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FOREWORD

Over the past three decades, Africa has suffered the greatest number of armed conflicts in the world. Countries in the Horn of Africa are among those plagued by armed conflict; indeed armed conflicts still continue to rage in the region. Ethiopia, too, has been consumed by strife for most of the nineteenth century and more than a third of the twentieth century. The horrors engendered by violent conflict in Africa are vivid and pervasive, among these: The loss of millions of lives, and the painful displacement of countless citizens and communities; no less tragic is the loss of opportunities and capabilities to improve the lot of the living.

Against this background, it is difficult to deny the urgent necessity of checking conflict, fostering enduring peace, and cultivating a culture of peace. Considering the scope, duration and intensity of armed strife as well as what is lavished on armies and weapons, meeting the necessity of peace appears daunting.

Addis Ababa University's Institute for Peace and Security Studies aims to make a modest contribution to this critical vast task: to develop objective knowledge and expertise in peace and security studies with a focus on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa while training dedicated and competent practitioners.

What is on offer in these pages is representative research by young scholars in peace and security studies. The work ranges from urban communities to varied rural communities. Sources of conflict examined are many: differences and rivalries over cultural identity; intensified competition for scarce resources aggravated by environmental degradation, together with new weapons and borders. Other new phenomenon considered include the growing trend in privatization of the provision of public goods such as security and punishment, a trend giving rise to new challenges in public regulation and accountability.

These maiden ventures in peace studies should attract the critical attention of policy makers and practitioners in federal and regional governments. The publication may also draw more students to a program of study new to higher education in Ethiopia but perhaps a more important benefit would be a better understanding by ordinary citizens of the problems that divide Ethiopian communities, and a clearer grasp of what can be done to advance the quest for greater solidarity.

Prof Andreas Eshete,
President, Addis Ababa University
INTRODUCTION

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies has taken a decision to publish an anthology consisting of five best awarded Master’s theses from each graduating class. The objective of this initiative is multidimensional. The primary objective of this publication is to disseminate findings of researches to policy makers and scholars and the secondary objective is to encourage students for excellence and rigour in their research works by providing an additional incentive of being published. In addition to the relatively high quality of academic research, the selection panel by this selection acknowledges the relevance of the topics to Ethiopia's policy settings. The five theses selected have both peace and security themes without one excluding the other.

Ethnic Identity and the Relations among students at AAU by Aberra Hailemariam attempts to understand the influence of ethnic identity of students in their relationships. Findings of the research not only show that relations of students are characterized by division, discord and misgivings but also unveiled the inclination of students towards forming groups along ethnic lines in group work and inhabiting dormitories. The study shows that there is a broad based support for federalism and the right to self determination across students coming from several ethnic groups but also brought into the limelight extremist elements that purport the one-Ethiopia image and indicates these differences play into the existing relationships among students. The research divulged that there is a tendency of using violence, among students, to solve disagreements. Key finding of the research is that there is no platform whereby students regularly dialogue on ideas and other matters of common concern. Students divided along ethnic lines not only fail to forge alliances among themselves but also show most conflict issues among them are far from pursuing a public cause nor real issues related to their welfare. The research suggests that there is a lot to do for the University administration to engage in tackling the growing ethnic division and the hostility by creating an enabling environment for the promotion of dialogue thus supporting students to forge alliances among themselves and encouraging peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The Role of Local Governments in Conflict Management: The Case of Meiso Woreda by Dereje Seyoum evaluates the role of local administration in conflict management taking the case of the Mieso Woreda located at the border of the Somali and Oromia regional states. The study illustrates that the conflict came to light since the introduction of a Federal form of Government and is apparently expressed in the form of disputes over the
border of the two regional states and has so far claimed huge costs of human lives and resources. The research indicates the root cause of the conflict to be the degradation of the environment pushing the Issa pastoralists to settle in the fertile territory of the Oromia region and the resistance of the Oromo’s to allow this to happen, which is then been expressed in the form of border conflict. Research findings show that the real cause of the conflict is competition for land and water resources exacerbated by environmental degradation but expressed in the form of dispute over state boundaries and highlights that efforts of the local administration are guided by the form of the conflict and not by its real substance. Consequently, they produce little as a result of their incorrect diagnosis of the problem and its causes.

The Status of Private Security Companies in Ethiopia: The Case of Addis Ababa by Solomon Hassen argues that there is a growing acceptance that security is an essential public good like education, health and water and tries to investigate the regulatory environment of the growing Ethiopian private security companies and indicates regulatory shortfalls in the sector. It argues that private security companies can contribute to improving the security situation in a country and thereby also further economic development provided there is sufficient and enforceable regulation.

Ethiopia’s private security industry has now become an important employer and actor in the security sector and is growing but it is in a danger of getting out of control as it is not regulated. The security guards working for these companies are poorly paid and are not well trained to carry out their job properly. The private security companies are using firearms for their services but are not directly accountable for them. For the private security industry in Ethiopia to become a competitive actor and play an important role in the security landscape of the country, national regulatory laws that scrutinize the activities of the companies should be developed as soon as possible.

Cross-Border Pastoral Conflict: The Case of Dassenetch and Nyangatom in Southern Ethiopia by Teshome Mekonnen explores the role of environmental degradation, the introduction of modern weaponry and growing lack of respect to traditional rules in the intensity, fatality and extent of pastoralist conflicts in the context of the Dassenetch and Nyangatom pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia. The study found out that there are direct links between the changing environmental/climatic condition and conflict in the case study area. Drastic change in climate and the shortage of resources have resulted in food deficit. Food-insecure people are likely to instigate or resort to conflict as a coping strategy against food shortage. Socio-cultural factors, poor governance, and marginaliza-
tion have also contributed to conflict in the case study area. Furthermore, government policies overseeing natural resource management and conflict prevention are often too restrictive and they undermine pastoralists’ livelihoods, and they tend to exacerbate conflict.

The Nexus between Food Insecurity and Conflict: The case of Jille Timmuga Woreda by Yohannes Buayalew examines the link between food insecurity and conflict taking the case of Jille Timmuga district, located in the Oromia zone of the Amhara National Regional State. The district is one of the drought prone and conflict ridden areas of the Amhara region. The main concern of the thesis is to carefully look into the correlations of the food insecurity and conflicts in this particular area of study. There are a few scholarly works on the correlations between food insecurity and conflicts; but, there are no consensuses in which one could influence another and vice-versa. The thesis through its detailed data analysis concludes that there is no such thing that the one causes the other but instead whichever of the phenomenon arises first reinforces the other.

Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe

Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Addis Ababa University
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I would like to thank Yonas Adaye Adeto, academic staff of IPSS, for organising the theses selection process, their content assessment, and language editing as well as putting them all together as an Anthology of Peace and Security Research. I would also like to thank Wrt. Seble Mulugeta for taking care of the financial and administrative aspect of the task.

Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe

Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Addis Ababa University
ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE RELATIONS OF AMHARA, ORMO AND TIGRAY STUDENTS AT ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY MAIN CAMPUS

By Abera Hailemariam
CHAPTER 1

1. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1.1. Background

In the past decade, the number of students in higher learning institutions in Ethiopia has shown dramatic increase. “Total enrollment in the higher education in 2006-07, for 55 reporting institutions is 229,864 in all programs including, Regular, Evening, Kiremt and Distance for both Government and non-Government institutions” (Ministry of Education, 2008:53). What’s more “As of 2006-07, there were 21 Government institutions of which Addis Ababa University is the largest” (Ministry of Education, 2008:52). The 2008 Educational Statistics Annual Abstract 2006-07 has also disclosed that 176,106 students have been enrolled in undergraduate, postgraduate and PhD programs in government-run higher learning institutions. Indeed, this is an encouraging sign of achievement in the human resource development front. But again a trend detrimental both to students and the county is brewing within the higher learning institutions.

It is not uncommon to hear turbulence, at least, in one of the higher learning institutions in any one year. More often than not minor disputes between individuals escalate into a big fight involving students aligned along ethnic lines. Majority of the conflicts occurred in the universities either between ethnic based groups or these groups with the universities’ administrations. So far the situation, if not worsened, has not changed for the better. An assessment entitled “Major Causes of Conflict among Hawassa University students and conflict between students and the University Administration” and which was conducted on 2004 indicated that one of the major causes of conflict (64%) between students and the university administration is related with the problem of nationality “(Tilahun, 2007: Appendix H). The assessment further unveiled that “Disagreement over difference on nationality (ethnicity) is the major cause (80%) for students’ in-fighting (Tilahun, 2007: Appendix H). Be that as it may, little is known for sure about the triggering factors for the perennial conflicts.

This research examines whether ethnicity has positive or otherwise consequences on
the relations of Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students pursuing their studies at the Main Campus of Addis Ababa University (AAU). The study looks into the contribution of ethnic identity not only in terms of easing or straining relations among these groups but also its role on the sporadic violence unfolding in the Main Campus. The research also examines to what extent ethnicity influences the role of students in forging unity of purpose to promote public causes including but not limited to defending human rights, advocating for the prevalence of rule of law in the country as well as ensuring good governance.

1.2. Statement of the problem

The propensity of students toward violence and the employment of the latter as the sole problem solving strategy have already created anxiety within society. In view of the legacy of Ethiopian student movement, many people doubt that the new generation of university students live up to the expectation of society. To put the subsequent discussion in the proper context, it is appropriate to briefly highlight the role of universities and students in a given society. In his analytic piece of article Alemayehu Gebremariam argued that “Universities are the proper venue for all types of dissenting ideas and views and serve as forums for robust debate on issues affecting society” (Alemayehu, 2008, para.26).

As he rightly noted, “In a university...students develop the habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry, which is instrumental in their own transformation as enlightened citizens', compassionate public servants, and professionals” (Ibid.). In simple language Alemayehu noted that “A university is a proper venue to challenge and test the credibility of official government rhetoric and ideology, question the legitimacy of a political party, leader or regime, and openly discuss and criticize official corruption, abuse of power and violations of civil liberties, and human rights” (Ibid, para.26). He further argues, “There is a much greater need for a robust and wide-open debate in the search for truth” (Ibid, para.24). Empirical examples from around the world that concur with the earlier view “show the dynamic role of universities and dissenting voices in bringing about far reaching social changes” (Ibid, para.27). The 1960s movement against the Vietnam War in the United States of America is a case in point. The anti-war protests “began at the University of California, Berkeley...soon evolved into a Free Speech Movement which transformed American universities and the society at large in the decades that followed” (Ibid.).

In the same way, in Ethiopia too, the 60s and 70s University students had audaciously pressed public causes, notably, “Land to the Tiller”, “the Right of Nations and Nationalities for Self Determination” and other sensitive issues believed to have been taboo in the
society. In the absence of political parties, the student movement transformed itself into an agent of social change. By severely criticizing government policies in public, in due course, the movement not only emerged as a formidable force to be reckoned with, but also played a pivotal role both in mobilizing the masses to stand up for freedom, equality, democracy, and social justice in the struggle against the monarchy.

Unlike their predecessors, the role of the present day students of higher learning institutions is severely criticized for their total failure in promoting public cause. Driven by some kind of prejudice, they waste their time and energy in trivial matters including but not limited to amplifying language and ethnic differences which often degenerate into an internal squabble. As they scarcely see or think outside the box, they overlook the commonalities that bind them together as a human person, a citizen of this country, and a student to say the least. Still worse, they show little interest to engage in a dispassionate discussion to solve their differences amicably. They rather rush to resort to moment of force. The question many people ponder over and over again and in fact that needs a well-thought-out answer is: What will the fate of this country be when state power goes into the hands of people whose bent is to seeing the whole lot through ethnic lenses? It does not require being a genius to foresee the disaster that may follow if persons driven by deep seated hate, vengeance, and reinforced by a disposition of settling differences through violence come at the helm of political power. It is this looming danger that prompted me to study the problem with the view to encouraging others to follow suit in this endeavor.

The second reason for selecting the topic is that violence in higher learning institution has been overlooked for quite some time now. The problem has not been given the attention it deserves. When compared with other conflict situations or issues (resource based, boundary conflicts…etc), it is one of the least explored areas. Consequently, comprehensive and carefully planned intervention has not been made, thus far, to address the problem. In this regard, my study will have an added value in terms of identifying the existing knowledge gaps and generating information to be used as an input for policy formulation, program development as well as in designing implementation strategies to address the challenge both at macro and institutional levels.

The third reason is that discord is the defining feature of students’ relations in many of the higher learning institutions. Invasion of a territory, occupation of a chunk of arable land, denial of access to pasture and water that commonly trigger violence among the sedentary farmers and pastoralist communities alike are farfetched to ignite on-campus
students in-fighting along ethnic line. Other resource based competitions are too remote to explain the recurrent discord and strained relation among college and university students. As a researcher I am just curious to know the role of political factors in fomenting ethnic conflict and its repercussion, particularly, on ethnic Oromo, Amhara and Tigray students’ relations.

The last reason that inspired me to undertake the study is the intriguing nature of the issue under consideration. As Alemayehu remarked, it goes without saying that “professors and (university) students are often (deemed) the tip of the intellectual spear in society not only in the search for truth, but also in demanding change and official accountability” (Alemayehu, 2008, para.26). It follows that given their academic background students of higher learning institutions are not expected to easily yield to any idea before testing its validity; nor are they supposed to take an action before critically examining its rationality. In light of these assumptions, this study assesses the disparity between the ideal and the real, the rhetoric and the practices.

Hence the main research questions are:

1. What is the attitude of ethnic Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray students towards one another?
2. What methods or means do these students employ to resolve their conflicts?
3. Does ethnic identity have any effect on students as promoters of public cause?

1.3. Objectives

1.3.1. General objective

This study aims at examining the role of ethnicity on the relationship among ethnic Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray students at Addis Ababa University Main Campus. The main objective of this research is, therefore, to find out the influence of ethnicity on the relationship of Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students at Addis Ababa University Main Campus.

1.3.2. Specific objectives

The specific objectives are to:

1. Assess the attitude of students towards other ethnic groups;
2. Find out the extent of employment of abusive and violent methods of resolving differences; and
3. Determine the role of ethnic identity on students as promoters of public cause.
CHAPTER 2

2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Defining ethnicity and ethnic conflict

2.1.1. Defining ethnicity

Ethnicity, for many people, is an elusive concept. There is little consensus among scholars as to what constitutes ethnic group and what ethnicity is all about. It can easily be inferred from the abundant literature on the topic, scholars “…define and describe the term in various ways, such as a modern cultural construct, a universal social phenomenon, a personal identity, a peculiar kind of informal political organization or affective association” (Berhanu, 2008:1). The wide array of designations, however, has made the notion even hazier than one could imagine. Merera, spelled out the challenges of defining “Ethnicity” when he says, “Ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism’ are particularly elusive; they have continued to frustrate the development of common terms of reference. Moreover, the attempted definitions are either ideologically informed or limited to local situations and hence they lack universal meaning and application” (Merera, 2003:20).

Regarding the reason for obscurity of the concept, Vaughan conjectured that the problem “has probably been exacerbated by the inter-disciplinary pedigree of ‘ethnic studies’, which has left it a ‘conundrum’…subject to parochial analysis” (Vaughan 2003:43). Vaughan, quoting Fukui and Markakis, further pointed out that one probable reason for elusiveness of ethnic identity could be “Its ‘chameleon-like capacity’ to ‘merge with other elements of social identity and solidarity’, leave it ‘hard to see what would remain of ethnicity if all [these] were peeled off’” (Vaughan, 2003:44).

Invoking experiences from the Horn of Africa, Hizkias Assefa, on his part, also explained the inherent complexity in defining ethnic identity. According to him, in the sub region, it is even unclear “what is meant by the terms ‘ethnic group’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic conflict’. In the context of the Horn, many concepts such as nationality, tribe, and now clan, have been used interchangeably with that of ethnic group, and it is very difficult to distinguish

1. For detailed discussion of critical literature review, see the full text of the thesis available in IPSS library.
between them” (Hizkias, 1996, para. 3). He further raised the contentious issues that often surface in defining ethnic identity, i.e., whether “…people must share commonalities in all the criteria mentioned to be members of the same ethnic group or to share the same ethnicity” (Hizkias, 1996, para.4).

