taking advantage of the openness created by the pragmatic Hashemi Rafsanjani. Khatami sought the support of many of the intellectuals who represented a break from traditional Khomeinian conservatism. This political victory, however, faced challenges from within the regime and its ideological organs embedded in society, which took a stance opposed to the reform of thought and society. After this anti-reform (conservative) orientation prevailed during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and the 2009 Green Movement gave voice to the continuing social transformations that embodied the decline of the regime’s legitimacy and ideology following

the disputed presidential election between Ahmadinejad, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi Karroubi.20

Asef Bayat expands on Roy and Kepel’s usages of the term “post-Islamism.” According to Bayat, the term has been used by a number of prominent observers in Europe primarily to refer to a shift in attitudes and strategies by hard-line Islamists in the Muslim world. While we may welcome the term’s spread, the particular way in which it has been used appears to have caused distortion moreso than the clarity desired. For some (like the French thinker Gilles Kepel), “post-Islamism” describes movement Islamists’ shift away from Salafist and jihadist teachings. For others (like French thinker Olivier Roy), “post-Islamism” is regarded as a “privatization” of Islamism (as opposed to state Islamism), i.e. the religious situation switching from state control to the control of the general public, where the focus is on the how and where of implementing Islamization instead of its content. When used to classify, “post-Islamism” has primarily been presented and viewed – including in my previous work on Iran – as an empirical rather than an analytical category, embodying a “particular era” or the “end of a historical period.” Whereas “Islamism” is defined by the merging of religion and responsibility, “post-Islamism” emphasizes religiosity and rights. “Post-Islamism” may find its expression in various social practices, political ideas, and religious thought, as well as in the philosophical basis of “post-Islamist” urban areas, youth and student movements, women’s activism, or theological perspectives.21

The Orientalist Effect and the Cuturalist Trend

Despite the obvious disagreement between advocates of the post-Islamism approach and those of the traditional Orientalist approach to Islam, post-Islamism is not free of Orientalism’s imprint in the context of

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neo-Orientalism, which is an approach saturated with the essentialism and stasis favored by the old Orientalist establishment. Academics with old liberal views who totally deny the existence of post-Islamist movements favor essentialism rather than contextualism. The new, culturalist Orientalist discourse insists that Islam’s various manifestations are tactical, not strategic, and that there is no qualitative difference between Al-Gannouchi’s Ennahda Party and Al-Baghdadi’s caliphate, as they all have the goal of entrenching their own Islamist agenda through tactics and rhetorical convolutions that do not involve sincerely adopting democratic pluralism.

The expanded usage of the term “Islamism” reveals that it is mixed up and confounded with the terms “jihadism” and “religious Islam.” In the book *Rethinking Political Islam*, which consists of studies, research, and articles collected by Shadi Hamid and William McCants about Islamism by defining what the writers call “mainstream Islamists.” Hamid and McCants use this term to refer to Islamist parties “that operate within the limits of institutional policies and are willing to operate within the state’s existing structures, even outwardly secular structures.” The groups to which this description applies include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, the Islah Party in Yemen, the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia, and many others.

Despite the great diversity in understandings of Islamism, its analysts fall into two main camps. The first can be said to take the “contextual view,” which asserts that political parties’ policies and practices are not driven by ideology as much as by events. They view these groups as reacting and tending to adapt. The political scientist Steven Brooke notes that proponents of the contextual view believe that Islamist groups seek to adapt to the relevant country’s particular circumstances and customs, and their main objective is to survive as cohesive organizations and political actors. Oftentimes, their use of religious rhetoric is nothing more than “Islamic talk.”

The second school of thought could be called the “essentialist view.” Its proponents see Islamists fundamentally as ideologues, and any
concessions they make to secular institutions or principles are purely tactical moves. Their participation in electoral politics does not stop them from calling for violent jihad as well. According to this view, the true Islamist conception of democracy is “one man, one vote, one time.” In other words, according to this school, Islamists see the ballot box merely as a road to power. Once they get there, they replace democracy with bureaucracy. The natural consequence of this thesis is the idea – which Islamism’s critics enthusiastically propound, and which some Islamists also endorse – that states that Islamic theology does not recognize any separation between religion and politics, and therefore, credible and genuine Islamists cannot abandon their ideological agenda in favor of a more pragmatic or democratic approach.22

One of the most significant epistemological problems in science generally and social sciences in particular is based on the difficulty of separating ideology and science. General epistemology lies at the heart of a thorny and tangled cloth woven from diverse concerns and examinations with their own objectives and methods. The philosophical tradition, ancient and modern, has worked to formulate general theories of knowledge that address the various modes of knowledge, their elements, and their rational, imagined, empirical, and other sources. 23 All of these contributions have links typically associated with concepts bloated with dogmatism at times and usually imperialism.

Edward Said’s contributions on Orientalism include perhaps the best approach to the West’s relationship to the East. He sees Orientalism as divided into the imaginary, the academic, and the colonial. Each has meanings conferred by this science, but there is an exchange or synergy among all of them to achieve certain goals drawn up in advance by Western colonialists, i.e. “Orientalism as a Western method of controlling,

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22 See: Olivier Roy, Political Islam After the Arab Spring: Between Jihad and Democracy, op. cit.
reconstructing, and maintaining sovereignty over the East.\textsuperscript{24} This has been done only through the mechanism of brute force at times, such as wars and fighting, and through soft power via the device of Orientalism.

The task of American and European liberals, i.e. those who believe that the one to lead the international community in the future will necessarily be a follower of the religion of secularism, will be to proselytize their value system and their social and political model to all Muslims in order to save them and deliver them from the authoritarian regime that rules over them. They failed to do so, and this missionary process seeks to convert Muslims and Islam to Western liberalism and its value system, regarding it as the only just and rational system, the one that the whole of planet Earth should adopt. As Talal Asad showed, liberalism’s mission is to “reshape” Islamic tradition “on the model of liberal Protestantism.”\textsuperscript{25} Liberalism perceives Muslims’ resistance to this grandiose mission as a rejection of modernism and liberal values such as freedom, liberation, equality, civil rights, democratic citizenship, women’s rights, sexual rights, freedom of religion, secularism, rationalism, etc.\textsuperscript{26}

Reinhard Schulze was one of those who warned of the intellectual risks implicit in relying on a specific conception of post-Islamism. The discourse of post-Islamism is multifunctional, as it assumes that there is a need to play different public roles, political, social, and cultural, without that necessarily meaning that there is a definite ideology. Because it distances itself from such an ideological stance, post-Islamism’s mission veers away from an overarching interpretation of the world in favor of a different, more specific interpretation of the spheres of life. The word “post-” indicates the disintegration of Islamist rhetoric’s sole function when confronted with the pressures of globalization, that being to perpetuate an Islamist model reproducing a form of identity that strengthens

ties to the state and organizations and individuals within the state. In the end, Islamism loses its expressive function, as well as its revolutionary role, while surviving at the expense of re-establishing the nation-state.

François Burgat has long argued that the hypothesis of political Islam’s failure is foolish and wrong. He emphasizes that three constants persist: first, the sociopolitical causes that led to Islamism’s rise in the first place; second, the ability of Islamist rhetoric around modernism to mobilize its audience with self-generated, internal terminology; and third, the manipulation pursued by various regimes regarding the Islamist threat.

In the same context, Alain Roussillon worked to deconstruct the new forms of Orientalism within the framework of post-Islamism. Roussillon questioned French political researchers specializing in the study of Islam and issued a warning about the “innate cultures” we find in analysis of the so-called political agenda of post-Islamism. Roussillon believed that those who argue for Islamism’s failure, e.g. Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, are operating under the same distorted logic that in the past led them to attach excessive importance to analyzing state of Arab-Islamic politics in terms of Islamism, as Kepel and Roy believe that Islam dictates anything and everything that takes place in Muslim societies.27

According to Joseph Massad, the battle breaking out today among various forces that speak in the name of Islam or out of hostility to it is not only part of the productive process that pins new meanings and connotations on Islam but is also part of another process related to the first. This process seeks to drive the term toward particular meanings and connotations and away from others. Islam is thus positioned at odds with certain antonyms (Christianity, the West, liberalism, individualism, democracy, freedom, citizenship, secularism, rationalism, tolerance, human rights, women’s rights, sexual rights) and in alignment with other notions identified as synonymous with it (persecution, oppression, dictatorship, dictatorship, dictatorship).

27 See: Luz Gómez García, Post-Islamism, the Failure of an Idea: Regards on Islam and Nationalism from Khomeini’s Death to the Arab Revolts, op. cit.
totalitarianism, subjugation, injustice, intolerance, irrationality, severity, misogyny, homophobia). Thus, the core of the post-Islamism theory is based on the relationship between democracy and Islam. At the heart of the long intellectual genealogy of liberal assumptions, there emerged an argument that Islam is not democratic or that it is anti-democratic, and that the most important cultural achievement of Christianity (in its Protestant form) and the West is their commitment to democratic governance. In his book “Islam in Liberalism,” Massad addressed the liberal context in which these assumptions appeared and the cultural impact that they have had on politics and in the ongoing efforts of the United States, and before it Britain (and France) to present an Islamic theology, if not a new Islam altogether, consistent with the colonial and imperialist system that they wanted to impose on Muslim-majority states under the slogan “spreading democracy and freedom.” In contrast to (Protestant) Christianity and capitalism or modernism, which liberal thinkers present as facilitating democracy, Islam is said to be either entirely impregnable or “defenseless” against this “Western” political system.28

Nader Hashemi’s thesis is an example of the demand that Islam be converted into Protestantism as gateway to liberal democracy. In the course of his search for a democratic theory of Muslim societies, he notes that the conditions for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East in 21st century are similar in their political context and socio-economic background to those surrounding Protestant fundamentalist movements in 16th- and 17th Europe. In Hashemi’s view, comparing some of the events that the European world experienced with events the Islamic world is experiencing today can contribute to highlighting the case of Lutheranism on the borders of the Islamic world, especially because this world “stands today on the threshold of the 15th century after the Hijra, which is equivalent in Christian history to the century just before Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses to the door of the Wittenberg Castle church.” According to Hashemi, what makes radical Islamist movements similar to the Protestant case is that the latter was responsible for cutting the primitive ties with the family, the clan, the tribe, and the

village. These traditional ties, often based on hierarchies and vertical relationships, were replaced with organic, horizontal ties revolving around loyalty and solidarity among equal individuals. This is what Islamists have done by emphasizing the need to cut ties with the traditional religious establishment and that each individual is responsible for his own salvation. From another standpoint, Islamists have contributed by deploiring and rejecting the climate of corruption and promoting the culture of merit and worthiness (just as the Protestants did). This could mean the birth of a new capitalist spirit in the Islamic world in a future period, similar to what happened in the Calvinist Protestant case.29

The discourse around democracy is often a Christian religious discourse that presents democracy as the ultimate stage of (Protestant) Christianity. This discourse is, in short, no less that what Foucault described as the pairing of a set of practices (which in our case will be local and imperialistic rule) and a system of reality (which in this case is Orientalism) both derived from a body of power-knowledge (in liberalism’s formulation) “that clearly refers to something not present in reality and places it rightfully on the dividing line between fact and truth on one side and error on the other side,” i.e. the fact of “democratic Europe” and “antidemocratic Islam.”30

The Strategy behind Labels and the Limits to Exploitation

The terms “Islamism” and “post-Islamism” have not left behind the strategy of labeling and the limits to exploitation. In the case of Islamic studies and the examination of Islamist movements in particular, the problem is compounded, as scholarship is linked to an imperialist strategy. Jihadist groups, descendants of Islamism, have entered an internationalist stage as a reaction to the dynamics of globalization,31 following structural shifts in the international strategic field between 1989

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and 1992 after the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan on 15 February 1989, the outbreak of the Gulf War after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and the failed American campaign in Somalia on 9 December 1992. The Soviet Union’s collapse and the disintegration of the socialist system have led to the United States’ emergence as a hegemonic imperialist power seeking to control, expand, and impose a new world order. Strategic shifts witnessed a change in the American perception of the international political reality that prevailed during the Cold War era, the perception that caused the adoption of an American political and military strategy founded on the principal of “containment” of geopolitics and of communism, as well as on the principal of “deterrence” of conventional, nuclear Soviet power. The United States stumbled into the crisis of an ideological and political vacuum, which led to the emergence of many visions for defining the future. President George Bush Sr. adopted the notion of a “new world order” based on guaranteeing American hegemony and control over the world.

In this context appeared Francis Fukuyama’s thesis extolling the final victory of democracy and market capitalism and the declaration of the end of history, as well as the emergence of Islamic fascism. The American political-ideological establishment, however, adopted a new, diverging perspective on the nature of future dangers, embodied in the concept of “rogue states” with the ability to develop weapons of mass destruction or seeking to possession such weapons, like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the “clash of civilizations” arose in this context, adopting a culturalist-Orientalist approach proposing that

33 It seemed clear that the American Empire’s new enemy would be “Islam.” Former American President Nixon wrote: “Some observers warn that Islam will be a fanatical and concentrated geographical power, that the growth in its number of followers and in its financial power will pose a major challenge, and that the West will have to form a new alliance with Moscow to face a hostile and violent Islamic world.” Richard Nixon, *Seize the Moment: America’s Challenge in a One-Superpower World*, translated by Dr. Mohammed Zakaria Ismael, Dar Bissan Publishing, Damascus, 1992, p. 187.
the global conflict after the end of the Cold War would not be economic or geostrategic but civilizational par excellence. Thus, cultural groups would replace the Cold War’s blocs, and the lines of contact between civilizations would become the primary lines of conflict in global policies. Huntington saw Islam as the backbone of the power of darkness in the world because of Muslims’ inclination toward conflict and violence. He therefore decided that the clash between Islam and the West would be inevitable. This is a culturalist thesis compatible with the stereotypical Orientalist vision of Islam.

The famous Orientalist Bernard Lewis’ message to the United States about the Middle East after the September 11 attacks – which have had enormous impact on American foreign policy and decision making in Washington – was simple and stark, and it can be summarized as: “If the Middle East continues on this path, the suicide bomber will become a symbol of every part of the Middle East, and there will be no way out of the swamp of hatred, hostility, anger, self-flagellation, poverty, and tyranny.” His message to the United States about how to deal with the region was clear and harsh: Be tough or get out of the region. Some have called this the “Lewis doctrine,” and the Wall Street Journal identified Lewis’ theory as “seeding democracy in failed Mideast states to defang terrorism.”

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36 Samuel Huntington published his article “The Clash of Civilizations” in the spring 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, then converted his article into a book published in 1996. See: Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, translated by Talaat Al-Shayeb, Sutour Books, Cairo, 1999. According to Huntington in his study “American Interests and Security Variables”: “The West, after the Soviet Union’s fall, is in urgent need of a new enemy uniting its countries and peoples. War will not end, even if weapons fall silent and treaties are signed, because a coming civilizational war will continue between the Western camp, led by the United States, and the other side, which could be the Muslim world or China.” Foreign Affairs magazine, June 1993.


George W. Bush became president. In 1997, the neo-conservative hawks in the American foreign policy establishment formed the Project for the New American Century, one of the most important think tanks promoting the United States’ imperial invasion to ensure its superiority as an imperial power.

In this context, the terms Islamism and post-Islamism arose in extremely vital strategic, geopolitical, and international conditions. The events of 11 September 2001 functioned to invoke Islamism and post-Islamism in the search for a strategy to confront and contain the ascendant, grassroots, jihadist brand of Islamism. The American administration and European administrations adopted a course based on separating “moderates” and “extremists” with the ascension of the neo-conservatives’ cultural Orientalist approach, which stressed that the dictatorial regimes and religious culture of the Arab region were key drivers of extremism, violence, and terrorism, and that the solution lay in changing the regime’s culture and reforming local authoritarian regimes without regime change, in order to restructure the political and religious spheres and ensure safe passage from authoritarianism to democracy. Furthermore, many groups had been excluded, repressed, or marginalized by earlier regimes and governments and wished to participate and integrate, but the Orientalist approach focuses on the local, cultural dimensions of extremism and violence, excluding root causes. According to Burgat, violence arose under three strategic conditions. The first, a local and national condition, is closed political models, failed promises of democratic transformation, and entrenched despotism. The second, a regional condition, is the absence of a just, real peace in Palestine. The
third, a global condition, is the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unipolar dominance of the US, and the advent of globalization.42

The spread of the post-Islamism thesis clearly indicates the United States’ attempt following the September 11 attacks to pull political Islam movements into the framework of post-Islamist transformations through involvement in the structure of the authoritarian nation-state and acceptance of democracy and pluralism, considering these a firewall to extremism, violence, and terrorism. Theories of political integration emerged that were based on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. “[The hypothesis] was discussed at length from the standpoint of including Islamist parties in limited, state-dominated political liberalization processes in the Middle East.” Several researchers have contributed to developing this approach in different ways and from different angles, such as: Norton 1995 and, by implication, Anderson 1997. In recent years, several different scholars have, from the perspective of social movement, worked to broaden the discussion around the effects of including or excluding various Islamist parties within diverse patterns of systems and institutional contexts, such as: Hafez 2003, Wickham 2004, Caldwell 2006, Schwedler 2006, Asef Bayat 2007, Thuram 2007, Brewers 2009, Omar Ashour 2009, Wagner and Pellicer 2009, Yadaf 2010, Murad Tazkur 2010, and Clark 2010.43

Under the weight of September 11, Islamism in its moderate “post-” form was pulled into the framework of the nation-state in order to combat and contain jihadism, which was deemed terrorist. The United States of America and Arab-Muslim local governments had treated the most prominent representative of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a firewall against nationalist and leftist-communist challenges and risks during the Cold War, then radical and jihadist Islamist with the advent of globalization and the rise of jihadism. The “firewall” thesis became popu-

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43 See: Jillian Schwedler, “What is Behind the Moderation Hypothesis?” translated by Sabine Tougjian and Manal Khadar, *Kalamon* magazine, No. 8, Fall 2013, link: [http://www.kalamon.org/articles-details-180](http://www.kalamon.org/articles-details-180)
lar, and according to Eric Trager: “During the decade that followed the September 11 attacks, Western analysts’ search for a ‘moderate Islamist’ alternative to Al-Qaeda often led them to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose statements rejecting terrorism and embrace of electoral politics were alluring.”

Moderation/Extremism perspectives and inclusion-moderation arguments would lead to the emergence of post-Islamism in the framework of systems that had become quasi-authoritarian and were interested in making democratic electoral changes. Islamists turned out in force in all the elections that took place after September 11. The Justice and Development Party won in Turkey in 2002, and the coalition of Islamic parties advanced in Pakistan, where it won in the National Assembly elections for the first time in Pakistan’s history in 2002. The Justice and Development Party in Morocco obtained 42 seats in the House of Representatives, finishing in third place and making up the largest parliamentary bloc among the opposition in the 2002 elections. If we were to go down the list of Arab and Islamic states that held elections after the September 11 attacks, we would find clear progress for Islamist movements.

The authoritarian regimes in the Arab and Muslim world would quickly reassert control over the path of integration. Moderation has long been defined negatively as an antonym to radicalism and extremism, concepts that become individual, subjective issues in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. The moderate becomes subject to a political authority that wishes to absorb him and bend him to its will without restriction or condition, and without the authority changing. From a theoretical standpoint, moderation requires a process of change that can be described as movement on a continuum from radicalism to moderation, where each step away from exclusionary practices (of the type that considers all alternative viewpoints illegitimate and therefore dangerous) is an increase in moderation. But the Muslim Brotherhood’s engagement in

Jordan and the Arab world, emphasizes that the gains offered by structural openness exist in the context of a game of semi-authoritarian control that works to absorb the group as part of a given system to play according to the rules of the (semi-authoritarian) game, rules defined and controlled by existing regimes. This process is what Samuel Huntington called the “participation/moderation trade-off,” a type of “democratic deal” in which opposition groups become able to benefit from political openness only if they commit to “moderation in tactics and policies” through agreeing to reject violence or any other commitment to revolution, and accepting the existing contours of social, economic and political institutions.

The moderation-integration problem became more complex once “fallout of September 11th” dissipated and the declared end to the “war on terror” drew near, which led to the rise of Islamism. There was a return of local authoritarian policies that base their vision on Islamist movements on an Orientalist perspective that identifies Islam with violence and terrorism and treats the religious, political, and jihadist variations on Islamism as quantitative, not qualitative differences. This made the concept of Islamic moderation worthless, given that Islam is contrary to political modernity in its democratic stage. According to the Orientalist and culturalist perspective, Islamic moderation means abandoning Islam and embracing secularism and liberal democracy, as is apparent in the discourse of a clash of cultural civilizations, with Samuel Hunting-

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45 See: Jillian Schwedler, “What is Behind the Moderation Hypothesis?” op. cit.
47 Several books and studies appeared after the September 11 attacks that were based on the Orientalist perspective, which links Islam to violence and extremism structurally, such that Islamic moderation is possible only through transitioning to liberalism or limiting religious activities to Sufi rituals, without getting involved in politics. The American RAND Corporation is one of the most important think tanks in developing the conception of moderation and building moderate Muslim civil networks. Along these lines, see examples of these books and studies on the RAND website and the RAND Corporation’s series of reports, including: Cheryl Benard et al., *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, translated by Ibrahim Awad, Dar Altanweer, Cairo, First Edition, 2014; and Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam*, translated by Ibrahim Awad, Dar Altanweer, Cairo, First Edition, 2012.
ton’s theses stating it outwardly, along with fearmongering theses on Islam and claims that Islam persecutes minorities and is based on coercion and violence. This is also grossly obvious in the Orientalist claims in Bernard Lewis’ writings.

If we were to track the course of electoral democracy in a semi-authoritarian context, we would realize the impossibility of fully integrating Islamists. According to Brown, it started out that Islam was participating in elections to lose in a game of participation rather than fighting. This is because “semi-authoritarian systems are those that allow the opposition some ability to organize and compete but deny them any possibility of forming the government. Fully authoritarian regimes do not allow the opposition to operate even in these ways. Under authoritarianism, autonomous social organizations may exist and even flourish, but they are not allowed to tread far into the political realm without risking repression… Democracy, by contrast, allows the opposition to win. It has been paradoxically defined as a system in which political parties can lose elections; if there is a party that cannot lose, the system is not democratic.”

**Arab Uprisings and the Imperialist-Dictatorship Condition**

Since the spark of the Arab uprisings at the beginning of 2011, analyses have attempted to explain the factors, causes, and courses of the popular protests that swept the region. The outbreak of these uprisings surprised Western analysts and researchers, along with some intellectuals in the Arab world, because of the dominance of a paradigm incapable of understanding the dynamics of Arab society and based on a theory of continuity and despotism. These studies envisaged Arab societies as “stagnant” and “resistant to change” because their peoples had only a

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weak sense, or no sense at all, of the need for democracy and its principles, standards, and mechanisms for political representation, oversight, and accountability, i.e. these were considered “special” societies living under the guardianship of an authoritarian power’s tyranny for centuries.

Analysis of the Arab situation has remained a prisoner of two interpretive models: the cultural Orientalist approach and the structuralist approach. Despite limited updating in the field of Mideast studies, it has not been able to overcome its Western-centric intellectual biases in the case of culturalist approaches or determinism in the case of structuralist approaches. Such flaws make these approaches unable to comprehend the profound transformations that have occurred. They have produced either teleological approaches that seek to compare events in the Arab world to revolutions in Eastern Europe or Latin America, in an attempt to project deterministic models of “democratic transition” onto the Arab world, or approaches skeptical of the possibility of ongoing events in the Arab world to free Arab states from the snare of despotism and create a new civilizational archetype. These approaches stoke fears of an “Islamist Winter” and the models of the Taliban, Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda,51 in spite of the intensifying declarations of the decline of the global jihadist organization and Al-Qaeda at the start of the peaceful Arab uprisings in 2011, which coincided with the killing of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011.

Since World War II, the United States has dedicated its imperialist policy to counseling its European and Third World clients on how they can ensure sustainable control. During the last three years, however, and as a result of the uprisings that have occurred across the Arab world, the United States and the ruling elite in the Arab world have begun to reevaluate the dominance-subjugation equation. The new strategic objectives of both have been to identify a new balance of dominance and subjugation that would ensure the United States’ continued political, economic, and military control of the region and maintain the continued rule

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of the Arab elites who profit from these arrangements and are committed to them.

The deliberations going on today between United States policymakers and their Arab clients, then, are no longer focused on the outlines of the democracy or autocracy that Arab peoples should experience but rather on the most appropriate admixture of the dominance and subjugation (rounded out by corruption) that are necessary to produce a proper balance of love and fear in order to ensure the stability of the same hegemonic arrangements that have governed the region since the start of the United States’ imperial rule. The United States’ objective in this old/new strategy is to guarantee that the Arab Spring does not become an American Winter and indeed to perpetuate the flourishing of the updated neoliberalism imposed by the United States wherever it goes.52

Since its emergence in the Arab and Muslim worlds more than three decades ago, Islamism and its most prominent representative, the Muslim Brotherhood, have not been defeated in any electoral clash within an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian system. After the Arab revolutions, the Muslim Brotherhood proved to be a force for reform that could not be bested at the ballot box, nor could its influence and popularity in the public sphere be ignored. Islamism was deposed in coups that were outwardly military in form and tactics. This cleared the way for jihadist movements to come to the fore as a key actor in many Arab countries for objective and understandable reasons: the military coup that overturned the outcomes of the democratic process in Egypt following the Arab Spring revolutions, the militarization of the Arab revolutions in Syria and Libya, the subversion of Yemen’s, and the sectarian splintering of Iraq’s. With the Arab world entering a new period at the beginning of 2011 through uprisings and revolutions in opposition to authoritarian regimes, the Muslim Brotherhood constituted a fundamental challenge to jihadist movements and authoritarian regimes. Ithad been able to reach the seat of power in accordance with democratic mechanisms

representing the “will of the people” in free and fair elections, and it was militarily deposed on 3 July 2013 under the pretext of saving the revolution and democracy, which had been hijacked by Islamic “fascism” through adopting the strategy of the “war on terror.”

The campaign of systematic repression of Islamist movements led to the growing attractiveness of jihadist movements in general, and the Islamic State in particular. The organization became the preferred choice of new jihadists, and it siphoned a portion of political Islam’s adherents away into its ranks, becoming the top center of gravity pulling in jihadists from around the world and from both sexes. In contrast to previous jihadist experiments, the goal of the new jihadists was no longer confined to the traditional jihad of solidarity or grievance, instead moving beyond that to migration (hijra), consolidation of power, and contributing to the jihad of empowerment and state-building, residing within the Islamic State’s Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, and voluntarily complying with its exacting political, social, and economic system and its militant political rule.

Political Islam has thus in recent years been placed in an unfamiliar position, thanks to what Hamid and McCants call the “twin shocks” of the military coup in Egypt in 2013, which overthrew the Islamist-led elected government after it spent barely a year in power, and the appearance of the ISIS ministate in 2014 following the group’s brutal march across Iraq and Syria. Naturally, there was also a greater shock: the so-called Arab Spring in 2010-11, which brought mainstream Islamists more influence and power than they had enjoyed at any previous time.53

One of the methodological entry points to understanding the crises of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular and of political Islam in general involves not just the tendency to politicize in a semi-authoritarian regime but the nature of the modern Arab state, which Taha Abdurrahman calls the “suspicious state.” This is a “state which practices a kind of “politici-
Post-Islamism

zation of religion’ characterized by the combination of the secular requirements of modernity and the requirements of faith.” The suspicious state strives diligently to define religious practice as a public matter that falls within its scope of responsibilities and jurisdiction, and not, as in the case of the secular state, a private matter linked to the individual alone. The suspicious state is not satisfied with exercising control over religious activity in the same way it exercises control over political activity; it must have greater control, denying religious activity things that it permits for political activity. The suspicious state, according to Abdurrahman, bases its (despotic/authoritarian) behavior on two arguments. One is that religious competition leads to extreme positions and repudiation of dissenters, while management through dialogue necessitates the mediation of opinions and the moderation of views. The other argument is that if the existence of “democracy” in a society enables the creation of mechanisms to manage political conflict, the existence of “fundamentalism” in society prevents the creation of mechanisms to manage religious disagreement. Abdurrahman calls the first argument “the argument of religious extremism” and the second “the argument of incompatibility between fundamentalism and democracy.”

Following the Arab Spring revolutions, many of the convictions related to political Islam became a threat to foreign imperialism and local dictatorship and were modified. This resulted in important repercussions for long-standing hypotheses about the Muslim Brotherhood in particular and about Islamists on a larger scale. According to Mark Lynch, theses that were still robust five years ago no longer necessarily apply to the present.

An opposite view holds that the Brotherhood facilitated rather than acted as a barrier against violent extremism and was in fact a step on a path leading to extremism. This “conveyor belt” theory suggests that even if the Brotherhood itself did not endorse violence, it put individuals on the path to extremism, increasing the overall number of potential ter-

rorists. This view’s adherents point to the Brotherhood’s contradictory and wavering rejection of violence, seen in the continuing prestige accorded to jihadist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb for their writings or their support for violence in places such as Palestine or Iraq.55

One of the major problems the Muslim Brotherhood suffered and which arose after the Arab Spring revolutions, was the issue of ambiguity, confusion, and redundancy within the religious intellectual authority, along with a stagnant organizational structure. It is still hostage to its conciliatory proposals, vacillating on whether to favor traditional or modern structures. It presents public ideas and visions within the framework of “post-Islamism,” while its leaders insist on remaining within “Islamism.” Meanwhile, Islamist movements that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood have chosen among their options and settled on post-Islamism. This is what the Turkish Justice and Development Party has done, along with its counterpart the Moroccan Justice and Development Party, and finally the Tunisian Ennahda Party.

In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood’s decline was not mainly due to its ideology and programs but a result of change in the international and local vision and a shift toward exclusion and eradication by military means. International and local strategies have retreated from defining Islamism as a state of peaceful moderation in opposition to violent extremism, a definition that prevailed after 11 September 2001 and was shaken by wagers on integration. The theses related to Islamism, such as the “inclusion-moderation” approach and theories of a “firewall” against extremism, were thus replaced, and arguments for the “conveyor belt” of violence came to the fore.

Now that the Arab uprisings have been reined in, many of the long-standing theses on the Muslim Brotherhood are simply no longer relevant. A whole new institutional and political framework has come into being, one which is no longer characterized by enduring authoritarianism,

55 See: Marc Lynch, “Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization or a Firewall Against Violent Extremism?” translated by Aladdin Abu Zaina, Al Ghad newspaper, link: https://bit.ly/2GLp34G
tolerance for the existence of Islamist movements – so long as they are confined to the role of the permanent political opposition – and a clear distinction between mainstream Islamists and violent extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda. The debate about whether participation promotes moderation, for example, was based on institutions and political opportunities of a type that have fundamentally changed.\textsuperscript{56}

Following the military overthrow of the Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates quickly welcomed the exclusion of the group and the removal of the elected Brotherhood-affiliated president, Mohamed Morsi. The coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was not limited to removing it politically from governance and authority. It evolved into a coordinated campaign to strip the group of its legal legitimacy, causing it to be designated as a terrorist movement on 25 December 2013.\textsuperscript{57} The process of delegitimizing the group did not stop with its presence in Egypt; it extended to several Arab countries, particularly those in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia added the group to its list of terrorist organizations on 7 March 2014,\textsuperscript{58} followed by the United Arab Emirates putting the group on its list on 15 November 2014.\textsuperscript{59}

In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood became besieged and prosecuted locally, regionally, and internationally. The process of eradicating the group went beyond material and political aspects, impacting the moral and symbolic spheres through divesting the group of political and legal legitimacy and deeming it a “terrorist” movement. Many countries proceeded to take a set of actions, including reassessing the group’s nature, approach, and activities, and introducing draft legislation to treat the group as a terrorist movement. In the United Kingdom, a report pre-

\textsuperscript{56} See: Marc Lynch, “Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization or a Firewall Against Violent Extremism?” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} See: “Egyptian government labels Muslim Brotherhood a ‘terrorist’ group,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, link: https://bit.ly/2UjF06y

\textsuperscript{58} See: “First Saudi list of terrorist organizations includes Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Nusra, and Daesh,” \textit{BBC Arabic}, link: http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/03/140307_sauditerror_organizations

\textsuperscript{59} See: “UAE designates organizations including Muslim Brotherhood as ‘terrorist,’” \textit{Al Jazeera}, link: https://bit.ly/2ClhjTe
pared by the government on 17 December 2015 on the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities concluded that membership in or association with the group should be considered a possible indicator of extremism and terrorism, but it refrained from deeming the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. In the United States, a draft resolution was submitted to Congress to include the group on the terrorism list on 24 February 2016. The draft resolution reached the same conclusions contained in the British report.

Some Arab approaches have focused on dealing with Islamism at the intersection of the American and British approaches. Jordan adopted an incremental strategy situated between exclusion and integration. In other words, it did not follow in the footsteps of the Egyptians, Saudis, and Emiratis by eradicating the group and designating it as a terrorist movement. Instead, Jordan approved a series of political and legal measures and put pressure on the group’s various steams to create fragmentation and polarization, pushing the “doves” toward further moderation and identification with the government’s policies. These policies led to the birth of the group Zamzam, then created support for legalizing the Brotherhood in preparation for divesting the historical group of legal legitimacy. The policies also operated to push the “elders” to form a new party.

Morocco, meanwhile, adopted an approach based on political integration, crafting a “Moroccan model” for integrating Islamists into political action. Morocco worked to shape its own model supported by two pillars: the monarchy’s neutrality amid political jostling, which placed the monarchy above currents and parties, and allowing Islamists to engage in political action incrementally and in accordance with certain controls. This distinctive model affected the response to the events of the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in 2011. The Islamists did not take up anti-regime slogans, nor did they call for toppling the regime, as occurred in other Arab countries. Instead, they merely voiced slogans of a social and economic nature, most notably about combating corruption,

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reforming the judiciary, and the fair distribution of wealth. The party achieved a win in the elections in 2016 and March 2017, and King Mohammed VI appointed Saadeddine Othmani as prime minister, succeeding Abdelilah Benkirane. Both are from the Justice and Development Party.

Tunisia is an exceptional case in the Arab world, having overcome the post-Arab Spring transitional stages by crafting consensus between Islamism and other political factions. The Ennahda Party is described as a post-Islamist movement, and it reached a decisive turning point in practice and rhetoric after the Tunisian revolution in 2011, which restored Ennahdai Tunisia, put it into power, developed its rhetoric, and modified its views. This was readily apparent at its ninth conference in 2015 and the 10th in 2016, at which it endorsed the separation of religion and politics within the movement, defined itself as a national democratic party, and adopted a new historical and interpretive understanding of the principles of Islamic legislation and Islamic history as a whole.

In practice, Ennahda opened up to Tunisian civil society and Tunisian secular parties, and has existed side by side in the government with Nidaa Tounes in the past two regimes. Before that, Ennahda formed a troika with two leftist secularist parties, the Congress Party under President Moncef Marzouki and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties under President Mustapha Ben Jafar. In May 2018, in the first municipal elections in the country during the period democratic transition since 2011, Ennahda won 27.5% of the vote, with Nidaa Tounes coming in second at 22.5%.

