From Caliphate to Civil State
The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring

By Mohammad Suliman AbuRumman

Transl. by William Joseph Ward

Published in 2018 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq

FES Jordan & Iraq
P.O. Box 941876
Amman 11194
Jordan
Email: fes@fes-jordan.org
Website: www.fes-jordan.org

Not for Sale

© FES Jordan & Iraq

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the editor.

Translation: Industry Arabic

Cover design: Yousef Saraireh
Lay-out: Eman Khattab
Printing: Economic Press

ISBN: 978-9957-484-82-8
Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman
Dr. Neven Bondokji

From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
The “Arab Spring” brought change to most Arab countries in one way or another. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was effected economically, politically and demographically by events in neighbouring countries. Among the most notable direct impacts on Jordan was the change the “Arab Spring” brought for the Muslim Brotherhood. Before 2011 there was only one political party to represent it: the Islamic Action Front (IAF). This has changed. Disagreements between party leadership and party youth, controversial debates about the lessons learnt from regime changes in Egypt and Tunis and the exodus of many members with roots from the east bank of the River Jordan have let to the establishment of three new parties. Two of these parties are described by Mohammad Abu Rumman and Niveen Bondokji as Post Political Islam parties: They are deeply rooted in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood but have at the same time overcome some of its doctrines.

I am grateful to both authors for providing us with insights on some significant changes of the map of political Islam in Jordan. By interviewing youth and leaders both from the National Conference Party (Zamzam) and Partnership & Rescue Party and comparing their intellectual discourse with the traditional approach of IAF members and leaders they gained a number of very interesting insights. The different approaches on the relation
between religious advocacy and politics are among the topics that I found most interesting. The authors also raise the important question whether the IAF will manage to remain a national political force or might rather turn into an entity that represents Jordanians with Palestinian roots only.

FES Jordan started in 2007 a series of publication on Political Islam. Ever since 16 publications have seen the light of day, each one of them not for sale, but for open distribution among the interested public. Since Political Islam still has a quite notable influence on Arab and Muslim societies it is my believe that understanding its history, its development and the debates within the movements of Political Islam are crucial to the understanding of Arab and Muslim societies. I am convinced that a healthy knowledge of the developments in this field are of importance not only for academics of Social Sciences but for all who attempt to engage into development or governance related work in the region.

FES seeks to contribute with its research and its programs to the vision of democratic transformation that His Majesty King Abdalllah II formulated in his famous discussion papers (2012 to 2017).
# Table of Contents

**Introduction**  
Objectives of the Book  
Methodology of the Study  
Limitations of the Study  

Chapter One The State and the Muslim Brotherhood:  
A Winding  
In the Stage of Amity and Coexistence  
Transformation in the Relationship: Reasons and Results  
With King Abdullah II: Elements and Dynamics of the Crisis  
The Relationship’s Constraints and Possibilities  
Conclusion  

Chapter Two: Internal Changes: Organizational Mobilization and Intellectual Debates  
The Qutbist Wave  
Attitude Towards Democracy  
Controversy over the “National Question”  
Findings and Conclusions for 2018  
Conclusion  

Chapter Three: “Post-Islamist” Parties  
National Congress Party – Zamzam  
A. Founding Circumstances  
B. Intellectual Discourse  
C. Organizational Structure  
D. Activities and Political Orientation  
Licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society  
A. Founding Circumstances  
B. New Methodology  
Partnership and Rescue Party  
A. Founding Circumstances  
B. Party By-Laws  
C. New Thinking and Different Discourse  
Conclusion
Table of Contents

Foreign Experiences, Both Successes and Failures 204
The Popular Movement and Rapprochement with Non-Islamists 209
Accumulation of Practical Experience 209
Conclusion 210

Conclusion 215

Bibliography 221
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
INTRODUCTION

The Arab Spring witnessed significant changes among Islamic movements. This moment acted as the main “test” of these movements’ intentions, and of the credibility of their previous statements regarding their belief in democracy and their acceptance of political pluralism and rotation of power.

While the new Islamic experiment in governance was somewhat successful in some countries and failed in others, the questions related to the above-mentioned concepts remain open and controversial. Moreover, these questions are even more urgent given the rise of extremism, violence, and terrorism, and the debate over the civil state, human rights, and the enforcement of Islamic Shari’a, as well as Islamic-secular polarization.

The Islamists’ actual experiences in governance have not yet produced definitive and comprehensive answers. This is true whether one looks at what occurred in Egypt, with the reversal of democratic progress and the reinstatement of the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party (now considered terrorist movements), or what occurred in Tunisia and Morocco, where the Islamists participate in governance and in drafting laws and constitutions. The negotiations and conversations regarding the Islamists’ true agenda are ongoing. The path of these experiences relies
more on the balance of power and the political characteristics of the regimes than on Islamic ideologies, and whether they exhibit or conceal a deep belief (or the contrary) in democracy as a definite system for governance and for the state.

One of the problems of previous Islamic experiences was doubts regarding the credibility of the Islamic discourse on democracy, and whether this discourse has penetrated, and been accepted by, the Islamist base and by the young people that are active in these Islamist groups. Likewise, there are doubts surrounding the credibility of these groups’ renunciation of their former ideas regarding the establishment of an Islamic state and the enforcement of Islamic Shari’a.

There are also doubts regarding the degree to which Islamists understand the consequences of their announced acceptance of democracy, human rights, public freedoms, and political pluralism. In other words, there are doubts regarding their conception of democracy and its tenets, significance, and philosophy generally.

This type of “grey area” in the question of the Islamists and democracy raised a group of questions in the intense debate in Arab media and politics, and fueled the fears of many social groups towards the Islamists. These groups include religious minorities, women, and other secular and liberal currents. The discussions moved from the question of the Islamists’ general position on democracy towards more precise, specialized, and penetrating questions, such as:

What is the Islamists’ position on individual and private freedoms? What are the limits that could check these freedoms through legislation and laws?

What is the Islamists’ vision of the rights of religious minorities, not just as relates to their holding official and
high-level positions in the state, but as relates to the state’s social and cultural policies, the sources of its laws, and the recognition of the identities of these minorities?

What is the Islamists’ position on women, on their political rights and personal freedoms? Moreover, what is the Islamists’ position on women generally?

What is the Islamists’ conception of democracy, pluralism, rotation of power, and the rights of an opposition that has an ideology that is alien to their religious perspective?

What is the Islamists’ position on ideological and religious freedoms, and the freedom of expression, art, and culture? What are the limits that they see as acceptable and unacceptable? Do they think it is necessary to impose these limits using the force of legislation, the laws, and the executive authority, or would they leave this to civil society?

What is the Islamists’ position on the civil state and the Islamic or religious state? Does their acceptance of democracy mean the abdication of their historical and ideological aspirations to form an Islamic state? How can this be justified in relation to Islamic jurisprudence and Shari’a?

In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, went through several internal shake-ups during their history. Since 2007, when the conflict between the doves and the hawks intensified, these internal disputes have become more apparent. The media has covered these disputes, and members of the party and the group have spoken about them. However, since the start of the Arab Spring, there have been other developments in both the internal debates and visible schisms.
For example, the constitutional monarchy initiative in the years from 2008 to 2010, proposed by Rahil Gharaibeh, one of the leaders and thinkers of the group at that time, was one aspect of the internal disputes. The Muslim Brotherhood was quick to reject this suggestion and label it Gharaibeh’s personal opinion. This was repeated in 2016 when Zaki Bani Irsheid expressed an opinion on the civil state, and the members of the party and the group criticized it and labeled it a personal judgment, saying that this opinion did not represent them. It is important to note that the two above-mentioned ideas were circulated and discussed inside the group before Gharaibeh and Bani Irsheid stated them publicly.

The deeper problem lies in the limited opportunities for internal or self-reform inside the party and the Muslim Brotherhood. This is what pushed Rahil Gharaibeh, Nabil Kofahi, and others to split from the group in 2013 and form the National Conference Party-Zamzam. At that time, the Muslim Brotherhood expelled them from the group. Following this, Abdul Majid Thneibat and other members of the Muslim Brotherhood submitted an official request to the government to license the Muslim Brotherhood. According to what was reported at the time, they did this without first agreeing with the group itself. The government granted the license in 2015, which led to the presence of two groups in Jordan going by the name of the Muslim Brotherhood. The limits of the potential for internal reform were made even clearer when Salem Falahat and other members of the group founded the Partnership and Rescue Party in 2017, in support of finding an inclusive party framework built on partnership with the other Jordanian political forces and on the principles of the civil state.

Since 2011, this general framework of internal disputes and splits has formed the overall picture of the internal crisis
within the original Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front.

The Islamist movements and Islamist youth of the region were influenced by various experiences and examples. Chief among these is the Arab Spring, and the subsequent successes and failures of the Islamist movements across the region, especially the paradoxical experiences of Egypt and Tunisia. Before that, however, the rise of the Turkish role in leading the Justice and Development Party served as a model. The Muslim Brotherhood movement as a whole, before the schisms, strived to benefit from these lessons and to work within the Jordanian context, and within the movement’s conceptions of its relationship to the state in Jordan.

**Objectives of the Book**

This book discusses the effect of the Arab Spring on the changes experienced by the young people in the Islamic movement in Jordan. This includes those that either resigned or were expelled from the parent organization after they joined the National Conference Party-Zamzam, and those that chose to join the Partnership and Rescue Party. This includes both those who resigned from the parent organization and those who are still members in it. The book also looks at the changes experienced by the young men in the parent organization and in the Islamic Action Front.

This book is based on the hypothesis that the Arab Spring, and the regional experiences and the divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan that followed, led to personal and collective changes among young Islamists. Therefore, the book studies the reasons for these changes and their ideological manifestations, and the practical and party choic-
es that followed, whether in the Islamic parties or other political parties in Jordan, in four ways:

First, the most prominent sign of these changes can be found in the literature on the civil state published by the three parties that are the focus of the study (the Islamic Action Front, Zamam, and Partnership and Rescue), and their position on pluralism, democracy, the separation of proselytizing from politics, public rights, and the rights of minorities. Therefore, in this book, we discuss these concepts and their definitions according to the young people in these parties, in order to examine the problems and limitations from the point of view of both the leadership of these parties, and the young people who are their members.

Secondly, the book examines the similarities and differences among the positions of the members of these parties, with the goal of comparing the three groups. Third, the book discusses to what extent the leaders and young members of a single party are of one mind, and to what extent their opinions differ. The aim is to better understand the magnitude of the gap, if one exists, between the leadership and young members and also the extent of, and reasons for, agreement among them.

Fourth, the book analyzes the political, psychological, ideological, and organizational factors that led to change and transformation in the ideas and convictions of young Islamists, and some of their leaders, following the Arab Spring, in order to understand the different aspects of these changes and their causes, and forecast the extent of their future effect on politics in Jordan.

The book presents a general picture of the debate around the civil state versus the Islamic state and the Islamic
point of reference as it emerged in the literature of these three parties. It also examines the separation of proselytizing and politics – as seen by young Islamists – and the problems of implementation related to public rights, the rights of minorities and “supra-constitutional principles.”

**Methodology of the Study**

In this study, we relied on the descriptive analytic method in the first three chapters, which present a critical historical reading of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan, and of the ideological and political backgrounds that led to the creation of the three parties in question. These chapters also touch on the licensing of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in 2015, and prior to that, the founding of the Al Wasat (Centrist) Party in 1997.

In the subsequent chapters, we relied on two methods. The first is discourse analysis, which studies and analyzes political discourse. This allows us to study the intersections in the religious, political, and socio-psychological discourse in the opinions of the participants of the study and in their narratives, the strengths and weaknesses of this discourse, and its historical and functional relationship to the political and historical context in which it emerged. It also allows us to compare this discourse to the prior literature of the Islamic movement in Jordan, and elsewhere.

---

The analysis in these chapters is also built on grounded theory,\(^{(2)}\) which is concerned with studying the discourse and the opinions presented, and analyzing them without imposing prior research judgements or angles that might influence the kinds of opinions presented. This methodology opens the field to as wide an array of different opinions as possible, then examines them in order to reach a general understanding and develop critical hypotheses to understand the questions being studied.

Based on this, in December 2017 and January 2018, the authors organized individual meetings with several leaders in the three parties, as well as discussions with young members of these parties who had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood or were otherwise close to the group. In these meetings, we relied on a small number of questions to direct the discussion, and then left the floor open to the participants to present a full explanation of their opinions. Then, we collected, organized, and analyzed these opinions to form a comprehensive picture of the changes that they experienced, their limits, causes, and practical implications.

**Limitations of the Study**

Here, it is important to mention the limits of the study. The sample group with which we met was comprised of 30 individuals from among the young members and the leadership. Of course, this sample does not provide a precise representation of all the individuals that faced and dealt with the ideological changes under study. However, the book presents

a theory and conception of these changes based on this limited sample. Perhaps future studies should focus on the aspects and causes of the changes and their practical consequences in a comprehensive study of each party individually, or look at a wider sample across these parties together.

Another limitation of the study is the absence of any representation of female members, as the sample with which we met did not include any female members of these parties, despite our efforts to focus on their participation in the meetings. Therefore, the views of female members are completely absent from the outcomes of this study. Future studies can focus on the viewpoints of female members specifically, and study the changes that they experienced, including the practical changes that affect them in these parties compared to the parent organization.

The final limitation is the fact that members of the licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society were not included in this study, because they did not form a political party that represents them. However, as we will explain later, they did express that Zamzam Party is the closest to them politically. Thus, we have excluded the original Muslim Brotherhood and the licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society from this study, and focused only on the three political parties.

**Chapters of the Book**

This book contains eight chapters. The first three chapters discuss the general historical and political context, and the discussions and debates that led to the emergence of the three parties that are the subject of this study. The first chapter looks at the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan,
its relationship to the state, and the tensions that plagued this relationship. The second chapter focuses on the internal transformations within the Islamic movement in its modern history in Jordan, both ideologically and organizationally. The third chapter studies the circumstances that led to the creation of the National Conference-Zamzam Party and the Partnership and Rescue Party, and their effect on changing the map of political Islam in Jordan. These parties represent post-political Islam trends.

The later chapters in the book analyze the changes in the literature, ideas, and practices of the parties that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan. We focus in the fourth chapter on the concept of the civil state and the debate around freedoms as they emerged in the modern literature of these parties, and in the discourse and opinions of their leaders. The fifth chapter discusses the concept of the civil state, and its relationship to the Islamic state and Islamic sources, as understood by the young members of these parties.

The sixth chapter discusses the debate around the separation between proselytizing and politics, and how the young people in these parties view this separation and its practical implications and theoretical justifications. The seventh chapter analyzes the views of the members and leaders of these parties on public rights and the rights of minorities by looking at their understanding of freedom in the framework of the state that they seek to establish. This chapter also discusses their conception of supra-constitutional principles, and to what degree they are suited, in the Jordanian context, to protecting rights in the face of temporary parliamentary majorities.

In its eighth chapter, the book concludes by examining the reasons for the young brothers’ ideological changes, and
the factors that motivated them to change or amend their convictions, whether personal factors, internal factors within the original Muslim Brotherhood, or regional factors related to both the mature and failed Islamist experiments in the region. In this way, we try to examine the extent of these changes, and the causes that led to the ideological transformations that we detailed in the preceding chapters.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was founded in 1946, at the same time that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan gained independence. Prior to that, the Brotherhood had established a presence and formed a group in Palestine, then moved to Amman. It then registered as a group that engaged in various cultural, political, and religious work and activities.

Throughout its history, which began in 1946 and continues until today, spanning more than seven decades, the Brotherhood went through several phases and different transformations, in its cultural, social, and political role, its relationship with the governing regime, its organizational structure and internal trends, and its ideological and intellectual discourse. This winding path included the group’s announcement of the formation of the Islamic Action Front party in 1992, following the passage of the political parties law and the return of parliamentary life in 1989. The party became a representative for the Brotherhood in political life. However, the group did not cede the floor entirely to the party, whether in terms of political participation (the group ran shared lists with the party), or in terms of the party’s organi-
izational independence. The group had notable influence, or, to be more precise, dominance, over the party.

In this chapter, we will discuss the main political stages in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history, from the founding of the Islamic Action Front, to the trends within the organization and the disputes among them, to, finally, the development of the organization’s and the party’s political and ideological discourse.

In the Stage of Amity and Coexistence

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1945, meaning its official age is the same as that of the kingdom, which received its independence in 1946. The Brotherhood began its work in Jordanian society as a charitable religious organization, focused on cultural, political, and social issues. The founders and original members of the group were elite businessmen and dignitaries, and they had a good relationship with Prince Abdullah I during the period of the group’s founding. There was an exchange of letters between the Prince and the imam Hassan Al-Banna, the general guide of the group in Egypt. (3)

In the 1950’s, the Brotherhood’s activities developed and moved more in the direction of politics and public work, alongside its interest in social and charitable work. It established the newspaper Al-Kifah Al-Islami in 1954, and its members participated in the protests and marches against Jordan’s joining the Baghdad Pact in 1955. It also participated in the parliamentary elections of 1956, and four repre-

sentatives from the movement won in their elections. They gave confidence to the government of Suleiman Nabulsi in 1956, which was formed by the National Union Party in agreement with the socialist and Baathist parties, despite the clear animosity between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian and Egyptian organizations that sponsored these forces.

In 1957, martial law was imposed, and political parties were abolished. No one was left in the arena except the Muslim Brotherhood (they were not an official political party like the others, since they were registered as an association). They formed the Islamic Center Society in 1963, from which sprung a network of schools, colleges, health centers, and societies linked with economic, social, and service work. Over a period of decades, it formed one of the main channels of the group’s relationship to the public.

The Muslim Brotherhood strengthened their presence in society during the 1960s. In the 1970s they avoided involvement in the state’s military confrontations with the Palestinian factions. They were closer to the regime’s side during these events, despite the fact that they had participated in the “Sheikhs’ bases” in 1969, in order to train to support the Palestinian cause.

The 1970s was the decade in which the Muslim Brotherhood’s social presence in Jordan was truly established. There are three main reasons for this:

The first reason is the 1967 war, which, in the opinion of researchers, analysts, and historians, led to the start of the rise of what is called “the Islamic tide,” and the ebb of the cultural and social influence of the nationalist and leftist trends, which had flourished in the 1950s and 1960s. The
1970s was the stage in which the social and cultural seeds were planted for the rise of the Islamic current in the Arab world, and then in Jordan.

The second reason is that most leftist Palestinian organizations and forces left Jordan during the 1970s, and went to fight in Lebanon, which had transformed into the battleground for the feda’yeen [Palestinian guerilla fighters]. Eventually, the Muslim Brotherhood attracted a wide segment of society. Jordanian society became an open arena for the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities, for the group to both take root and spread, especially since the state did not resist these activities, but rather may have welcomed the fact that they filled the gap left by the Palestinian forces, especially in the Palestinian camps (Amman, Irbid, Balqa’, Zarqa, and Russeifa) and the surrounding areas, and in working class Palestinian neighborhoods. (4)

(4) Some politicians discuss the theory that Wasfi Al-Tal’s government pursued a policy of filling the gap left by the absence of the Palestinian organizations by permitting the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities. Adnan Abu Odeh, who was one of the most prominent political figures at this time, disagrees with this opinion. He was the Information Minister in Wasfi Al-Tal’s government, and in subsequent governments. He points out that the state appointed Ishaq Farhan the Minister of Education (in Wasfi Al-Tal’s government at that time), and allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to continue to function because they (the Brotherhood) stood on the sidelines during the 1970s, and did not participate in armed activities with the Palestinian organizations. So, the state wanted to win the group over to its side. However, the state’s policies did not treat the group as an alternative to the Palestinian organizations, and, according to Abu Odeh, it is not at all possible that this was the case. As evidence of this, he points to the creation of the National Union in the 1970s to protect the internal situation in the country, and defend society from fracture and division. The National Union was the proposed alternative, not the Muslim Brotherhood.
Some researchers and critics believe that Dr. Ishaq Farhan, Minister of Education from the time of Wasfi Al-Tal’s government until Zaid Al-Rifai’s government (1970-1974), was on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood.\(^{(5)}\) It is as though they think that the state was colluding with the Muslim Brotherhood to Islamicize education, society, and culture, despite the fact that Farhan was suspended from the group because he agreed to participate in the government without the approval of the Brotherhood leadership.

It is not possible to reduce the reasons for the Brotherhood’s influence and growing power during the 1970s to this one cause, i.e. that the space was open to them in the country. There were also societal transformations towards an Islamic identity that began to emerge noticeably during this time period.\(^{(6)}\)

The third reason is martial law and the state of emergency, which banned party activities. The Muslim Brotherhood leveraged their social and service work, and their presence in the mosques in particular, to spread their discourse and to change the collective culture. The Brotherhood’s discourse itself during this period was connected to issues of

---

\(^{(5)}\) He served as Minister of Education and Islamic Affairs for nearly three years (in Wasfi’s government, then in the two governments of Ahmad Lozi), and Minister of Awqaf in Zaid Al-Rifai’s first government (March 1973) before he resigned from the government (during a ministerial change in November 1973). See: Nibal Taysir Al-Khamas. The Jordanian Ministries 1921-2011: Ninety Years Since the First Jordanian Ministry. Publications of the Publishing and Printing Department: Amman, pp. 131-137.

\(^{(6)}\) It is notable that Mudar Badran succeeded Ishaq Farhan in 1973 as Minister of Education in Zaid Al-Rifai’s government. He was followed by Thouqan Hindawi (who has a nationalist orientation), who served in the position for around three years, or almost the same length of time that Farhan served as Minister of Education. If he had found radical changes in the curriculums, he would have changed them. See: Nibal Khamas, ibid., pp. 135-148.
Islamic identity, confronting secular and Westernizing trends, and asserting a holistic Islamic solution.

The fourth reason is that the 1970s witnessed a large increase in the numbers of Jordanians and Palestinians that went to work in the Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates. In these countries, there was a notable increase in the activities of the Brotherhood and the Salafis (who were influenced by the Brotherhood) who had fled the bloody conflicts with the regimes in their countries, in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Saudi Arabia welcomed them and allowed them to teach in its schools and universities, so they had a large influence on young people, and on the Jordanians working and studying there during these years. The number of Jordanians in the Gulf countries increased with the emergence of the “oil boom.”

In the 1980s, the Brotherhood’s presence and influence in society was strengthened as a result of the four above-mentioned factors. This period formed a “golden age” for the Islamist rise in Jordan in education, universities, unions, schools, and social, volunteer, and charitable work. Likewise, the activities of those members of the Brotherhood who escaped to Jordan from Syria after the events of Hama in 1982 contributed to the growth of this influence. They participated in founding libraries and business ventures. All of this served to anchor and strengthen Islamic ideas in the collective culture, and to increase the Brotherhood’s social and organizational capital as well. (7)

(7) For example, several libraries and publishing houses with a Brotherhood and Salafi character were established starting from the 1970s, or since the beginning of the first confrontations, until the mid-1980s. These include Al-Maktab Al-Islami, Modern Message Publishing, Al-Maktaba Al-Islamiyya, Ammar Publishing House, Al-Basheer Publishing House for Publishing and Distribution, and Al-Furqan Library. Most of these libraries contributed
The relationship was not—as some imagined—a strategic alliance between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, whether formal or tacit, but was rather closer to an alignment of interests when faced with a shared enemy. The two sides were facing shared regional and internal enemies. However, there were crises and major problems between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state. The Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Abdulrahman Khalifa, was arrested more than once in the 1950s, as a result of the Brotherhood’s position on the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the declaration of martial law. Muslim Brotherhood preachers and activists were beleaguered in several arenas.

However, the important difference that distinguishes this period (i.e. the 1950s to the mid-1980s) is the fact that the situation did not reach the point of all-out conflict between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood at any time during this period. Likewise, neither side considered destroying the other. At no point during this period did the state consider the Muslim Brotherhood an opponent, an enemy, or the primary threat to the regime. The state did complain about some of the Brotherhood’s behaviors, and the Brotherhood likewise grumbled about some of the regime’s policies, but neither side saw the other as an enemy or an opponent. There were others who played that role for both the state and the organization.

greatly to spreading Islamic ideological consciousness, or a consciousness influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and its thinkers, and also by the Salafi trend, especially with the presence of Sheikh Nasiruddin Al-Albani, the founder of traditional Salafism in Jordan, starting in the beginning of the 1980s. This was a basis for the subsequent clear and rapid spread of Salafi thinking, in its different forms, in Jordanian society in the 1980s and 1990s.
Transformation in the Relationship: Reasons and Results

“The seeds of transformation” began in the mid-1980s, in a message from King Hussein to Hafez Al-Assad during Zaid Al-Rifai’s government. In this letter, the king used unprecedented language against the Muslim Brotherhood, and accused them of tricking him. He also admitted that the Syrian members of the Brotherhood in Jordan had been plotting against the Syrian regime from Amman. This led to questioning and confusion on the part of the Jordanian Brotherhood, especially since there were not any warning signs or precedents for this frank speech against them. (8)

Under Zaid Al-Rifai’s government (the fourth, 1985-1989), the Muslim Brotherhood noticed that the group was being targeted. Politicians confirm that this was on the agenda of this government, which had begun, in practice, the policies of blocking the Brotherhood, and reducing its presence in the state’s institutions. This included the dismissal of the secretary-general of the Ministry of Education, Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyat (he later became the speaker of parliament after the democratic revival), preventing the Muslim Brotherhood’s preachers from giving sermons, and dismissing several of the other members of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership. (9)

(8) Politicians (with whom we met) insinuated that the prime minister at that time, Zaid Al-Rifai, is the one who wrote the letter, the goal of which was repairing Jordan’s relationship with the Syrian regime after the major crisis of this relationship in the 1980s. The late King Hussein had begun growing closer to Saddam Hussein at the end of the 1970s. The politicians point out that Al-Rifai had a clear agenda against the Brotherhood.

(9) Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyat mentions in his memoir (A Politician Remembers) that, when he was secretary general of the Ministry of Education, the Minister of Education came to him with the names of dozens of people to be forced into retirement, with the justification that they were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. He refused to carry out this order. See: Mohammad Khair Al-Rawashdeh. “Arabiyat: The Minister of Education Came to My
The efforts to restrict the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities were halted for several years because of the popular uprising in 1989, which pushed King Hussein to revive the country’s democratic life and hold parliamentary elections that same year. In these elections, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a singular political force that enjoyed great popularity. The Muslim Brotherhood won 22 out of 80 total seats, in addition to the other seats that were won by independent Islamists. This reflected, first, the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strength in the streets and, secondly, the change in the societal mood towards favoring religious discourse. Evidence of this is the fact that in addition to the Muslim Brotherhood, prominent independent Islamists also won, such as Dr. Ali Al-Faqir, Laith Shubeilat, and Yaqoub Qarrash.(10)

The Brotherhood’s significant strength was a “warning bell” for the state’s apparatus and institutions, which had not expected this outcome. However, the ramifications of this did not provoke a state of concern and apprehension between them. The Gulf crisis of 1990 led the two sides (the state and the Brotherhood) to take a unified stance. Indeed, a group of Muslim Brotherhood leaders participated in the government of Mudar Badran in 1991, by taking five ministerial portfolios in a change to the government composition. They had given his government confidence, after Badran had agreed to

---

a set of conditions made by the group in exchange for their granting confidence and participating in the government. (11)

Salem Falahat, the former Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood, says that 1989 was a significant turning point in the history of the organization. Despite their prior participation in the parliamentary elections during the 1950s, and in the Advisory Council elections in the 1980s, their participation in 1989 was different. It put them at the forefront of the political powers, and as leaders of the street as well. Also, the elections ushered them into the political field through its widest doors. They participated in the government and in drafting the National Charter. Abdul Latif Arabiyat became the speaker of parliament and transformed into a major political player.

With the return of parliamentary life in 1989, there began a process of sifting through the laws and legislation in order to remove the martial law provisions and their effects. The political parties law was passed, and the Muslim Brotherhood established the Islamic Action Front party, and received a license for it in 1992. Subsequently, they engaged in political action in different and varied ways: in parliament and the unions, among students, and in politics, the media, and culture. (12)

(11) See the details of this: Salem Falahat. The Islamic Movement in Jordan, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 32-34.

(12) Several new Islamic organizations have been established since that time, such as Al-Rabat newspaper in 1990, then Assabeel newspaper in 1995, the Islamic Studies and Research Association in 1990, the Association for the Protection of the Holy Quran in 1993, and the private Zarqa University (although its ownership changed later, but members of the Brotherhood took part in establishing the university).
In 1992, signposts of a new stage in the relationship between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood began to emerge with the passage of the One Vote Law, which the Muslim Brotherhood saw as seeking to undermine their presence in the parliament. Likewise, similar processes began in various universities, unions, and institutions.

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s objections to the One Vote Law, and the way in which the former parliament was dissolved, they decided to participate in the general elections of 1993 and won 17 seats. However, the state of crisis and conflict with the regime continued. The policy of weakening and restricting the Muslim Brotherhood became dominant in the political regime.

What are the reasons for this transformation in the relationship between the state and the organization during the period of the 1990s, and the emergence of a period of conflict between them?

Mainly, the conditions for the relationship of coexistence between the regime and the state came to an end during the preceding decades. The nationalists and leftists, and the organizations that fostered them, were no longer the main threat to the legitimacy and stability of the state. These groups did not move the street. On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood had become the major power in the street, which made the goal of incapacitating them and weakening their popular influence more important to the state compared to other actors.

The second important reason is the fact Jordan participated in the Madrid Conference in 1991, which the Muslim Brotherhood strongly opposed and agitated the street against.
The state believed that the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament and in the street would weaken the official position seeking to pass the expected peace agreement with Israel. Therefore, for official institutions, it was necessary to neutralize the Brotherhood’s power in parliament and weaken them in the universities and unions in order to weaken their opposition to the agreement and to this path as a whole. This is, in fact, what occurred with the passage of the One Vote Law, and the many similar steps that were taken against the Brotherhood’s social and political influence.

The issue of normalization with Israel was one of the pillars of King Hussein’s and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s concept of peace at the time. Rabin was one of the main reasons for the major tension between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, which moved the crisis from the parliament and universities to the unions. The Jordanian officials were called upon to “professionalize the professional unions,” and distance them from engagement in political issues.

The Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time, Mohammad Abdulrahman Khalifa, made efforts to control the crisis and smooth over the relationship between the Brotherhood and the state. Nevertheless, even though the crisis did not reach the point of outward clashes, the hawkish wing of the Muslim Brotherhood mobilized the street in force against the negotiations and, later, against the Wadi Araba Treaty of 1994. Some of the sermons crossed red lines, when some of the Brotherhood preachers attacked the king personally, although in an indirect manner.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyat, who was the prime minister at that time, said that the king summoned him during the peace talks. He had in front of him a file containing some of what had been said in the Muslim Brotherhood preachers’ sermons, which included an attack on him, accusations of feebleness, =
It is important to note that the 1990s witnessed the end of the “honeymoon” between the two sides, and the start of the escalation of the ongoing crisis. Even though the crisis saw fluctuations of quiet and escalation at different times, it reflected a transformation in the regime’s vision of the Muslim Brotherhood, and an attempt on the part of the Brotherhood to increase their political opportunities in the political regime.

In the mid-1990s, a new, young generation began to become prominent in the group. They were called “the moderates,” and stood between the hawks and the doves, as will be discussed later. They pushed for the decision to boycott the parliamentary elections in 1997, a decision that surprised the state, and intensified the crisis on both sides. This occurred at the same time as somewhat important changes in the decision-making circles regarding the demarcation of the relationship between the two sides. This occurred in 1996, when Samih Al-Battikhi became director of the General Intelligence Department and, before this, in 1995, when Abdul Karim Al-Kabariti became prime minister. The new political and security team around King Hussein had hostile ideas about the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. They widened the rift between the two sides. This same team supported the schism that occurred after the decision to boycott elections, which later resulted in establishing the Islamic Centrist Party, and led to more tensions between the state and the group.\(^\text{(14)}\)

---

= and so forth. Arabiyat worked to contain the king’s anger by assuring him that these speeches were not connected to the Brotherhood’s official position, and that the affairs between the group and the state were managed through the official relationship. Source: A interview with Abdul Latif Arabiyat, 3/2/2016.