In the face of these difficulties, scholars have continued providing definitions to this fluid and politically susceptible concept. From among numerous definitions, one describes ‘ethnic group’ as a “…collectivity of people who share the same primordial characteristics such as common ancestry, language, and culture (People have included religion in the category of shared culture)” (Hizkias, 1996, para.3). Hutchinson and Smith, as quoted in Berhanu, on their part define it, “…as a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members’ ” (Berhanu, 2008:1). Challenging the foregoing definition, Abbink argues that “actual social reality shows that ethnicity cannot be ordained on straightforward or fixed criteria. People shift allegiances according to perceived political and economic opportunities or according to religious and cultural affinities” (Abbink, 1997:159-174).

2.1.2. Ethnic conflict and its sources

Like the notion of ethnicity, there is neither shared view nor consistent designation, among scholars, as regards the term ‘ethnic conflict’ (see Horowith, 1985:95). Similarly, Brown contends that the notion of ‘ethnic conflict’ is, “often used loosely to describe a wide range of inter-state conflicts that are not, in fact, ethnic in character. The conflict in Somalia, for example, is occasionally referred to as an ethnic conflict even though Somalia is the most ethnically homogenous country in Africa (Brown, 2005:210). The question, then, is what is ethnic conflict? What makes it distinct from other conflicts; say, from internal conflict? In this sub section variety of perspectives regarding the sources of violent ethnic conflicts will be discussed briefly.

Gurr, noted that “Comparative and case studies point to four general conditions that strongly affect group incentives for collective actions. The four are collective disadvantage, loss of political economy, repression and the ‘frames’ or cognitive understanding they have of their situation” (Gurr, 2005: 169). For Brown the “…four main clusters of factors that make some places more predisposed to violence than others (are): structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors and cultural/perceptual factors” (Brown, 2005:214). Under structural factors “weak states, interstate security concerns, and ethnic geography” (Ibid.) are mentioned as most important factors for ethnic and internal con-
conflicts. In his view, weakened state structures give a breathing space to “…ethnic groups that had been oppressed by the center…to assert themselves particularly, perhaps in the form of more administrative autonomy or their own states” (Brown, 2005: 215).

“Hate Propaganda “ and “Myth”, if not the underlying cause, have a great deal of contributions in fomenting violent ethnic conflict. Hate propaganda has the potential in engendering the nightmare once it grips the minds of the people. Similarly,

It is also true that groups tend to whitewash and glorify their own histories, and they often demonize their neighbors, rivals, and adversaries…Stories that are passed down from generation to generations by words of mouth become part of a group’s lore. They often become distorted and exaggerated with time and are treated as received wisdom by group members (Brown, 2005: 218).

To sum up, as Robert and Rotblat put it, “It is not possible to do justice to the full complexity of the factors leading to ethnic prejudice (and ethnic conflict) here, but it will be apparent that they are far from simple” (Robert and Rotblat, 2003: 71). Obviously the foregoing analysis is not exhaustive, but it suffices to provide background information and a framework that helps a reader understand the next section which deals with ethnic relations and ethnic conflict in post 1991 Ethiopia.

### 2.2. Ethnic identity and ethnic relations in the post 1991 Ethiopia

#### 2.2.1. Federalism as a panacea to ethnic conflict

Although the debate has not yet settled, considerable number of scholars seems to concur that since the centralization project started in the 19th century, successive regimes that ruled the country perpetuated ethnic oppression and marginalization under the guise of nation building endeavors. According to these observers, the nation building project in due course generated its own antithesis by stirring sense of ethnic nationalism among the elites of different ethnic groups and thereby begot secessionist armed national movements. The wide spread armed struggle across the country resulted not only in the overthrow of the military government that ruled the country for 17 years but also marked the end of the era of the unitary state that lasted for about a century. Some of the major issues to be discussed in the subsequent part of the study include whether the post 1991 changes introduced responded to the demands of national movements
who wedged secessionist struggle against the military regime; whether the new ethnic federalism put the country on the right track in terms of preventing violent ethnic conflicts, and whether the new federal arrangement has improved relations among different ethnic groups.

The post 1991 Ethiopia is markedly different from the past unitary state in many ways. Primarily, the unitary Ethiopian state has been reconfigured along federal line. Secondly, ethnic identity (ethnicity), which has been a taboo, apart from achieving prominence, has now become state ideology underpinning the newly entrenched federal system. Thirdly, in a direct contrast with the Indian experience, the fundamental principle of the Ethiopian federal model “…is loyalty to a separate identity, the ethnic one, as superior to an overall national identity” (Aalen and Hatlebakk, 2008:5). The last important point is, “The post 1991 political developments…have brought about new elite configurations and as such a new dimension to the intra and inter elite competition and the interest to be served” (Merera, 2003:173).

The authors of the Constitution reiterate that the rational behind the implementation of ethnic federalism is to “…decentralize power and resolve the ‘nationalities question’ by accommodating the country’s various ethno-linguistic groups” (Assefa, 2006:131). It is also argued that when the reform is “Seen in the light of the fragile situation the country was in a decade ago, threatened by various national liberation movements, the commitment to national self-determination and the establishment of regional governments based on nationality was a bold measure that ensured the survival of the Ethiopian state” (Assefa, 2006:132).

Be that as it may, the decision made to reconfigure the Ethiopian state along ethnic lines has received mixed reactions. Considerable number of national movements perceived ethnic federalism as the panacea to the age-old national oppression and dominations of their respective constituencies and hence they commended the implementation of ethnic federalism as appropriate measures to salvage the country from the alleged impending disintegration. Equally, there are groups who view the entrenchment of ethnic federalism as a disingenuous move at best and a political ploy at worst, with a malicious intent, to destroy the country and hence they bitterly resent it. So far, it has been nearly impossible to find out a middle ground between these incongruous views. As a result, the debate has continued unabated for a long time now with a little hope for consensus in the foreseeable future. But before assessing issues identified, it is vital to briefly look into the relevance of federalism in terms of accommodating diversity, ensuring self rule
and shared rule and most importantly in preventing violent ethnic conflict, and sustaining durable peace.

By and large, it appears that federalism is perhaps one of the main conflict preventing models, among others. However, unless the necessary conditions are fulfilled, federalism has no magic wand that prevents ethnic conflict. “Many scholars in the field argue that one of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and purpose to generate and maintain both unity and diversity simultaneously” (Berhanu, 2007:18). For federalism to achieve ‘unity and diversity’ and thereby serve as conflict preventing model the following conditions need to be met: First, the federal system assumes that every ethnic group inhabits “a territorially defined geographical area. Certainly, it is difficult to adopt federalism unless there exists a territorially defined diversity” (Assefa, 2006:135). The second necessary condition, for federalism to succeed is striking appropriate balance between central control and self governance not only in words but also in fact (enforcement). “In much of Africa the success of federalism thus hinges on the ability of the state to strike an appropriate balance between the exigencies of central control and the demands of the periphery for regional or sub regional autonomy” (Lemarchabd,1997:102). Thirdly, when there is real ‘check and balance’ between states and central government; expressed in the “distribution of power to different levels of government and the competition between these levels allows for a system of checks and balances which is likely to set limits on the central government” (Kalin, 1997:176). The last element is participation of units in the central government. “Power sharing means that the units on the lower levels of government have some influence on the central level and can therefore participate, at least, to a certain degree in central decision making procedure...It allows for their integration into the nation and is thus well suited for conflict reduction” (Kalin, 1997:176).

Similarly, Kymlicka, in his observation, identified some of the inherent challenges of implementing multination federalism. Among these challenges the first is, “…this process of institutionalization (of federalism) has not always been the outcome of peaceful democratic mobilization, but rather has been imposed from above” (Kymlicka, 2006:58). The second problem is the process could also be “…captured by local elites who do not represent the interests of the wider group” (Ibid.). Kymlicka, nevertheless, warns that even in the face of these predicaments any attempt to resort to unitary government is counterproductive.

2.2.2. Controversy over the existing ethnic federalism

After having seen the background information, the fundamental question that needs to
be addressed is whether the existing ethnic federalism has addressed the sources of vio-

cent conflict that threatened the very existence of the country. In fact the issue is not as

such a binary question that requires a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. It, naturally, presupposes some

kind of analysis to respond in the affirmative or otherwise. Therefore it is vital to high-

light first the point of contention between those who advocate for ethnic federalism and

those who categorically reject it.

Berhanu (2008) put into perspective the views of the proponents of ethnic federalism

and its opponents who fervently counter it. Those who categorically reject ethnic federal-

ism and strongly advocate for its dissolution seem more or less homogenous groups. In

this regard, observers note, “All multi-ethnic organizations, most of which are now Am-

hara based and the AAPO strongly argue in favor of non-linguistic and territorially based

federal structure” (Merera 2003:155). More often, the stance of this group encounters

stiff resistance from different quarters. Kymlicka, for instance, unequivocally avowed that

he never “…accept(s) the view that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia should be rejected for

its tendency to sharpen and institutionalize what were previously more diffused ethnic

identities. In and of itself, that is not a decisive objection” (Kymlicka, 2006:58). Kymlicka,

however, questioned the wisdom of applying multination federalism across the board in the

Ethiopian context.

Those who perceive the existing ethnic federalism positively may be clustered broadly

into two sub-groups. Of the two sub-groups, the first backs not only the reconfiguration

of the Ethiopian state along ethnic federalism but also strongly believe that the exist-

ing federal arrangement has more or less answered all the fundamental questions that

led many of the national movements to engage in armed struggle.(This is the stance of

EPRDF and its allies). Contrary to the preceding view, the second sub-group maintains

that in principle it accepts ethnic federalism as a panacea to the age-old ethnic domina-

tion and marginalization, but rebuffs the existing federal arrangement altogether as a

sham designed only to keep a minority group in power with the view to perpetuating

ethnic domination as well as hoodwinking outsiders. Further more, they contend that

ethnic oppression and exclusion from political power and resources have continued

unabated even after the alleged ethnic federalism has come into force. Observers, if not

all, also noted that considerable number of “Ethnic based political groups favor more

balanced federation based on genuine linguistic and/or ethnic criteria, which also take

into consideration the right of all Ethiopians as citizens” (Merera, 2003:155). On the other

hand, from among ethnic affiliated parties, some who felt that they are betrayed by the

ruling coalition, EPRDF, revived their secessionist agenda with the view to establishing
their own independent states through violence.

The other most contentious issue, among different groups, related to the Ethiopian ethnic federalism is the explicit acknowledgment of ‘the right to self determination up to and including secession’ in the Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution. Article 39 of the FDRE Constitution “states that ‘Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession,’ and sets out the procedures for the exercise of this right, which cannot be suspended, even during a state of emergency (Article 93(2c))” (Assefa, 2006: 141).

Interestingly, the reaction individuals and groups have towards Article 39 is polarized. For instance, groups who contest ethnic federalism take it for granted that the inclusion of a secession clause in the Constitution as a compelling evidence for the conspiracy of the regime in power and its cohorts to dismember Ethiopia. Consequently, they demand an unconditional revocation of Article 39. Assefa, though not as stern as the above critiques, expressed his concern by saying that “…by expressly singling out secession as a constitutional right, and in the absence of a federal supremacy clause, the Constitution appears to grant states an undivided power of sovereignty” (Assefa, 2006: 141). On the other hand, the practices of other countries also show that the inclusion of secession clause in the constitution is a bit strange. In a stark contrast to the Ethiopian experience, in India, for instance, “The first rule is that no secessionist demand shall be recognized. The Indian Constitution does not give any state the right to secede. Therefore, it can suppress such demands by force” (Bhargava, 2006:101).

Then again, nationalist movements including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) welcome the inclusion of Article 39. In this regard, OLF and ONLF share almost similar view with the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), as far as the inclusion of Article 39 in the FDRE Constitution is concerned. When it comes to practical matter, however, OLF and ONLF very much doubt the commitment of the EPRDF led government in translating the provision into a reality alleging that the latter, leave alone granting independence to a constituent state, is reluctant even to acknowledge and respect states’ right to exercise self rule as enshrined in the Constitution.

2.2.3. Effectiveness of ethnic federalism in preventing conflict: the Ethiopian experience

With regard to the conflict prevention functions of the Ethiopian ethnic federalism,
scholars espouse contradictory views. For instance, Assefa argues, “By establishment of regional government whose boundaries coincide with at least some of the major nationalities… (the federal arrangement) has served as a conflict-regulating device, by creating more homogeneous states” (Assefa, 2006:132). On the contrary, Valfort attributes the sharpening of ethnic competition to a couple of reasons; the first reason, according to her, is that the ruling EPRDF has “…endorsed the administrative division of the country along ethnic lines without previously ensuring a nationwide political debate on what, after decades of oppression of one group over the others, nevertheless would keep unifying Ethiopian people” (Valfort, 2007:97). In the same vein, Merera (2003:143) writes, “The ruling party’s decentralization drive carries in itself the tendency of heightening the competing ethnic nationalism which (sic) have further provoked intra and inter-elite rivalry across the board”.

According to Valfort the second reason for the spiraling of grievances among different ethnic groups is that the new power elite have continued to rule the county in the old way. She writes, “Ethnic grievance on the part of non-Tigrean ethnic groups has been exacerbated (because of)… the TPLF’s temptation towards ethnic patronage” (Valfort, 2007:97), which confers “a privileged access of Tigrean elite to key posts in the public administration” (Ibid.). Likewise, Merera also unveiled, “The change of regime, which ended the century old domination of the Amhara elite, has created new power relations which facilitated the hegemonic aspiration of the Tigrean elite while frustrating that of the rest of the Ethiopian elites” (Merera, 2003:173).

Kymlicka, while appraising the Ethiopian ethnic federalism in respect of Western multination federalism model, reflected mixed impressions of hope and fear. In his view, “There is nothing in the idea of ethnic federalism that is inherently illiberal or undemocratic. On the other hand, the conditions that enabled the voluntary adoption and successful operation of multination federalism in the West are not present in Ethiopia. It follows that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is likely to remain a fragile experiment for some time to come” (Kymlicka, 2006:58). Asefa seems to share Kymlicka’s concern when he describes, ‘The Ethiopian federal system stands at a crossroads. It has been able to contain one of the most devastating wars in Africa, but it has also added new dimensions to existing conflicts’ (Assefa, 2006: 138).
CHAPTER 3

3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Methodology

The methodology of this study is qualitative one. It gives emphasis to the process of the research from its inceptions to its completion. It is interested in meaning, notably, how people make sense out of their lives experiences etc. Also, in a qualitative research the researcher is central. He/she is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. Unlike the quantitative methodology where data are collected through inventories, questionnaires or machine, in qualitative research data are mediated through the researcher or the “human instrument.” Furthermore, in a qualitative design the researcher present in person among the people and observe institutions or record behavior; not in the laboratory, but in its natural settings. The other unique feature of the qualitative methodology is that it is explanatory. The interest of the researcher lies in the process, meaning as well as in the insight to be gained through words or illustrations. Another important aspect of qualitative research is that the researcher plays a pivotal role in constructing concepts, theories, and principles out of details of discussions, interviews and observations (Creswell, 1994:166) In line with this, I was the one (my assistant took part in data collection) who collected and analyzed the data. The purpose of conducting Focus Group Discussions and a one to one unstructured interview is to find out meanings from the life and experiences of the participants of the study. The latter can only be obtained through the qualitative method. I would say some of the reasons I mentioned above give clue as to why I selected the qualitative research methodology.

3.2. Research design

I used “Cross-sectional study design” (Kumar 1996:81). The reason behind selecting this design is, primarily it is “…the most commonly used design in the social science” (Ibid.). The second reason is that this design is “…best suited to studies aimed at finding out the prevalence of a phenomenon, situation to problem (of) attitude or issue by taking cross section of the population. They are useful in obtaining an overall ‘pictures’ as it stands at the time of the study” (Ibid.). This perfectly goes hand in hand with the purpose of my
study since the latter examines how ethnic identity affects the relation of students of the three major ethnic groups. The third reason for the selection of this study design is that it gives discretion for the researcher what he “...want(s) to find out, identify the study population, and select a sample (if you need to)” (Ibid.).