**Conclusion**

The jury is still out on the future of Islamism. In the near term, jihadist Islam and its most prominent representative, Islamic State, have taken advantage of international, regional, and local transformations. There has been a coup against outcomes of the Arab Spring, and a return to repressive authoritarian regimes, and the forces behind military coup
continue to impose imaginary “war on terror” scenarios and are determined to cement their seizure of power and rebuild the military police state. The proliferation of jihadist movements and the increasing attractiveness of their rhetoric is indisputable, but that does not provide a long-term roadmap for the peoples of the region.

Thus, the objective alliance between forces of violence, i.e. the repressive state and radical jihadist movements, could turn out to fragment and run off course, clearing the field for the return of revolutionary democratic movements, actors, and forces. We may see a revival of the integration theory for Islamic movements that prove they are rooted in society, pursue a peaceful approach, and are democratic in their practices. However, this does not seem possible in the foreseeable future, when violence prevails over governance.

Islamism’s current crisis finds expression in the dual challenges of the Islamic State and the nation-state, which corroborate the movement’s hypocrisy through two clashing theses: One enjoins the movement to abandon its religious references and the second emphasizes its strict fundamentalism. According to nation-state theorists, it is impossible to integrate Islamism into the framework of the Arab nation-state in its current form, which developed after colonialism, because the two entities were founded on incompatible reference authorities. It seems impossible to put the two worlds on equal footing through integration, as the Brotherhood seeks to Islamize the nation-state, while the latter calls for compliance and obedience to its requirements. The concept of moderation in the context of the modern nation-state means that one party adapts and submits. Since the Arab nation-state came into being, it has felt out its own path to emergence and stability, searching for it its legitimacy in Western, secular, nationalist sources on the legitimacy of ideas and institutions, and brushing Islamist reformists aside.62

Islamism’s dual problems of the Islamic State and the nation-state are based on the fact that the modern Arab nation-state is founded on nationalist, liberal democratic, or leftist socialist thought, or a mixture of these ideologies, but has vacillated between authoritarianism and semi-authoritarianism regardless of ideology. After the Arab Spring revolutions and the shakeup of the authoritarian nation-state system, ambiguously religious and political Islamist movements emerged. Controversy and conflict increased around the identity of the state and society and the place of religion in the public sphere. The issue of moderation became complicated by conceptions of the state as essentially religious or civil, principles for integration, and the religion’s relationship to the state.

The post-Islamism approach does not seem possible without an open political environment, an effective democratic system, and strong civil society institutions. The success of democracy requires a firm conviction and sincere intentions on the part of Islamist movements, as well as semi-authoritarian regimes, concerning the necessity of change and transformation and building confidence in a better future for everyone. Although the concept of “post-Islamism” appeared more than two and a half decades ago, it remains widely controversial with regard to its definition, application, and validity because of its limited explanatory power, weak predictive effects, and modest intellectual impact in the phenomenon’s homeland in the Arab-Islamic world. The research efforts made toward developing the theoretical framework for the post-Islamist stage and propagating post-Islamism as an effective and useful analytical tool from the standpoint of social and political terminology have now been overtaken by the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011. The Arab revolutions challenged the theoretical foundations that served as a solid basis for post-Islamist discourse, which argued with definite certainty for the hypothesis of Islamism’s decline as a viable political alternative amid globalization and the fragmentation of sanctity. The individual experience of Islam transformed on the basis of a new, globalized system founded on

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the defense of civil rights and the separation of political and religious spheres.

The Arab Spring has demonstrated the failure of all the forecasts of the end of Islamism. The prophesies of post-Islamism have also failed. Bayat’s prophesy about the Iranian situation itself has not proven apt, as the Iranian regime maintains its religious legitimacy, which it has prioritized at the expense of democracy and elections. Time has demonstrated that what seemed to be a strong internal reformist trend in Iran was nothing but a delusion that served to spice up a battered political path. Nevertheless, talk about the end of Islamism or a post-Islamism stage is still widespread.

We can see an echo of that in many writings of the most famous French researcher in this field, Olivier Roy, who sees the road as closed to the political practice of Islamist groups and that even where it is permitted, such groups will not be able to reach the seat of power or will fail to remain there. At the same time, the orientation toward violence is not a logical alternative, but merely a nihilistic choice that will lead only to further eradication and constraint. Because of all this, according to Roy, the alternative may be an Islamist/secular political movement applying a system more closely resembling the Turkish experience.64

It can be said that post-Islamism is freezing and ossifying the present analysis because in itself it prevents weighing the importance of forms and content that have proven to be impossible to implement and even obsolete (modernity, Islamism, and globalization). The popular mobilizations of 2011 presented an independent civil society unprepared and unwilling to prioritize civil rights at the expense of political rights, which appeared for the first time in the reshaping of Iranian and Turkish policies (those therefore being the main reference for the post-Islamism stage).

64 See: Madi Al-Fateh, “The End of Political Islam as an Orientalist Theory,” Al-Quds newspaper, October 2017, link: http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=802012
The Arab revolutions reclaimed the streets and political life as a means of exerting pressure and of self-expression, with the state being the main focus of discussion. It is worth noting, however, how political life, the streets, and the state are now seen free of the ideological burdens of Nasserism, Baathism, and Wahhabism, which were imposed on Arab societies by post-independence discourse, and all of which revolved around dishonest rhetoric about the Ummah. The issue in the Iranian case is that we still need to see what kind of relationship between politics and the state would replace Khomeini’s Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.

In the Arab case, the separate courses that those revolutions took in form and content raise questions about the methodological contingency implicit in the theory of post-Islamism and, to some extent, the restoration of the historical colonial process.65

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The contention that post-Islamism theory has epistemological and political implications is usually taken for granted. From the start, it is necessary to make the distinction between “post-political Islam” and “post-Islamism.” Islam has been political and post-political in a circular manner throughout its history. As such, post-Islamism would be the result of a sociopolitical ideology focused on a utopian project, as suggested by the prefix “post-” and the suffix “-ism” in the name “Islamism.” However, this paper will concern itself with post-Islamism as a theory for understanding the late developments of political Islam. It will discuss the origins and implications of conceptualizing political Islam in a post-Islamist framework, as well as advance an interpretation of its implications for the Arab future within the framework of the general neo-Orientalist push after the miscarriage of the Arab revolts.

Two (or Three) Origins: From Diagnostic to Performance

Post-Islamism theory was born in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. Two French authors popularized this concept at the same time: Olivier Carré67 and Olivier Roy.68 In 2001, Roy acknowledged that it was...
Carré who first coined the term.\textsuperscript{69} This is insignificant for the purposes of this paper, as they both used the term with different goals and perspectives. But in both cases, they found in post-Islamism a diagnostic for an endogenous form of secularism within Islam itself. As such, they did not consider secularism, the other side of the coin, to be in crisis like Islamism, as Asma Bin Qada decried in 2009.\textsuperscript{70}

For Olivier Carré, post-Islamism is mainly a historical paradigm, “the forgotten Great Tradition” of Islam.\textsuperscript{71} He defines the “post-Islamist” era as the longest era of Islam, the period from the 10th to the 19th century, in which both Shi’i and Sunni Islam were distinguished by “the separation of the political-military from the religious realm, both theoretically and in practice.”\textsuperscript{72} The 20th century would see the departure from this path with the advent of neo-Hanbalism in both Muslim societies and among Islamic scholars and Islamologists. The trap was the notion of the Sharia as an ahistorical, closed, and holistic paradigm. All Islamist movements that have played a significant role in the Middle East since the 1960s have followed suit, which may explain their failure politically and socially at the end of the century. Returning to the post-Islamist paradigm means recovering the autonomy of political power, as opposed to religious authorities wielding it, and an interpretation of the Qur’an anchored in history and individuals.

Olivier Roy uses “post-Islamism” to explain the failure of Islamism due to a systemic fault within itself, i.e. its internal, circular contradiction: Islam is a political model based on individual virtue, while virtue itself can only be acquired in a truly Islamic society established by an Islamist agenda.\textsuperscript{73} When confronted with reality, Islamist movements ultimately fail to attain their goal (the establishment of an Islamic State) due to the state appropriating the task of re-Islamizing society and the

\begin{itemize}
  \item Carré, \textit{L’Utopieislamique}, p. 11.
  \item Roy, \textit{L’Echec de l’islampolitique}, p. 42.
\end{itemize}
Islamists losing their monopoly over religious discourse. Roy’s post-Islamism is a political paradigm in which the State is the main concern in terms of dissociating the religious and political realms. The market, rule of law and authority are the three elements that shape the relationship between the state and religious indicators. In other words, liberalism has managed to undermine Islamism, and this will condition the current post-Islamist era.

After Carré and Roy, Asef Bayat was one of the first researchers to adopt “post-Islamism” as not only an epistemological, but also an analytical tool. Moreover, Bayat’s approach is more performative than empirical, which he defends clearly in his 2005 manifesto. We say “performative” in the sense of being a dramatic act, an act of expression that serves to effect the execution of itself, as Judith Butler stated in relation with the construction of gender in history. Bayat later expanded the definition of post-Islamism from a condition (where and how an exhausted Islamism loses its leadership abilities in the political, social and doctrinal realms) to a project: “It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in space of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scripture, and the future instead of the past.” In doing this, Bayat’s post-Islamism places democracy at the core of a debate that is performative in nature. In addition to describing and analysing Middle Eastern societies, Bayat does not hesitate in offering a strategy to attain true democracy through a “socialization of the State.”

But in going from the diagnostic to the performance, from Carré and Roy to Bayat, post-Islamism theory has fallen into contradiction with what it considers to be the default of Islamism: its holistic and all-encompassing character (shumuliyya). Because of its extraordinary

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flexibility, post-Islamist theory can accommodate a host of “post-” realities of different and even contradictory Islamic experiences. For example, it can focus on Iran’s triumphant model, or the Muslim Brotherhood’s ambiguous relationship with the Mubarak regime, as well as on women’s movements and minority Muslim communities.  

Although it is important that subaltern and minority Islamic voices get their space in the analysis of political Islam, it cannot be at the price of magnifying the Islamic category of every social, political or cultural phenomena. The danger of an oversized Islam encompassed by the “post-”, instead of being disintegrated into its mono-functional character, as it should be, must not be underestimated. The persistence of an Islamic paradigm reproduces a form of identity that involves both the state and individuals at the expense of the structural conditions. As such, the conditions that were the raison d’être of Islamism are as present now as they were fifty years ago.

The late Egyptian analyst Husam Tammam argued that in constantly pointing out Islamism’s external failures (both in its access to power and in the implementation of an ummaist alternative to the nation-state), post-Islamist theorists have underestimated the importance of Islamism’s inner logic in organizational, generational, programmatic and financial terms. Thus, post-Islamism led to the disintegration of classical Islamism, mainly that of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Tammam, the end of political Islam is by no means characterized by the acceptance of the nation-state. Rather, post-Islamism is characterized by the birth of alternative formulas to the already existing nation-state, both in revolutionary branches as well as those existing at the limited margins allowed by regimes. The great legacy of Islamism to post-Islamism is what Tammam called the “latent Islamist politicality in the making” (al-siyasa’awiyya al-islamiyya al-kamina al-muntazira), exemplified in Egyptian Salafism. Marcus Holdo focused on three of these underestimated political actors: Islamic feminists, Salafi-jihadists and

revolutionary youth. He concluded that their sources of legitimation and social recognition give important clues for the future of the conflicts in the Arab World post-2011.80

On the other hand, there have been hard critics of post-Islamism that question its validity as both a concept and analytical tool in addition to its performative roll. Françoise Burgat denies the existence of a post-Islamist era for the same reasons he denies the failure of Islamism: the ethnocentrism of the West that pervades the analysis and perpetuates our “old Muslim alter ego” well into the 21st century.81 He represents one of the fiercest detractors of post-Islamism, always questioning its academic efficacy, as well as its contribution to the end of authoritarian and repressive Middle East regimes. Another French academic, the late Alain Roussillon, also warned against “congenital culturalism”82 that we find in analyses of the so-called post-Islamist political agenda, as was the case when the political paradigm was under the umbrella of the Islamist agenda. In his view, the approach of French academia to Islamism then and post-Islamism now has been deformed: everything that goes on in Muslim societies ceases to be Muslim and becomes Islamic instead.

A Neo-Orientalist Turn? “liquid” Islamism

Defenders of post-Islamism theory have stipulated the conditions that would demand the end of the liberating Islamist utopia. In doing so, they have introduced into the Islamic framework the Western postmodern formula that “liquefies”83 the solid nature of past ideological undertakings. Islamism would dilute itself in a liquid modernity as it had in the Enlightenment, Liberalism or Socialism. In this respect, post-Islamist theory subjects the South to a supposed universalist epistemology which in fact is an ethnocentrism coming again from the North. Thus, Arab societies may have offered their own dialectic

response to modernity at the end of the 20th century. The main feature of this response would be that both nationalists and Islamists alike had activated a conservative social re-Islamization and a successful post-colonial, Weberman individual. Oliver Roy illustrates his theory within different contexts, including Europe. He concludes, “The ‘nationalization’ of Islamist movements is, incidentally, congruent with a general phenomenon: Islam as such is never a dominant strategic factor. The religious dimension always contributes to more basic ethnic or national factors, even if it provides afterwards a discourse of legitimation and mobilization.” But such an analysis utterly ignores the liberating potential implicit in Islamist discourse for those same men and women who, over the past 50 years, have joined the ranks of protest movements nationally, regionally (for Palestine first and then for Iraq) and internationally, culminating with the Arab uprisings of 2011.

To liquate Islamism also means to include it in the ongoing processes of globalization. This will be done by means of undermining the logic and inner expressions that may propel new Islamist mobilizations forward with new resources and strategies. The de-ideologization of the public sphere, popular disaffection towards Islamism, and the lack of social interest in the political were all signs of the post-modern times with regards to the prospect of post-Islamism. However, the Arab revolts exposed a new political culture developed over the last two decades under the noses of repressive Arab regimes (which, one must remember, acted as guarantors of international stability). Egyptian human rights advocate Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa’id insisted as early as 1995 on the necessary alliance between modern technology, the shift towards a new economic model, and the struggle for democracy through civil grassroots networking as the only worthwhile future. The events in Tahrir were an opportunity to reach an

understanding among very diverse groups of different origins and ideologies, yet who all shared a similarly silenced political culture. Kefaya, the April 6 Movement and the Coalition for Change were able to bring to their side traditional organizations and trade unions, including, towards the end, the Muslim Brotherhood. This formerly silenced political culture did not necessarily mean a post-Islamist culture, nor a de-political culture, but rather an inclusive political culture with Islamism as one of its decisive actors. In this regard, the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2011-2012 gave Islamists a chance to come to power in Egypt, against which the old political culture reacted fiercely. Going even further, Françoise Burgat asserts the political nature of Daesh’s agenda against those defenders of the de-politicization of post-Islamism, whom he accuses of denying any political agency to the Muslim other.\(^87\)

Nevertheless, this agency of the new Muslims has four main features. First, it rejects the supremacy of the religious, but not politics or religion \emph{per se}. Second, it breaks with pyramidal structures in everything related to decision-making processes, but not with responsibility and commitment. Third, it resists the co-opting of social mobilization on the part of traditional institutions, such as political parties, trade unions and religious organizations, but does not reject political militancy. Fourth, it does not distinguish the public space from the political one, because it lives amidst an on-going organizational effervescence, between \emph{hizb} (party), \emph{haraka} (movement) and \emph{tanzim} (organizational structure). Moreover, the re-politicization of the Arab streets in tandem with cyberspace has certainly been the most important Arab contribution to contemporary popular movements. The new political culture is a “\emph{re-}” more than a “\emph{post-}”, because it is new and familiar at the same time. It is new in forms and demands, yet old by remaining ideological. Simply put it, it is an ongoing experience of the new era of transversal understanding of protesting born in the South and expanded to the rest of the world since Tahrir.

\(^87\) Françoise Burgat (2016) “Réponse à Olivier Roy: les non-dits de ‘l’islamisation de la radicalité,’” \emph{L’Obs}, 1.12.2015 [https://goo.gl/6H934g].
Islamist militants have not been unaware of nor incompatible with this political culture tested since the early 2000s. The youth, veteran reformists, and women have established new links both among themselves and their partners outside of Islamist organizations and traditional channels. They have resorted to multiple strategies, and sometimes these means are as important as the end, as is the case with the spread of social media. Without leaving Egypt, we have witnessed how sometimes the route taken is through negotiation and the establishment of pacts inside one single Islamist movement. This was the case of the youth/reformist branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with regard to the organization’s leadership, which in 2007 finally rejected the establishment of a political party as demanded by the former. However, four years later the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders did feel compelled to quickly set up the Justice and Freedom Party. Another example was the strategy of some Islamists supporting the establishment of an independent political party, even if within a system designed to exclude any kind of opposition. That was the case of Al-Wasat Party, whose requests to become legal were successively rejected in 1996, 1998, 2004 and 2009. The party finally became the first legalized party in Egypt following Mubarak’s demise. Occasionally, there has also been room for timely and visionary improvisations of sorts. For instance, the middle-class followers of the suave television preacher Amr Khaled, whose political positions always remained a mystery, joined the Tahrir mobilizations early on following Khaled’s call via Facebook. This action came in spite of warnings by Egypt’s religious institutions and the initial lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The unequivocally Islamist turn of an important sector of the Arab revolts reflects the ability of Islamism to combine two different requests: those of the middle-class and those of lower classes. The former demands freedom and pluralism, the latter seeks a distributive ethics capable of realizing socio-economic improvements. This is nothing new nor spontaneous. Starting at the end of the 1990s, Rashid al-Ghannushi, the leader of the Tunisian Ennahda Party, adopted ideas and themes stemming from sociology and political science. In doing so, he situated
theoretical Islamism as a subject that elaborates and feeds these disciplines, rather than being merely their object, as neo-Orientalism does. Of particular relevance in Ghannushi’s thought is the shift of Islamist ideology core from the state to civil society. The shift also shaped Ennahda’s electoral campaign in the 2011 legislative elections, when Ennahda announced that they “consider the state to be a political civil entity.” Later, in May 2016, Ghannushi stated that the party was moving away from so-called “political Islam” towards “Muslim democracy.” This statement incited lively discussions, not only about its opportunism in order to broaden sympathy for Ennahda among the Western audience, but also about the possibility of separating democracy and Islam in contemporary Muslim societies. For his part, Mohammed Badie, Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, stated on the eve of the last round of the Egyptian 2011-2012 legislative elections that “Islam lacks the notion of a religious state.” This was something that had never been said before by a Brotherhood’s leader, but which had been discussed over the last twenty-five years. A new stage has been set in which the debates over the state are not only limited to good governance, as the post-Islamist thesis would have it. Rather, the discussions harken back to the old debate of the relationship between Islam and politics. Hence, the tension between the need for the state to be both the receptacle of community consensus and the agent implementing Sharia re-emerged. As such, the terrain for a redemptive utopia remains ambiguous. However, defenders of the post-Islamist thesis, such as Asef Bayat, interpreted this abandonment as a “rescue of Islam.” In rather general terms, they considered it a sort of “ideological normalization” after the (abnormal) Islamist detour.

88 Ennahda Electoral Programme 2011 [https://goo.gl/yMzrof].
90 Al Masry Al Youm, 12.6.2011.
In any event, the alliance between secularists and Islamists in confronting authoritarianism and the continuity of Arab regimes remains one of the dividing lines between different kinds of Islamism. Such seems to be the case in the rather brief democratic experience of the post-revolutionary elections held in some countries. In Tunisia, the Ennahda civil alternative entered a coalition government with secular liberal parties, while turning its back on leftovers from Ben Ali’s regime. On the contrary, in Morocco the timeserver Justice and Development Party found its place under the wings of the monarchy and led the Moroccan government between 2012 and 2017. In Egypt, two Islamic alternatives faced each other in the 2012-2013 democratic interregnum: the Muslim Brotherhood (through its political arm, the Justice and Freedom Party) and the Salafists (through Al-Nur party) occupied most of the seats in Parliament without arriving at any sort of consensus and lacking any real prospects for ruling together. Moreover, when the coup d'état took place, the Salafists positioned themselves from the outset alongside the new regime, while the Brothers became the first target of repression. In all the cases, the reach of such different alternatives may mean a rupture within Muslim Brotherhood-inspired movements in each country and in the region as a whole.  

And yet, a very significant question that one should ask is that of the role Salafists ought to play in the near future, as that future now seems to be counterrevolutionary in nature. It is worth mentioning that contemporary Salafism brings together old attitudes derived from previous forms of Islamism (such as radical anti-Western positions of qutbism and jihadism) while also promoting both Sufi spiritualism (like communitarian rituals or the centrality of the figure of the Prophet) and a re-Islamizing orthopraxis (in clothing, prayer, and social relations). The worldly nature of Salafism, i.e. integration in the world that looks forward to the looming utopia of a personal return to the roots of faith, is what strengthens its current diversity and popularity. The new Salafist elite are local preachers who become transnational figures with a very

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distinctive rhetorical style. They do not speak in classical Arabic language, but rather in a way bordering on the most vulgar dialect, in order to accommodate all kinds of outbursts against sexual promiscuity, foreign influence or political activism to the television audience. And after that, YouTube took care of the rest, hosting these addresses on the internet and making easier to reproduce them on a multitude of social networks. The material support of transnational Salafist networks, as well as Salafism’s *virginity* in the political spectrum, made it possible for these kinds of Salafists to gather significant popular support in the context of a controlled media opening in the last years of Mubarak’s regime. One such Salafist star is Tariq al-Zumar, a furious anti-Nasserist and historical leader of al-Jihad al-Islami, who was imprisoned after the murder of Anwar al-Sadat and released in 2010. Al-Zumar founded his own Salafist party (Building and Development Party) early in 2011 and made his own tour of Tunisia and Lebanon as the champion of “Salafist pan-Arabism,” if such a thing ever could exist.

It remains to be seen how Salafists can solve the tensions arising from an Islamo-nationalist political practice in the post-revolutionary period and a pan-Salafist strategic transversality. In any case, a new and powerful “pan-ism” is under way, which contrast with Roy’s statement that "pan-isms have disappeared: neither pan-Arabism nor pan-Islamism exist any longer.”

**Post-Islamism and the Future**

In short, one could argue that post-Islamism theory liquefy the current analysis by not allowing Islamism to become free from the forms and content that have proved rather inoperative and even outdated. The popular mobilizations of 2011 have brought forth an autonomous civil society unwilling to give primacy to civil rights as much as to political ones. This is in opposition to what had first appeared in the reshaping of

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Iranian and Turkish politics at the beginning of the century (both countries being the first reference of post-Islamism theory).

The Arab revolutions have recovered politics in two different senses. These two senses can be summed up in the street and state: the street as politics, as an inner space for expressing oneself and exerting pressure, as the “site of all possible freedom,” in Maurice Blanchot’s words when describing France in May 1968; whereas the State is the central axis around which the political debate revolves. Yet, it is worth mentioning how politics —street and state— are thus devoid of the ideological ballasts that post-independence discourse had imposed on Arab societies, a superstructure that always has revolved around the confrontation between the State and the nation. It is what Burhan Ghalioun explained as “the political trap of post-independence”: to impose the logic of the state (i.e. a technical structure over organizational matters) on the people-nation (the true generator of solidarity) such that repression was only able to guarantee the preservation of the status quo (the chain of failures and “internal colonization”).

The autonomy of both the revolts’ form and content has called into question the systematic dependence inherent in post-Islamist theory and, to a degree, has reversed the non-stop colonial process. Sociopolitical epistemology, as well as political praxis, have exchanged the flow of the traditional North-South relationship for a more horizontal one, if not a South-North one in some cases. Although revolutionary changes have not yet materialized, at least political Islam has proved not to be “post-,” but rather present and diverse. Moreover, it is horizontally connected with plural societies, as well as with the new network of a worldwide, decentralized society 2.0. A new era has certainly opened, but not necessarily a post-Islamist one. If this were a time of post-political Islam or post-Islamism, its life expectancy would be shorter than the time it needs to develop a consistent strategy. In that case, we would already need another analytical category to understand it.

This paper aims primarily to argue that writing the political, social, and intellectual history of Islamist movements in the Arab world requires two levels of analytical and methodological consideration.

The first involves giving primacy to dynamic approach to the Islamist movement phenomenon and avoid studying it in a static way, so that this approach can provide a deeper understanding of the paths, developments, and transformations that these movements and organizations have experienced.

The second involves liberating the analytical approach to the Islamist movement phenomenon from the stereotyping that has led it to be addressed as a phenomenon distinct from the contexts of social, humanitarian, and political development. It is difficult to separate the culturalist legacy generally from the social environment, and therefore it becomes necessary to work systematically and diligently to present composite approaches to the phenomenon of political Islam that take into consideration its interaction with social and political realities.

In fact, political Islam is diverse in its adoption of specific and divergent mechanisms for employing texts, references, and historical facts in service of an extremely complex and variable reality, doing so in light of its understanding of these texts on one hand, and in the light of its lived reality on the other. This doubtlessly leaves its impact on these groups’ rhetoric, performance, structure, and interpretations of reality. Based on this equation, the limits of which are inscribed between the text and reality, there should be a dialectical, humanized reading of Islamist groups,
free of preconceived characterizations of devilry or saintliness. This means not being satisfied with analyzing the texts and approaching the actors in political Islam within political, social, economic, and cultural contexts in the same way as any group interacting with reality and its challenges and offering answers to its problems that could be utopian, radical, or reformist. There is generally more than one answer and more than one form of expression, so long as freedom of expression is available.

The thesis of political Islam’s failure reignites a deep discussion on fundamental questions. This is what justifies its power as a concept regardless of whether and how correct it is. At the same time, it opens the door for discussion of post-Islamism as a concept, a term, and a phase. The term “post-Islamism,” like every “post-” term, is undoubtedly characterized by an extremely fluid definition. This fluidity tends to prevail until certain interpretations cease to be valid and fail to others, or until there are profound transformations within an intellectual or social phenomenon that presage that it will evolve away from its original form. In no circumstance, however, will what comes after resemble what came before. To a large extent, the relationship and similarity between the two stages will remain relative and ambiguous.

A Reading of the Islamism Thesis’ Failure

The booming market for new sociological studies of Islam in Europe requires special consideration. The emergence of a group of “star” researchers specializing in what has become known as the “new Islamology,” with reservations about this term, has become a notable phenomenon since the political sociologist Olivier Carré kicked off those writings with the publication of a piece of his research in 1979 discussing a theory of progressive Arab Islam’s origin. He would return to and develop his ideas in 1983 in cooperation with Michel Seurat and become more inclined to consider “political Islam” as the political culture of the Muslim world, through which the Muslim world could express itself, given that religiosity is a permanent, central phenomenon in Arab societies.
Since then, what Gilbert Achcar calls “Orientalism in reverse” originated in the West, and with it post-1979 currents in French Islamic studies. This date is of the utmost importance on the landscape for the shifts that took place, including the toppling of the Shah’s regime and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, as well as the outbreak of the Islamist resistance to the leftist dictatorship in Afghanistan, which led to the Soviet invasion of the country. These events became a focus of intellectual discussions and political disputes, especially among the ranks of the French left before spreading across Europe. The most famous leftist intellectuals beguiled by the “Islamic revolution” actually were not Muslim or even from the Middle East, and only Michel Foucault was well-known at the time. It should be said, however, that Foucault was certainly not within his area of expertise and competence in his analysis of developments in the Iranian revolution and arrived at them only through a quick reading.

A generation of French and European researchers took shape and contemporaneously launched a new wave of research on Islamism through the lens of social sciences, especially political sociology and religious sociology. It focused on the Islamist movement as a social movement, with the challenges that entailed of wrestling it from the ahistorical prejudices that characterized research on Orientalist heritage. For these researchers, that meant sociology’s prioritization of ideology, the presentation of research, field studies, everyday experiences, observation via participation, and conducting analysis of foundational texts, as was customary. They therefore favored spending time in various Muslim regions and mixing with Muslims, even learning Arabic, and most importantly, observing lived Islam and patterns of religiosity up close, considering it a human experience more than an experience of the religion it-


101 Foucault nevertheless was fascinated by what he considered a search for “spirituality,” and he mixed up what he heard from the relative liberal Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari - who later became a fierce opponent of Ayatollah Khomeini - with the reality of Khomeini. This is what prompted him to declare, naively, that the central pillars of democracy can be found in Shiite Islam, and that is what is really meant by the program of “Islamic government.”
self as a transcendent divine text. Their experience with leftist movements led them to focus on movement Islam more than historical or doctrinal Islam, though their positions ranged from activist (Michel Seurat, Olivier Roy, Gilles Kepel, and François Burgat) or ideologically aligned (Alain Roussillon). Movement Islam was on a rapid ascent and attracting coverage from a variety of standpoints, especially with the outbreak of Khomeini’s revolution in Iran, the beginning of jihad in Afghanistan, and Egyptian Islamists’ success in killing President Anwar Sadat. The political Islam thesis grew to dominate the landscape in Egypt and North Africa. Each researcher went his own way with a path or region that became the subject of his special interest; Roy wrote about “Islam and Political Modernity” in the battle of the Afghan jihad, Kepel took up the battle of “The Prophet and Pharaoh” in Egypt, and Burgat titled his work “Islamism in the Maghreb: The Voice of the South.”

The most important thing uniting these researchers methodologically is their marginalization of religion in analysis and their focus on the sociological and political dimensions in interpreting and reading the course of the Islamist movements that they characterize as Islamist rather than fundamentalist movements. They make this characterization because in their view, these are political and social movements par excellence, to which religion is an ideologically employable topic to be used in the battle for social and political change. In Burgat’s terms, religion is the language that Islamists speak, but their driving factor – in his opinion – is the desire to rebel against the North’s control.


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102 There is an Arabic translation put out by Dar al Saqi, Beirut, 2002.
103 There is an Arabic translation put out by Dar al Saqi, Beirut, 1996.
Afghanistan was actually Roy’s first subject within Islamic studies, and his book *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* was the start of his examination of contemporary Islam. In that book, Roy observes politics’ supremacy over religion, making the mujahidin seem modern in spite of the rhetoric and religious vocabulary used. He smartly notes how those mujahidin are modernist and unaffiliated with Afghan Islamic tradition, and how they are the ones who consolidated the concept of the state in Afghanistan, a country of simultaneous local and international conflict. This is perhaps the distinguishing feature of the Afghan war from which Roy gleaned his later observations.

In 1992, Roy wrote *The Failure of Political Islam*, his most famous and controversial book to date, in which he adopts a thesis that still retains its power. Roy’s view was based on the fact that Islamist movements failed to combine religion and politics within the framework of the modern state and also failed to restore traditional forms in building a different political system. They either became modern political movements that differ from their counterparts only in rhetoric or left the political sphere altogether.

When his thesis encountered intense criticisms following the rise of political Islam after the September 11 attacks, Roy would return to reaffirm these hypotheses in his book *Globalized Islam*, in which he noted the most important shifts that Islamist movements had identified in the Western environment, as new patterns had appeared in these movements’ rhetoric and thinking. Olivier Roy’s perspective in explaining this thesis is based on a central question: Does Islamism offer an alternative for Muslim societies? In Roy’s view, the answer was that Islamism was a failure because these movements were unable to build an Islamic state, which was the real argument for mobilization as part of its political project, because of two considerations. The first was the intellectual failure of these movements’ political project; they clung to Muslim society’s

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104 *Afghanistan, Islam et Modernitépolitique* [Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan], Paris, Le Seuil, 1985
105 *L’échec de l’IslamPolitique* [The Failure of Political Islam], Paris, Seuil, 1992
106 *L’Islam Mondialisé* [Globalized Islam], Paris Seuil, 2002
old values without keeping up with contemporary societal evolution, causing them to lose one of the most essential motivators for mobilization. The second was a history of failure; the Islamist movements that came to power in Iran and Afghanistan were unable to establish new societies with Islamic values. Contrary to the prevailing moral rhetoric, the mechanisms of these movements’ political and economic activity were in large part governed by secularism. However, these signs of failure in Roy’s view do not signify a retreat in Islamism’s spread as much as a regression in the thesis of Islam as a political and economic ideology capable of solving all the societal problems that contemporary reality poses.

Olivier Carré has used the term post-Islamism since 1991, following the tragic death of his pupil Seurat. The incident had a major impact on him and on the new generation of researchers, as it undermined the credibility of the Islamist alternative. After that, Carré began to reconsider some of his theses, talking in a controversial 1993 book about the seeds of “secular Islam,” which is actually a return to what he calls the great tradition (la grande tradition). The tradition he means is that which existed from the 10th century AD until a new Wahhabist Sunni Islam emerged in the late 19th century that was founded on a puritanical interpretation of Islam, namely the interpretation of Ahmed ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, paving the way for the later Islamist “wave.” Carré’s remarkable book is considered a call for a relatively secularized Islam from the pen of a veteran who knows the difficulty of creating a complete separation between the state and religion in Muslim countries.

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107 Michel Seurat was abducted in Beirut in 1985, after the Israeli invasion, by a Hezbollah-affiliated organization that called itself Islamic Jihad. Islamic Jihad announced in 1986 that Seurat had been executed, and his remains were not found until 2005. I had the chance to get to know this distinguished researcher in Tripoli between 1983 and 1984. He was making a field study of political Islam and loyalties in the city, using the Tabbaneh neighborhood, which at the time was witnessing transformation and bloody clashes that remained a focus of various studies for years after Seurat’s death. This incident was a major shock for leftist researchers in the West, including Olivier Carré, which he clearly expressed in his book L’utopieislamiquedansl’Orientarabe [The Islamic Utopia in the Arab World], FNSP, Paris, 1991.

108 Olivier Carré, L’Islamlaïque ou le retour à la Grande Tradition [Secular Islam or the Return to the Great Tradition], Armand Colin, Paris, 1993, p. 136
Gilles Kepel would offer another interpretive model for the post-Islamism thesis through his work *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*.\(^\text{109}\) In spite of the momentum associated with these movements in the 1980s as ideological movements incorporating various social groups clustering around a common focus in political Islam, in the researcher’s view, the events of the 1990s began to foretell Islamism’s disintegration and decline. Because of pressures from repressive regimes and international apprehension about these movements, new doctrinal trends would arise from within these organizations that would undertake examinations with their extreme choices, break with years of armed political action, and produce interpretive judgments to reconcile Islam’s values with the spirit of democracy.

Outside of the French school, the Iranian-American sociological researcher Asef Bayat would attempt to develop the contours of his post-Islamism thesis through certain of his articles and work, presenting a methodological definition of the end of Islamist movements’ spread and evolution that differed from Olivier Roy’s. In fact, we find that he stresses considering this ending as a step in the development and adaptation of these movements’ right to political and activist rhetoric in their dealings with the prevailing reality. The societal and political transformations experienced by the contemporary nation-state have forced these movements to keep up by reinventing themselves or fall into intellectual stagnation and political dormancy, which could lead to the total ruin of their project.