\(\text{(14)}\) The former prime minister, Abdul Karim Al-Kabariti, admitted that the state’s policies nurtured and supported the separation of several persons from the Muslim Brotherhood after their decision to boycott in 1997. =
With King Abdullah II: Elements and Dynamics of the Crisis

In 1999, King Hussein passed away and was succeeded by King Abdullah II. King Abdullah II also believed in intensifying the crisis and widening the gap between the state and the Brotherhood. The official authorities expelled the leaders of Hamas from Jordan and closed their offices at the end of the year. The internal policies, in which the previous director of Intelligence, Samih Al-Battikhi, participated, were based on categorizing the Muslim Brotherhood as enemies, and pursuing policies in opposition to them. This was clear in the official reaction to the Brotherhood’s marches and demonstrations following the start of the second intifada in 2000, which protested the visit of former Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, to the Al-Aqsa mosque in September 2000.

Parliamentary elections were postponed for approximately two years (2001-2003), during which the world witnessed the events of 11 September 2001, followed by the war in Afghanistan. The prospect of the Iraq war (2003) began to loom on the horizon. During the same year, parliamentary elections were held in Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood participated through a list that included young men from the movement. This resulted in them winning 17 seats in the parliament at the time.

The return to participating in elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s return to parliament, did not significantly change the nature of the crisis between the two sides. The Iraq war led to an increase in regional tensions, and the ad-

He feels that this was a mistake, because it would have been better to keep the group together, instead of removing the moderates from the group.

Source: A trusted source with whom the researchers met.
vent of Iranian influence in the region. Subsequently, a new axis began to form in the region. It was called “the axis of resistance,” and was sponsored by Iran in alliance with the Syrian regime (which, at that time, embraced Hamas), Hezbollah, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements. This is the alliance that stood in support of Hezbollah in its wars with Israel, and in support of Hamas, which had won the majority in the Palestinian elections of 2006, and took control over the Gaza strip in 2007 using armed force.

In opposition to the axis of resistance, the Arab axis of moderation was formed. This group included Jordan, Egypt, and the Arab Gulf countries. At this time, Jordan was extremely worried that Hamas’ success in the elections would whet the Muslim Brotherhood’s appetite to seize power, or think about expanding the group’s political role. The group was linked to this regional axis by the decision makers in Amman. As a result, the crisis between the two sides reached an unprecedented point. This led to the closure of the Islamic Center Society, which had represented the group’s economic clout, its capital, and its long reach in economic and social work, followed by the arrest of four of the group’s parliamentary representatives. These representatives were among those who expressed condolences for the killing of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, in June 2006. Two members were sentenced to prison, while the others were set free.\(^{(15)}\)

Despite all of this, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the parliamentary and local elections in 2007, held during the government of Marouf Al-Bakhit, in an attempt to mitigate the intensity of the crisis. Shortly before the elec-

---

tions, they agreed upon mutual guarantees. The Muslim Brotherhood presented a message confirming their rejection of terrorism and violence. In exchange, the prime minister pledged, in the presence of ministers and the former director of General Intelligence, Mohammed Al-Dahabi, to hold fair elections. This did not happen, and the parliamentary elections were openly rigged, as shown by subsequent confessions by officials. The Muslim Brotherhood withdrew from the local elections after similar indicators appeared. The Brotherhood won only six seats in this parliament. This moment was a new turning point in the relationship between the two sides.\(^{(16)}\)

The relationship between the state and the Brotherhood deteriorated further after parliamentary and local elections in 2007. Then, there was a temporary reversal in the position of the director of General Intelligence at that time, Mohammed Al-Dahabi, towards the group and Hamas. He moved towards a rapprochement with them in 2008. However, the situation quickly returned to a deadlock between the two sides after Al-Dahabi was removed from his position at the end of that year (2008), during the Israeli war against Gaza.

The group boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2010, which were held on the eve of the events of the Arab Spring, at a time of an increase in protests and internal popular protests. The two sides (the state and the Muslim Brotherhood) entered into the Arab Spring with the relationship between them still in crisis. The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the popular mobilizing and in forming different committees demanding political reform. Despite the fact that this was the extent of their demands, and that they did not call for the overthrow of the regime, as occurred in Egypt, Tuni-

sia, and other countries, state institutions viewed the group’s eight demands with great suspicion. They implicitly accused the Brotherhood of having more than one agenda, and of seeking to carry out a “soft coup” of state institutions.

The Muslim Brotherhood refused to participate in the National Dialogue Committee that was formed to set the framework for the desired political reforms and the proposed amendments to different laws, particularly the elections law and the political parties law. Later, constitutional amendments were also added. Members of the Brotherhood participated in the large sit-in that was held on 24 March 2011 in Jamal Abdel Nasser Square (in front of the Interior Ministry). This sit-in ended when the security forces broke it up by force, so that it would not turn into another Tahrir Square.

The Arab Spring intensified the growing crisis of confidence between the state and the group, and created mutual convictions on each side that the other side was waiting to ambush them. Tensions continued as the group was not able to gather enough support to change the power balance in the streets in order to force the regime to accept the group’s eight demands. In 2011, the situation ended with a retreat of the popular movement, the passage of constitutional amendments and amendments to the Election Law and the Political Parties Law, and preparation for the parliamentary elections that took place in 2013 according to the One Vote Law. The waves of popular protests receded, and a national list was added to the elections, but the Muslim Brotherhood boycotted these elections. (17)

With the army’s intervention in the political game in Egypt, the end of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule there, the arrest of the former Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, as well as other leaders of the group and thousands of its members, and the bloody, violent break-up of the sit-ins at Rabaa Al-Adawiyah and Al-Nahda Squares, the year 2013 represented a new twist in the group’s relationship to the state. This was particularly true because this transformation came at the same time as the declining fortunes of the Arab Spring revolutions, and the emergence of a new trend represented by the rise of armed radical groups in Syria and Iraq, and by sectarian and civil wars, leading to worried reactions in the Jordanian street towards movements for change and reform.

It is also important to note that in 2013, given what occurred in Egypt, the issue of regional alliances and conflicting political agendas rose to prominence. As a result, the regional axes were restructured, and what was known as the Arab “conservative axis” was formed. This axis, consisting of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Jordan, takes a conservative stance towards popular revolution and the “Arab Spring,” and is concerned about the rise of political Islam in the region. This axis supports conservative forces and the regime of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya, and forces hostile to Islamists in the Arab world.

This Arab alliance, of which Jordan was considered a part in the beginning, thinks that Turkey (and along with it Qatar and the forces of political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas) and Iran (and along with it Hezbollah and Shia political forces) are threats to both national security and regional stability. As a result, following
the military coup, some of these countries categorized the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as terrorist organizations. They even went so far as to broaden the lists of terrorist organizations and persons to include most global and regional personalities and organizations connected to Qatar or the Muslim Brotherhood.

Naturally, these steps affected the Jordanian state’s relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood, and pushed the relationship between the two sides further towards estrangement and crisis, although the Jordanian decision was not identical to that of its Arab allies in categorizing the group and its party, the Islamic Action Front, as terrorist organizations. Rather, Jordan avoided this, and used a different tactic to increase pressure on the Islamists. This was achieved by paving the path for some leaders and public figures in the Muslim Brotherhood to “correct the legal status” of the group. As a result, a new group was licensed under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood Society, so that this group would gain the legal status rather than the parent organization, and would also take over its property. This is what the former Secretary General of the group in Jordan, Abdul Majid Thneibat, did along with a number of well-known leaders and public figures in the group. (18)

(18) The issue of the legal status of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was subject to broad media and political discussion, even among members of the group. The group had retained the legal license that it had acquired in its beginnings, in the era of King Abdullah I. This license linked the group to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and authorized it to engage in different activities and to mix religious activities with politics. However, the state insisted that the group in Jordan had to separate itself from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and define the framework of its work in a particular field, to clarify the official umbrella under which it worked; i.e. whether its work falls under the purview of the Ministry of Political Affairs, the Ministry of Social Development, or the Ministry of Awqaf, according to current Jordanian laws. See, for example: Salem Falahat. *The Islamic Movement in Jordan*. ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 339-350.
For the first time, the Muslim Brotherhood (the parent organization, which includes the vast majority of the group members, not the new group, in which only a handful of the members of the parent organization are registered) is legally prohibited in Jordan. Its offices and properties were seized, and it began to hold its meetings unofficially and privately. Later, the Secretary General was chosen by recommendation, and the Shura Council was chosen without the traditional elections that took place in the group’s branches and offices.\(^{(19)}\)

At the same time that the licensing of the new Muslim Brotherhood was announced, the authorities arrested the deputy Secretary General of the Brotherhood, Zaki Bani Irsheid. He was a prominent hawks leader, and was arrested because of social media posts on Facebook that were considered to be insulting to the United Arab Emirates. He was sent to the state security court, and sentenced to nearly a year and a half in prison.\(^{(20)}\)

Despite this, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the parliamentary elections of 2016, through an alliance that included the Islamic Action Front party and figures in the political opposition. They were able to win 15 seats in parliament for the alliance, out of 130 total seats in the 18th parliament.\(^{(21)}\)


The Muslim Brotherhood also participated in the municipal and local elections (held in the governorates for the first time in Jordan) in 2017. They won 76 seats in municipal and local elections. These seats include the heads of three municipalities, including Zarqa, and five seats in the Greater Amman Municipality. (22)

The Islamists returned to parliament, and to political life, at the end of 2017. Likewise, they returned to the municipal and local councils. However, their relationship to the state institutions is still vague and unclear. The group is still legally prohibited, while the new group, which includes few members, retains the legal name of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its possessions. Furthermore, the channels of communication between the state and the group are limited. It appears that there is a desire on the part of the “decision makers” to demonstrate a lack of interest in dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front. Even their return to political life was treated with a kind of feigned disregard by the state institutions.

The Relationship’s Constraints and Possibilities

The possibilities for the relationship between the two sides (the state and the Brotherhood) in the near future are linked to the main constraints and variables. Their influence and dynamics have become clear over the past decades. The first variable is the personal positions of the elite that make the decisions regarding the group. It is clear that King Hussein’s relationship with the group was not like that of King Abdullah, as their political considerations and personal opinions were different. There was common ground between the

(22) “Reform Announces the Number of Seats that It Won,” Assabeel Newspaper, 16/8/2017.
Muslim Brotherhood and King Hussein, such as when the group stood with Hussein in his confrontation with his leftist and nationalist enemies, and when Hussein embraced the group at a time in which its leaders were being hanged. On the other hand, King Abdullah came at a different time, with different variables. He did not have any true common ground with the group. Rather, on the contrary, his relationship with them was characterized by tension and a lack of faith from the beginning. This only increased further with the advent of the Arab Spring, as the king felt that the group sought to surreptitiously seize power, and that it was blackmailing the state with its demands and popular following.

The importance of personal opinions was not limited to the king, as other important figures in the political regime also played important roles. In particular, the director of General Intelligence played an important role, because the intelligence agency is the entity that actually manages the relationship with the Brotherhood. We have noticed that, historically, a change in director has had a significant influence on the group’s status. When Samih Al-Battikhi became director in the second half of the 1990’s, the relationship took a negative turn. He intensified the policies of limiting and deterring the group. This was also the case in the beginning of Mohammed Al-Dahabi’s tenure, before he reversed his position in 2008 and began to move closer to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, before being removed from his position.

The external factor, and in particular the regional factor, also plays an active role in the dynamics of the relationship between the two sides. We noticed this in Jordan’s regional alliances. For example, when the “decision makers” considered the Muslim Brotherhood to be part of the axis of resistance in 2006, along with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas,
this led to the rigging of the 2007 elections. Likewise, the Brotherhood was considered to be a part of the network of Turkey-Qatar alliances in 2013, which led to the banning of the group and the seizure of its assets in 2015. In contrast, when the group stood with Hussein in facing the Arab nationalist parties in the 1960’s, and the Palestinian organizations in the 1970’s, the state allowed it to engage in work and activities freely. This was also the case when the two sides (the state and the group) took similar positions on the Gulf crisis in 1990. At that time, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in Mudar Badran’s government with five ministerial portfolios.

Political demographics also play a role in determining the parameters of the relationship between the two sides, and its developments. With the passage of time, there was a fluctuating increase and decrease in the demographic base of the Muslim Brotherhood, ultimately moving towards an increase in Jordanians of Palestinian descent. This increased further in the 1990s, with the support and blessing of the state’s policies, and, more recently, with the ongoing schisms or exists occurring within the group. These began with the Centrist Party, then Zamzam, then the licensed group and, finally, the Partnership and Rescue Party, as well as several important figures in the group. With most of these schisms, members with origins in east Jordan, who were mostly those who belonged to the moderate wing or the doves, were the ones to leave the group.

This important factor influences the state’s position on, and understanding of, the group. The state sees the group as a political and social force that mainly represents Jordanians of Palestinian descent. This helped the group during the 1970s, as it was a moderate force in the face of the nationalist and leftist forces and the Palestinian organizations. In 2003, when
there was an initiative to integrate Jordanians of Palestinian descent, there was an unofficial desire on the part of the state for the candidates to be closer to young people of Palestinian descent.

However, this same factor, demographics, played the opposite role at other times. The impression that the Muslim Brotherhood is closer to Jordanians of Palestinian descent is used to imply that any success that they achieve that goes beyond the traditional boundaries of the game (like winning a parliamentary majority and forming the government) threatens east Jordanians and the conservative institutions in the state. Therefore, the issue of demographics was often used as a justification for opposing the group’s political aspirations.

The impression that the group represents Jordanians of Palestinian descent is not limited to the regime. Rather, it extends to the Jordanian conservative trend, and right-wing currents such as military retirees, who incite fears that agreements exist between the Muslim Brotherhood and the United States to change the balance of power in favor of Jordanians of Palestinian descent, which, according to this current, threatens the identity of the state. (23)

However, these fears cannot be considered to be an actual threat to the group’s identity. It is well-known that the schisms within the group occurred on the basis of internal disputes and personal differences, which had caused rifts among the groups’ members. Personalities are the main threat within the group. In addition, given the absence of any effec-

(23) A paper presented by the former secretary of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khaled Hassanein, summarizes a large part of the considerations related to the influence of demographics on the relationship with the state in the organizational framework of the group. For more details, see: Salem Falahat. The Islamic Movement in Jordan, op. cit., Vol 2, pp. 210-222.
The State and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Winding Path

tive party forces with political weight in Jordan, it is natural that Jordanians of Palestinian descent would gravitate towards the group with the strongest political and social presence. From the perspective of political sociology, individuals gravitate towards joining groups when they do not have the tribal strength, for example, that the east Jordanians possess regardless of whether these individuals belong to political movements or not.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the historical relationship between the Jordanian state and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan over the course of four stages. It is important to review the historical constraints of this relationship in order to understand the changes that the young people in the group experienced, and the political and ideological frameworks of these young people today.

Historically, the group’s relationship to the state in Jordan was characterized by understanding and coexistence from its founding in 1946 until the mid-1980s. During this period, the group formed a religious-social force that isolated and restricted the influence of the nationalist and leftist movements in Jordan, which flourished in the region during the 1970s. The group’s relationship with the state was characterized by understanding and mutual gains on each side, though there were still some conflicts between them.

With the popular uprisings in the mid-1980s and the return of democratic life, along with the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in the 1989 elections, the group demonstrated its power in the street. It emerged at the forefront of the political powers. As a result, the state began to fear its rise and aspira-
tions, so the election law was changed to the one-vote system. This occurred in conjunction with a change in the reasons for the mutual understanding between the two sides. The nationalists and leftists were no longer an influential force in Jordan, and Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, and the subsequent normalization approach to relations with Israel, had the most significant effect in highlighting the gap between the state and the group. In this way, the transformation of the relationship between the two sides began.

The crisis of confidence between the two sides became clear when King Abdullah II took power. There was a new political elite that did not have a historical political relationship with the group, and they took an adversarial position towards the group. Regionally, with the Afghan war in 2001, the Iraq war in 2003, and Hamas’ rise to power in 2006, the axes of resistance and moderation emerged in the region. The latter axis, of which Jordan was a part, adopted a hostile position towards the Muslim Brotherhood, which was apparent in the widespread fraud in the elections of 2007, after the state had promised not to rig the elections.

The crisis of confidence grew during and after the Arab Spring, but in a manner particular to Jordan on both sides. The crisis did not reach the point of complete breakdown or hostility. The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the popular movement in Jordan, but limited itself to calling for reforms, without demanding regime change. Afterwards, the Jordanian state did not classify the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, contrary to what occurred in other countries in the region. Likewise, while the relationship was tense and problematic, neither side allowed it to escalate to the point of a complete rift. This was cemented by the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in the 2016 parliamentary elections and
the 2017 municipality and local elections. The state had pressured or encouraged some of the group leaders to request to license the group and correct its legal status, which led to one of the recent schisms in the group, as we will explain in the third chapter.

Demographically, the group’s base tilted towards Jordanians of Palestinian descent with three waves of schisms within the group after 2010, as we will explain in the third chapter. Today, in the eyes of the state and the east Jordanian political forces, the group is a domain for Jordanians of Palestinian descent, not east Jordanians. This affects the group’s relationship to the state, and its general popular presence.

This historical framework of the relationship forms an important basis for understanding the historical transformations that the Brotherhood has undergone, and the political and ideological debates that defined its development in previous decades. This is especially the case since the group’s intellectual revisions derived their importance from the general historical political context of the group’s role and political opportunities. Meanwhile, historical context and the nature of the regimes are the most important key to understanding the changes of Islamist groups generally.
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
CHAPTER TWO

Internal Changes: Organizational Mobilization and Intellectual Debates

The Muslim Brotherhood began its work in Jordan using a social formula like any charitable da’wa society. Its first leaders were mostly merchants, and its relationship with King Abdullah I was friendly and good, as was the king’s relationship with the Supreme Guide, Hassan Al Banna. However, later, at the beginning of the 1950s, elements of change emerged in the organization regarding its role and organizational structure. This was the result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War’s impact on Jordan, the annexation of the West Bank, the emergence of the Palestinian issue in Jordanian and Arab political life after the Nakba (Palestinian exodus), and the rise of the Nasserist, nationalist, and leftist trends in the 1950s.

The initial result of this was a change of leadership in the Brotherhood via a group of youth who were more politicized. Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifa, supported by the youth generation, replaced Abdul Latif Abu Qura as the General Secretary. The organization began to take clear positions on domestic policies, such as its opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Later, it participated in the 1956 elections in which nationalist parties won a parliamentary majority (the National Socialist Party led the way with 12 seats, followed by the
Ba’ath Party with two seats and the National Front with three seats); it won four seats, while the Islamic Liberation Party won one seat.  

From the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood did not have a wide social base compared with the nationalist and leftist parties and the Palestinian organizations and forces in the Jordanian scene. Thus, the Brotherhood and its activities tended towards religious (*da’wa*) and educational work more than political activity, even after its exemption from the martial law imposed following the resignation of Suleiman Nabulsi.

This phase was largely about building a social grassroots. The Muslim Brotherhood founded the Islamic Center Association in 1963, which later expanded like an “octopus” in terms of the organization’s activities and channels of communication with social groups and segments, as well as mosques. The organization’s members considered mosque activity to be an important recruitment tool. Here, there was no competition from any political forces, or even any of the religious forces that arose later and made up a large part of mosque activity, such as the Salafis, Da’wa wal Tabligh, and other movements.

This chapter addresses the internal, intellectual changes and debates that shaped the history of the Brotherhood and its reality today. These consist of the five basic stages/themes discussed here:

---

The Qutbist Wave

As noted previously, the 1967 war was a crucial turning point in the history of the Brotherhood, or, more precisely, a springboard to popular extension and expansion. This occurred first at the Arab level and then at the local level, during the events of the 1970s, and the organization’s activity increased as it expanded further into society. At this stage, the Brotherhood remained governed to a large degree by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (whom Gamal Abdul Nasser executed in 1966), who represented the intellectual and ideological leadership of the group. Despite coexistence with the regime, the group skewed toward the concepts of *hakimiyya* (sovereignty belongs to God alone), *jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic ignorance), separation from and ascendancy over Muslim society, and other concepts. Two main factors strengthened the hold that these concepts had over members of the organization: first, influential foreign scholars in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other countries; and second, the absence of democratic life, which prevented a real alternative to challenge the viability and feasibility of these concepts. At this stage, the prominent leaders included Abdullah Azzam, Ahmed Naufal, Mohammed Abu Faris, and others.

In his review of the history of the organization and its intellectual milestones, Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh (one of its most prominent former leaders in Jordan) notes that it was discovered that a secret organization had been formed in the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s. This secret organization was composed mainly of Brotherhood youth studying in Egypt who were influenced by events there, particularly the thinking of Sayyid Qutb and the so-called “idea of a *mihna* (period of persecution).” Some of the members of this elite took over power in the Muslim Brotherhood from the 1970s to the end
of the 1980s. This includes personalities such as Dr. Ham-mam Said, Dr. Mohammed Abu Faris, Ibrahim Masoud Kharisat, and others. They served as a new leadership rank, replacing the personalities who had represented the movement’s leadership until then, such as Dr. Ishaq al-Farhan, Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyat, and others. (25)

The 1970s was also a golden age for Islamic student activism, since the Brotherhood was active in student unions and universities. Dr. Abdullah Azzam had a large role in mobilizing student activism. Dr. Ahmed Naufal was also prominent at this time, and later Hammam Said, Mohammed Abu Faris, and others dominated the scene as well. (26)

Gharaibeh calls this stage, from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, the “wave of Qutbist thought.” This wave later receded in the 1990s in the face of a new wave that began to appear in the Arab world in the mid-1980s under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi and Rached Ghannouchi. This new wave was pragmatic, democratic, and widespread in Jordan in the 1990s. (27)

(26) Although Abdullah Azzam and Ahmed Naufal, along with Abu Faris and Hammam Said, shared the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, they opposed working with the existing political system, according to Gharaibeh. They participated in the Sheikhs’ bases with the Fatah movement at an early stage, but they remained skeptical and rejecting of the principle of working under the umbrella of what they considered the “Jahiliyya” (pre-Islamic ignorance) political system. Interview with Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh, 12/29/2017.
(27) Ibid.
Attitude Towards Democracy

The year 1989 marked another important turning point of internal debates and organizational mobilization. The doves emerged in clear confrontation with the hawks, the former espousing pragmatism and realism, and the latter embracing the ideology and dogmatism of Qutb. Nevertheless, both streams participated in the parliamentary elections at the time, and leaders of both sides won seats in the parliament.

The attitude towards democracy was one of the most prominent internal debates, and the doves began to try to include these concepts into the organization’s discourse. With other Islamists, they coined the term “shurocracy” to affirm that there is a unity of content between democracy and the Islamic concept of *shura* (consultation). The doves began to consider the need to accept the democratic process and its implications, such as pluralism, power-sharing, and public freedoms. The hawks had reservations and tried to restrict the Brotherhood’s participation and objectives in the electoral process and its role in parliament.

When examining the 14 conditions put forward by the Brotherhood in order to give a vote of confidence to the government of Mudar Badran, we find them dominated by *da’wa* (proselytization) and organizational characteristics, along with some of the traditional issues in the movement’s discourse. For example, the organization demanded a move toward application of Shari’a law, forbidding of the manufacture of alcohol, establishment of a domestic Islamic university, support for the *intifada*, and abolition of interest on state loans for small farmers. Other issues were the return of exiles, the removal of the consequences of emergency and martial law, and so forth. (28)

---

At the beginning of the 1990s, five Brotherhood members participated in the National Charter Committee formed by the king to achieve internal, mutual understanding among the various and numerous political forces on shared political ground. The committee included representatives of Islamists, nationalists, and leftists, both conservative and liberal. The General Secretary of the Brotherhood had sent a letter to the prime minister outlining their vision of the required national charter – based on a fatwa published by a committee of its Shura Council – which is dominated by the Islamic identity of the nation and society. (29)

Brotherhood participation in Mudar Badran’s government reinforced the disparity between the two trends (doves and hawks). In his well-known book, Mohammed Abu Faris issued a fatwa rejecting the Brotherhood’s participation in governments. The Brotherhood withdrew the book from the market and pushed several religious authorities like Dr. Omar al-Ashqar and Dr. Ali Sawa to issue an opposing fatwa permitting participation in governments.

In parallel with the contrast in the “ideological approach” (i.e. the attitude towards government, the regime, political activity, etc.) and political vision (ideological or pragmatic), the difference between the doves and the hawks emerged at the level of adversarial discourse towards the regime. This became evident, in particular, with the rapid deterioration of the democratic trajectory since 1992, beginning with Jordan’s entry into peace negotiations, adoption of the “one man, one vote” law, and the signing of the Wadi Arabah Peace Accords with Israel. The hawks attacked the official stance actively and strongly and escalated criticism in their

(29) Ibid., pp. 32-36.
discourse, while the doves worked to contain the regime’s responses and tried to defuse crises, as previously noted. This was the main role of the doves within the organization, particularly in the era of King Hussein. (30)

The Islamic Action Front (IAF) party was founded in 1992, following ratification of the Political Parties Law and the process of screening legislation associated with the state of emergency and martial law. Prior to establishing the party, a wide debate among Brotherhood circles took place on the expected nature of the relationship between the party and the organization. The Brotherhood’s planning division, dominated by young people, sketched out scenarios for the relationship between the organization and the proposed party. They proposed the preservation of the organization and the establishment of the party largely independent of the organization. This is, in fact, what happened, but only after intense internal disputes and mutual accusations between the two sides and their leadership because of this new step in their history. (31)

The year 1994 marked the rise of a new trend within the organizational mobilization of the Brotherhood, later launched in the media as the “centrist” trend, composed of the organization’s youth. This trend had reservations on both the hawks and the doves. For them, the hawks offered fiery rhetoric that appealed to its members’ emotions but was without real, practical content. Also, they did not go beyond fixed limits in their relationship with the regime and were inconsistent regarding the ideological claims of Sayyid Qutb and participation in the political process. The doves, in the centrists’ opinion, privileged their personal interests in their relation-

(31) Ibid., pp. 90-91.
ship with the regime over other considerations. They neither
paid heed to the state’s retreat from democracy nor con-
sidered alternatives – such as boycotting – to protest the retreat
from democracy or the crackdown on the organization. (32)

It was the conviction of the centrists, represented by
Ahmed Kuteish al-Azaydeh (the Brotherhood leader, and its
intellectual and political inspiration), that the state tolerated
its relationship with the Brotherhood and feared its political
opposition, while thinking it held the keys to controlling the
organization via prominent doves. The youth generation
wanted to push back against this conviction, deeply-rooted in
decision-making circles, to prove that there was a new, in-
fluential generation within the organization and its leader-
ship. (33)

The Executive Bureau changed in 1994, and Abdul Ma-
jeed Thneibat became the General Secretary of the Muslim
Brotherhood, after almost four decades under the leadership
of Abdul Rahman Khalifa. The formation of the Executive
Bureau under Thneibat was a mixture of doves and the new,
centrist youth leadership (Emad Abu Diyah, Salim al-Falahat,
and Jamil Abu Bakr). (34)

The new members of the Executive Bureau, representing
the centrist youth generation, contributed to the Brother-
hood’s decision to boycott the 1997 elections. This led to the

(32) Ibid., pp. 91-93.
(33) Al-Azaydeh is considered one of the most important Brotherhood leaders of
the 1980s and 1990s, particularly during the democratic transformation in
1989 and the founding of IAF. He was primarily in the governorate of Ma-
daba during the 1980s, then was a member of parliament, and died from ill-
ness at an early age in 1992. Observers see him as the inspiration for the
new generation of leadership in the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Emad
Abu Diyah, Salem al-Falahat, and others.
freezing out and true separation of the members who opposed this decision and the expulsion of others, mostly well-known doves, including Abdel Rahim al-Akour, Abdulllah al-Akayleh, Dr. Bassam al-Amoush, and a group of youth from the city of Salt (Marwan al-Faouri, As’ad al-Qaryuti, Malik al-Amariyya, and Hussein Hiyasat).

(35) Dismissed in 2000 because of his participation in the government of Ali Abu al-Ragheb, he was previously one of the prominent Brotherhood leaders held the position of Deputy General Secretary. He was formerly a member of the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, representing the Muslim Brotherhood.

(36) One of the most prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, he was known for his pragmatic opinions. He was in the parliament for successive terms, as well as a minister in the government of Mudar Badran (in which the Brotherhood participated at the beginning of the 1990’s). He wrote a controversial paper on the Muslim Brotherhood project in Jordan, calling for realism and recognizing for the first time that the Brotherhood’s Islamist state is not suitable for Jordan. He called the Brotherhood to political commitment and realism and to drop the idea of establishing a regime in Jordan. He also demanded that the organization coexist with the regime. Al- Akayleh later left the Brotherhood after the decision to boycott in 1997; his participation in the 1997 parliamentary elections (where he won a seat) led to his separation from the organization. See: Abdullah Al- Akayleh paper, “The Islamist Movement Experience in Jordan,” in Azzam al-Heneidi, Power Sharing Islam, Liberty for Muslim World, London, 1994. See also: Faisal al-Shabul, ”’Akayleh attacks the ‘sheikhs’ and accuses the ‘brotherhood’ of deadlock, Islamist Perestroika the Jordanian Way,” Al-Hayat, London, 2/10/1997. See also: Moshari al-Thaidi, “Conversations in Fundamentalism and Politics, (2-5) – The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan…Between Hawks’ Beaks and Doves’ Wings,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, London, 10/10/2005.

(37) He was one of the most prominent dove leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the movement’s best-known representatives. He was a university professor of Shari’a who fought the Brotherhood’s decision to boycott the parliamentary elections in 1997. Al-Amoush wrote an article in the newspaper, Al Rai, entitled, “Why Did They Boycott?” in which he criticized the decision. This led to his separation from the organization, and he was selected to be a minister in the government of Abdelsalam al-Majali in 1998 and then in the government of Fayez al-Tarawneh.

(38) See the separation of this group from the Muslim Brotherhood and the letter they directed to the Brotherhood’s General Secretary, protesting the decision to boycott the 1997 elections, and the circumstances of the formation =
In 1998, the Executive Bureau was once again restructured and the centrist presence in the organization increased under the leadership of Emad Abu Diyah. However, the centrists received a harsh blow with the exit of several of the organization’s members, as mentioned previously, the expulsion of the Hamas leadership from Jordan in 1999, and the aftermath of news leaks that suggested that some centrist leaders were in the loop of this decision. (39)

As a result, the youth centrists split into two camps. One was led by Emad Abu Diyah and included a large group, such as Salem al-Falahat, Nimr al-Assaf, Rahil Ghariebeh, and Nabil Kofahi. The other was closer to Hamas and opposed Abu Diyah and his group; it included Saoud Abu Mahfouz, Zaki Bani Irsheid, Mohammed al-Attar, and others.

Controversy over the “National Question”

During the 1990s, a group of Hamas youth leaders returned to Jordan from Kuwait after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. They established a Hamas political office, made a gentleman’s agreement with the Jordanian government in 1993, and expanded their political and media activities. The Jordanian centrist leadership accused the Hamas political office of expanding recruitment of centrist members to Hamas and mixing the two groups, so that Hamas grew within the Jordanian Brotherhood and became what was later called a “shadow organization.”

In his review of the Brotherhood transformations, Rahil Gharaibeh notes that the Gulf crisis was a major turning point for developments within the Muslim Brotherhood structure. The return of many Brothers of Palestinian origin from Kuwait led to democratic changes. First, it led to changes in the organizational structure, and, second, in the tone of the discourse, which was oriented toward greater engagement in the Palestinian issue and hostility towards the US, internally and locally.\(^{(40)}\)

Later, the intensity of internal disagreement between the centrists and those closer to Hamas escalated, leading to a change in the composition of the Executive Bureau in 2002 (with the centrist leadership decision to not return to power later, especially Emad Abu Diyah, who was considered the architect of the centrist trend as it arose in the mid-1990s). The new Bureau was composed of the General Secretary himself (Abdul Majeed Thneibat) and a mixture of the two wings (hawks and doves).

In the following years, two main coalitions took root in the organization and the party. They entered a state of internal polarization, debates, and personality clashes that extended to subsequent years. The first coalition was represented by the doves and centrist Jordanians, classified as the Brotherhood’s moderate wing (main leaders: Salem al-Falahat, Rahil Gharaibeh, Nabil Kofahi, Nimr al-Assaf, Abdul Latif Arabiyat, Abdul Majeed Thneibat, and Abdul Hamid al-Qudah). The second coalition – termed the extremist wing – was the result of an alliance of the hawks and the

trend close to Hamas (main leaders: Hammam Said, Zaki Bani Irsheid, Ahmed al-Zarqan, and Ali al-Atum). (41)

On one hand, it is not accurate to say that the Brotherhood’s first wing, the moderates, represents the East Bankers, while its second wing, the extremists, represents Jordanians of Palestinian descent (in fact, there is a mixture of each in the leadership of both wings). However, on the other hand, it is also not reasonable to deny that the national issue, the relationship with Hamas, the identity of the organization and the party, and the setting of priorities are the keys to the disagreements and the disputes between the two wings, which are both competing for leadership positions in the organization and the party.