3.3. Selection of research setting

In the 60s and 70s students, irrespective of their difference in ethnicity, linguistic and cultural background, used to convene at the AAU Main Campus to discuss matters of national concern. On the contrary, in the past 15 years literally there has been no organized student movement that involved cross-section of students in the Main Campus. As a researcher, I am curious to explore the cause(s) for this complete divorce from the legacy of Ethiopian student movement in general and the contribution of ethnicity to the absence of unity of purpose among students of different ethnic groups in particular using the current relations of Oromo, Amhara and Tigray students.

3.4. Context of the research setting

Addis Ababa University (AAU) is the oldest and the largest educational institution in the country. It started its operation as far back as 1950 as University College of the Addis Ababa. In 1962 it was dubbed as Haile Selassie I University, named after the late Emperor and soon after the dawn fall of the Emperor, in 1975, it was renamed as Addis Ababa University. AAU runs a wide range of programs including Bachelors, Medical Doctor, DVM, Masters, Specialty Certificate and PhD degree programs. AAU embraces 25 colleges, faculties, institutes, and centers. What’s more, AAU runs over 50 PhD, and over 90 graduate programs as well as around 57 undergraduate programs (AAU Office of the Registrar, 2008). AAU Main Campus, located north of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, is perhaps the largest of all campuses of the University. The Main Campus, apart from hosting more than eight faculties and institutes, is the seat of the University leadership. AAU’s admission of students for undergraduate programs has shown remarkable growth over the years and this has substantially increased the diversity of students’ composition. Although it is difficult to ascertain the fair distribution of ethnic composition of students due to the absence of disaggregated data of students in terms of ethnicity, the Main Campus seems to host nearly all ethnic groups existing in the country.
3.5. Selection of research participants

The research questions stated in the first chapter presuppose the involvement of the study population of the research who are categorized into three clusters. While the first cluster embraces ethnic Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students, the second one consists of instructors offering “politically sensitive” courses. The third cluster comprises the AAU leadership, Dean of Students, and campus police/security; nevertheless, they did not take part in the research for reasons discussed (in my thesis which is in IPSS library). The participants of the study are selected on purpose. The reason behind the selection of these participants is briefly presented below.

Student participants

The first cluster, the primary participants, consists of second, third and fourth-year (Note that the latter are law school students) ethnic Oromo, Amhara and Tigray students at the Addis Ababa University Main Campus. AAU Office of the Registrar does not have the disaggregated data/list of second, third, and fourth-year ethnic Oromo, Amhara and Tigray students. As a result, the figure of the study population is not known. This problem can be solved by using purposive sampling technique. I selected purposive sampling because the latter's main consideration lies on “…the judgment of the researcher as to who can provide the best information to achieve the objective of the research. Since the main objective of the research is to investigate the relation of ethnic Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students, the participation of students belonging to the three ethnic groups is vital for the study. Accordingly, I conducted three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs); one for each group. Each focus group consisted of seven participants drawn from second, third and fourth-year Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students. The reason behind the exclusion of first year students is, primarily, it is assumed that students who stay longer in the campus will have, relatively, a better insight and rich experience about inter-ethnic relations than a freshman student. The other reason is, most of the students who are now third and fourth-year have firsthand experience about the inter-ethnic violence occurred in 2007. Consequently, involving them in the FGD would provide better opportunity to the researcher to generate valuable information for the study. As far as the process of selection of participants is concerned the following activities have been accomplished with utmost care: numerically participants of each group were equivalent. Each Focus Group consisted of seven participants; three female and four male. In this regard attempt has been made to maintain not only numerical equivalence but also gender balance of participants. Besides, participants were drawn from 10 departments: philosophy, psy-
psychology, history, linguistics, law, political science and sociology, Amharic, Oromifa and Tigringa languages. At least one student from Amharic, Oromifa and Tigringa language departments respectively has been represented in each focus group.

**Instructors**

The second group of participants includes instructors who offer courses including Introduction to Ethiopian History, Constitutional Law, Federalism, Ethiopian Politics and Government and Civic Education. I approached the History Department head and explained the purpose of the research as well as the participants to be involved in the study and asked him to assign me an instructor who offers a course on ‘Ethiopian History’. I was informed that the course has phased out long ago. My repeated attempts to meet the Civic Education Coordinator were not successful. Also I had to talk to three instructors, from political science department in order to get the consent of a lecturer willing to be interviewed. In the face of these difficulties, I managed to conduct three interview sessions with instructors who offer courses on Constitutional Law, Federalism and Ethiopian Politics and Government.

**Dormitory coordinators**

Initially, I intended to hold an interview with the Dean of Students and I submitted my request to the office. Soon I was referred to the Main Campus Dean of Students. After repeated attempts, I managed to meet the competent officer and briefed him the purpose of the study and my plan to hold an interview with him. He then referred me to dormitory coordinators. The two coordinators, male and female, were more than willing to partake in the interview. I had lengthy discussions on the overall relations of students in the students’ residential quarters, allocation of dormitories, possible causes of conflict in students’ residential quarter and other similar matters. I used the interview guide prepared for Dean of Students selectively and as deemed appropriate to the interviewees.

**3.6. Data collection tools**

- **Focus Group Discussions (FGD)**

One of the two main data collection techniques I used was Focus Group Discussion (FGD). I developed FGD guide for the Amhara, Oromo and Tigray student participants. The contents of the guide used for the three FGD are identical. The discussion was conducted in Amharic, the working language of the Federal Government, with the consent of participants. In the selection process I attempted to make sure that participants are not only
willing to use Amharic as medium of communication but also have sound command of the language.

- **Semi structured interview**
  While conducting interviews, with the instructors and dormitory coordinators I employed separate semi-structured interview guides for instructors and dormitory coordinators respectively. The discussions have been conducted in Amharic as well.

- **Document review**
  Document review is another data gathering tool. In this regard my plan was to lodge my requests to get access to some documents (minutes, correspondences, police records) relevant to the research topic while conducting interview with the University leadership. Unfortunately, the planned interview did not take place. Likewise, I asked the campus police chief to get access to police records, but to no avail. I collected from the AAU Office of the Registrar a document indicating students’ distribution along faculties, colleges, departments, and gender. I also reviewed the Student Handbook (2008) prepared by Addis Ababa University Office of the Registrar to learn about AAU, its programs and student-intake. In addition, apart from going through one conference paper and a couple of term papers prepared on graffiti, I embarked on gathering writings inscribed on desks, walls of class rooms, lecture halls in the College of Social Sciences, Institute of Language Studies buildings as well as on some of the doors of students residence blocks’ bathrooms. This was mainly to gain more insights about abusive words, pejorative labeling, and stereotyping pertinent to the Amhara, Oromo and Tigray ethnic groups.

- **Observation**
  In addition, I used also observation technique by spending some times in the Main Campus in general and in the canteen, dubbed “White House”, Idir lounge and around lecture halls in particular.

**3.7. Data analysis and interpretation**

In a bid to analyzing the data gathered, the first thing I did was transcription of all audio taped focus group discussions, and unstructured interviews verbatim as well as organizing my notes. I carefully went through the transcription to get sense out of it. I used different colors of highlighters to mark ideas related to each research question. Next, I put together the transcriptions marked with different colors of highlighter under the relevant research questions. Having translated the information put under each research question
into English, then I attempted to learn the meaning embedded in the information. Then I wrote the impressions or thoughts I got from them in separate papers. After having completed the inference exercise, I listed down all possible topics based on the impression obtained from the reading of the transcription. Next, I put topics that have similarities into a single major topic and this exercise has been followed by further clustering of different topics into major topics. In doing this I tried, as much as possible, to reduce the total number of topics. Then I coined the most descriptive topics that capture the content or the essence of each theme. The themes were discussed in respect of literature and the research findings.
4. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter aims at capturing the broad-spectrum of perceptions of participants of the study regarding the relation of students belonging to the three ethnic groups. To put the discussion in its proper context, the information gathered has been presented and analyzed under the following six themes: An over view of relations of Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students, Ethnic affinity and group work in a classroom setting, Ethnic relations and controversial issues in class discussions, Ethnic composition of students in dormitories: Homogeneity versus heterogeneity, Ethnic identity and the role of students as promoters of public cause and The trend of solving differences among students: Amicable vs. Non Amicable ways. Please note that all the findings of the FGD and interviews presented in the study are rough translation of the author. Besides, to maintain the principles of confidentiality the names of the participants of the study are kept anonymous.

4.1. An over view of relations of Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students

An instructor who participated in the interview stated that a more pronounced division among students, along ethnic line, reared its head during the Ethiopian Schools’ Soccer Competition hosted by the Addis Ababa University (AAU). “It was in the Ethiopian Schools Soccer Competition, hosted by the Addis Ababa University that I observed a more pronounced division among students. The soccer teams were named after the regions, Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, and Somali where they (students) were coming from” (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor). The key issue that needs a thorough assessment is what has happened since the introduction of ethnicity in the University with respect to students’ relation.

The assessment of the Oromo students’ Focus Group Discussion participants, by and large, seems to suggest that all is not well as far as relation of Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students is concerned. While some of them note that the relation is dismal, others state it is very much strained. Some perceive the relation is neither good nor bad” (Oromo students FGD participants). An instructor who reflected on the overall relations of students
of the three ethnic groups commented:

Originally the tension was between Amhara and Oromo students. Mostly Tigrean students are associated with the ruling party. Even if they are not members, there have been attempts of alienating them. There were tensions between the Amhara and Oromo students which have not been observed before. The tensions were caused predominantly, for instance, by Arbagugu (and) Bedeno massacres… On the other hand there was feeling of animosity among Oromos. Significant number of Amharas, whose forefathers have been Naftagna, are living in Oromia region and the descendants of the Naftagnas, have now continued leading good life there… This was unacceptable to considerable Oromo students (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

Furthermore, a student respondent who was asked to assess whether the relation of students is based on ethnic lines, replied that “It can be said hundred percent” (Oromo students FGD participant). Likewise, another participant, who was asked a similar question answered by saying with an irony of some sort, “In the students’ dining hall, all of us have our respective enclaves. While such a thing is a reality, how on earth, the so called ‘unity’, ‘unity in diversity’ ” (Oromo students FGD participant) could come true? Besides, it was indicated that in the students’ dining hall there are “reserved” areas named after certain ethnic groups. The quote below, taken from the observation of the Oromo students Focus Group Discussion participant signifies not only that the sitting pattern of students in the dining hall follows ethnic line but also gives clue about the extent of ethnic cleavage within the student body.

There is ‘yemariam sefer’, ‘yejezba sefer’… and there is also ‘O-channel’. No one sits in Oromo-channel unless he intends to leave early. ‘yejezba sefer’ is a recent phenomenon. ‘yemariam sefer’ is an enclave of Amhara region students who are also devotees of Orthodox Christian creed. They wear Netela. Therefore it is called ‘yemariam sefer’ I do not know the Tigreans’ enclave (Oromo Students FGD participant).

Participants who attempted to appraise the relation of students of the three ethnic groups noted:

In terms of personal relationship an individual could communicate with all …but when we see it in light of groups there could be division… individually we communicate but when it comes to groups there is a bit division… for instance when we refer to Oromo ethnic group, Tigrean ethnic group as a group there could be divi-
sion. But individually you can communicate with your classmate (Oromo Students FGD participants).

Discussants of the Amhara students Focused Group Discussion seems to concur with the views of their Oromo counterparts in the sense that they too characterize the relations of students of the three ethnic groups with discord. As one participant comments:

I see very strained relation among these students...Everybody is glued to his ethnic commune. Except few students, there is no one that accompanies you on the ground that you belong to other ethnic identity group... Only few have managed (outside their groups) to accompany one another. Even the latter might have maintained their relations probably out of common problem....If you scratch their relation a bit deeper, there could be mutual distrust (Amhara Students FGD participant).

Another participant depicted the situation as if there is no bond among these groups.

When you look at what is going on in the campus, mostly you observe allegiance to one's own ethnic group. If you look at the Oromos and Tigray students, they roam around in groups. They speak on their own languages. You don't find an outsider mixing with them and I have never come across this... Go anywhere in the campus (and see them) while dinning in the student cafeteria...which ever activity they are involved in even while playing cards they isolate themselves (Amhara Students FGD participant).

On the other hand a female participant, who tends to attribute the cause of ethnic cleavage to personal behavior than a group attitude remarked:

It is difficult for me to speak about it. I take it as personal matter. Yes there are extremists but again this is personal. Some people could be good, others may not be that good. The way I see it, the relation is a bit tough. Mostly the relation is thorny, especially when contentious issues that involve everyone are raised. When some economic or social problems are raised, in the end, it boils down to ethnicity. It is difficult for me to judge that it is good or bad (Amhara Students' FGD participant).

Discussants that opted for appraising the relation in its entirety put students into three groupings and assigned labels that characteristically describe each group. According to them,

The relations of students can be classified at different levels. It is a bit sticky to put them all in one pigeon-hole. There are students who have good relations. There are
also students whose relation is good, but who fear one another. There is a group embracing students that harbor deep hatred but who grudgingly live with others not out of their free will (Amhara Students’ FGD participants).

The participants also remarked:

As far as students’ relation is concerned…some are good. These are students who have positive outlook. From among the students of the three ethnic groups, there are students who cherish the spirit of unity. But, majority of them are swayed by parochial sentiment… (and) these students have considerable influence… while members of the other categories are vocal, those with positive outlook are not that assertive (Amhara Students’ FGD participants).

A student who unveiled the deceptive nature of the relation comments:

Apparently, their relations seem harmonious. But if you closely look into it you discover that something is simmering. Everybody has inherent ethnic leanings but you find a lot of people who are merely posturing that they are this and that or asserting that they want Ethiopian unity in order not to be labeled as racist … But a lot of hostility is going underneath… When you look at the surface, it appears harmonious (Amhara Students’ FGD participant).

Sharma, quoted, in Tilahun, asserts, “One major cause of the tension that are maintained between various groups is the astounding degree of ignorance that they harbor about each other. Group tensions are based upon prejudice” (Tilahun, 2007:15). Equally, stereotypes also have a role to play in exacerbating groups’ tension. Cushner, et al, cited in Tilahun, described stereotypes as “any summary generalization that obscures the differences within a group’ (Tilahun, 2007:15). As a rule, “Most stereotypes end up as negative labels placed on individuals simply because they are members of particular group. These stereotypes, especially the negative ones, do have a negative consequence on the communication environment of diverse groups” (Tilahun, 2007:15-16). Duhaney, as quoted in Tilahun, also comments that “negative stereotypes often lead to a breakdown in communication and deterioration in relationships” (Tilahun, 2007:16).

As expected “Denigrating languages, in (ethnic) epithet and in various graffiti… offend those who are ‘branded’ with such demeaning expressions” (Tilahun, 2007:16). In the same way the findings of this study revealed how stereotypes, pejorative labeling, and prejudice hurt feelings of a person or a group and thereby worsen ethnic tensions. Par-
participants of the Tigray students’ Focus Group Discussion expressed how rumors, stereotypes, and pejorative labeling taint one’s reputation, sow the seeds of suspicion and thereby bring about a negative bearing on students’ relations. For instance, a female participant resented the rumors going around by saying,

Some students think that we have direct contact with the government simply because we are Tigreans. Some even allege that the gold that we wear is given to us. There are such kinds of rumors. This is absolutely a misunderstanding. But, I haven’t heard this in person from students or instructors… I heard only the rumors…(Tigray students’ FGD participant).