The post-Islamism thesis as Asef Bayat sees it could thus be summed up as a turning point, but it is also a project, a conscious effort to develop a vision and strategy for logic and methods to move beyond Islamism in the social, political, and cultural spheres. Post-Islamism is not, however, anti-Islam, un-Islamic, or even secular. Rather, it is an endeavor to integrate religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn Islamism’s fundamental principles upside

\(^{109}\) *Jihad, Expansion Et Declin De L’islamisme* [Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam]. Gallimard, 2000
down by focusing on rights instead of duties, pluralism instead of individual authority, historicism instead of static texts, and the future instead of the past. It wants to couple Islam to the individual right to choice and freedom, to democracy and modernity. That summarizes the basic building blocks of this thesis.\[110\]

The Problem of the Model and the Discourse’s Construction: Da’wah and the State

A discussion of this thesis requires constructing a different methodological approach to the concept of politics and its place in the project of political Islam and therefore a precise understanding of the meaning and logic that politics has for them. It is not simply founded on a wholly positivist authority, nor based on specific political, social, and economic programs, as was customary for traditional movements and parties, but on a different logic.

For the Islamist movement, politics is one of the central necessities of proselytizing activity, meaning that it is an existential requirement. As such, the definition of Islam becomes characterized as a state, and their favorite slogan is “Islam is a religion and a state.” Religion and the state thus become a single structural entity as the only model for the state that Islamists maintain is pure within the parameters of the “ideal model” derived from the historical doctrinal record and embodied in the experience of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the Rightly-Guided Caliphate. This model has not been subjected to systematic research to explain either the reasons why it was abandoned in the course of political history or the outcomes it produced. This model was not developed and updated. This allowed it to survive and continue as a utopia in spite of the many disagreements and visions around it among doctrinal currents and schools, which have led to the formation of numerous historical and intellectual hypotheses and contributed to generating a cascade of other

problems, most critically the identification of the Ummah with the state in the Muslim imagination.

Drawing on Max Weber’s innovative methodology of ideal types as an analytical and intellectual tool for the study of social life, it can be said that there is agreement that the state is a historical phenomenon, by virtue of the fact that humanity is inherently civic, and therefore it was natural that Muslim society would experience the birth and centralization of a state. Islam’s authoritative texts, however, do not point to a ready-made system of government that enjoyed consensus both in ancient times and today. This subject remains one of the most examined, reconsidered, and disputed issues entrusted to public consensus.

In summary, it can be said that the discourse around the “Islamic state” that has been the focus of the Islamist project through the years brings us directly to two approaches. The first is what the “ideal model” achieved in the past, which cannot be recovered. The second approach brings us to several contemporary forms and models that have been tried in more than one place in our Muslim world (with the Turkish and Iranian models seemingly the most remarked upon outside the Arab world today), each having its own character and conditions.

Remarkably, Arab Islamism generally remains of little interest in terms of theorizing about and understanding the political and pragmatic nature of the state, or at least it has declined in interest and priority in favor of the state’s moral and religious nature to some extent. This makes the state an “ownable tool” to be used in a project dominated by religious ideology. In any case, that is what the political forces that have governed and continue to govern the Arab world do. But promising experiments that began in Tunisia and Morocco with the Arab uprisings have produced intellectual reference points and other “synthetic” forms in an attempt to reconcile modern humanitarian political thought with Islamic religious authority and forge a path separate from that of traditional political Islam.
The Troublesome Triangle among the State, Politics, and Religion

Another problem posed by the integration of Islamists into politics and their ascension to power in some Arab states relates to a matter beyond religion’s relationship to the state. That relationship monopolizes heated debates, especially given its specific institutional manifestations that can be isolated by making a division or distinction between two of them. But the issue becomes more complex when the research moves into another area related to separating religion from politics. The complication is evident at more than one level:

The first is the fact that the state is an institutional and political expression of the society. It consists of leadership, administrative and technical personnel, and the professional bureaucracy. Its chief function is to attend to the public interest, and so religious factionalism cannot play a role in the state’s performance of its functions.

The second is the fact that politics exists at a different level. Although it is concerned with studying the principles of governance, the regulation of state affairs, and the like, politics ultimately consists of ideas favored by the people in a particular society who participate in the shaping of that society. Political ideas are typically inspired by the society’s values, heritage, and beliefs, and they are aimed at winning the society’s support. It is therefore unrealistic to demand that political actors, whatever their religion, abandon their convictions and feelings as soon as they decide to get involved in political work. That would be contrary to the freedoms of belief, thought, assembly, expression, and organization that have become mankind’s unalienable rights under international conventions, not to mention that it is not objectively or factually possible.

We will, therefore, always and necessarily see political parties and currents that adopt religion as a source of authority. Even if they have anti-democratic positions, it must be recognized that they have the right to organize, raise issues, participate in elections, and codify their political practice. This recognition does not, in practice, deny that problems will
arise due to religion’s powerful effects on our societies, especially in regions of sectarian diversity.

The fact is that Islamists, or some of them, are extremely sensitive to the phrase “separation of politics from religion,” which some secularists bandy about arbitrarily, because this phrase goes to the heart of political practice and freedom of belief and opinion. Likewise, secularists, or at least some of them, are similarly sensitive to the intensive use of religious terminology in political work. The problem is that the call for a total separation between politics and religion is one of the “legacies” of Western thought. Secularism germinated in a climate of conflict with the religious authority of the church, and the idea has persisted and witnessed various applications and interpretations. No one has been able to prevent people generally from being inspired by religious values in their pursuit of political action and consequently shaping their political positions under all systems, laws, and legislation in light of their beliefs and the moral values they hold sacred. The outcome of practical experience in Western societies supports this view. Calling for a complete separation is a frivolous slogan because it is unrealistic. A political proposition, no matter what it is, needs to gain the support of its society in order to succeed. It will not be able to do so if its substance runs contrary to the society’s culture, religion, and morality. There is no use in talking about the “epistemic break” between two fields that are proven to overlap in a way that would be difficult to totally sever. This is what leads to the search for systematic angles to regulate and control this overlap.

Post-Islamism and Alternatives

Western academics have really gone too far in betting on the theory of political Islam’s failure and relying on the emergence of post-Islamist tracks. François Burgat and Alain Roussillon are among those who are fundamentally skeptical of this hypothesis, and they have written on the matter to warn against this excess. It is notable that this theory has had limited impact among Arab Muslim academics. Other than the late Hus-

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111 François Burgat, L’islamisme en face [Face to Face with Political Islam], Broché, 2007
Tammam, who was initially influenced by the theory and worked on it with Patrick Haenni. Tammam made a broad study of the internal activity of Islamists in the Egyptian arena, but few have used it as a frame of reference. Although he never totally rejected the post-Islamism theory, Tammam years later came to warn against the reductionist nature of this thesis. He was convinced of many of the reservations expressed by Alain Roussillon, pointing with much foresight to latent Salafism and growing Salafization in all its dimensions and connotations since 2008. After that, the Arab revolutions would come to confirm the truth of his predictions, especially in da’wah Salafism’s noteworthy shift in Egypt toward politicization with the Al-Nour Party.

Overall, the Arab uprisings were attempts to change the political structure, to disrupt the prevailing conditions without resorting to violence. But political actors on post-Islamist trajectories have found themselves besieged and stuck in the trap of despotic regimes with their totalitarian logic, interference, and security institutions on the one hand, and the Islamist opposition with their restrictive logic on the other hand, along with rapacious foreign interventions. Tunisia got out of this trap with minimal damage, but the upshot was a long series of failures in which the critics and defenders of post-Islamism alike believe that the so-called Arab Spring proves their counterparts right.

In my estimation, the important point is that the 2011 uprisings revealed something that post-Islamist analyses failed to perceive: Islamism’s growth toward civil rights. The books Market Islam (Haenni 2007), Islam and Gender (Mir-Hosseini 2002), Marginalized Sufism (Van des Bos 2007), and Being Young and Muslim (Herrera and Bayat 2010) all studied the phenomenon of the “new proselytizers” and the religious media promising Islamization, and what has been learned in studies of or-

112 Patrick Haenni, Market Islam, translated by Omareyah Sultani, Namaa Center for Research and Studies, 2015, originally published in 2005
113 Hussam Tammam, Post-Islamism, Modern Discussion, Issue 2391 on 9/1/2008
Problems of the Term and Concept

Thopraxy\textsuperscript{114} (hijab, prayer, clothing, halal food, and all forms of conspicuous religious adherence and associated relationship patterns, etc.), with the aim of exposing new, ascendant patterns in Islamism incompatible with the totalitarian nature of the political Islam project. This has led to a focus on the margins, a fragmentation of analysis, a vacuum of meaning and evidence, and opening the door to creating a false consciousness in order to substitute political rights with certain civil rights, thus showing the error of laying this bet.

**Dreams Shattered and Models Built**

Does political Islam’s failure mean it will die out? Not necessarily, in my estimation, because it could mean structural transformations that put ideas in motion either for failure or for success. The strength of any thesis is measured in the extent to which alternatives can dislodge and dismantle it. Islamism in its traditional version gained its power from the failure of national and development projects that preceded it, presenting itself as an alternative and a promising and ascendant project. Although it failed to fulfill its promises, the other alternatives do not seem encouraging at all, especially in the authoritarian forms they have taken.

In contrast, the models that have achieved an approximation of political Islam’s transformations, those based on integration into democratic choice, the civil state, and separation of religion and politics in the experiences of Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco, seem to suggest successes that approach the essence of the post-Islamist idea.

The experience of the Islamist movement in Turkey is a rich one. It is a political experience, despite the religious background of the leaders of the Welfare Party and then the Justice and Development Party. The difference between Necmettin Erbakan and Erdogan is not a difference between leaders who are conservative versus those who are reformist or

\textsuperscript{114} Meaning, in religious research and theology studies, as used by experts, correct applied practice; in other words, the developing awareness of beliefs or teachings that emphasize correct conduct or practice.
young, but rather in the pragmatic choices and alternatives that each has presented for economic development and freedoms in countering the deep state and its military leanings.115

In the case of Tunisia, the country of *The Surest Path* author Hayreddin Pasha Al-Tunsi, Muhammad Al-Tahir ibn Ashur, and the legacy of the Nahda enlightenment, we perceive day after day the success of the Ennahda movement in integrating democracy into the structure of Islamic thought and political and societal practice, and how it has moved from a position of opposition to a position of authority, emphasizing the acceptance of rotation of power and partnership, which are the basis and essence of democratic practice, and with which it has long been sincerely doubted that Islamists would comply. In its conclusions, trajectories, and programs, this is an experience that confirms that post-Islamism breaks with a prior identity-based stage and propositions centering their discourse on the authority of the state and not society.

In the case of Morocco, we find a similar evolution in integration into politics. From the Chabiba movement and its polarizing rhetoric to an Islamist movement engaged in political action and committed to its basic rules (The Justice and Development Party) or forswearing violence and accepting pluralism in spite of a dispute with the state (Al AdlWa Al Ihssane), there is evidence for the hypothesis that traditional Islamism is evolving into post-Islamism. The Justice and Development Party would not have succeeded in attaining leadership of the government in 2011 without the radical intellectual reexaminations governing its view of the Moroccan political system and its historical legitimacy.

In addition to the movements in these three cases carrying out their mission of making a place for democracy within the system of Islamist political thought, they also created an institutional culture within their organizational structures and leadership institutions where accountability

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115 For further detail, see a comparison of the Turkish and Iranian experiences in Abdul Ghani Imad’s book *Islamists Between Revolution and the State: Problems of Creating a Model and Building a Discourse*, Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 2013, p. 244
and oversight processes take place and leaders are selected and nominated.

The problem with the thesis of Islamism’s failure is not in its generalizations and absolutes, as it guards against such methodological error. Nor is it in the critical and analytical framing of its subject, a framework the thesis determined from the outset for uncovering the innate structural defects in political Islam’s project as a whole since its establishment. In my estimation, the problem lies in the construction of an interpretative thesis of extreme fluidity and ambiguity. Post-Islamism refers to many models and to many things, and in addition it signifies the launching of a new stage abounding in contradictory indicators.

The problem with this reading is that it does not, in sufficient sociological depth, convey the dynamic way in which these movements operate, nor does it track the evolution of the intellectual forms at which the movements arrived after a complex course of intellectual reexaminations that combined Islam as a source of authority with considerations such as the Ummah as a whole, the interests of the movement, the actual situation, and its constraints and necessities. Many Islamist thinkers worked on these forms, and they have produced a generation that does not see an adversarial relationship between Islam and democracy and modernity. Indications of the seeds of such trends could have been gleaned in the 1940s in Egypt and Syria, when nascent Islamism got involved alongside liberal and secular parties and movements and accepted the principles of the modern constitutional state that arose at that time. Had it been given the chance to grow, that democratic movement could have birthed its own caretakers and elites, established its own trajectories and traditions, and served as a strong support for an early rhetoric for post-Islamism capable of adjusting to and allying with liberal and secular policies. But the termination of that experiment through military coups, the dominance of nationalist ideology, and single-party rule rehabilitated radical political Islam in its various forms.

Today, we are witnessing attempts to revive the old political landscape through conflicts around sectarianized and politicized identities
that reinvigorate partisanship and loyalties that predate the state and even Islamism in its contemporary forms. It reminds us of those dark pages in the history of politicized, sectarian infighting in Muslim memory, with the phenomenon of armed sectarian militias and politicized ritualistic Islam. Most unfortunately, the various sects have become clashing identities that reject difference and diversity in the name of resistance, liberation, and confronting the Great Satan.

In my estimation, therefore, the Islamist landscape cannot be reduced to a thesis of failure or success, or be used to further the discourse of “posts.” Such a classification will remain vulnerable to methodological criticisms, especially if we understand Islamism, at least in one of its expressions, as a rebellion against the modern state as a whole, against its supremacy, positivism, and imitations of Western modernity. And so there will always be a political Islam that protests and rejects the idea of the modern state. This is therefore a twofold problem. The first issue is how should a state that is essentially closed off to them deal with their protest and rejection, and the second is how to get them to move beyond this rejection.

Accordingly, the relationship between despotism and religious extremism on the one hand and democracy on the other hand is existential and controversial. Democracy does not fight extremism; it eliminates the causes of extremism’s existence so that extremism cannot find fertile soil from which to sprout. As for political despotism, it is the recipe for extremism because it prepares the appropriate climate and environment that allow extremism to flourish. In its repression and persecution, despotism enters a two-way relationship with religious extremism. Despotism benefits and harms extremism while benefiting itself and suffering harm at the same time. In its conflict with extremism, despotism revives it and then strangles it in a tragic and inescapable tug-of-war. Despotism thus provides extremism the issue of “oppression” as an intrinsic motivation for sacrifice and persistence, while at the same time providing a justification for itself in fighting “injustice” under the banner of a false modernity. This is the spiral of false ideological delusions that religious and political tyranny produces, regardless of the banners it waves.
This leads to a hypothesis stating that whenever the gates of political integration are opened to religiously and ideologically conservative and hard-line forces, the potential increases for them to be “extracted” from their hard-line ideological context and their political behavior guided. This is due to the fact that social and political actors are inclined to show some flexibility in their rhetoric and practice, albeit as a tactic at the outset, in order to maximize their gains, protect their interests, and increase their impact on the public sphere. This hypothesis has been tested empirically in many cases in sociological studies, in what has come to be known today, controversially, as “integration and moderation vs. exclusion and extremism,” and it has been shown to have considerable potential. It is an established track for some Islamist movements that have been able to adapt to the democratic system and become a democratic opposition power and even share in the governance of various countries. This is similar to the path that communist, totalitarian, and right-wing parties have taken in Western Europe since World War II.

We can conclude that there is an objective relationship between political actors and the overall conditions present in the social and political environments around them. The exclusion or marginalization that any political group or faction experiences is reflected in the intransigence of their rhetoric, while the initial outcomes of integration and participation in the political process are a reduction in that intransigence and the guided emergence of moderation (integration = moderation). This study therefore finds that whenever political, economic, and social crises are acute and fit with these movements’ sense that they are targeted for repression, they resort to secrecy, proposing radical ideology, and, perhaps, violence. By contrast, when repression and persecution are less savage, and political and economic crises and circumstances are less severe, these movements choose involvement in public political life and consequently establish flexible organizational structures and practice specific political functions. They adopt something that their political language labels the

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“jurisprudence of the phase” or of “necessity,” which results in taking realistic, flexible political course and softened alternatives instead of making dogmatic, radical proposals.

Alexander R. Arifianto’s thesis has proven its worthiness and interpretive power by employing the charismatic leadership theory, which Max Weber coined and applied in his famous study on the religious reform movement in Europe, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, and the role of the movement’s leaders (Calvin and Luther), who were prominent at the time in introducing intellectual changes through their impact, prestige, and experience, drawing on the moral authority they enjoyed, especially given that it offers to charismatic leaders in general as reformist leaders healthy cooperation and official institutions that assist them in their historical mission. Arifianto’s thesis on the making of reform and progressive Islam is distinctive in that it offers a new interpretative model based on an in-depth sociological examination of the Indonesian experience that reveals new truths about the process and mechanisms of applying reality, ideas, and their manifestations to new, contemporary analytical models.118

There is a fact that needs to be deeply understood, a sociological truth that Karl Mannheim formulated in his famous and canonical book *Ideology and Utopia*, which is among the classics of the literature of sociology. This truth states that ideas are not rigid; they undergo changes as they move. They come into focus, like utopia and ideals, but when they come into contact with power, they collide with reality and are reshaped through new political ideologizing. The gap between the old and the new is broad enough to change ideas in form and content entirely and even to dismantle their structure as an epistemic system.

It can therefore be said that politics usually tames an inflexible ideology, while power usually works to dismantle it. Hegel described the idea as “degrading” when it becomes a reality. Its decay does not mean

118 *Faith, Moral Authority, and Politics: The Making of Progressive Islam in Indonesia*  
https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/93952/content/tmp/package-jjkeh6/Arifianto_asu_0010E_11981.pdf
that it becomes without content or function but that it becomes subject to application, criticism, and development in the realm of reality. For these reasons, new ideas emerge, and ideologies are elevated while others fall into decline and decay. Such is the movement of ideas and their sociological journeys. Many are the historical landscapes in which politics was victorious over ideology, in which reality smashed idealists’ dreams and utopias, in which humanity proved the “sovereignty of society” and that the experiences and texts that society produces live for a time, just as every era reproduces its texts and reshapes its experiences in light of its challenges as needs. It is states and ideas that we discuss among people. They articulate our actions and minds in a dialectic of change that will happen only on the basis of reality once people begin to change themselves and their societies for the better.
CHAPTER 2

Post-Islamism: Ideological and Political Failure or Evolution?
Over the last four decades, research and academic activity in the field of Arab studies, or Mideast studies, as some call it, has continued the search for concepts, theories, and interpretative approaches that make it possible to understand and unpack sociological phenomena in the Arab world, in particular the religious, Islamic, or Islamist phenomenon, as some call it. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the thorny intellectual and research questions it raised about the relationship of religion to the state, of ritual to daily life, and of religious ideology to political activism in Arab and Muslim societies, the wheel of intellectual and research production and activity around Islamists and their rhetoric, ideas, and practices has never stopped turning. We have come to a stage where we need clarification of the presumptive concepts and tools for interpretation. This is the case for the topic we are discussing at this conference, by which I mean the concept of “post-political Islam” or “post-Islamism,” which itself is in need of understanding and interpretation. It is an extremely vague and unsettled concept, reflecting a state of confusion and intellectual and research chaos in the study of Islamism.

Of course, this is not to diminish the efforts and consideration of those who coined this term and concept. Nor is it meant to challenge the seriousness of their attempts to explain the transformations that Islamist groups, movements, and organizations (call them what you like) are undergoing, so much as it reflects the complexity and fluidity of this phenomenon itself. It seems that they are trying to catch hold of something that cannot be caught, whether by virtue of its active and fluid nature or because of its changing and volatile contexts. The phenomenon of politi-
cal Islam, like other complicated phenomena in the Arab world, such as the state, the tribe, the sect, the Arab Spring, etc., has inspired a large share of theorizing and interpretation, or rather attempted theorizing and interpretation, to the extent that there is hardly any agreement among researchers on the matter, much less consensus. This is true not only of the methods for discussing and dissecting it but also of the bundle of expressions, concepts, and terminology used to describe it, let alone explain it. There is conceptual chaos in the characterization of the actors in the field of political Islam (which is also a problematic term not without methodological problems), in which the epistemic gets mixed up with the ideological, the objective with the ontological, and the activist with the sociological, based on the researcher’s background, position on the phenomenon, and objective in studying it. There are those who characterize actors in the socioreligious field as Islamists, without specification or examination, and that falls on the majority of researchers, including sometimes this researcher. There are those who call them fundamentalists, or revivalists, or Islamizers, and so on. Perhaps a viable solution for dealing with this conceptual chaos, even temporarily, is to call these people by the names they call themselves, without abbreviating, generalizing, or categorizing. So we would say, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Ennahda movement in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the Islamic Action Front party in Jordan, Hamas in Palestine, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (Hadas) in Kuwait, and so on.

This conceptual chaos has produced even clearer disruption and chaos in the methods and approaches for studying this phenomenon, meaning the phenomenon of political Islam. It has been addressed in such diverse academic fields as social movements, party studies, the sociology of religions, security studies, etc., without researchers’ minds and ideas settling on clear, agreed upon methods.

Genealogy of an Ambiguous Concept

The term “post-political Islam” or “post-Islamism” (and I do not say concept because instead of explaining the phenomenon, it muddies it) first appeared in the early 1990s in the writings of the well-known French
researcher Olivier Roy, especially his famous book *The Failure of Political Islam*, in which he spoke of the failure of Islamist movements to achieve their objectives by establishing an Islamic state and enforcing Shariah, whether in Egypt, Algeria, or elsewhere. Roy argued that these movements must reconsider their positions and ideology, especially with regard to their position on the nation-state and issues of freedoms, rights, and democracy.\(^{119}\) Roy did not use “post-political Islam” as a term or an interpretative concept but as a descriptor of a state of inadequacy and stagnation reached by Islamist movements and organizations in the early 1990s, especially after the failure, or the imposed failure, of the Islamists’ experiment in Algeria and escalating confrontation between Islamists and the Egyptian regime. The use of the descriptor seemed at the time to be an extension of the wave of “posts-” that swept the philosophical and research communities in the early 1990s, such as “post-modernism,” “post-nationalism,” “post-state,” “post-Cold War,” etc. At the time, the term was nothing but a negative description of the situation that the currents of political Islam were then experiencing, along with their crises, whether internal (defections and splits) or with authoritarian regimes.

During the second half of the 1990s, specifically in 1996, the term “post-political Islam” gained new momentum after Asef Bayat, the researcher and sociologist of Iranian descent, published an article in the periodical “Middle East Critique” titled “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society.”\(^{120}\) In his article, Bayat tried to confer interpretative power on the term “post-Islamism” by analyzing the rise of new socioreligious expressions in Iran, or rather a new pattern of religiosiy exceeding the proposals of the classic Islamist mainstream, which led Iran from the 1979 revolution until the mid-1990s. This new pattern of religiosity was embodied in the “alternative thought movement” led by the Iranian researcher and philosophy professor Abdolkarim Soroush. In that article, Bayat defined “post-Islamism” as a “state” or a stage following the intel-


lectual, ideological, and political exhaustion that traditional Islamism had come to, and its loss of appeal among its base and supporters. The most important manifestation of this situation, according to Bayat, was the ability to “fuse religion with personal freedoms, and to achieve harmony among Islam, modernity, and the values of democracy.”

After the publication of that Bayat article, the term “post-Islamism” moved from the margins to the center of the debates and controversy around the transformations of Islamist movements, and it also provoked varying reactions within research and academic circles. In a lecture Bayat gave in April 2005 at Leiden University, after moving there from the American University in Cairo, which is where he was teaching when he wrote the “post-Islamism” article, he acknowledged that the term “post-Islamism” had stirred up a lot of confusion and clamor among researchers who extracted it from its context and tried to apply it to other contexts and cases. This is what the French researcher Gilles Kepel did, using the term as evidence for the beginning of a retreat and decline for traditional Islamist currents, especially Salafist and jihadist currents, as well as Olivier Roy, who used the term as evidence for what he called the “privatization of religion” or religion’s shift from the realm of the state to the realm of individuals.

The reactions to the term “post-Islamism” prompted Bayat to re-examine it and the potential for it to become a coherent interpretative concept that could be generalized beyond the Iranian case. In the lecture referenced, he said that what he meant by post-Islamism was a “state” and a “conscious project to rationalize the process of Islamization taking place in social, political, and cultural spaces ... an attempt to turn the

121 Ibid, 45.
122 Ibid.
123 For more on this, see Asef Bayat, “What is Post-Islamism?” ISIM Review, 16/Autumn 2005.
126 It is worth noting that this lecture has been incorporated into a book Bayat published in 2007 titled Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamism Turn (California: Stanford University Press, 2007).
priorities of Islamization upside down so that rights take the place of duties, pluralism takes the place of a single voice, historicism takes the place of static texts, and the future takes the place of the past.”  

Bayat affirms, perhaps in response to the criticisms of the term he coined, that “post-Islamism” is not a movement against Islamism or its opposite but an attempt to “resecularize religion” or lessen religion’s political role, as he puts it.

Bayat’s new proposal on “post-Islamism,” viewing it as an alternative project to Islamism, touched off a new wave of reactions in research and academic circles, which did not refrain from criticizing his new proposal in spite of Bayat’s assertion that it rejected historicity and the view of some that “post-Islamism” is a stage after Islamism. For example, Luz Gómez García points out that the term “post-Islamism” is problematic in both concept and application, meaning that the term is incapable of explaining the phenomenon it claims to interpret. This became obvious after the Arab uprisings in 2011. Bayat therefore returned in 2013 with a book titled *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, in which he argues that Islamist movements are in a state of perpetual change. For him, post-Islamism must be understood as “a rebirth and a break with the Islamist projects that prevailed in the 20th century, and it is a qualitative break at the level of rhetoric and policies.”

In summary, with regard to the theoretical controversy over the term “post-Islamism,” four problems posed by this term could be pointed out. The first is that it is a term suffering from a degree of ambiguity and fluidity and thus lacking the interpretive power necessary for analyzing, unpacking, and explaining the transformations of Islamist groups and movements. The second problem is that it is a descriptive term, not an interpretative or analytical one. It describes transformations that take

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130 Ibid, p. 29.
place in the sphere of Islamist movements but does not provide interpretive tools to enable a deep understanding and interpretation of these transformations because it does not exceed a baseline of describing events. The third problem is that it is a temporary or transitional term that engages with a particular temporal stage in the evolution of Islamist movements and currents until other terms or concepts are found that can provide more convincing explanations of the transformations that Islamist currents experience. The fourth problem relates to the historical imperative, which is an assumption inherent in the essence of the term “post-Islamism.” The term assumes that there is a particular ideological or intellectual path that all Islamist currents and movements must travel.

The Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Since the 3 July coup, the Muslim Brotherhood has been suffering the most profound crisis it has encountered since its inception 90 years ago. It is a compound crisis in which the political is intertwined with the organizational, the internal with the external, and the local with the regional and international.

1. The Brotherhood’s Political Crisis

Since leaving, or rather being removed from power in July 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood has been suffering a profound political crisis. This crisis is largely linked to the unprecedented repression to which the group has been subjected ever since. After 3 July 2013, the regime adopted an intensely oppressive policy against the Brotherhood in order to eliminate the group. Thousands of its leaders and members have been thrown in jail, and those who were able to escape have been pursued. In addition, the regime froze the Brotherhood’s financial and economic assets, and confiscated their educational and medical centers, and took over their thousands of social institutions throughout Egypt. Furthermore, the regime of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has killed hundreds of the group’s members and supporters since the 3 July 2013 coup by using excessive force toward demonstrators, as when the Republican Guard broke up the
sit-ins at Rabaa Al-Adawiya and Nahda, as well as through extrajudicial killings. This unprecedented repression has created major disputes and divisions within the movement around how to respond and whether members should carry weapons to stop the regime’s repression.

In contrast to prior instances of repression, to which the group was able to adapt, the recent repression campaign has greatly affected the movement and its effectiveness. From another standpoint, the deep divisions among members of the group around how to respond to the regime’s repression and around who leads the movement after the arrest of its senior leaders are among the most important issues in the movement since the coup. The group has experienced various instances of repression since its establishment by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. With few exceptions, the relationship between the Brotherhood and successive political regimes in Egypt over the course of the past half-century has been a case of hostility at times and competition at others. This has been clear since the al-Banna’s assassination in 1949.

In this context, the Egyptian state has historically treated the group as a threat that must be contained or eliminated. Gamal Abdel Nasser (1960-1971) banned the Brotherhood’s activities, detained thousands of

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131 On 14 August 2013, the Army-backed security forces killed more than 800 Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters who were demonstrating by holding a sit-in in Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square. According to Human Rights Watch, this slaughter was one of the largest mass killings in Egyptian history. For more, see: Human Rights Watch, “According to Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt” (August 2014): www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0814web_0.pdf.

132 According to numerous reports from human rights organizations, extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances have become a common practice of the Egyptian security forces, especially against Islamists. Mass executions of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members have also become the rule in Egypt. For more reports and information about human rights violations in Egypt, see, for example: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/09/egypt-new-leader-faces-rights-crisis

On extrajudicial killings, see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/since-trumps-mideast-visit-extrajudicial-killings-have-spiked-in-egypt/2017/08/30/62b48c0-8200-11e7-9e7a-20fa87a0dbb6_story.html?utm_term=.8ba842b703a2

Also, according to the official Muslim Brotherhood website, the Egyptian security forces unofficially killed 135 members of the movement between January and June of 2017: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=32757
its members and leaders, and even executed some of them, like the movement’s most famous thinker, Sayyid Qutb. The old generation of the Brotherhood viewed that period of repression and persecution as trials and tribulations, an experience that would later become one of the main strategies the movement would follow to withstand the regime’s repression in the years to come.

In the 1970s, the late President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) was able to open a new chapter in the relationship with the group, releasing most of its leaders from prison and thus allowing them to reorganize the movement and return to political life, but without granting them official recognition. The group was able in that era to rebuild its network of social and educational relationships, resume its political activity, and increase its influence among young people, especially university students. These changes created a new generation in the Brotherhood under the leadership of Supreme Guide Umar al-Tilmisani, who adopted conciliatory rhetoric toward the state.

During the era of former President Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), the regime’s relationship with the Brotherhood swung between adaptation and exclusion because of Mubarak’s concern with confronting Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The early years of Mubarak’s rule witnessed tolerance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities, and the Brotherhood was able to seize the opportunity to strengthen their social networks and their political influence. They regularly participated in parliamentary elections and worked to build alliances with other secular, liberal, and leftist parties. The influence also increased within the professional syndicates, universities, and mosques, which vexed the regime and later threatened its influence. The regime turned against the group in the mid-1990s and adopted harsh policies toward its activities, indicating a new era of exclusion and repression had begun to take shape.

133 For a detailed report on the Muslim Brotherhood’s social and religious activities during the 1970s, see, for example: Abdullah Al-Arian, *Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
The Muslim Brotherhood’s response to repression after the 2013 coup was characterized by suffering, division, and uncertainty. The movement’s failure to break up the coup led to a harsh wave of repression and exclusion, which rebounded on members within the movement and deepened their disputes. These divisions escalated after the regime arrested the first and second ranks of the movement’s leaders after the Rabaa massacre in August 2013. It was the first time since 1981 that the Supreme Guide and members of the Shura Council and Guidance Office were arrested.

This political crisis negatively affected the Brotherhood and caused them to lose the ability to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the new regime. The group is still in shock because of what has happened to it in recent years, leading to numerous fractures and faults among its members. This is what we will explain in the next section.

2. The Brotherhood’s Organizational Crisis

The Muslim Brotherhood has often boasted of its organizational cohesion and ability to absorb crises, but that does not seem to apply this time. The group has lost its organizational balance and cohesion after undergoing an unprecedented political defeat. The group suffers from divisions, if not yet schisms, in ideas, rhetoric, and strategies. Since the arrest and disappearance of its past leadership, the Brotherhood has suffered from a leadership vacuum that certain young leaders have tried to fill in their struggle against the Sisi regime. Contrary to the old leadership, represented by Deputy Supreme Guide Mahmoud Ezzat and Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein, the new young leadership has adopted a course based on confronting the regime in every way possible and not surrendering to it. This new leadership has received some support from young members of the group, especially those who have themselves or whose relatives have been subjected to the authorities’ repression since the July coup. This is the opposite of the old leadership’s logic, which sees the current crisis as a trial and a test that requires them to be patient and recall the narrative of tribulation.
Generally speaking, the series of blows and defeats that Islamist movements have undergone during the post-Arab Spring period has played a role in many of the debates, discussions, and questions among young people in these movements. The unprecedented decline and repression of the Brotherhood, the setbacks in the Syrian revolution, the Turkish Justice and Development Party’s regional and international predicament, the shrinking influence of Islamists in other places such as Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco, etc., have spurred many of the ideas, options, and scenarios that young Islamic activists inclined toward politics and movement work are discussing in a way that parallels their diversity, in contrast to the common wisdom about the stagnation and dormancy of these movements. These young activists are debating the stances that should be taken toward these crises and setbacks.

From one standpoint, one faction of young Islamists believes that there is no way to avoid “adapting” to the accelerating changes buffeting the region, especially in light of the authoritarian regimes’ brutality and their becoming stronger thanks to the ascendance of the extreme right in the West. This has led some of them to summon arguments from past calamities and crises in order to deal with and perhaps overcome, at least psychologically, their setbacks and regressions. They are repeating classic arguments about the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, patience in times of trial, and the like. Some of them believe that “loss is answered proportionately,” that “what is not fully grasped should not be fully abandoned,” and that in certain situations and places, there must be a retreat for the sake of “warding off evils and bringing benefits” and to prepare for a new round of conflict after consulting the accounts, understanding the facts, and examining the scenarios. This is similar to what occurred recently among Moroccan Islamists, with Tunisian Islamists before them, and now with one of the factions within the Egyptian Brotherhood, which recently issued an assessment paper (to which we will return in another article) that some see as a preamble to ongoing reconsiderations being conducted by certain segments of the group inside and outside the country.

Another faction of young Islamists, on the other hand, believes that confrontation with authoritarian regimes is unavoidable and that “adapt-
ing” and accepting limited political prospects will not convince these regimes to accept Islamists but instead will increase the pressure on them and restrict their movement. And therefore, there is no avoiding confronting and challenging these regimes politically and ideologically. Some of them now present views critical of Islamist leaders’ positions in various countries and clash politically and doctrinally with their decisions and choices. Some of them think that it is not necessary to accept what they call the “rhetoric of defeat” and of “weakness” that those leaders offer in order to justify their retreats and losses. While some of these views and criticisms are sympathetic to the general feeling of despair and frustration over the leadership’s poor options, as well as the adversity and complexities of reality, they also reveal a critical strain that is growing and rising among young Islamists. They have the ability, awareness, and boldness to dismantle the leadership’s arguments and clash with it, in contrast to the common wisdom about the relationship between these young people and their leaders being dominated by the principle of “hear and obey.” Perhaps one of the unintended benefits of authoritarianism is the creation of this state of controversy and internal criticism. An obligatory dialogue has been opened between the leadership and the rank-and-file, in which all the issues that until just recently were prohibited “taboos” are subject to discussion and debate.