The moderate wing, described as the “Jordanian” trend whose base of support is East Bankers, sees the necessity of clear organizational separation from Hamas and distrusts the “shadow organization” loyal to Hamas within the Jordanian Brotherhood. This wing also believes that priorities must be linked to local affairs and politics, meaning the relationship between the nation, the party and the organization is not dependent upon the relationship with Hamas. In their view, the organization, together with the party, is a Jordanian, Islamist movement.

On the other hand, the second wing, which is close to Hamas, gives utmost importance to the issue of supporting and assisting Hamas in its discourse and its process of popular and organizational mobilization. It considers the priority to be the struggle of the Palestinian people to remain in their land, in contrast with the moderate wing, which is focused on internal political reform.

In 2005, the Brotherhood published its vision for political reform and democracy, which clearly constituted a qualitative leap in the organization’s thinking. The manifesto set forth the Brotherhood’s position on democracy and its acceptance of political pluralism, and it mirrored similar Brotherhood platforms in Egypt and Syria. This was considered a world-wide, Brotherhood answer to the question that was asked repeatedly in Western political and academic circles post-September 11: does the Brotherhood accept the democratic process, and can it be an alternative to the Arab regimes, or not?

Regardless of the motives behind the writing of such documents, whether for internal or external purposes, they represent a clear break (at least in their “official” stance) from the Islamist movement’s reluctance to accept democracy and the remaining ambiguous, grey areas in its stance on many issues related to embracing democracy. These include issues such as religious freedoms, minority and women’s rights, and many other issues that remain open for debate. (42)

We can say, therefore, that the polemics of the national question related to internal political reforms and the relationship with Hamas was at the center of the internal Brotherhood debates and the process of organizational realignment. Thus, the organization’s attitude toward democracy, for example, was not considered a source of dispute between the two wings of the Brotherhood, since each of them agreed to accept democracy broadly. However, the hallmark of the moderate and extremist wings was tied to their attitude towards the regime: while the moderate wing wanted to contain

crises, the extremists were escalating their political rhetoric. Yet, we will observe later that the stances of escalation and placation towards the regime were later reversed between the leaders of the two wings.\(^{(43)}\)

In 2006, the Brotherhood’s Executive Bureau was again restructured: Salim al-Falahat, known for his affiliation with Jordanian centrists, became the General Secretary of the Executive Bureau, which was a mixture of the two wings dominated by centrist ideas. By contrast, Zaki Bani Irsheid, one of the prominent leaders favoured by Hamas, was chosen Secretary General of the IAF, which increased the dynamic of crisis with the state.

In the same year, the issue of regional alliances emerged (the poles of opposition and moderation), and the Brotherhood aligned with the opposition. Hamas won the Palestinian elections, which fueled the crisis within the Brotherhood, as we mentioned previously. This was followed by the arrest of Brotherhood leaders as they visited the house where Zarqawi was being mourned.\(^{(44)}\)

Meanwhile, to contain the crisis with the state, General Secretary Salem al-Falahat signed a document affirming the Brotherhood’s belief in tolerance for other creeds and its rejection of violence, extremism, and terrorism, as well as its loyalty to the king and the state. This document shut down a wide swath of the internal conversation and debate between the two wings of the organization, and the Executive Bureau and the moderate wing were accused of collusion against the organization. The Brotherhood’s Shari’a committee was

\(^{(43)}\) Compare that with op. cit., pp. 95-96.
compelled to issue a fatwa against contravening the document’s overall affirmation of the Brotherhood approach and positions.

The hawks used the issue of this document to attack the moderates who, after the election fraud of 2007, were accused of being dupes of the state. The episode ended with the resignation of the Executive Bureau and Salim al-Falahat, following increasing disputes with the Brotherhood’s Shura Council. (45)

Then, for the first time, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent, Dr. Hammam Said, rose to the position of General Secretary in 2008. This was reflected thereafter by state policies that took another escalated approach in confronting the Brotherhood and by the Brotherhood moderates (including Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh, Nabil Kofahi, Salem al-Falahat, Abdul Hamid al-Qudah, and others), who felt they had been placed in a vise between the state’s policies against them, on the one hand, and the harmful distortion of the hawks (which led to the resignation of the General Secretary himself), on the other hand.

From these events, the moderate leadership (especially Rahil Gharaibeh and Nabil Kofahi) conceived the “constitutional monarchy” initiative. Unprecedented in the annals of the Muslim Brotherhood and in the relationship between the state and the Brotherhood, it was based on a discourse that

---

(45) In his book, *The Islamist Movement in Jordan*, former General Secretary Salem al-Falahat offers important details about the meeting that preceded the Brotherhood’s publication of the press release, between the government and the director of intelligence on one side, and the Brotherhood leaders on the other side. Al-Falahat also reviews the response to the declaration, the circumstances surrounding the convening of a session of the Shura Council, and the impact of the document/press release on the heated debates inside the Brotherhood. See: Salim al-Falahat, *The Islamist Movement in Jordan*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 272-301.
affirmed the importance of reducing the powers of the king and the size of his constitutional role and adopting a constitutional monarchy like Britain and other European countries. (46)

The state was shocked by this initiative and fought it by all means; ironically, while the new discourse represented an exceptional twist between the Brotherhood and the state, the hawks disavowed the initiative and denied any link between it and the organization. This led to a huge dispute between the authors of the initiative and the Executive Bureau of the organization and the IAF regarding whether the organization had approved the initiative. (47)

In 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood held an important internal meeting where working papers on the Brotherhood’s approach were discussed. The discussions revealed the transformations within the organization, whereby the discussion, competition, and disagreement between the two wings (moderates and hawks) became centered on the relationship with Hamas (organizational duplication), internal reform and in relation to the “national question,” and the moderates’ emphasis on accepting Jordan’s disengagement decision between the east and west bank legislated in 1988. (48)


(47) The authors of the initiative asserted that it had gained the confidence and blessing of the Brotherhood Executive Bureau under Hammam Said. This was later denied by other sources, such as Zaki Bani Rashid, who asserted that the Brotherhood does not want to raise the level of non-traditional discourse in its relationship with the state. See for example: Mohammed al-Najjar, “The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood Discuss the Constitutional Monarchy,” Al Jazeera.net, 6/12/2010, at the following link: https://goo.gl/FSndV7

(48) The Muslim Brotherhood’s position on the disengagement decision - made by the late King Hussein bin Talal, effectively ending the unity of the two banks (1950) - remains ambiguous. Its only official decision came at the time of Hussein’s decision and rejected disengagement. Yet, afterwards, =
Since the resignation of the Executive Bureau and the General Secretary and the dissolution of the Shura Council after the 2007 elections, the Brotherhood fell prey to an internal crisis, which became an overriding concern for the organization, its members, and the media. Former General Secretary Salem al-Falahat observes the details of this crisis, the subsequent problems, the resignations, the media coverage, and the dozens of initiatives and diagnoses trying to resolve the internal crisis, all the way to 2015, when the internal crises exploded, leading to the announcement of the Jordanian reform initiative, Zamzam, in October 2013. Zamzam was launched by two prominent moderates, Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh and Dr. Nabil Kofahi, along with Dr. Jamil Dheisat, Dr. Nael Zaidan Masalha, and dozens of leaders and youth specifically from the Brotherhood’s moderate wing.

After that, former General Secretary Abdul Majeed Thneibat applied to register a new group, the Muslim Brotherhood Society, with the blessing of official institutions. With that, the exodus of the moderate wing from the organization intensified, particularly after the parent organization expelled most leaders who participated in these two steps (Zamzam and the Muslim Brotherhood Society). Then, a new internal initiative put forward by the Group of Elders transformed into drafting a new party, also made up mostly of moderates, in 2016, called the Partnership and Rescue Party.\(^{(49)}\)

\(^{(49)}\) See: Khair al-Din al-Jabari, “Jordanian Brotherhood: Smooth Solution for the Group and Organization in Its Most Difficult Phase,” *Noon Post*, 3/3/2015, at the following link: https://www.noonpost.org/content/5678
Meanwhile, Hamas reiterated its demand to separate from the Jordanian Brotherhood and to be an independent group in Palestine. (50) The Executive Bureau rejected this demand more than once, until the Guidance Bureau in Egypt intervened, after which the process of separation between the two groups (Hamas and the Brotherhood) began. The Palestinian Brotherhood included all Palestinians, both inside Palestine and in the diaspora, thus, there remained a problem with regards to Jordanians of Palestinian descent (those who have a Jordanian passport with a national number). Should they join the Jordanian Brotherhood or Hamas, or should they be given the choice to choose either? This was also the solution for the external administrative bureaus (particularly, in the Arab Gulf, where many members of the organization reside). (51)

In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood reviewed its by-laws (especially after the establishment of the new Muslim Brotherhood Society) and prepared a draft for new by-laws that separated the organization from the parent group in Egypt. In parallel, a new draft for the by-laws of the IAF strengthened its independence from the Muslim Brotherhood and pushed for better participation of women and youth and the development of the party’s political discourse.

(50) The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and in Palestine both made up what was called the Bilad al-Sham Organization in 1978. While Hamas remained a part of the Jordanian Brotherhood, the Palestinian division served as an organizational vessel for Hamas. The Jordanian Brotherhood’s external administrative bureaus were a mixture of Hamas members who also had representation on the organization’s Shura Council.

(51) See: Salem al-Falahat, The Islamist Movement in Jordan, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 199-240, where Al-Falahat presents important historical documentation of the stages of the relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian groups and associated organizational relationships. He also describes the process of separation and its merits, and the attitudes of different Brotherhood trends toward the situation.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was in a state of shock after the intervention of the army and the fall of the Mohammed Morsi regime (July 2013) and denied the need to review the organization’s course to learn from the mistakes of the Egyptian Brotherhood, they nevertheless attempted in 2016-2017 to develop their discourse, return to political life, and overcome the consequences of what occurred in Egypt. The organization expressed its willingness to legally register again, and thus began a new conversation regarding its relationship with the regime, the need to separate da’wa from politics, and the internal sparring over the organization’s position vis-à-vis the civil state, as we will detail later. (52)

Findings and Conclusions for 2018

We have arrived at the year 2018, in the context of major changes and developments in the internal Brotherhood crisis, and perhaps a review of the way stations and turning points is important to understanding the paths that the organization and the IAF have taken over the past decades:

A. The collective and individual processes of departing or splitting off, which occurred from 1998 to 2016, all came from the organization’s moderates or doves, beginning with the Islamic Centrist group in 1997 (which split off after the 1997 elections and established the Islamic Centrist Party, then Zamzam in 2013, followed by the new Muslim Brotherhood Society (2015), and, finally, the Participation and Rescue Party (2017).

(52) See: Mohammed Abu Rumman, The Crisis of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood...The End of Ongoing Conflict and the Beginning of Political Resolve, op. cit.
These departures are associated with two other indicators: first, most (though not all) of the members behind these initiatives are East Bankers, which weakened their representation in the parent organization and the IAF; and, second, the doves and the moderates were the ones who traditionally worked to absorb and contain crises with the state before they grew. They constituted a channel of communication, especially during the regime of King Hussein. This splitting off has weakened these channels of communication between the organization and the regime.

B. There are noticeable changes in the Brotherhood’s debates, disputes, and discussions, as follows:

1) Since the 1960s, regarding the use of armed action and engagement in the commando and jihadist enterprises to liberate Palestine.

2) In the 1980s, between two trends—first, the pragmatic trend, influenced by the thinking of Rachid Ghannouchi, Hassan al-Turabi, and its most prominent leaders who studied sociology, anthropology, and the sciences abroad (such as, Dr. Ishaq al-Farhan, Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyat, Dr. Abdul Hamid al-Qudah, Emad Abu Diyah, Dr. Nael Masalha, Dr. Adnan al-Jaljuli, Dr. Bassam al-Amoush, and others); and second, the current influenced by Sayyid Qutb and its best-known leaders who are professors of Islamic Shari’a (such as Dr. Hammam Said, Dr. Mohammed Abu Faris, Dr. Rajih al-Kurdi, and others).

3) The year 1989 was a turning point for the Muslim Brotherhood, as they entered the parliamentary elections and won seats in the parliament and in municipalities and established a presence in university student syndicates and unions.
They also established several political, media, research, and educational institutions and newspapers, combining them with debate on democracy and *shura* and participation in Parliament and ministries.

4) In the mid-1990s, a new youth leadership generation emerged, most notably Emad Abu Diyah, Salem al-Falahat, Rahil Gharaibeh, Ibrahim Gharaibeh, and others. This group led the organization’s 1997 election boycott, protesting the decline of public freedoms and democracy.

5) Also in the 1990s, Hamas leaders returned to Jordan from Kuwait against the backdrop of the first Gulf War in 1990. Hamas began to grow within the Jordanian Brotherhood organization, where the roots of the so-called “shadow organization” began to appear, signaling Hamas control over the Brotherhood. This situation later became the focus of the internal organizational crisis.

6) The first organizational split was after the 1997 elections and involved a group of doves who had opposed the boycott. Well-known dove leaders left with them, such as Dr. Bassam al-Amoush, Dr. Abdullah al-Akayleh, and Abdul Rahim al-Akour, and eventually formed the Islamic Centrist Party, which became very close to the state in its official position and relationship. It did not enjoy mass or popular support like that of the Muslim Brotherhood.

7) The decision to close Hamas offices in Jordan in 1999, at the beginning of the reign of King Abdullah II, was also a reflection of the internal battle. It led to the division of the centrist youth generation into two currents: the first concerned with national reform and the second with the relationship with Hamas. Later, in 2002, the structure of the Execu-
tive Bureau changed to increase the presence of the hawks. After 2002, two main alliances appeared in the organization, one associated with the East Bankers and including the doves and centrist leaders (most notably Abdul Latif Arabiyat, Abdul Majeed Thneibat, Abdul Hamid al-Qudah, Salem al-Falahat, Rahil Gharabaibeh, Nabil Kofahi, Nael Masalha, and Ahmed al-Kafawin), and the other associated with Hamas and including Hamas leaders and hawks (in particular Dr. Mohammed Abu Farhan, Dr. Hammam Said, Saoud Abu Mahfouz, Zaki Bani Irsheid, Mourad al-Adaileh, Ali Abu al-Sukr, and others).

8) In 2006, Hamas’s success in the elections and regional alliances were reflected in the relationship between the state and the organization, the election fraud of 2007 against the organization, the dissolution of the Shura Council and the resignation of the General Secretary, and the entry into the tempestuous internal crisis between the moderates and the hawks.

9) The internal debates and conversations among the Brotherhood during the internal crisis (that lasted from 2007 to 2017) centered on the relationship with Hamas and the question of the duality of the organization, as well as on the project of political reform and the “national question.” Other topics being debated were the disengagement decision, the priorities of the organization, and the issue of representation of the administrative bureaus in the Gulf in the Shura Council.

10) Issues such as the relationship between the organization and the party and between da’wa and politics began to be vigorously debated within the Brotherhood. Also at issue was the relationship with the international Guidance Bureau and the civil state. This all was occurring within the context
of regional changes during and after the Arab Spring, and the pressure that the organization felt to offer its opinion and position regarding these events.

C. Returning to the topic of the Brotherhood debates and documents, we also observe the trend toward “politicization.” The Brotherhood maintained, from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, a discourse of da’wa and sermons linked to politically-principled stances. The organization entered elections (1989, 1993, 2003, and 2007) under the slogan, “Islam is the Solution,” and despite their announced acceptance of democracy, their rhetoric nevertheless remained linked to the theme of application of Shari’a law and to politically broad language. Meanwhile, Brotherhood ideas and debates proceeded toward a more political discourse over time.

Within this context, it is possible to compare specific historical stages as an indication of these changes. It begins with the Brotherhood’s conditions for lending confidence to the government of Mudar Badran (1990) – which focused on issues related to “traditional, Islamic ideology” (the veil, Shari’a law, establishment of a Shari’a college) – followed by the reasons for the organization’s boycott of the 1997 elections – focused on democracy and public freedoms. Then came the Islamist movement’s vision for reform in 2005, announcing its sincere support for democracy, followed by the demands of the reformist Brotherhood during the Arab Spring (political, reformist, and purely internal in nature), and, finally, entry into the parliamentary elections of 2016 as part of the National Coalition for reform (minus the slogan, “Islam is the Solution”), with greater focus on political and reformist issues.

D. Although the Brotherhood was traditionally split between two currents, the hawks (hardliners) and the doves
(moderates), this is an over-simplification. There were generations that were part of both organizational divisions. The second generation (circa 1970s and 1980s) split into two groups: the first was closer to Qutb and the other to pragmatism. The third generation arose in the mid-1990s and became the centrist trend, which in turn split into the internal reform trend and the Hamas trend. The second-generation doves allied themselves with the third-generation internal reformers to form the moderate wing, while the second-generation hawks allied themselves with the third-generation Hamas proponents to form the hardliners wing. The internal crisis between the two wings was clearly set in motion during this period, and, since 2002, the youth of the third and fourth generation have affiliated with one of the two pre-existing wings.

The terms “moderate” and “hardliner” are not entirely accurate and reflect neither the changes that have occurred in the Brotherhood nor the trading of positions between the two camps. For example, in 2007, the moderate wing took an escalated approach with the political regime and reached levels of discourse unprecedented even among the hawks. Two dove leaders, Rahil Gharaibeh and Nabil Kofahi, called for a constitutional monarchy, compelling even the extremist wing to disassociate itself from this proposal. Salem al-Falahat was one of the most prominent leaders in the popular mobilization calling for reform in 2011, among them those movements with the same high ceiling.

However, Rahil Gharaibeh and Nabil Kofahi returned thereafter to announce the Zamzam initiative, and later the Zamzam party, which advocated conciliation with the state and gained official acceptance. Meanwhile, the hardliners, who had refused to give up reform demands, worked to achieve a draft plan for the governance of the Brotherhood.
and the party. The plan included many developments that the hardliners had previously considered treasonous or overly conciliatory, such as complete separation from the worldwide Brotherhood, separation of *da’wa* and politics, and emphasis on internal reform (see Figure 1).

This means that the evolution of positions (both political and ideological) within the Brotherhood crisis were set in motion and evolved non-systematically between the extremists and the moderates, with the two wings exchanging the rhetoric of escalation and of calm during this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hardliners Wing (Hawks)</th>
<th>Moderate Wing (Doves)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reject Call for Constitutional Monarchy (2007-2010)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Call for Constitutional Monarchy (2007-2010)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This chapter discussed the political debates within the Jordanian Brotherhood and their effect on the internal alignments of the organization so that we may examine the development of the Brotherhood’s political discourse and its intellectual structure over the preceding decades. We classified these transformations, the themes, and prominent individuals involved, which also gives the reader the intellectual and organizational background, before we move on to discuss the appearance of post-Islamist parties in the next chapter. In this chapter, we focused on Islamism as an entry point to understanding the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood until about 2007, after which the features of post-Islamism emerged, beginning with the thinking of some members of the Brotherhood and its later factions.

We can understand the internal intellectual debates within the Brotherhood under three main headings: their attitude toward democracy in the 1980’s, the national question at the turn of the century, and, finally, the separation of da’wa and politics. These broad headings have permeated many intellectual layers; however, the general framework of the intellectual development is made clear through these headings compared with the traditional religious discourse that distinguished the Brotherhood in the 1980s. This explains the Brotherhood’s gradual orientation towards political institutionalization, which is currently represented by the debates on separating da’wa from politics, as we will discuss later.

This politicization came with a cost to the intellectual composition of the Brotherhood: the price was the disputes and the emergence of the two historical trends (doves and the hawks), with the gradual – and sometimes confrontational – withdrawal of the moderates from the Brotherhood ranks to
form the Centrist Party in the 1990s. The Zamzam Initiative emerged in 2013, followed by the licensing of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in 2015, and the formation of the Participation and Rescue Party in 2017, as we will explain in the next chapter. In this way, the moderate trend that often called for reform and containment of its crises with the state became absent from the Brotherhood, while the extremist trend adopted positions vis-à-vis the state that were more conciliatory than those of the moderates during the Arab Spring.

Demographically, the East Bankers dominated the leadership and membership of the moderates, who withdrew from the Brotherhood and the IAF. This strengthened the belief among political players that the Brotherhood was made up of Jordanians of Palestinian descent, which in turn fostered the emergence of the national question and the political role of the Brotherhood in the debates that ensued.

These factors and stages of the intellectual debates within the Brotherhood form the general intellectual framework for understanding the reasons that motivated the emergence of post-Islamist parties from within the organization in 2010. This chapter attempts to link the political and historical context in the first chapter with the intellectual context in preparation for understanding and discussing the motives for establishing the National Congress Party-Zamzam, the registration of the Muslim Brotherhood Society, and the formation of the Participation and Rescue Party as will be discussed in the next chapter.
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
CHAPTER THREE

“Post-Islamist” Parties

The movements that split off from the Muslim Brotherhood have seen clear and obvious development since 2013, beginning with the Zamzam initiative in the same year. This was followed by the establishment in 2015 of the new Muslim Brotherhood Society bearing the Muslim Brotherhood name and under the leadership of the most recent General Secretary, Abdul Majid Thneibat. Later still, in 2017, another group of Brotherhood leaders (including Salem al-Falahat, also a former General Secretary of the Brotherhood) announced their intention to found the Participation and Rescue Party (PRP).

We mentioned previously that the three new entities (the licensed Society, Zamzam, and the PRP party) emerged together from within the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Although there are three entities organizationally, it is difficult to distinguish among them ideologically and intellectually since they all propose a similar intellectual discourse vis-à-vis democracy, civil society, human rights, public freedoms, and minorities and women. They also all have similar views on the “national question,” which has occupied a wide space in the Brotherhood debates in past years and in the dynamics of the organizational crisis, as mentioned previously.
We argue in this chapter that what unifies the three entities is that they all go beyond the classic tenets of Islamism and, thus, belong more to post-Islamism. The term “post-Islamism” appeared in the writings of the French academic, Olivier Roy, and then in those of the Iranian-American, Asef Bayat, at the beginning of the 1990s. It was applied to Islamist movements and parties that emerged in the 1990s and later that adopted democracy and reinvented themselves based on promoting human rights, the value of citizenship, pluralism, and political partnership. The social and political repositioning of these movements figured significantly in the debate over the separation of da’wa and politics.

The licensed society has accepted the separation of da’wa and politics and independence from the Egyptian Brotherhood. It has turned over political activity to the new political parties and limits its work – as a civil society organization – to proselytization, social, and cultural activities. Although its system includes political activity, the organization appears to content itself with supporting a specific party and being a “pressure group” (i.e. having an indirect political role). Likewise, the ideas of an Islamic state or application of Shari’a law are not raised in the literature of the new entities and have been replaced in broad terms by the concept of “the reference point of Islamic values.”

Nevertheless, there appear to be differences in approach among the new entities, especially in their level of proximity to the state and relationship with state institutions. Both Zamzam and the Muslim Brotherhood Society are accepted by state institutions (and actions are occurring to facilitate their licensing process), while the primary feature of the PRP (under establishment) seems to tend toward a critical vision and opposition to official policies.
This chapter will deal with the rationale behind the founding and formation of the three entities, their most notable ideas and leaders, and their general political orientation to date.

National Congress Party – Zamzam

A. Founding Circumstances

With the attendance of elite Jordanian statesmen and politicians, a public event took place at the Royal Cultural Center on the evening of Sunday, October 6, 2013, where the Jordanian reform initiative, Zamzam, was launched. Two prominent leaders of the initiative, Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh and Dr. Nabil Kofahi, spoke at the event, which provoked strong media interest and increased the organizational crisis surrounding the participation of Brotherhood leaders in this initiative. Ultimately, both Gharaibeh and Kofahi were dismissed from the Muslim Brotherhood.

Salem al-Falahat, former Muslim Brotherhood General Secretary, provides readers and those interested with rich material on the circumstances and debates surrounding the formation of Zamzam. This includes documentation related to the internal attempts and initiatives to resolve issues and to prevent the expulsion of leaders participating in Zamzam, ending with the decision to expel them from the parent organization, and the aftermath of these developments. (53)

In 2016, the National Congress Party-Zamzam was formally registered as an official political party. It participated in the parliamentary elections that same year, but with-

out slates or slogans, and the candidates who belonged to the party won on their own individual merits and social bases. Although the party later claimed victory of five of its candidates in the elections, they did not form a bloc in parliament, nor did they act according to one agenda or shared positions. This created fundamental doubts about the strength of the new deputies’ relationship with the Zamzam party and its organizational and intellectual consistency.

To understand the circumstances surrounding the establishment and formation of the Zamzam experiment, we must bear in mind three main factors:

**Factor One: the experience of both Dr. Rahil Gha-raibeh and Dr. Nabil Kofahi**, the two originators of the Zamzam initiative. They both have a long history in the Muslim Brotherhood, since their entry as youths into student and youth work and then in the planning unit at the beginning of the 1990s. They also witnessed the rise of the moderate wing in the mid-1990s, and later of the organizational polarization in the Brotherhood, which began with the expulsion of the Hamas leadership, and escalated in 2002, and broke out into an open crisis in 2007.

Since 2007, Gharaibeh and Kofahi have formed a duo, even within the moderate wing. They both experienced bitter defeat in the parliamentary elections, even at the municipal level, according to Kofahi. Despite espousing a moderate ideology, they felt that they were targeted by the state and the media machine, compared to the hawks. They both participated in the development of the “national question” approach in internal Brotherhood debates, and they were often accused by the hawks of working for state security or regional apparatus. In the 2010 internal Brotherhood conference, Kofahi pre-
sented a vision for political reform titled, “National Identity and Citizenship,” which stressed the importance of including the national question in the Brotherhood’s discourse. His vision was not accepted by the hawks, and, as Salem al-Falahat indicates in his book, the papers from that conference disappeared and were not published or preserved! (54)

In his paper, Kofahi called for internal balance and for a review of the Brotherhood’s position on the national question, especially on the state’s disengagement decision between the East and West banks. Although the organization had already rejected the decision, Kofahi proposed that it was not possible to either absolutely accept or reject it because there were pros and cons. (55)

Between 2008 and 2010, Gharaibeh and Kofahi together inaugurated the constitutional monarchy initiative, from which the extremist wing of the Brotherhood disassociated itself. This initiative was prompted by the moderate leaders’ suspicions of collusion between state institutions and the extremist wing to remove the internal national question from the priorities and concerns of the Brotherhood and to classify the organization as being linked with a Palestinian-Jordanian identity rather than with a comprehensive national identity. Thus, the reaction of Gharaibeh and Kofahi was to adopt a new discourse on the concept of constitutional monarchy that emphasized national identity.

(54) For this conference and its most important deliberations, see: Mohammed Abu Rumman, “The Muslim Brotherhood after the 2010 election boycott: Redrawing the political role of the movement,” paper published by the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan (2010).
(55) Ibid.
There is a clear political aspiration that unites Gharai-beh and Kofahi, i.e. their participation in the development of both the ideological and organizational experiments; however, most important is their dynamism, intellectualism, and personality. They are not afraid to revise and evolve their ideas and to adopt new ideas, even if they clash with the prevailing sentiments that govern most of the organization’s social rules. Nevertheless, neither of them was able to stimulate the kind of independent or forward thinking in others that allowed their exit from the vicious cycle of internal Brotherhood disputes. Gharai-beh and Kofahi lack this great influence on the grassroots, perhaps for social and organizational reasons, although Kofahi has a clear presence in Irbid and was formerly the mayor of Irbid.

This leads us to the second factor, the organizational crisis. As we mentioned earlier, the organizational crisis reached an unprecedented stage beginning in 2007, and numerous efforts to resolve the polarization were fruitless. Ultimately, the moderates, specifically Gharai-beh and Kofahi, felt that the majority might not be with them and that what they were proposing regarding the national question was not yet internalized in the majority culture. The hardliners placed internal pressure on them. Over time, all this pushed the two moderates to consider another project through which to promote their results and concepts regarding political reform and national internal affairs. These ideas were hard to sell inside the Brotherhood given the current climate of polarization, thus, the search continued for another avenue other than the Brotherhood organization.

Finally, the third factor is linked to the events of the Arab Spring and the Brotherhood’s experience governing Egypt. Kofahi noted this clearly in his remarks at the confe-
rence announcing the Zamzam initiative, where he confirmed that they were convinced of the need for national participation and partnership in the current stage to avoid the stormy ideological and political disputes of the Egyptian revolution—which led to the return of military rule and the end of the dream of Arab democracy.

Zamzam learned from the Brotherhood’s mistake of trying to manage the transitional phase in Egypt on their own, which led to the intervention of the army and a reversal of the situation. Zamzam concluded that it is necessary to focus on national rather than party and organizational priorities and to find common ground for all and a framework that goes beyond politics to address the developmental, economic, and social dimensions as well.

Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh explains his conclusions about the concept of the new project (Zamzam), saying: “We are witnessing a dangerous transitional stage, and we need the maximum degree of wisdom and collective intelligence to learn from what is happening in the surrounding countries. The transitional stage requires agreement on a road map to the future, the form of the state, and clear rules for the political process before starting on the process of party competition and going to the voting booth.”

Regarding the importance of national identity in the discourse of the new initiative, Gharaibeh says, “The Jordanian identity and the Jordanian state is beyond dispute and outside the scope of debate; it is not a bargaining chip. This state with its incontrovertible identity is not a platform and is not subordinate to any one group. Jordanians bear the respon-

---

(56) Interview with Rahil Gharaibeh, 12/29/2017.
sibility for protecting this patch of land, and they have the
ability to build their state.” (57)

The previous paragraph clearly shows the conclusions
that Gharaibeh, Kofahi, and the Zamzam group drew, as
summarized by Alaa al-Froukh (a later member of the party’s
Advisory Board and a former member of the Muslim Bro-
therhood): Zamzam represents a departure from most politi-
cal movements and parties in Jordan, which are in the “pock-
et” of the authorities or have links abroad and see Jordan as a
“platform” and not as a nation, a state, institutions, a society,
and an identity. Thus, we have emphasized these concepts of
Jordan as a state, institutions, and a society, in opposition to
the view of Jordan as a “functional entity.” This view is tied
to the state here and permeates the mindset of many politi-
cians, including a segment of the Muslim Brotherhood. (58)

Dozens of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and youth par-
ticipated in the formation of the new initiative; however,
some of them later withdrew and joined the PRP. The most
prominent Brotherhood leaders in Zamzam are Dr. Rahil
Gharaibeh, Dr. Nabil Kofahi, Dr. Jamil Dheisat, and Dr. Nael
Zaidan Masalha, while the most notable youth include Alaa
al-Froukh, Yaman Gharaibeh, Dr. Mohammed Hassan
Thneibat, and Ahmed al-Akayleh.

The main ideas and conclusions include:

(57) Ibid.
(58) Interview with Alaa al-Froukh, 12/22/2017. The notion of a “functional
entity” is based on the belief that Jordan was established by the British col-
onialists, on one hand to protect and separate Israel from the major Arab
countries, and on the other hand to absorb Palestinian refugees as an alterna-
tive homeland for them.
1. Emphasis on national identity and affirmation of the concept of the state, the citizenry, and the national identity.

2. The importance and the need of national partnership and the search for common ground with others.

3. Going beyond the era of ideological parties and thinking in terms of economic and development programs that are based on inclusion rather than exclusion.

4. Going beyond the concept of political Islam and thinking outside that framework, since Islam (according to this proposal) “is not a storehouse for ready-made, practical solutions; Islam stimulates the mind to reflection, creativity, and capability to keep up with modernity, seek points of wisdom and derive human expertise therefrom.” (59) Thus, the notion of identity, which governed the ideological discourse of the Brotherhood, was no longer explicitly dominant over the Zamzam members.

5. Zamzam members (former Brothers) abandoned the tenets of the Islamic state and the application of Shari’a; they do not refer to them at all in their writings and speeches. Rather, Dr. Nabil Kofahi describes Zamzam’s political project as “aiming toward the establishment of a modern civil state based on the citizenry, freedom, justice, equality of opportunity, respect for human dignity, national partnership, preservation of social stability and growth, and development of a political life based on competitive agendas, so as to achieve broad political and social partnership that promotes the principle of peaceful transfer of power and parliamentary gov-

(59) Ibid.
ernments and the elimination of financial, administrative, and social corruption.”

6. As evidence of going beyond the tenets of political Islam and the mentality that governs them, Alaa al-Froukh points out that they (Zamzam members formerly of the Muslim Brotherhood) do not discuss an Islamic state with the recognized ideological meaning. Instead, they speak clearly about a pluralistic, democratic, civil state with transfer of power, and they are not interested in the party whether a person prays or is religious or whether a girl wears the veil. In their opinion, the topic of Islam has changed to become a general value reference, i.e. an array of values – justice, respect, freedom, loyalty, honesty, and integrity – that can be shared with other global humanitarian values.