She further said:

When you look at the situation there is something stuck between us and them. They think that since it is our government it favors us or they feel that (we report) if we hear them discussing something… or whenever we come while they are talking, they immediately quit their conversation… As far as instructors are concerned… those who offer common course even if they don’t inflict harm on us they favor others. When we were freshmen students there was a certain Oromo student. She rarely appears in class… She even comes to class drunk. The instructor, while assigning ‘F’ for many students, awarded her ‘B’. I asked her what she scored. She said that… he awarded her ‘B’. She admits that she did not attend class. She has never studied but she finished the exam in fifteen minutes and left the exam hall. The pervasiveness of this malpractice is known by students and instructors alike. Yet, I haven’t faced any problem in person (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

Another student-respondent revealed how perception strains group relations:

If someone is from Tigray region generally there is a feeling that he is associated with the government. It is not that common these days… This feeling is observed among students, but it is not much seen among instructors… I have experienced this in person many times. Perhaps, some students could be involved in things other than their studies. They secretly spread rumors… Although I am a bit disappointed no harm has been inflicted on me (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

Equally, one participant aggrieved that “Gossip could be circulated in the campus alleging this and that. When something wrong is told about you which you do not really know…, psychologically it hurts you” (Tigray students FGD participant). A female partici-
There are things which I personally experienced. For instance, on one occasion while my friend and I were crossing the main gate, we were talking in Tigrigna. We were a little bit late in showing our I.D cards to the gatekeepers. Then, one of the gate keepers said ‘why are you getting in trouble so much in showing I.D card? This is your personal estate. After all you are royals something to that effect.’ I was fresh and I felt sad… My friend was enraged…I appeased her (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

She further recounted:

There are even instructors who foster similar view. Each time they ask you a question they relate it with the government in power; they relate it with politics. If they come to know your ethnic identity either by inferring from your name or any other means they ask you unusual question… While there are lots of students coming from different ethnic groups, when my instructor singles out and asks me, ‘have you heard the speech of the Prime Minister something to that effect, I feel it… I feel it… In our class only two of us are from Tigray region. Of all students when he asked me what the Prime Minister has said, you can imagine the feeling I would have (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

The other source of information that gives insight about the status of inter-ethnic relations is graffiti. By and large “Graffiti and ethnic epithets will be potential causes for wounding the sensitivities of groups and for igniting conflicts in campuses” (Tilahun, 2007: 16). Reisner, quoted in Mulumebet, said,“ Studies conducted in the United States universities indicate that ethnic graffiti are found in abundance in the higher learning institutions of other countries”(Mulumebet, 1998:13). Likewise, in AAU Main Campus issue of “Ethnicity, like sex, is a widely covered subject matter in graffiti” (Mulumebet, 1998:13). Interestingly, the graffiti in the Main Campus largely focuses “on Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray ethnic groups” and the contents of “the writings, for the most part, reflect hatred and disdain” (Mulumebet, 1998:13). The researcher, while collecting ethnic graffiti written on desks, walls of lecture halls, class rooms and in some of the bathrooms of students’ residence buildings, also observed that ethnic graffiti largely target Amhara, Oromo and Tigray ethnic groups. Apart from this, the researcher also learned that the contents of the graffiti characteristically reflect extreme loathing and scornfulness. If ethnic bigotry, stereotypes and spread of rumors are at work it is no wonder that there is strained inter ethnic relations.
On another note, one of the interviewees said that the reason behind the strained relation between Amhara and Oromo students is their leanings towards extremism. He argues:

It is widely observable that these groups (extremist Amharas)… tend to uphold the belief that national oppressions were non existent in Ethiopian history. There is also a deliberate attempt to paint a rosy picture, that there has been absolute unity in Ethiopia, that nationalities have been living together in love, with no grudge. As a result, the overriding belief, among these groups is that since the alleged problems did not exist, the prevailing ethnic crisis is the handiwork of the regime in power. This line of thinking presumes that ethnic parties and ethnic political groupings are mere creation of the government. They are out there simply to promote the political agenda of the government in power, but hardly have their own legitimate cause and legitimate interest. In my opinion this is a wrong perception (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

Furthermore the interviewee blamed the proponents of the other extreme viewpoint for the prevailing political stalemate.

There is an attempt to hold the existing generation responsible for the wrong done on account of the past history of ethnic domination. Rather than grappling with issues how to live together on the basis of equality, by doing away with the past ethnic domination as well as by ensuring rights,… there is a trend of invoking the past history and injury to fostering hatred on the existing members of a nationality. There are also other perceptions that reinforce the above thinking. These perceptions underline that ‘we have never been free from Abyssinian oppression and domination. In the past, the Amhara ruling elite were oppressing us. Now the Tigrean ruling class is oppressing us. They are stifling our rights. So, there is no reason to live with Abyssinians. The solution is to free ourselves from their bondage and form an independent state.’ I presume this is widely entertained belief among the Oromo nationalists (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

Another interviewee asserted that in normal time relations among students of different ethnic group seem blurred. According to him the right time to observe students’ relation is during crisis. In his view ethnic tension is no where conspicuous than in the event of crisis.

Tension in inter ethnic relation is highly pronounced when conflict flares up. For
instance, when conflict breaks out some students characteristically feel more close (to the university administration) with regard to ensuring the continuity of the system which could be restoring the University’s rule and order, attending class, implementing some of the tasks of the university and this creates to some extent grievances (on the part of other students) (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

To sum up the discussion, reflections of student-participants and instructors, the stereotyping and ethnic bigotry expressed in rumors and graffiti bear out that ethnic relation in the Main Campus is largely characterized by discord. Extremism is also observable on both sides of the political divide. On the one hand there are students who advance not only the one Ethiopia image but also adamant to accept the existence of ethnic oppression in the past. On the other there are students who are hostages of the narratives of the past ethnic domination and who invoke the latter as an excuse for the pursuit of secessionist agenda. Apart from these leanings, there is also another trend that blesses all actions of the government with little reservation. It is discernable that the leaning of some of these students to be more close to the University administration and by extension to the government in power have brought about negative bearing on the overall relations among Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students learning in the Main Campus.

4.2. Ethnic affinity and group work in a classroom setting

By and large, if there is a fair distribution of students, in a class, belonging to different ethnic groups, ethnic affiliation would be more evident or more pronounced in group formation for the purpose of carrying out assignment or term paper. Put it differently, if the ethnic mix in a given class is proportional, group formation largely takes ethnic pattern. As has been witnessed by the Amhara students’ Focus Group Discussion participants, individuals form a homogeneous group even without noticing that their selection of members of a group is ethnically biased. On the other hand, the nexus between language and group formation seems paramount. It seems that individuals co-opt member of their respective ethnic group because of language imperatives. As expected, once a heterogeneous group is formed, the next issue that inevitably takes the center stage is the question of medium of communication. More often, since English is not the first choice for many students due to the evident lack of proficiency, Amharic comes into the picture as alternative. But again considerable number of students will not be comfortable with it for at least a couple of reasons. One reason could be students coming from Oromia and Tigray regions may not be proficient in speaking Amharic. In effect, lack of proficiency in Amharic becomes an impediment, for these students, to actively interact with group
members. Secondly, students like any other human being have innate drive of exercising their own languages. Communicating with one’s own mother tongue gives a person the freedom to express what is in his mind straightforwardly. So, students feel comfortable if they use their mother tongue. If a group consists of students coming from two or more ethnic groups, most likely, the medium of communication would be Amharic. In other words, when students coming from Oromia and Tigray join a heterogeneous group, they would be forced to abandon Oromifa or Tigrigna and use Amharic albeit they barely have the command over the latter. Most probably, had these students formed a group with their own kinfolds, they would have had the opportunity to discuss matters freely in their mother tongue. The third reason could be a political one. Using Amharic, which is associated with political and cultural dominations, may ensue a feeling of betrayal of one’s cause amongst nationalist students and seemingly prompts the latter to shun from the formation of heterogeneous group.

Having seen the possible reasons that may push students to join ethnically homogeneous groups, let us turn our attention to investigate the actual practice of group formation in class room setting. Significant number of participants of the Focused Group Discussion from Tigray described that they often prefer competence to ethnic affiliation. They seem to say that so long as the academic track record of a student is remarkable, they never mind about his/ her ethnic origin, but join him/her. One discussant elucidated the reason why he prefers competence to ethnic affiliation, when he says,

> If bright students carry out assignments jointly with the average ones, the latter score good results. If the former do the assignment all alone, yes, the average students score good result but never gain knowledge. If I do assignments with outstanding students, my knowledge and skill will be enhanced (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

A female participant also explained the rationale behind opting for joining bright students in writing term paper.

> it is obvious that we do assignments with outstanding students. We, female students, do not carry out assignment supporting each other. We feel contempt for one another. We say ‘I don’t want to work with her’. We are comfortable when we work with male students. However, groups should have a balanced mix of the average and outstanding students. If students are given the discretion to form groups on their own, weak students would be left out and eventually they will fail. There-
fore groups’ composition should be mixed (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

It is also pointed out that there are occasions where

Average students also do assignments all alone. We join outstanding students to score good results. We team up with students having excellent class performance to score better results. But average students also from a group and seek the assistance of outstanding students to guide us (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

Contrary to the preceding view one participant argues,

Whenever an assignment is given, close friends come together and form group. Its advantage is that since we always meet, it is not that difficult to carry out the assignment. We share tasks. If groups are formed on the basis of alphabetical order you may join students whom you are not intimate. I recommend groups be formed on the free will of the individual (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

In a direct contrast to this view, a female participant who shared the trouble she had undergone said, “Last year we were told to form groups on our own. At last, my friend, an expatriate student and I were left alone. While the rest of the groups comprised six students each, only three of us doomed to work out the assignment” (Tigray students’ FGD participant). A discussant who openly expressed her contempt for the established trend of group work says:

I don’t support the discretion bestowed upon students to form groups on their own to do assignments. There are female and male students who do not actively interact with other students. These students scarcely get a chance to work with outstanding students or others (even average ones) … Had the instructors assigned them, they would have not been left out…There are students who have no friends. Students who lack interpersonal communication skills are destined to do assignments on their own…I would say this is not a good practice (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

With a similar fervor another participant argues:

I don’t commend the discretion given to students to form groups on their own free will. You don’t team up with a student simply because he is a top student. You rather opt for joining your friend or someone with whom you are intimate. The reason is simple; you do not interact with a student with whom you are not close. Even if both of us are less competent, I wouldn’t join other group. I would not abandon
my friend simply because I am at liberty to form a group with others. Unless you are close, you don’t ask a person to enlist you in his group… If instructors assign students in groups on the basis of their ability; those who are capable will support weaker students. The purpose of group work is either to improve the result of students or enable them to share ideas…Random assignment is suitable for me (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

In fact a view that despised group work altogether has also been transpired. “I abhor group work simply because not all students are responsible. They just tell you to do it by yourself or to that effect. What I like most in a person is not his ability, but the commitment he shows for the group work” (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

Participants of the Amhara Focus Group Discussion on the other hand noted that in a group work students co-opt their own kits and kin for membership. According to these discussants, the trend seems that once the groups are formed they will continue for an indefinite period probably up until graduation. A female participant, for instance, shared her observation by saying that “In our department a significant number of students belong to the Amhara ethnic group. Since I keep myself at distance, I have no interaction with my classmates. As groups are formed for assignment along ethnic line, they enlist their own folks and I often remain without a group” (Amhara students’ FGD participant). According to her the common practice is, “When instructors ask students to form a group for a term paper and submit names of members of groups, students coming from the same locality and who have identical ethnic background team up and submit their names” (Amhara students’ FGD participant). As a result, “The Southerners do form their own group. There is division even within the Amharas on the basis of locality… Students from Gojam do not mix up with students that of Gondar” (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

Similarly, a student-respondent, from the Amhara students’ Focus Group, who recounted his personal experience, exposed that ethnic affinity plays a pivotal role in group formation. He said,

Instructors give us the chance to form groups on our own discretion and when we form a group it does not come to my mind whether the guy is Amhara, Oromo or Tigre. But in the end, when I see the group composition I discover that all belong to my own ethnic group. I don’t do it intentionally. It could be said that intuitively there is some kind of propensity that draws us to our ethnic group (Amhara students’ FGD participant).
Another participant from the Amhara students’ FGD relates his personal experience, ostensibly, deviating a bit from the mainstream practice shared by members of the group. He said, “In my class there are Oromo and Amhara students. So far I have never carried out assignment with the Amhara students all alone. I have been working so far with different groups comprising Amhara and Oromo students” (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

On the other hand participants of the FGD commented that the bond among students in a classroom setting is loose. In line with this thesis one discussant remarked that,

Like any one I greet him (his classmate). Although I see him like any of my friends, there is no bond, per se, among us. For instance, in our class there is a practice of sharing materials among students. But an Oromo student never shares material other than his Oromo kin. When it comes to group assignment, an Oromo student enrolls Oromos in his group. If the size of the group is limited to five, you find five Oromo and five Amhara students team-up respectively and submit their names to the instructor. You do not find them mixing up (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

In the same vein, one more participant comments:

In a classroom setting, to some extent, there is division among students. Particularly the Oromos keep themselves aloof. There are occasions where the Amhara and Tigreans respectively keep themselves aloof as well. Often Southerners and Addis Ababa students tend to mix/assimilate. For instance, last time certain students initiated a trip… To make the journey possible a committee that organizes the trip has been formed. In the course of pondering over issue of financial contribution, a change of mind occurred. Certain students told us ‘Oromo students’ trip will be organized and facilitated by OPDO. We asked them ‘what is wrong if they join us … They answered …when we tour we listen to Oromifa (songs)… and talk in Ormoifa. Anyone who speaks Oromifa can join us… But this does not mean that we do not organize a trip with you’. We will do that’ (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

It is observed that during discussion participants of the Oromo students’ Focus Group gave little heed to the issue of group work. But again from the limited discussions on the issue it could be inferred that they mostly weigh competence and diligence to friendship in the event of constituting groups for the purpose of carrying out assignments or term papers. In addition, most of the participants have expressed that they have friends either in a class or outside class from other ethnic groups including Amhara and Tigreans. Some even mentioned that their intimacy is so strong that it never once crossed their
mind the idea of contemplating the ethnic identity of their friends (Oromo students FGD participants).

However, one of the instructors who participated in the study purports a different opinion. In his view:

(Students) mostly form groups on the basis of friendship. Normally what you observe is that students who stay together form groups and write papers. On the other hand a student who is unable to create friendship relation is marginalized. Even if you assign him in one of the groups he will ask you to let him work out the paper by himself on the ground that since they do not know him, they will alienate him. You hear similar complaints (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

By way of summary, all participants of the Focused Group Discussion invariably exposed that instructors shun from the responsibility of forming groups for the purpose of carrying out term papers or assignments. Discretion is bestowed upon students to team-up with whom they feel comfortable. It has, now, become clear that students, who have little inter-personal communication skills, frequently, pushed aside and as a result they are ill-fated to work out group work or term paper single-handedly.

In addition, those who allege that they prefer competence and diligence to ethnic affiliation seem almost on a par with those who claim group formation follows ethnic pattern. The practice on the ground reveals that the propensity to carry out group work along ethnic lines is fairly high provided that ethnic distribution in a class is proportional. From the lengthy discussion held with participants and on the basis of personal observation, at least, there could be three reasons why students tend to join their kinfolks in a group work. The first reason seems to be language barrier. A heterogeneous group presupposes a medium of communication other than the mother tongue of many of the group members. Usually, English and Amharic are the probable choices for medium of communication. English may not be the best choice of students, as considerable numbers of them lack the requisite proficiency. The next option is Amharic. But again the latter may not be acceptable due to the fact that significant number of students, who come from localities where vernacular languages, such as Oromiffa and Tigrigna, are widely spoken, may lack the proficiency of the language to communicate with. This in turn hampers students from interacting with group members. Consequently, these students may start feeling that the problem would not have occurred if they were to join students who speak their mother tongue. The other reason which is more pertinent to nationalist students is that
it would be hard to use the language that they associate it not only with age old eth-
nic oppression but also regard it as a culprit that arrested the development of their
own vernaculars. In effect, they may think that, if they were not joining heterogeneous
group, they would not have been forced to use a language that they abhor. Added to
this, language is one powerful marker of ethnic identity, among others. Using one's own
language is tantamount to asserting one's identity. Particularly, nationalist students may
think that speaking a language other than their own as a betrayal of their cause. The easi-
est way out of this trouble seems forming a homogeneous group embracing one's own
ethnic group. Besides, forming a group and working with one's own kinfolk could also be
seen, by nationalist students, as a strategy of solidifying solidarity among members of
the ethnic group.