These debates and discussions among young Islamists reflect internal agitation and jostling among the rank-and-file in these movements. In contrast to what could appear to be obvious stagnation, calcification and stereotyping of these movements’ bases, what we are currently seeing reflects substantive transformations taking place right now within Islamist movements, in a way that raises many questions about young peoples’ relationship to their leaders and movements, how content they are with those leaders’ choices and decisions, their willingness to accept those choices and decisions even if they disagree with them, and to what extent the movements are able to control young people if they disagree. It seems clear that the issue of controlling and guiding these dialogues as the leadership of Islamist movements wants to do is no longer possible in light of the expansion of the public sphere and the massive explosion in social
media, which has become an effective and important means in directing criticism at these leaders and dismantling hierarchical relationships within Islamist organizations, in a way that affects the activist and symbolic authority of these leaders.

If most of the discussions young Islamists are having revolve around what is possible or not possible to achieve under the current authoritarian conditions, there is a third faction, albeit a small and marginal one. It seems that these young Islamists have decided to abandon this dialogue and jostling, which they see as a waste of time and unhelpful. They have resorted to marginal options, either by sliding toward violence and armed confrontation with these conditions, or by abandoning political activity and movements altogether and in certain cases abandoning religiosity and sometimes religion itself. Some reports suggest that atheism is spreading in some Islamist circles, especially among those who are suffering psychological crises and anxiety as a result of the unprecedented repression to which they themselves or their relatives and peers have been subjected.

If it is difficult to generalize the reactions of young Islamists in the Arab world to their problems and issues and their view of their relationship with their regimes and the other political forces, it is not difficult for any observer to notice the current debate among them, especially in light of the leadership’s retreating role and ability to contain them and convince them. This could lead to qualitative transformations that Islamists may witness in the near future.

The Brotherhood and the Possibility of Separating Politics and Religion

After the bold step that the Tunisian Ennahda movement took by separating its religious and political activities two years ago,134 calls have increased for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to take this course and separate the proselytizing/education wing from its political/activist wing.

134 Tenth Ennahda Congress: Separation of Religion and Politics, Noon Post, 21/5/16, https://www.noonpost.org/content/11880
There have been many reports about some Brotherhood leaders abroad calling for the adoption of this policy. In fact, these calls are not new; they could be called old and repetitive, having come from writers, researchers, and intellectuals over the course of the last decade.

Several studies, research papers, and articles have been written in this regard by certain favorites of the Islamic mainstream in the Arab world. Here we can mention the famous book edited by the Kuwaiti researcher Dr. Abdullah Al-Nafisi some 25 years ago, with its remarkable title: *The Islamist Movement: A Vision for the Future, Papers in Self-Critique*.135 Well-known figures contributed to the book, such as the judge Tarek El-Bishry, Hassan Al-Turabi, Mohammed Imara, Farid Abdul Khaliq, and Tawfiq Shawi. It is a book that I do not believe the Brotherhood leaders have read, as with other serious critical writings, or they would not have come to the point where they are now. The book has been republished a second time, with editing and a foreword by Dr. Hamed Abdul Majed Quisay, who is one of the harshest critics of the Brotherhood’s conduct before and after the revolution, in spite of his falling under the Islamist umbrella. I also mention that Dr. Mohammad Salim Al-Awa wrote a 2007 article in which he called on the Brotherhood to be satisfied with educational and proselytization work and to keep its distance from political activity. This provoked a lot of reactions within the group, mostly characterized by rejection and derision.

Apart from that, there are barriers and obstacles that prevent the Brotherhood in Egypt from making a separation (and not just a distinction) between religious and political activities, at least at the current stage. Perhaps the most important are the following:

First is what we can call the “original problem”: the mix of religion and politics is a major part of the Brotherhood’s DNA as an idea and an organization. It is true that the group began its life and spent a decade (1928-1938) as a social proselytization movement, but that was merely

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preparation for engaging in political work down the road, which is indeed what happened. One of the magic ideas that group founder Hassan Al-Banna had, and which has and continues to inspire many people, is inclusiveness (in thought and organization), which has significantly contributed to the group’s spread. This issue is explicitly reflected in the comprehensive definition that Al-Banna developed for the group: a Salafi call, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political body, an athletic group, an economic enterprise, and a social idea. Any talk about separating these elements, therefore, would necessarily require the group to redefine itself, its message, its role, and its scope. This issue involves many risks, ideological, organizational, and tactical, that could destroy the group itself because the reasons for joining the group range among these seven elements that Al-Banna established, even if different weights are accorded to each.

The second obstacle is something we can call the “burden of the parent group.” In spite of the intellectual and ideological agreement between the Brotherhood in Egypt and other branches in the Arab world and beyond, the “parent” group still represents the “pure” example of the Islamist idea as Al-Banna put forth. His pupils and followers believed in this model, especially in Egypt, and therefore any change to the foundations of this idea would transform it into something else that cannot correctly be called the Muslim Brotherhood. This was perhaps one of the reasons that caused the group, after the January revolution, to turn to the “wings” option, i.e. establishing a political wing in the form of the Freedom and Justice Party, instead of completely separating politics and religion. That is because the mere idea of a complete separation still seems unimaginable to many people within the group. During the interviews I conducted while preparing my first book on the group (The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Gerontocracy Fighting Against Time?, 2007), I mentioned that many of the people I interviewed rejected the idea of a complete separation between religion and politics, and perhaps this was an issue where there was no dispute between the elders and the young people within the group. In other words, it is difficult for the Brotherhood’s leadership and young people to imagine themselves only as “reli-
racial people” or to limit their activities to education and charity work only, without any organizational and political outgrowths to that.

The third obstacle is something we can call “the burden of socialization.” This is a burden that is linked to the nature of the Brotherhood’s education, which is not limited to the inculcation of religious values such as homage and obedience. It also involves many political and organizational values such as loyalty, belonging, consultation, participation, etc. This is a type of socialization that is not passive in the political sense; it is active and effective, and it is clearly evident in various situations. The values of Brotherhood socialization assumes that a Brotherhood member will have a permanent presence in the public sphere at its different levels, whether political, social, or even at the level of family ties and social networks. In other words, the Brotherhood member, especially one at an organizational or operational level, is a continuously active player who performs certain functions as part of the group’s organizational obligations, which go beyond religion and education. Consequently, separating politics and religion, whether oriented toward being satisfied with the former or dedication to the latter, would require a new socialization system different from the one that currently prevails within Brotherhood incubators. This would take years to accomplish.

Fourth is the organizational burden. Here we mean the enormous expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, which, despite the blows it has suffered to date, has left an organizational culture to its heirs in the present generations. This could create a dilemma in the matter of separating politics and religion, especially if the choice is made to turn to building a purely political party. More specifically, with its closed hierarchical structure and a membership limited to certain groups, the nature of the Brotherhood’s organization has contributed to “sectarianizing” the Brotherhood mindset in a way that makes it difficult for it to become an open political party that includes people from different backgrounds. Furthermore, from a technical standpoint, if the party were to move in the direction of such a party, it would be difficult for individuals to move from the Brotherhood organization into the framework of the new party
without making a structural change in their culture and organizational values. This problem was clearly apparent in the case of the Freedom and Justice Party, whose members were unable to break the shackles of the Brotherhood’s organizational culture.

The fifth obstacle is the burden of reality. Anyone who believes that the Ennahda movement’s decision to separate the religious and political spheres is a new phenomenon is mistaken. It is a product of a long and serious process of intellectual reconsiderations and internal discussion. And this process would have come to naught had there been no political opening to encourage the movement’s leaders to take this bold decision. A similar opening is simply not present at the moment in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, for ideological as well as situational reasons. Ideologically, the current generation of the group’s leaders includes no open-minded, progressive, charismatic figures who could carry out those deep ideological reconsiderations. Situationally, the group is facing a brutal battle of eradication, and it is divided amongst itself internally and externally. This complicates the possibility of making a fateful decision to separate religion and politics.

Nevertheless, it is not impossible an evolution would take place within the Brotherhood, especially among young people who have lost confidence in the leadership’s ability to put forth a political and intellectual proposal to overcome the group’s current crises. However, the emergence of a new current within the Brotherhood that adopts progressive ideas or, if you like, “post-Islamism,” is closely linked to the political and social context existing in the country. Greater openness and political integration of Islamists is an important and necessary condition for the development of such a current, which could represent an alternative to the Brotherhood in its current form, thinking, and discourse.
STUDY 2

Transformations in the Moroccan Islamist Experiment

Dr. Rachid Mouqtadir

Political Islam’s experiences have been varied, its paths have been numerous, and its results have been scattered, all depending on the following variables: the nature and institutional structure of the political system, the degree to which the system is open or closed, the character and political culture of the political elite, the nature of the ideological references and the political project adopted, and the magnitude of regional, international, and other influences.

The Islamist experiments in the Arab worked are linked through two models: the model of political Islam’s natural evolution, and the model of political Islam’s failure. We should pause a moment to reflect on these classifications and seek out the political logic that brought us here, as the regression of Islamism in the Egyptian example, and its stagnation and relative evolution in the Moroccan and Tunisian examples, are linked not only to ideological references or political proposals but to the nature of each political system and its level of intellectual and political development.

Political Islam’s problem, then, is not only the system’s problem but also that of the various political elites, the dominant political culture, the historical consciousness of the present stage, and the balance of regional and international policies and their contradictions.

The purpose of investigating political Islam’s transformations is to exercise scientific care and methodological caution in dealing with this complex subject. Islamists in Morocco have different references and projects. There are Islamist forces that are integrated within political in-
stitutions (Movement for Unity and Reform, Justice and Development Party), and there are Islamist forces operating outside the rules of the political game (Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane, one of the largest Islamist associations in Morocco). There are elitist Islamist forces still seeking legal legitimacy (Civilized Alternative, Movement for the Ummah), and there are unorganized Salafi forces and a group of Sufists who play an active role, but there is no room here to elaborate on those.

It should be acknowledged that the rhetoric of political Islam has changed from concepts of the religious state, enforcing Shariah, and imposing hudud punishments, to the civil state and rhetoric around Islamization, identity, and moralization, going so far as to recognize democracy, human rights, and a state based on rights and the rule of law. Islamism’s transformations in Morocco can be interpreted via the example of the Movement for Unity and Reform and the Justice and Development Party. This example is linked primarily to the outcome of the political integration of Islamist forces and the intellectual and political reconsiderations that such integration requires, and also to its relationship to the effects of the so-called Arab Spring.

From 1997 to 1981, there was a political approach that was wary of integrating Islamists. They were gradually integrated into political institutions between 1997 and 2011, during which period reform Islamists were involved in the role of the political opposition in Parliament. Then came the Arab Spring, which was a new stage during which Islamists were able to gain power and lead the government, and therefore embark on a new political experiment from the seat of authority and influence. This enabled them to further their proposals and develop their views on political issues and governance through contact with authority and other political actors. They developed a concept of political work as a field re-


quiring professionalism and expertise in considering problems and organizing public policies. One of the results of this assimilative process was enabling Islamists to understand the logic of the state and politics as it is, not as it should be, and to work to gain experience through political practice in a way that helps democratize the Islamist movement project through electoral and political competition.

Some of the questions around political Islam’s shifts in its relationship to the challenges of the so-called Arab Spring include:

- Why have political forces’ various political projects failed to create political change, while the Arab street is succeeding in some of its experiments in imposing political and constitutional change? How do we explain the consensus among all political forces on the demand for democracy, after their previous disagreement?

- How do we interpret the evolution of political Islam’s rhetoric from concepts of the religious state, enforcing Shariah, and imposing restrictions, to the civil state and rhetoric around Islamization, identity, and moralization, going so far as to recognize democracy, human rights, and the right to difference, as compared to the pre-Arab Spring stage?

- Why does political Islam, through the Moroccan and Tunisian experience, seem more open and receptive to the spirit of political consensus, compared to the Egyptian experience, which has reached a stage of stagnation and regression? Why did political Islam witness an evolution in its ideological references and political visions via the Moroccan Justice and Development Party and the Ennahda Party, compared with the other experiences of political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s experiment in Egypt?

We can trace the public’s consensus during the Arab Spring on democracy’s necessity and priority for our societies to a set of explanatory elements:

First: Democracy became a principle and system that obtained consensus after previously being the subject of dispute around its ideological...
and philosophical foundations and skepticism around the legitimacy of its political representativeness.

Second: The effectiveness and usefulness of the Western model for managing political conflict is mainly attributable to the existence of democratic institutional mechanisms to manage political and social disputes.

Third: The crisis of the Arab Islamist model, and its political, institutional, and cultural defects, such as authoritarianism and despotism, and the absence of rational grounds for managing political conflict. These make it a continuation of a despotic political model that adopts an authoritarian cultural structure marked by political opposition, which may consider itself an existing alternative to the ruling regimes, potentially leading to recreating the same closed political model.  

We also note that the pragmatic involvement of political actors in the transformation process has focused efforts on considering the process of taking political positions and seeking to be at the fore of that process, while intellectual proposals have been semi-stagnant in the post-Arab Spring stage. This has generated a scholarly and cultural vacuum that must be given an epistemological and methodological framework that transcends classic political and intellectual problems in the context of society’s relationship to the state in the Arab world and thus presents new problems that have not been raised, such as involving the Arab street as a social and political actor capable of creating change.

Methodological and Scholarly Observations

- There is a need to avoid the disadvantages of generalized approaches that stereotype Islamist movements as identical entities and organizations. Islamism in Morocco is not a unified body governed by the same references and visions. In spite of the unity of Islam’s religious references, the practical reality, the contexts of each country, and the nature

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of its culture, social, political, and otherwise, are clearly diverse in ideological readings and political visions.

- There is a crisis in the theoretical frameworks and epistemological models for interpreting and achieving an objective scholarly understanding of political phenomena and social and cultural realities. This presents an assortment of theoretical and methodological challenges because the epistemological and scientific frameworks used to study our Arab societies have become almost entirely outmoded, especially after the so-called Arab Spring. This is one of the features of fragile, transitional stages that seek to leave behind personalist authority, with its individual and authoritarian inclinations, and aspire to further institutionalization and codification of the rules of the political game.139

- Amid the growing risks of nonsense and inscrutability around political and social action, specialization and the multiplicity of intellectual fields – such as political science, philosophy and political theory, anthropology and historiography, and media studies – have led political Islam and its various issues and problems each to be addressed as its own specialization with its own qualification and approach, be it theoretical or practical. The difficulties faced by academic approaches aimed at exploring and dissecting political action are exacerbated by virtue of its complexity, changeability, and concealed nature.140 Consequently, the scientific wager that this stage requires with its evident and underlying transformations and complexities aspires to transcend the intellectual one-sidedness that shapes science and knowledge to fit a single, specialized mold, and to open as many fields of knowledge as possible in order to learn from their methods and techniques while observing the specificity of each one.141

139 Dr. Rachid Mouqtadir, “Reflections on the Political Experience of the Justice and Development Government,” Siyasat Arabiya, a peer-reviewed journal dedicated to political science, international relations, and general politics, Issue 3, July 2013.


There is confusion between the concepts of Islam as religion and political Islam as an ideology, necessitating a brief theoretical definition of ideology and religion. Ideology is a system of markers related to legitimate social organization, and it is defined as a set of intellectual ideas, lofty principles, or higher values. Although ideologies can be based on certain scientific theories, giving them unearned credibility, these theories are either incorrect or dubiously scientific. The power of an ideology lies not in its logical consistency or intellectual depth but in its ability to attract and tempt the public with the usefulness of its project. An ideology has several functions, i.e. legitimation, persuasion, integration, and misrepresentation. An ideology can be founded on religious beliefs and references that constitute a framework for its intellectual structure and political projects. There are those who view political Islam’s currents as religious communities that embody the religion’s essence and seek to enforce the religion on reality, and there are those who see those currents as a particular interpretive judgment of the religion and how to understand and apply it.

Islamists take on religion as an ideological identity. Therefore, Islamists aspire to transform their religiosity and Islamic references and apply them as a political and social project, meaning that Islamists seek to change political authority, society, and the rest of the symbolic arrangement in accordance with their beliefs and convictions that they view as capable of bringing about change and reform. Islamism, then, is an ideological authority and political project for political and social forces operating under a hierarchical organization, and it draws on Islamic references in order to gain access to power or to share in power.

143 Raymond Boudon, “L’ideologie ou l’origine des idées reçues,” Idées Forces, Fayard, 1986, p. 444
144 Rachid Mouqtadir, Political Integration of Islamist Forces in Morocco, op. cit., p. 8.
145 Ibid., p. 24-25.
I will use reform Islamists as a procedural concept to refer to Islamists affiliated with the Movement for Unity and Reform and those integrated into politics within the framework of the Justice and Development Party, which decided to integrate into the institutional political sphere and operate under the rules of the political game. Thus, by using the term Islamists as a shorthand, we do not intend to generalize or cause a mix-up with the forces who reject integration, such as Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane.

If there is consensus around the history of movement Islamist organizations’ emergence in Morocco, which most researchers trace to the Chabiba Islamiya movement established in 1969, the disagreement centers around the determinants and motivations for that emergence, as well as the conditions it produced and the subjective and objective circumstances that contributed to its development, especially amid ideological, cultural, and political stimuli in the Marxist left in all its components and currents. The left totally dominated the ideological, intellectual, and cultural sphere and had considerable influence in framing, directing, and mobilizing intellectual and cultural activism in order to consolidate its supporters and attract sympathizers.146

Chabiba Islamiya became deadlocked, and clashes and disputes began to arise, after a number of its leaders were arrested and charged with involvement in the assassination of union leader Omar Benjelloun. After the escape of Abdul Karim Mutee, who is still at large abroad, the movement experienced a leadership vacuum that it tried to fill by forming a six-member committee from among its fighters in order to save Chabiba.147 Because Abdul Karim Mutee was unable to control the “six-part command,” he accused it of betrayal on behalf of the regime and conspiring against the movement. This spurred Mutee to appoint new leadership. When the six-part command refused to recognize the new

146 Rachid Mouqtadir, Political Integration of Islamist Forces in Morocco, op. cit., p. 31.
leadership, it destabilized the movement, and many of its members withdrew. In spite of reform initiatives and attempts to mend the rift, it became clear that the tension was more severe and the dispute deeper than ever planned. Before long, the matter came to exacerbate a structural crisis that devastated Chabiba Islamiya’s components and currents.

Chabiba Islamiya’s relationship to the ruling regime was marked by a series of stages that we summarize below:

- Peace and a truce with the authorities, which characterized the period during which Chabiba Islamiya appeared and lasted from 1969 to 1975. The Chabiba movement was a legally recognized association, backed by a parallel organization of structures, people, and cells.

- Splintering of the movement and prosecution of its figureheads. This stage was marked by the movement’s transition from public work to clandestine work immediately after Omar Benjelloun’s assassination and lasting from 1975 to 1981. Chabiba Islamiya shifted to clandestine work and a revolutionary approach, adopting the jahiliyya thesis and influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s ideas and orientations.

- After organizational fracturing (post-1981). The decision was made to break from the Chabiba Islamiya’s revolutionary line and cut ties with the movement, renounce violence, and pursue peaceful religious and political work, based on gradual change and an abandonment of clandestine work. This trend materialized clearly and was resolved after 1986.

In the same context, Chabiba Islamiya experienced rifts and fragmentation after the most prominent forces and currents withdrew from the movement. It carved a more radical and violent path after calling for armed action against the regime. This eventually led it to become isolated and confined to a limited number of followers after fragmenting into several currents and trends that later formed the most prominent Islamist activist forces.

If Jamaa Islamiya’s emergence was a direct result of the negative aspects of the post-1981 organizational fragmentation stage, it was dis-
t nguished by the decision to break from Chabiba Islamiya’s revoluti-

everse and cut ties with the movement, renounce violence, and pursue

peaceful religious and political work, based on gradual change and an

abandonment of clandestine work. When Abdelilah Benkirane, Muham-

mad Yatim, Abdellah Baha, and other leaders began engaging in public

work, it was a new stage in the Islamist movement experiment.

The most important feature of this stage was the ability of the

movement’s leadership to make a significant strategic decision: to aban-

don clandestine activities and the goal of a coup by 1986, to move

beyond secrecy and abandon revolutionary ideas, to enter a public phase

and work under the cover of legitimacy, and to reconsider many of their

arguments and concepts, such as their attitude toward the system of go-

evernance, the nature of the Islamist project they were defending, and their

attitude toward violence.

Chabiba Islamiya would change its name to the Movement for

Reform and Renewal at the beginning of the 1990s. It later joined the As-

sociation of the Islamic Future to announce a new organization named

the Movement for Unity and Reform. The merger was announced in a

statement dated 31 August 1996.

The Intellectual and Political Transformations of Reformist Islamists

The structural and intellectual transformations that reform Islamism

underwent in Morocco initially required entrenching a positive and flexi-

ble view of the system of governance, the state, and politics. This was an

evolution in its settled positions on political action based on the political

authority’s recognition of Islamists’ right to enter the public sphere.

The adoption of the civilizational change approach, which consid-

ers the essence of Islamist action to be a reformist act, and which rejects

violence and extremism as a means of resolving social and political con-

flicts, was a break in reference authority from the revolutionary approach

to political change. Several Islamist movement figureheads and intellec-
tuals contributed to renewing the movement’s vision of the nature of the crisis confronting the Ummah and ways to solve it.

The movement’s and party’s intellectual theorizing was based on the civil and cultural approach as an explanatory mechanism, recognizing the priority of religious, cultural, and political factors in understanding and interpretation. The intellectual and ideological frame of reference was thus characterized by a flexibility that interpreted multiple intellectual and legal sources through a vision based on the goals of the Shariah (maqasid). This approach showed an awareness of the nature of the problems that society is facing and an appreciation of the balances of social and political forces. It became clear to us that there are many independent judgements (ijtihad) and interpretations with various readings and analyses, and that there is no theoretical unity that vindicates the idea of an inspiring charismatic leader as religious authority.

The reform Islamism current also embraced intellectual judgments from outside the Brotherhood school, especially the contributions of Malek Bennabi, Allal al-Fassi, Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, and Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, for implementing an alternative intellectual and ideological structure that left behind the compulsions of the revolutionary Islamist references that still dominated the cultural and ideological space. They also injected the interpretive judgments of many people affiliated with the movement, such as Dr. Ahmad al-Raysuni, Farid Ansari, Al-Othmani Waitim, and others.

The break in reference authority that the Islamists established does not, however, preclude the fact that it has been influenced by the proselytizing and educational side in the Eastern Arab world that is still present. Meanwhile, the Islamists have been able to achieve independence at the ideological, intellectual, and political levels and to reach maturity in their political experience. This represents an evolution in Islamists’ relationship to governance and a culmination of the integration process, in spite of the difficulties and obstacles befalling it.
Reformist Current’s Waypoints

We can summarize the path that reform Islamism has taken in the following stages:

- The first stage lasted from 1979 to 1986 and was a period of formulating a new vision separate from the revolutionary Chabiba Islamiya experience and escaping its psychological and political imprint. An organizational split was made from the parent movement due to a political decision and attempts to establish a new organization with independent structures and bodies. At this stage, the reformist stream was unable to transcend the theory of revolutionary action inherited from ChabibaIslamiya. A new awareness took shape out of the failed approach of fighting and clashing with the regime, and a conviction emerged that there is a need for reconsiderations based on coexistence with the regime and working within the system as a gateway to reform.

- The second stage, from 1986 to 1996, first brought about a renunciation of secrecy and a commitment to operate in the open, and second, faith in the idea of political participation and the beginning of intellectual, political, and legal activity to support such participation.

- This period was permeated by the quest for legal legitimacy as a route to participation in the political game. The regime rejected attempts to found the “National Renewal Party” and the “Unity and Development Party.” The movement’s leadership thus understood that the problem was purely political in nature, and they adopted a legal approach as justification for refusal and protest. So they moved on to a second version that allowed for joining an existing political party, because they realized that the motives for the earlier refusal had been political and not legal.

- The third stage, between 1997 and 2003, marked the beginning of Islamists’ political integration into the public sphere and friction with other, official political actors. The transition was made from ideology and theory to political practice in an official capacity once the Islamists entered the Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement.
The party’s documents and views were redrafted, and new party branches were opened in other prefectures and provinces. At the movement level, there was progress in the transitional stage of merging the Movement for Reform and Renewal and the Association of the Islamic Future into the Movement for Unity and Reform between 1996 and 1998. After the movement was convinced of the need for political participation as a strategic wager, around which there was no longer any dispute as there had been initially, and Islamists entered Dr. Abdelkrim Al-Khatib’s party, participation became a matter of course. Reality proved the effectiveness of participation in strengthening Islamists’ political influence. This resulted in the movement adopting the political party’s project, which created an organizational dichotomy between the movement and the party. However, the vagaries of politics, calculations, and conflicts forced the movement to put distance between itself and the party in order to avoid charges made against the movement of exploiting religion in politics. The idea of separating the movement and the party was proposed, but the overlap in shared leadership and a shared objective required that they consider replacing the principle of separation with the principle of differentiation in functions and competencies, as dictated by political conditions and the balance of political and social forces.

The Dialectic of Party and Movement, Religion and Politics

It is necessary to clarify the relationship between the Movement for Unity and Reform, which is the proselytizing and educational authority for this current, and the Justice and Development Party, which is involved in political institutions. Integrating the movement into the political game caused the movement’s relationship to the party to evolve, which posed several problems for that relationship or the party-movement or politics-preaching dialectic. Researchers’ interpretations of this problem are numerous. Some see the organization as a single structure with two heads, each with the same responsibilities but following different functions, focusing on the party instead of the movement.

Others believe that the party’s scope of work is daily political activity, while the movement’s field of work is proselytizing and educational activity, so that each sphere has its own work. This proposal is in line with the official perspective on movement Islamism, while some others view the party as a political front for the Movement for Unity and Reform.

The use of the term reform Islamist current is a recognition of the unity of the political project that the movement embraced and supported up to the stage of building a self-standing political party. This produced new problems for us that required redefining the party’s relationship to the movement in accordance with political and social transformations, a gamble that was made apparent by political practice.\(^\text{149}\)

**The Birth Pangs of Political Integration**

The mid-1990s saw the start of an experiment to politically integrate certain Islamist forces into the system of governance in Morocco. Islamists resorted to founding an Islamist political party, but when the regime rejected their request, they understood that the issue was linked to the problem of political legitimacy rather than legal legitimacy. This impeded a political settlement between reform Islamists and the monarchy. The Islamists’ awareness and certainty that the rejection of an Islamist party in Morocco was politically motivated and not a legal problem led to a strategy of seeking integration into an existing political party, which facilitated their political integration. The Islamists’ shift to opening the door to political reconciliation with the regime was the official start of their entry into the practice of institutional politics.

The adoption of this mode of political activity, with the advent of so-called consensual rotation, integrated the socialist political opposition through consensus rotation. The left’s reliance on legitimacy born of struggle was compromised by the need to pass painful social and economic policies, whose social and political repercussions were borne by the left. This weakened the opposition’s historical position and portrayed

it as the savior of projects fundamentally at odds with its ideological identity, as the opposition bore the responsibility of governing. Although this contributed to strengthening the opposition’s resources and expanding its influence, it weakened it at the grassroots by virtue of the burdens of government responsibility and the narrow margins of maneuver, which also encouraged the integration of Islamists and alleviated growing doubts about the failure of this process, which was affected by an international and Moroccan climate skeptical of the Islamists’ intentions and true attitudes toward democracy and political participation. The Islamists also benefited from King Mohammed VI’s shift to ruling as an objective party.

One of the unacknowledged problems impacting Islamists’ political work in the public sphere is that, without prior intent or planning, it collided with a sensitive area that, throughout this experience, created a growing concern for the monarchy as a political authority and the “leader of the faithful” (amir al-mu’minin) as a politico-religious authority. The party overstepped its permitted bounds by competing with the king as the leader of the faithful in drawing on religious political legitimacy and repeatedly putting the monarchy in a bind by calling for Islamizing the economy, opposing the microcredit law, the existence of customs fees, and moralizing the television landscape. This approach also provoked the ire and indignation of the political elite, who saw Islamists as exercising a kind of moral and political guardianship over them.

These were some of the problems and issues created by political practice. For the party and the movement, this stage was an occasion to reassess their political and proselytizing path and the necessity of respecting a distinction in which politics is identified with religion at the level of the “leader of the faithful” and with a separation between politics and religion at the level of other political and social entities. This crystallized after the Islamist current shifted from rejecting the idea of separating politics and religion to endorsing the so-called principle of differentiation between politics and religion, which was a form of political evolution that political practice birthed and brought to maturity.
The painful period of the 16 May 2003 bombings in Casablanca did not cause a break in the authority’s relationship to Islamists so much as it was regarded as an obstacle on the path of political integration. It produced a crisis that lasted only a brief period. The idea of a break requires a freeze or temporary dissolution of the institutional relationship. This experience manifested as a political crisis that saw a period of great tension, actions and reactions, and gestures toward dissolution but not an actual dissolution. It ultimately led to the formulation of a new plan for working together, and the Islamists’ response to the authority’s pressures during this difficult period was intelligent and prioritized pragmatism, which reflected the Islamists’ realism and their realization of the balance of forces. Also realizing the flexibility that this stage would require, they offered a series of concessions to satisfy the authority’s will in order to preserve their existence, such as voluntarily curtailing the magnitude of their electoral participation, softening and moderating their political rhetoric, marginalizing ideological and political hardliners within the organization, and cutting ties with religious and political forces who were seen as a source of extremism.

Assessing the Reformists’ Political Performance

The method of integrating Islamists and the scale of their political participation was a matter of dispute between the regime, which wanted that participation codified in a way that would not affect the regime’s functioning, and the Islamists, who aspired to expand their participation so as to help them put down social and popular roots and to highlight them as a major political force. This was one of the most significant problems in the regime’s relationship to Islamists.

The Islamists’ electoral platform for 1997 was distinctive for the way it avoided engaging with stubborn problems, such as applying Shariah, mixing between males and females, enforcing hudud punishments, and calling for the establishment of an Islamic state. Instead the platform heavily featured concepts of Islamization, moralization, and Muslim identity, with a focus on implementing the Islamic character provided for
under the Constitution. This explains the Islamists’ wager on the strategy of Islamization within the rules organizing political work, in an attempt to neutralize any accusations that they were overstepping the parameters of politics.

The electoral platform tried to reconcile the classic demands that all parties adopted in their platforms, such as making political reforms, strengthening the position of the prime minister, and expanding Parliament’s powers, with the demands of Islamism, such as the existence of an argument for civilizational change and Islamization and the necessity of building up humanity.

The electoral platform was characterized by drawing on a number of references, namely the reform Islamism ideology, adopting the concept of Islamism and shoring up identity and values. There was a universality to the references in the platform’s endorsement of democracy and human rights, its recognition of individual and collective freedoms, the demand for political and constitutional reform, and so on. Finally, the platform drew on socialist references by focusing on the creation of employment opportunities, improving and advancing social and economic standards of living, and achieving social justice.

The Justice and Development Party’s platform for the 2002 elections adopted the slogan “Toward a Better Morocco: Heritage - Democracy - Justice - Development.” It treated these concepts in finer detail than in the 1997 platform, while seeking to establish a kind of balance of references and reconcile the Western and Islamic references among its intellectual sources.

The Moroccan Islamists avoided the political slogans “Islam is the solution” and “The Quran is our Constitution,” adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in its political battles, in its own electoral platforms. This can be explained by their avoidance of following in the footsteps of the Muslim Brotherhood in their political experience with the political regime in Egypt, which was dominated by confrontation and obstruction more than consensus and harmony.
The electoral platform aimed to reinforce Islamic authority as an ideological identity for all reform projects, starting with applying the constitutional principle of Islam being the nominal source of all legislation and laws, repealing anything inconsistent with that provision, and restoring the role of Islamic references in guiding economic policy.

The electoral platform also afforded attention to the issue of national sovereignty and unity, with the party acknowledging the centrality of the issue of Western Sahara and territorial unity. This reflected the party’s desire to play a strategic national role alongside Islamist identity issues.

The sixth legislative term from 1997 to 2002 gave more attention to identity issues and reinforced Islamic references, and demanded that many general laws and policies be subjected to the authority of Islamic references, thus introducing new obstruction into Parliament.

The seventh legislative term from 2002 to 2007 gave more attention to social issues linked to domestic policy and productivity and financial issues. During that term, the domestic sector ranked first in questions posed, followed by social sectors that included national education, health, employment, and others. The productive sectors ranked third, including agriculture, rural development, fishing, energy, and the tourism sector, then industry and trade. The financial sectors ranked fourth, and the justice sector fifth, followed by the public sectors and the relationship with Parliament. Human rights and the Secretary-General ranked last.

During the seventh legislative term, Justice and Development was able to accumulate expertise in handling legislative initiatives and acquired many skills in political management and legislative action. This was one of the ways in which their political experience developed and was a consequence of 10 years of professionalism in parliamentary work and consulting experts and specialists, whereas their experience in the sixth parliament had encountered some deficiencies in political expertise and legislative and oversight work.
The Islamists’ electoral platforms were characterized by the way they avoided engaging with stubborn problems, such as applying Shariah, mixing between males and females, and enforcing *hudud* punishments. They also avoided adopting political slogans claiming that “Islam is the solution” and “The Quran is our Constitution,” which the Muslim Brotherhood adopted in their political battles. Instead, the platforms heavily featured concepts of Islamization, moralization, and Muslim identity, with a focus on implementing the Islamic character provided for under the Constitution. This explains the Islamists’ wager on the strategy of Islamization within the rules organizing political work, in an attempt to neutralize any accusations that they were overstepping the parameters of politics.

The Islamists involved aimed to meet the expectations of an Islamic political elite that drew on a reformist ideology and aspired to frame and moralize political work for the sake of creating further convergence between the Islamist project and the objectives of political work in accordance with a gradualist logic endorsing political action within political institutions in order to change them from the inside. This enabled Islamism to operationalize its political and social roles.

The regime saw Islamists as having violated the implicit rules of the political game related to the king’s monopoly on religious-political legitimacy, to the extent that that constituted a transgression of the lines that had been drawn and an assault on the non-negotiable religious-political arena. The Islamists’ focus on the rhetoric of Islamization, identity, and moralization can be interpreted through their desire to stand out and stand apart with new political rhetoric that draws on Islamic references in a way that creates new a new dynamism that wins over audiences that the rhetoric of traditional political parties has had great difficulty in mobilizing and motivating.

The focus on this type of issue is understood as the exercise of a kind of super-guardianship over the functioning of the state and political actors and an effort to steer that functioning in accordance with the Islamists’ convictions and to dictate to the state and parties what they
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should do. This reflected a divergence in references about the moral and political function undertaken by the modern state, which the Islamists believe abandoned traditional Islamic functions such as *hisbah* and commanding the right and forbidding the wrong. The state’s role in prohibiting religiously forbidden acts, and its employment as a docile tool in service of Shariah and its aims, is not limited to certain functions that do not necessarily evoke Shariah.