B. Intellectual Discourse

Although most founding members of Zamzam (which obtained its license at the end of 2016, as we have noted) are not from the Muslim Brotherhood, the ideas of Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh and Dr. Nabil Kofahi are considered the key to the party’s creation as an idea, a group, an institution, and a political player. The party is thus the result of the thinking of the group of Brothers that played the main role in its founding.

Zamzam describes itself as a “Jordanian political party, founded in 2017, that relies on a peaceful, public approach that seeks to empower Jordanian society and to build a modern civil state via gathering and investing in potential and presenting alternatives and initiatives to realize complete

(60) Ibid.
(61) Ibid.
reform based on citizenship and competence, according to an approach of mutual, shared values.”(62)

Nowhere in the party’s literature, discourse, and basic platform is there anything to do with political Islam. The basic platform defines the party’s message as “harnessing and developing potential to achieve comprehensive reform based on citizenship and competence, via a gradual, participatory, consensual, values-based approach.” Zamzam’s vision is “an empowered, compassionate society and a modern, civil state.”

Zamzam’s logo – a gold Jordanian iris borne on a stem formed by the word “Zamzam” resting on a seven-pointed star, with the name “National Congress Party” and the date of its foundation – draws on national symbolism rather than recognized Islamic symbols.

In the party’s references, there is emphasis on the complementariness between national, ethnic, and Islamic identities. Its principles stress “preservation of an independent, stable Jordanian state as an achievement for all Jordanians.”

Zamzam’s principles reveal a clear evolution in political concepts vis-a-vis the traditional intellectual discourse of political Islam. The party affirms its commitment to the constitution; respect for the rule of law; freedom of religion, thought, culture, expression, and opinion; neutrality of public institutions toward all citizens in providing services; equality of opportunity for all; and considering citizenship the basis for acquiring rights and performing duties.

(62) By-laws of the National Congress Party-Zamzam
Regarding goals and objectives, the party’s first goal (according to its basic platform) is “to contribute to building a modern, civil, Jordanian state based on citizenship, justice, and effective participation” and “to build a broad national trend that has a large presence and a strong influence on political decision-making, expresses the conscience of the people, and has the correct vision, expertise, effectiveness, and management capability for affairs of state in all areas.”

Clearly, it can be noted, first, that the party’s national priorities prevailed over ideological considerations and, second, that the notion of national identity supersedes the notion of Islamic identity, which governed Islamist movements over the preceding decades. This reflects the evolution of the national question in the thinking and discourse of the group of Muslim Brotherhood leaders who founded the party and were previously in the moderate wing.

There is also a noticeable lack of any caution, limitation, or check on the party’s use of the terms and concepts of democracy, political pluralism, and intellectual freedom. Instead, the concept of the “democratic, civil state” in party literature has replaced the concept of the Islamic state or “Islamism” in the writings of political Islam. There is no mention of applying Shari’a or the Islamic point of reference, except under the broad umbrella of Islamic values and general humanity.

**C. Organizational Structure**

With membership of more than 800, the party was registered in August 2016 and held elections for the position of General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary, and the 72 members of the Advisors Council. In the first elections, held
in November 2016, Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh ran unopposed and was elected General Secretary (confirming his personal and intellectual importance in the new initiative) and Kamal al-Awamleh was elected Deputy General Secretary.

In the Advisors Council, the number of seats is distributed according to the governorates and the number of members in them. There is a clear membership advantage for the governorate of Irbid, and, thus, it has more representation on the Advisors Council. For example, Irbid has 15 Advisors Council members, while Amman has 12, even though Amman has a much larger demographic distribution in the kingdom than Irbid. However, the Irbid presence is a result of the connection between the founding of Zamzam and the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal crisis. Irbid was one of the most prominent governorates that hosted a reform conference against the conservatives, in which it established initiatives to resolve the internal Brotherhood disputes. There were entire branches that joined the new licensed society (founded by Thneibat), and many members resigned from the IAF and joined Zamzam – i.e. the switching process from the Brotherhood to Zamzam occurred largely in Irbid.

In the remaining governorates, like Zarqa for example, a known Muslim Brotherhood stronghold in which Zamzam’s influence is clearly limited, Zamzam had a modest four seats win. They won another four seats in each of Ajloun, Jerash, Madabah, and Aqaba, while they got five seats in Mafraq; only three in Tafilah. In Balqa they won six seats and seven in Karak.

From a socio-demographic perspective, the difference between the organizational make-up of Zamzam and that of the Muslim Brotherhood is clear: Zamzam is distributed
throughout the governorates, while the organization and mass of the Brotherhood is centered in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, i.e. places where Jordanians of mainly Palestinian descent are located, including the Palestinian camps in Jordan.

The irony appears to be that even in the three governorates mentioned (Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa) the majority are East Bankers, and the total level of representation of East Bankers in the Advisors Council is more than 90% at least. This means that the party’s composition reflects the social structure of the East Bank, as seen in its elections, numbers, and indicators. (63)

Note also that the number of participants in the first Advisors Council elections was 377 of 818, i.e. less than half. According to one member of the founding body, this is because a proportion of the founders are only there because of kinship or friendship, to fulfill the number needed to obtain the necessary license and to increase the membership.

On November 19, 2016, Wasfi Obaidat was elected head of the Advisors Council, along with the members of the political bureau and the permanent bureau of the Advisors Council. Only two women were elected, one to the permanent bureau and the other to the political bureau, while only four women (from the precincts of Irbid and Amman) were elected to the Advisors Council. In addition, one Christian was elected (representing Irbid). This reflects a noticeable weakness in women’s representation in the new party.

(63) Even in cities known to have a high population density of Jordanians of Palestinian descent and containing Palestinian camps, we do not find representation of the Palestinian-Jordanian element, e.g. in Amman and Zarqa (where all Council members are East Bankers), and even Irbid and Balqa (where there is no elected representation in Baqa’a Camp, for example).
D. Activities and Political Orientation

Despite Zamzam’s participation in the parliamentary elections, and its announcement of five deputies from its membership in the Council, the party failed to form a cohesive parliamentary bloc uniting the deputies with their social and tribal bases whom they represent. The party did not participate in the elections with their own lists, or under their slogans, or within coalitions; in other words, the deputies succeeded in winning office as individuals.

The party also participated in municipal and decentralized elections, winning only six seats, half of them, remarkably, from Irbid governorate. (Two of them were women, meaning that the party invested well in the women’s quota.) One seat was from Amman governorate and the other was from Balqa governorate (Zayy), with three of them on decentralized councils and the rest on municipal councils.\(^{(64)}\)

In addition to participating in the parliamentary, municipal, and decentralized elections, Zamzam issued several political statements regarding condemnation of terrorist operations (such as those occurring in Egypt), support for Jordan’s position on Jerusalem in response to the American administration, and opposition to rising electricity prices. Other Zamzam statements relate to political topics such as a warning against what party life has suffered following the decision of the National Current Party to dissolve itself, or the call for accountability of security officials for an attack on a citizen spread through social media networks.

\(^{(64)}\) See: “Reception for the party’s winning candidates,” official Zamzam website on the internet, 8/28/2016.
The party’s activities focused on diverse forums and workshops, on such topics as the budget, taxes, and the traffic crisis in Jordan, i.e. issues related to public policy. Other workshops related to the civil state, field visits of party leaders to state officials, and the call to participate in protests against the decision of the Trump administration to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in late 2017. (65)

It is difficult to gauge the future political orientations of the party based on its agenda of statements and activities to date; however, it is clear that the party is avoiding positions that strongly support government policies, while at the same time opposition to government decisions continues. Evidently, the party’s focus is on public policy and discussion through a schedule of symposiums and workshops.

Licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society

A. Founding Circumstances

In February 2015, the former General Secretary of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdul Majid Thneibat, and dozens of Brotherhood members and well-known leaders (such as Rahil Gharaibeh, Dr. Nabil Kofahi, Dr. Jamil Dheisat, Dr. Sharaf al-Qudah, and others), submitted a request for a new license for the Muslim Brotherhood. They obtained the license from the ministries of Political Development and Social Development in March 2015.

The background to the new step stems from two issues:

(65) All of these activities can be reviewed at the party’s private Facebook page or its official internet website at the following link: https://zamzamparty.jo/
The first issue relates to the effects and dynamics of the crisis inside the Muslim Brotherhood organization, as we have noted previously. The new group that applied to license the society was from the dove wing that was itself divided into two factions: the faction that supported this step, and the faction that opposed it and worked to contain the problems and make a final bid for internal reconciliation.

Those who took the step of founding the new society clearly despained of any possibility of true, radical solutions to the internal crisis, given the obstinacy of the extremist wing in its positions and opinions, its attempt to seize control of the leadership, and the clear division of the base into extremists and moderates.

The second issue stems from the evolution of the relationship with the state. First, Thneibat confirmed that he received notification from the king about the necessity of correcting the organization’s legal status to enable Jordan to resist regional and outside pressure from Arab allies after Egypt and some Gulf countries listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a banned terrorist group. Second, some actors in Jordan argue that because the legal status of the Jordanian Brotherhood is ambiguous, whenever there is a crisis between the Brotherhood and the state, historically, the state hints at dissolving the Muslim Brotherhood and exploiting the confusion surrounding its legal status. Therefore, correcting its legal status will protect the Muslim Brotherhood from such pressures.

(66) The Muslim Brotherhood obtained a license from the state in 1946 as a society affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In 1953, it obtained a new license, following the development of its basic structure by the new Brotherhood leadership, which was approved by the Jordanian government under the leadership of Tawfiq Abu al-Huda at the time. See: Salem al-Falahat, The Islamist Movement in Jordan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 344-345.
The new licensed society united a broad swath of Brotherhood moderates and formed divisions and branches in Irbid, Karak, Ajloun, Jerash, the Jordan Valley, and Ramtha.

It also obtained a legal ruling to acquire the real estate and property owned by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is exactly what it did, forming a committee to follow up and inventory the assets of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this way the new entity pulled the legal license, real estate, and property right out from under the feet of the parent organization. (67)

From the demographic perspective, the predominant organizational make-up of the new society is East Bankers. In the January 2015 elections, Abdul Majid Thneibat was elected General Secretary; the Executive Bureau is made up of nine individuals and the Shura Council has 45 members (40 of them are directly elected by the General Authority, and the other five are appointed by the Shura Council itself).

Note also that the Brotherhood Society has a heavy concentration in the northern governorates and in governorates with East Bank majorities, such as Ramtha, Irbid, Ajloun, Jerash, Mafraq, Karak, Aqaba, and in the Al-Kourah District. These were the districts that actively tried to resolve

the crisis in the parent Muslim Brotherhood organization. This group also held an important internal conference in 2014 to try to reform the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, there were other groups in Irbid governorate, especially in the city of Irbid, who maintained their complete loyalty and commitment to the parent organization. This demographic factor appeared evident in the process of fragmentation within the Brotherhood in the city of Irbid between the Jordanians of Jordanian descent and those of Palestinian descent. (68)

Dr. Mohammed Sharaf al-Qudah is the Deputy General Secretary (he was previously a hawk in the parent organization). Raed al-Shiyab is one of the active members of the Executive Bureau, while Dr. Jamil Dheisat (prominent member of Zamzam) and Dr. Fatha al-Ta’amneh are responsible for the Political Bureau. Among the well-known current deputies in the House of Representatives (from Aqaba) are Ibrahim Abu al-Izz and Khalil Askar, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader. (69)

**B. New Methodology**

Although the licensed society has kept political activity, along with da‘wa and educational work, in its new structure, it has a new approach to not engage directly in party or political work, in keeping with the general principle of separation of da‘wa and politics.

---

(68) Compare this with: “Irbid the most dangerous note for the reality of the Brotherhood, 50 meeting details, and warning of schism,” Shaab News, 5/8/2014, at the following link: http://shaabnews.com/news-37172.htm

There are hints that the society considers Zamzam as its closest political representative, especially since there was overlap in the membership of the two institutions.

In terms of ideas, the national question occupies a clearer and more explicit place within the licensed society. It affirms its commitment to the Muslim Brotherhood school intellectually and methodologically, but it remains organizationally independent because it did not announce itself as a branch of the parent group in Egypt. The by-laws also stipulate the organization’s commitment to the legal, national, and Jordanian framework. They state: “The ‘Brotherhood’ is an Islamic body, working within the national Islamic framework that promotes a national reform project, with the goal of protecting and preserving Jordan’s safety and security, anchored in democracy and the peaceful establishment of the civil state, adopting moderate thought based on tolerance, cooperation, and political participation, and building good relationships with national institutions, removed from doubt and treachery, preserving the national prestige, and maintaining its safety and security, maintaining national unity, based on a gradual process of transfer to democracy, and adoption of a reasonable and positive discourse based on openness and peace, and achieving the goals of orthodox Islam.” (70)

It seems clear from the foregoing that there is a decisive break from the hesitation and confusion that dominates the parent organization’s handling of crucial concepts that shaped the crisis inside the parent Brotherhood organization. The licensed society emphasizes the “national reform project,” working within a peaceful national framework, protecting

Jordan, democracy, the civil state, a peaceful methodology, and the value of tolerance and cooperation.

The licensed society rejects the “organizational secrecy” that has marked the parent organization, and call for transparency. It dismisses the principle of “organizational secrecy and open advocacy” that has marked the teachings and approach of the Muslim Brotherhood. Even in the ideas of Hassan al-Banna, there is an emphasis on the concept of “organizational secrecy.” But the licensed society replaces this principle with open advocacy and open organization.

**Partnership and Rescue Party**

**A. Founding Circumstances**

The Participation and Rescue Party (PRP) obtained official approval at the end of 2017, and, like Zamzam, it was founded by the moderate wing. At its forefront are Salem al-Falahat and dozens of leaders and youth from the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF who had resigned from the party; however, at the time of writing this book, the Muslim Brotherhood had not yet decided to expel the members of the new party from the Brotherhood.

Despite the common background of the leaders of Zamzam and PRP in the centrist youth wing (in the mid-1990s) and the moderates (since 2000), the difference is that PRP members took a longer time trying to resolve the internal crisis in the Muslim Brotherhood. Their attempts at internal reform continued even after the announcement of the Zamzam Initiative and the licensing of the Muslim Brother-

---

(71) See: Faisal Malkawi and Salah al-Abadi, “Muslim Brotherhood, we renew our call to come to a common word,” *Alrai*, 4/13/2017.
hood Society, and they were trying to keep the internal and organizational house in order in the face of these developments.

Salem al-Falahat, one of the most prominent PRP founders, was a member of several Brotherhood reform committees (with Dr. Abdul Majid al-Qudah, Khalid Hassanein, Ahmed al-Kafawin, and Hassan Thneibat, all notable party leaders), most notably the “Group of Elders,” founded in 2013, and the committee with the same name, “Partnership and Rescue,” at the end of 2015. When these committees reached a dead-end in their reform attempts, their members issued a statement threatening their resignation from the IAF and their withdrawal from any leadership position in the Muslim Brotherhood.

When the PRP group finally became convinced of the futility of continuing its attempts to resolve the internal crisis, and when the opposing wing took over the leadership, some PRP leaders began the process of establishing a new party, while remaining in the Muslim Brotherhood unless the group decided to expel them. (72)

Among the prominent moderate founders of the PRP are Salem al-Falahat, Abdul Majid al-Qudah, Ahmed al-Kafawin, Hassan Thneibat, Khalid Hassanein, and Mohammed Rajoub. From the youth generation, there are former

(72) With them were other prominent leaders in the Brotherhood and the IAF, especially from the second generation of the organization, such as Hamza Mansour and Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyat (both of whom served as Secretary General of the IAF), and Jamil Abu Bakr, Azzam Heneidi, and others; however, the leaders mentioned backed away from the idea of founding a party for various reasons, while a group of leaders remained with the youth group who were adamant about the idea and founded the PRP along with other political figures outside the Muslim Brotherhood.
IAF youth officials, Ghaith al-Qudah, Dr. Mohammed Abdul Hamid al-Qudah, Dr. Mohammed Hassan Thneibat, and Saed al-Azzam.

Under the leadership of Salem al-Falahat, the PRP group began searching for partners outside the Brotherhood. They met with another group that included the well-known nationalist jurist, Dr. Mohammed al-Hammuri, who played an active role in the process of founding the new party and shaping its by-laws. Although al-Hammuri’s publications on Islamist thought greatly conflict with the classic writings of the Brotherhood and the IAF, he agrees with them, overall, on the concepts of the civil state, citizenship, democracy, pluralism, and a national Islamic identity. (73)

B. Party By-Laws

In the by-laws of the PRP, we find that the party identifies itself as “a civil, democratic, program-oriented, participatory, Jordanian party working in the framework of constitutional legitimacy and existing law, and pursuing the strengthening of the value of democracy, freedom, and social justice.” (74)

We find no reference in the by-laws to expressions associated with the writing of political Islam. Its logo, a seven-pointed star inside a white circle surrounded by the colors of the Jordanian flag (red, green, and black), evokes national

(73) His most prominent work in this area is a book, Freedoms Captive Between the Tyranny of Government and the Exploitation of Religion, see: Nasr al-Majali, “Conversations with intellectuals and researchers at the Arab Thought Forum on: Freedoms Captive Between the Tyranny of Government and the Exploitation of Religion,” Elaph, 7/31/2017, at the following link: http://elaph.com/Web/News/2017/7/1160452.html

symbolism to indicate – according to its by-laws – the concept of an integrated and mutually supportive society. (75)

The PRP’s principles clearly center on the concept of diversity and pluralism, a commitment to respecting the rights of different societal groups, a commitment to the constitution and the laws, and to a national and Islamic identity for Jordan. The concept of the link between power and responsibility appears clearly in the goals, principles, and concepts of the party. The party focuses on the principle of separation of powers and integration, and the subordination of executive power to the political system. It is also clear that the notion of political reform is paramount in the party’s ideas and by-laws, (76) which may reflect the personal experiences of the two most prominent theoreticians of the party: Salem al-Falahat, who went through many experiences during the Arab Spring within the popular and political mobilization for constitutional and political reform, and Dr. Mohammed al-Hammuri, whose interests and ideas are dominated by political reform.

In the organizational structure of the party, there are two main councils. The first is the Central Assembly, made up of 41 members, of whom 35 are chosen by the Constituent Assembly and the remaining six by secret ballot of the Central Assembly. The other is the Executive Bureau, which is chosen by the Central Assembly with nomination by the party’s Secretary General, who is also chosen by a majority vote of the Central Assembly. (77)

C. New Thinking and Different Discourse

Those who follow the founding statements of the PRP founders (former leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood) clearly see a new and different thought and discourse, perhaps best expressed by party theoretician, Salem al-Falahat. In a press interview, he offered us a summary of the circumstances and reasons that motivated the new thinking of the party, the conclusions they reached, and the ideas that he and his PRP companions adopted. He said:

For a long time, we have been conducting subdued reconsiderations and feeling real uncertainty about the effectiveness of Islamism in the overall mold of the Muslim Brotherhood. Certainly, we read about some experiments here and there, particularly the Turkish experiment that earned our indignation in the beginning as amounting to betrayal and perhaps blasphemy from the Justice and Development Party. However, the results of the experiment were accepted and proved that it can handle the situation, raise the people up, and persuade Turkish citizens not through ideology but through his service and his sense of distinction.

I do not claim that we reached this situation through old strategic thinking, we are where we are. Maybe I have contributed to where we are, failure to reform internally and to evolve and work from within. Maybe we have approached a state of despair towards correcting the internal Brotherhood work, and we have reached this outcome.

This has come about after about twenty initiatives for internal organizational reform, the last one being Partnership and Rescue – meaning partnership in responsibility, even when we hate it or think that it is a losing partnership for the common good, and rescue of the Muslim Brotherhood’s path from the imminent danger that has been significantly revealed since February 2015.

The incentive now – I’m speaking of the Arab, Islamic, liberal, nationalist, and leftist experiments over almost 70 years – is the age of the main Arab parties. After many long years, those parties came to power and estab-
lished a state. The nationalists, leftists, and Islamists have all done this. But all these states that originated from ideological parties remained under the hammer and were soon overthrown, eliminated, destroyed, or marginalized.

Nationalism became ideological although it was not itself and ideology – it was taken up thus to ideologically oppose religion, communism, and the political interpretation of Islam. When the parties decide on decisive interpretations that do not accept \textit{ijtihad} (independent interpretation), the margins left for human development are limited, on the one hand. On the other hand, extremism in any national and political work isolates the vast majority from this activity, whether Islamic, nationalist, or otherwise. Nationalists do not make up the majority of society, nor do Islamists, or leftists, and so on.

Even if there is greater acceptance of the Islamic component in some Arab regions and counties, like Egypt, for example, when they were in charge of administering the state, they failed. It is not only the regimes that remove them, but there are political opponents allied with the regimes against those who reach power. In other words, most parties do not believe in the peaceful transfer of power and political pluralism – they see immunity only for themselves. We believe that this situation has lasted for 70 years and is true for all parties, including us Islamists. It is important to rethink this way of party work and find a new way of doing it – acknowledging at the same time the significance of the Arab ummah (people) and the Islamic and human dimension. Ideology should not dominate the daily, administrative work; the practicalities must not be subject to the rigidity of texts. This does not mean abandoning Islam, or the love of and commitment to Arabism, or the general issues of human experience.

This party respects any other idea that does not control the day-to-day program of the party and its plan for the nation. It is not a substitute for or a competitor to anyone. We think this type of work is still lacking in the Arab space. There were attempts at unity, but from the top, meaning that the formation of an Islamic nationalist congress, or what was proposed in the coordinating committee of the opposition parties, began inside the parties themselves but was unsuccessful and failed with the first turn in Syria. It is not our intention to demand that the Muslim Brotherhood,
the IAF, the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party, or the Popular Unity Party form one party. Rather, our intention is to persuade the players in these differing parties that monolithic political work is not feasible, and that it is possible to cooperate in the search for a big picture with broad parameters, in addition to the majority of the people who are not engaged in party schools. (78)

We relay this long quote from Al-Falahat because it summarizes for us the intellectual way stations and important policies in the process of founding the new party, the ideological evolution of its leadership, and the events that affected all this. For that matter, these circumstances and reasons are not limited to the Brotherhood members in the PRP but include those in Zamzam as well. Where did this awareness come from? First, it came from the heart of the internal Brotherhood crisis and the dialectic that dominated the “national question” and its importance. Thus, we find that the by-laws of the two parties emphasize the “strengthening of the state” and its establishment. Second, the awareness came from the failures of the Arab Spring, the collapse of states, and learning from the events in Egypt that overthrew Brotherhood rule. Third, it came from the developments that occurred in Islamist experiments, such as the experience of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey – the influence of which Salem al-Falahat, Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh, Dr. Nabil Kofahi all acknowledge – and the Tunisian and Moroccan experience of partnerships with other actors in successful governments, as opposed to the mistakes of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. (79)

Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the founding circumstances of post-Islamist parties in Jordan and their organizational and intellectual framework. When the Muslim Brotherhood Society was licensed in 2015, it did not form a political party but was oriented towards the religious side; however, the circumstances and thought that led to its registration dovetail with what is proposed by the National Congress Party-Zamzam and the PRP, i.e. a political role far removed from the *da’wa* (religious) framework that has historically characterized the Brotherhood.

This chapter explains the importance of three factors in the appearance of these entities. The first factor was the organizational crisis in the Brotherhood between the moderates and the hardliners and the obstruction of reform, from the perspective of the moderates who founded or joined these entities. Compared with others, the PRP leadership and members differed over time in their attempt to enact reform from within the Brotherhood and to preserve the organization’s cohesion.

The Islamist experiences in the region and their failures, especially in Egypt, had a role in expanding the horizon of the originators of these initiatives regarding the role of Islamist parties in the region and the ingraining of new convictions about political partnership, pluralism, and general political reform.

Intellectually, given their political role, the discourse of Zamzam and the PRP emphasizes the Jordanian national question, political partnership, legal sovereignty, and the provisions of the constitution. In addition, PRP’s discourse fo-
cuses on the link between authority and responsibility, thus betraying the critical, opposition role that may be the party’s role in the Jordanian state, while Zamzam and the Muslim Brotherhood Society, on the other hand, are accepted by the political elites in the country today.

Post-Islamism dominates both Zamzam and the PRP, given their focus on the national question versus the Islamist ideology that characterizes the Islamist parties and the replacement of the concept of the “Islamic state” or “Islamic point of reference” in their discourse with the “civil state.” The licensed society is distinguished from the parent organization in its clear organizational separation from the Brotherhood in Egypt and its rejection of the principle of “organizational secrecy” held by the Brotherhood since its founding.

Demographically, as mentioned earlier, East Bankers dominate these three entities, with a clear Zamzam presence in Irbid and a visible membership in the licensed society from the northern governorates, thus distancing the East Bankers and moderates from the parent organization in general.

This chapter and the founding details of these entities form the widest political framework possible for understanding the organizational outcomes of the changes experienced by the Jordanian Brotherhood. We dealt here with the founding details and political thought associated with the general political and intellectual contexts in the history and development of the Brotherhood in Jordan. The next chapter discusses the aspects of change (around the civil state, the separation of da’wa and politics, and public rights) as seen by Zamzam and the PRP (as post-Islamist parties) and the IAF, which continues to fluctuate between Islamism and post-Islamism.
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
CHAPTER FOUR

Islamists and the Debate on the Civil State and Freedoms

The civil state debate between Islamists and other political trends and groups intensified with the advent of the Arab Spring and the entry of the Islamists into positions of political power. This was particularly the case after the Egyptian experience, which brought an Islamist to the presidency of one of the largest Arab countries and gave the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists a large majority in both the parliament and Shura Council.

The controversy over the civil state is linked to a significant extent to the anxieties of various groups: secularists, Christian minorities, and different political forces and sections of society which did not accept the governing ideology of the Islamists. All of these groups were concerned that the Brotherhood and other Islamists would attempt to monopolise power or push through their agenda of taking control of the state and making changes in line with their ideology. This has been referred to as the “Islamisation” (aslama), “Brotherhoodisation” (akhwana) or “Salafization” (salfana) of Arab laws, societies and cultures.

The anxieties of these other groups, sceptical of the Islamists’ belief in democracy, were intensified and took on
from the rise of the so-called “Islamic State” or ISIS in the Arab and Islamic world. ISIS has given new life to the language of the Caliphate, and savagely murdered its opponents, even those of other Islamist tendencies. It has terrorized minorities and provided an alarming model of governance. This has pushed other forces and tendencies to intensify their media and political rhetoric calling for affirmation of civil principles and the civil state and efforts to combat “ISIS ideas” in society.

Discussion of the civil state, public, private, and individual freedoms, minority rights, the role of religion in the public sphere, and the separation of da’wa (proselytization) from politics in Islamist governmental practice added to previously existing debates around the Islamist positions on democracy, religious, and political pluralism and transfer of power.

Previous “Islamist declarations” expressing an acceptance of democracy were no longer enough to provide peace of mind or thorough guarantees to other political tendencies or sections of society on the “Islamist agenda.” Democratic mechanisms themselves – elections, majorities in legislative assemblies – could be exploited to implement the changes they sought, meaning single-party rule and no guarantee of the minority’s right to oppose it.

This sort of discussion drove the other political tendencies and forces on the Egyptian street to attempt to create what was referred to as a document of “supra-constitutional principles.” The aim behind such a document was to ensure that one political group would not be able to prey on the others while in power, and to establish consensus on the identity of the state and the political values giving it structure. In
theory, these concepts could be free of the normal framework of party-political competition. However, this document only succeeded in uniting the forces of Egyptian Islamism against it, bringing them out onto the streets to unequivocally reject it. This further entrenched fears that democracy would be transformed into a new kind of theocracy, perhaps similar to the Iranian model, particularly given that there were clauses in the constitution requiring legislation to be approved by al-Azhar before entering into force. This detail in particular invited comparisons with the Vilayet-e Faqih in Iran.

In sum, this period brought the question of the civil state to the heart of the political and media scene. It pushed other forces and currents to present the civil state as a safeguard against the establishment of a theocracy by parliamentary election and as a guarantee that democracy would not produce totalitarian regimes, as had happened in Europe with the Nazis and the Fascists.

At the same time, this fear of political Islam was used to reinforce an anti-democratic agenda. The civil state’s confrontation with theocracy was used to justify military interference in government and the launch of counter-revolutions throughout the Arab World against the revolutions of the Arab Spring. It was even used to demonise that historic moment and associate it with global conspiracy, with ISIS, and with the ascent of the Islamists to power. The term “civil state” thus came to encompass multiple political and media objectives.

In Jordan, the concept of the civil state was already familiar in the media and in political circles. However, the events of the Arab Spring, the emergence of ISIS and the fear of Islamist rule served to further strengthen the “civil state”
discourse and drove some political figures to form the Civil State Alliance, made up of leftist, nationalist, and liberal forces. Members of the Alliance stood for office in the 2016 parliamentary elections on the Ma’an (Together) List, which made the civil state one of its key issues, before announcing the formation of the Civil Alliance party. This Party includes well-known deputies and political personalities like Marwan al-Muasher, former MP Jamil al-Nimri and current MP Kays Zayadin, among others. Its core message is that of the civil state.

The state itself entered the debate after the controversy around the civil state intensified and moved to discussion of curriculum reform, leading Islamists and conservatives in the community to fear that Islamic identity was being targeted. In the ensuing political and media battle it was as if the civil state had been placed in opposition to the “Islamic identity” of the state and society. This pushed King Abdullah II to publish a discussion paper dedicated to the issue in which he asserted that his government was working to establish a civil state, but not a secular one in the sense of being anti-religious. He also affirmed the role of religion and its place in society and culture. (80)

In this chapter we will attempt to review how the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front responded to this concept and these new parties, both in the official stated

(80) See King Abdullah II bin Hussein, “Discussion Paper 6 (The Rule of Law is the Basis of the Civil State)”, on kingabdullah.jo, 16/10/2016
https://goo.gl/3SNxc4
See also Hadeel Ghabboun and Nusour, “Jordan is a Civil State, Neither Secular nor Religious,” Al Ghad, 14/02/2015 and “The King In His Sixth Discussion Paper: The Rule of Law is the Basis of the civil state”, Al Ra’i, 16/10/2016.
positions of these parties and forces and the writings, speeches and lectures of their leaders.

**Ambiguity of term and concept**

In spite of all of the controversy and debate around the term “civil state,” there are both general and specific dimensions of the concept itself which remain unclear. There is also exploitation of its definition by secularists in general primarily in opposition to theocracy, without actually defining the concept of theocracy itself. This makes establishing and explaining the Islamist position on the civil state considerably more complicated.

Generally speaking, Jordanian Islamists can be divided provisionally into three main groups based on their position on the term “civil state”:

1) **Rejection of the civil state:** This position is represented by Hammam Saeed, who sees the civil state as secularist and the Islamic State as the goal of the Islamist movement. This view is also shared by a number of traditionalist hawks who consider the concept of the civil state to be religiously illegitimate and continue to insist on the idea of the Islamic State, and the second generation of members, who are not as strong as they were previously. (81)

2) **Acceptance of the civil state on the condition that it has an “Islamic reference point”:** This position represents a general Islamist tendency in Jordan and else-

Many Islamist movements include this notion in their rhetoric when discussing the civil state and democracy. This position was previously associated with the Arab Spring, but it still commands the support of a large number of Islamists in the Arab World and in Jordan. In the Islamist movement there is a tendency which holds closely to this condition (the Islamic reference point) as a safeguard against a civil state in the secular, laic sense – i.e. opposed to religion. (82)

3) Acceptance of the civil state unconditionally and without reservation or modification: This is the position of the Partnership and Rescue Party, the Zamzam Party, and the new officially registered Muslim Brotherhood. The constitutions of all these parties and formations accept the concept of the “democratic civil state.” This is also the position of some Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and unequivocally that of Zaki Bani Irsheid, who has published an essay on the Al Jazeera Center for Studies website in which he affirms his acceptance of the term civil state. (83)

Although Zamzam, the PRP, and the officially registered Muslim Brotherhood have no reservations about the term “civil state,” there is disagreement in the ranks of the Islamic Action Front and the pre-split Muslim Brotherhood. Bani Irsheid recognises that there is still not agreement on the Brotherhood’s position on the term, but considers its accep-

---


tance to be no more than a matter of time. The only obstacle is personal differences among the leadership of the Brotherhood and the IAF, but there is nothing to cause reservations or alarm about this term and its acceptance. (84)

IAF Secretary Murad al-Adaileh, on the other hand, believes the concept of the civil state to be very vague and that there have been attempts to change it into a synonym of laic secularism. As such he rejects unconditional acceptance of the term. He maintains that King Abdullah II has presented a clear conceptual framework for the civil state which affirms the role of religion and which rules out the idea of it being secular. (85)

In order to determine a position on the civil state the IAF held an internal conference to discuss the subject in early 2017. Three working papers were presented, each of them containing a vision and a position. The first was presented by Dr. Hammam Saeed (former Comptroller General of the society), the second by Ali al-Suwa (one of the IAF’s prominent jurists), and the third by Zaki Bani Irsheid (who declared his sincere acceptance of the civil state). In the event, the attendees resolved to delay official or institutional consideration of a position to a later date. (86)

(84) Interview with Zaki Bani Irsheid, 7/1/2018.
(85) Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, 7/1/2018. King Abdullah says (in his sixth discussion paper) that “these principles form the core of the civil state. It is not a synonym of “secular state,” because in a civil state religion is a fundamental element in the construction of the system of social morals and values, and an inseparable part of our constitution. We cannot allow anyone to exploit or make use of religion to realize political benefits or goals or to serve factional interests.” See King Abdullah II bin Hussein, “Discussion Paper 6 (The Rule of Law is the Basis of the civil state),” on kingabdullahjo, 16/10/2016, op. cit.
As previously mentioned, we find in the literature of the Zamzam Party, the PRP, and the officially registered Muslim Brotherhood a clear recognition of the concept of the civil state related most of all to democracy and pluralism. However, the concept itself remains disputed, in the sense of what is meant by “civil state” and its disassociation from other concepts such as secularism, democracy, theocracy and the Islamic State. We might ask what the Islamist position on this is.