4.3. Ethnic relations and controversial issues in class
discussions

Instructors who offer courses often deemed “politically sensitive” and who participated in
the study unanimously replied that regardless of the contentious issues entertained dur-
ing class discussions, they have neither encountered violent confrontation in person nor
have they experienced violence among students in their respective classes. In addition,
one of the instructors said that in his observation, class discussions, depending on the
subject tend to take either political or ethnic alignments. He comments:

Generally, there are groups whose tendency of openly defending the Constitution
is more pronounced. Probably… we cannot conclusively say, in clear terms, that
the class discussions take ethnic pattern … It could also be political orientation,
and if it is a political orientation, then the students who are defending the existing
political system are not coming only from one group alone. There are students
who have associations with the political system in a variety of ways, be it directly
or indirectly… At times… when the right to secession and other matters related to
self determination… land right (i.e.) property right, which is pertinent to land issue,
other similar constitutional… principles are raised and discussed, I observe differ-
ences… As far as issue of self determination is concerned, students who tend to
defend it have a broader base. This means that not only Tigrean students but also
students from Oromia and South openly defend the right to self determination. To
some extent there are students who argue that the right to self determination up to
secession should be prohibited. They contend that owing to the Eritrean secession,
we have lost access to sea and this has incurred damage on us. Most probably, it
can be guessed that those who advance this view... come from the Amhara region 
(Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor)

The instructor further said:

On such issues differences of opinion arise. I think it is good to see the issue in two 
ways. There is a political base...There could also be ethnic alignment. What interest 
me most is that, as far as self determination goes, it has a broader support base. 
Even if it is debatable and there is opposition to it and there is a difference (among 
the students) on its extent, when it comes to the right to secession enshrined in the 
Constitution, there are people, with a broader base, who have similar stand (Interview 
with ‘Y’ course instructor).

Another instructor who participated in the interview said that he encounters students 
who often look into issues through the prism of ethnicity during class discussions. The 
interviewee clusters these students into three groups. In his view, though the compet-
ting paradigms that emerge during discussions are two, in actual fact the class splits into 
three groups advancing their respective positions. According to him, in order to set the 
tone of the class discussion, by way of introduction, he first outlines the gist of the con-
tentious issues that have been dominating the Ethiopian political landscape for the last 
three or four decades. It reads:

As far as the Ethiopian history and the existing federalism are concerned, there 
are two images. The first version envisages that the Ethiopian state has existed for 
about 3000 years that it is a state where diverse people have been mingled, that it 
has survived against all odds in the past and it has continued existing, etc. Accord-
ing to this image the national oppression alleged to have been existed were too 
much exaggerated. Though there were some wrongs, they were insignificant and 
therefore it is not appropriate to amplify them. The other version of Ethiopian history 
is that all ethnic groups other than the Amhara have been subjected to national 
oppression, that they were treated ruthlessly, that they were denied the right to 
develop their culture and hence this history has to be changed. In order to redress 
the past wounds and history as well as to ensure Justice ethnic federalism is vital 
tool (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

He, moreover, remarked that after having set the context, to stimulate discussion, he 
often poses questions such as “Do you think that the new federal arrangement has ad-
dressed outstanding issues raised earlier on? What should be improved in the existing
federal arrangement?” According to him he gets fascinating reactions from students to the above questions. In his own words:

I often get amazing answers and many of the students who advance the image of unity-question: Is it not that the seed of difference in nationality or ethnicity has been sown by the government in power? Is it not the existing Constitution the one that is instilling more division rather than uniting the people? Why the former leaders are accused of perpetrating national oppression while they have created the modern Ethiopian state?’ They see the new federal arrangement as if it were totally alien and imported from without and imposed on the people. What struck me is that these students have been taught civic education. When the Constitution was promulgated probably they were primary school students. They are sons and daughters of today. Yet, they haven’t accepted it completely. There is a total denial (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

The interviewee has also shared his observation as regard to the deeply entrenched division within the proponents of ethnic federalism. Illuminating some of the contentious issue, he said,

Members of the other group pose questions not on the merits of ethnic federalism but on its implementation. They argue that the rights of nationalities are not respected, that the rights to self determination has not been promoted, that they are not fully exercising their rights to self administration…that the existing federalism is strikingly similar with that of Serbia, Yugoslavia, and Russia’s federalism, as it exists only in form but not in practice (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

The debatable issues often raised are stunningly similar across the classes where the three courses are offered. The observation of ‘Z’ course instructor and who participated in the interview seems to prove this assertion. According to him,

There is a course entitled Ethiopian Politics and Government in this department. At least on one occasion a serious conflict has erupted while the class was underway… Many instructors shun from offering the course subsequent to the assault of an instructor by infuriated Oromo students (Interview with ‘Z’ course instructor).

Recalling the reason that prompted the beating of the instructor, the interviewee recounted:
While giving reference materials for the course, the instructor made them (students) to copy excerpt from the book which was alleged to have dishonored Oromos and he was beaten by Oromo students. I was assigned to offer the course, when other instructors refused. If you properly handle the class students they learn how to adhere to the rules… Occasionally they ask you question in a crude language, but I let them ask what ever question they feel like to ask and I also attempt to respond to the questions within the academic remit (Interview with ‘Z’ course instructor).

He further said, the questions that are put forward by students are the mirror image of the political division existing in the country. It is not uncommon, in his view, to hear, in class, the political agenda of contesting political groups through the agency of students. He goes on to say,

For instance, an Amhara student opposing OLF political agenda asks you a question. A TPLF fan opposing OLF asks you a question and an Oromo student inquires in support of OLF… An Amhara student asks you a question supporting the Ethiopian unity. A TPLF devotee supporting the position of the government asks a question. Questions are raised in support or opposition to political groupings (Interview with ‘Z’ course instructor).

In addition, he noted that “Every time questions are raised from which ever quarter, I attempt to answer them with little anxiety. From the nature of the questions, you can easily have your own conjectures saying that this is TPLF’s question; that one is OLF’s issue; this one is AAPO’s query” (Interview with ‘Z’ course instructor). The interviewee contends that at times questions are raised not out of curiosity but are posed deliberately in provocative manner. Akin to this, the interviewee has described below his encounter:

A person who was not a student of that class often asks me unnecessary questions. Later students informed me that the guy was not their classmate. They also complained that he is wasting their time by asking irrelevant questions. Then I called the names of students for verification. Since his name was not in the list, I did not call him. Soon I told him that his name is not in the list. He argued that his name was not found in the list because he did not submit the registration slip to me. Then I notified him never to come again unless he brings a memo, from the Dean or the Department that warrants him to attend the class and I ordered him to leave the room immediately. He was defiant. Once again, I firmly told him that I will not teach
anyone who is not duly registered for the course and I ordered him to leave the class. He grudgingly left the room and since then he never showed up again (Interview with ‘Z’ course instructor).

Another instructor on his part underscored that in his class even “when contentious issues are raised and debated, there is no confrontation” (Interview with “Y” course instructor). He, however, remarked:

To a certain level, I hear from my students that… issues raised in the class discussion alleged to have continued even after the class wind-up, but, this time around the discussion appears to take ethnic grouping pattern. Some students complained that it would be difficult for them to forward their view on the ground that their opinions are misrepresented. They also aggrieve that views and position they purport for the purpose of academic discussions in the class are being interpreted as if it reflects their political stand and thereby cause unnecessary things on them” (Interview with “Y” course instructor).

The instructor further gave an account of his personal observation:

Subsequent to conflict incidents… some students assume the role of maintaining order. Later both of them (those who assum the role of maintaining order and the other students) come back to class when class resumes. But the incidences create some kind of permanent strain on their relations and this is observable. Normally, strained relation is created not only during the discussion of controversial issues. In the aftermath of violence whatever the cause may be… there will be a blame game, i.e. somebody has done me this and that and afterward the social relations including relation in the class could be disturbed (Interview with “Y” course instructor).

By way of conclusion instructors who offer courses deemed “politically sensitive” pointed out that they have neither encountered violent confrontation among students in their respective classes nor have they experienced physical challenges against them while conducting classes. Besides, all of them have indicated that the contentious issue subjected to intense class debate includes the Ethiopian history, particularly the two competing images of the Ethiopian state, the legitimacy of existing ethnic federalism, notably, the issues of self determination, the dichotomy between the rhetoric and the practice, deeds and words in implementing the existing federalism. The three instructors also arrived at more or less similar conclusion based on their respective experiences and observations. In view of that, one of the instructors summed up his remarks on two major points. The
First is as far as the validity of ethnic federalism is concerned, it has broad-based support among students across the ethnic divide. Secondly, although there is a difference as to its extent, the issue of self-determination has broad-based support among students. According to him, regarding the aforementioned issues, the political alignment that prevails over ethnic allegiance. The preceding view is largely shared by the two instructors as well. It is possible to deduce from the discussion held with the instructors, extremists on both ends of the political spectrum are still alive and working among students. It is also discernible from the discussion that ethnic division in the Ethiopian body-politics is reflected in a classroom setting through the agency of students.

4.4. Ethnic composition of students in dormitories: Homogeneity versus heterogeneity

Obviously, like many campuses, AAU Main Campus is characterized by diversity. According to Tobia and Foxman, cited in Tilahun, “While the impact of increased diversity on college and university campuses is, for the most part, positive, the disturbing backlash consisting of incidents of bigotry and inter-group strife is also prevalent” (Tilahun: 2007:13). In such a state of affairs “interaction with individuals who are different is filled with anxiety, frustration, misunderstandings, conflict, and tension, ... people tend to be together with those who make them feel comfortable and who support or share their values” (Tilahun: 2007:13). In this section of the study, one of the indicators used to gauge the relation of Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray students is testing whether the composition of students in a dormitory is characterized by diversity or not, whether the worries of Tobia and Foxman are real concerns in the Addis Ababa University Main Campus and if so what caused these concerns to happen.

One may wonder reading a statement affirming that students of the 60s and 70s also used to co-opt their own kith and kin to share rooms with them. Vaughan says,

At the end of the 1960s almost half the dormitory rooms were occupied by students on the basis of ethnic connections’... This situation at once reflected and fostered the prominence of ethnic affiliation, and Tigrigna, Oromiffa, and Gurage languages began to be spoken on and around the campus (Vaughan, 2003:135).

Vaughan attributed the sharing of rooms with members of one’s own ethnic group to “... the closure of the University boarding system after which ‘students from the same school background and language group tended to find accommodations together’” (Vaughan,
2003:135). The preceding quote suggests that even at the epoch where the revolutionary zeal of students reached its zenith, considerable number of students opted for living with members of their own ethnic groups provided that they get the opportunity.

When we come to the issue of ethnic composition of students residing in the dormitories of the Main Campus, the probability of cohabitation of students belonging to identical ethnic group in the same dormitory seems very high. On the account of the Amhara students’ Focus Group Discussion participants, even students who came from the same school would have a chance to live in the same dormitory. Generally, the diversity of students’ composition in dormitories seems fairly high during freshman when compared with second and third year. The actual practice on the ground indicates that students for the most part occupy dormitory on the basis of ethnic identity. As things stand now, one may safely infer that homogeneity is the rule while heterogeneity is the exception as far as ethnic composition of students in dormitories is concerned.

Discussant of the Tigray students’ Focus Group, for instance, explained the ethnic composition of students in his dormitory by saying,

> When I was a freshman student I shared dormitory with students coming from seven ethnic groups. Thus, I had the opportunity to know seven students and through them seven ethnic groups. By talking to them about their feeding habit, their way of life and everything I learned about them… They also learned the Tigrean culture even from the things I do unconsciously (Tigray students’ FGD participants).

Another participant described what is commonly practiced in the Main Campus regarding allocation of dormitories. He said:

> When you join the campus as a freshman student, you don’t know each other and you simply live with randomly assigned students. When you join second and third year, you pick your dorm mates and live with whom you choose… In second and third year you are told to come with your own liking… you select persons whom you are comfortable with to live together… Students more incline towards their kin. They say ‘he is my kinfolk.’ But allocation of dormitory should be like freshman (Tigray students’ FGD participants).

Unlike the observation of the previous student, at least three of the Tigray students’ Focused Group Discussion participants testified that they live with students having diverse ethnic background. One of them noted that “In our dormitory there are students from South, Oromiya, and Gurage. If an incident occurs we talk about the fact. We all know
each other. Often we speak similar things about the fact. If a problem arises, we arrive at a correct decision on how to solve it " (Tigray students’ FGD participant). Similarly, another discussant expressed that his dormmates “are students coming from more than 10 nationalities” and added that he has “smooth relations with all of them” (Tigray students FGD participant). In the same way one participant also said, “I interact with my entire roommates. I don’t mind whether he is my kinfolk. The only thing I want is that he has a similar temperament with me. So long as a person is as good as I am, I will be intimate to everybody” (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

Regardless of the positive notes made above, there are still reservations among the participants on the manner of allocations of dormitories. Some students argue that “They (students’ service) could have allocated on the basis of alphabetical order or department” (Tigray students’ FGD participant) instead of bestowing the discretion of co-opting their own dorm-mates upon students.

In line with this, Amhara Students who partook in the Focused Group Discussion have their own version of the reality. It is noted that “(Albeit) there are strong individuals that break this practice, the norm is to cohabit with one’s own kin and kith” (Amhara students’ FGD participants). Buttressing the earlier observation, one FGD participant remarked:

As soon as you arrive (at the Main Campus) as a freshman student, you simply wait for your turn lining-up. You don’t even know with whom you stood in the queue. You are told to go to a certain block. You go and report to the proctor that you are assigned in that block. The proctor will tell you to form a group of four, five, six, etc and come. These students team up with members of their ethnic group. To your surprise, even students who came from the same school occupy the same dormitory not-to-mention (let alone) students having the same ethnic identity (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

Sharing his own personal experience, the participant further said “Three of us who came from the same school, gave our name to the proctor and we were assigned in the same dormitory” (Amhara students’ FGD participant). Equally, describing the established practice in the Main Campus with respect to allocation of dormitories, one discussant noted that whether a student is second, third, or fourth year what often happens is that:

You go to the proctor. He will tell you to form a group of certain number … five. You form a five men group and go back to him but this time around co-opting students of your own ethnic group. The situation on the ground is that the University
is being divided. This is not a good (omen)…If you visit each and every dormitory; you can easily discover the ethnic identity of students living in the rooms. It is not diversified. I strongly oppose this practice because it is virtually dividing us. We want to share (experience). We want to learn language. I spent my college days with students who came from my locality. We have identical culture. We have similar attitude and in the end we leave the University. If the composition of students in a dormitory is diversified it will be good (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

An aggrieved participant of the Amhara student Focused Group Discussion recalled his freshman experience with deep disenchantment. Recounting his reminiscence, he said,

When I was freshman student, I was the only Amharic speaker in the dorm…Since majority of my roommate were Oromos, and Tigreans, they converse in their respective languages. I did not have a language that I claim to be exclusively mine. Even if I had that language no one was around with whom I can talk to (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

Interestingly, another participant from the same Focus Group came up with a narrative entirely different from the experience of the previous student.

While I was a freshman student, I was assigned in a certain block. I went there and asked the proctor to assign me in a dormitory. He asked me whether I have a friend or a person whom I know…I told him to assign me any where he wishes. He was astonished by my stance and assigned me in a dormitory and I went there… All of them were senior students. I was the only fresh student… and one of them asked me where I am from. I told him. Then he said ‘no problem! Henceforth whenever we talk issues that impinge on you, never mind, we will talk in Amharic. In as much as possible we would try not to use Oromiffia in the dorm until you adopt the environment… They treated me well. I was very much happy. After that I started uttering Oromiffa words. I stayed the whole year feeling very happy (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

Notwithstanding some positive experiences, the practice, by and large, suffers from inherent obsession of ethnic affinity. As one participant put it,

Students occupy dormitories predominantly on the basis of language. I classify the practice into two: There are students alleged to have been extremists or nationalists. There are also moderate ones. The latter never care to live with anyone…I would
say the nationalists are significant in number (Amhara students‘ FGD participant).

In addition, he said,

I recommend that the composition of students in dormitory be diversified. I am not comfortable with the dominant homogenizing trend. On my part, probably, it (disputes in dormitory) could be personal problem. We should not think that way in the first place. There are differences and acknowledging these differences we should live together tolerating one another (Amhara students‘ FGD participant).