We can trace the causes of the dispute to the following key elements:

First: The conflict around religious-political legitimacy. The Justice and Development Party’s adoption of Islamic references as the foundation of its ideology and politics stoked the ire of leftist political forces that viewed such references negatively, seeing in them the exploitation of religious symbols and Shariah concepts in the field of political work. This is an issue that does not please the monarchy, as it contributes to competition with the king, as the leader of the faithful, over religious-political authority. The monarchy considers this authority a special field where it monopolizes representation, and it employs it symbolically, religiously, and politically based on contexts and circumstances that help to distinguish between political roles and religious functions or to convert certain disputed religious issues to political ones. This is the same card that the party plays in its political and parliamentary practices.

Second: The political consequences of the moral regulation function. This is an issue that transcends politics, encroaching onto beliefs and morals, such as the persistent demands around moralizing the audiovisual landscape, keeping gambling out of public media, the draft microcredit law, closing bars and alcohol shops, and the problem of sex tourism.

These are issues and problems where politics overlaps with religion, morals, and the economy. Islamists view them as violations of Shariah, relaxing prohibitions, and permitting prohibited actions. The political authority, meanwhile, sees them as subject to interpretive judgment and falling within the state’s scope of work at the central or local level.
This reflects a kind of divergence of references around the moral and political function undertaken by the modern state, which the Islamists believe has abandoned its moral and religious functions.

Third: Preserving the major political balances. The authority’s persistent involvement in controlling and steering the political sphere, the continuing game of politically artful balances based on the authority’s hegemony, and the refusal to allow strong political forces to emerge all serve the authority’s strategies and enable it to control the entire political sphere, which is a point of contention with Islamists. The authority fears any prospective inundation or jumbling of the political map.

The Islamists’ vision, however, was not governed so much by concern for constitutional and political reform as it was defined by the desire to prioritize the codification of Islamic law as the nominal source of legislation, prioritize political and party rehabilitation and the necessity of political reform, and develop the structure of the state, especially Parliament and the government. The political and social dynamism that characterized the Islamists’ founding experience was lacking in the seventh legislative term, which did not see the same political vitality.

An exploration of the outcome of parliamentary legislative and oversight work within the legislative branch bumped up against the limited political roles assigned to the branch within Parliament. Islamists’ parliamentary performance, while holding the most seats due to achieving record numbers compared to previous legislative terms, reflected the Islamists’ seriousness and discipline in parliamentary work. The most important obstacle the Islamists encountered was the power vested in the legislative branch, as it is granted only ceremonial and inconsequential functions, and this caused the Parliament to want for genuine political stakes within the Moroccan political system.

The Justice and Development Party’s Political Experience in Governance

During the so-called Arab Spring, the Justice and Development Party managed to benefit from the Arab Spring’s effects and reach the
position of leading the government following snap legislative elections on 25 November 2011. These elections resulted in Justice and Development winning 107 seats in Parliament. In the elections on 7 October 2016, the party won 125 seats in Parliament.

By integrating the reform Islamist stream into institutional politics, the governing regime sought to renew the consensus around the rules of political competition on the regime’s terms, strengthen the consensus around the religious-political status of the monarchy and support its legitimacy, and reinforce the monarchy’s political and social stability. Islamists also benefited from taking on the role of the institutional opposition in the vacuum created by the historical leftist opposition’s transition into government, which was followed by the deterioration of social and economic conditions that remained at an impasse. The Islamists undertook the following functions:

- Legitimating and strengthening the authority, serving as a relief valve for social tensions and complaints, integrating extremist factions and working to neutralize them, giving a new dynamism to parliamentary work, performing the role of moral control within the political sphere, and then highlighting the political system’s capacity for containment and maintaining political stability.

The questions that arise for consideration are: To what extent did the course of political integration in Morocco impact the intellectual evolution and political maturity of reform Islamist forces? How did political practice and a logic for political action inform the evolution of intellectual and political rhetoric? Is the Justice and Development Party’s ascension to leading the government a positive culmination of its political integration? Or did political interest and the effects of the so-called Arab Spring and the 20 February Movement force the regime to accept this concession until the storm calms?

Has the Justice and Development Party’s experience in government been affected by the causes of the dispute between Islamists and the system of governance during the period of opposition?
Culmination of the Integration Path or Managing the Demands of a Political Phase

The experiment of politically integrating the reform Islamists has been characterized by a kind of persistent volatility first in their relationship to the system of governance — which has passed through various stages ranging from fleeting consensus and cautious coexistence to ad hoc deadlock and constant confrontation that approached deadlock and stagnation — and secondly in their relationship to the political forces operating within that system, governmental majorities and political opposition alike.150

It should be noted at the outset that due to the nature of the relationship between the reform Islamism current and the political system, the coalition government led by the Justice and Development Party between 2011 and 2016 was not the result of a natural political evolution in the context of democratic succession. It resulted from the protest movements witnessed in the Arab street during the so-called Arab Spring, which toppled a series of authoritarian regimes and hastened reform processes in order to contain the situation and prevent it from exploding. King Mohammed VI proactively called for amending the Constitution in an address on 9 March 2011, despite the opposition of the various components of the 20 February Movement and Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane, one of the most prominent organizations within the Islamist opposition in Morocco.

This political situation was a political opportunity that the Justice and Development seized, working to solidify its constitutional and political proposals, including citing and defending the leadership of the faithful and the monarchy, in addition to affirming the party’s own progress on its political path within the political system in accordance with a gradualist reform logic. These political steps can be considered reassuring messages that the Islamists continue to broadcast, and during that excep-

150 Rachid Mouqtadir, *Political Integration of Islamist Forces in Morocco*, Al Jazeera Studies Center, ibid.
tional period they contributed to relieving mistrust and wariness between the Islamists and the monarchy.151

One of the outcomes of this societal and political movement was the drafting of a new constitution, which triggered the organization of snap parliamentary elections on 25 November 2011. Those elections resulted in Justice and Development winning 107 seats in Parliament, followed by the Justice and Development Party’s ascension to leading the government. This was considered an important step for Islamists, who bet on political integration into the system and managed to gain power through peaceful means, without any political or social convulsions or tensions, by virtue of the character of the Moroccan political system, where the monarchy is central.

This political experiment took place within a new constitutional framework that is still pending implementation. It was characterized by its appeal to constitutional rules that increased its powers and authorities.

In order to examine the Justice and Development Party’s experience within the system of governance in the context of highly sensitive political circumstances, embodied in the handling of what is known in the government’s political discourse as the democratic application of the constitution, it is necessary to detail this problem through a set of fundamental questions:

Were government and party political actors affected in their political behavior by the 2011 Constitution, which most researchers agree is more advanced than the 1996 Constitution? Did the 1 July Constitution and the elites’ political behavior reconcile citizens with politics?

What are the Justice and Development Party’s visions for the transitional stage? What are the visions of the rest of the governing coalition? What mechanisms have been adopted to manage this difficult transitional stage?

151 Rachid Mouqtadir, Political Integration of Islamist Forces in Morocco, ibid.
Features of the Government’s Program and its Overall Objectives

What are the characteristics of the government’s program, and what is its diagnosis of the political situation the country is facing? What are the most significant additions submitted?

The king’s appointment of the government and the government’s efforts to win the confidence of the House of Representatives led it to present its government program. The program, which embodies the government’s official viewpoint, starts with a basic conviction that attends the program’s contents from beginning to end, i.e., that the government and its program came about in a new transitional phase. That phase embodies the so-called Moroccan model of a third way for dealing with the protest movement experienced in the Arab world. Thanks to the Moroccan monarch’s address on 9 March 2011, a reformist approach was established that enabled the recognition of a continuing and quiet transformation. This was followed by a series of political measures that the government’s program described as courageous and positive, such as the 1 July constitutional referendum and the 25 November 2011 elections, which the government considered a milestone in the history of the electoral franchise in Morocco. Those steps were then followed by the appointment as prime minister of Abdelilah Benkirane, from the party that took first place in the elections. A governmental majority was then formed on the basis of a broadly participatory methodology.

The evaluation of the government’s program was therefore positive due to the way the monarchy managed the fallout of the political movement that Morocco experienced, and indeed, the Moroccan experience was the subject of broad media interest and international anticipation.

152 Kingdom of Morocco, Prime Minister, “Government’s Program,” January 2012, p. 5.
154 Ibid., p. 6.
What are the Main Stakes of the Government’s Program?

The government’s program aims to “transition to a new stage of democratic development by making progress in applying the requirements of the new Constitution, promoting confidence in a better tomorrow for the Moroccan nation, providing the prerequisites for competition and collective action to revitalize the strength, sovereignty and unity of the nation, and striving to establish a Morocco of dignity, freedom, development, and social justice for all its citizens, both men and women.”155

If the government’s program gives form to the visions of the electoral platforms of the government coalition’s parties, it identified its fundamental wager in “substantiating the commitment to apply the Constitution and its legislative and institutional requirements, respond to the essential and urgent expectations of the Moroccan people in all its classes and groups both domestically and abroad and of all social and economic actors and civil society institutions, and fulfill our country’s international commitments.”156 This meant that the government program considered the legislative term a truly exceptional one because of the need imposed by the Constitution to apply its requirements in the context of “a profound reform of the state, the renewal of its functions, the development of its structure, the rehabilitation of its roles, and the establishment of rules for harmony, integration, and cooperation among its institutions, in order to meet the challenges of good governance, economic development, and social justice, thus making Morocco a shining and attractive example.”157

The government’s priority, then, was to reinforce the path of the country’s democratic development, continue building a democratic state, and combat deficiencies and corruption through what it called the “participatory and democratic application of the requirements of the Constitu-

155 Ibid., p. 5.
156 Ibid., p. 7.
157 Ibid., p. 7.
tion\textsuperscript{158} and its resultant effects: advanced regionalization, administrative reform, and enshrinement of the judiciary’s independence.

**What is the Benefit of Applying the Constitution?**

The government’s program refocuses on the way the Constitution is applied through a democratic logic, based on a participatory and democratic approach with awareness of the sensitivity of the phase and the need to maintain consensus and involve others in order to achieve success in managing the transitional stage and the transition to a new stage of good governance.\textsuperscript{159} The overall objective of the government’s program is: “To solidify the process of building a balanced, cohesive, stable, united, and flourishing society that ensures a dignified life for citizens and special care for Moroccans living abroad. This society is based on growing the middle class by providing the necessary conditions for producing wealth and achieving solidarity among different groups in society.”\textsuperscript{160} Five major directives were adopted to reach this objective:

1. Promoting the common national identity, maintaining the cohesion and diversity of its components, and being open to other cultures and civilizations.

2. Strengthening the rule of law, advanced regionalization, and good governance that guarantees dignity, rights, and freedoms and is based on genuine citizenship, and linking responsibility to accountability and rights to duties.

3. Continuing to build a strong national economy that is diverse in sectors and regions, competitive, and generates wealth and decent work, and economic policy that ensures the equitable distribution of the fruits of this growth.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 9.
4. Developing and activating social programs to ensure equitable access to basic services, especially education, health, and housing, and to enshrine solidarity and equal opportunities among individuals, classes, generations, and regions.

5. Promoting positive interactions with the regional and global environment and strengthening the overall performance of services for Moroccans living abroad.\(^{161}\)

**The Government’s performance and the Opposition’s Criticisms**

The views of the government and the opposition diverge concerning the manner of the Constitution’s interpretation, necessarily raising the question: What are the main reasons behind misunderstanding the Constitution?

“We must begin with the fact that the Constitution itself contains a number of ambiguities (...) People do what they like with the Constitution’s provisions. If this judgment is correct, maybe it can provide another explanation for our confusion and turmoil.”\(^{162}\)

The opposition’s criticisms of the government’s program, then, are specific to a set of points that they see as incompatible with the government’s program. Those points are:

- The slow pace of government action in implementing the Constitution, as indicated by the low number of draft laws proposed.

- The government’s inconsistency with the Constitution and the government’s program, in that it has not given the political opposition its rightful status. The opposition considers this a retreat from what the government calls the participatory and democratic application of the Constitution.

161 Ibid., pp. 10, 11-87.
The government’s tendency, in its approach to implementing the Constitution, to interpret the Constitution’s articles instead of seeking the Parliament’s interpretation. The opposition sees this as vacating the Constitution of its contents and a failure to activate its articles.

We can add another set of observations in the context of comparing the government’s program and the legislative agenda with what has been achieved on the ground:

The government raised the ceiling for its promises and, if we like, its expectations for reform, combating corruption and autocracy, improving social conditions in the country by creating jobs and fighting poverty and marginalization, and working to develop and modernize the Moroccan economy. This has caused citizens to pin their hopes on these government aspirations, which quickly collided with a complex and thorny reality that was hiding an onerous political, economic, and social legacy (the Compensation Fund and Pension Fund crisis, the conundrum of worsening corruption, the weak national economy, unemployment, debt, the effects of the global financial crisis on Morocco, etc.), and the government has thus realized the difficult situation in which it finds itself. That situation is a test that has narrowed the government’s margins of maneuver and provided a golden opportunity for its adversaries to accuse it of negligence and inadequacy.

The government was a culmination of the Arab Spring era under a new Constitution that expanded its powers and authorities compared to its predecessors and granted it the ability to take initiative. This affected the government’s position, as its pace of work seemed to fall into a sort of sluggishness, weakness, and hesitation, reflecting the absence of a strategic vision in the context of managing the not inconsiderable problem of political authority. The situation seemed to show that the government was incapable or hesitant and will not satisfy the pressing demands of the wider public that is waiting with bated breath.

There is a worsening political culture that believes the Islamists are incapable of taking hold of the reins of power. This culture considers
Islamists to lack political legitimacy and to be unworthy of governing even though they ascended to that role through the ballot box. This is an undemocratic tendency that can be explained by their opponents’ failure to achieve political results, weakening their legitimacy, along with the flareup in the competition between them and their ideological adversaries, then the conflict over political and social positions. Despite uncounted government errors, to us the sum total of these factors explains why they have so many adversaries and critics.

- The purpose of taking the path of establishing consensus between the monarchy and the Justice and Development Party during the Arab Spring era was to manage the critical transitional stage. If some historical political stages required the establishment of a kind of alliance between the monarchy and leftist forces to counter the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism, the current stage is on a path that aspires to establish mutual trust for the sake of coexistence between Islamists and the monarchy in Morocco.

- The incompatibility of the components in the governmental majority and their worsening political disputes, both private and public, have negatively affected the government’s image and allowed it to be lured into sideline battles made more severe by the attempts of the government’s political adversaries to hunt for errors by the government’s officials, foremost among them the prime minister, and to shower criticism and accusations on their statements, positions, and even some of their personal actions.

- The government’s installation coincided with the direct impacts of the global economic crisis beginning to reach Morocco. If, for various reasons, the official rhetoric has not previously acknowledged the effects of this crisis on the country, those effects seem tangible at the level of Moroccan communities in the diaspora, whose resources and remittances have been shrinking, on top of the shrinking number of tourists and the liquidity shortage.
Conclusions

There is no doubt that the effort to explore the outcome of the experiment in government is not a simple or inconsiderable issue for anyone seeking a substantive academic treatment of the matter that avoids politics, ideology, and political jostling. We assert that such an inquirer will confront a set of theoretical and methodological challenges by virtue of the experiment’s recency and due to the nature of the transitional political stage we are experiencing, which is difficult to address with any sort of objectivity and scientific rigor. This has prompted us to focus on the problem of implementing the Constitution rather than general policies.

Overall, the criticisms that have been made portray the Justice and Development government as hesitant and slow in its application of the post-Arab Spring Constitution. We see the following explanations for this:

- The Benkirane government wagered on moving toward consensus with the monarchy because of its deep social and popular roots, and because of the balance of forces and political influence in favor of the monarchy. This means that any ill-considered confrontation between the monarchy and Islamists could adversely affect the future of the reform process.

- Morocco achieved political stability and was shielded from social and political unrest that could devastate the economy, security, and the country’s image overseas.

- The manner by which the Islamists came into government was smooth and brought them into direct contact with all the state institutions, especially the army and security forces, so as to change the negative stereotypes used to depict them.

- Good relationships created links with the economic lobbies, capitalists, and business leaders with important economic roles.
• Benkirane evolved in the direction of political realism by recognizing the country’s situation, learning the real balance of forces, and realistically managing the most significant problems. By doing so, he avoided any rashness that could expose the political project and lead to frustration and disappointments. This vision was derived from Benkirane’s experience during the Chabiba Islamiya era, his separation from the movement, and the effects on the political integration of his current.

As for the government’s legislative productivity during the ninth legislative term, 2011-2016, the government filed 389 government draft laws. A total of 359 laws were ratified during this term (so a rate of 92 percent out of the bills submitted), out of which 284 were to establish laws and 75 of which were to amend laws.

As for legislative initiatives (draft bills proposed by Parliament), parliamentary groups and bodies filed 185 draft laws, and 20 were adopted, or 11 percent. This can be understood as a continuation of the government’s monopoly on legislative activity and its efforts to implement its legislative agenda at the expense of parliamentary activity, in spite of the existence of a constitutional framework supporting legislative initiatives.

Regulatory laws had a strong presence in legislative production (approximately 23 regulatory laws), in addition to Article 86, which mandated that the government refer regulatory draft laws before the end of the ninth legislative term.

Some 166 agreements were signed. This is a large number, reflecting Morocco’s policy of returning to the African Union, the tour of Africa that King Mohammed VI conducted, and the conclusion of dozens of partnerships with several African countries.

The most significant challenges facing the first Justice and Development government, as well as the current government led by Saadedine Othmani, remain:
1. Democratically implementing the Constitution and managing the transitional stage.

2. Smoothly managing the relationship between the government and the monarchy and maintaining enduring consensus on contentious issues.

3. Managing politics within the framework of government responsibility.

4. Maintaining political and social stability in the face of escalating protests, such as Hirak Rif and Hirak Jerada.

5. Establishing a foreign policy that results in growth, development, reducing dependency, and achieving independence.
The Arab Spring was an inflection point, and its reversal was a milestone in the intellectual and cultural transformation of a significant cross-section of young people in what is known as political Islam. Their convictions shifted, and they formed new notions of the relationship between religion and politics and everything related to the concept of the civil state, its visions, and its understanding of democracy and human rights. This means that there is a certain transformation in visions, thinking, and notions that could represent a certain break with the traditional perceptions of political Islam for those individuals, and their political and cultural visions for life.

In this study, we will try to further our knowledge of these transformations, the extent of those young people’s confidence in such transformations, and how the changes have affected their lives and ideas during this stage. We will also ask whether it really was a turning point for them in their vision of everything around them due to the major developments and repercussions that followed the Arab Spring revolutions, which caused a major shakeup in those young people’s assumptions and political concepts.

On the other hand, it may not mean that this transformation became a widespread phenomenon so much as it means that there was transformation for a select group of young people in Islamist movements – perhaps only the very elite – due to the nature of their upbringing and of the complexity of the entanglement between religion and politics, which is latent in the approaches and incubators of Islamist movements. This is of course in addition to the organizational stagnation and the absence of democratic fluidity and transparency in sorting the leadership and rank-and-file in the Islamist movement.
Nevertheless, the indicators of transformation among elite youth in the Islamist movement and its sympathizers are still a phenomenon that deserves study, consideration, and reading in order to produce a clearer picture of the nature and results of this transformation and whether it represents a broad trend and a certain conviction or is more of an elitist media phenomenon confined to narrow segments of the educated elite, not crossing over to other segments of society and the broad rank-and-file of Islamist currents.

**Preliminary Overview**

The case of Islamism in Yemen is somewhat politically advanced, compared to its Islamist counterparts elsewhere, in regard to its political vision and its notions of the state, although most of that stems from lacking a clear vision of the world and trends. This is in the framework of Islamism’s situation as a whole, especially the strain of Islamism that is culturally linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, the most present and organized of the movements in the Muslim world and indeed the movement that reconnected politics with da’wah and religion more clearly than other Islamist movements.

Even so, the Islamist movement in Yemen continues to be politically and culturally specific, springing from the core of Yemen’s problems and complexities, given how pervasive the grip of Yemeni identity has been through many stages of history. This prompted Yemen to stay perpetually outside the map of Arab political consensus, from the first Rashidun Caliphate to the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates and up to the Ottoman Empire. Yemen was always outside the box of seclusion with projects coming from outside of its geographical region, despite being a theater of conflict for these projects.

From this starting point, the Yemeni reform movement, as it is called in Yemen, made early reform attempts relating to the state, da’wah, the constitution, and politics generally. Central to these attempts was the so-called constitutional revolution of 1948, during which the reform movement called for the first constitution in the entire Arabian
Peninsula, i.e. the first reformist vision of the idea of the state, constitution, rights, and freedoms.

But this reformist path later shrank and declined in the reform movement’s literature and significantly regressed at all cultural, intellectual, and political levels due to cross-pollination between the Yemeni reform movement and other Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups like the Wahhabis, due to many youth from the Yemeni movement studying in universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere.

In the political imagination of the Yemeni reform movement, this regression occurred in the framework of the general evolution of ideas and concepts in the Arab and Muslim world. That is to say, Islamist movements were absorbing a clear general idea of the political concept by which the Brotherhood operated throughout the Muslim world, namely the idea of politically pursuing Muslim empowerment and a restoration of the caliphate through Islamists ascending to power and governance through democratic means.

But this sort of conceptual context was also shrouded in considerable ambiguity regarding the Islamists’ faith in democracy generally as a set of complementary and overlapping values, such as rights, duties, and systems. Democracy is not merely as an electoral procedure confined to the practice of elections, but rather an integrated system of human rights leading to acceptance of the idea of multiculturalism in a single society.

First Democratic Transition

On the morning of 22 May 1990, the Republic of Yemen’s existence was declared, the union of North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen). It was a step in drafting the first pluralist democratic constitution in Yemen, and the Islamist movement’s Brotherhood cultural dimension was present in force as a proselytizing and education movement rooted in Yemeni society.
The new Yemeni constitution provided for democratic and cultural pluralism, along with electoral mechanisms for political transition. This obliged the Islamist movement to adapt to this new landscape with its mechanisms and ideas, leading the Islamist movement to engage seriously and politically with this new orientation. The Islamists embarked on a series of reconsiderations of their political notions, initiating the first steps toward reexamination by announcing the establishment of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah) as a political party reflecting the Islamist movement and its new orientation.

This step is considered a major transformation in the Yemeni reform movement’s literature and mentality. During the transformation, a major intellectual, cultural, and religious controversy arose in the Islamist movement’s attitude toward democracy, pluralism, and elections. This controversy was resolved in favor of the modernizing current in the movement, which adopts the idea of democratic, political, and cultural transformation at the heart of the movement’s vision, mentality, and political outlook in general. At the time, this new orientation was considered a major intellectual shift at the heart of the Islamist movement’s view of many political and cultural issues.

However, points of contention that were difficult to resolve at the time persisted, such as women’s right to vote and stand for election. Although the issue was later decided in favor of women’s rights, the obstruction originated in customs and traditions, not religious opinions at the time. Otherwise, the Islamist controversy over the constitution and the source of legislation was resolved, and all of this was a genuine transformation at the heart of the idea of “political Islam” as per the Western characterization of the Islamist phenomenon.

The political vision, however, remained very foggy, especially with regard to the relationship between the sacred and the secular, the religious and the political. Nevertheless, it seemed apparent that they had bypassed this grey zone in separating the two by taking on clear party status, by announcing the establishment of Al-Islah as the political umbrella for their activities and movements.
Yemen passed through several parliamentary and presidential electoral milestones, but the first was the most democratic and transparent, due to the political balance among political forces. This allowed the Islamists to emerge from the elections very successful, obtaining 56 of the 301 seats to finish in second as an ascendant political force.

The political and democratic process regressed in the April 1997 elections following the political rebalancing due to the war in the summer of 1994. The democratic margin retreated, and in the wake of the elections the reform Islamists left the government coalition but did not proceed straight to the opposition, instead remaining semi-neutral between the ruling authority and the opposition. They were not among those who joined the opposition. This stance was the result of the haziness and confusion between the religious and political concepts of politics itself, meaning that their opposition would have been a departure from “obedience to the ruler” in terms of the Salafi concept of opposition.

Islamism in Yemen is divided among three main currents: the reformist with its Brotherhood background, the Salafi, and the political Zaidiyyah current. Each has a governing idea and a system of concepts and visions governing its orientation. The reformist current is the most dynamic and deeply rooted in the Yemeni landscape, while the Salafi current is quickly transforming and is an extension of the Salafi idea. The Zaidiyyah current was the first with politicized sectarian ideas in the Yemeni case.

Reformist Transformations

The reformist case has been the most evident expression of Islamism in Yemen in the two decades since Yemen’s unification was declared in May 1990 and has had the biggest presence in the Yemeni party landscape, being an Islamist current that has combined religious and political approaches since it was first established.

The reformist current has been the clearest expression of activism with a Brotherhood-inspired approach to culture and da’wah. Since its
earliest beginnings, this movement has faced an intellectual and cultural controversy between two clear orientations: the organizational and da’wah orientation, and the cultural and political orientation.

The former has the larger presence and is more widespread, in contrast to the latter, which is civil and elitist and also does not hide its media and cultural presence as a prominent political and media face of reformism. The visibility of the current’s intellectuals and civil and political activists has contributed to the formation of a more dynamic and effective Yemeni political landscape. They served as the first battalion in the 11 February 2011 protests, which were a natural extension of protests in the Arab Spring capitals in Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli, and Damascus.

Due to this civil orientation within the reformist current, with its “liberal” tendencies and its political and intellectual maturity, the outlines of new thinking appeared there. Although limited to elites, it represents a progressive model in its vision and concept for politics, the state, society, pluralism, human rights, and all of modernism’s concepts. They are all considered progressive views relative to the conventional sense of these issues in reformism’s traditional mentality linking religion and politics.

Thus, the climate of the 11 February revolt was the most important outlet for these new ideas at the heart of the reform movement, and they were clearly expressed in the overwhelming popular protests, led by a selection of new reform figureheads. The most significant event in this transformation was activist Tawakkol Abdel-Salam Karman, a member of the reform Shura Council, winning the Nobel Peace Prize as one of the most important symbols of the Arab Spring. With enormous effectiveness, she had contributed to the Arab Spring since its first moments and even before the winds of the Arab Spring began to blow, by engaging in human rights and civil activism in Yemen since a young age.

In addition to Tawakkol Karman, there were three human rights and political activists who emerged or came onto the political, human right, and civil scene through the reform current’s activities among the unions and students in universities, schools, and elsewhere. This made
them the most prominent and present voice during the 11 February revolt, and they became the leaders in the ranks of this peaceful, civil revolution.

The landscape remains most reflective of the ideas and contours of the “new reform,” which in its proposal of visions and ideas is very close to the concept of post-Islamism, in the critical sense of the concept. In the case of the “new reformers” in Taiz Governorate and southern Yemen, several people belonging to the reform current have emerged in various artistic, cultural, religious, and intellectual spheres. They have formed an intellectual and media current, with the ideas published in Al Gomhoriah newspaper\textsuperscript{163} as a clear platform for them and their ideas. Most of them belong to Al-Islah.

The pre-11 February revolt moment was a phase of the intellectual and cultural controversy between conservative and progressive reform orientations about various issues and ideas. The main questions under debate were the women’s quota, underage marriage for girls, the authority of Prophetic traditions (hadith), personal and public freedoms in Muslim society, issues of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong, and other issues related to private and public rights and freedoms.

This new reformist trend faced a more conservative and hardline trend. The two trends dove into a heated intellectual and cultural battle via mosque pulpits, newspapers, and social media, each side presenting its opinion and marshaling its supporters and the surrounding society. The strange thing is that neither trend, the conservative or the progressive, had any effect or presence in Al-Islah’s institutions and organizational structures.

The progressive trend, however, was the tip of the spear in the 11 February peaceful revolt, which pushed it to center stage, in addition to

\textsuperscript{163} The ideas supplement was a weekly intellectual supplement put out every Thursday by Al Gomhoriah, the daily newspaper published by the Gomhoriah Press Foundation. The journalist Mohammad Lutfi supervised the supplement, preceded in that role by the journalist and academic researcher Mujib Al-Humaidi. The supplement was a constant arena of controversy between the conservative and liberal branches of reformism.
its international presence in international and regional venues. Unfortunately, this trend is still absent as an organizational or institutional player, despite its potential and experience from its intellectuals, activists, and artists, in contrast to the other, more organized and interconnected trend.

The conversation here still revolves around this trend’s ideas and notions in relation to its vision of the state, religion, society, rights, and freedoms. These visions and notions do not, however, signify a complete break with the reform current so much as a natural shift at the heart of the reform current that gives voice to a significant segment of the current’s young people.

These ideas that have become a clear topic of conversation in elite reform circles include the civil state, citizenship, rights and freedoms, the party’s platform rather than ideologies, and absolute faith in civil and political rights and the freedom of thought and expression. These convictions have been further entrenched for this trend by the major setback that disrupted the march of democratic change and transition, namely the 21 September 2014 coup by a sectarian group that claims a divine right to governance and knowledge. The coup consolidated the new reform’s values of political modernization and renewal such that they became fully convinced of the importance of separating religion and politics in parties, confining parties to their visions of policy and their platforms, and prohibiting the establishment of parties on a religious or sectarian basis.

**Transformations of the Salafi Current**

Like the reform current, the Salafi movement also experienced profound and substantial cultural transformations, namely the discarding of many of its traditional arguments regarding democracy, pluralism, elections, the Constitution, and other issues related to the state and society. We can say that the eve of the 11 February revolt – like the declaration of Yemen’s unification and the declaration of pluralism for the reformers in their changes and reconsiderations regarding democracy, elections, and pluralism – was a new stage and a major inflection point for the Salafi movement.
Following the 11 February 2011 revolt, there was a profound transformation in the Salafists’ vision, and three Salafi political parties emerged on the Yemeni political stage: the Al-Nahda Movement in southern Yemen, the Al-Rashad Union, and the Peace and Development Party, all of which have clear Salafi backgrounds and references.

This transformation in the Salafi current, which is officially banned from politics and politicization, is also an aspect of the changes in Yemeni Islamism in its various orientations. The transformation in Islamists’ structure, concept, and vision of the state and the relationship of politics to religion is an aspect of the changes that followed the Arab Spring, which changed many concepts and assumptions that were uncontroversial to these groups before the Arab Spring revolt caused an earthquake in their ideas and premises.

It is notable in these Salafi parties’ foundational literature that they proposed politically progressive ideas, especially the Salafi Al-Nahda and Al-Rashad movements, regarding their view of the state and Yemeni political issues, in a major departure from other national parties, such as the Nasserists, socialists, reformist, and GPC-supporters. This means these newly founded parties started in their approach to politics from a practical, utilitarian, pragmatic perspective, not an ideological one as other parties did.

None of these transformations in visions and notions would have happened if not for the winds of democratic revolutionary change, which prompted these groups to get involved in the political and democratic scene, abandon their isolation for community politics, and integrate. This in itself is a transformation worth considering, studying, and encouragement for these groups that are trying to renew their visions and intellec-

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164 The Salafi current has long prohibited democracy and political work. Like their bitter enemies the Sufis, they adopt the saying, “It is policy to leave politics.” This saying explains the MurjiteSalafist tendency that prevails within a broad segment of Salafism and later fragmented into various orientations and currents, most of which prohibit political work under the pretext that it constitutes contesting a ruler’s right to obedience.
tual concepts. This necessarily occurs within the transformations of “post-Islamism.”

What the counter-revolutionary forces did after that constituted a grave reversal that worked to undermine this transformative path for Salafi groups. It pushed a number of their supporters towards joining extremist groups, such as Al-Qaida and the Islamic State, a path that people resort to when prospects for change and choices are closed to them. The counter-revolutions, which the West has supported or been silent about, have worked to throw political transformations far off course, toward the options of barbarism and extremism that benefit radical groups and are used by intelligence services.

These Salafi groups are closest in their beliefs and concepts to jihadi Salafism, which have increased their activities and become more attractive to a broad segment of Arab Spring youth, who have lost the ability to continue their peaceful, civil struggle in the face of the counter-revolution’s tanks and military coups. Previously the jihadi Salafists had been on the brink of withdrawing, disappearing, and transforming in the face of the peaceful, civil outbreak of the Arab Spring.

**Political Zaidism and its Transformations**

Political Zaidism in Yemen is part of the Shiite Islamist current, but it is the most violent among all of the political groups that are its counterparts, Sunni and Shiite alike, given its more violent heritage and present. The movement has not, however, been studied and classified by the international community in the same way as its Sunni counterparts, such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others. This is because of considerations that do not relate so much to methodology and vision as to the political usefulness of these groups in the game of balances and sectarian and ethnic minorities that Western strategies employ in the Arab world.

With the start of the 1990s, the declaration of Yemeni unification, and the unified state’s constitution opting for pluralist democracy, Zaidi groups moved to found several parties after a major controversy among
Zaidi political authorities around the imamate, which is a central governing idea in Zaidi doctrine. It is a purely political idea that says, as in Zaidi texts, that governance and knowledge pass through and are limited to a specific line of descent, which is what they mean by “Al al-Bayt” or what Yemenis call the Hashemite “sadah,” who are the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Zaidism’s political thinking revolves around the theory of a divine right to govern that is limited, per the jurisprudence of the Zaidi, to those called the “batnayn” (descendants of either Hassan or Hussein).

Returning to the period of the political pluralism that the Yemeni Constitution adopted, a number of Zaidi authorities at the time agreed on an idea that the imamate is a historical matter that no longer exists. They handed down legal opinions to that effect and signed a document that was not accepted by a number of their authorities, namely the Saada Zaidi wing.

The Zaidi parties that were founded following Yemen’s unification embarked on the path of democracy but did not succeed democratically because they had no electoral popularity. The parties failed and did not benefit from the Party of Truth, to which the founder of the Houthi establishment belonged at the time, who won two elections from Saada Governorate as a representative in the Yemeni Parliament at the time.

In parallel with these parties, an armed, ideological, activist Zaidi current emerged. It was called the Believing Youth at the time, and it later became the Houthi group following the outbreak of the Houthis’ war with the Yemeni state in September 2004. The Houthi establishment’s founder, Hussein BadrEddin al-Houthi, was killed during that war.

The Houthis joined the 11 February peaceful revolt, and their young members got involved. But this involvement ended in the coup d’état over the transitional stage and over the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, which the Houthi group had joined, signing all articles of the outcomes document.
More seriously, there was a class of intellectuals and academics affiliated by denomination to political Zaidism, who were distributed among Yemeni parties and currents and today have turned back to the Houthi group.

Conclusion

It is too early to judge the phenomenon of “post-Islamism” in the Yemeni case in the same way as other countries of the Arab and Muslim world. There are still individual attempts and islands separated from one another that cannot be judged as a fully developed case.

The transformations in the Islamist landscape have an elite character, limited to a group of young elites who were at the forefront of the Arab Spring revolutions and have an Islamist background. Through their experience of political action in the post-Arab Spring scene, they have seen the results and dangers of the coup against the democratic path.

Furthermore, Islamic references are still the framework that governs many social and political movements. This is a consistent choice and path that cannot change in an environment that bases its culture and behavior on a governing authority for ideas and behavior. This is apart from the spiritual, cultural and intellectual energy that Islam represents for these societies, as well as the enormous revolutionary energy inherent in Islam, such as values rejecting injustice, despotism, and priesthood.