If we return to the question of definitions and concepts, we find that Zaki Bani Irsheid defines the civil state as follows: the civil state is a state governed by a constitution (a social contract) in which law and statute represent an organising reference for the organization of the balance and interaction of powers and authorities and the mechanism for transfer of power and for safeguarding the rights of citizens to practice freedom of opinion, expression and organization. The ummah (nation) is the source of executive, judicial and legislative authority through its representatives, i.e. members of parliament. As such, the law applies to all constituent parts of the state, both individuals and authorities, and leadership of the state is delegated to the ruling authority conditionally rather than absolutely, in the interests of the ummah and the citizenry. (87)

Bani Irsheid defines the criteria which make a state “civil” with five phrases: representation of the will of society; a state of laws; a civil regime guaranteeing freedoms, accepting pluralism, and acceptance of the other; an understanding of citizenship as the basis of the rights and duties of all citizens; and a commitment to the peaceful transfer of power. (88)

(88) Ibid.
This is to say that according to him the civil state is a civil, social contract state, i.e. the basis of authority is contractual between the nation and the ruling power; a state of law, and pluralism; a state of citizenship and democracy and the peaceful transfer of power.

Dr. Rahil Gharaibeh (General Secretary of the Zamzam Party) believes that the defining criteria of the “civilness of the state” in Islam are “the submission of the state to the rule of the constitution and the law; the anchoring of the criteria of citizenship in equality in rights and duties; full authority of the people granted by a social contract and representing the collective will in legislation, oversight, provision of justice and administration; safeguarding of the general rights and freedoms of the citizenry; the anchoring of the precepts of justice, reform, and equality between people; and preservation of human dignity and liberty.”

Dr. Nabil Kofahi (al-Gharaibeh’s fellow founder of the Zamzam Party) defines the civil state as a “state of law, a state whose people are the foundation – not a state which belongs to the president or the king. [A state] built on the principle of the separation of powers, which guarantees the following individual freedoms among others: the right to life and physical integrity; the right to establish a family and to consent to marriage; [the right] to freedom of conscience, thought and opinion; the freedom to work; and the freedom to learn. [A state] which guarantees political freedoms such as the following: the right to elect, the founding principle of democracy.”

(90) Dr Nabeel al-Kofahi writing on “The Civil State,” Judran blog 19/1/2012 https://goo.gl/C46hwN
It is clear that for al-Kofahi the civil state rests on a mixture of principles like the state of laws, pluralism, the transfer of power, elections, the separation of powers, the sovereignty of the people, human and political rights and individual and public freedoms – including the freedom of conscience, work and learning – and institutional and cultural guarantees safeguarding these principles, rights, and freedoms.

These definitions are inseparable from parallel definitions of the Islamic state as a civil state with a broadly Islamic reference point presented by a number of Egyptian Islamist thinkers including Muhammad Ammara, Tariq al-Bishri, and Muhammad Saleem al-Awa. (91)

The same applies to the well-known Moroccan thinker Dr. Saadeddine Othmani (one of the leaders of the Islamist Justice and Development Party in Morocco), who has written a complementary dissertation, *The Civil State in Light of the Aims (Maqasid) of The Shari’a*, and has worked tirelessly to root the concept of the civil state in a separation between *da’wa* and politics both through the foundations of Islamic law and its jurisprudence – that is, in the “theoretical roots” of Islamist political thought. (92)

In his writing, Othmani defines the civil state as a “state which embodies the general will of the people; is governed according to law and not the whim of the ruler; and is based on the principles of citizenship, the social contract and democracy.” Using his methodology, he reconsiders the funda-

(91) See Burhan Dweikat, “The Civil State in the Thought of the Muslim Brotherhood,” op. cit.

(92) *Towards A Scientific Reading of Dr. Saadeddine Othmani’s “The Civil State in the Shadow of the Maqasid Of the Shari’a*, Believers Without Borders, Rabat, Morocco, 9/10/2015, pp. 3-6.
mental basis of many ideological convictions and adjustment of Islamist political concepts, such as religious obedience and political obedience, the concept of the Islamic State itself, and the concepts of “nationality” and “citizenship.” In doing so, he arrives at the important conclusion that “the political system which Muslims construct is a human structure based on *ijtihad* (independent jurisprudence) invented according to their circumstances and their needs, an ultimately neutral structure which can be shared with non-Muslims in the same motherland and which can have the same model as other societies. (93)

The above shows clearly that the concept of the civil state as understood by the general Islamist current incorporates many allusions to citizenship and state of laws, a contractual and legitimate authority based on the choice of the *ummah*, and on representative and elected institutions, acceptance of pluralism, the transfer of power, rejection of arbitrary rule, the protection of public freedoms and guarantees of human rights.

**The Civil, Religious, and Secular State**

The things noted above may be considered to apply to the Islamist position on democracy generally – so what, we might ask, does it add to their position on the Islamic State? This question helps us to arrive at the heart of the dispute between Islamists and other political tendencies who support the civil state. The point of dispute is in fact very different from that implied by the hot debate and loud controversy seen in the media and the political sphere. The problem lies in the concepts of Islamic State, religious state, and secular

state and the position of religion in legislation and the private and public spheres. The true debate and dispute is over the meaning of these terms.

As far as the idea of the religious state is concerned, there is an ambiguity between two primary terms. The first is the theocratic state, which existed in Europe in the Middle Ages, where the legitimacy of the state was derived from God either directly or indirectly and not from the people or the ummah. The majority of Islamists declare their opposition to this concept, in particular those who accept the concept of the civil state, who affirm the principle of the social contract, and assert that the ummah are the source of authority.

If “religious state” is intended to mean that a special place is given over to a priesthood (kahnutiya) who have a religious authority parallel to political authority, then Islamists – generally – also reject this. They believe that there is no priesthood in Islam like that found in Europe during the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, an ambiguity arises in questions of legislation, where religious institutions, fatwa-producing bodies or [Islamic] jurists may be given a special role – as in the controversy in Egypt over the clauses in the constitution granting al-Azhar authority over new laws, which caused secularists, Copts and others such anxiety. (94)

This issue is connected with the concept of the “Islamic reference” of the civil state – specifically, what is meant by this? Does it mean that legislation must be in agreement with the Shari’a, or at least not contradict it? Or does it mean that

It must be accepted by official or unofficial religious institutions, in accordance with the famous article in so many Arab constitutions? (It is worth noting that this concept has made and still makes this issue very controversial in Arab cultural and political circles).

These anxieties are felt by both sides. We recall the political situation in Egypt between the Revolution and the military intervention in early July 2013: the Islamists were afraid that there was a secular agenda seeking to minimise the Islamic identity of state and society, while the other parties were afraid of an Islamist agenda which would work to govern legislation and the private and public sphere with the religious and ideological stamp of the Islamists. (95)

These were the circumstances in which the new controversy over the civil state was born. It was primarily a result of the insistence of the Islamists’ enemies on protecting the state and legislation from an agenda seeking to establish an Islamic state through democratic means, and the use of the straw man of the “religious state” and perhaps even of ISIS to intimidate those who disagreed with the Islamists. At this point, the civil state seems closer to a secular state, which itself requires a more precise definition than simply a separation of religion from politics.

(95) See Muhammad Abu Rumman, *Salafists And The Arab Spring*, Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2e., 2014, pp 104-113. The author explains the circumstances of the constitutional conflict between the Salafists (backed by the Muslim Brotherhood) and other forces and how the Salafist tendencies were mobilized in what was referred to as the “Battle of the Constitution” against secularists and other groups, stirring up anxieties about the identity of state and society and fears of political agendas seeking to remove religion entirely or minimize its role.
“Supra-constitutional” Principles

The controversy, then, is primarily over legislative issues: within what limits Islam can intervene in them and govern private and public life, in public and individual freedoms, and minorities. Perhaps more precisely, the question is whether Islamists seek to make use of their electoral majorities (where they exist) to impose cultural and social changes by legal means.

As far as the PRP and Zamzam are concerned, they have in any case largely shed their Islamist garb and become closer to the nationalist parties who call for a civil, democratic, pluralist state. Some members of these parties have no Islamist ideas whatsoever, and are closer to the old positions of the nationalist parties. Furthermore, there seems to be less anxiety felt by other political elites surrounding the agenda of these two parties than there is around that of the Islamic Action Front.

We might add that these two parties (the PRP and Zamzam) do not combine da’wa and political activity: they are purely political organizations, while there is still overlap between the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamic activity and projects on the one hand and the IAF as a political party on the other.

With regard to the IAF and the parent Muslim Brotherhood organization, Murad al-Adaileh’s response to these questions is that the IAF is well aware that it is not possible to impose religious and Shari’a rulings onto citizens and other forces and demographics. Rather, it is necessary to distinguish between the legislative sphere, which should be governed by consensus, and preaching and da’wa, which are closer to the work of civil society and da’wa organizations. (96)

(96) Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, 7/1/2018.
Zaki Bani Irsheid agrees with this point, and adds that the IAF has begun to hold in-depth closed discussions with political leaders from Jordan’s Christian community on the political situation and national unity, particularly since the rise of ISIS, which has hit minorities and other sections of society hard. Bani Irsheid mentions that there is a movement to create something similar to a document of what have been referred to as constitutional principles, more similar to a series of guarantees from the various parties establishing clearly each group’s intentions. This may quell fears of the imposition of one or the other agenda. (97)

A similar document was proposed in Egypt during the transitional period (when the Brotherhood and the Salafis controlled a majority in both chambers of the parliament) by secularist parties and forces, but in that case – as previously mentioned – it was unequivocally rejected by the religious tendencies, and large demonstrations were held against it throughout Egypt. The Egyptian street was mobilised under the banner of preservation of Islamic identity in the face of attempts to “change the identity of the state” and the whole idea of the document was abandoned. (98)

(97) Interview with Zaki Bani Irsheid, 7/1/2018.
(98) Islamist forces rejected the document because it provided the armed forces with a special immunity and because in law there can be no legislation higher than the constitution, since the constitution is the highest law of any state. Supporters of super-constitutional principles wanted to establish a special body to draft the constitution which would include representation of various parties, and accused the constitution produced under President Muhammad Morsi of having been prepared by a body with a distinctly Islamist character. The document of super-constitutional principles (known as the Silmi Document after the then Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Silmi) was made up of an affirmation of a number of principles – such as that Egypt is a civil-democratic state and that its citizens should enjoy public and private freedoms, freedom of conscience and opinion – and thus did not earnestly and clearly engage with the disagreements between Islamists and other forces on the identity of society and the state and the role of religion in the public
Can such a document really act as a “guarantee” or clarification of different sides’ intentions, for example to talk about the necessity for consensus and mutual understanding in issues related to the invention of religion in the public sphere, or to not impose religious laws on society and other political forces by exploiting a temporary majority in the parliament? (99)

Perhaps such documents and discussions can help to eliminate or limit the grey areas in the relationship between Islamists and other forces, and in their conception of legislation and the role of religion in the public sphere. There remains, however, an even larger problem, which is that the issue of religion and Islamic identity is not solely the preserve of Islamist forces but extends to the culture of society as well. This became clear during the debates which took place against the background of school curriculum reforms and the trading of accusations linked to the Islamic and religious identity of society and the state.

(99) Lawyers and politicians have reservations about the term “super-constitutional document”, because there cannot be a law higher than the constitution. As such it is possible to change the name, as suggested by Dr. Abdulwahhab Efendi, to “citizenship document” or “social contract” or another name. The important thing however is that the content should include explanation of intentions and ideas with regard to the controversial issues raised above. See Abdulwahhab Efendi, “Are Constitutional Principles Necessary To Build Democracy,” op cit.; and Nadir Jibli, *The Idea Of Supra-Constitutional Principles*, Harmoon Centre for Studies, Doha/Berlin, 18/7/2016 (https://harmoon.org/archives/1293); and Hafiz Abu Saada, “Supra-Constitutional Principles,” *Youm7*, 21/7/2011.
In this context, we need to pass over the discussion of the issue of the identity of the state and society, because it is more complicated than that of the participation of Islamist parties in political life. Nonetheless, there are certain points that could represent a qualitative development in the thought and rhetoric of Islamist movement and in democratic transition more generally. These starting principles include: the principle of separation of *da’wa* and politics, the necessity of consensus for changes to legislation connected to religion, and the need to not impose religious or secular, anti-religious agendas on society through legislation.

Of course, this does not mean that we concede the sincerity of the Islamists’ claim or confirm the existence of specific binding guarantees. But this kind of agreement is very important for two reasons. First, it liberates the debate and moves it to the real world, eliminates doubt, and clarifies the theoretical-customary social contract – rather than continuing with ambiguity and vagueness in this field that is very important to the Arab World. Second, it binds together parties that are different morally and politically and perhaps even legislatively if they adopt particular legislative models, and minimizes the mutual anxieties of political rivals.

With this, the question of the concepts of Islamic State, secular state, and religious state would no longer be as important on the practical level, because of the existence of agreements and mutual understandings clarifying these points. Regardless of the various sides’ definitions of these concepts, or indeed their understanding of the “Islamic reference” of the civil state, they would all be bound by what they have previously agreed on in this regard.

On the theoretical level, the Islamists’ arrival at this level of “intellectual development” – by which we mean the
division between politics and da’wa, acceptance of the civil state and abandonment of old slogans like “Islam is the solution” – raises the question of how Islamists now envision the Islamic State. It makes us consider the developments that have taken place away from their well-known ideological vision linking the Islamic State with the institution of the Shari’a, the classical concepts of Islamic jurisprudence, the imposition of hudud punishments, Jihad, forbidding usury, and religious duties like da’wa and education, i.e. a close association between the state and Islamist-revivalist ideology.

On the level of individual developments, Zaki Bani Irsheid recognizes that developments have affected the Islamist vision of the state and that for him, the civil-democratic state has come to represent the desirable state model. He came to this conclusion over the course of numerous reviews conducted during the years since the Arab Spring. He participated in a number of debates which developed this vision, and thereafter attended a conference in Malaysia on the civil state. As a result, he has no ideological or jurisprudential (fiqhi) problems, for example, with the idea of a Christian or non-Muslim becoming Prime Minister of Jordan assuming he is qualified for the position and capable of carrying out his duties. The same applies to women and minorities.\(^{(100)}\)

Murad al-Adaileh responds to the question by affirming that the Islamic State is not defined on a theoretical level, religiously, and jurisprudentially, inasmuch as it is represented in Islamic principles and values: its form within a democratic or civil state is left to human ijtihad. There is broad acceptance of democratic, participatory, electoral, and representative frameworks across societies generally, and as such, there

\(^{(100)}\) Interview with Zaki Bani Irsheid, 7/1/2018.
is nothing preventing the Islamic State from existing in a civil-democratic form.\(^\text{(101)}\)

As far as the “Islamic reference” of the state is concerned, al-Adaileh did not provide a clear definition of the extent of this reference in legislation, contenting himself with affirming that the party calls for a civil state with an Islamic reference point. When asked about how to reconcile a situation in which a parliamentary majority requests the institution of a law contradictory to the Shari’a, he said simply that such a scenario was not possible because of the conservative Islamic culture of Jordan. This, however, only puts off consideration of the basic practical issues involved in application of the concept of a civil state and is one of the problems which might cause us to doubt Islamists’ understanding of this concept and their later commitment to the principles of the “civilness” of the state.\(^\text{(102)}\)

Rahil Gharibeh (the ideologue of the Zamzam Party) considers the civil state to be an original principle of Islamic thought and not a recent introduction. Clerics have no special stratum in society, nor do they have any political authority; authority is based on a social contract and reflects the will of the \textit{ummah}.\(^\text{(103)}\)

\(^{(101)}\) Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, 7/1/2018.  
\(^{(102)}\) Ibid.  
\(^{(103)}\) Discussion with Dr Rahil Gharibeh on his vision 29/12/2017. He does not believe that there has been any change in his notion, which he recorded in his doctoral thesis in Islamic law on this subject (nationality, citizenship and the civil state, published later as a book, \textit{Political Rights and Freedoms in the Shari’a} (Arabiya Research and Study Network, Beirut, 1st Ed, 2012))
Salem al-Falahat (founder of the PRP), on the other hand, admits having developed his intellectual and political vision over the past few years, and having arrived at new conclusions related to his involvement in the Jordanian popular reform movement. He has mixed with, collaborated with, and participated alongside various political forces and personalities in creating a framework of political reform demands. All of this has reinforced his conviction that it is not acceptable for one political tendency to impose its position unilaterally on others, and that the state of necessity must embrace political, cultural and religious pluralism and operate by consensus.

Al-Falahat adds that with what happened during the Arab Spring, in particular in Egypt, he came to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood will never again reach the same level of popular influence, acceptance and power as it had in Egypt, and that it was deposed regardless of reasons both objective and personal. As such, neither the Brotherhood nor others are able to change the political situation without agreement between different political forces on the desired reforms to the state, its institutions and its statutes. No specific party can believe that it is the most righteous or the single representative of Islamic forces in society, and as a result, participation and pluralism become very important in political work. (104)

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter has presented details of the disagreements and differences in the literature of the three parties (the Islamic Action Front, Zamzam, and the Partner-
ship and Rescue Party) around the concepts of the civil state and the religious state. It is clear from what has been discussed that the nationalist concepts of pluralism, democracy, and values of citizenship dominate the literatures of Zamzam and the PRP. Meanwhile, the IAF has not yet unequivocally determined its stance on the definition of the Islamic reference of their concept of the civil state.

What is still not clear is whether disagreements on that subject will lead to a new wave of defections from the party. However, it is clear that the party will have to make a decision soon in order to clarify the practical application of the concept of the civil state, which will allow observers to establish the distance separating the IAF from Zamzam and the PRP. However, current indications suggest a possible agreement between the three parties, in which case they will either form coalitions increasing their political weight or remain in their current state, even as the ideological and practical constraints which led to their division disappear.

There is no doubt that with the current process of review within the original Muslim Brotherhood organization on the subject, the separation of da’wa and political activity is simply a matter of time. This is particularly the case given that Murad al-Adaileh and Zaki Bani Irsheid have emphasized that this review encompasses the Moroccan experience, hinting at the inevitability of a division of da’wa and political activity, in such a manner that the Brotherhood takes responsibility for educational and da’wa activity and the IAF for general political activity. A clear organizational division would thus form between the Brotherhood and the IAF, facilitating official registration of the Brotherhood and solving the problem of the legality of the organization’s existence in Jordan.
As for the officially registered Muslim Brotherhood, it seems that they have already decided to specialize in *da’wa* and consider the PRP National Congress (Zamzam) Party the closest to them politically. If this occurs, we will find ourselves in Jordan with two Muslim Brotherhood organizations specializing in *da’wa* and two or more Islamist parties focusing on general political activity.
CHAPTER FIVE

Perceptions of Islamic Youth Regarding the Civil State

This chapter and the following chapters address the views of youth from the three parties (Islamic Action Front, Zamzam and the Partnership and Rescue Party) with respect to the concept of the civil state, public rights, and minority rights. They also address the reasons that led those youth that belonged or still belong to the Muslim Brotherhood parent organization to change their beliefs and outlook after having grown up on the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, a discourse embodied in the slogan “Islam is the solution” and in the building of the Islamic state over stages.

This chapter and the following chapters will explore the similarities and differences between the three parties, as well as the differences, if any, between the views of the leaders of the parties and their youth members. It will use these comparisons to understand the distance separating the parties in terms of present beliefs and concerns and the distance separating their leaders and youth members. This contrast is important in predicting the future of the parties and their ability to benefit from the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood parent organization in Jordan and the Islamic Action Front,
which have both suffered a generational gap between their leadership and youth members.\(^{(105)}\)

The previous chapter addressed the three parties’ conceptions of the civil state, as set forth in the by-laws of each party. In addition, it explored problems of definition according to the views of the leaders of the parties with respect to the definition of the concept and their perceptions of the civil state’s relationship with public rights, democracy, and various concepts, such as the civil state and secularism. In this chapter, we will explore the views of the youth of these parties with respect to the concept of the civil state and its relationship with the concept of the Islamic state and Islamic reference point.

**The Concept of the Civil State**

Mohamed Hassan Thneibat (37 years old, doctor) from Zamzam, begins by pointing to the fundamental ambiguity of the concept of the civil state, and states that, since there is no clear definition, it is difficult for them to express a position on this concept. He also categorically opposed our contending in this book with the concept of the civil state and comparing the different conceptions of it by the Islamic Action Front, Partnership and Rescue, and Zamzam, since the disagreement between the parties was never based on the concept

of the civil state and its values. (106) However, observing the contrast surrounding this concept and the problems relating thereto allows us to observe the intellectual change in the youth that turned to post-Islamist parties, since ideas pertaining to national identity, partnership, and pluralism are what have defined the distance between them.

Zamzam members mainly focus on the Jordanian national issue, the authority of the people and the right of the people to exercise authority as a collective national task for all groups of society. They believe that by focusing on these two principles, they have a broad political horizon that applies to other Arab countries as well. The absence of legitimacy is no longer internationally acceptable today, so they are therefore striving to pave the way for the restoration of Jordanian legitimacy. (107)

Mahmoud al-Akayleh (31 years old, Lawyer from al-Tafila), explains that the state as a legal expression is a legal entity, and he therefore opposes the name civil state or Islamic state. After all, when a state is labeled as Islamic, who is the one to decide whether certain conduct conforms to Islam? Names such as civil state or Islamic state place the state in the position of actor and evaluator of conduct, whereas society should be the entity with this authority and the entity that protects minorities and civil pluralism. (108)

(106) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
This is with respect to Zamzam members, whereas Partnership and Rescue members propose three elements for their definition of the concept of the civil state: a state of institutions that is based on rights and duties and protects individual rights. It is a social contract between the citizens and the ruler that is principally based on the will of the people, the equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, and is formulated according to partisan and democratic ideals that take into consideration pluralism in Jordanian society. *(109)*

The members of the party believe that democracy is the most effective tool to preserve this social contract and protect individual rights and duties. Under this system, the legislature enacts laws that reflect the will of the people and the legal authority is the highest in the state, in the sense that the laws designed pursuant to this democratic tool govern the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. *(110)*

Mohammed Hassan Thneibat (32 years old, from al-Karak) recognizes that the concept is still vague but states that some of the characteristics are known to them, the most important of which being that the civil state is not governed by a military or religious-theocratic authority. Rather, it is a state that balances and separates powers and is based on a partnership between all members of society, so that secularists consider it secular and Islamists can feel that it meets their needs. *(111)*

*(109)* Several Opinions, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of the Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
*(110)* Ibid.
*(111)* Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
These ideas reflect the literature of the party and the ideas of Salem al-Falahat in his various publications in recent years. This suggests an intellectual rapprochement between the youth members and the leaders of the party. It should be noted that the Partnership and Rescue Party includes members from various intellectual backgrounds. Muslim Brotherhood members (or former Muslim Brotherhood members) make up only approximately 20% of party members.\(^{(112)}\)

Islamic Action Front youth, on the other hand, put forth a more vague and confusing definition of the civil state than that proposed by Zaki Bani Irsheid – who has always been considered one of the prominent hawks of the party. Irsheid presented an understanding of the civil state similar to that presented by Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue leaders, as we mentioned in the previous chapter.

The youth of the party, however, propose loose ideals on the concept with a focus on three elements: rotation of power, institutionalism, and Islamic point of reference. Moatazz al-Hrout (29 years old, Department Head at a school and the Head of the Youth Division of the party) describes rotation of power as the foundation of the civil state. A state can take a capitalist or even a communist form, but as long as there is rotation of power without inheritance, it is considered a civil state.\(^{(113)}\) His colleagues agree with him with respect to the tools of *shura* and democracy as the tools for rotation of power. But they focus on *shura* as a principle of governance, compared with the emphasis on democracy among young members of Partnership and Rescue party as the ideal tool for achieving the goals of the civil state.

---

\(^{(112)}\) Interview with Salem al-Falahat, January 7, 2018.

\(^{(113)}\) Mu'tazz al-Hrout, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.
As for the concept of “institutionalism – or state of institutions,” this materialized as a transient descriptive formula, and Islamic Action Front youth did not offer a clear vision of their goals with respect to state institutions, tools for protecting these institutions, or how the Jordanian state can empower its institutions. Instead, their focus was on the Islamic reference of the civil state, which we will discuss in more detail later on.

However, on the leadership level, when Bani Irsheid was asked about the difference between each party’s conception of the civil state, he acknowledged that there is no difference with respect to the concept. But while the founders of Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue deemed fit to establish a new party, he and his fellow party members deemed fit to present this conception from within the Islamic Action Front without separating or splitting off from it, noting that the Islamic Action Front and the parent organization still have not reached a clear conclusion with respect to their conception of the civil state. (114)

Salem al-Falahat agrees with him and explains that their conceptions of the civil state are similar, with the disagreement among them lying in the relationship between the three parties after these ideas are proposed. The confrontation that occurred between the founders of Zamzam and the parent organization did not repeat itself in the case of the Partnership and Rescue Party, which never separated from the parent organization. (115) It appears that the parent organization wished to avoid repeating the experience of clashing with those who separated from it, with the separation of Zamzam

(114) Interview with Zaki Bani Irsheid, January 7, 2018; Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, January 7, 2018.
(115) Interview with Salem al-Falahat, January 7, 2018.
still being a subject of debate in the meetings of the organization and the Islamic Action Front party. (116)

What clearly emerges in addressing these views is the focus of the members of the three parties on the authority of the people and the rotation of power as a basic defining element of the civil state. This focus originates in the broader Arab political reality – there is no completely democratic Arab country aside from Tunisia and, to a certain extent, Morocco. Moreover, democratic experiments were unsuccessful due to non-Muslims’ failure to accept democratic outcomes when they brought Islamists to power in Algeria, Egypt, and Palestine. Therefore, their greatest concern is the political other’s non-acceptance of them when they have committed to the rules of democracy. Hence, the emphasis on the authority of the people, shura, and democracy as tools of governance.

Youth members also disagree on other defining elements. Zamzam members focused on the Jordanian national identity as the most important factor behind their adoption of the values of the civil state. On the other hand, Partnership and Rescue members focused on institutionalism and the authority of the law as tools to protect the authority of the people and build the state, taking into consideration the vagueness of the concept for everyone.

The Civil State and the Islamic State

The views that were presented by Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue youth constitute a quantum leap from the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood to which they previously belonged. Furthermore, Islamic Action Front youth agree with some of these new ideas surrounding the

(116) Interview with Zaki Beni Irshheid, January 7, 2018.
intellectual and political controversies pertaining to the civil state compared with the Islamic state, but to a less developed extent and in a more confused manner. To understand more about these intellectual transformations, we asked those youth if they have today abandoned the Islamic state that they previously desired.

The answers varied. Partnership and Rescue members categorically confirmed this, explaining how their initial conception of the Islamic state was ideal and naïve in and of itself. While Islamic Action Front members emphasized that the Islamic state is essentially a civil state, Zamzam members focused on the shared values between the civil state and the form of the state that they desire regardless of its name.

A. The Naïve Vision of the Islamic State

Mohamed Hassan Thneibat of the Partnership and Rescue Party described, for example, the caricature image that they had in mind of the Islamic state, i.e. a person with a turban and a red carpet! Alaa al-Qudah shares this view, explaining that this naïve image was based on emotion. Malek al-Omri (24 years old, student of Shari’a from Irbid) explains that the previous vision of the Islamic state “was based on our fundamental rejection of reality and return to the past. It was not a vision based on expertise and a political role. Today, however, regardless of the name, we want a sovereign state of rights and duties that produces skills and guarantees political and religious freedom.”

(118) Alaa al-Qudah, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of the Members of Partnership and Rescue Party
Salem al-Falahat, however, a leader of the Partnership and Rescue party, offered a different opinion, arguing that “the dream of a state that brings joy to humanity has not died, even democracy does not bring joy to humanity,” democracy has brought about the occupation of countries and the control of the powerful over the weak. “I have not given up on the dream, but this state cannot be achieved without passing through the civil state. I will submit to the constitution and the law but at the same time I will work towards changing society. The desired freedom will provide space for political competition.” *(120)*

This opinion of his as a leader differs from the opinions of party youth, who argued that the Islamists’ problem is that they looked at the nation-state as being temporary until the desired Islamic state was achieved. However, the Islamists overlooked the fact that these countries had already defined the stages of their development, their political visions, and their problems. *(121)* Islamists today must therefore operate based on realistic aspirations and identify their political role as Islamists, i.e. creating strong and honest officials. *(122)*

Here, one of the most important disagreements emerges in these visions. The leader al-Falahat holds on to his dream with which he grew up, whereas the youth members have considered other interpretations and strive towards another way that is not based on the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is based on the Islamization of society, followed by rising to power. It would be fair to say that al-

*(120)* Salem al-Falahat, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.

*(121)* Mohamed Hassan al-Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.

*(122)* Ghayth al-Ma’ani, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
Falahat is one of the most prominent leaders to have worked on the subject of intellectual transformations, having published a book on the topic. Before that, he published a book in which he laid out the most important stages and transformations that the parent organization has undergone in past decades. He was also a leader in the popular movement demanding political reform. And yet, he appears more cautious than party youth on evaluating these intellectual transformations. This applies to the party’s current practice on working with the non-Muslim other within the Partnership and Rescue party, or towards making any judgments on the success of this new approach, which we have named here as “post-Islamist.” Al-Falahat encourages instead monitoring the experiment itself and leaving room for observing its results.

B. The Islamic State is a Civil State

According to Islamic Action Front youth, “the civil state is the Islamic state” (123) in that it represents the Islamic values of justice, *shura*, and freedom. They are of the opinion that the Caliphate was a form of governance in Islam, and that the Islamic state is another human development in the form of governance, based on rotation of power. They believe that it is possible to find several forms of governance in Islam, provided that they are based on the principles of justice and *shura*.

According to them, the concept of the civil state is both an old and modern concept that the Arab Spring has enabled to re-emerge in different terms. They insist that the changes today are not in the idea and the agenda, but rather in the

(123) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.
ways of conveying these ideas, \(^{(124)}\) with a clear need for new rhetoric and detailed programs devoid of the short slogans that have been used in the past. \(^{(125)}\)

For example, the slogan “Islam is the solution” was used during the conflict with the communists and the left as an identity marker. Today, however, there is no longer a need for this slogan. For example, the Islamists participate in university elections with lists bearing the name “Determination,” without an identity marker, according to the changes in the political and social reality with a focus on national work. \(^{(126)}\)

Islamic Action Front youth therefore argue that the idea of the civil state had already existed, though it was not previously expressed through the Islamic and media rhetoric that we see today. We are therefore dealing with a change in media rhetoric, and not a change in the intellectual domain, which differs from the ideas put forth by Bani Irsheid and to a lesser extent by Murad al-Adaileh, who spoke of changes and transformations that led to the crystallization of new beliefs within the party. \(^{(127)}\) This generational gap was most evident between the leadership and youth of the Islamic Action Front. It appeared that the youth are isolated from the qualitative transformations occurring in the party and are not paying attention to the details of the intellectual debates and their impact on the leaders of the party themselves.