Oromo students‘ Focused Group Discussion Participants like the other two groups reflected their respective views. They seem to concur that, for variety of reasons, students in the Main Campus tend to share dormitories with their own kinsmen. The statement made by one participant exhibits the degree of sensitivity of the issue. He said,” Often students whom I know ask me with whom I am sharing dormitory. This question is raised frequently…. In my dormitory, there is only one student coming from Oromiya. The rest are Amharas. We live together on our free will and mutual consent” (Oromo students‘ FGD participant). Similarly, another participant explained that he is comfortable with the diverse ethnic composition of his dormmates. According to him, in his dormitory, “there are Southerners, Afar, Gambella, Oromo, Tigray students. Since freshman we have been living together. And afterwards we agreed to continue living together and up until now we are together” (Oromo students‘ FGD participant).

Then again, a student who seems to question the relevance of the diverse composition of students in class or dormitory argued that the issue is mere rhetoric whose liability outweighs its benefits. According to him,

While students hate each other because of the idea they are espousing what is the purpose of being together? It may have good end result and it may also trigger conflict. This is not helpful for students, for (their) families and for the country as well. For instance, it (conflict) may cause dismissal of students from the Campus(Oromo students‘ FGD participant).

One participant put forward a bizarre idea that probably reflects the magnitude of the impending danger. The participant in his lengthy account said:

When I was a freshman, my friend alerted me that ‘this place is reserved for students of Oromiya. Take your seat here and enjoy your meal. Oromos do not at all share
dormitory with Tigreans. Likewise, the latter also on no account share the same dormitory with the Oromos. Although I feel I should think rationally, I am scared. Even if I love a person for he/she is human being, the situation instills in me fear and the other party may also feel scared as well. Thus in the future if they assign me to share dormitory with Tigreans, I will not join them, for I feel scared (Oromo students’ FGD participant).

Reflecting her personal experience, a female participant noted that “…during the (2007) inter ethnic violence, in female students’ dormitories, windows have been broken. They (female students) were also involved in fighting. Students who lived together in the same room for years and who love one another have harmed each other” (Amhara students’ FGD Participant).

Those who are in charge of dormitory service and who participated in the interview explained the modalities of allocation of rooms in the Main Campus. They said,

While allocating dormitories to freshmen students, mostly you do not get students who know each other beforehand from the region they come. If there are any, they are few in number. Students, thus, line up. What we often do is that we put student who consecutively lined up in a row into group of four. At times we let them team up into a group of four on their own (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

Sharing her observations one of the interviewees furtherer said:

Students exhibit common behavior. When they come as freshmen students they prefer to live with their kin coming from their respective regions. When he becomes a sophomore he wants to live with a student from his locality. When he joins third year, then he wants to share dormitory with his best friend. This is typical characteristics of students. During their first year in the campus, if they come from region-3 (Amhara region) they don’t bother you, they live together but when they get into second year a student from Gonder wants to share a room with a fellow from Gonder, and an Oromo looks for an Oromo when he gets third year he wants to live with his best friend (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

Normally, students tend to inhabit dormitories,

especially on the basis of ethnicity. Oromo Joins Oromos. Heterogeneous group consisting of Southerners, Amhara, Oromos seldom come to forming a group. What
is observed in a majority of cases is, Tigrean students live with Tigreans. Likewise the Oromos live together. The others also do the same (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

According to these informants, rarely do “Students come together along department lines for the purpose of studying together. These students (who team up along department line) are matured ones” (Interview with dorms’ coordinators). They remarked that “If there is squabble in male students’ blocks either it is caused by ethnicity or music (noise pollution)” (Interview with dorms’ coordinators). Also, they pointed out, “If, for instance, the Oromos, Amharas, Tigreans live in adjacent rooms in the same floor, there could be exchange of abusive words”(Interview with dorms’ coordinators). The interviewees further noted that generally “…heterogeneous groups live in mutual respect” (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

In a bid to drawing a parallelism between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of students residing in dormitories, one of the interviewees imparted her observation by saying that,

There were Oromo and Tigrean students, who have been living in the same dormitory up until graduation. Later they became friends and now they are working together. I know also students from Region 3 (Amhara region) who lived together in the same dormitory but, now, who do not want even to see each other (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

Moreover, the interviewees have also explained the rationale behind giving students the discretion to choose their dorm mates. They said:

Giving students the discretion to select their own dormmates aims at minimizing their complaints. For instance, if they are told to form a group of four and if they come teaming up with students whom they choose, they have no reason to complain to the proctor because they are the ones who selected their roommates on their own free will. Each of them joined the group on their own choice. The fact is the liberty to select their dormmate has created peace. It is good for us. It is also good for the proctors as well (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

In addition, they disclosed some of the sources of conflict among students in dormitory life. According to these informants:
In the female student block, students dispute with proctors on the ground of intentionally skipping the time of Tigrigna television program while opening on time the Oromiffa television program transmission. This controversy occurs in the male blocks as well. (When this happens) they (students) go all the way to investigate the background of the proctor, his ethnic identity and his political persuasion…They come and complain to us that the proctor did not come on time to open television program (the program could be either Tigrigna or Oromiffa) (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

Likewise, the interviewees also mentioned that “Why Oromiffa?’ This word is uttered in males’ blocks, when television is opened during Oromiffa program transmission airtime while the Tigrigna program transmission airtime is skipped” (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

It is clear that in the allocation of dormitories, the dormitory service employees and proctors play little role since they confer with students the freedom to choose their dorm mates. Seizing the opportunity, students team-up along ethic line to occupy dormitories. Equally, it is also true that there are also heterogeneous groups embracing students belonging to as many as ten ethnic groups and who live in the same dormitories. Some of these students joined the heterogeneous groups by mere accident, while others mixed with the diverse groups on purpose. The bottom line seems that ethnic affinity dictates the Main Campus students’ compositions in dormitories. Put it differently, in the Main Campus dormitories, students’ composition is characterized by homogeneity although such practices defy the defining feature of the former, i.e. multiculturalism.

There are a lot of conjectures about the reason behind students’ preference for cohabiting with fellows coming from identical ethnic group. As has been discussed elsewhere in this study, the first reason could be language related matters. The second and probably most relevant factor is security issue. As long as there is mistrust and feeling of animosity, real or perceived security threats grip the minds of students. The remarks made by the Oromo students’ Focus Group Discussion participant is a archetypal example that exhibits how a perceived threat has been pivotal for his decision not to share dormitories with students belonging to a particular ethnic group. In this regard, cohabiting with one’s own ethnic group seems a coping mechanism for a real or perceived personal security threats.

The findings of the study also brought into the limelight the fragility of ethnic relations in the Main Campus citing how a simple thing such as delay in or failure to opening Oromiff-
fa or Tigrigna television program transmission could easily turn inter-ethnic relations sour or exacerbate ethnic tension in students’ residential quarters. Besides, ethnicity is deemed one of the culprits (noise pollution stemming from tape recorder or compact disc players is the other one) that stir up conflicts in dormitories.

4.5. Ethnic identity and role of students as promoters of public cause

Tracing back to the annals of history, one may come across the narratives of University students’ of the 60s and 70s who spearheaded the struggle for social transformation. The student movement advocated for the respect of human rights of citizens. They campaigned for ending serfdom by popularizing the organizing theme of their struggle “Land to the Tiller”. They strived for doing away with national oppression and domination. What’s more, in the face of the reprisal of the regime, they stood firm to promote the aforesaid societal issues until the demise of the monarchical rule. Bearing in mind the legacy of the earlier generation of University students, in this section of the study, an attempt is made to investigate the question, whether ethnic identity has any effect on students’ role as promoters of public cause. The issue has been extensively discussed in all the Focus Group Discussions conducted as well as the interview sessions held with instructors. The observations of participants of the study who reflected their respective point of view on this issue and the subsequent analysis are presented below.

4.5.1. Change in the political context

Regardless of the noticeable differences on the reason behind the absence of a unified stand among students to promote public cause, participants, by and large, seem to agree that there are a lot of challenges that frustrate efforts to forge a common stand even on minor issues. One instructor attributed the absence of unified voice among University students largely to the radical change that transpired in the political context of the country. The interviewee recounted:

The context in which the 60s and the 70s student movement took place has now changed in many ways... To some extent this trend might have started in the Derg era. During the Haile Selassie reign, in my belief, the University had been detached from the government and its functionaries. It had its own system. And there were tendencies of opposing the government in unison, among students... There was a unified voice among students against the monarchy. Students, from which ever background they come, were challenging a very backward monarchical system...
with progressive view. It was monarchy against progressive students. Therefore, it was possible to draw a clear demarcation line between the students... and the regime. This created a fertile ground for the student movement... Students had a unified voice since the government had visible deficiencies. They had the unity to challenge clearly observable problems. But, now this is not the case (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

He goes on to say that in the country’s political landscape there are marked differences between the political situation of 60s and 70s on one hand and the present day Ethiopian reality on the other. The interviewee argued that in the present day Ethiopia:

The government and students are not that far apart. Regardless of the shortcomings that this government is being criticized, for, there are still significant voices that support it... I see that this has diluted the relationship among students. Thus, you cannot have now one voice at the University level. The change in the political system by itself is one factor that distinguishes the student movement of the Haile Selassie regime from the present day scenario. At that time the University was an ivory tower, within the political system. Freedom of expression and everything had been practiced in the campuses alone. Outside the university they were luxuries. Therefore the University used to serve as a platform to carry out these activities. Nowadays, to some extent, these problems have been addressed. There is a Constitution. There are rights, to some extent, exercised by everyone. Therefore, there is a limited ground that can create a singular unity among students. I think this is an important reason for the difference (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

4.5.2. Ethnicity

Also the interviewee has not overlooked the role of ethnicity in undermining students’ unified voice. He said:

In a different form...there are ethnic issues. There are different layers of relationships, based on peoples, nations, and nationalities between University students and the outside world... Therefore, certain group of students might feel even more associated with the government than with the student body. This spurs the existence of diverse opinions. Whether it is good or bad, students are now divided (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

On the other hand, another instructor attributed the problem to the demise of Marx-
ism, the dominant ideology of the time, which underpins the unity of purpose among students of the 60s and 70s. Comparing Marxism with the divisive identity politics, the instructor asserts:

First the ideology of the era of the 60s and 70s in which the generation aspiring for a change passed through was Marxism...Marxism, Bolshevism, were common to all students. It was a period where you put your demands jointly and widely involve for a change. Marxism made possible to carve out a common agenda...After Marxism had been consigned to oblivion; identity issue filled the ideological vacuum and emerged as a dominant credo. For instance, in (today's) Ethiopia identity issue is pervasive. In the past the overriding agenda was class struggle and defending the oppressed classes had been deemed the most honorable task. The order of the day has now become to stand for one's own ethnic group...there is a shift in the agenda. In the 60s and 70s it was class struggle and standing for the oppressed class (was a lofty cause). The advocates of the oppressed used to come invariably from all nations and nationalities and the solution prescribed for national oppression was doing away with class oppression. Marxism was a common ideology. This does not, however, mean that question of national identity has never been an issue even then, but the dominant paradigm was class approach. When Marxism is relegated to oblivion the identity issue in the form of ethnicity or religion took the ascendancy (Interview with 'Z' course Instructor).

The interviewee stated that ethnic identity has filled the ideological vacuum left by Marxism. According to him Marxism has not only been a dominant ideology in Ethiopia but also in many countries around the world as well. In his view:

The global political trajectory has also been changed. It is not only here in Ethiopia even at global level identity politics (has become pervasive)... For instance the war in Eastern Europe has been caused by identity issue. Nowadays in Africa mostly people stand not for class interest, but in defense of identity questions. It is the identity issue that reigns supreme...There is a shift (in agenda) both in Ethiopia and across the globe as well (Interview with 'Z' course Instructor).

As the interviewee rightly pointed out, “naturally identity is not inclusive. The trend is you stand for you own nationality and religion and I stand for my nationality and religion (Interview with 'Z' course Instructor). The interviewee while elaborating his thesis cited the Ethiopian experience as a show case.
Of all questions, if identity issue assumes prominence, then you are at loggerheads with me… You run into conflict not only against the government but also against me… What you describe it as democracy; I may not take it as democracy… For instance, if you take the Amhara elite what they regard as democracy is more or less restoration of Imperial Ethiopia. For them this is not a sin. They believe that EPRDF’s ethnic politics is the handiwork of narrow nationalist Tigrean and Oromo elite. When it comes to the Oromo elite the fundamental problem of Ethiopia is the attempt to establish the Abyssinian supremacy as it happened in the past by the Amhara and today by Tigrean elite. Averting the Abyssinian supremacy or seceding from Ethiopia and forming the Oromiya republic is what they call democracy. As far as TPLF is concerned it contends that ‘it is nurturing democracy and democracy is flourishing in Ethiopia, that the yesteryear chauvinists and today’s narrow nationalists who wreak havoc (Interview with ‘Z’ course Instructor).

He goes on to say:

Whether it is due to privilege or other reason for instance if you are a Tigrian elite you envision Ethiopia through your own lens. You start with the narrative that TPLF has liberated Ethiopia; that democracy is flourishing in the country. If you are from the Amhara you state that (The TPLFs) let alone to bringing about democracy, they are dismantling Ethiopia, that they are working hard to dismantle the remaining part of the country… that they intentionally put in place what they called federalism along ethnic line. OLF supporter claims that ethnic federalism has not been implemented per se and they allege that the regional autonomy put in place is not satisfactory. It advocates that Oromos cannot be liberated anything minus independence (Interview with ‘Z’ course Instructor).

Another instructor who took part in the interview thoroughly analyzed how the unity among students for a joint action is persistently declining to the level that they cannot even stand in unison to ensure the quality of service provision the university caters, let alone to jointly promote public cause. The interviewee, recollecting his college days’ experience and comparing it with scenarios that transpired later remarked,

When the protest against Eritrean secession was staged (in the early 90s), nearly all university students were involved. But when it comes to the land redistribution issue, for the first time, the Amhara region students all alone staged the protest. Students from other ethnic groups virtually shunned from showing their solidarity”
He further noted that the same thing had happened at another time. He recounted:

If I could remember, (Oromo) students requested the (University) administration to celebrate the Oromo culture. They got the green light. The organizers planned to invite the Gadda band to stage a concert during the cultural event. But, there was an urge on the organizers of the event to invite a musical band affiliated to the ruling OPDO to stage the concert. Soon disagreement cropped up… Some of the students who were alleged to have masterminded the conflict were put under custody… As a result, students gathered in front of the President office; they were Oromo students. No student from other ethnic groups joined them in the protest… for that matter the former were attending class… During break, Oromo students from my class who were not in the protest joined their colleagues. After the break, I resumed the class and soon I discovered that some of my students were not around. The rest of the students were learning as if nothing had happened. This was strange experience, for me, because I was teaching students who knew that their classmates were arrested, but they dogged to keep on learning with ease. In this incidence too, ethnic division was noticeable (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

Gradually, according to this informant:

The issue of unity has been put into the back-burner and the demands of students shifted to the right of students. As a result, it has become the question of bread, the question of removal of police from the campus. The organizing themes for the struggle became issues related to the concern of students. When ethnic federalism is deeply entrenched and ethnic identity become a subject that matters most, students’ demand even for survival (food, other services) has been superseded by nationality questions. Consequently, the issue became the question of redistribution of Gojam farmers’ land; the issue became who should stage the concert: the Gadda band or the OPDO sponsored band? (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

The interviewee ascribes the cause for students’ fragmentation to ethnicity. In his view:

Issues have taken ethnic pattern because of the division created among students; henceforth I don’t have any illusion that students will stand together backing cross-cutting issues given the existing condition. I don’t think that the student body promotes national political agenda; even economic issues for that matter… During the
national election (2005) there were certain things that transpired. Even these developments presupposed political affiliation. For instance in events that unfolded following the June riot, the issue became not a question of national unity and other national agenda but an issue of party loyalty (Instructor with ‘X’ course instructor).

Students who participated in the Focused Group Discussion asserted that, due to variety of reasons, there is no unified voice among students. For instance, the negative response of sizeable number of Oromo students’ FGD participants to the question, whether they will protest if human rights violations are committed, corroborate the all pervasive apathy and lethargy seen among students towards violations of fundamental rights and freedoms. Apparently, considerable number of students replied that they will not protest even if they see violations of rights of a person in the Campus. They attributed to a number of reasons for their claim including but not limited to threats of personal security, apathetic feeling that views protest as a futile exercise as well as the lame excuse that alleges whether they protest or not “no one gives a damn to respond to such things.” Only a few of the respondents claimed that they will protest if they see violations of rights invoking what they have done in the past.