Perhaps this path is what the French thinker and expert on Islamist movements François Burgat clearly expressed in his most famous book, *Islamism in the Maghreb: The Voice of the South*, or in a number of his contributions on political Islam. Burgat said that this phenomenon cannot fail or end, and he attributed its persistence to three related factors. First: Political and social causes that led to the rise of Islamism in the first place. Second: The ability of Islamism’s rhetoric around modernity to mobilize its audience with self-generated, internal terminology. Third: The manipulation pursued by various regimes regarding the Islamist threat.165

That was what our colleague Hussam Tammam really feared in talking about the failure of an idea and the absolutism of the concept of post-Islamism, given all the factors that we mentioned. This means that the phenomenon of post-Islamism is being marshaled in a political context and amid agendas that are no more research- or methodology-based than they are accurate and deep academic studies.
Post - Islamism
CHAPTER 3

Various Models:
Indonesia, Iran, and Iraq
Post - Islamism
STUDY 1

“Post-Islamism” in Indonesia after the Jakarta Elections

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

Introduction

On Friday, 2 December 2016, around 750,000 to 800,000 Muslim protestors took to the streets of Jakarta demanding the arrest of the then Christian-Chinese Jakarta Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (widely known by his Chinese name, “Ahok”). The largest in a series of protests since October 2016 – and cleverly labeled “Defending Islam Acts” (aksi bela Islam) – the crowd accused Ahok of blasphemy, alleging that a speech he made in September 2016 had insulted Islam. Most observers believe, however, that he never made such statements.166 These protests were led by the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam [FPI]), a far-right Sunni political group associated with violent gangs. As the result of this protest, Ahok saw his polling numbers drop significantly, even though he was running as a popular incumbent for re-election. Conversely, the hardline and militant Muslim groups that mobilized the protest enjoyed a new share of the public spotlight. The rest is history. Despite a 74% approval rating as Jakarta Governor in December 2016, Ahok lost the election held in April 2017. More tragic, however, was his subsequent prosecution for blasphemy and two-year jail sentence, a heavier sentence than the prosecutor requested.

166 As the Jakarta Vice Governor, Ahok became the Jakarta Governor in 2014 after replacing his former boss, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who won the presidential election that year and is the current President of Indonesia. Early in the campaign, Ahok gave a speech in which he asked voters not to listen to those who used a particular verse from the Koran (Surat al-Ma’idah 51), which argues that Muslims should not vote for Christians. Hardline Islamists, who had attacked Ahok for his race and religion since he became governor in 2014, edited the speech to make it sound as if he was criticizing the Koran. The edited video, which was disseminated widely on social media, succeeded in fomenting the desired anger and protest.
These events have triggered heated debates, not only among Indonesians, but also among scholars studying Islam and democracy in Indonesia. Was the protest a strong indication of heightened conservatism among Indonesian Muslims? Did these groups such as the FPI represent genuine sentiments among the Muslims, or were they merely pawns used by national political actors to damage Ahok, a Christian of Chinese origin? Did the events indicate a considerable shift in the religious, social and political attitudes of the generally moderate Muslims in Indonesia? Or, were they the result of a rare confluence of political dynamics that will have no impact in the years to come?

With these questions in mind, it is no wonder that the international media paid close attention to this gubernatorial race. Make no mistake, this election was about the future of Jakarta. Not only is it the capital city of the third-largest democracy in the world, but it is also that of the nation with the largest concentration of Muslims. After the election, the London-based *Economist* warned that “[t]he governor’s race has given unscrupulous politicians a simple blueprint for winning office: stir up religious fervor by decrying real or invented insults to Islam” (20 April 2017). Meanwhile, the *New York Times* ran a similar story and warning entitled “Indonesia Governor’s Loss Shows Increasing Power of Islamists” (6 May 2017). Closer to home, the *Australian* quoted Marcus Mietzner, an expert from Australian National University and a prominent Indonesianist, who correctly said that “the Jakarta [election] result reflects the growing power of those once-marginal Islamist groups to swing elections in Indonesia” (21 April 2017). All of them have implied that Ahok’s defeat has reinforced the sense that Indonesian democracy is being overwhelmed by intolerant strains of Islamic politics.

This essay on “post-Islamism” in contemporary Indonesia will be structured around these events. As defined most popularly by Asef Bayat, post-Islamism is the “conscious attempt to strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains.” While post-Islamism represents “an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty,” its advent “does not
necessarily mean the historical end of Islamism. What it means is the birth, out of the Islamist experience, of a qualitatively different discourse and practice” (2005: 5). Evaluating whether Bayat’s thesis fits the Indonesian context, Noorhaidi Hasan wrote in his 2013 article entitled “Post-Islamist Politics in Indonesia”:

“There is reason to believe that Indonesia today is in the throes of a post-Islamist path. A sort of synthesis between the call for Islam’s importance for public life and democracy, post-Islamism has emerged to be an alternative to Islamist radicalism” (2013: 157; italics added).

Although one may generally agree with Hasan’s remarks, his conclusion is nevertheless too simplistic and his observations less attentive to the dynamics of the country’s democratization process. One need not look any further than the recent election in Jakarta for strong evidence of what this paper suggests. Despite the fact that Indonesian democracy has, as Hasan correctly states, a “moderating effect,” this essay will show that the process itself provides avenues for both freedom and extremism. This occurs when politicians – in tandem with some Islamists – exploit some of democracy’s gray areas to achieve their undemocratic goals, thereby contradicting Bayat’s prognosis. This was made even more possible by two new factors that appeared in force during the events surrounding the Jakarta election: the rising tide of Islamic populism in the country, which follows the same pattern worldwide; and the development of hate spin as a political strategy to curb the influence of one’s opponents.

Following Anderson’s famous definition of the nation as “an imagined political community” (1991: 5), this paper will posit Indonesian nationalism as an everlasting project by which the Indonesian citizens, as a pluralistic community in various forms, attempt to expand their sense

167 More recently, Bayat concludes that post-Islamism: “[w]ants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom (albeit at varying degrees), with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have termed an ‘alternative modernity.’ Post-Islamism is expressed in acknowledging secular exigencies, in freedom from rigidity, in breaking down the monopoly of religious truth. … Whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights. Yet, while it favors a civil and nonreligious state, it accords an active role for religion in the public sphere” (2013: 8).
of “deep [and] horizontal comradeship” (1991: 7). From this perspective, although the Islamists’ recent victory in Jakarta election is significant, it constitutes only another deviation in the long history of mostly healthy relationship between Indonesia as a nation and Islam as a religion embraced by the majority of its citizens. This history began during the struggle against Dutch and Japanese colonialism, carried out in large part by Muslims in the archipelago. Their struggle was reinforced by their support for the newly-proclaimed Indonesia in 1945. Likewise, the tolerant, “smiling face” of Islam played a significant part in sustaining the new nation throughout most of independent Indonesia’s history. In contrast to this general trend, Ahok’s case in the Jakarta election signifies what appeared to be a paradox: that the exclusionary socio-political expressions by some Muslim actors have grown stronger, even at a time when the country’s political system has become more democratic since Suharto’s collapse in 1998.

This paper will delve into this argument further in the last three sections by referring to both Bayat’s and Hasan’s aforementioned observations. Before all of that, however, it is necessary to explain the weak roots of Islamism in Indonesia.

The Legacy of “Smiling Islam”: the Weak Roots of Islamism in Indonesia

As Bayat defines it, Islamism “refer[s] to those ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an ‘Islamic order’ – a religious state, Shari’alaw, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities.” He specifies that “association with the state is a key feature of Islamist politics…The primary concern of Islamism is to forge an ideological community; concerns such as establishing social justice and improving the lives of the poor are to follow only from this strategic objective” (2013: 4).

While some expressions of this kind of Islamism have existed and made inroads throughout Indonesian history, its roots in the country are relatively weak. Without going too deep into the matter, there are many
reasons why Indonesia’s model as a nation and state is essentially secular and pluralistic.

When the country achieved its independence in 1945, Indonesia was not only one of the largest archipelagos, but also one of the most populous and multi-ethnic/religious countries in the world. Given these facts, it is no wonder Indonesians proudly adhere to its country’s motto: “Unity in Diversity” (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). As the nation regained its democracy in 1998 after more than three decades of dictatorship, Indonesians are also proud of being the third-largest democracy in the world. This came despite some scholarly notions in 1998 and 1999 that Indonesia could possibly “break up” (Booth, 1999; Emmerson, 2000) following the same pattern of transition from authoritarianism in other countries, such as in the former Yugoslavia.

Indonesia is also now the largest Muslim democracy in the world. One crucial aspect of this is that although 87% of Indonesia’s 260 million people are Muslims, the country is not ideologically an “Islamic State” like Iran, Saudi Arabia or Sudan. Rather, Indonesia is a state based on a national ideology called “Pancasila” (Five Principles): belief in the One Supreme God; just and civilized humanism; Indonesian unity; democracy; and social justice.

Indonesian Muslims should be credited for this achievement. Both Sukarno and Hatta, the first President and Vice-President who jointly proclaimed Indonesia’s independence, were themselves Muslims. However, in spite of strong pressure from several Islamist (according to Bayat’s definition) Muslim leaders and politicians before independence to establish Islam as the basis of the state, they were confident in their initial commitment that the country should not be based on any particular religious ideology due to its divisive potential. Perhaps more importantly, the two founding fathers were able to convince other Muslim leaders to accept and support this commitment (Ramage, 1995). 168 It is also for this

168 Recalling this crucial moment, in his Memoir, Hatta said, “If a serious problem, and a problem that could endanger the national unity, can be resolved in a small discussion that took place for only about 15 minutes, it meant that those leaders really prioritized the national unity and its future fate” (quoted in Ali-Fauzi, 2002: 106).
reason that Alamsjah Ratuprawiranegara, former Minister for Religious Affairs, once claimed that Pancasila is a Muslim’s “gift” to the nation in general (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 79).

This does not mean that the more exclusionary and militant forms of Islamism have never existed in the country’s history. In this regard, Islam became “the umbrella for security” for different kinds of opposition to colonialism, authoritarianism, and, later, military rule (Utrecht, 1978, 416). These incidents shall be briefly described below.

During the War of Independence (1945-1949), many Islamic movements resisted the return of the Dutch. The Nahdhat al Ulama (b. 1926), the largest Muslim mass organization in the country, and which the Dutch labeled as “extremists,” had called the Muslims to wage *jihad* against the return of the Dutch (Bush, 2009). Later, under the Sukarno presidency, several resistant movements in Sumatra, Java, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan joined the Islamic State of Indonesia/The Islamic Army of Indonesia (Darul Islam Indonesia/Tentara Islam Indonesia, or the DII/TII). The main issues here were autonomy for the regions, implementation of Islamic law, as well as protests against Sukarno’s authoritarianism. Although not all Islamic organizations supported the DII/TII rebellion, many shared their aspiration with regard to implementing Islamic law (van Dijk, 1981).

Meanwhile, under Suharto’s presidency, several developments (especially the limited space for political participation, exclusionary policies, and repression) encouraged the use of Islam as fuel for protests, not only for the *santri*, or pious Muslims, but also for nationalist *abangans*, or nominal Muslims, dissidents in the military, and even communists. For example, both Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, later associated with the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda, started their careers as opposition figures in early 1980s, when the New Order imposed Pancasila as the sole basis for Indonesia (ICG, 2005).

Given this background, Indonesia had been widely known as a multireligious country with a strong tradition of religious tolerance and
pluralism. In particular, two Islamic mass organizations, Nahdhat al Ulama and the Muhammadiyah (b. 1914), the largest such organization in the world, have been not only the backbone of tolerant Islamic expression, but also of peaceful coexistence between pluralistic communities. Hence, Indonesian Islam was also known as “Islam ramah” (smiling Islam) as opposed to “Islam marah” (angry Islam).

Other Forms of Post-Islamism in Indonesia after the “Reformasi”?

This reputation of Indonesia’s “Smiling Islam” has changed, however, in the last twenty years or so following the country’s democratization, commonly known as the “Reformasi” (Reform) era. During this era, multiple parts of the archipelago witnessed Indonesian Islamists inciting some forms of religious extremism.

It started with the incidents of communal violence between Muslims and Christians, such as those which took place in Ambon, North Maluku, and Poso in Central Sulawesi, wherein more than three thousand people died. Although these violent conflicts remarkably declined around ten years ago, one can still see their legacies: populations segregated along religious lines; remaining suspicions among different religious communities; etc. It is worth noting that Poso has been a safe haven and hotbed for the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s best-organized terrorist group, over the past fifteen years. It was from this remote location that Santoso, a former JI recruit who later led the East Indonesia Mujahidin (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur [MIT]), pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS) in a viral video on YouTube. He later was shot and killed in a gunfight in July 2016 (New York Times, 23 July 2016; see also IPAC, 2017b).

Moreover, reports by human rights groups show the rise of another form of inter-religious conflict, especially over places of worship in many parts of the country. This happened not only against the construction of churches in the majority Muslim areas, but also the other way around. Sadly, the “snowball effect” occurred in this case: people re-
ceived misinformation from other people, which then engendered venge-
ful sentiments. When conducting fieldwork for “Policing Religious Con-
licts in Indonesia” (Panggabean & Ali-Fauzi, 2015), one respondent, a
Christian in Ende (Timor Island), was reported as saying, “We learned
from the television that you (Muslim) did that against our churches in
Jakarta and Bogor. And if you could do that against ours, why do you
think we couldn’t do the same thing against your mosques here?”

Another expression of “angry Islam” is intolerant, even violent,
acts of discrimination against religious minority groups, such as the
Ahmadis and the Shias, or against sectarian “cults” or indigenous belief sys-
tems, such as SundaWiwitan in West Java. These violent acts have their
own precedents in the country’s history, but these present expressions are
even more deadly (for example, the killing of three Ahmadis in West Ja-
va and one Shia in Sampang, East Java). Most of these violent acts
started with hate spin and the mobilization of Muslim hatred. The most
notorious example was made by SobriLubis, the Secretary General of the
aforementioned FPI. During a religious meeting in 2008 in West Java, he
and others called for the killing of the Ahmadis (Panggabean & Ali-
Fauzi, 2015).

Because of these recurring incidents of violence in the name of Is-
lam, some observers have begun asking if Indonesian Muslims began
“hopping on the bandwagon” of violent, international Muslim groups that
employ a violent repertoire to achieve their goals (Bubalo&Fealy, 2005).
Meanwhile, one long-time observer of Islam and politics in Indonesia
began asking if the present moment represents a “conservative turn” in
Indonesian Islam (van Bruinessen, 2013).

In his evaluation of the post-Islamism thesis in Indonesia, Hasan
seems to underestimate these violent tactics used by many Islamists dur-
ing the Reformasi era. In some places, he even appeared to be overly op-
timistic, such as in his reading of Abu BakarBa’asyir. Hasan said, “On
many occasions Ba’asyir himself promoted nonviolent endeavors to de-
fend Muslim solidarity and struggle for the application of the Shari’a. He
now claimed that violence gives Islam itself a bad image” (2013: 165).
However, it is now well known that this same Ba’asyir swore his allegiance to ISIS in July 2014 (IPAC, 2016).

**The Paradox of Indonesia’s Democracy: Peaceful and Violent Islamists**

The aforementioned expressions of “angry Islam” can be seen as challenges that the Islamist pose to Indonesia’s young, yet consolidating democracy. For the purposes of this paper, the term “Islamist” means Muslim individuals or groups who believe that there is a guiding political doctrine in Islam that justifies and motivates collective action on behalf of that doctrine. Islamists believe that Islam is a complete system of belief that regulates not only matters of worship (ibadat) but also social relations (mu’amalat).

While not necessarily rejecting Bayat’s definition of Islamism, this paper wishes to contrast the Indonesian Islamists with the group of Muslims known commonly as “abangan,” or nominal Muslims. Contrary to the first group, these nominal Indonesian Muslims – sometimes also called liberal, progressive, reformist, or even secular Muslims – believe that being a Muslim is a personal matter with no necessary societal or political implications. In this context, Geertz (1960) and Hefner (1985) have designated some of Indonesia’s political leaders, such as Sukarno and Suharto, as “abangan Muslims.”

The generic term “Muslim” here refers to both groups of Muslim believers. This is a general practice in Indonesia, as all citizens must list their religion on their identity cards. The distinction between Islamists and nominal Muslims is not based on their religiosity or piety, but rather on their stances towards the relationship between Islam (as a religion) and Indonesia (as a state). This paper hesitates in using terms such as “moderate” and “radical,” because they do not reveal much about one’s actions. As such, democracy, including its imperative to uphold the principle of the rule of law, should be concerned more with action rather than behavior or thinking.
In any discussion about Islam and democracy in Indonesia, it is imperative to further distinguish Islamists into non-violent and violent categories. Once again, the emphasis is on individual actions. Although they share the belief that Islam demands Muslims to be socially and politically active, the Islamist part ways on how to perform this religious obligation. In this context, “non-violent Islamists” refers to those individuals and groups who condemn the use of violence to Islamize society and politics. Rather, they seek to achieve their goals by working through formal institutions or civic associations. By contrast, “violent Islamists” reject accommodation with the state regime, refuse to participate in its institutions, and insist on the necessity of violent means to Islamize society and politics. In his observation on post-Islamism in Indonesia, it seems that Hasan – and later Bayat – concerned himself more with the first and underestimated the second.

The self-proclaimed “jihadists,” such as Santoso, whom this paper prefers to call “terrorists,” are violent Islamist par excellence. Although smaller in number than they were ten to fifteen years ago, they still pose a serious challenge to Indonesian democracy. In December 2016, these pro-ISIS groups were able to successfully approach and recruit Dian Yulia Novi to become the first ever female suicide bomber in Indonesia. Fortunately, the Indonesian police discovered her whereabouts and imprisoned her (see IPAC, 2017a).

On the other end of the spectrum, peaceful Islamists, i.e. those working through democratic institutions, such as general elections – are mostly unsuccessful, as Hasan has correctly suggested (2013). To quantitatively corroborate Hasan’s observation, in the last four free and fair general elections during the Reformasi Era, the four biggest Indonesian Islamist parties only collected between 24% and 33% of total votes: 31.8% (1999), 33.3% (2004), 24.1% (2009), and 30.3% (2014). This strongly suggests that the major division within Indonesian politics is not religion (between Muslims and non-Muslims), but the multivocality of Islam (between one Muslim group against another). For this reason, Liddle and Mujani (2009) argued that Indonesia’s democracy has now become more secular.
Democracy’s Gray Areas: When Islamist Rhetoric is Useful

The evidence discussed above suggests that the ideal, smiling Islam, is clearly losing ground. However, it also suggests that it has been making a comeback in the last few years. But the more challenging battle, the one that involves higher risks for the future, is taking place in what the paper calls “democracy’s gray areas.” These are the areas where legal democratic institutions or regulations are manipulated by politicians, who are not necessarily sincere Muslims, to play the “Islamic card” and strengthen their Islamic credentials.

One such democratic institution is regional regulation, which came out after the national agreement on decentralization in 2002. With reference to Hasan’s essay, Bayat writes that “Indonesian decentralization policies facilitated the integration of militant Islamists into the political structure, where they managed to put into practice some tenets of Islamic laws at the local level after winning local elections” (2013: 12-13). While this may be the case in some regions, the more complete figures from across the country suggest a more dynamic and complex development. Scholars have long noted, for example, that politicians from secular and nationalist parties, such as Functional Groups (GolonganKarya, or Golkar) and Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PartaiDemokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P), often supported or even initiated the aforementioned local Shari’a regulations (Bush 2008; Buehler 2016). This begs the question of who is co-opting whom in this case: the Islamists or their “rivals” (or, are they really rivals?).

Another facet of democracy severely manipulated by politicians is the freedom of speech and protest, which leads back to Ahok’s case. Here is not the place to rehash the case in detail, as there are some excellent analyses already available (see Fealy, 2016; Wilson, 2017; Mietzner&Muhtadi, 2017). Moreover, the case has been elsewhere labeled as “mobocracy,” a situation where the law is determined by the size of the crowd involved in the protest (Ali-Fauzi, 2016). However, it is safe to say that instead of bringing more inclusionary effects, the right to protest and freedom of expression exercised by the Indonesian Islamists during
the Jakarta election had the opposite effect. As noted previously, it led to increased fear among and intolerance against religious and ethnic minorities, especially Chinese, not only in Jakarta, but also nationally.

The rest of the paper will discuss three interrelated factors leading to Indonesian Islamists’ unprecedented success in the Jakarta election: the strategic manipulation of Islamist rhetoric; rise of Islamic populism; and the cynical use of hate spin as political strategy. Before all else, however, one must remember that this is Jakarta, the most strategic political and economic city in the country. As such, many observers have seen that this election is a prelude to the presidential election of 2019, which is likely to once again pit the current President Joko Widodo (the former Jakarta Governor whom Ahok replaced) against his old rival, Prabowo-Subiyanto. Perhaps assumptions about the use of Islamist rhetoric and the role of militia organizations, such as the FPI, are always important. Thus, underestimating this aspect of Jakarta would be a huge mistake, as they are indeed conditional. As Sana Jaffrey and this paper’s author reported from their studies on local elections in four provinces in 2015, the militia’s involvement in elections, despite their ubiquitous presence, is contingent on two factors: first, they are more likely to display explicit support for particular candidates where they face competition from rival organizations; and second, they are likely to engage in concrete action to support their political allies when electoral competition is high (2016).

The Jakarta election was a situation wherein those two conditions were met. Although FPI has long been famous for their hostility toward and protests against Ahok, their December protest was the only event where they were able to gather broad support. This broad support included former President Suharto’s children, who have clear oligarchic interests in defeating Ahok. For this reason, as Hadiz has correctly suggested, “Ahok’s defeat in the face of FPI-led mobilizations was considerably less of an indication of the inexorable rise of Islamic radicalism in Indonesian politics than the ability of oligarchic elites to deploy the social agents of Islamic politics in their own interests” (2017: 267).

With regards to Bayat’s post-Islamism thesis, this evidence also begs clarification and specification. First, within the broad-based coali-
tion that has successfully defeated Ahok, were the Islamists the co-opting or co-opted party? Second, while it may be the case that, as Hadiz has suggested, the Islamists were the pawn manipulated by others, the end result is still the same: the increasing significance of Islamism, which strongly undermines Hasan’s and Bayat’s optimism. As the new report by the Institute of Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) makes clear, while the agendas of each part of the anti-Ahok alliance “are different and sometimes contradictory … the overall impact has been to increase the perceived need of mainstream politicians to appeal to conservative constituencies and thus help advance Islamist goals” (2018: 1).

At the same time, however, the Islamists’ victory also signals the rise of what Hadiz called “Islamic populism” in the country. As he broadly defines it, Islamic populism is “a variant of populism where the concept of the ummah (community of believers) substitutes for the concept of the ‘people.’ But like the ‘people’ in more conventional populisms, the ummah is made up of internally diverse social interests that are notionally homogenized through juxtaposition against a set of purported oppressors, made up of economically exploitative or culturally remote elites or even foreign interests” (Hadiz 2018: 296). Here again, as stated previously, Islamist rhetoric appeared to be useful tools for political mobilization, even by actors who are not necessarily Islamists.

Finally, another important aspect of the Jakarta election that has received little attention is the use of what communication scholar Cherian George called “hate spin” (2016) as a political strategy in marginalizing Ahok. This is a two-fold technique that combines hate speech (incitement through vilification) with manufactured offense-taking (demonstrating righteous indignation). The Jakarta election is an effective textbook example of how one may benefit from this strategy. Ahok’s speech was fabricated to the effect that a large part of the Muslim community believed he was insulting Islam. Next, a religious edict (fatwa) was issued to sanction the speech as an insult. Then, a movement was set up to defend the edict, including a series of protest and demonstrations. Finally, although a court was set to judge whether the defendant was guilty, the protest
outside the court room strongly demanded that he had indeed insulted Islam.

Sadly, the judges referred to an Indonesian blasphemy law in order to imprison Ahok for two years. Thus, he not only lost the election but was also jailed for a crime he never committed. Indonesian human rights activists usually call this blasphemy law a “rubber clause” (*pasalkaret*): it is so flexible that you can make almost anything out of it. ***
Citations


When we investigate post-Islamism in Iran, it means we are accepting that Islamism in Iran is finished, and we are discussing what comes after it. Here the question that must be asked is as follows: Is it the really case that Islamism in Iran has failed such that we can research what comes after it in that country? Or is there an Islamist system that was able to take shape in another country, so that we can compare them to one another?

The research on political Islam as a whole is broader than summarized here, but on the other hand, political Islam in Iran cannot be examined without an examination of its connections to political Islam in other countries.

Pre-Revolution Islamism

Since the establishment of the First Persian Empire, Iranian society’s culture has historically been built on four pillars: the monarchy, the military, the clerics, and the elite (merchants, feudal lords, and influential political figures).169

This arrangement persisted until the period after Islam came to Iran. It can be said that Islamist movements in Iran began when a number of Shiite imams and their families came to Iran, especially to distant and rugged areas of Iran, to be far out of reach and safe from the hands of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. The Iranians tried to adapt to the new Is-

lamist regime by gaining access to and influence in the court, especially in the days of Abbasid rule.170

We can see the harbingers of “political Islam” in Iran in the Ismaili movements circa 1080, which were influenced by the Fatimids in Egypt and opposed to the Seljuks in Syria and Lebanon. The Ismailists were known as the Hassan-i-Sabbah Movement, after the leader who claimed that his forefathers were descended from origins in the southern Arabian Peninsula and Yemen, and as the Assassins(Hashashin), not because they used drugs but because they subsisted on farming medicinal plants. These Ismailists could be considered the earliest historical Islamist movements or organizations, the members of which committed suicide operations to assassinate their political opponents for ideological purposes.171 They were trained as professional killers at Alamut Castle in the Qazvin region of Iran.

We must not forget here Iran is a country that encompasses different ethnic groups that have always been in conflict with one another. Many of these nationalities have been influenced by external forces, especially by the Abbasid caliphs and later the Ottomans. While the Abbasids supported ethnic Arabs by way of controlling other ethnic groups in Iran, the Ottomans later supported the Turkmen and Azeris in order to control the other ethnic groups in the country. This turned Iran into a perpetual conflict zone among various ethnic groups.172

Because a major segment of the Iranian people were influenced by Shiite ideas, which the descendants of Shiite imams and Shiite Sufis spread throughout the country, King Ismail I was able to unify the country in 1501 by declaring Shiism the country’s official religion. Iran emerged as a unified country for the first time after the Sasanian Persian Empire fell to the Muslims in 651.

170 Ibid.
Political Shiism and the “Intellectuals’ Movement”

The four pillars – the monarchy, the clerics, the military, and the elite – returned as pillars propping up stability in the country. Religion returned – Islam and Shiism this time – as a source of unity for the country. But we see here that the Safavids were insistent on promoting Shiism as the only way to unify the country, and the situation has continued along those lines to this day. The Safavids were able to transform Shiism into political Shiism in the country.

Despite the fall of the Safavids in Iran, the political equations in Iran continued to keep Iran united until 1905, when new movements influenced by Iranian intellectuals arose, demanding changes in the political equation. The intellectuals emerged as a fifth pillar in the country.

One of the reasons for the intellectuals’ movement’s emergence was the impact on Iranians of intellectuals’ movements in Turkey, Egypt, and Europe, as well as the topic of political Islam assuming a prominence that loomed over political Shiism based on the idea that the Islamist world is larger than the Shiite world. The leaders of religious movements in Iran turned to emulating Islamism.

Although Shah Mozaffar ad-Din Qajar complied with the intellectuals’ demands to create a constitutional monarchy and establish a parliament in order to prevent the Qajar dynasty’s fall, the conflict over executive power continued.

Political Islam as an Alternative to Political Shiism

The Shiite clerics’ ultimate goal was the establishment of Shiite rule. New Islamist figures, however, were inclined to institute inclusive Islamist rule, not only Shiite rule.

A large segment of Shiite clerics avoided involvement in the country’s politics because the prevailing intellectual trend in *hawzazas* (seminaries for Shiite clerics) deemed that they should await the appearance of Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, who it was promised would form a divine government. But with the emergence of the intellectuals, new Islamist movements began to arise and demand the establishment of a religious government that would lay the groundwork for al-Mahdi’s promised appearance.\footnote{Nikki Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society*, collective essays, pg. 22.}

Because the secular intellectuals influenced by secular movements in Europe and Turkey insisted on establishing a constitutional monarchy, the clerics also insisted that there be a legislative council to revise laws so they would not conflict with Islamic law and religion. A council of jurists and legal scholars was formed and reviewed the laws enacted by Parliament. The council’s name was later changed to the Guardian Council, which led to Islam’s direct involvement in policy in Iran.

In this period, we see the beginning of Iranian Islamist movements influenced by the movements of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mohammed Abdu in Egypt. We cannot deny the impact of Islamist movements in other countries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, especially the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, on one hand, or the impact of other leftist movements in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey, on the crystallization of the ideas of Islamist movements in Iran and their demands to establish an Islamic government encompassing all Muslim countries.

We can note that while Arabs call the Arab revolutions the “Arab Spring,” the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran calls them the “Islamic awakening,” also the term that Islamist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, use for their movements.
The Appearance of Modern Islamist Movements

The last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, tried to build good relationships with the clerics, assuming that he could control the military after returning to the country, meanwhile trying to strike at the feudal landlords through reforms called the White Revolution. He confiscated the landlords’ lands and distributed it to the peasants, imagining that this behavior would secure him the common people’s support. This revolution, however, started a clash between the Shah and the clerics, who saw the Shah’s decision as contrary to Islamic law. These conflicts came to a head when the Shah decided in 1964 to give American military personnel judicial immunity, a policy called capitulation, which clerics in Iran saw as an affront and a humiliation of the Iranian people.

This stage can be considered the inception of the modern, official Islamist movement in Iran. The name of Imam Khomeini cropped up for the first time due to his leading the opposition to capitulation. After the security agencies confronted popular demands to revoke capitulation and decisions related to changing the society’s cultural identity, we see the clerics for the first time making statements calling for toppling monarchist rule in Iran.176

No one imagined at the time that the demands of Imam Komeini could bring down the monarchy, which had ruled the country for thousands of years. Although the Islamic Revolution in Iran was a revolution to overthrow the monarchy that had governed the country, it can be said that it was linked to Islamist ideas and movements throughout the world. Just as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels imagined that their socialist ideas would lead to revolution in Western Europe, such as Germany or Britain, but it actually took place in Russia, Islamist movements had thought that their ideas would come to fruition in coups in Egypt or other Arab Muslim states, but in fact it occurred in Iran. The only country governed by a

party that models itself after Brotherhood ideas today is Turkey, also not an Arab country.

One of the reasons, then, for starting research into the exportation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran to other Muslim states is that it was influenced by Islamist movements elsewhere in the world. It can also be said that the reason for including a law in the Iranian Constitution that requires Iranian governments to support the oppressed and the demands of the world’s peoples, instead of supporting governments, is that the revolutionaries aimed to support other Islamist movements elsewhere in the world. One of the reasons for the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran was that Imam Khomeini was able to offer a new system of governance based on cultural and social balances in Iran, while the Shah had no connection to the people’s needs and had lived in Europe since childhood. He thought that he could impose Western social policies and cultures on Iranians, which the majority of the conservative Iranian people rejected and could not accommodate.

“Religious Democracy” and the Conflict over Power

With the beginning of Islamic rule in Iran, Imam Khomeini tried to sketch out a form of religious democracy to govern the country, relying extensively on elections. He therefore held a referendum on establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Constitution. Although he was confident that the majority of the people would vote in the affirmative, there were many statements from revolutionary figures who rejected the necessity of such a referendum.

This choice emphasized by Imam Khomeini was a formidable weapon that the new Islamist regime could wield against its neighbors. Iran has experienced more than 40 elections during the past 40 years, and it boasts that it earns its credibility from the people’s support through their participation in elections.

Ever since the start of the Islamist regime’s rule in Iran, conflict has continued among political tendencies over the form of political go-
vernance in the country. At the beginning of the revolution, the leftists dominated governance in Iran, and the presidents of the Republic and the prime minister had Islamist socialist intellectual tendencies. They fought against the right, as embodied in the merchants and the clerics, who resisted leftist and socialist tendencies.\footnote{PayamMohseni, "Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political Economy of Regime Transformation". \textit{Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation}, ed. Daniel Brumberg and FaridehFarhi, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies, Indiana University Press, 2016, pp. 201-204.}

Because the leftist, socialist current dominated the revolutionary atmosphere in the world at the time, it is our view that this tendency grew strong after the revolution, and its adherents attacked the American embassy in Tehran to cause the severing of relations with the United States. They believed that they were creating an “iron curtain” around Iran like the one that Stalin imposed around the former Soviet Union, and that they could force the Iranian people to rely on themselves and produce what they needed domestically.

After some years, Iran would be able to make a resurgence as a powerful industrial state. Meanwhile, the right believed at the time that relations between Iran and other countries and trade between countries must be opened and improved to put Iran on the road to development.

Because the left, who later took upon themselves the title of “reformists,” controlled the situation, and the country was facing wartime conditions and numerous financial and economic problems, perhaps this sort of governance was the best for the country at that time. Former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, with the support of Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, led this political orientation, which was known as “Islamic socialism.”

On the other side, we see that another current led by President of the Republic Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who later became Supreme Leader, and Prime Minister Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then supported by bazaar merchants and a large number of clerics, opposed socialist Islamism
and demanded openness, but this orientation later became the one known today as the fundamentalists or conservatives. Today, another movement has emerged that considers itself a moderate movement trying to create a blend of Islamic socialism and capitalism. We will have to wait to see whether or not its vision succeeds.

Exporting the Revolution and Khomeini’s Death

Among political orientations, the left was most inclined to export the revolution, especially given that it had strong relationships with Islamist and non-Islamist leftist organizations outside the country at that time. We can point to the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon under the supervision of the former Iranian ambassador in Damascus, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, who later became the minister of interior in the Mir-Hossein Mousavi government.

Furthermore, during the left’s governance of the country, Islamist movements outside Iran, especially in Iraq, were founded and they established relations with Palestinian parties and movements.178

Here, we must recall that a large number of those Islamic revolutionaries were part of Islamist groups that received military training from leftist organizations or the Palestinian Liberation Organization before the revolution, and they were the ones who made up the nucleus of the Revolutionary Guard in Iran.

Therefore, it can be said that the Islamic Revolution in Iran was greatly influenced by Islamist and leftist movements outside Iran, especially in Arab countries at the beginning of the revolution, and the connection between the two sides was not based on the Islamic Revolution in Iran wanting to have influence in other Muslim countries. Rather, it was based on the fact that many leftist and Islamist foreign political figures though that they deserved credit for the revolution’s victory and that the

revolution in Iran was an extension of their struggles. Therefore, we see how the Islamic Revolution in Iran received former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat like a major leader, and how the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was influenced by the Amal Movement founded by Imam Musa al-Sadr. Mostafa Chamran, the movement’s military leader, became the minister of defense and was one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard. We also see that Iraqi religious figures like Ayatollah al-Sadr and Ayatollah al-Hakim acquired major influence in Iran.