\(^{(124)}\) Riyadh al-Sunaid, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.

\(^{(125)}\) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.

\(^{(126)}\) Mu’tazz al-Hrout, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.

\(^{(127)}\) Interview with Zaki Beni Irsheid, January 7, 2018; Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, January 7, 2018.
The concept of the civil state was not present in any form in the previous literature or teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood. The explicit goal has been the Islamization of society in order to achieve the Islamic state. Today, the argument cannot be accepted that the Islamic state is a civil state, or that the Muslim Brotherhood has long believed in a civil state. The first to make this argument from within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and for it was Rahil Gharai beh, as we mentioned before. Only years later, the Muslim Brotherhood discussed the concept. Nevertheless, none of the youth members of the Islamic Action Front referred to this intellectual argument or the internal debates on the concept before asserting that the Islamic state is essentially a civil state.

C. Agreement on Values and Fears of Political Exploitation of the Concept

Zamzam youth mostly object to comparing the civil state with the Islamic state. They make two arguments in this regard. First of all, a comparison between the two concepts suggests that the Islamic state is not civil in nature and this is a disputed argument to begin with. In addition, some believe that the first Islamic state in the era of the Prophet guaranteed civil rights and was modeled in conformity with the principles of the civil state, and that the civil state and the Islamic state were originally not mutually exclusive, citing the thesis of Rahil Gharaibeh that proved this, which was published in 1995.

(128) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
Second, Zamzam youth object to the term “civil state” today in light of the political exploitation of the term in Jordan by several powers in order to give up the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Hence, Zamzam’s youth focus on people reclaiming authority. (130) Ahmed al-Akayleh (29 years old, engineer from al-Tafila) emphasizes the difference between the academic use of the term “civil state” and its political use. Research studies analyze the concept, its values, and its applications, whereas politicians exploit it for goals that may not serve the national objectives in Jordan. (131)

From the standpoint of values, however, Zamzam youth agree with all of the values and principles upon which the civil state is based, i.e. freedom, equal rights, democracy, and political pluralism. They are of the opinion that Zamzam has overcome conceptualizations in this regard. They have also applied this vision practically through their political focus on the national identity, their participation in the Jordanian protests alongside nationalist and leftist forces, and their partnership with Christian politicians based on the latter’s being equal citizenship in rights and duties. They therefore believe that Zamzam has upholds these values and promotes them, but they have reservations about the political use of the term “civil state” today in Jordan in light of the weakness and decline that the state is currently experiencing.

Zamzam youth zigzag on the issue of identity when talking about the civil state and the Islamic state. Alaa al-Farouk is of the opinion that there is no conflict between the

(131) Ahmed al-Akayleh, Focus Group Discussion Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
civic and religious in Jordan, and that freedom forms the ba-
sis for choices in religion and in the development of social
and political ideas. (132) According to al-Akayleh, for seventy
years the Muslim Brotherhood has been occupied with ques-
tions of identity, and has fulfilled its role successfully, mak-
ing it the most important organization in the region for dec-
ades. It was the Muslim Brotherhood, through its work on
Islamic identity, the Caliphate, and the Islamic state and civi-
lization from an identity standpoint, that they paved the way
first for political Islam, and today for post-Islamism. “But we
have overcome the issue of Islamic identity today, and there
is no fear for Islam in Jordan.” (133) Hence, Zamzam focuses
on the values of the civil state, regardless of the name. Zam-
zam activities therefore focus on raising the political aware-
ness of citizens, Jordan’s regional role, and the future of Jor-
dan (134) in the framework of the focus on the purely political
role of the party.

Islamic Reference

The discussion surrounding identity lead us to the ques-
tion of the Islamic point of reference of the desired civil state.
We noticed that Partnership and Rescue Party members did
not qualify their mention of the civil state with the subse-
quently phrase “with an Islamic point of reference” as appears
in the literature of many Islamic parties. It is important to re-
call that this is consistent with the literature of the Partnership
and Rescue Party, which also distances itself from this de-
scription.

(132) Alaa al-Froukh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, Jan-
uary 17, 2018.
(133) Ahmed al-Akayleh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam,
January 17, 2018.
(134) Mahmoud al-Akayleh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zam-
zam, January 17, 2018.
Partnership and Rescue Party members confirmed that the reference of the civil state is that of the people, who strive to preserve its values of cultural and social heritage. Furthermore, given that Jordanian society is conservative in nature, it is only natural for these social values to be reflected in laws.\(^\text{(135)}\) However, the basic reference is the legal system, and any group of society has the right to propose laws through the Parliament, which will then vote on them and enact them by majority rule.\(^\text{(136)}\) This will reflect the will of the people through these laws,\(^\text{(137)}\) and citizens are differentiated according to the degree to which they abide by the law.\(^\text{(138)}\)

As for public values, Alaa al-Qudah (24 years old, doctor) from Partnership and Rescue Party, emphasizes that the term “civil state” is loose, and that the desired state will therefore be influenced by its surrounding environment, and every environment has different interpretations and religious practices that reflect human development in it. Accordingly, the form of the civil state in Jordan will reflect the environment of Jordanian society and its values.\(^\text{(139)}\)

For example, Zamzam members are not interested in the term “Islamic reference,” pointing to the fact that the Jordanian constitution preserves Islamic values through Article 2, which states that Islam is the religion of the state. They go on to state that Jordanian society is the preserver of this iden-
tity, pointing to the conservative value system of Jordanian Christians as well. The society is conservative by nature, and on this point the general position of the two parties on Islam as a point of reference intersect.

Islamic Action Front youth, on the other hand, do focus on Islamic reference in their description of the civil state. Like the other two parties, they focus on the fact that the culture of Jordanian society is Islamic and conservative, and that the issue of the Islamic reference point is therefore “settled and achieved in society,” (140) and they emphasize that they are against the imposition of Shari’a law. (141)

At the same time, one of the youngest members (24 years old, works at the Society for the Conservation of the Holy Quran) emphasized that the choices of the people, after the process of Islamization, will be based on “common sense and true Islam.” (142) These are problematic terms. After all, who determines what “true Islam” is and what “common sense” is? Does the Muslim Brotherhood parent organization determine this? Or the party? Or the licensed association? For example, the academic Ahmad Shboul describes at least six types of Islam, i.e. Islam of the elite, da’wa (Islamic proselytism), Islam of the people, and so forth. (143) However, reliance on general terms such as these is what provokes the fears of Islamist opponents. It is precisely these questions that need to

(141) Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, January 7, 2018 and Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.
(142) Abdel Rahman al-Shawaqfa, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.
(143) Ahmad Shboul, “Islam and Globalization”, in Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium, eds. Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 44.
be addressed, and if party members insist on these terms, they will have to answer to the political, legal, and practical consequences of these terms.

Firas Qattan (27 years old, manager in a company) of the Islamic Action Front objects to this description. He believes that some of the party youth adopted the term “civil state” before and after the Arab Spring, and that the priority became the term “state of law and institutions,” without any need to refer to Islam as a point of reference. Furthermore, historically there have always been people with varying degrees of religious commitment within Muslim states, which never affected the foundations of the state or its *modi operandi.* (144)

This suggests the existence of intellectual disputes among the members of the party, which is a natural phenomenon, especially in light of the transformations that the parent organization and the Islamic Action Front are currently undergoing. However, the degree to which several of the party youth hold on to the concept of an Islamic reference was noteworthy compared to the Partnership and Rescue and Zamzam youth.

Although Partnership and Rescue members do not focus on the term “Islamic reference,” one member stated in his definition of the civil state that the relationship between the institutions of the state must be based on correct citizenship and on “Arab and Islamic values.” (145) When the other members were asked about this term and if they had given up on

(144) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.
an Islamic reference in the state that they desire, their answers varied. This suggests changes in their conceptions, detached from the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, even if they have maintained certain Islamic visions in their ideas.

However, the ideas pertaining to Islamic reference today may require a broader horizon from both a political and a rights standpoint. For example, Mohamed Shahrour, in his book *Religion and Power: A Contemporary Reading of Hakimiyyah* (the concept that sovereignty belongs to God alone), emphasizes that the moral reference of the civil state, is based on the principle of “there is no compulsion in religion” and on the 14 prohibitions mentioned in the Quran, as detailed in his book. The state is therefore based on general human ethics regardless of the different ideologies of its individual citizens, but is rather focused on the social conduct of individual citizens with regards to public rights and ethics.\(^{(146)}\) This view offers a wide human umbrella, regardless of the conservative nature of Jordanian society. After all, the nature of society can change. The political parties therefore need to offer a broad intellectual umbrella that has the ability to take into account social and political variables.

Said al-Azem (43, agricultural engineer), member of Partnership and Rescue, later emphasized that the Islamic point of reference is a core value that reflects the values of Islam without imposing Islam on society or allowing any political party to politically exploit religion.\(^{(147)}\) In this regard, he agrees with Islamic Action Front members. Although it should be noted that they did not address political exploita-

---


\(^{(147)}\) Said al-Azem, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of the Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
tion of religion, whereas members of the other two parties emphatically opposed the political exploitation of religion.

In this context, Partnership and Rescue members objected to the use of the term “Islamic” in the name of any institution, because it “reflects an imaginary robe worn by the Islamists,” and the names of institutions do not require holiness, given that their framework is political or social activities, which are variable in nature, and are no longer considered inherently Islamic, compared to fixed beliefs.\(^{(148)}\)

The members of the three parties therefore agree on the conservative nature of Jordanian society, and on Islam as a point of reference for values in the enactment of legislation and laws that reflect the will of the people and the conservative Islamic and Christian heritage. The difference, however, lies in the emphasis of Islamic Action Front Youth and Murad al-Adaileh on the Islamic reference of the civil state compared to others.

**Conclusion**

The discussion in this chapter clarifies three points of view shared by the members of the three parties in terms of generalities. They strongly disagree, however, with respect to the details of these generalities. We will now identify the points of intersection and disagreement in order to summarize what we have discussed in this chapter.

\(^{(148)}\) Hamza Yassin and Mohamed al-Qudah, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of the Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
First of all, the youth participants in this study acknowledge the vagueness of the concept of the civil state, and they do not have any clear and precise definition. However, they listed specific characteristics and defining elements of their conception of the civil state, i.e. a state of institutions in which the authority of the law and the sovereignty of the people prevail – a state based on political pluralism and rotation of power. This procedural definition of the civil state is essentially the “common ground” on which the youth of the three parties stand together.

However, the disagreement among them lies in their emphasis on certain characteristics over others. For example, Partnership and Rescue members focus on the institutionalism and authority of the law compared to other characteristics. They believe that the foundation of the civil state is equality before the law and the application of its provisions. Zamzam members, on the other hand, prioritize the Jordanian national identity of the civil state, but some of them fear the exploitation of the term “civil state” to give up the Palestinian right of return in favor of foreign agendas, whether western or regional. Islamic Action Front members were unable to overcome the vagueness of the concept to offer defining elements and characteristics of the civil state, aside from mentioning the principle of *shura* and democracy as the governing mechanisms of the civil state.

For methodological necessity, it is important to interpret these conclusions differently in order to understand the positions of these youth. The concept of the civil state is in and of itself confusing. There is a deep dispute among academics and researchers, on the one hand, and politicians, on the other, with respect to the legitimacy of the term itself. Academics in politics insist that there is no such thing as a civil state,
but rather civil society, civil life, and civic education. The civil state, however, is a completely new term that does not exist in the literature of political science literature anywhere in the world. On the other hand, Arab politicians, especially secularists, insist on the term, particularly after the Arab Spring (as we mentioned previously), due to their phobia of the Islamization of the state and society by emerging Islamist groups. Secularists want political “guarantees” of the preservation of what they consider to be “secular achievements” that have been realized in Arab countries over the past decades. Islamists’ winning of parliamentary majorities and their rise to power causes the secularists to fear the drifting of societies and countries towards regimes with religious identities that will eventually constrict public and individual freedoms. This also alarms minorities and modern Arab women.

It is natural for us to observe here the skeptical attitude – on the part of the youth of these parties and especially on the part of Islamic Action Front youth – towards the term “civil state,” given that the legitimacy of the term is brought into question even in academic circles. Nonetheless, we can see that the youth of the Partnership and Rescue Party has overcome all of these reservations and announced their complete acceptance of the term. Some of the youth of Zamzam have reservations about the term, not out of concern for the Islamic identity of the state or society (and this is an important intellectual transformation which we will discuss later on), but rather out of concern for national identity. In particular, they describe the proposals of the Jordanian Civil Alliance as being devoid of the concept of national identity and promoting the settlement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, which would mean – according to some Zamzam members – an attempt to fracture the Jordanian national identity and establish the “alternative homeland” for Palestinians in Jordan.
On the other hand, we find that the reservations on the part of Islamic Action Front youth do not pertain to the content but rather to the term itself, and this is a substantial and methodological point. They emphasize their acceptance of pluralism, rotation of power, the right to opposition and so forth that is the procedural elements of democracy. But they fear “political exploitation” of the concept of the civil state. This is primarily based on two reasons. First, they feel that the Islamists are unjustly blamed, and argue that they did not turn against democracy in Egypt and other countries, but it was the democratic process that turned against them. Second, and in relation to fears from using the term to impose a particular political agenda, Islamists are not in power today in most Arab countries. Therefore, it is not the right place or time to confront them with questions pertaining to matters like gay marriage, sexual freedom, and so forth. Rather, these are matters connected to the culture of the society itself and are not governed by the Islamists’ ideological discourse.

It would therefore be beneficial to escape the confines of focusing on the term and on the attempts by the various political and ideological movements to exploit it in their confrontation of one another, and to rather move towards developing a more procedural and operational definition of the term in order to build common ground. At the same time, it must be considered that there are legitimate concerns with respect to Islamists, and possibly other groups, concerning democracy as a procedural mechanism for the transfer of power. This is without taking into consideration that there are key intellectual and political conditions necessary to protect the democratic process from drifting towards totalitarian systems, such as what happened after the First World War.

On the other hand, the disagreement among the youth of the three parties in their attitudes towards the concept of
the civil state is principally connected to the contrast in priorities with respect to the matter of identities their political experiences. The reservations of Islamic Action Front youth with respect to the term “civil state” mainly have to do with their prioritization of Islamic identity (which they believe represents the general framework of society) over secular and Western identities.

The reservations of Zamzam youth (with respect to the concept of the civil state) are connected to national identity. These youth are mainly former members of the Muslim Brotherhood who left the organization with Rahil Gharaibeh and Nabil al-Kofahi, whose primary interest was the importance of national identity and its rhetoric in the organization, which was the center of their dispute with the more hawkish members, whose priority is the Palestinian issue. We therefore find that national identity is very much present in the ideology of Zamzam youth, and some of them (like Ahmed al-Akayleh) describe Nahed Hattar as a martyr and feel that his assassination (by an extremist) is one of the things that has most affected their lives and ideas recently. (149)

On the other hand, Partnership and Rescue youth participated in popular protests, with Salem al-Falahat, who were active during that period. Hence, their strong emphasis on the concept of democracy and demands for reform. They are joined by political figures with a legal and reformist background, such as Dr. Mahmoud al-Hamouri, the current Secretary General of the Partnership and Rescue Party, and their focus on the correlation between power and responsibility is therefore clear.

Second, everyone agrees on the importance of the values governing the concept of the civil state and marginalize the name itself. They do not see any need for the name “Islamic state.” However, the most noteworthy divergence emerges with respect to the relationship between the Islamic state and the civil state. Partnership and Rescue Party members feel that they had a naive perception of the Islamic state, which resulted from the dream of a past that cannot be restored. They reject the name “Islamic state” today in light of its political exploitation. Members of the Islamic Action Front, on the other hand, do not see any difference between the two states with regards to the governing values, and believe that the Islamic state is in and of itself a civil state. Zamzam members share this focus on values, but with a skepticism towards the name “civil state” in light of its current political exploitation.

This result does not differ from the previous one, in the sense that there is no one conception of the Islamic state. It is therefore difficult to reach a conclusion with respect to whether the Islamic state is a theocratic-religious state (which is what the secularists fear) or a civil state based on a civil-social contract (which is what the Islamists confirm). There are various models and formulas to define the concept of this state. One approach focuses on Islamic historical expertise (there is no one agreed upon legal ruling), while another refers to Islamic jurisprudence heritage (there are several schools, some of which give priority to the rule of force, while others advocate governance by shura (consultation), and so forth. Finally, another model is based on complex modern Islamic experiences (the Iranian religious-democratic model, the Afghan Taliban model, the Saudi non-democratic monarchal model, and some consider the Justice and Development Party another completely different model).
If this is the case, it is difficult to achieve a methodological comparison of the Islamic state and the civil state from a terminological standpoint. Rather, it is more effective to focus on the procedural content. At the same time, there is an important difference among the youth of the three parties in their positions on the terms themselves (i.e. civil state and Islamic state). We can see that Islamic Action Front youth hold onto the Islamic state and feel that it does not contradict the democratic state or the civil state, given that the Islamic state is civil and democratic to begin with. They therefore see no need to abandon the term.

On the other hand, we find a much less significant degree of commitment to and insistence on the term on the part of Partnership and Rescue youth, as well as a clearer ability to overcome it both psychologically and intellectually. The reason for this can most likely be attributed to the fact that Islamic Action Front youth still belong to the era of political Islam and the Islamic movements, to which the Islamic state attributes clear importance in its goals and programs. Islamic Action Front youth strive to expand and adapt their ideological agenda in order to restore the concept of the Islamic state, with the introduction of democratic and civil aspects, without abandoning the term and the goal.

On the other hand, Partnership and Rescue and Zamzam youth have partially abandoned the Islamic ideological cloak, assuming new cloaks such as those of political reform, democracy, and national identity, and they have no problem talking about another form, formula, or name for the state, without any need to justify or frame the concept of the Islamic state to make it consistent with these new ideas.

Third, the members of the three parties rely on Jordan’s conservative cultural heritage. In this respect the
members and leaders of the three parties all consider society to be the protector of the religious identity of the state and its laws. The disagreement, however, lies in the emphasis of some Islamic Action Front members on the Islamic reference of the civil state, whereas the members of the other two parties do not see any need for this as long as they believe that society protects its values as a point of reference.

For the most part, Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue members propose broader and better-informed visions than those proposed by Islamic Action Front youth. This can be explained by the intellectual debates and deliberations in which they participated, and the readings that led them to leave the Muslim Brotherhood parent organization. Today they are therefore more able to explain their views and compare them with more confidence. On the other hand, a clear gap in views and perceptions emerged among Islamic Action Front youth, with views ranging from realistic, political, and pragmatic, to embodying the usual traditional discourse, which sometimes contains the strictness and epistemic closure of the parent organization (as will be clarified in the discussion in the following chapters). At the same time, we find that this contrast in views and attitudes of Islamic Action Front youth is logical in light of the dispute and disagreement among its leaders with respect to the concept of the civil state and the issues of internal transformation and reform (as mentioned in previous chapters).
CHAPTER SIX

Separating Da’wa from Politics

The ideas surrounding the separation of da’wa (Islamic proselytism) and politics are closely related to the knowledge that was accumulated by studying the experiences of Ennahda in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, as well as studies that critically analyze the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan and in the region. In addition, the emergence of functional challenges have made the da’wa role a burden on the political role of the Islamic parties and decreased their competitiveness.

The benefit in the separation of da’wa from politics lies in the fact that it frees party and political activities from the control of the concepts of da’wa, preaching, guidance, and social work and increases the professionalism and specialization of party in political activities. This distances them from the language, slogans, and emotionality that have dominated

the discourse of the Islamic parties and movements over the past decades, embodied in the slogan “Islam is the solution.”

It is therefore important at this point to clarify the principle of separation of da’wa from politics, and the results, indications, and implications arising therefrom, given that it consists of several levels:

The first level – the institutional level: the separation of da’wa from politics necessitates limiting the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood organization or other similar da’wa organizations (such as the Movement for Unity and Reform in Morocco) to da’wa and preaching activities, and for the parties to carry out political activities independently, without either side (the party or the organization) interfering with, overlapping with, or dominating the other.

The second level – spheres of activity: the separation of da’wa from politics means that each party has its own sphere of activity. The sphere of the party is the parliament, trade unions, and government elections, whereas the sphere of da’wa is the mosque, charitable organizations, and civil society. No overlap between the two spheres is permitted. This is the case in Morocco, for example, where there is a clear separation between the activities of the Movement for Unity and Reform and those of the Justice and Development Party, with the leaders of the party being prohibited from carrying out da’wa activities at the mosque, such as sermons, and vice versa.

The third level – rhetoric and language: party rhetoric is different from the rhetoric of da’wa and preaching. If we consider, for example, the election platforms of the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and Ennahda in Tunisia,
we find that Islamic slogans and sentimental religious rhetoric are completely absent. Instead, the language is that of politics, economics, and clear realistic programs. The Islamic Action Front once again followed their example, as mentioned before, when they moved past the slogan “Islam is the solution” in the most recent parliamentary elections and adopted the principle of separation between da’wa and politics.

The fourth level – results and implications: this aspect should lead to important results and political implications in dispelling the concerns of other groups with respect to fears of imposing the Islamization of society, the state, or legislation if Islamists rise to power. This religious goal can be transferred to the da’wa and preaching sphere in civil society, without being forcefully imposed by the law, the regime, or the authorities. At the same time, freedom of choice and pluralism is sanctified in political life, meaning that this principle in and of itself can constitute an important guarantee of the protection of “civil life” against the forceful instrumentalization of religion in politics.

The leaders and members of the three parties (Islamic Action Front, Partnership and Rescue, and Zamzam) currently recognize the need to separate da’wa from politics in their activities. They all point to the internal debates within the parent organization, which subsequently led to the breakaway of the moderate stream, or their exit in one way or another from the parent organization, as previously mentioned.

Both Zaki Bani Irsheid and Murad al-Adaileh from the Islamic Action Front believe that the matter of the separation of da’wa from politics is only a matter of time, and will

---

(151) Interview with Zaki Beni Irsheid, January 7, 2018; Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, January 7, 2018, and several opinions from the Focus Group =
be put to a vote within the party in February 2018. It is a mat-
ter that currently overlaps with the options of the organization
to license itself as a charitable organization in the Ministry of
Social Development or as a political movement in the Minis-
try of Political Development. Bani Irsheid indicates that the
most likely option is that the party will focus on general po-
litical activities and the organization will focus on *da’wa* and
educational activities.\(^{(152)}\)

This change comes in the delineation of the relationship
of the parent organization and the Islamic Action Front in the
framework of the transformations within the organization.
This is because a lack of adaption and re-examination with
respect to what are known as the “constants” will lead to the
increased isolation of the parent organization according to
Beni Irsheid, “because the Muslim Brotherhood is currently
interested in recreating itself,”\(^{(153)}\) and recognizes that the
separation of *da’wa* from politics will help solve some prob-
lems, but that it alone is not enough.

As for the youth members of the three parties, Zamzam
and Partnership and Rescue members present clear ideas with
respect to the general importance of separating *da’wa* from
politics, all of which originate from the same Muslim Bro-
therhood intellectual background. Members of the Islamic Ac-
tion Front, however, present a less-developed position, not
yet having fully crystalized their views on the form of this
separation and its practical consequences for the Muslim Bro-
therhood organization and the party. This is despite the fact
that they accepted this principle after it had previously been

---

\(^{(152)}\) Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party,
January 10, 2018.

\(^{(153)}\) Interview with Zaki Beni Irsheid, January 7, 2018.
rejected by, or not considered, by the leaders of the organization, the party, and their members.

It would be fair to say that Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue members enjoy more freedom in formulating their opinions because they do not need to organize this separation in practical terms. The two parties entered the scene as purely political parties, and are not originally linked to any specific organization or religious or social movement, compared to the Islamic Action Front, which has operated since its founding in 1993 as the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, and in which da‘wa and politics have overlapped in its activities for years, in a way that makes it difficult to define the line between them. Therefore, Islamic Action Front members have before them intellectual, organizational, and operational challenges when addressing the matter of the separation of da‘wa from politics today.

The main points of the discussion surrounding the inevitability of the separation of da‘wa from politics according to the opinions of the youth can be summarized as follows:

**Functional Specialization**

The youth of the Islamic Action Front recognize the importance of separating da‘wa from politics, but they emphasize that it is purely functional separation. In their views, this separation will allow for more specialization in developing the institutional framework of the party, having clearly separated departments, and clearer roles for each person in a way that will strengthen the institutionalism within the party. (154) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, the Zamzam member, agrees

(154) Riyad al-Sunaid, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.
with the view of the youth of the Islamic Action Front that the word “separation” does not fulfill this objective and that it would be better to speak of functional/operational specialization, because political and da’wa activities complement one another, in his opinion. (155) Again, this indicates a diversity of personal beliefs and intellectual backgrounds among the members of one party.

At the same time, Firas Qattan, a member of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, emphasizes the right of the organization to have a political position and political opinions, as is the case with every entity in society, but states that carrying out political activities falls under the exclusive specialization of the party, without the involvement of the organization. In the same way, any person who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood organization and has a political inclination must join the political party that represents him. (156) The other members of Zamzam agree with him, seeing themselves as a political party that focuses on the Jordanian national issue, and whoever has an interest in da’wa must take it to another framework outside of the party.

From the practical standpoint of separation of roles, Zamzam youth launched a lobbying campaign within the party to strengthen the separation of da’wa from politics and categorically refused Rahil Gharaibeh and Nabil al-Kofahi taking up leadership positions in the licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society, and agreed only to their membership in the association, in order to prevent an overlap of roles. (157) As we

(155) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
(156) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 13, 2018.
previously indicated, the association considers Zamzam to be closest party to it. But this has later led Rahil Gharaibeh to emphasize that Zamzam is not the political arm of any entity.\(^{(158)}\) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat clarified that they are not against the licensed association or the parent organization as long as neither carries out any political activities and instead focus on their da’wa role. However, he also feels that the licensed association has not contributed anything new, neither ideologically nor organizationally.\(^{(159)}\)

Thus, Zamzam and Islamic Action Front members intersect on the matter of functional separation, even if Islamic Action Front members emphasize the nature of the functional separation only, whereas most of Zamzam youth and Partnership and Rescue youth agree with a complete separation between the two roles, with some individual differences.

**Society and Protecting Islamic Identity**

Some Partnership and Rescue members recognize that when they had previously been close to the Muslim Brotherhood or members of it, they considered themselves as the protectors of Islam. Today, however, their beliefs have changed, and they have discovered that society is the primary protector of Islam, and that they, along with others, represent this society and are “part of the truth rather than holding a monopoly on the truth.”\(^{(160)}\) Zamzam members share this view, with one of them indicating that they “do not consider

\(^{(158)}\) Hadeel Ghabboun, “Al-Gharaibeh: Zamzam is not the political arm of anyone,” *Al-Ghad*, February 9, 2016, at: https://goo.gl/oaPv5D

\(^{(159)}\) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.

\(^{(160)}\) Ghayth al-Ma’ani, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
themselves as the protectors of religious identity, because religious identity is already well-established in society. Rather, they today attempt to gain political partners to protect the Jordanian national identity.” (161) They therefore see no need to adopt a religious-political approach to protect this (Islamic) identity, as was the case during the period of the rise of nationalists and leftists in the Arab world in the seventies. Instead, they believe that their role is political, i.e. to advance the state and the form of governance.

In this way, the members of these two parties have overcome the problem of political Islam. Leaders of political Islamist movements and parties have long believed that they represent social and Islamic ideals and that they must promote these values in societies in a way that is consistent with their value system. However, undertaking political activities with such belief in self-superiority will inevitably and generally lead to a legislative dictatorship, where laws that align with the intellectual background of these parties are imposed on citizens.

The rhetoric and approach of the Muslim Brotherhood was previously based on the Islamization of society. It also implicitly embraced this notion of achieving an ascendancy over society in their role as the protectors of religious identity against westernization, according to Hassan al-Banna, and subsequently against society’s return to a state of pre-Islamic ignorance, according to Sayyid Qutb. Furthermore, although the Muslim Brotherhood has overcome these positions today and presented practical examples of their political flexibility, the broad ideological framework of the rhetoric and conduct of the Muslim Brotherhood is still focused on Islamic identi-

(161) Mohamed Ta’ammeh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
ty. The Islamic Action Front, for example, have already overcome this in its programs and moved on to address the political reform and democracy. However, the large overlap between its membership and the membership of the Muslim Brotherhood organization makes it hard to distinguish which of its rhetoric pertains to *da’wa*, on the one hand, and which pertains to politics, on the other.

**Criticizing Political Options Versus Adopting Ideological Constancy**

One of the most compelling reasons for separating *da’wa* from politics according to Partnership and Rescue members, is the fear articulating political options as if they are ideological (Islamic) constants. Several youth members discussed the separation between ideological constants and political variables, so that political options that necessarily depend on environmental, political, social, and economic variables cannot be presented as obligatory religious stipulations.\(^\text{162}\) One of them noted that this was probable in the parent organization, which has led them to develop a different political vision than that of the parent organization.\(^\text{163}\)

Mohammad al-Qudah also notes that the Islamic juristic opinion on any issue is subject to change. For example, a scholar could come and argue that taxes are a form of zakat, instead of separating the imposition of taxes by the government and the religious obligations to pay zakat. But since this is a juristic opinion and like others is subject to change, then it would be best for any political party to distance itself from

---

\(^\text{162}\) Mohamed al-Qudah, Hamza Yassin and Ghayth al-Ma‘ani, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.

\(^\text{163}\) Mohamed al-Qudah, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
similar ideological/juristic opinions and leave religious discussions them to those whose responsible for this sphere. (164)

Mohamed Ta’amneh, a member of Zamzam, also explains the reasons for Zamzam’s emphasis on this separation since political opinions can be right or wrong, and there therefore must be space for criticism. A preacher, however, cannot leave space open for criticism, (165) “because the goal of the politician is to win over supporters, whereas the goal of da’wa is to win over hearts.” (166)

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front adoption of the principle of separation between da’wa and politics, confusion still exists between political positions and fatwas (religious rulings). Evidence of this confusion lies for example in the existence of an Ulama Council in the Muslim Brotherhood organization and an Ulama Council in the party. The decisions of both are non-binding for the party, according to Abd al-Rahman Abu Gosh, a member of the Youth Division. (167)

One might ask, however, what need does a political party have for an Ulama Council? And what is the role of this council if its decisions are non-binding? And if the voting of the members of the party is based on public political interests, why is it necessary to survey different Islamic jurisprudence and religious positions if the Islamic reference of the civil state and of civil parties, as confirmed by those youth, is a

(164) Ibid.
(165) Mohamed Ta’amneh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
(166) Mahmoud al-Akayleh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
(167) Abdel Rahman Abu Gosh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 18, 2018.
reference for values and not a legislative reference in the functional sense? Therefore, the existence of bodies that issue fatwas gives rise to doubts about the extent of commitment within the organization and the party towards this separation between the religious and political roles. These are the questions that were absent in the ideas of the party youth, and that do not seem to constitute a concern for them. However, these are the questions that must be contemplated in order for these youth to overcome the current crisis and develop their ideas with respect to both politics and da’wa.

**Preventing the Exploitation of Religion in Politics**

Partnership and Rescue youth emphasized the need to stand up against the exploitation of politics by certain religious figures and the barbaric use of religion by some to gain support for their political views, as we have seen in the region. (168) In this framework, one of the members rejects the slogan “Islam is the solution,” which has been associated with the Muslim Brotherhood for decades, because he believes that it has been used to appeal to the emotions of voters, whereas any political party must focus on economic and social programs and services. (169) The primary objective of the state is to serve the citizens and protect their rights, and the biggest concern for any party is to provide services, reduce unemployment, and address other daily concerns, without becoming preoccupied with Islamic rituals. (170)

---

(170) Hamza Yassin and Ghayth al-Ma’ani, Focus Group Discussion with a Group of Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, January 10, 2018.
When Zamzam youth were asked whether their party is a secular party, they all stressed the importance of liberating religion from politics, taking into consideration, first of all, that the concept of secularism is unclear and has many versions. (171) But stressed their support to the definition of secularism that utilizes peoples’ identities to serve them, according to Ahmed al-Akayleh. (172) This indicates the shared attitude of Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue towards the potential exploitation of religion in politics and vice versa, whereas the members of the Islamic Action Front have not put forth any arguments indicating their acknowledgment of this potential exploitation nor internal debates on this within the party.