A discussant from the Amhara students’ Focused Group, on his part, revealed the difficulty of setting a common agenda even among classmates let alone mobilizing the student body to rally behind a nationwide issue. Sharing his personal experience the participant said,

Last year there were widespread rumors alleging that the Sudanese have annexed Ethiopian territory around Metema…When we raised the issue to be discussed in class there was a challenge from government supporters. Others also claimed that they are neutral. Because of this disagreement we couldn’t discuss the issue (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

On another note, though they differ as to the reasons, almost all discussants of the Focus Group Discussions seem to concur that there is no platform where students meet and thrash out all matters of common concerns including cross cutting issues. Oromo students’ Focus Group Discussion participants with a strikingly similar tone underscored that the reason behind the absence of a platform is fear of disturbances, more specifically, threats of eruption of violence among students of different ethnic groups. One participant from the same group described “lack of maturity” as the main reason behind the nonexistence of a forum for deliberation of cross cutting issues. He remarked:
There is no forum because majority of the students pursuing their studies in the Main Campus are under 20 years of age... If one ethnic group is provoked, even if the thing told is accurate... it may trigger a lot of things. Lack of maturity causes serious damage (Oromo students’ FGD participant).

In conclusion, the findings of the Focused Group Discussions and interviews clearly indicate that in the post 1991 Ethiopia it is implausible to find out substantial number of students who are committed to popularize cross cutting issues, as has been the case in the 60s and 70s. Unlike the Haile Selassie regime, the government in power has managed to garner the support of certain portion of the students through the implementation of ethnic federalism which diluted the unified voice of students. At the moment, there is “a limited ground that can create a singular unity among students” (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

As expected, “(politics of) identity is not inclusive. The trend is you stand for you own nationality and religion and I stand for my nationality and religion” (Interview with ‘Z’ course instructor). Considerable number of students view both their relations and the views of other people through the prism of ethnicity. As a result no two students belonging to different ethnic groups seem to share similar view regarding one issue. One may, thus, safely infer that ethnicity, as a dominant ideology, has debilitated students’ unity. By the same token, students seem, now, powerless to transcend the ethnic divide. They failed to appreciate their commonalities that necessitate them to stand in unison when the need so requires. The net effect of this deep seated division is an abysmal failure on the part of students to discharge their moral duty of playing the lead role in a society as member of the intellectual community and as a public conscience.

4.6. The trend of solving differences among students: Amicable vs. non amicable ways

From the discussions of the preceding sections of the study one may infer that the relation of students belonging to the three ethnic groups is mostly characterized by mistrust, suspicion, fear and at times violence. It is also possible to surmise that stereotyping, pejorative labeling and mutual recrimination seem to be widespread phenomena in the Main Campus. In this subsection attempt will be made to briefly analyze the manner in which students resolve their difference in the event of disagreement or disputes.

It is worthwhile to recite here that students of the 60s also had undergone similar experi-
ence as well. According to Vaughan,

Tension seems to have been developing between the three major student language groups: Tigrigna-, Oromiffa- and Amharic-speakers. In one instance it resulted in a ‘serious fight involving these two groups of students [Tigrean/Eritrean and Amhara] which went on for several days, reportedly on a ‘tribal basis’ at the Laboratory School of the Faculty of Education in 1967” (Vaghuan, 2003:135).

As one participant rightly noted, in the Main Campus (this could also be true in other campuses as well), “There are already defined categories…Since the division has already been created, friendly relations are determined on the basis of ethnic affiliation or political alignment” (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor). It is noteworthy that the stereotypical views and pejorative labeling do have a role to play in reinforcing the division within the student body in general and among students of the three ethnic groups in particular. The words of a female Oromo student who participated in the Focused Group Discussion signify how stereotyping and pejorative labeling griped the minds of the student community. In her view, “members of other ethnic groups perceive Oromo students as racist…” (Oromo students’ FGD participant). In the same way, the perceptions of the other two ethnic groups towards one another seem to be tainted with negative images. For instance, the derogatory labeling commonly associates Oromo students with ‘narrow nationalism’. It lays blame on them of showing propensity of some sort to secession. Suspicion of being sympathizers, if not member, of Oromo opposition political groups is widespread. Equally, Tigrean students are identified with the government in power and are perceived not only as ardent defenders of the regime in power but also seen as privileged ones. Similarly, the Amhara, are perceived as mischievous chauvinist skunks who are desperately aspiring to restore their lost political dominance at any cost.

On the other hand, the discussions held with students, instructors, persons working in students’ service, informal discussions held with different individuals as well as personal observations of the researcher seem to suggest that the relations among students of the three ethnic groups is fraught with grudge, suspicion and threat. The following observation of an interviewee clearly corroborates this assertion:

Amhara students have no clearly visible alliance. Their alliance is predominantly regional. Normally they greet each other… But strong bond is observable on the basis of locality. There is Gojames’ group. There is Weloyes’ group. There is Gonderes’ group… The reason behind this fragmentation is that there is no much perceived
threat. Normally Amhara and Ethiopianness is, more or less, deemed identical. This feeling is there among the Amharas. That group thinks that it is mainstream Ethiopian. Therefore the ‘minority mentality’ is reflected among students that belong to other ethnic groups. Mostly tension is observed between Tigrean and Oromo students (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

The interviewee further elaborates why the tension between the two groups is so much pronounced:

When we say friendship along ethnic line, for instance, an Amhara student creates friendship with his Amhara kin. An Oromo student looks for an Oromo for a friendship. A student from Tigray creates friendship with his/her Tigrean kin. These kinds of friendships are not mere friendship alone. They are reflected in all social activities starting from living in the same dormitory to exchanges of greetings to accompany one another to dining together in cafeteria. In addition there is another observable grouping particularly among the Oromos. There are Oromos that are affiliated to the ruling OPDO. On the other hand there are other Oromo students … who have unflinching stance on the issue Oromos’ self determination. The latter constitute significant number…; because of the political alliance, the latter are closely knitted. In essence the friendship even goes beyond a shared ideology. Rather it is a security issue since there is an alleged security threat said to have been posed by the other(group), they must stay together to protect one another. So, the confrontation unifies and makes them more closely knitted. Similarly when it comes to Tigrean students albeit there is no internal division there are students who feel more threatened (Interview with ‘X’ course instructor).

There seems to be a consensus among the participants of the study that the tolerance limit among students is very slim, if not zero. The remarks of one of the participants of the study exemplify students’ ill-temperedness and belligerency. “Though infrequent, I have encountered conflicts. Conflicts are ignited emotionally. Someone… my friend may emotionally utter abusive words that taints my family or my ethnic group. I will take a prompt measure” (Oromo students’ FGD participant). Indeed, in the face of strained relations, wrong perceptions, and stereotypes creating communication channel seems very improbable to address real or perceived problems. What is most perplexing in this regard is that in the lengthy discussions held with different participants no mention has been made about any effort on the part of the University leadership to improve inter-ethnic relations within the Main Campus. One instructor openly said “There are no sufficient
forums where students independently discuss the responsibilities... they have toward each other, how to respect persons who is different from... them and the significance of these values” (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

Participants have their respective conjecture as to why the University leadership has failed to initiate a dialogue forum. In the main, the thesis of “threat of imminent violence” seems the reason behind the absence of a dialogue forum. Considerable number of the Oromo Students Focused Group Discussion participants upholds this conjecture. A discussant, for instance, remarked that “If we create such a thing (forum) instead of love we create turmoil. Since everybody has a grudge he will speak it out his grievances and then the situation will get out of hand” (Oromo students’ FGD participant). The other participant also argued in a similar tone saying that “If a forum is created to bring us all together, the harm outweighs the benefit. I think it has no advantage other than ensuing conflict” (Oromo students’ FGD participant). Also another student-participant comments, “If a forum is organized and cross cutting issues are raised disagreement may surface” (Oromo students’ FGD participant). Still one more participant noted “There are people who allege that they are not Ethiopians. Since there is a difference (if a forum is organized) riot will break out. This is my personal feeling” (Oromo students’ FGD participant).

Tigray students’ Focused Group Discussion participants have a divided opinion on the issue at hand. One participant for instance ascribed the nonexistence of the forum to the “fear of violence.” He argued, “The reason why the University administration refrained from creating the platform is due to the fear that convening students for discussion may lead them into verbal warfare and this will soon degenerate into conflict” (Tigray students’ FGD participant). Likewise, a student who maintains similar view also remarked that “There is a fear that the Main Campus is an epicenter where most of the conflict begins. There is a feeling that if students assemble conflict erupts” (Tigray students’ FGD participant). Other participants attributed the non-existence of the forum to yet another reason, notably, “distrust.” Contrary to the preceding conjectures one participant asserted that “Students have no motivation. If students submit their demand that they have a plan to create a forum, it would have been established. But, there is distrust (on the part of students)” (Tigray students’ FGD participant). In the same vein, a student-participant argued that “There is a feeling that even if they (students) are given a chance they may not use it, for they have already made up their mind. The existence or non-existence of a forum has no meaning. They have already alienated themselves” (Tigray students’ FGD participant). Another discussant notes that the reason behind the absence of the forum is that “students’ focus is not a national/current issues. Aside from pondering over it in person, I
presume that there is no student that is concerned about question why such things happened in this country” (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

The Amhara students’ Focused Group Discussion participants’ view is no different from the majority of the respondent that underpins ‘threat of violence.’ For instance, one of the participants noted “At times what immediately slips into our mind is, if the forum is organized issues that stir up emotions to run high would be raised and thereby trigger conflict. We prefer not to raise it at all… Even students could not openly talk about the problem. But the problems are getting worse” (Amhara students’ FGD participant). Likewise, another participant a bit elaborated the reason behind the nonexistence of a forum for facilitating dialogue among students.

If a certain problem happens, the easiest thing, for students, is resorting to wanton destruction, i.e. they smash offices, classrooms using whatever they get around, be it stone or otherwise. They don’t even spare a person. Such violent behavior creates fear in the minds of University administration officials. I think the latter refrains from creating a platform because of the fear that if students are assembled and disagreement arises, as usual, they will wreak havoc (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

But again the same interviewee ascribed another reason for the absence of the forum. He said, “The administration knows full well if the opportunity is created students have a lot to say. They also feel that if they gather students and create the opportunity (for them) it will burst and get out of hand” (Amhara students’ FGD participant).

If fear or threat of violence is the dominant narrative for the absence of a forum, then, it would be farfetched to tell convincingly that there is healthy relationship among students. If there is no mechanism in place to create communication channel to eliminate wrong perception and start dispassionate discussion among students, it would be implausible again to anticipate students to resolve real or perceived differences or any dispute that may arise amicably. Since there is little bond among students that bind them together, the possibility of resorting to violence, in the event of disagreement, is wide open. In other words, the prospect of peaceful settlement of disagreements, among students, seems very slim. The outbreak of the 2007 violence is a case how minor disagreements can easily escalate into widespread violent ethnic conflict. In 2007 the dispute over honoring the agreement reached among students to continue the hunger strike abruptly took ethnic character and eventually degenerated into violent clashes between Tigray and Oromo students. One of the Tigray students’ Focus Group Discussion partici-
pants described the incident in the following manner:

They were also on hunger strike for one or two days. The protest soon turned into smashing of windows. But some of the students refrained from involving in this action and before long the students were divided into two groups. While the one involved in the smashing of windows continued its disturbance, the other group that abstained from taking part in the disturbance decided to end the hunger strike. The former resented the latter’s decision of quitting the hunger strike and this triggered the violence (Tigray students’ FGD participant).

Participant of the Oromo students Focused Group Discussion, on his part, explained the situation:

Certainly a person was dead. He was an Oromo student. The food has been contaminated. There was an agreement to go for hunger strike. Initially all students have protested in unison… (Later) others breached the agreement and end the hunger strike… As a result the conflict erupted… Though the incident happened only for one day, class has been interrupted for about a week (Oromo students’ FGD participant).

Although division has been more pronounced between Amhara, Oromo and the Tigray students the trait is observable across ethnic groups as well. One participant from dormitory service expressed her observation:

I have never seen anything that unites students other than expressing their grief, in unanimity, in time of mourning. Whoever he may be, whatever his ethnic background or his department is, if a student dies all of them wail… In the event of death, they are one in lamentation… I have also come across conflict (among students)… In such incident, when they fight, they do not even seem that they are human beings (Interview with dorms’ coordinators).

She further said, when there is crisis “even offices, windows, lecture rooms, dormitories are smashed. They do such kinds of things… They are unified only in the event of mourning” (Interview with dorms’ Coordinators).

To sum up the foregoing discussion, there is no interaction among students in general and the Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students in particular. No mechanism has been in place to improve relations among students with the view to building mutual trust and
tolerance. In such state of affairs, minor disagreement can easily kindle violent ethnic conflict, as has been the case in 2007. Regrettably, the findings of the study indicate that students seem to give no heed to interact let alone to solve their differences through dialogue. Absence of interaction often paves the way for employing violent means as the sole strategy of solving disagreements.

For all intent and purposes, overplaying ethnicity is counterproductive. Deplorably, students, by overemphasizing ethnicity, seem to paying little attention to the nationwide aspiration, i.e., creating one economic community. Normally, “If ethnicity is left to its own, it may create problems. If it is not backed by building political culture, through order and political maturity, it will be destructive” (Interview with “Y’ course instructor). As things stand now,

At the University level, proper guidance is not given to student as regards how to socialize, what it means to be part of symbolic community and responsibilities expected from them not only as intellectuals and leaders of the development of their communities which they come from but also to Ethiopia as a whole. This is a serious limitation (Interview with “Y’ course instructor).
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Conclusions

The findings of the discussions held with the three instructors indicate that the contentious issue subjected to intense class debate includes the Ethiopian history, notably, the two competing images of the Ethiopian state, the legitimacy of existing ethnic federalism, more specifically the issues of self determination as well as the dichotomy between the rhetoric and the practice in implementing the existing federalism. Also, as far as the existing ethnic federalism is concerned, the findings of the study seem to indicate that the former seems to have a broad based support among students irrespective of the differences in their ethnic backgrounds.

Similarly, the study has also revealed that regardless of the difference in its extent, the issue of self determination seems to have enjoyed a broad based support among students having different ethnic backgrounds. In addition, when it comes to the issue of ethnic federalism and self determination, one thing that has come out from the discussion seems that political alignment prevails over ethnic allegiance among students. One can also deduce from the findings of the study that extremists on both ends of the political spectrum are still alive and working among students. It is also discernible that the pervasive division in the Ethiopian body-politics that coincides with the marked ethnic cleavages and its cogent influence is vividly felt both in the campus and classroom setting through the agency of students.

The findings of the study disclosed that there are students who seem to be detached from the reality and who still purport a one-Ethiopia image. These students are adamant to accept even the existence of national oppression in the past. They down play the need for a change in the political structure as well as its ideological underpinning. On the other hand, the flipside of this extremism is also observed among students who are hostage of the narratives of the past ethnic domination and who vigorously pursue secessionist agenda. In addition, the study also unveiled those students who are merely posturing that they are more affiliated to the University administration and by extension to the
government in power have also played their part in exacerbating suspicion, mistrust, and animosity among students of the three ethnic groups.

Nurturing sense of unity, developing mutual respect and tolerance, and laying the foundation for multiculturalism among students coming from different ethnic backgrounds, require a deliberate policy measures that ensures the diversity of students in every respect including but not limited to classrooms, dormitories, and in all campus life to say the least. When it comes to group formation for the purpose of carrying out assignments, instructors often give freedom to students to team up on their own volition. As a result, students using the opportunity form groups largely along ethnic lines.