Imam Khomeini tried at the time to stand in the middle between the two tendencies – right and left – and steer the country through rough seas to dry land.179

**The Rafsanjani Era and Economic Transformations**

Many people wagered that the Islamist regime would collapse after the death of Imam Khomeini or the declaration of the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War without the liberation of Karbala and Najaf. We saw, however, how the regime was able to collect itself and shift from socialist rule to being open to the world after Ayatollah Khamenei became the Supreme Leader and Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani became president.

Rafsanjani, who worked in business alongside his studies in *hawza*, soon shifted Iran’s political orientation from a socialist country closed unto itself to a capitalist country open to other countries. He was able to improve political relations with neighbors despite the fact that Iran had fought an eight-year war with Iraq that was supported at the time by several Arab countries in the region.180

Iranian-Saudi relations in particular witnessed a golden age, and Iran opened to relations with Western Europe and Eastern countries, such

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179 Ibid., p. 73.
as China and Russia. The slogans of death to Britain, France, Russia, and China were scrubbed off the walls, slogans about death to America faded, and only “death to Israel” remained. Meanwhile, the left continued to call for “death to everyone,” so to speak.

Under these circumstances, Iran experienced a major boom in the importation of foreign goods that were not to be found during the left’s rule, and many war profiteers began flaunt their wealth by showing off their luxury cars and expensive homes. During the first 10 years after the revolution, Iranian society had gotten accustomed to austerity and making do with domestically manufactured goods. We saw how President Rafsanjani’s government began implementing a raft of policies called “cultural reforms” at the time, in order to impose these reforms on society and adapt to the new situation.

Former President Mohammad Khatami, then Minister of Culture and Guidance, led the plan for implementing reforms in the country, but he faced significant opposition from Iranian society, which felt that he sacrificed his people in the war while some people got rich behind the front lines. The Rafsanjani reform movement faced fierce resistance from the clerics, who thought that these reforms would influence the religious beliefs of the people and the youth, and Rafsanjani was then obliged to sacrifice his Minister of Guidance, Mohammad Khatami, to quiet opposition.

The Rafsanjani reform movement encountered demonstrations and gatherings that began in Mashhad and reached Tehran, culminating in Khatami’s resignation.

**Khatami and the Reformers’ Era**

In the elections that followed the end of Rafsanjani’s government, Mohammad Khatami was able to ascend to the top office with the support of Rafsanjani against his rival, then-Speaker of Parliament Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri.

Rafsanjani had removed leftist figures from government and replaced them with a generation of Revolutionary Guard youth returning
from the Iran-Iraq War, on the basis that he could rely on them. But the leftists returned to the government after Khatami came to power, under the cloak of the “reformers’ current.”

The paradox was that parties loyal to former President Mohammad Khatami represented three parties out of 21 parties and political organizations that made up the reformers’ group. The reformers confronted the Supreme Leader and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, claiming that the two of them caused them to be excluded from governance. The reformist newspapers launched vehement campaigns against Rafsanjani and his family and aides, and they began calling for limiting the Supreme Leader’s powers and increasing the powers of the president in return.

The parties and groups opposed to the reformist tendency quickly banded together, waving the banner of the fundamentalists and rallying around the Supreme Leader. The political arena in Iran shifting from disputes between dozens of political organizations and parties on the right and the left to disputes between two strong political tendencies: the reformers and the fundamentalists.

Although the reformers tried to pressure the Supreme Leader through popular mobilization, with their supporters, especially university students, taking to the streets after the so-called “dormitory incident” (Kuye Daneshgah Disaster) at Tehran University in 1999, these movements did not cause any essential change in the system, and eventually they led to a fundamentalist figure, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the presidency.

Although the reformers were able to rally millions in the so-called Green Movement following the 2009 re-election of Ahmadinejad, the movement was unable to shake the Islamist government in Iran, which countered 3 million protesters contesting the outcome of the elections with some 10 million supporters of the government challenging the protesters in the streets.

**Iran and the Arab World’s Revolutions**

Ahmedinejad faced severe opposition and criticism on the home front from the elites, but he received major support from the general public, both in the country and abroad, because of his populist rhetoric.
The revolutions in Arab states coincided with Ahmadinejad’s presidency. He was proud to be the only Iranian president to attend the Gulf Cooperation Council summit, the photos from which showed him entering the summit hand-in-hand with King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and Sultan Qaboos of Oman.

Iran stood with the revolts that led to the fall of Arab regimes in North Africa, seeing those revolts as an extension of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, without considering whether those revolts opposed or approved of Iran. Even when the war began in Syria, Iran tried to take a neutral position between the government and the opposition, sometimes trying to play the role of mediator and advising the Syrian president to give the opposition a bigger role in government, based on the assumption that Iran could form alliances with Islamist movements. But Iranian policy began to change when those movements took up slogans against Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian influence in the region. Tehran began to feel at risk and sided with the Baathist, secular Syrian government against Islamists.

The Danger of the Regime’s Collapse in Iran

The biggest reason for the regime’s ability to withstand various events and developments is that neither reform leaders nor fundamentalist leaders have sought to bring down the regime. Instead, their goal has been to control governance of the country.

The Iranians reached a stage at which they began to feel that neither the reformers nor the fundamentalists can meet their demands, and wearied of continuing the escalating disputes between the two existing orientations. They therefore elected current President Hassan Rouhani to the presidency as a moderate able to reunify the various political orientations in the country and leverage all the country’s energies in terms of human resources.¹⁸¹

Ahmedinejad had tried to remove the earliest generations of politicians from the government and replace them with young people to give the new generation a role in carrying on the revolution. Of course, there were those who preferred that the previous generation should not return to power again and that the disputes come to an end between the reformers and the fundamentalists, who had ruled the country since the beginning of the revolution. But when Rouhani came to power, he made use in his government of the retired figures from the earliest generations and formed a government described as a “government of generals,” instead of a government of soldiers, arguing that the country’s political and economic circumstances could not afford any errors.

The people accepted President Rouhani’s intellectual direction in restoring the early generations to governance, reunifying political factions, and entering into sensitive international negotiations that could change everything for the country, because any minor lapse could cause everything to fail, and there was no room for mistakes. After the nuclear agreement was reached, however, the Iranians were unable to achieve what they had hoped for because the United States impeded the agreement’s enforcement.

The paradox was that the new government linked the solution to all the country’s problems to the nuclear agreement, raised the people’s expectations, and hung all its economic projects on the agreement, hoping that the agreement would enable it to solve the country’s economic problems after Iranian assets were unfrozen.

The Country’s Economic Circumstances

President Rouhani’s government pursued a policy of economic deflation or freezing the Iranian economy to stop the inflation that the country faced when the current government came to power, hoping to reach a nuclear agreement shortly thereafter to allow it to dispense with economic deflation. But the process of negotiating the nuclear agreement stretched on, and that and the continuation of the economic deflation pol-
icy devastated a significant share of small and medium-sized economic enterprises that could not withstand the economic freeze. That in turn led to an increase in unemployment and popular dissatisfaction.

In contrast to all the previous protests in the country, which were led by either the reformists or the fundamentalists as politicians sought to achieve their political objectives through mobilizing the public, the late-2017 protests in Iran were not controlled by any particular political tendency inside the country or abroad, although several political tendencies tried to ride the wave of anger.\textsuperscript{182}

Although these protests included many of the country’s cities, they were not based on uniform demands, and the objectives of the protests differed from one city to another. Some political groups, especially the opposition outside the country, tried to exploit these protests. Their supporters moved from one city to another, chanting anti-regime slogans to ignite general protests, but after political objectives overshadowed protests with economic and social demands, most of the demonstrators withdrew from the streets. The protests stopped and faded into “smoldering discontent,”\textsuperscript{183} because their economic causes still existed, but there is no political faction able to convince the people that they can accomplish their demands. For example, while the cause of the protests in the Kurdistan region was the cancellation of licenses by which the government allows holders of the licenses to transport goods from Kurdish Iraq to Kurdish Iran without paying taxes on those goods, the cause of the Mashhad protests was the breakdown of financial institutions that were not licensed by the central bank and that delivered high returns to investors. Elsewhere, the causes of the protests in Khuzestan Province were unemployment, dams on the Karun river, and environmental pollution, while in Isfahan Province the cause was the water shortage in the Zayanderud river. Most of these protests continue in one form or another to this day.


\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
But what was notable in the late-2017 protests was that some university youth took to the streets with slogans in opposition to reformers and fundamentalists both, reflecting a kind of public retreat from the country’s two political orientations. It was also notable that these slogans did not include any opposed to the regime, instead including language that reflected a social dejection over those two tendencies that were no longer able to meet the needs of the people and the youth generation. Consequently, that generation came to seek a new tendency that could meet its demands, and this spread through the Iranian street at large.184

**Orientations of Iranian Youth**

It can be said that Iranian youth are divided among three orientations:

The first demands changes based on Western currents and cultures, imported via Western social media, the Internet, etc. They are not concerned with the system of governance in the country of what it is called: they want to have greater public freedoms. Some also demand a change in the existing system of governance and will not be satisfied with changes in the governing laws.

The second tendency is the largest and demands internal political changes in the country to clear the way for them to participate more in the political process and managing the country. They demand the retirement of the first and second generations of the revolution but not a change in the country’s system of governance. This group has no problem living under the current Islamist conditions.

The third tendency supports the country remaining as it is. They are ready to volunteer and become martyrs to achieve the revolution’s goals in order to keep the country as it is currently.

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Despite the many difficulties Iran has faced since the Islamic Revolution, especially economic difficulties, the revolution has been able to advance the country in various scientific fields. The centrality of the nuclear issue may cause some people to think that Iran considers the issue to have major importance, but the reality is that nuclear technology is more than 100 years old, while Iran is working today to attain modern, advanced science and technology, such as nanotechnology, space engineering, medical technology, and reverse engineering.

In the area of regional influence, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran adopted four main pillars for its foreign policy:

1. Produce the defensive weapons that the country needs within the country, regardless of the cost. Iran began producing various weapons, especially ballistic missiles, in order to be able to threaten its enemies with enormous danger should they attack Iran.

2. Move the country’s virtual borders as far as possible from its political borders in order to stave off the risk of enemy attacks. In this area, Iran is working to facilitate its friends’ and allies’ path to power in neighboring countries.

3. The enemy of Iran’s enemy is Iran’s friend, and so Iran supports any entity that opposes its enemies so that Iran’s enemies are distracted by their own enemies and cannot make plans to destabilize Iran’s security.

4. The Islamist regime in Iran does not consider its core alliance-to-be its relationship with Shiites, who make up 15 to 20 percent of the world’s Muslims, but it does try to connect with all Islamist and even non-Islamist movements that it considers liberationist and to struggle on behalf of the people, in order to spread its influence throughout the world. In this area, we see that Iran is closely linked to the Shiite Hezbollah and the Sunni Islamic Jihad and Hamas, and even to Maronite Christians and Druze in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, the Baathist, secularism-oriented government in Syria, and the communist government in
Venezuela, despite the ideological differences between the Islamist or Shiite current in Iran and some of these other political ideologies. The regime is not working to “Shi’ify” those people or change their ideologies, so long as they are allied with Iran.

The Islamic Republic knows that these goals are largely supported by most Iranians.

**Conclusion**

The Iranian model has been able to adapt to the various conditions that the country has faced since the victory of the Islamic Revolution up until today by viewing it as a popular and democratic model. Today the model faces many problems, mostly from outside the country, especially due to the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and its allies, or to the impact of internal mismanagement, but this system cannot be seen as having ended or lost its credibility with the people, and its prospects for the future remain open.

As we have observed during the past 40 years, the regime has been able to adapt to various circumstances and react to the people’s demands in one form or another. It therefore transformed from a socialist government to a capitalist government to a liberal government, then a moderately conservative government. We do not see this in other Islamist movements in the world.

Although there are extremist Islamist tendencies that impact the political arena in Iran, just as there are extremist political tendencies in other countries, moderate intellectual orientations – and here I do not mean only the moderate political orientation loyal to President Rouhani – prevail over the extremist tendencies.

We must wait and see how the regime will adapt to the new demands of the country’s social and economic circumstances and how it will approach the new generation.
Past experience points to a trend toward excess, whether reformist or fundamentalist. When we speak here about the reformers or fundamentalists, it must be noted that it does not denote the well-known reformist or fundamentalist tendencies. The new generations’ tendencies have begun to emerge, and sooner or later these tendencies will control the country. Their intellectual and political currents will differ from those of the first generations of the revolution, and therefore we have to wait to see which of the young people’s intellectual tendencies, reformist or fundamentalist, will come out on top.

Bringing down the regime in Iran would require an alternative. Because there is no alternative able to convince the general public of its ideology, and the Iranian people are not prepared to take the risk of pulling the country on the path we see in Iran’s neighboring countries, it is unlikely that the Islamist regime in Iran will be toppled. Therefore, if we want to talk about post-Islamism in Iran, the subject is linked to thinking about the next stage as the Islamic Revolution evolves.

The actual circumstances indicate that the next stage will be one of new generations controlling the country and its overall political trajectory. The intellectual orientation will be that of the new, prevailing generation.
The rift in the Islamic Dawa Party over the choice of its candidate for prime minister in 2014 was a turning point in the party’s history, causing the dam to burst on urgent questions that had been skipped over or long ignored in the past.

Perhaps the calls for reconsideration indicated a deep sense that structural change was necessary for the party in order to equip the Dawa party for a new stage in which it would reach a state of harmony between the needs of civil authority on the one hand and the demands of the party’s Islamism on the other hand.

Perhaps it was possible that the party would join Islamist parties that were voluntarily isolated or involuntarily excluded – as in the case of Tunisia – or persecuted as in the case of Egypt – especially because the Islamic Dawa Party has been atop the political heap ever since 2006.

Here we consider the problems that Dawa faces, the objective it seeks to achieve, and an analysis that could be useful in understanding the method of adapting to the intellectual and organizational needs in a phase after the end of political Islam in its traditional version (that calls for Islamizing the state and society).

By problems, we mean those contradictions that materialize at the meeting of two theories, or theory and reality, or two realities. Dawa’s intellectual theory may contradict other theories in a way that the party cannot resolve. Or the party may have faith in a religious or political belief that is not applicable to the reality of its members’ behavioral prac-
tices. Or the practices of Dawa’s leaders and members may not align with
the reality of the practices required for administering the state and building
the nation.

We will divide the current study into four main themes that we will
address in turn: the party’s structure, organization, thinking, and adopted
mechanisms; the party’s relationship to the state; the party and the prob-
lem of the Other; and finally, the party and its vision of the world.

The study relies primarily on several meetings with Islamic Dawa
Party leaders and people who follow its affairs.

The Party’s Structure: Problems of Organization and Thought

What are the contradictions that the party’s organizational structure
faces? What are the contradictions in Dawa’s thinking? What mechan-
isms can be followed to achieve the party’s objectives?

The internal dialogue in the Islamic Dawa Party, which revolves
around the imperatives of change and reconsideration, has not thus far
covered Dawa’s thinking to the extent it has covered the party’s organi-
zational structure.

Perhaps the simplest organizational problem that Dawa faces is the
challenge of the divide between external proselytizers and internal prose-
lytizers, which has not yet been resolved. While Dawa’s entry to the
practical political fight in Iraq, which began due to a foreign actor,
caused it to neglect the need to communicate with the public, the organi-
ization became more of a gathering of proselytizers united by a history of
shared struggle and difficult migration after security persecution by the
former regime.

It is clear, for instance, that since 2003 there has been confusion,
both intellectual and political, concerning how to handle the directives of
religious authorities. While some leaders adhere to these directives as a
duty of Shariah, other leaders assert that their adherence is a matter of
moral respect and political significance except with regard to the tenets of Shariah, as adherence then becomes a compulsory obligation in accordance with the system of Shiite jurisprudence that requires following a religious authority (marja’ taqlid).

The confusion over Dawa’s relationship to religious authority is also reflected in proselytizers’ view of the religious establishment in Iran and Iraq. While certain leaders adhere to the directives of the supreme Shiite authority in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, other leaders believe that it is possible to have multiple marja‘ authorities, meaning that it is possible to refer to any authority, anywhere, including Kazem al-Haeri and Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi in the Iranian city of Qom.

The reconsideration of the role of jurisprudence in the party is the essential point determining its course and its relationship to the Islamic creed. Believing that jurisprudence has a role inevitably leads to the trap of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (vilayet-e faqih) and the requirements of an Islamic state, which, while not unfamiliar in Dawa’s thinking and history, seems elusive today in light of Iraq’s religious and intellectual pluralism, on top of the difficulty of making this idea a reality due to its regional and international complexities.

This desired reconsideration, in turn, requires a thorough reading of the history of religious authority, the profound transformations that it has experienced inside and outside Iraq, and the extent of its evolution and adaptation to the nation-state in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is clear that such reading will lead to an important truth, one that Islamist parties have often sought to skip over, which is that the geopolitical borders between countries are no longer artificial and imposed from above, as emphasized and insisted upon in the literature of Islamist movements from various currents. These borders have become a part of the cultural, social, and political system of the world. Moreover, a scientific reading of contemporary policy concepts reaches another conclusion that differentiates between the Islamic Ummah, which is culturally united by a set of beliefs, and contemporary nations, which diverge in their interests, orientations, and understanding of the world. While Islamist parties in the 1950s
and 1960s condemned and criticized the borders that colonialism created between Muslim peoples, today they must deal with those borders as legal facts, imposed by the values of the modern age.

The question with regard to the Islamic Dawa Party is the following: Has the party’s theory considered Muslim peoples’ experiences giving leadership roles to jurists in their political systems? Politically and realistically, is it possible to trust those systems in the current era? How has the party handled the corpus of Shiite jurisprudence and its vision of the state in general? Does the party think it is possible to adopt al-Sistani’s theory within the civil state? It is very likely that al-Sistani’s theory, which is a digest of the jurisprudence and empirical endeavors of Shiite religious scholars and which was the basis of Iraq’s standing constitution drafted in 2005, could be an important starting point for the Dawa Party, although the constitution remains a disputed matter even today.

Dawa’s objective, namely “building a Muslim society” through sanctioned, conventional party mechanisms (e.g. seminars, publications, etc.), does not seem achievable in the current era. The Islamic Dawa Party’s preoccupation with the state and its administration over the past pe-

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185 Al-Sistani’s theory of the civil state is a realistic middle way between a state based on the absolute guardianship of the Islamic jurist, in which jurists control public affairs, and the total retreat of jurists from public life, as in the partial guardianship of Abu al-Qasim Khoei, which allowed jurists to exercise their authority only as directly decreed by Shariah. Thus, al-Sistani does not believe in the limits of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist shown by Khomeini, nor did he restrict it along the lines of Khoei. In al-Sistani’s view, the state is fully empowered to uphold people’s rights and implement their will. As for the powers of the jurist, they are limited to preserving public interests, within strict conditions. Al-Sistani, answering a request for a legal opinion, stated: “Public matters on which the preservation of social order depends are the province of a just jurist who addresses the management of public matters and is acceptable to the general public.” It is necessary that the jurist be acceptable to the general public, as al-Sistani did not provide for the guardianship of the Islamic jurist except as it satisfies the people themselves. Thus, for al-Sistani, authority and administration belong to the people, and the people’s will is the basis of the government’s formation and the state’s perpetuation. Al-Sistani gives no thought to the legitimacy of anything not determined by the people, speaking clearly and unambiguously about his rejection of a religious government despite his call for the government to respect the majority’s religion and not violate its precepts. For more, see: Al-Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, Rulings on Religion Between the Asker and the Answerer, Fourth Edition, p. 76. See also: Hamed al-Khaffat, editor, Texts Issued by His Eminence Al-Sayyid al-Sistani (long may he live) on the Iraqi Issue, Dar Al-Mouarekh Al-Arabi, 2nd Edition, Documents Nos. 19, 22, 25, 26, and 53.
period has diverted attention from this objective, turning it into an electoral pressure group. This reflects the magnitude of the pressure and the inability to achieve the moral objectives for which the party was founded. These circumstances represent a retreat from achieving its moral objective that may seem involuntary, but in fact they have facilitated politically pragmatic action. The situation has also paved the way for the party to evolve formally, organizationally, and intellectually into an elite (not popular) party that exercises its influence through platforms that tend to be moderately center-right. But that requires a comprehensive review of the party’s organization, thinking, and mechanisms, which does not seem to be a priority of the party to date, despite its urgency.

The Party and State-Building

Does the party have a modern vision of state-building?

It is sufficient here to provide two prominent examples of the visions necessary for state-building in politics and economics in order to reveal the size of the gap in the party’s understanding of the needs of politics and economics.

The political theories of state-building have shifted from theories of the state/nation, or what is called the central state or the nation-state, in the 1960s and 1970s to theories of the pluralistic state now. These shifts began with the manifold intellectual, political, and social changes that the world has witnessed in the era of globalization since the beginning of the 1990s. While globalization has eliminated disparities and differences, presenting universal cultural and consumer models for the whole world, it has also caused anxiety about identities around the world. Since the 1990s, religious, national, and sectarian identities have risen to the surface, and experts have since warned that conflict between civilizations was due to the states of the world opening up to one another. In order to resolve the dilemma of diversity and its shaping in the mold of the state and the nation, the countries of the developed world proceeded to gradually erase the idea of majority and minority as the basis of the democratic
system, in favor of the idea of pluralism. Pluralism here is a set of guarantees that the majority provides to the minority in order to preserve the state’s existence and the identity of the nation’s members. The guarantees include a collection of laws related to rights, affirmative action, the veto, administrative decentralization or federalism, and expansive changes to school curricula and state policies.

If there is any internal dialogue in Dawa circles whatsoever about the problem of the state/nation versus the plural state, all that can be said is a grievous oversimplification that views the plural state model as nothing but tyranny of the minority.

In context, it is clearly noted that the party has a Salafi-inflected spirit in considering the validity of the “governance of man and the testimony of prophets” theory of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the founder the Dawa Party, as it applies to the building of the modern state today. Since its founding in the 1950s, Dawa has relied on this theory in calling for the establishment of a state and society of Islamists. On the other hand, Iraq’s reality today is pushing the Dawa Party to disavow that theory, as expressed by the party’s secretary-general, Nouri al-Maliki, when asked for his view on it. He answered by saying that practical reality taught the Islamists a lot because “Before the fall of the regime, they were outside the state, and someone on the outside is not like someone on the inside. Before that, we used to talk about theory, but within the state we talk about reality and application.” This statement indicates the degree of flexibility that Shiite Islamist forces demonstrate in Iraq to survive in the political process, as “participation in this system requires coexistence,” according to al-Maliki’s statement.

The second example relates to economics, because modern political economics sees the political system as an outcome impacted by the type of economy.

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In an economic system that emphasizes public ownership or socialism, one may get a sense of the many forms of bureaucracy that in turn reflect the state’s failure to provide goods or services, which then forces it to strengthen its patterns of bureaucratic organization to exert more control over the market. By contrast, an economy based on private ownership substitutes minimally coercive bureaucracy, making it possible for individuals to interact properly with one another on an equal footing, which is consequently reflected in a political system that guarantees individuals maximum freedom with minimum government intervention.

In other words, every model of economic ownership has a parallel in social relationships and a political system. The capitalist system of private ownership requires that property owners be free to compete on a level and open playing field, meaning that the suitable social and political system is a liberal, democratic one that respects individuals’ freedoms and free choices. Meanwhile, the system of socialist, nationalized state ownership means that individuals have no freedom of economic activity except through the state, or rather, the state is the principal owner, producer, and distributor in the economy. This requires a suitable political and social system, which is a totalitarian dictatorship because power and limited freedoms are necessary for bureaucratic control over this model of economic ownership.

The studies thus stipulate economic freedom as one of the conditions of successful democracy, revealing the relationship between the economy and the state’s political model. In such a political system, especially if individuals in the system rely on the culture of citizenship, the state then seeks both economic modernization and social integration. Development is a process parallel and equal to integration, which is one of the components of democracy. Economic development is thus a factor in both state-building and nation-building.

Here also, the most that the Islamic Dawa Party can say is on the validity of the book *Our Economy*, by party founder Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, in rejecting the contours of a socialist economy and offering general suggestions on models for usury-free banking systems. The par-
ty’s discussions and intellectual contributions have not managed to address the importance of the economy and its role in drying up the wellsprings of the dictatorship and political totalitarianism that have afflicted Iraq for decades. As a result of this ignorance of political and economic theory, long years of governance have been wasted without the party working hard to reinforce democracy and prevent the return of dictatorship through society’s economic structure rather than political struggle and incremental tactics.

It is obvious that the al-Maliki and al-Abadi governments have stumbled mightily in their approach to the economy although both are veteran Dawa Party leaders. The former pursued and supported many socialist measures by stimulating public hiring, such that by the end of his tenure as prime minister in 2010, state institutions and the number of individuals therein had grown to nine times their size in 2003. Al-Abadi, meanwhile, has deliberately reversed this trend during his tenure as prime minister by stimulating the private sector, blocking public hiring, and significantly reducing state expenditures.

The Problem of the Other and Building the “Iraqi Nation”

Does the Islamic Dawa Party have an intellectual vision and strategy for interacting with national, religious, and sectarian “others” within Iraq?

There are three approaches to nation-building.

1. The economic approach, which is based on building a communications network, production, factory-based economic exchange, rail lines, transportation routes, and human development.

2. The cultural approach, which is based on building a cultural communication network based on language and education, through such

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tools as books, newspapers, schools, and universities, as well as memo-
rials, national holidays, and common symbols, fostering a collective im-
agination by using tools of communication such as radio, television, the
internet, and mobile phones.

3. The political approach, which is based on building a central po-
litical apparatus (a capital, a common currency, a unified administrative
body, etc).

Nation-building is a process aimed at ensuring political stability
within the state through integration. Integration does not mean eliminat-
ing differences altogether. Ethnic minorities, in particular, can only main-
tain their distinctive cultural identity through isolation within their own
systems of daily life, law, and education. Therefore, a policy of integra-
tion can be applied to those groups only through force and coercion.

Global experiments in integration have adopted various types of so-
lutions to involve different ethnicities in building the state and nation,
based mainly on local administration, self-rule, federalism, consensual-
ism, or other such solutions to overcome the problem of “ethnocracy,”
i.e. the rule of the ethnic majority over other groups. The management of
disagreements among various ethnic groups leads to one of three out-
comes: tyranny of the majority, a division into federal/self-rule cantons,
or partnership and power-sharing.

There is no avoiding the fact that language, culture, and religion are
elements of identity in monoethnic states. In multiethnic states, history is
the common element through which problems are address, groups are
brought into dialogue, and a shared background is formed, equipped with
symbols and priorities.

In addition to history, there is another element of social unity,
which is the desire for coexistence. If this desire is lost, the mightiest in-
stitutions involved in coexistence will eventually collapse.

Citizenship education seems like the ideal mechanism for generat-
ing a common identity. Education’s aim is liberation from bigotry and
cultural intolerance, as well as considering and dealing with others from a different perspective. Experts stress the need for the educational system to include the following elements:188

1. A public spirit, meaning the ability to assess officials’ performance and effectiveness and the willingness to get involved in public life and hold political authorities accountable.

2. A sense of justice, meaning the ability to understand others’ rights and the commitment to eliminating injustice against others and defending the integrity and fairness of legal institutions.

3. Tolerance and civility, meaning feelings and modes of interacting with unfamiliar people, i.e. those who are different from us, without discrimination, bigotry, or prejudice.

4. A common sense of solidarity and loyalty, meaning nourishing the desire to coexist and a sense of loyalty to the nation and society, and accepting the results of democratic decisions.

To return to Dawa’s vision for interacting with the “Other,” if we exclude political tactics, we observe no serious intellectual dialogue or a clear strategic vision in party circles for interacting with sectarian, national, or religious “others” in Iraq.

The magnitude of the party’s stumbles in this area are evident in the party’s split in the last elections in 2018 into two lists. One, led by al-Maliki, engaged in fearmongering Shiite rhetoric about the secular, civilian other, after his rhetoric had been directed against the Baathist other in order to grant legitimacy to the party being in power. Meanwhile, the other list, led by Haider al-Abadi, adopted nationalist, federalist rhetoric that attracted broad participation from other sectarian and national groups among the candidates in the different governorates. This demonstrated a

new model of a cross-sectarian electoral list led by an Islamist Shiite party, after it had been hoped to be secular-led.

The Dawa Party also lacks a theoretical vision of national identity, as well as engagement with history and education as agents of social unification for the Iraqi nation.

Furthermore, the party is cut off from contact with Iraqi others (Christians, Kurds, Sabians, Yazidis, Baha’is, Shaykhis, Kaka’is, Jews, and Afro-Iraqis) inside and outside Iraq. It also is withdrawing from its intermittent communication with the educated Shiite elite of various sects and nationalities in Iran and other countries in the region.

Because the Dawa Party is the only case of a party with the power to lead Islamist party life in Iraq and similar Shiite situations in the region, its international shifts, intellectual approaches to the other, and nation-building project are of great importance if we consider their implications within Iraq and at the regional level.

**The Party’s Vision of the World**

Does the Dawa Party fulfill its Islamist responsibilities in the world? Does it have a vision for dealing with the Western world and other societies and countries?

Shiite elites in the region have many hopes for the Islamic Dawa Party, the most significant of which is their desire to find an alternative to compete with the role that Iranian rather than Arab Shiism plays in the Shiite world. This is a role that only the Dawa Party can play, and in a country like Iraq. This is evident from the keenness with which the educated Shiite elite in Lebanon and the Gulf states follow Iraqi events and their desire to engage with the party – but without much reciprocation of their interest thus far.

Moreover, communication between the Islamic Dawa Party and the Christian world is minimal. How can we talk about a party that aspires to state-building and nation-building in Iraq while it maintains its sectarian
and geopolitical isolation? Islamist-Christian communication through participation in intellectual dialogues with the Vatican and Christian institutions could provide a picture of what comes after the Shiite Islamist rhetoric that has a grip on power in Iraq. Such a case could also be a model of Islamism unlike those that have provoked the West and Muslims themselves, such as the experience with the Brotherhood in Egypt after the Arab Spring.

A simple glance at the intellectual findings of prestigious international institutions involved in Islamist-Christian dialogue (e.g. conferences, workshops, books, and periodicals) reveals the egregious isolation of Dawa, which prides itself on its “thinking and consciousness” about the world. At the international level, at the Vatican there is the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue, the Community of Sant’Egidio, the Pontifical Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies; in France, Pax Christi International; in South Korea, the World Alliance of Religions for Peace; in Cairo, the Arab Dialogue Network; in Beirut, the Arab Working Group for Muslim-Christian Dialogue; and in Jordan, the Royal Institute for Inter-faith Studies. They all have published many findings with contributions from intellectuals, politicians, and academics from various Islamist Muslim and Arab countries, with a negligible presence from Iraq or Shiite Islamism.

**Conclusion**

The Islamic Dawa Party, like the other Shiite political parties, faces an arduous challenge in shifting toward the idea of a center-right party, i.e. a conservative political party, but it has clear programs for state administration and nation-building instead of slogans and ideologies that inhibit state-building and nation-building.

The party also faces a serious intellectual challenge in shifting from one model, in which it is accustomed to promoting an Islamic government and society led by jurists along the lines of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, to a model of rational state administration in accordance with the vision and needs of the civil state.
The Dawa Party has yet to review its written heritage, and meanwhile its social role is dwindling due to post-2003 daily political needs because the party is a gathering of proselytizers united by a history of shared struggle and nothing else.

It seems that Shiite Islamist rhetoric in Iraq is trending toward greater openness and secularism, led by a society with a heritage of coexistence and a civic vision of the state and the nation.
CHAPTER 4

Political Islam and Beyond:
Jordan
It is remarkable to always see that the West coins political phrases, and then we in the East begin examining these terms and commenting upon them, carefully searching out the term’s author and analyzing that author’s views and perspectives publicly so that we can understand what the term means. This seems to be our lot in the East. Since the coining of the terms “clash of civilizations,” “Islamophobia,” and others, we have been chasing after these slogans and terms to understand and analyze them. This undoubtedly applies to this new term “post-Islamism” being promoted.

In my opinion, there is an important question that goes as follows: If the revolutions of the Arab Spring had not occurred, could we have seen the same results we are now seeing within Islamist parties? Is it possible that all this change and evolution would happen within these parties’ political being? Does the evolution that occurred within the body of the Islamist movement stem from intrinsic factors, or is it a reaction to developments outside the movement?

To certain people with an intellectual bias, it may seem that we, as new political parties, are seeking to please others or draw their attention. We believe that this will have no natural end as long as the goal is “pleasing others,” or the West specifically, because we will never win their approval. The issue we have relates to reaching understandings regarding the national interest. It also relates to an inward orientation, in the sense that the dynamic that should govern the evolution of so-called Islamist movements is one of genuine consideration and an explicit inward turn toward the nation and the citizens’ concerns and livelihood. From there,
we will set off toward any other success we like, and this is what undoubtedly creates proper balance.

Can we really say that political Islam has failed? Or has it evolved? Or is there a new political product arising from a genuine intellectual evolution outside the political incubator of the Islamists and completely unconnected to them, while also learning from and building on past experiences? Or is what has happened a natural retreat within the Islamist movement after the political earthquake that took place outside the movement in the Arab nation and the region?

I would like to ask: Why is gaining access to power the only measure of Islamist movements’ success, especially under regimes that prevent it? There are other, important measures under which Islamist movements have largely succeeded, for instance reaching and influencing people’s minds and ideas.

**Important Points for Reading the Future**

First, we must admit that in Jordan we have lost the most solid political opposition bloc, namely the Islamist movement, which was a political, social, and economic assemblage with an important demographic dimension. The Islamist movement brought together Jordanians of East Jordanian, Palestinian, Circassian, Chechen, and Syrian origins, and could have been a major pillar of reform and change in Jordan and stood strong in the face of reactionary forces. The movement is a force that has persisted for more than 70 years, during which time it has had political, social, and economic foundations making it the largest effective force in Jordan, if it holds together, because of its proliferation and broad acceptance in society.

Second, we must also admit that if we want a positive interpretation of the division that has occurred within the Islamist movement, it is an indicator of the breakup of the political monopoly that the movement has exercised unwittingly, putting it above criticism and accountability in one way or another. Without knowing it, the movement may be afflicted by a
kind of political arrogance and intellectual intransigence. The insistence
on looking “in the mirror of the past to see one’s present self” has led to
political mistakes, most importantly, their inability to interact and partner
with people outside the Brotherhood. There is no evidence of that in the
experience of the Islamic Action Front, which was founded in 1992 and
comprised 40% Brotherhood members and 60% independent members.
This was the situation at the time of the party’s formation. Eventually,
after years of political work, the party became almost entirely controlled
by Brotherhood members, and most of the independents resigned or left
their posts.

Third, when reading the landscape of political work in Jordan, we
must recognize that the reactionary forces, including the “old guard,” do
not want any strong political project to succeed, whether Islamist, leftist,
or nationalist. This in itself puts real political pressure on all emergent
political tendencies.