Changes in Rhetoric Versus Intellectual Constancy

Islamic Action Front members asserted that the intellectual basis of the organization and the party remains unchanged, even when “their experiences and exposure to new issues have led to changes in rhetoric.” In other words, new administrative needs arose that led to the functional separation between da’wa and politics. (173) Furthermore, in the broader context, Mohamed Bassam from the Islamic Action Front feels that it is the political environment that highlights certain issues, and it is in this context that the Islamic movement clarifies its position. For example, the discussion with respect to forbidding or permitting participation in elections arose in the 1980s, and the Muslim Brotherhood contended

(171) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
(172) Ahmad al-Akayleh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of Zamzam, January 17, 2018.
(173) Abdel Rahman Abu Gosh, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 18, 2018.
with and clarified their positions on this subject. Today, the issue of the separation of da’wa from politics has come to the fore, but the political thought of the movement has not changed.\(^{(174)}\)

This view, however, is inaccurate. It is well known that the Muslim Brotherhood movement lacks an ideological point of reference in Jordan and does not have a clear intellectual foundation. This means that each stage brings with it its own challenges, at which point the movement researches the various views and discusses these challenges. In addition, this perspective ignores an important truth: change is the key to continuity. Any political, da’wa, or social movement cannot continue as an influential entity without developing and changing its ideas, methods, and modi operandi. It is also important to note that the intellectual constancy (or rigidity) of some Muslim Brotherhood members could potentially lead to its decline and fragmentation.

These views also indicate a clear gap between the youth whom we have met and the leaders of the party, who did not hesitate to discuss transformations in their thought and rhetoric. This indicates a closure within the party between its leaders and members. For example, none of the party youth with whom we met attended the party seminar that was held in the beginning of 2017 to discuss the subject of the civil state,\(^{(175)}\) whose importance we addressed earlier.

In the broader context of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Salem al-Falahat, one of the founders of Partner-

\(^{(174)}\) Mohamed Bassam, Focus Group Discussion with Members of the Youth Division of the Islamic Action Front, January 18, 2018.

ship and Rescue and the former Secretary-General of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan, confirms that the separation of da’wa from politics was the approach of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Al-Falahat believes that Muslim Brotherhood historians have overlooked this position, especially considering that it was developed in 1946, before al-Banna’s assassination in 1949. Al-Falahat cites in his book (Illuminations and a Review of the Muslim Brotherhood) the views of al-Banna in support of the separation of da’wa from politics through two propositions: compatibility with the national party in Egypt at the time to make the party the voice of the political views of the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Fabian idea to let Muslim Brotherhood youth join the political parties consistent with their individual political visions in Egypt, in addition to their membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. (176)

These views by al-Banna are considered to be among the most important reconsiderations that he offered before his death, and they are views that have been historically overlooked by the members and literature of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and elsewhere. They are views that could have, according to al-Falahat, opened up space for dialogue within the organization earlier on and reduced the overlap between da’wa and politics historically, organizationally, and politically in the confrontation with the authorities.

Conclusion

The importance of discussion on the separation of da’wa from politics in the Arab and foreign literature ad-

(176) See Salem al-Falahat, Illuminations and a Review of the Muslim Brotherhood, Amman, Center for National Studies, 2017, Pages 74-85, and with respect to the two propositions Page 75.
dressing the experiences of political Islam and its problems, with the ascendancy of the Moroccan experience in this regard, was reflected in our dialogue with the members of the three parties. Although all of the leaders and members agree on the importance of separating da’wa from politics, the contrast in points of view emerges in the five main points that we addressed.

The views of Islamic Action Front members reflected a clear rejection of the idea of complete separation and they instead focus on “functional separation,” which would strengthen institutional activities within the party. On the other hand, we do not find this caution among Partnership and Zamzam youth. This shows that the parent organization and Islamic Action Front are still confined to the “procedural level” when addressing this separation. But the roots of this separation are conceptual and should be reflected in more than one level like the rhetoric, function, and practical implications. The separation is not only confined to areas of specialization, as the party youth emphasize. This perception among party youth can deprives the principle of separating da’wa from politics of a significant portion of its value and significance for the future of political Islam, and it can hinder their professionalism and their full integration in democratic processes and dynamics.

We can notice these subtle and important differences all at once in the interpretation by the youth of the three parties of the reasons and motives for the separation between da’wa and politics. Islamic Action Front youth see the reason as being the emergence of a practical need for this separation, and they do not see any transformation or change in their ideas or conceptions. On the other hand, we find that Partnership and Rescue and Zamzam youth fully acknowledge these trans-
formations and the difference between where they are now and where they were when they were members of the Islamic Action Front. They consider this separation to be an important key for the development of professional political activity devoid of the *da’wa* slogans and sentimental religious discourse that has governed Islamist political activity throughout the past decades.

The identity aspect concerning society’s role in protecting the religious identity of the state was also prominent. Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue members believe in their role as part of a whole in Jordan, and their focus on their political role comes from their assertion that the protector of religious identity is Jordanian society itself, which has the ability to reflect the cultural heritage of Jordan through the system of laws. They therefore believe that their main role is to strengthen the authority of the people (democracy) and empower them. Islamic Action Front members, on the other hand, did not present a clear vision of their role in this regard.

The discussion of the *da’wa* and political roles also clarified the practical differences in the visions of the members of these parties. For example, Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue members presented clearer details on the issue of ideological constancy versus political change. This pertains mostly to the right to criticize political opinions and refute them, as opposed to accepting religious rulings. They therefore advocate limiting the religious discussion to academics and Islamic jurisprudents who qualified to discuss such matters. This paves the way for debate and political competition.

These views are also based on the desire to eradicate the political exploitation of religion and to limit the religious instrumentalization of politics by religious figures to achieve
their own agendas. We also observed that Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue discussed these issues among themselves as individuals away from the party and within the formal discussion platforms of their parties. This gives them credibility in presenting their views as well as the ability to formulate their views efficiently and clearly.

Furthermore, because the separation of da’wa from politics is one of the aspects of the development of political and Islamic thought, it was noteworthy to observe the belief of Islamic Action Front youth in the ideological and intellectual constancy of the Muslim Brotherhood, which strengthens the conviction that ideas about this separation are perhaps still unclear for Islamic Action Front youth.
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
CHAPTER SEVEN

Ambiguities of Application: Public Rights, Minority Rights and “Supra-Constitutional” Principles

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements have often been accused of seeing democracy as a mechanism to obtain power. It is said that once they are in government, they will not accept the buttressing principles of democracy, and will seek to impose their vision and laws in line with the Shari’a as they understand it on the rest of society. This will continue to be a point of dispute as long as the numbers of Islamists in government remain limited. That is in spite of the models presented by the Ennahda Party in Tunisia and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco.

The issue of public freedoms and minority rights represents one of the greatest fears associated with the rise of Islamist parties to power. Although the three parties discussed in this book all offer reassuring ideas on this subject, they will remain in the realm of the theoretical as long as these parties do not have a parliamentary majority in Jordan. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to inspect the opinions of both the young members and the leaders of these parties in order to understand their positions on these ambiguities.
In this chapter we will consider two essential issues: public and minority rights and “Supra-Constitutional” principles. In order to arrive at a general idea of the opinions of participants in the study, we asked them what they thought about the idea of a Christian or a woman becoming the Prime Minister in Jordan, about using the law to impose for example the wearing of hijab, and whether a parliamentary majority should be able to legalize prostitution in Jordan.

General and Minority Rights

Young party members’ opinions overlapped in four different areas representing the most important points of convergence between them, as a result of their shared Islamist background, their personal convictions, and their attempts to reorder their political and religious priorities. In spite of differences of opinion between the members of the different parties on matters of detail and emphasis, they all agree on the basic principles of the concept.

A. Equal citizenship and shared responsibility

Members of Zamzam do not accept the idea of “minorities” to begin with, since Christians are equal Jordanian citizens and participants in the national work. They believe that Zamzam was the frontrunner in the national participation movement and this creator of the shared national discourse. What distinguishes Zamzam from other parties in its dealings with the Christian other, according to Mohammed Hassan Thneibat, is candor. “We see and address Christians as fellow citizens, who bear responsibility as do other citizens without thinking of themselves as a minority.”

(177) Mohammed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with members of the National Conference Party – Zamzam, 17/01/2018.
level, Zamzam has Christian members, including one elected within the representative/leadership frameworks.

In the Islamic Action Front, Muhammad Bassam (28 years old, civil engineer) believes that the Islamist movement is not restricted to a single country and that as a result if we want examples of its political ideas and positions it is possible to look at their track record elsewhere. Islamists have accepted a Shi’ite Prime Minister in Iraq and cooperated with Shi’ites in Bahrain. In Pakistan, a woman became Prime Minister – and was accepted by the Islamists. The IAF members believe that the realities of the Jordanian situation are different, and that these questions centering on minorities, whether religious, sectarian, or ethnic, are not necessary because Christians make up only 5% of the total citizenry and there are no different ethnic groups allowing us to study Islamists’ practices with regard to broader political participation in Jordan. (178)

B. Democracy, Majority Opinion, and Legal Authority

Members of all three parties adopt similar positions on the role of women in politics, and approach the involvement of both women and Christians in politics from the same perspective. Members of the Partnership and Rescue Party, for example, believe that majority opinion is the highest legal authority and that their political role as a party should be based on respecting the law and the opinion of the majority even if it runs contrary to their personal convictions. (179) Ab-

(178) Muhammad Bassam, Focus Group Discussion with members of the youth section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
(179) Various opinions, Focus Group Discussion with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
dul Rahman Abu Ghosh (30 years old, accounting technician) explains that the position is that “if the people choose a Christian or a woman, I might accept it as an Islamist movement, and reject it in my own convictions. But I won’t impose my opinion on the people, because the question then won’t be whether it’s permissible or not according to the Shari’a, but a matter of agreeing to the choice of the people in accordance with the democratic mechanism.” (180)

Likewise, other members of the IAF emphasized the democratic mechanism. Mu’tazz al-Hrout, for example, who is head of the IAF Youth Section, does not object to a normalizer with Israel becoming Prime Minister if chosen by the people. They call for a democratic mechanism and accept its outcome. They will seek the election of a prime minister who agrees with their views – but only through use of that same democratic mechanism. (181)

C. Competence and Trustworthiness

All three parties, leaders and members alike, asserted that the fundamental principle of office-holding is competence and that they accept the rule of the majority even if it goes against their personal opinions or even their position as a party. When we asked Malek al-Omri (24 years old, a Shari’a law student, and member of the PRP) about the possibility of a woman becoming Prime Minister, he said he believed his opinion would be affected by the patriarchal mentality of society, but that on a party level he believes that the most

(180) Abdul Rahman AbuGhosh, Focus Group Discussion with members of the youth section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
(181) Mu'tazz al-Hrout, Focus Group Discussion with members of the youth section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
competent and most able person is the one entitled to hold an office regardless of sex or religion. (182)

This was also emphasized by some members of the IAF, who considered competence and the choice of the people to be more important than any other considerations. (183) This position is part of the current Islamist intellectual framework of *ijtihad* (independent jurisprudence), according to Riyadh al-Sunaid, deputy leader of the IAF Youth Section, who believes that the focus should be on *Ruh al-Islam* (spirit of Islam) values like justice, competence, and trustworthiness. As such, there is no problem with anybody taking up any office as long as they meet these criteria. (184)

Zaki Bani Irsheid and Murad al-Adaileh also agree with the pre-eminence of competence, and there is nothing in the IAF constitution preventing a woman from officially holding this position. (185) Riyadh al-Sunaid asserts that the IAF have nominated more women to be members of parliament than any other Jordanian party, and worked hard between 2008 and 2018 to increase participation by non-Muslims and women in student assemblies. (186)

**D. Da’wa and Political Role**

As we discussed in the previous section, there is general agreement on the separation of *da’wa* from political work

(182) Malek al-Omri, discussion session with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.

(183) Amr Mansour and Firas Qattan, discussion session with members of the youth section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.

(184) Riyadh al-Sunaid, discussion session with members of the youth section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.

(185) Private interview with Murad al-Adaileh, 7/1/2018.

(186) Riyadh al-Sunaid, discussion session with members of the youth section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
either functionally or completely. The various views on this matter appear more clearly when we ask about the various practical and legal issues discussed in this chapter. We asked participants their opinion on legal imposition of hijab, for example. Both the leaders and members of the three parties state that they are against the imposition of any religious requirement in line with the Quranic principle “no compulsion in religion.”

They made a clear distinction between their personal opinions and religious convictions, on the one hand, and their political role as members of a party, on the other. For example, members of the PRP emphasized that their political role is to put forward a legal/rights-based framework built on majority rule. Propagation of da’wa, meanwhile, is the concern of the bodies dedicated to that task. Society reflects its values in a consensually-produced legal system, which falls under their current conception of the separation of da’wa from politics as detailed above. In the political sphere “there is a political-economic program which focuses on services and problems. Religious issues like the headscarf should be discussed in da’wa and cultural institutions,” and the party is not the right place for them. (187)

Alaa al-Qudah (PRP) says that his political and personal conception, in summary, is that Shari’a and the Qur’an’s rulings are nothing to be ashamed of, but that freedom comes first and that the people have the freedom to choose their representatives. Politically, he would not impose his opinion on anyone – but in the educational framework, he might work to

(187) Hamzeh Yaseen, discussion session with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
disseminate his ideas. “I apply the law, but I struggle against it socially.” (188)

On the subject of women’s rights, Zamzam members see these rights within a legal framework of full citizenship. From the religious perspective, as regards women, they openly admit “we would like to see women wearing the headscarf, but this is a job for the da’iyas.” (189) This position comes from the general intellectual background of the Zamzam members we met, who were formerly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which may also apply to members of the PRP. Al-Froukh explains:

“As young men from a Brotherhood background, even before the Arab Spring we had an idea of the kind of state we wanted and our position on freedoms, and the principle that freedom comes before the Shari’a. We have moved past these issues now, and no longer see them as at all ambiguous – we feel that these questions are not for us, and that we have put these ideas into practice... Nationalist Christians are closer to my position than anti-state Salafists. We do not describe ourselves as an Islamist party or engage in da’wa. We are a political party.” (190)

All of the IAF members agreed that their priorities today are political, rhetorically and programmatically, and that the economy is their greatest concern. They recognize the need for political discourse which deals with these problems. As for legislation recognizing behavior not in accordance

(188) Alaa al-Qudah, Focus Group Discussion with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
(189) Alaa al-Froukh, Focus Group Discussion with members of Zamzam, 17/01/2018.
(190) Alaa al-Froukh, Focus Group Discussion with members of Zamzam, 17/01/2018.
with Islam, they are opposed to it on the grounds that it is clearly forbidden by religion. Nonetheless, they affirm that legislation is changed through democratic, peaceful mechanisms, and legislative work in the parliament. (191)

Members of the PRP, meanwhile, were divided into two groups. The first believes that as members of a political party their concern should be public services, rights, unemployment, public transport, and other concerns of daily life, and that other people should concern themselves with propagation of *da’wa*. The second group asserts that they respect majority opinion, but that they will seek through *da’wa* and education to change the culture of society without any compulsion in such a way that this change will be reflected later in the legal system. (192) This position, too, is linked to the division between *da’wa* and politics – there is a place for political work and its rules, and another place for individual religious convictions which can be put into practice in social life outside of political conduct and the ideological discourse of the party.

Of course, it is not possible to test these ideas practically in full. Even if political programs, behaviors, positions, and discussions uncover certain parts of these convictions, taking power, and sticking to them is another kind of test entirely. This is not currently possible in Jordan because the opportunities of political parties in Jordan to compete freely in elections and win parliamentary majorities are limited. These ideas will not develop more clearly because it is political experience that would refine them and demonstrate these

---

(191) Abdulrahman Abu Ghosh, discussion session with members of the youth section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
(192) Various opinions, discussion session with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
parties’ practical capabilities. As long as the state restricts all parties’ political capacity, it is not possible to blame these parties and ignore the state’s responsibility for their stunted political growth.

E. Culture of Society

When participants were asked whether a parliamentary majority should be able to pass laws contravening the Shari’a, Alaa al-Froukh asserted that they would fiercely oppose such a development, but that they – like the members of the PRP – would submit to the will of the majority. Members of all three parties, however, were confident that since Jordanian society is conservative, Jordanian MPs were unlikely to face this dilemma. This was a general point of agreement between all of them.

When PRP members were asked about eating in public places during Ramadan, there was general agreement that this issue is a matter of public taste and that it has long been the case that Jordanian Christians, even more than Muslims, operate within this general framework of behavior during Ramadan. They gave a similar response when asked about a hypothetical situation in which legalization of prostitution was raised in the parliament for economic or rights-related reasons: they did not present a pragmatic rights-based argument (prostitution is an established phenomenon which happens in any case, it is better to legislate to protect individuals working in that field, etc.). They did not even consider the question within the general rights-based framework of the discussion.

(193) Ala al-Froukh, discussion session with members of Zamzam, 17/01/2018.
(194) Various opinions, discussion session with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
These points suggest either a complacency rooted in the belief that Jordanian society is conservative and will not, in the medium term, raise such questions. Or it indicates that they have not yet discussed these sorts of points in their party meetings – bearing in mind that the members we met with were formerly members of or close to the Muslim Brotherhood and their conservative/da‘wa-based indoctrination, and that like anyone else their positions on these sorts of issues will develop gradually, leading either to a decisive rejection or to acceptance.

Muhammad al-Qudah (PRP) notes the importance of recognizing the reactionary power of culture as well. Bin Kiri-ran’s Justice and Development Party for example were unable to promulgate a law against child prostitution, which is widespread in Morocco. In order to succeed in such an endeavor, it is necessary first of all to change the culture – only then is it possible to reflect this change in law.\(^{(195)}\)

Discussion of hegemonic cultural values also cropped up in a different context, that of the participation of women. All agreed that it is culture which is the main barrier in this regard. Yaseen Hamzeh, for example, cited the refusal of tribes to appoint women as leaders.\(^{(196)}\) Even on the level of parties and organizations, Murad al-Adayleh, Bani Irsheid, and Salem al-Falahat all suggest that the obstacles preventing more active participation by women and young people are social and cultural. Organizationally, the IAF has recently established a youth section and a women’s section replacing

\(^{(195)}\) Muhammad al-Qudah, discussion session with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.  
\(^{(196)}\) Hamzeh Yaseen, discussion session with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
the older committees. In the PRP, the Central Committee currently includes five women out of a total of thirty-five members. In their view, this reflects a desire on the part of the organization to encourage greater participation – but the cultural obstacle continues to dominate.

**F. Concept of Freedom**

As well as the other factors, members of the IAF discussed various different definitions. “We don’t have a concept of absolute freedom,” said Riyadh al-Sunaid – deputy leader of the IAF Youth Section. Freedom is based on the Islamic reference of the people. However, his colleagues in the party – despite agreeing with him – did not provide any clarification either for the reader or the observer of exactly what this definition entails or what the defining characteristics of freedom are according to any religious or political interpretation, other than that public freedoms come before individual freedoms in Islam.

With regard to freedoms and the implementation of hudud punishments, for example, one of the IAF members stated that the higher goal is legislation which preserves the state and not legislation conforming to the Shari’a. According to him, the purpose of the state is to realize the Islamic values of justice and equality, not to concern itself with who prays or does not pray, or who wears or does not wear the

---

(197) Private interview with Murad al-Adayleh, 7/1/2018.
(198) Salem al-Falahat, discussion session with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
(199) Riyadh al-Sunaid, discussion session with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 13/01/2018.
(200) Muhammad Bassam, Focus Group Discussion session with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 13/01/2018.
(201) Amr Mansour, Focus Group Discussion with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 13/01/2018.
headscarf. The goal is how people think, and working in society to change that without compulsion.\(^{(202)}\) The priority, as far as can be understood from these comments, is first to educate and Islamize society.

The question of the *hudud* is not considered a priority for the IAF. The priority is to establish a form of governance which realizes the *maqasid* (goals) of the Shari’a: preserving life, property, honour, religion, and mind. These *maqasid* will not be realized by instituting *hudud* punishments, according to Youth Section member Amr Mansour.\(^{(203)}\)

**“Supra-Constitutional” Principles**

In Chapter Four we discussed the controversy around the “Supra-Constitutional” Principles proposed in Egypt in 2013 to act as general regulating principles in such a way that no temporary parliamentary majority would be able to suppress general freedoms and the rights of minorities, and which might come in the form of a “national pact” affirming fixed rights and principles.

On whether this is an appropriate solution for Jordan, Ghayth al-Ma’ani (PRP, 41 years old, lawyer, from Irbid) explains that the basic principle is that constitutional documents lay out general principles, while laws are responsible for detailed application, and that the place of party-political competition should be to produce regulating laws through

\(^{(202)}\) Mu’tazz Hrout, Focus Group Discussion with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 13/01/2018.

\(^{(203)}\) Amr Mansour, Focus Group Discussion with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 13/01/2018.
majority voting. (204) Muhammad al-Qudah, meanwhile, believes there is a need for a “societal” contract parallel to the contract with the state, to ensure that temporary majorities do not lead to a change in the constitution. (205)

While these opinions are acceptable in theory, they would certainly encounter practical obstacles, since any parliamentary majority will work to change laws. In the current practical political context, there is no framework protecting the Constitution from attempts to change it by a temporary parliamentary majority. This is an ongoing struggle which Islamist and other parties have to consider in order for us to understand and solve these ambiguities.

On a similar topic, PRP members – joined by Falahat – stated that anxiety over identity is no longer the main concern of the Brotherhood or the Islamist youth. In our opinion, it was this anxiety that motivated their emphasis on the conformity of laws with the Shari’a in their older literature. For them, this anxiety derived from the history of the organization: Hassan al-Banna established the Brotherhood in the context of his struggle against westernization and colonialism, and the Jordanian Brotherhood came to prominence as a counterweight to the nationalists and the leftists during the 1970s. Today, however, the Islamist Youth in general see no need to emphasize the issue of the identity of the state as formerly. Past and current experience has strengthened their belief in the necessity of creating a state of institutions and freedoms rather than emphasizing the creation of laws in line with Shari’a.

(204) Ghayth al-Ma’ani, Focus Group Discussion with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
(205) Muhammad al-Qudah, Focus Group Discussion with members of the PRP, 10/01/2018.
However, the discussion of “Supra-Constitutional” principles also met with a number of reservations from IAF members, which can be summarized in two points. Firstly, why is it always Islamists who are required to offer guarantees – as if non-Islamists are more competent, while Islamists have to provide guarantees before taking their political opportunity? (206)

The second objection is that practice is the real measure. Here IAF members pointed to political collaboration between Islamists and other groups in Tunisia and Morocco, and to the difficulties which they have confronted and overcome in Turkey. Although offering guarantees is a good thing, according to Muhammad Bassam, “practice is more important than position,” because of the ever-present concern of the other parties that these guarantees are no more than a temporary political tactic. (207) As such, they take a defensive position against demands for them to give written guarantees in the form of a political document clarifying their position on freedoms, pluralism, and political participation.

Another group, however, considers it very important to offer a written document expressing these guarantees and explaining their intellectual framework within the method of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is for two reasons. First, in their opinion the Brotherhood’s internal documents already provide for these freedoms, and second, because “the Islamist project has been distorted by the support of the Wahhabi Salafists, so it’s important for us to explain the differences be-

(206) Amr Mansour, Focus Group Discussion with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
(207) Muhammad Bassam, Focus Group Discussion with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
Ambiguities of Application: Public Rights, Minority Rights and “Supra-Constitutional” Principles

tween us and them so that we’re not treated like Wahhabsis.”

Amr Mansour agrees with this opinion, saying that a political document would be the beginning of political dialogue and negotiation with other forces with the aim of arriving at common ground, especially since the media typically stirs up fear of the Islamists and their methodology.

In the same context, both IAF and Zamzam members stress that the general political environment in Jordan does not permit these ideas on political participation to be put into practice. “First give me a democratic opportunity, then judge me on how I act!” Even the limited provisions that currently exist are producing results. For example, one of them considers the rounds of Brotherhood-Christian dialogue taking place currently, in which Zaki Bani Irsheid of the IAF is an active participant, to have resulted from joint participation alongside Christian personalities in the last round of parliamentary elections.

Conclusion

The discussion with study participants on public and minority rights, “Supra-Constitutional” principles touched on a wide variety of issues related to ideology and real opportunities to put these opportunities into practice. Members of all three parties and their leadership are in agreement on the

(208) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
(209) Amr Mansour, discussion session with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
(210) Ibid.
(211) Abdulrahman Abu Ghosh, discussion session with members of the Youth Section of the IAF, 18/01/2018.
three main principles, and as becomes clear in the chapters of this book, differ on the details. The most important points of agreement are:

1) A focus on accepting the outcome of the democratic process whatever the results may be, on the interest of these parties in buttressing democratic action in Jordan.

2) Focus on competence, ability and trustworthiness as criteria for taking office, regardless of religion and sex, with recognition of the patriarchal character of Jordanian society which prevents women participating in politics despite an organizational desire to increase this participation.

3) Emphasis on the separation of political opinion and acceptance of the opinion of the majority on the one hand and individuals’ personal and religious opinions on the other, in particular with regard to minority rights.

4) Highlighting of culture as a fundamental factor in protecting society’s system of values in legislation: the people will choose MPs who represent them, who in their turn will pass laws or oppose suggested laws in accordance with the cultural norms prevailing in society.

The discussion of rights also shows two issues which beset the three parties. The first relates to Islamist parties – the IAF – and other political forces’ continuing doubts about their practical credibility and their constant demands for Islamists (rather than anyone else) to provide guarantees that they will respect general rights. The other is a problem affecting all Jordanian parties: the general political climate in Jordan, which prevents their participation and seeks to divide and weaken them politically. The real-life political behavior
of these parties is the only means by which it is possible for us to know the extent of their commitment to their political rhetoric affirming their respect for rights and their acceptance of majority opinion. It is also the only way for them to refine both their ideology and their praxis.
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
CHAPTER EIGHT

Causes of Change and Transformation

The youth and leadership of the three parties have undergone organizational circumstances and personal transformations. This process has solidified the ideological shifts that led to the establishment of the Zamzam Party and the Partnership and Rescue Party, as well as the licensing of the Muslim Brotherhood Society registration, and to many revisions within the parent organization. In previous chapters, we discussed the most prominent milestones of these transitions regarding the civil state, the separation of da’wa from politics, and public and minority rights. We also examined the most important relevant problems, such as designating the Islamic point of reference, the relationship between the civil and Islamic state, and “supra-constitutional” principles.

These intellectual changes were shaped by an overlapping set of factors in which organizational and personal factors intersect in a way that makes it difficult to define the boundaries between them. In this chapter we shall attempt to offer a comprehensive view of the causes behind these intellectual changes, allowing the reader to evaluate the depth of these shifts and form a general view of the trends among today’s Islamic youth based on the reasons offered by the youth
who participated in the study to explain the reasons for their own intellectual changes.

**The Brotherhood’s Internal Crises and Organizational Rigidity**

Successive crises within the parent organization had a major impact on the emergence of new convictions. These crises prompted detailed questions which required a clear intellectual foundation and framework as well as scope for amendment, review, and flexibility within the parent organization which had not been available in recent years, as we detailed in Chapters Two and Three of this book.

One of the most important discussions within the parent organization was about constitutional monarchy, which was first proposed in 2007 and emerged more prominently onto the scene in 2010. A member of the Partnership and Rescue Party said that these discussions had an impact on the crystallization of his view that throughout its long history, the Islamic state had lacked constitutionality. He developed the conviction that constitutionality had been preferable to the caliphate over the last thousand years of the latter’s history, as freedoms, institutions, and alliances could ensure Islamic unity through a civil state.\(^{(212)}\)

At the leadership level, Bani Irsheid — whose positions underwent a major shift— also announced that the debates within the party had influenced the development of his convictions. For example, when the Russian ambassador was in-

---

\(^{(212)}\) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with group of Partnership and Rescue Party members, 10-1-2018.
vited to an *iftar* celebration in 2017, a major controversy broke out due to objections within the party and the movement. For him, this had been an application to the new orientation at the parent organization to open up to all political forces. These debates changed his positions, which subsequently crystallized in prison, where he had sufficient time to consider these matters.

The organizational rigidity within the group and within the Islamic Action Front party narrowed the horizons for reform and for putting forward different ideas. Mohamed Hassan Thneibat notes: “The most important key to understanding the Brotherhood is that they are a group governed by organizational decision-making and not an intellectual framework” and that they will accept any intellectual proposal as long as it does not have political implications. For instance, the Brotherhood includes those who are Sufi, Mu’tazili, and Salafi and others from the across the ideological spectrum, and while there are attempts to accept this ideological diversity, the Brotherhood will not tolerate straying from organizational decisions, such as participating in elections without their approval, he says.

In this respect, Salem al-Falahat points to the overall paucity of thinkers in our society, and the fact that, if one does emerge, he is removed or challenged at the first signs of proposing an intellectual shift or new ideas. This, he says, is what has limited the capacity for change within Islamic movements in the past, as the focus has always been on the

---

(213) “Jordan Brotherhood and invitation for all ambassadors to Ramadan banquet, except America, Iran, Syria and Israel,” *Rai al-Youm*, 13/6/2017, at the following link: http://www.raitlyoum.com/?p=691969

(214) Interview with Zaki Bani Irsheid, 7-1-2018

(215) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with members of National Congress Party-Zamzam, 17-1-2018
principles of “hear and obey,” restricting the intellectual space for members.\(^{(216)}\)

He also points to the organizational concerns that emerge when new views are put forward. When any view that differs with the organization’s is proposed, the one who proposed the view is asked what they have offered organizationally — how many marches they have organized, how many participants there were, and so on. The group’s preoccupation with organizational practicalities has made it harder to give space for new ideas, as the one putting them forward will be end up feeling like he is in the minority within the organization, compared to what others have proposed.\(^{(217)}\)

**Contradictions of Identity**

The Brotherhood’s internal crises had the largest impact on the youth who later joined Zamzam, as the internal crises made prominent the issue of national identity among these youth — a problem exacerbated by the Brotherhood’s organizational rigidity. As a former Brotherhood member explains, the dispute within the Brotherhood was, in his view, the result of the fact that there were two currents within the movement:

“One current was reconciled with its society — pragmatic, calling for pluralism, democracy, and acceptance of others. It was represented at the time by Salem al-Falahat, Hassan Thneibat, Nabib al-Kofahl, and Ahmed al-Kafwain. The other was ideologically rigid, based on a belief in society’s ignorance. This current attempted to remove the group from society to preserve the group in

\(^{(216)}\) Salem al-Falahat, Focus Group Discussion with group of Partnership and Rescue Party, 10-1-2018, and Interview with Salem al-Falahat, 7-1-2018.

isolation. It did not reconcile between its intellectual theories and its actual practices in Jordan. (218)

The national question emerged within the two camps’ disputes, as we explained in Chapter Two, and these disputes impacted some young members. Ahmed al-Akayleh (a 29-year-old civil engineer from al-Tafila) said that these questions influenced his thinking and pushed him to join Zamzam:

“The year 2010 was a decisive year for the Jordanian state in terms of the failure of the neoliberal project and the ascent of the Jordan 36 Movement and the retired military officers movement, as well as the attempts at reform within the Brotherhood led by Rahil Gharibeh and Salem al-Falahat … In 2010 it occurred to me to ask whether I was Tafili (someone from Tafileh) or ‘a Muslim Brother … We discovered that what we had been brought up in the organization as members of the Muslim ummah moving us away from our immediate Jordanian society. The question around my identity was very deep and pushed me to rethink the ideas I had believed in, such as the caliphate and so on.” (219)

These questions emerged for other youth members as well. Mohamed Ta’amneh (26-year-old computer engineer from Irbid) said:

“I studied in an Islamic school and came from a Brotherhood family, and I lived with intellectual contradictions. I was a member of a tribe, come from a village, and also had an enormous sense of nationalism, as is the case for village residents. At the same time, I experienced bitter contradictions when I was in a Brotherhood’s Islamic school. I was active at the school radio, and I remember once I wanted to talk about the Battle of Karameh, but I felt that the teachers disliked my choice — especially the teachers originally from West Jordan. I was surprised by that … I felt that the Brotherhood movement does not represent me in national

(219) Ibid.
terms. I stayed with the Brotherhood for two years (1997-1998) and then left. From 1999 until I joined Zamzam, I did not have political membership in any group.”

The experience of Alaa al-Froukh, a 33-year-old psychologist from Madaba, overlapped with those of his colleagues. He said that he entered the Brotherhood because of his religious convictions, but that he felt that his devotion and understanding of the religion contradicted with his roots in his village, where he was a member of a tribe with Jordanian nationality. He tells how he felt disappointed when he asked one of the Brotherhood leaders about the ambitions of their project in Jordan. The answer he received was that the Brotherhood did not have a political project in Jordan and that they were awaiting the establishment of a greater regional state establishing an Islamic caliphate to join. His sense of internal contradiction deepened.

Mohamed Hassan Thneibat summarized all this when he said that he left the Brotherhood without immediately joining Zamzam and that when he did later join Zamzam he did so as a result of his conviction that:

“The intransigence within the Brotherhood was not intellectual, but to cover up its political position toward the Jordanian state itself … For example, they do not object to the Tunisiafication of Tunisia or Egyptification of Egypt, but were sensitive to calls to focus on Jordanian national identity, and expressed that through organizational rigidity.”

Mohamed Ta’amneh, Focus Group Discussion with members of National Congress Party-Zamzam, 17-1-2018.


Ibid.

Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with members of National Congress Party-Zamzam, 17-1-2018.
These testimonies, from four Zamzam members, bolster the idea that the Jordanian national question dominated the contradictions which they felt, and which pushed them to leave the Muslim Brotherhood parent organization. These contradictions had emerged even before the crises flared up within the Brotherhood between the reformist movement and its opponents, as we have detailed in the previous chapters. However, these crises further escalated the severity of the contradictions which these young men experienced and later pushed them to prioritize political efforts which put forward the national question without contradicting, in their view, their Islamic religious identity.

Al-Froukh also offered an analysis of the general political situation before Zamzam’s establishment, explaining Zamzam’s allure. In Jordan there were Islamist movements that had been in conflict with nationalist identity, nationalist movements in conflict with Islam, as well as those who practiced opposition for its own sake and movements that defended the state while overlooking its errors (the so-called “saheija”). The young people who felt alienated and conflicted in their identities within the Brotherhood wanted to reconcile their national and Islamist identities while simultaneously defending the rights of the Palestinian people. (224)

Ahmed al-Akayleh tells how a group of Brotherhood youth met in 2009 and discussed these concerns. These young people were those who later accelerated the launch of the Zamzam initiative. Out of the 12 people who wrote the initiative’s first paper, seven of them were young people — and three were Ahmed al-Akayleh, Alaa al-Froukh, and Mo-

---

hamed Ta’amneh. And thus, in their view, there emerged onto the scene a political entity that reconciled their national and Islamist identities and was also committed to defending the rights of the Palestinian people, thereby resolving the “major psychological problems surrounding the pressures of identity.”

Al-Froukh explains this situation from a psychosocial perspective. He says it is also fair to point out that a sense of national belonging had not been made easy for Jordan’s Brotherhood because of the state’s political pressure and harassment, which pushed individuals to resort to an overarching Islamic identity. Conscious of the contradiction between national and Islamic identities inside the Brotherhood, “he and his colleagues endured a state of intellectual confusion which pushed them to read and to start searching for a group to join. Humans, by their psychological nature, need to belong to a group. They therefore took refuge in Jordanian national identity which could give people their cover.”

Social psychology confirms this view. Humans search for a group to belong to that will give them a role and

(225) Ahmed al-Akayleh, Focus Group Discussion with members of National Congress Party-Zamzam, 17-1-2018. It should be noted that the youth members have a strong and competitive presence within the Zamzam party. The youth members enjoy full membership and are not integrated under a youth council or youth sector, as is the case for the Islamic Action Front party, for example. Youth members competed for the position of deputy secretary-general of the party against leadership figures. There are 15 youth members present as elected members in the party’s shura council.

(226) Ibid.


(228) Ibid.

Causes of Change and Transformation

a place in life and in their communities and which will make them proud to belong to and defend. Individuals generally try to change the group they belong to when this group fails to meet the individuals’ identity needs and to make the individual proud of belonging to this group. They then join others, which is what seems to have been the case for the group of young people who joined Zamzam.

Self-Education and Exposure to New Ideas

Throughout the Arab Spring and its aftermath, some Brotherhood youth developed an educational program, according to Partnership and Rescue members. They had previously read about Hakimiyyah, Asha’arism, and Salafism. Now they began looking at the blogs of Brotherhood’s youth in Egypt and became familiar with al-Qaradawi’s view that freedom takes priority over Shari’a. They looked into the books of Saadeddine Othmani in Morocco about separating the Prophet’s role as prophet from his political role in reading the Prophet’s biography. They also read Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Burhan Ghalioun, Muhammad Mukhtar al-Shanqiti, and others who criticized the mentality of Arabs and the Muslim Brotherhood and put forward ideas which were completely different than those the Brotherhood youth had been accustomed to in their educational circles.\(^{(230)}\)

Salem al-Falahat, who was responsible for the educational unit in the Brotherhood, said his views were also influenced by the books of al-Shanqiti, Abdel Wahab el-Messiri,

\(^{(230)}\) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with group of Partnership and Rescue Party members, 10-1-2018.
Mohammed al-Hamouri, Jassim Sultan, and others who criticized the Brotherhood. He began to reconsider this critical literature — which does not appeal to Muslim Brotherhood members in general — after he was advised to read not as a Muslim Brother but as a neutral reader. This influenced his views and his ideological shifts. (231) Similarly, Bani Irsheid’s participation in the Kuala Lumpur cultural forum around the civil state had a major impact on the emergence of his new convictions. (232)

For the Zamzam youth, their identity contradictions, and the search for answers to their questions motivated them to find readings different from those offered by Jordan’s Brotherhood. For example, Alaa al-Froukh points to being influenced by Hassan al-Turabi’s proposal of a nation-state in Islam. This led him to question the organization’s refusal in Jordan to put forward proposals touching on Jordanian national identity. (233)

Ahmed al-Akayleh, who was also preoccupied by the identity question, began reading Islamic thought across its various spectrums, from al-Maqdisi to Taha Abdurrahman to Ahmad Abizeid. He was also influenced by Muhammad Amara’s Islam and Human Rights: Requisite Necessities Rather Than Mere Rights. He arrived at the conviction that Islam could be a primary motivator for discussing rights issues, and that this need not be limited to secularism and liberalism. (234)

(231) Interview with Salem al-Falahat, 7-1-2018.
(232) Interview with Zaki Bani Irsheid, 7-1-2018.
Nahed Hattar — a Jordanian Christian leftist and journalist assassinated in 2016 because of republishing of a cartoon some considered insulting to Islam — had been a common factor between two Zamzam members attracted to his ideas. (235) One says: “The death that most affected me was Nahed Hattar’s. I disagreed with him daily because of the radical Jordanian nationalist view he represented, but he influenced me greatly.” (236) Mohamed Ta’amneh, who had felt alienated from the Brotherhood because of concerns about national identity, was also influenced by Nahed Hattar. But he also admits that Hattar’s ideas and colleagues also made him feel alienated because of their animosity towards religion and that religion is antithetical to patriotism. He therefore went from one form of alienation to another until he joined Zamzam, which brought together his Jordanian national identity and Islamic identity. (237)

Mohamed Hassan Thneibat objected to the multiplicity of readings. He believes that a large part of the discussion after the Arab Spring had strayed from the real question, and turned to critical and philosophical interpretations away from the practical challenges like the difficult economic conditions, which dominate Jordanians’ concerns. He nevertheless recognizes the benefit from exposure to new experiences and new intellectual perspectives to gain maturity. (238)

The Islamic Action Front party youth, when asked about the factors which led to changes or development in their ideas, did not at first point to any theories or writings that had impacted their convictions toward accepting a civilian state and separating da’wa and politics. Firas Qattan, a 27-year-old manager from Marka, merely pointed to their being informed of various ideas and models so as not to become indoctrinated within the party and group circles, and were then exposed to tools of political analysis and various experiences to create a balance among them. (239)

Amr Mansour pointed to an important factor which confirms the importance of dependency within the party. Among the factors of change which he mentioned was the maturity and changes in the convictions of their sheikhs and leaders, which also affected the youth (240) — a reference, although indirect, to the limited intellectual independence of young people inside the party and their ability to put forward proposals that differ from the general views within the party. We noted this previously with the testimony of Salem al-Falahat about the principle of “hear and obey” and the educational unit.

However, when asked specifically about their readings, some of them appeared convinced that there was no need to change the political ideas of the Brotherhood, and that their failures had been due to political practices and misjudgment of political positions — that is, their failures were tactical and not intellectual. They did not see it as necessary to reform,

(239) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 13-1-2018.
(240) Amr Mansour, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 13-1-2018.
Causes of Change and Transformation

amend, or revise these ideas. (241) This view contrasts strongly with that of the members of Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue, who left the Brotherhood movement due to its intellectual rigidity and weak intellectual and political reconsiderations. One was even convinced of the Brotherhood’s failure today while acknowledging and being grateful for their major role in previous decades. (242)

However, Firas Qattan (from the Islamic Action Front) believes that the writings they read have become more varied recently and they have become exposed to writings outside the Brotherhood’s intellectual framework. (243) For example, they read Muhammad Mukhtar al-Shanqiti, Mohammad Salim al-Awa, and development texts regardless of the author. They also read the biography of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Mahathir Mohamed’s book (A Doctor in the House), and Hitler’s Mein Kampf (244) But compared to others, it seems clear that the youth of Partnership and Rescue, for example, are better informed and more intellectually solid in explaining their intellectual and political views.

Members of the Islamic Action Front party objected to the formulation of the question around changes in their views, as they believe that their intellectual basis has not changed. They asserted that they may be more mature today after accumulated experiences, but their underlying principles

(241) Mohamed Bassam, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
(243) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
(244) Mu'tazz al-Hrout and Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
The pressing need today for them was merely to develop their rhetoric in an attractive and interactive manner to present their ideas through a political program to address economic and social problems. This should be achieved not only through political literature, but also through social media in language easy for society to understand. (246)

With regards to the role of new media, some Brotherhood youth follow “al-Rabi’ al-Awwal,” presented by Wadah Khanfar on YouTube, for example. This is an opportunity to be exposed to new ideas in a new style. This method might not shape new ideas, according to Mohamed Bassam, but it expands the horizons of their knowledge, especially since not everyone is interested in reading. (247)

Foreign Experiences, Both Successes and Failures

It is known that the Arab Spring had a major impact on the Muslim Brotherhood in general, and that the Egyptian experience was a major shock to Brotherhood youth in the Arab region. (248) A question emerged afterward: Would the Brotherhood youth disavow democracy?

This question emerged due to evidence some Brotherhood youth were defecting from the organization and resorting to joining extremist groups or to complete political with-

(245) Mohamed Bassam and Mu’tazz al-Hrout, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
(246) Riyadh al-Sunaid, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
(247) Mohamed Bassam, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
In light of the other experiences in the region of Islamist parties, both successes and failures, questions emerged about the long and medium term impact of the Egyptian Brotherhood experience on the movement’s youth in the region generally, coinciding with the ascension of extremist armed groups in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

Murad al-Adaileh, Secretary of the Islamic Action Front party, believes that such a shock did not occur among Brotherhood youth in Jordan and cites the fact that the Brotherhood was eager to participate in the 2016 parliamentary elections and 2017 local elections. He also says that the Jordanian environment and the Brotherhood’s efforts to adhere to its commitment in calling for reform only have protected Jordan’s Brotherhood from the consequences of this shock.

However, the party youth have a different view. They acknowledge that they were shocked, but argue that events caused a general sense of frustration among everyone in the region and that they are part of the region and were affected by this general mood. Therefore, their frustration and shock at that time could not be taken as if it were an exception. Firas Qattan believes that the retreat from democracy was a natural reaction and lasted for two or three years only, and that the situation cannot be exaggerated. He noted that those Islamists who joined extremist movements were mostly from


(250) Interview with Murad al-Adaileh, 7-1-2018.
(251) Mohamed Bassam, Focus Group Discussion with youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
the Salafi-Wahhabi movement and not from the Brotherhood, in his opinion.\(^{(252)}\)

This shock has led to maturity in the youth’s political ideas, because it woke them up from their romantic visions of democracy and began to confront them with practical challenges as the Brotherhood took power in Egypt.\(^{(253)}\) The shock led them to reposition themselves politically as this “stage of loss and dispersion” led to a reconsideration of the changes in the region and analysis of the map of alliances, and pushed the Brotherhood to alter its tools and methods.\(^{(254)}\)

Leaving aside this specific question and examining the impact of other experiences, we find that the youth of the three parties cite Islamist experiences throughout the region. The Moroccan experience had the biggest impact in establishing the convictions of the Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue youth regarding the separation of \textit{da’wa} from politics,\(^{(255)}\) as well as their teaching them that political action requires a realistic political program based on serving citizens and not opposition for its own sake.\(^{(256)}\) Here, the experience of the Ennahda Party and its allies and the way they dealt with the adoption of the provisions of the Tunisian constitution in 2014 expanded their perceptions about the importance of alliances with other forces and offering concessions. They likewise benefited from the experience of the Turkish Justice

---

\(^{(252)}\) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.

\(^{(253)}\) Mohamed Bassam, Focus Group Discussion with youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.

\(^{(254)}\) Firas Qattan, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.

\(^{(255)}\) Mohamed Hassan Thneibat, Focus Group Discussion with group of Partnership and Rescue Party members, 10-1-2018.

\(^{(256)}\) Hamza Yassin, Focus Group Discussion with group of Partnership and Rescue Party members, 10-1-2018.
and Development Party and its successes in introducing a civil political discourse within the state’s secular framework in Turkey.

The failed experiences also had a role in developing their ideas. For example — in contrast to the Egyptian example which is always put forward — the Brotherhood youth who later joined the Partnership and Rescue party studied the experience of Abbassi Madani in Algeria, who dominated the political scene and “harvested the fruit and fed it to Algerians while it was unripe and pulled Algeria into a bitterness that continues today in Algerian society,” according to Alaa al-Qudah.  

Likewise, the Sudanese experience made it clear to some that what was important was not reaching power but how to establish what came after reaching power.

Members of the youth segment in the Islamic Action Front focused on the Egyptian experience, which made it clear to them that political access did not necessarily mean political empowerment. It also gave them a realistic image of the need for political alliances based on concessions and common interests and persuaded them that “as Islamists, we are not able to solve [the problems] alone. My hand needs the hand of others, and my shoulder their shoulders. Alone we are not able to change.”

(257) Alaa al-Qudah, Focus Group Discussion with group of Partnership and Rescue Party members, 10-1-2018.
(258) Ibid.
(259) Amr Mansour, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 13-1-2018.
The Popular Movement and Rapprochement with Non-Islamists

Some former Brotherhood youth and leaders said that they had been in a closed environment, belonging to their Brotherhood families, or their narrow circles, and that most of their social and historical knowledge was limited to Brotherhood interpretations. However, the Jordanian movement in 2011-2013 clarified to them the common ground they share with a number of Jordanian movements. They found that their demands for social justice and reform of the system accorded with those of many members of other parties and movements. At the same time, they realized that some of their fellow Muslim Brothers did not join them in protests that demanded reforms. This persuaded them that they –as Islamists- did not monopolize the call for values of justice and that they were in proximity to others — even if differences emerged among them later around the war in Syria.

At the leadership level, they also had experience with other forces which broke their isolation and made clear their agreements with these other forces. In this framework, Zaki Bani Irsheid points to the Brotherhood-Christian dialogue meetings currently underway. Before that, Salemal-Falahat had other meetings with Christian religious leaders that influenced the expansion of his views around cooperation with non-Islamists. Then came Falahat’s participation in the Freedom Flotilla in 2010, where he found people from

(261) Interview with Salem al-Falahat, 7-1-2018, Hamza Yassin, Focus Group Discussion with a group of Partnership and Rescue Party members, 10-1-2018.


(263) Interview with Zaki Bani Irsheid, 7-1-2018.
totally different social and political backgrounds expressing their solidarity with the children of Gaza, including ordinary people as well as foreign politicians. This increased his conviction that humanitarian values transcend party vision since “good is not limited to one party.”

Accumulation of Practical Experience

Amr Mansour (a twenty-seven year old engineer and a member of the Action Front Party) stressed the importance of practical experiences, which had influenced changes in individual convictions and refined their expertise more than theoretical readings of others’ experiences. For instance, he found during his leadership of student activities at one university that only 60 percent of his preparations for events materialized, whereas 40 percent were urgent and unexpected needs and practical necessity.

Other colleagues said that knowledge was by nature cumulative. They pointed to a grievance usually faced by Islamists, which is that the balance of their previous experiences is always taken against them. If they had failed in the past, they must bear the burden of the failure permanently, while if they transform some of their convictions and rhetoric, they are blamed for giving up their principles and disowning their former Islamic convictions. These views reflect the overall premise which the youth of the Islamic Action Front take in expressing their views, as they usually adopt a

(264) Interview with Salem al-Falahat, 7-1-2018.
(265) Amr Mansour, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 13-1-2018.
(266) Several views, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 13-1-2018.
defensive stance to ward off the accusations that are usually directed toward Islamists.

In the Arab political context, dictatorial regimes have prevented the refinement of the experiences of Islamists and others, as we previously noted, because they have limited the development of political thought for all parties. Mu'tazz al-Hrout for example believes that Islamic personal jurisprudence has developed throughout the ages through new fatwas, while the forces of political Islam, who remained out of power for years, did not develop in their conception of the form and practices of governance until the moment the Arab Spring arrived. Although the Brotherhood youth were impacted by the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Moroccan experiences, they have not yet reached a complete vision around the form of governance within Islam because of limited practical experience.\(^{(267)}\)

**Conclusion**

This chapter addresses six factors which clarify the reasons for the change and development of the ideas of the youth of the Zamzam, Partnership and Rescue, and Islamic Action Front parties. These factors varied in their impact on the youth members between the parties and in terms of the depth of their influence on some over others within a single party.

The impact of the Brotherhood’s internal crises and their organizational rigidity was limited to the Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue Party youth because it gave rise to many questions that pushed them in the end to leave the organization, in the case of Zamzam, or to join the Partnership

\(^{(267)}\) Mu'tazz al-Hrout, Focus Group Discussion with members of youth sector in Islamic Action Front party, 18-1-2018.
and RescueParty. The Islamic Action Front youth seemed indifferent to the internal debates or were not sufficiently familiar with aspects of these debates and their intellectual or practical implications.

Preoccupation with the Jordanian national question was more influential on Zamzam members than others. Their case shows the depth of the identity questions which led to their decision to leave the Brotherhood. They experienced contradictions of identity and wrestled with them before finding their place in Zamzam, which brought together their political and national identities. They were joined by that at a less clear and less explicit level by members of the Partnership and Rescue party.

The national identity question among these young people is inseparable from two variables. The first variable is related to the internal Jordanian discussions and debates around this issue in light of the country’s demographic binary (those who are originally from East Jordan and Jordanian Palestinians). This is a complex binary related to a historical formula that has passed through stages, from the unity of the two banks, which gave citizenship to Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and then the decision to break ties in 1988, and subsequently the formation of the Palestinian Authority in the Occupied Territories. These domestic and regional changes and developments made the question of Jordanian national identity controversial, ambiguous, and based upon outstanding questions.

The second variable relates to the nature of the social structure within the Muslim Brotherhood organization itself. It is predominantly Jordanian-Palestinian, which has become clearer since the 1990s. The organization has seemed, to po-
political and official circles, as if it is a primary representative for Jordanians of Palestinian origin, in contrast to the institutions of the sovereign state, which have seemed to represent East Jordanians. The political binary in the country (the state and the organization) has paralleled the internal organizational binary and pushed the organization to focus on slogans related to the Palestinian issue and to consider this to be a priority, with Hamas having influence at this level since the 1990s.

All of this has influenced the sense among a large portion of East Jordanian youth in the organization that they are a foreign body within it — the national identity question. For the state, they are members of an opposition group that is majority Jordanian-Palestinian. This crisis may extend to their communities as the group’s influence and presence increasingly declines in the Jordanian provinces and is concentrated among Jordanians of Palestinian origin, especially in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid.

The Brotherhood’s presence in Irbid (in East Jordanian circles) is still notable even after its decline in other provinces. However, internal disputes in recent years, especially in the period after the Arab popular revolutions of 2011) has strengthened the disputes within the province itself and pushed a large portion toward the licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society and to the Zamzam party, in which we find a large force of the province’s residents. This fact can be explained in light of the growing internal identity crisis in the group.

Participation in the Jordanian movement likewise gave rise to new convictions among members of the Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue parties that the fellow-national Other
Causes of Change and Transformation

may be closer to them than some Brotherhood members. After their isolation in Jordan, they came to be aware of shared commonalities with leftist and Christian nationalist forces in making political and rights-related demands, and they were further persuaded by joint action.

The practical experiences of the Islamic Action Front deepened convictions about the importance of such practices in refining skills and developing practical experiences. They of course enjoyed a longer history of practical experience and of developing their capabilities in organizations, unions, and parliament. They were therefore better able to discuss the influence of practical experience than those of the other two parties.

Other than these factors, youth members of the three parties shared two other factors, but to varying degrees. For example, the influence of different interpretations on changing convictions was most clear among Partnership and Rescue youth and this was reflected in their ability to formulate their convictions more informatively and persuasively during discussions around the various subjects of this book. It is also important to note that some members of Zamzam were influenced by their Jordanian intellectual opponent Nahed Hattar in particular.

All youth were influenced by the experiences of political Islam and post-political Islam in the Arab region. The Moroccan experience was clearly influential in separating da'wa from politics, in particular on members of Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue. The depth of the impact of the Egyptian experience on Islamic Action Front youth was also clear. It was notable that some members of the Partnership and Rescue party also made use of the Algerian and Sudanese
experiences in expanding their perceptions around the differences between political access and political empowerment.

Overall, the testimonies and views addressed in this chapter indicate the depth of influence of these various factors on Islamic youth and their interrelations. Of course, personal, psychological, and individual difference had a major role in the depth of one factor over another. Differences of experience within the Brotherhood and personal efforts in searching for solutions to basic questions also had a role in the differing impacts of these factors among the three parties’ members and leaders.

However, the observer of these cases will note a deep and serious change among some youth members in contrast to the uncompleted foundations of transformations of some others. The observer will also note a great intellectual rigidity in opening up to these questions and their practical implications among another segment of these youth. However, the discussion here has clarified the interlocking and overlapping factors inducing intellectual and behavioral change among Islamic youth of the three parties.
Conclusion

The binary of continuity and change is the basis for understanding developments among political groups in general. It is also an important gateway to understanding the changes which political Islamist organizations are undergoing — whether they are those that have stuck to their ideological frameworks or those which have headed either steadily or hesitantly toward post-Islamism. Thus, it is important to study the aspects of change and stability in the political ideas and practices of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood. The changes in the ideas of Brotherhood youth discussed in this book are the most important indicator of this.

Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood has a large political and public presence compared with other political forces. However, it has also undergone a number of changes governed by Jordan’s political context, regional conditions, the group’s internal transformations, and the intellectual debates which have led to an internal alignment among members into moderate and hardline camps.

The arrival of the Arab Spring pushed questions of reform powerfully into the political discourse and raised the upper limit of the reforms demanded in Jordan. However, the biggest impact came from the regional experiences of political Islam, with the successes of the Turkish, Moroccan, and
Tunisian experiences as well as the failure of the Egyptian experience leading to substantial internal reviews of issues such as the Jordanian national question, the rule of law, political participation, and the separation of da‘wa from politics.

The Arab Spring, with its failures and successes, was a major jolt to Brotherhood members — specifically youth members, but also some leaders, especially from the moderate camp — and raised substantial questions about the Brotherhood’s political ambitions, as well as its relations with the Egyptian organization, its political participation with other Jordanian forms, and the closing of the prospects for political reform within the Brotherhood.

At this time, the Brotherhood’s political and intellectual environment pushed youth members to search for other political means and entities that adopted the political concepts that represented them, in terms of rule of law, political participation and democracy. Rhetorically, the political expression of these ideas came through expressions of the civil state, separating da‘wa from political, and public rights and the rights of minorities.

Although the manifestations of these concepts and their practical applications are still hazy — following first from the haziness of the concepts and second from the narrow horizon for political practice for Jordanian parties — the political rhetoric and ideas of the Islamic youth in the three parties shows the depth of the changes which have affected their views.

The book discusses modes of change in the ideas of current or former Muslim Brotherhood youth who represent three intellectually diverse entities: The Islamic Action Front party, the National Congress Party-Zamzam, and the Partner-
ship and Rescue Party. The first of these represents the parties of political Islam and the other two represent the parties of post-political Islam.

A comparison of the ideas of the youth members and their leaders in the three parties demonstrates the degree to which internal Brotherhood crises influenced the emergence of the national and reformist preoccupations. Those at the Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue parties were critical, while members of the Islamic Action Front party appeared isolated from or oblivious to the depth of these internal crises and remained steadfastly committed to the Brotherhood’s political thought. In contrast, the other youth tended to be critical of the Brotherhood’s organizational closure and the limited intellectual diversity of what they studied inside the group.

The depth of the influence of the Moroccan experience was also apparent with regard to the separation of da’wa from politics among leaders and youth members alike, albeit with practical differences. Members of the Islamic Action Front in general emphasized the nature of functional separation solely for the purpose of institutional empowerment. Members of the Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue parties meanwhile believed in the need for a separation whereby parties take on a purely political role far from da’wa work. The Egyptian experience expanded the scope of political awareness among everyone with regard to political participation and the importance of political empowerment versus political access. Questions related to the failure of the Brotherhood pushed Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue members specifically toward new readings, stemming from diverse intellectual sources which then pushed them toward abandoning the Brotherhood’s ideas.
The impacts of these changes cannot in any case be exaggerated. Concepts connected with these changes, especially the concept of the civil state, are still hazy for everyone, and there are real fears that the designation could be exploited politically in a way that serves foreign agendas and marginalizes the Jordanian national question. The debate around the separation of religious and political outreach has also not left the realm of theory for members of Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue, since they are purely political parties. The major share of this dilemma goes to the Islamic Action Front, whose roles and responsibilities overlap with the parent organization. Its members and leaders are today obligated to implement and detail their views in practice, a point they have not yet reached.

Two important yet unstudied constraints remain for the future of the Jordanian Brotherhood and its relations with the post-political Islam parties. These are the demographic factor and the role of the hardline camp inside the Brotherhood. In terms of demographics, the “East Jordanian” identity dominated the moderate camp that left the parent organization and the Action Front party, where “West Jordanian” identity predominates. This means that the positioning of the organization and the party today will depend on their ability to represent all Jordanians or to emerge as a voice for Jordanians of Palestinian origin specifically. This would lose them — that is, the parent organization and the Islamic Action party — the Islamic identity upon which political Islam parties are based.

With regards to the hardline camp, as we have said, successive defections within the Brotherhood have led to the reformist camp’s departure. This will impact the new parties’ relations with the Islamic Action Front party as a political
competitor and could also lead to new changes inside the Brotherhood, whereby the review of the separation of *da’wa* from politics and relations with the state leads to the emergence of a new internal movement that changes the structure of the group’s relations with other political forces.

Questions about the future of the post-political Islam parties, their relationship with the state, and their political competition with one another and with the Islamic Action Front party remain dependent on the development of the general Jordanian political context and the expansion of the rate of reform inside the parent organization and its relationship with the Islamic Action Front party.

As for the Islamic youth in these three parties, some of them have overcome substantial intellectual dilemmas, while others are still governed by their Brotherhood background despite the clear contrast in the stances and ideas among the youth of the three parties. However, we must also acknowledge the individual differences within a single party in terms of the depth of the impact of political and practical experiences on the development of political convictions. But the changes which they have undergone have clearly and singularly worked toward changing their ideas about the Islamic state, the Islamic point of reference, public rights, and political relations with the Other.
From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
Bibliography

Arabic Sources


“Jordan Brotherhood and invitation for all ambassadors to Ramadan banquet, except America, Iran, Syria and Israel,” Rai al-Youm, 13/6/2017, at the following link: http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=691969

“Brotherhood announce beginning of legal and judicial battle,” Saraya News, 7/26/2015, at the following link: http://www.sarayanews.com/article/318822

“Irbid the most dangerous note for the reality of the Brotherhood, 50 meeting details, and warning of schism,” Shabab News, 5/8/2014, at the following link: http://shaabnews.com/news-37172.htm

“Jordan: Muslim Brotherhood investments are in the names of individuals and cannot be inherited by dissidents, ownership reverts to the members of charitable organizations and not to the organization,” Rai Al-Youm, 3/9/2015, at the following link: http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=232876.


Aron Lund, “Struggling to Adapt: The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria”, Carnegie Middle East Center, 7/5/2015, at the following link: https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/07/struggling-to-adapt-muslim-brotherhood-in-new-syria-pub-51723

“Reform Announces the Number of Seats that It Won,” Assabeel Newspaper, 16/8/2017


“Brotherhood Society’ forms internal committee to monitor ongoing ‘Brotherhood’ litigation,” Saraya News, 7/28/2015, at the following link: http://www.sarayanews.com/article/319010


Jihad Husni, “Signs Of ‘Disagreements’ In the House of The Jordanian Brotherhood: Sheikh Hammam Saeed Opposes His Deputy Bani Irsheid on ‘Non-Objection to the Civil State’ and Doubts about the Feelings of the Base on Dialogue with Secularists,” Al Ra’i Al Youm online, 8/10/2016, at the follow link: http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=537364


“Jordan Rules to Jail Bani Irsheid for 18 Months with Labor,” Al Jazeera Net, 15/2/2015.


“Legislative Office rules to transfer the property of the ‘Brotherhood’ in Jordan to the ‘authorized society,’” the ‘organization’ rejects the opinion as political and illegal,” Asharq Al-Awsat, London, 5/29/2015.
Dr. Rahil Gharibeh, “Developments in the Domestic Scene of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan,” papers of the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Volume 1, August 2017.
Dr. Rahil Gharibeh, Political Rights and Freedoms in the Shari’a (Arabiy Research and Study Network, Beirut, 1st Ed, 2012
The Vision of the Islamic Movement for Reform, Society of the Muslim Brothers, 2005.
Essam Abdel Shafi, The Inevitability of Change Within the “Muslim Brotherhood,” The New Arab, January 27, 2015, at: https://goo.gl/FvpFGH
Faisal Malkawi and Salah al-Abadi, “Muslim Brotherhood, we renew our call to come to a common word,” Alrai, 4/13/2017.
Group of scholars, Towards A Scientific Reading of Dr. Saadeddine Othmani’s “The Civil State in the Shadow of the Maqasid Of the Shari’a, Believers Without Borders, Rabat, Morocco, 9/10/2015.
Muhammad Abu Rumman, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Crisis in Jordan: The End of the Circular Conflict and the Start of the Political Game.” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 16/6/2016, at the following link: http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2016/06/160615121453136.html
Muhammad Abu Rumman, Salafists And The Arab Spring, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2e., 2014.
Muhammad Abu Rumman, “Bani Irsheid’s Fatwa”, Al-Ghad, 10/10/2016.
Mohammad Khair Al-Rawashdeh. “Arabiyat: The Minister of Education Came to My Home and Informed Me that I would be Forced to Retire,” the Jordanian daily newspaper Al-Ghad, the “A Politician Remembers” series, 20/12/2016.
Mohammed al-Najjar, “The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood Discuss the Constitutional Monarchy,” Al Jazeera.net, 6/12/2010, at the following link: https://goo.gl/JZ9L1U


King Abdullah II bin Hussein, “Discussion Paper 6 (The Rule of Law is the Basis of the Civil State),” on kingabdullah.jo, 16/10/2016 https://goo.gl/G8WbDo


Hadeel Ghabboun, “Islamic work preserves the concept of civil state,” Al Ghad, 8/1/2017.

Hadeel Ghabboun, “Al-Gharaibeh: Zamzam is not the political arm of anyone,” Al-Ghad, 9/2/2016.


Hadeel Ghabboun and Nusour, “Jordan is a Civil State, Neither Secular nor Religious,” Al Ghad, 14/02/2015


English Sources


From Caliphate to Civil State: The Young Face of Political Islam in Jordan after the Arab Spring
The Arabic Spring, with both its successes and failures, has had a profound impact on young members of the Muslim Brotherhood and some of its leaders as well – especially those belonging to the moderate camp. It has pushed to the forefront fundamental questions on the Brotherhood’s political ambitions, their relationship with the organization in Egypt, their political participation with other forces in Jordan, and the closing off of prospects for political reform from the inside of the organization.

At this juncture, the political and intellectual context of the Brotherhood drove its young members to explore other political approaches and entities that adopt political concepts that represent them, such as sovereignty of the law and political and democratic participation. On the level of discourse, the political expression of these aspirations took the form of the civil state, the separation of da’wah from politics, and public and minority rights.

This book discusses changes in the thinking of the young people that belong or previously belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, who now consist of three ideologically-distinct entities: the Islamic Action Front, the National Congress Party – Zamzam, and the Partnership and Rescue Party, the first of which represents political Islam, while the latter two are post-Islamist parties.