Fourth, it is important that we (I am speaking of the Partnership
and Rescue Party) confirm that the seeds of the party’s founding undoub-
tedly sprouted within the Islamist movement. There had been disagree-
ment over many issues, first and foremost at the time over the administra-
tion of national affairs, how to approach that administration, and the
complete turn inward. Developments in the region at the time required a
rapid review of the movement’s ideas, methods, and literature, but unfortu-
nately the movement was persistently slow to react, and the response
was not at all commensurate with the magnitude of the problem in the
region. In my opinion, the movement’s performance was substandard,
and the enormous reliance on the movement’s success in Egypt was an
important factor in slowing the move to think about transformative
change. I offer one example: Everything recently said about the civil
state within the Islamic Action Front was theorized and established by
Dr. Rohile Gharaibeh several years ago when he was in the Islamist
movement. His ideas and terminology were later adopted by certain
people within the movement after the Brotherhood left and founded a
new party. It was impossible to stay in a climate where we were ground
down by problems. However, our idea evolved into a genuine partnership, a structure, and a framing of ideas with national forces and groups of independents and activists who believed in the necessity of political action based on participation and understanding. We did not establish in our literature that this party would be an Islamist party because we came to believe that we should be called a participatory, programmatic, democratic, national party, in which citizenship is the basis of belonging to the nation. We defined the state and belonging on the basis of citizenship, and we have moved past the stage of definitions. Our reference is the Jordanian Constitution, which says that the state’s religion is Islam and we cannot endow political activity with sanctity just by attributing it to Islam.\footnote{In one of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed’s meetings, he spoke only of the economy, growth, education, development, modernity, and building human resources. At the end of his speech, someone asked him, “What about Islam and religion?” Mahathir Mohamed said, “I was just talking about Islam.”} Furthermore, this is not about undermining or competing with the Brotherhood or the Islamic Action Front. To the contrary: we seek to reach an understanding with everyone on political commonalities that bring us together and unite our goals.

Fifth, the case of Jordanian Islamism is a unique one. As the Islamist movements of the world have begun to evolve, and some have begun to develop, modify, or change their ideas to bring them more in line with measurable political reality, the outcomes of the developments within Jordan’s Islamist movement are unique among such movements. I am speaking here as a researcher and a person with long experience within the Islamist movement. In the terms of an academic researcher, the so-called research problem can be summarized in two questions:

1. Why did this evolution and change not happen within the body of the movement itself? Why did ideas not evolve and mature within the movement as with the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, for instance? What caused the movement to stagnate and freeze in the face of demands for change made by a certain segment? There are many compelling answers to this question, the most important of which is that the intellectual system within the movement has reached a point of intellectual intransi-
gence and organizational rigidity and is unable to accept new ideas, even when they are correct. The best thing at the time was for the old ways to stay as they were because change had become difficult.

2. Why are we seeing that most of those who left the Islamist movement (85%, which is my own statistic) are of East Banker origin? Recall here that I am speaking as a researcher, making the question a major one at this point precisely. Why is it this demographic component specifically that first endeavored to distance themselves from the Islamist movement, and what is the primary motivation for all of them? What were they missing when they were inside the movement? Is the problem, then, one of demographics, or one of ideas, philosophies, and objectives? Or is it both? In my opinion, this question alone would need an appropriate allocation of time and effort to try to answer it. When we do, we will be able to read the landscape more clearly.

Sixth, it seems that the secret of post-Islamism’s power (the idea and the spread of these new parties), if we accept this categorization, is its ability to answer two important questions:

1. The question of the definition of citizenship and that of identity and belonging, and the interplay between the two.

2. The question of the civil state and the concept of secularism in that state.

But these two concepts are also a major challenge for Islamist movements, as the movements in Jordan and Egypt, for instance, have been unable to move beyond the two concepts and provide a new meaning to belonging on the basis of citizenship rather than affiliation with Islam, or to provide a modern conception of the civil or secular state (not like the French conception, of course) that differs from the idea of the Islamic caliphate. The Islamist movement has thus far been unable to do that, and its position on those two concepts will continue to waver be-

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190 As we always say, “We are all Jordanians in our love for Jordan, and we are all Palestinians in our love for Palestine.”
cause of the principle on which the movement is founded. The writings of Hassan Al-Banna, for instance, still say that the head of state cannot be Christian, even if he is elected. A Christian minister, however, can be accepted in the state. And there are still even demands to retake al-Andalus in the writings of Hassan Al-Banna! Some of these ideas and others are still at the heart of the understanding and education that the members of the organization receive. Within the framework of the Islamist movement, it is not possible to resolve this problem and talk about this concept except by leaving behind the old terms and concepts that were valid in a particular era. I have referenced this particularity in detail in my paper at last year’s conference, the title of which was “The Prospects of Political Islam.” In Jordan, for instance, we noted the controversy within the Islamist movement when one of the party’s leaders made a statement on the concept of the civil state. Then, within 24 hours, the denial came from the party’s head of Shura, stating that this was a “personal” concept that had not yet been adopted by the movement or party.

Conclusion

We can definitely say that the Jordanian case is a unique one in terms of the outcomes that have occurred within the Islamist movement. We cannot say that the idea is a failure. While the Islamist movement remains wedded to its old ideas to a large extent, some slow and overdue evolution has occurred in mechanisms and tactics (the recent elections, for example). But were they incremental or strategic tactics?

The intellectual discourse within the movement has started a revival that is evolving in the direction of a civil state, but it is encountering substantial opposition within the organization. An intellectual evolution will doubtless occur within the movement in Jordan, but it will be slow and always overdue. At any level – trade union, party, or community – the upcoming elections could be an incentive for the Islamist movement to change its approach and adopt different ideas.

There is a process of societal evolution and change, intellectual and social, that the movement has not yet grasped. The Islamist movement is
no longer the only driving force and hope for society. We have new, strong, influential societal forces that did not previously exist but now have found acceptance. The Islamists will find themselves face-to-face with these forces, which will gradually begin to take their place. The new, conscious societal forces will begin to emerge and influence and drive society.

The parties that emerged from out of the Brotherhood took a leap forward in their ideas, transcended every intellectual dispute, and settled issues that it was forbidden to discuss. For instance, it was forbidden to talk about citizenship, identity, and the definition of the state. This is the secret of success and distinction in the future, and in my opinion, those parties will be the centers of political and social power in the future.
The Iranian thinker Asef Bayat proposed the idea of post-Islamism as an analytical framework suitable for explaining the transformations that occurred in some Islamist movements in the 1990s. If we presume that Islamist movements of various types seek to establish an Islamic state based on the tenets of Islamic Shariah (i.e., sovereignty belongs to God alone), then post-Islamism seeks a system based on the values of pluralism, freedom, democracy, majority rule, and rights instead of duties.

With regard to political Islam in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood dominates the conversation as the prevailing Islamist force on the country’s Islamist scene. The Brotherhood movement has occupied the lion’s share of the political arena in Jordan since 1989, which may speak to the fact that its ability to win seats is far greater than that of any other party or coalition. It is truly surprising that all attempts to marginalize the movement have ended in failure. The Muslim Brotherhood is still a political force that cannot be ignored because of its potential for rallying and mobilizing its base and because it has not yet attempted to govern.

But despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s strong presence, it is a force that represents no more than 15 percent of the Jordanian public, according to polls. Its organizational power, however, accompanied by the weakness and fragmentation of other political forces, has created the impres-

191 For more, see: Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (California: Stanford University Press, 2007)
192 Hibah Rauf Izzat, “Post-Islamism: A Critical Theory” Al-Ahram Democracy, 6 November 2013
193 This is evident in the scientific opinion surveys conducted periodically and regularly by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan.
sion that the Muslim Brotherhood is a very large political force. And de-
spite the Muslim Brotherhood’s successes and those of its political arm, 
the Islamic Action Front, in obtaining a number of seats and winning in 
some important unions, the movement has not yet been able to form a 
government or create a bloc that would prevent governments from pur-
suing their programs, whether in foreign policy or the assortment of do-
mestic political issues. Consequently, it is no coincidence that the move-
ment is coming apart. Most post-Islamist movements are defections from 
the Brotherhood, which points to a situation in which the movement seems 
unable to adapt and transition into another phase of political action.

Here we are discussing the course of post-Islamism in the Jorda-
nian context, which began with certain key figures in the Muslim Bro-
therhood realizing the necessity of conducting ideological reconsidera-
tions so as to enable to movement to delve deeper into democracy, plural-
ism, and the civil state instead of an Islamic state, in order to avoid mar-
ginalization and isolation. There are those who believe that separating 
religious and politics is the key to facilitating the integration of Islamist 
movements into the political process. This researcher argues that the suc-
cess of post-Islamist parties in Jordan is directly linked to their ability to 
capture enough seats in parliamentary elections in the years to come.

This study is divided into two key sections. The first section 
presents the evolution in Islamist movements’ work, the obstacle to the 
Muslim Brotherhood adapting, and its inability to truly adapt to the val-
ues of pluralism and accepting majority rule. The movement has not con-
ducted genuine ideological reconsiderations that would help it integrate 
into the democratic process. In the second section, we discuss the general 
context that has contributed to post-Islamism taking shape in Jordan and 
the political forces that represent post-Islamism. We will also discuss the 
benchmarks of success for post-Islamist parties in Jordan.

**Post-Islamism: The Jordanian Context**

For decades, the Brotherhood has made up what could be called the 
loyal opposition to the regime in Jordan. The movement has either stood
with the regime in countering its adversaries at home or has taken a neutral stance. It is true that the Jordanian regime did not target the movement from its establishment until the mid-1990s, when tensions began to tarnish the movement’s relationship with the palace as a result of Jordan signing the peace treaty with Israel.

Historically, the movement has benefited from its positions in support of the regime, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. After the overthrow of the Suleiman Nabulsi government in 1957, the palace banned parties, closing the public sphere to everyone except the Islamists. This means that Islamism was empowered in Jordan under the auspices of domestic state policy, which excluded, marginalized, and targeted political currents that were intellectually and ideologically opposed to Muslim Brotherhood. This, in turn, facilitated the Muslim Brotherhood’s spread in every city and village, from the far north of Jordan to the south.194

In contrast to many of the Brotherhood’s experiences in non-Arab countries, the movement did not resort to violence, content with its role as the loyal opposition, but its experience in political action was put to the test with the 1989 elections and afterward. For the first time, the movement gained significant parliamentary representation, making it the core of the political opposition. Many began to rely on it to create political balance in the country. The movement did actually embark on a phase that could lead it to share in power, and they had a short and unsuccessful tenure in Mudar Badran’s government, which was formed after the 1989 elections. But they soon formed the Islamic Action Front party as the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm.

Shortly afterward, Jordan was obliged to participate in the Madrid peace conference, held in the Spanish capital in late 1991. This culminated in Jordan signing a peace treaty with Israel on 26 October 1994. The Brotherhood opposed the treaty, which became a significant point of dispute with the regime, thus creating a new fissure in the historical rela-

194 In reality, the Jordanian regime used the Muslim Brotherhood to strike at nationalist and leftist forces because the greatest threat to the regime at the time came from such forces, which sourced their ideology from outside Jordan.
tionship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian regime. The Muslim Brotherhood accused successive Jordanian governments of constricting the political sphere by drafting elections laws primarily aimed at stunting the movement so that it would not be able to impact Jordan’s policies. The election law created tension between the movement and successive governments. On one side, the governments sought to curb the movement, while on the other, the movement sought to reach an election law that would give it representation beyond its true presence among the population.195

Despite the continuing tension and the ebb and flow in the relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood, there is an official desire to ensure the Brotherhood’s participation in elections and political action on the basis of integration and moderation. To put it another way, any political organization’s participation in elections and the political process leads those organizations to moderate, and that includes the Brotherhood, in a time of globalized violence based on ideologies that incentivize terrorism under various names and pretexts.

But this official desire is undermined by the closed-off political horizons, given the political context that restricts party work in general. Elections are not held under clearly defined party rules, due to a legacy and a mindset among Jordanians that detests political parties. Most parties before 1989 sought to bring down the regime. They were undemocratic parties with unpatriotic principles. Thus, the percentage of Jordanians who support party work is very small, and the laws governing political life do not encourage Jordanians to join political parties.

The Islamist movement in Jordan is a unique case; although it opposed the regime, it did not seek to topple it. It can be said that the inte-

195 Any in-depth study of the vote total attained by the Muslim Brotherhood, represented by the Islamic Action Front, both for candidates who succeeded and those who did not, would reveal the movement’s true size, which does not exceed 15 percent of the participants in the parliamentary elections. The movement therefore attempts to push governments to adopt electoral laws that favor the movement so that it will be disproportionately represented. Thus, the movement opposed the single-vote law and believed itself to be the target of that law.
Post - Islamism

The migration-moderation rule has largely succeeded in Jordan. The Islamist movement, however, continues to suffer from ideological stagnation related to its understanding of political action, specifically democracy. The movement is still baffled by the question of democracy, the concept of majority rule, and the legitimacy of this form of governance when it contradicts their understanding of Islamic Shariah.

In this context, Dr. Amr Hamzawy and Dr. Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment wrote a study on what they called a state of generalized tension within Islamist parties between the idea that the law should be based on God’s word and therefore consistent with Islamic Shariah, and the idea that laws in democratic political systems are based on majority rule through an elected parliament. The party cannot call itself Islamic and retain the support of Muslims because it abandoned the idea of Shariah as a source of legislation. Some constitutions mention Shariah as one of the sources of legislation. Meanwhile, the party cannot call itself democratic, compete in elections, and demand a pluralistic and open political system without accepting the principle of pluralism and acknowledging the binding power of majority rule.

The problem of the incompatibility of democratic and Islamist views has not been fully resolved in any of these parties, and so there are gray areas and ongoing political and ideological conflicts within these parties. This may be one of the reasons for the divergence of the hawks and the moderates. It is true that there are leaders in Islamist parties who believe in democracy, but the conflict between elites and the leadership in those parties is what will eventually determine the party’s commitment to democracy, which also depends on the prevailing political climate.

The most significant problem arises from the conflict and clash between Islamist and democratic principles for most Islamist participants. Islamist movements in the Arab world continue to fight against the separation of religion and politics because it impacts the standing of Shariah.

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in the legal and legislative system. They accept, for instance, the principle of political pluralism, but they fight over the limits of this principle. They do not oppose citizenship as one of the necessities of democracy, but in reality they are divided over the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and equality between men and women.

It is notable that these parties are operating in countries where the regimes are not fundamentally committed to democracy, and there are tactical considerations. For instance, the parties participate in elections that guarantee that they perform modestly, making them look weak. This reinforces the position of those ideologically opposed to participating because they see participation as a losing strategy. But the parties’ participation also gives the impression that they are committed to the democratic process. This is why mention has been made of the gray areas in the stance and tactics of the Islamists in Jordan.

The Arab Spring raised several questions about Islamist movements in general and can be seen as a major challenge for these movements in particular. The fall of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes gave Islamist movements the chance to take power. Indeed, hopes were pinned on the Islamists’ governance of Egypt after Mohamed Morsi came to lead the government, but his term in office lasted just a year, and he was not a strong president. Both his adversaries and neutral observers accuse him of being unable to shed the mantle of leading the Brotherhood movement, and therefore failing. Of course, there were countervailing Arab regimes that targeted the Brotherhood in Egypt and contributed to the so-called counterrevolution to defeat them, which is what happened in the military coup against the Islamists in 2013. The conflict in Egypt was not about democracy; it was a struggle between two despots: the Brotherhood and the military.

It cannot be said that Jordan went through the Arab Spring in the same way as Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen. The Jordanian regime was smart, employing a mix of soft power and limited reforms to counter the Muslim Brotherhood’s drastic demands. The movement boycotted the 2013 elections and refused to participate in national dialogues
out of a sense of arrogance due to Mohamed Morsi’s ascendance in Egypt and a belief that their Brotherhood associates would take power in Syria.

At the beginning of the Arab Spring, some Brotherhood leaders’ statements evinced an unfamiliar orientation. Some of them believed that the Arab Spring and the Brotherhood’s empowerment in both Egypt and Tunisia indicated a change in the balance of internal political power in the Brotherhood’s favor. The Brotherhood’s morale in Jordan soared as a result, and that is where demands for genuine change began. They did not escalate to the point of demands for toppling the regime, but they did rise to the level of demanding that the king be stripped of his constitutional powers. The Brotherhood called for amending certain constitutional articles, namely articles 34 and 35, which define the king’s authority to dissolve the House of Representatives and to form the government, respectively. 197

It is noteworthy that the Brotherhood refused to participate in any of the official initiatives, such as the National Dialogue Committee, and continued to organize weekly popular events to put further pressure on the regime to strike a deal tailored to them. However, their efforts to force the regime to engage and submit to their vision came to nothing, given regional changes and the Jordanian regime’s ability to preserve the determinants of stability.

Indeed, the military coup that General Adel Fattah el-Sisi led in Egypt in 2013 was a turning point in the Jordanian state’s interactions with the Muslim Brotherhood. Researcher Mohammed Abu Rumman of the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies states that the Policy Center, which is the top body formulating official policies, examined the available options for dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood in light of the coup in Egypt. Three scenarios were put forward: banning the group

and classifying it as a terrorist movement, exploiting the group’s weakness and decline by opening a dialogue with it to obtain concessions that were previously unobtainable, or maintaining the existing situation and allowing the group’s internal crises to take their course and weaken the group further. The state decided, of course, to leave things as they were and thereby wager on the Brotherhood’s internal crisis, while the Islamists wagered on the Arab Spring to return in Egypt. But the Islamists soon realized that the Arab Spring’s moment had passed and that the balance of power inside Jordan left them no choice but to reach an understanding with the regime and drop the fight.

In short, the Arab Spring was an opportunity for the Islamists to rise, but the regional situation was not supportive. The Islamists themselves failed or were made to fail in Egypt, not to mention the Syrian crisis, which sounded alarm bells for the majority of Jordanians. Jordanians preferred stability over the Syrian scenario or a scenario of chaos and violence. The Islamists’ failure to turn the Arab Spring to their advantage coincided with internal conflict that resulted in schisms and foreshadowed post-Islamism in Jordan.

### Internal Crisis and Schisms

The Arab Spring truly was the sufficient condition for schisms within the Muslim Brotherhood, but there is also a necessary condition for those schisms that dates to the lengthy period since Hamas was expelled from Jordan in 1999, which triggered the fury of the hawks within the movement. A hardline current that supported Hamas arose alongside the hawks, while another moderate current appeared and allied with the doves in the movement. The divisions within the movement peaked after the doves were blocked from the position of general controller in 2012 as a result of Hammam Saeed taking the position, ending the doves’ historical control over the post. The attempts to maintain the movement’s unity

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were unsuccessful and served as a prelude to schisms and the emergence of new parties that split off from the Muslim Brotherhood. The criteria of post-Islamism apply to those parties, as will be discussed in the next section.

The Outlook for Post-Islamism in Jordan

Many expert researchers see the future of Islamist reforms as lying in post-Islamism. Post-Islamism is an evolution or a synthesis for reconciling democracy and Islam. Until that happens, Islamist movements should separate religion and politics, and leave behind da’wah (Islamic evangelism), moving toward becoming civil political parties with organized programs based on equality and pluralism. The question in Jordan is whether those parties have actually reached the stage of committing to the democratic process and have stopped viewing themselves as religious movements, instead adopting civil, political agendas.

Here, it should be noted that the Brotherhood and the parties that split off from it have committed to peaceful political action as a result of the success of integration, plus official pressure. The fact is, the Brotherhood has always been motivated by achieving the goal of political survival, and we have observed how the schisms, the licensing of a new association, and the emergence of Zamzam and the Partnership and Rescue Party have affected the thinking of the movement’s leaders. The movement’s weakening pushed its leaders to moderate further and participate in the most recent parliamentary elections. But while the Brotherhood is conducting reconsiderations, they are lagging behind the platform of two new parties that emerged from the movement. Here we are talking specifically about the National Conference Party (Zamzam) and the Partnership and Rescue Party. The Brotherhood’s (the parent organization) actions do not reflect a genuine desire for ideological reconsiderations but are rather an attempt to reposition themselves under duress due to the development of domestic and regional circumstances.

The parties in post-Islamist Jordan are still nascent and have not yet had experiences in politics by which they can be judged. This does not prevent us from presenting a number of initial observations on these two new parties that are carrying the banner of post-Islamism.

The parties offer a new rhetoric that is not linked to the Brotherhood’s traditional rhetoric, and any careful reading of the new parties’ documents and arguments may prompt us to wonder whether they remain fundamentally Islamic. Believing in the civil state, the values of citizenship, and gender equality, and accepting pluralism and majority rule makes the parties more like secular democratic parties. We may therefore ask what the parties can offer as a unique contribution to political action, especially because other parties have adopted the same values and principles without making any real breakthrough among the Jordanian public. It cannot be merely prophesied that these two parties will be able to compete with the Brotherhood in the street. We must await elections in which all forces participate in order to trust in the solidity of so-called post-Islamism in the Jordanian context.

Why two parties, then? There are no apparent ideological differences between the two of them, and the leaders of both parties emerged from the nationalist and moderate reform wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. The issue may be one of personality. This is one of the reasons for the fragmentation of Jordanian party work in general, where the arena has witnessed the birth of many “national” parties alike in their programs and their inability to offer realistic programs that can be implemented.

The parties are generally led by a number of well-known Islamists who speak of a freely civil state and the values of citizenship, pluralism, and democracy. They see no problem with non-Muslims or women attaining positions of responsibility. Furthermore, there is no mention in the National Conference Party’s constitution of religious authority. For them, religion is a private matter and should not be up for debate in a society where the overwhelming majority of people are Muslim. In other words, these two parties are not identity-based. The most important issue
Post-Islamism is national reform, which surpasses any other identity, including the preoccupation with Islamic identity.

The parties’ shift to an intellectual and cultural mode different from that of the traditional Brotherhood enriches the party landscape in Jordan, but there is no guarantee that the parties will achieve a genuine political breakthrough because the political system in Jordan is generally ruled with a firm hand. Furthermore, the laws governing political action are generally unconducive to party work. In other words, the Jordanian state has never sought to encourage party work. All the laws, from the Parties Law to the Public Gatherings Law to the Election Law, do not encourage party work. This, in turn, promotes a societal culture adverse to the idea of political parties.

From another standpoint, we must consider that post-Islamism in Jordan resulted from a crisis within the Brotherhood and domestic and regional developments. These developments could continue to shape the reactions of these nascent parties and influence their course. External influences affect all parties, including Islamist and post-Islamist parties, and the way in which the parties generally approach these variables will have the greatest impact on their ability to make breakthroughs in the domestic political arena.

Ultimately, the most significant question is what factors enable post-Islamist movements or parties in Jordan to make a difference and present themselves as effective political forces in a restricted political context. Observers point to the fact that there are many, many political parties that profess values similar to those of the Partnership and Rescue Party and Zamzam. Why should we expect these two parties to succeed where all other parties have not? According to the literature on political parties, a party seeks to attain power or share in it. In order for that to be possible, the party has to participate in parliamentary elections. A party’s quest for electability depends on six main factors:

First, an appealing manifesto. For the party to have a chance to reach parliament and gain a challenging number of seats, it must have an
appealing platform that lays out the party’s plans and programs. This means that the party clearly discloses the outlines of its program in the event it comes to power, so that voters can decide if the program reflects their aspirations and therefore vote for this or that party. Additional effort is required to explain these two parties’ goals and programs, especially in light of a political culture that is anti-partisan for historical reasons, as outlined above.

Second, a sizable party base or membership. This is an extremely important factor that can strengthen the party’s chances of winning as many seats as possible in parliamentary elections. Politics is ultimately a numbers game. The more expansive a party’s popular base and membership, the higher its chances of achieving an electoral victory, and vice versa. This is a problem for Jordan’s parties other than the Islamic Action Front. The vast majority of the parties do not have a broad popular base or membership, and so they do not succeed in elections.

Third, available financial resources. This factor is one of the most absolutely important because electoral campaigns are often costly. In this sense, the availability of financial resources for spending on electoral campaigns is a significant factor in helping a party to win elections. Such resources finance activities and publicity in electoral campaigns, including advertisements and posters, and are also necessary for organizing rallies and marches.

Fourth, the personal attributes of the candidates in elections. A party that does not choose candidates well and does not consider their electability and political reputation is taking a risk in elections and likely to fail. The reverse is also true, that sometimes the presence of a charismatic figure in the candidate list redounds to the party’s favor in the election. In developed countries, candidates and their attributes, reputation, and national standing are extremely important factors that cannot be ignored if the party wants to win as many parliamentary seats as possible.

Fifth, a transparent political process. There is no doubt that the existence of transparent political procedures is extremely important because
such procedures affect the outcome of elections. Naturally, if the electoral process is transparent, the entities supervising that process cannot manipulate it. In the past, elections in Jordan have been marred by uncertainty, prompting many Jordanians to question the integrity of the elections. A party’s fortunes should not depend on the deep state’s good faith, and this can be guaranteed only if electoral procedures are highly transparent and fair.

Finally, a party cannot have an impact in elections if it does not have the ability to use media to broadcast its message clearly and counter any adverse publicity.

Therefore, the prospects of post-Islamist parties in Jordan are linked to their ability to reach Parliament, without which they will remain more of a political and academic exercise. The two parties have not yet presented practical and appealing programs and have not been able to muster sufficient financial resources to engage in real parliamentary campaigns. Although there are politically and socially accepted figures in the two parties known for competence and integrity, this factor, while important, will not be enough if the parties do not have the tools for political action.

This leads us to our final observation. It is true that Jordan has established an independent elections body that largely insures electoral transparency and integrity, but the state has the ability to intervene in the pre-election day process in a way that generally affects the outcome. The political landscape in Jordan is still in need of further serious reforms that would make political parties an option for a significant portion of the Jordanian public. The fact is, the two parties do not have a media apparatus, and they depend on their members’ social media activity and on media coverage that is sometimes selective and perhaps negative.

In my estimation, post-Islamist movements and parties will face significant challenges. They are still at the beginning of the road and will be between the hammer of the Brotherhood, which reclaimed a great deal of their prestige in the last elections, and the anvil of the laws governing
political action. Moreover, many of the conditions for any party’s success in parliamentary elections are lacking.

Conclusion

This study has touched on the Jordanian context and post-Islamist movements, addressing the prospects for such movements to operate in Jordan and giving consideration to the objective circumstances of the political game in Jordan.

We reached a preliminary conclusion on the prospects and future of the two post-Islamist parties, which is that in the short term, we do not foresee a major breakthrough led by the Partnership and Rescue Party and Zamzam, due to objective considerations. We understand that they represent a turning point in party work, but for objective reasons they cannot set themselves apart in the overall landscape in the foreseeable future. These two parties’ problem will deepen if the Brotherhood manages to conduct ideological reconsiderations that pull the rug from under the two parties’ feet. The parties are currently competing without an ideological base of the sort that distinguishes the Brotherhood and without real guarantees from the state.

If the political playing field remains unsettled in this way, and the political process remains recalcitrant, it will be difficult for these parties to have the future they desire. The problem of parties in Jordan goes beyond affecting political Islam exclusively, as no non-Islamist political party has come to power or led political activity for a long time. If it were the Brotherhood in the official bullseye, we would understand it, but the prevailing mindset in the deep state does not tolerate the possibility of parties sharing in power independently of the deep state’s wishes and agendas. Thus, activating party work in general relies first and last on the existence of a political will to carry out a package of political reforms, and I do not foresee that Jordan will accept this in the near future.
List of Researchers

Mohammed Abu Rumman

Researcher specializing in political ideology and Islamic movements at the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies. Holds a Ph.D. in political theory philosophy from the Faculty of Economy and Political Science, Cairo University. Writer for Jordan’s *Al-Ghad* daily newspaper; author of many books and publications, including “The Islamic Solution in Jordan: Islamists, the State, and the Stakes of Democracy and Security” with co-author Hassan Abu Hanieh; “The Islamic State: The Sunni Crisis and Conflict Over Global Jihad,” with co-author Hassan Abu Hanieh; “Martyrdom Lovers: Jihadi Women from Al-Qaeda to Islamic State,” with co-author Hassan Abu Hanieh; “I Am a Salafi: A Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis”; “Salafists and the Arab Spring”; “The Conflict Over Salafism”; “From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring,” with co-author Dr. Neven Bondokji; and “The Sociology of Extremism and Terrorism in Jordan,” with co-author Dr. Musa Shtiwi.

Hassan Abu Hanieh

Researcher in Islamic movement affairs. Has many publications, including: “Women and Politics from the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan”; co-author of “Salafi Jihadism in Jordan Following Zarqawi’s Death: An Approach to Identity, a Crisis of Leadership, and an Obscure Vision”; co-author of “Conservative Salafism, Islamization of Society, and Ambiguous Relations with the State”; “Sufi Practices, God’s

Luz Gómez

Associate professor of Arab Studies at the University of Madrid. Her research focuses on Islamist rhetoric around power and ideology in post-colonial and global frameworks. Her latest work is the book *Diccionario de islam e islamismo*. She is the author of the book *Marxismo, islam e islamismo: el proyecto de AdilHusayn*. She has won the Spanish National Translation Award for the Mahmoud Darwish novel *En presencia de la ausencia*. She is a major political analyst for the *El País* newspaper in Spain.

Abdul Ghani Imad

Professor in the Doctoral School of Literature, Humanities & Social Sciences at the Lebanese University and former dean of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Lebanese University. Has published more than 35 articles in periodicals on religion, politics, and society, including: “Islamists and the Revolution from Dawa to the State: The Problem of Producing a Model and Creating Rhetoric,” “Islamists Movements in Lebanon: Religion and Politics in a Diverse Society,” “The Culture of Violence in the Sociology of Zionist Politics,” “Culture and Communications Technology: Changes and Transformations in the Era of Globalization and the Arab Spring,” “The Sociology of Culture: Concepts and Problems From Modernization to Globalization,” “Lebanon’s Islamists: Unity and Disagreement on Impossible Ground,” “Islamists Between Revolution and the State,” and “The Sociology of Identity.” Also supervised the encyclopedia *Islamist Movements in the Arab Nation*, issued by the Center for Arab Unity Studies. Has also had several studies published in various Arabic periodicals and magazines.
Khalil Al-Anani

Director of the Political Science and International Relations Program at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies in Qatar. Previously taught at Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University, George Washington University, George Mason University, and Durham University. His research focuses on comparative politics, democracy, religion, politics, Islamist movements, social movements, Egyptian politics, identity politics, and Arab politics.

Has published several books in English and Arabic, including *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2016; co-editor of *Elections and Democracy in the Middle East*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; and *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt*, Dar el-Shourouk, Cairo, 2007. Has also published several academic articles in leading periodicals such as *The Middle East Journal*, Sociology of Islam, and Digest of Middle East Studies. Has also published policy articles and editorials in major media outlets, including the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, CNN, and The Monitor.

Al-Anani holds a Ph.D. in political science from Durham University, and master’s and bachelor’s degrees in political science from Cairo University.

Rachid Mouqtadir

Professor of political science and constitutional law at the University of Hassan II, Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences Ain-Chock-Casablanca, member of the executive office of the Moroccan Political Science Society and academic adviser to the Maghareb Centre for Studies of Human Society. The researcher has several scientific books published in Morocco and abroad, most prominently: *Electoral Entitlements in Morocco: Approaches for Understanding the 4 September 2015 Municipal and Local Elections*, sponsored by the Maghareb Centre for Studies of Human Society, First Edition, September 2016; *Reform Islamists and Authority in Morocco: Interviews on Governing and Politics*,...

**Nabil Al-Bukairi**

Holds a master’s degree in political society and a bachelor’s degree in Arabic and translation from Sana’a University in 2006. Also holds a postgraduate diploma in political society from Damascus University and a diploma in journalism with the British Broadcasting Corporation. Currently a journalist and researcher specializing in Islamic thought and movements and a researcher on international strategies with several international centers. President of the Arab Studies Forum in Sana’a, 2012-2015. Has several books and publications, including the book Political Arguments and Religion in the Experience of the Islamist Al-Islah Party, which is still in print, and the book Political Sectarianism: A Reading of the Yemeni Situation.

**Mohammed Ihsan Aliyev (also known as Ihsan Ali Fauzi)**

Founder and director of Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy, Paramadina Foundation, and a lecturer at the Paramadina Graduate Studies School, Jakarta. After completing his university studies in the Faculty of Theology and Philosophy at the SyarifHidayatullah State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Jakarta, he studied history and political science at Ohio University, Athens, and Ohio State University, Columbus, in the United States. His articles have been published in several widely circulated newspapers and magazines such as Kompas, Koran
Tempo, Tempo Magazine, The Jakarta Post (mostly in Bahasa, Indonesia), as well as in academic circles, such as StudiaIslamika, Asian Survey, and New Mandala (in English). Also supervises publications and research for PUSAD Paramadina: Disputed Churches in Jakarta (2014), Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia (2015), and Basudura Stories of Peace from Maluku (2017).

Emad Abshenas

Journalist and professor at the University of Tehran. Holds a Ph.D. in political science – international relations from the University of Tehran, a master’s degree in political science and Middle East studies from the University of Iran; founded Iran Diplomatic magazine and the Iran Press station in 2014. He served as general director and editor-in-chief of the government newspaper Iran Daily from 2008 to 2015. He has several analytical articles and interviews in Farsi, Arabic, and English through various media outlets as a political, social, and economic analyst. He also serves as a media adviser and a political analyst for several Iranian officials and foreign diplomats in Tehran.

Ali Taher Al-Hamoud


Ghaith Al-Qudah

A founder of the Partnership and Rescue Party – Jordan; former member of the Islamic Action Front party. Eng. Ghaith al-Qudah was
chairman of the Tla al-Ali branch of the Islamic Action Front in 2015 and head of the party’s Youth Division from 2009 to 2013. Was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan before resigning in 2016. Participated in many international conferences on political Islam, the fight against extremism and terrorism, and youth action in the Arab World. Recently, he established the Sa’is Center for Research and Studies in Amman.

**Hassan Barari**

Dr. Barari is currently a professor of International Relations and Middle East politics at the University of Jordan. Prior to that, he was a professor of Middle East politics at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and at Yale University. He also served as a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) based in Washington, D.C. for the year 2006-07. From 2001-2006, he was a senior researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan. He received his Ph.D. from Durham University in England, his MA from Leeds University in England and his BA from the University of Jordan. He is a columnist for the English *Jordan Times*. He is also a frequent commentator for key Arab and international TV stations.

Post-Islamism
A New Phase or Ideological Delusions?

Although the use of the “post-Islamism” term dates back decades, in particular to the 1990s, it has once again returned to the spotlight, more prominently now than ever, as several Islamist movements are advancing further on the path to accepting democracy, political pluralism, and power sharing. Several Islamist movements in the Arab and Islamic world today are announces an embrace of public and individual freedoms, then advocating a separation of religion and politics.

This book (which includes the regional conference’s papers that was conducted in May 2018) the examines “post-Islamism” concept, its legitimacy and credibility as a fundamental shift in the Islamists’ rhetoric and behavior, as well as the causes leading to it, and the conditions, obstacles, and realistic models of this concept or its approximates, both in the Arab or Muslim world, and both Sunni or Shiite.