A number of conjectures have transpired as to why students choose to carry out group work with their kinfolks. One reason, among others, that could prompt students to join a homogeneous grouping seems to be language related problem. Students feel much more comfortable and easily interact with their group members if they draw on their mother tongue. Naturally, heterogeneous grouping deprives students the opportunity to use his/her mother tongue, during a group work, which, in turn, deters their active participation. This could be a ground for a student to opt for joining a homogenous group. Also in a political environment highly charged with ethnic identity sentiment, the contribution of nationalism in the formation of homogeneous group cannot easily be overlooked. The findings of the study suggest that at least there was one occasion where dispute broke out the moment some students, in a group, switched the medium of communication to Amharic for the reason that they were unable to convey their ideas in English.

Regarding allocations of dormitories, the findings of this study unveiled that the dormitory service employees and proctors grant students the liberty to choose their own dorm-mates. In line with this scheme, students who team-up on their own volition in four, five, six are assigned to the same dormitory. Needless to say, the scheme largely gives a leeway for ethnically biased dormitory allocation. On the other hand, the findings of the study also indicate that there are dormitories inhibited by students coming from as many as ten ethnic groups. Some of them formed groups consisting of students with diverse ethnic backgrounds by mere coincidence while others intentionally join groups characterized by ethnic diversity. The bottom line is that students’ composition in dormitories is mainly characterized by homogeneity.

There are a lot of conjunctures as to why students prefer to live with their kinfolks in a
dormitory. Probably the most valid reason could be threat of personal security. Real or perceived security threats grip the minds of students so long as there is mistrust and feeling of animosity among students belonging to different ethnic groups. The remarks of an Oromo student who participated in the focus group discussion and which is cited elsewhere in this writing reveals how real or perceived threats can prompt individuals to look for a safe haven where they feel secured. Presumably, cohabiting with members of one’s own ethnic group seems a coping mechanism or means of averting security threats and ensuring individual safety. The other reason could be living with members of one’s own ethnic group provides students the space to discuss any matter including political issues and of course exercise their languages with a greater freedom.

In addition, the study also exposed that even delay or failure to open Oromiffa or Tigrigna television program transmission has been identified as one of the incidents that tries not only the patience of ethnic nationalists but also foment ethnic tension in students’ residential quarters. What’s more, noise pollution emanating from tape recorders or compact disc players and ethnicity are deemed the two major culprits that stir up conflicts in dormitories.

On the basis of the findings of the study, it is a bit difficult to speak about the Amharas as contending force, in ethnic competition prevalent in the Main Campus. One reason, among others, attributable to this could be, Amhara students predominantly think that they are mainstream Ethiopians who transcend ethnicity. The other reason could be they are too fragmented to advance a common position. Despite the foregoing facts, there are nationalists who advocate for restoration of the old system of rule under the guise of Ethiopian nationalism. When it comes to Oromo and Tigray students, they seem to be highly ethnically mobilized. Consequently, they tend to perceive each and every move through ethnic lens and hence they are the major protagonists in the ethnic competition.

The findings of the Focused Group Discussions and interviews clearly show that it seems far-fetched to envision commitments on the part of students to popularize cross cutting issues or a nationwide agenda. One reason, among others, is that the government, by introducing ethnic federalism has garnered the support of students whose number cannot be taken too lightly. In effect, unlike the 60s and 70s the plurality of ideas in the Main Campus has diluted the unified voice of students. Based on the findings of the study, it is also possible to conclude that the emergence of ethnicity, as a dominant ideology, has a lot to do with debilitating students’ unity. As things stand now, substantial number of students views their relations and actions through the prism of ethnicity. Consequently,
it seems improbable to find out two persons belonging to different ethnic groups who share same view, say, on issue of democracy, human rights and other similar matters. By and large, they emerge as proponent and opponent on any one issue subject to inquiry.

Weisel, quoted in Tilahun argues, “While some graffiti, for example, are meant to entertain, some are directly targeted at attacking a certain group. Among the various types of graffiti ideological graffiti, such as political or hate graffiti…conveys political messages or racial, religious or ethnic slurs” (Tilahun, 2007:17). By the same token, the contents of pejorative labeling, stereotypes and ethnic bigotry spread through rumors and to some extent through graffiti are indicative of the strained relations of Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students who study in the Main Campus.

At the moment, students have failed to transcend the ethnic divide and appreciate their commonalities as a student, a citizen of this country as well as human persons who are morally bound to stand in unison, when the need so requires, in defense of a common cause affecting cross section of the society. The reality on the ground shows that considerable numbers of students seem to be trapped by narrowly defined interest that prevented them to think outside the box. Because of this, let alone playing the role expected from members of the intellectual community they have miserably failed even to jointly assert their interest and defend their legitimate rights.

It is also easily noticeable that the rift among students in general and that of Amhara, Oromo and Tigray students in particular seems to be widening rather than narrowing down. This could be attributable, inter alia, to real or imagined perception towards one another. Since there is no mechanism in place to revamp the division created among students through dialogue with the view to building trust and mutual confidence, petite issue or minor disagreements tend to ensuing violent ethnic conflicts. The 2007 violent ethnic conflict unfolded in the Main Campus is a typical example to this assertion. The findings of the study indicated that there is no communication channel whereby students solve their differences or disagreements. This trend paves the way for employing violence as the sole strategy of solving disagreements or differences.

Overstating ethnicity is counterproductive simply because it is a stumbling block to the aspiration of creating one economic community. But, the prevailing trend among students seems to be overemphasizing ethnicity. As things stand now “Proper guidance is not given at the University level to student as regards to how to socialize, what it means to be part of a symbolic community and responsibilities expected from them not only
as intellectuals and leaders of the development of their communities which they come form but also to Ethiopia as a whole. This is a serious limitation” (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

5.2. Recommendations

Naturally students share a lot of things in common. They live together, learn together, and use same facilities and things that bind them are numerous. Equally, students, like any other person may take conflicting positions on variety of issues. Regrettably, “There are no sufficient forums where students independently discuss the responsibilities they have toward each other, how to respect persons who are different from them and the significance of these values” (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor). Moreover, there is no forum where they can freely exchange ideas, discuss on cross cutting issues. There is a little space for students to legally defend their rights, promote their interests, and freely circulate their opinions and views. Accordingly,

• Windows of opportunities should be open for students to interact on matters related to their rights and interests as well as cross cutting issues.

Instructors often bestowed upon students the liberty to form groups on their own free will. It has been observed that such practice has its own contribution in reinforcing the existing ethnic division among students. Similarly, students are given the freedom to choose persons whom they want to share dormitories with. Using this discretion, students largely team up along ethnic lines in order to occupy dormitories with. Such divisive practices have to be changed as soon as possible. Accordingly,

• The University administration should come up with a directive that makes instructors not only duty bound to form groups every time they give group work or term papers but also ensure the diversity of students’ composition in each group in as much as possible;

• The Dean of Students should also come up with a clear directive that ensures diversities in dormitory allocation; and

• The University leadership should put in place a monitoring mechanism to follow up the proper implementations of the directives as well as to ensure compliance with the directives.
Considerable number of students comes to the University with a sense of isolation. The University leadership has failed to put in place viable mechanism that addresses the widespread sense of isolation. One way of addressing the problem could be organizing events that bring students belonging to different ethnic groups on board. True, nowadays, students of different ethnic groups have their respective cultural day where they organize events. Oromo, Tigray, and Amhara students celebrate their respective cultural day. Although this is a commendable initiative, it has its own setbacks as well. Students of the three ethnic groups celebrate their individual culture separately by involving largely members of their respective ethnic groups. As has been indicated by participants of the study, attending the event by students belonging to other ethnic group may not be welcomed or at the very least seen with suspicion. A program has not been in place that brings different ethnic group together to stage their respective culture for the wider University community. This could be one way of tackling sense of isolation that has kept students of different ethnic group far apart. More than that there are no extracurricular activities that involve students along departments, faculties or colleges which would have given them a leeway to experience a new form of identity that downplay or at least counter balance the ethnic fervor. For instance, Inter College Sport Completions, apart from bringing students of diverse ethnic groups together, instill, among students, institutional identity. The ones mentioned above and similar other measures on one hand help severe the predisposition to isolationism and on the other pave the way for more integration among students. Accordingly, the University leadership should take the following measures;

• In addition to the cultural event organized by particular ethnic groups, the University should arrange cultural events matching with the multicultural character of the campuses;

• Organize extracurricular activities including but not limited to semi-annual inter-departmental soccer competition, annual inter-college sport competitions, etc;

• By mobilizing instructors who come from different ethnic groups and who have the relevant knowledge, experience, guts, and reputation among students, the University leadership should create a permanent forum where students cultivate the culture of dialogue, tolerance, mutual respect and non-violent way of solving differences with the view to transforming the institution into a tolerance hub as well as center for developing a nationwide vision; and
• Since there is a lot of work to be done to instill the foregoing values, the University leadership should go back to the drawing board and revisit its strategies and programs towards students.

Absence of violent conflict never warrants the prevalence of peace. As has been the case in 2007, proximate cause may ignite latent conflict into violence. As one participant rightly noted, in the Main Campus, students “Even when it appears peaceful … do not relate as a family… There is a feeling, among students, that there is unbalanced relationship on the basis of ethnicity” (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor). There is a grudge that certain sections of the society “get much better benefit than others… Unless the system is rectified and a new system is in place, a one time beneficiary may suffer in the future” (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor). It is everybody’s responsibility to create a system with which all benefit. Accordingly,

• The University, being an intellectual community, has the responsibility of setting the direction how to tackle this challenge and we can move forward.

There is no structure established via free, fair and competitive elections that represents students. If a system is in place where students elect their leaders on their own free will and if they are allowed to lead themselves, it will have significant contributions in forging strong inter communal relations among students as well as rallying them behind a common agenda. To achieve this end the University leadership should,

• Allow and give the necessary support to students to create their own independent body or association of some sort.

One of the objectives of the University, among others, is to carry out research on variety of issues. The institution has accomplished little when it comes to undertaking research on core values that help create and maintain bonds among diverse communities existing in the country and bolster their close attachment as well as instill these values among the populous. Accordingly,

• The University leadership should allocate sufficient funds for research on core values that help not only students of different ethnic groups but also different communities existing in the country create and maintain strong bond among themselves; and

• Design a course on multiculturalism that familiarizes students with how to maintain unity within diversity.
The university leadership in order to effectively realize most of these recommendations should first,

- Win credibility within the University community, instructors and students. To garner “…the credibility of instructors, students and employees requires to positively considering these actors as a change agents. This can’t be attained if they are still labeled as reactionary force” (Interview with ‘Y’ course instructor).

It would be naivety of a person to think that the University is an island of calm while the ambiance outside the University fortress is experiencing political turbulence. We like it or not the political fever diffuses into the university campuses from the outside world in variety of ways. As a matter of fact, the situations in University campuses are nothing but mirror images of the political reality outside them. Therefore “Unless the Ethiopian politics is transformed into broad national vision and agenda the University continues reflecting this” (Interview with ‘Z’ course instructor). The pervasive ethnic tension, mistrusts and animosity among students never vanishes into thin air so long as the ethnic division in the country’s political landscape persists. Therefore,

- The government, political parties, civic groups, and other relevant actors should do their level best to end smear campaigns and ethnic dissension for the purpose of political expediency or achieving parochial interest and transform the country’s politics into “broad national vision”

This Study attempted to investigate only the relations of students of the three ethnic groups in the Main Campus. But this cannot show the full picture, the magnitude and the gravity of the problem at a national scale. Since the problem is pervasive nearly in all higher learning institutions in the country the study should widen its scope beyond AAU Main Campus. Thus,

- A nation-wide study should be conducted on the problem.
REFERENCES


THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF MIESO WOREDA

By Dereje Seyoum
CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

Africa has been the site of the deadliest and most brutal conflicts. Recently, the genocide in Rwanda, the collapse of central governments in Somalia and Liberia, the civil war in Sudan and Angola, and the deteriorating political situation in the Horn of Africa could be cited as examples. These conflicts resulted in the death and displacement of Africans in the continent due to the very nature of the conflicts, which are difficult to manage (Zartman, 1996:12).

The Horn of Africa region is regarded as highly susceptible to conflicts, and is one of the most conflict-prone areas in the continent. The region is also characterized as highly complicated because politics and ethnicity are deeply interwoven. Similarly, the region is known for the pastoralist movement from place to place leading to almost continuous local warfare and frequent forced migration. Due to these factors, countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced inter-state and intra-state war over the past decades. In general, the sub-region is often considered as the most volatile area in the world despite some progress made in ending long lasting regional wars.

Ethiopia is a country in the Horn of Africa, home to more than 80 ethnic groups. The country has a plurality of peoples with their own language. Throughout the long history of Ethiopia, a multitude of ethnic and religious groups have coexisted; there are occasions, however, where these groups have been in conflict (Lederach, 1997).

After the downfall of the Derg regime, the country’s political landscape experienced a change in terms of politics and administration. The imperial and military governments imposed a highly centralized and unitary state structure. After the fall of the Military Regime in 1991, a federalist form of government based on ethnicity was installed. Even though, the introduction of federalism in Ethiopia resolved the long standing rebel confrontations which were based on ethno-nationalism, the country began to experience a new wave of conflicts. The conflicts can be categorized in to three groups: inter-ethnic competition, tension in majority-minority relations and problems relating to delineation of regional boundaries (Asnake, 2004:55).
The new federal state arrangement in Ethiopia allowed regional states to establish, their legislative, executive and judiciary institutions in regional and local level. Accordingly, branches of government have been instituted at lower levels with limited power under the jurisdiction of their respective regions. The ethnic and linguistic parameters to redefine state structure resulted in conflict among regional states (Ahmed, 2004:98).

The introduction of the federal system in the country resulted in nine ethnically based regional states and two administrative states. The effort to define regional and administrative boundaries along regional states fuelled the already existing tension and conflict over resources and land ownership. Furthermore, unclear administrative boundary delineation between regional states also became a source of conflict.

In this study, the Oromia and Somali regional states can be taken as a case in point. The two regional states share more than a 1000 km. boundary. As stated earlier, this boundary is known for its multitude of ethnic and tribal groups. Migration and interaction between people of the Horn resulted in complex patterns in the border area of the Somali and Oromia regional states. These two regional states experienced severe conflicts along the boundary. The causes of conflict in the area were pasture and water point. Recently, the cause of conflict changed into a border dispute due to the boundary disagreement between the two (Ahmed, 2004:99).

In order to solve the border problems between the two regional states, the Federal Government conducted a referendum in the disputed border districts. The referendum was conducted in October 2004 in 256 Kebeles; in many cases the referendum solved the boundary dispute between the two regional states but the conflict continued in other places after the referendum result was known. The referendum which was conducted in Mieso woreda allocated Mieso town and some cluster kebeles to Oromia regional states. The Somali ethnic groups refused to accept the result. As a consequence, tension and conflict continued between the two groups in general and in Mieso town in particular (Teshome, 2004:88).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Violent conflict among the Somali and Oromo ethnic groups in southern and eastern parts of Ethiopian is not a new phenomenon. The cause of the conflict most of the time is over grazing land and it is regarded as a traditional pastoralist and agro-pastoralist conflict. After the referendum which awarded Mieso town to Oromia regional state, the
conflict began to change in terms of causes and dynamics, due to the involvement of different actors, especially those officials who are working in the local government structure of the two regional states.

Local governments which are immediate to the public at large failed to manage the conflict and began to have their own interest in the conflict. As a result, the Mieso woreda conflict remained one of the unsolved border disputes between the two regional states, and has become the cause for the death and displacement of members of the two ethnic groups. So far little attention has been given to understand the difficult circumstance under which local governments attempt to manage conflicts.

Local government structures deal with the needs of every citizen to help to solve the communities’ day to day problem, because its goal is to be as close as possible to the people. On the other hand, it is important that local governments can be considered as an institution that decrease social tension between different groups and promote peaceful co-existence. Moreover, Local government bodies are expected to play significant role in managing conflicts and contribute a lot in minimizing the risk of transforming conflict to violence. In light of this, the research examines the role of local government in conflict management, in Mieso woreda in Ethiopia.

1.3 Research Questions

The research intends to show the role of local government institutions in conflict management in Mieso woreda. The study tried to answer the following interrelated questions

• How the local governments in the study area did manage to deal with conflict?
• Are the conflict management mechanisms employed by the local government bodies’ address the root causes of the conflict in Mieso Woreda?
• What is the perception of the respective communities towards the local government’s role regarding conflict management?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The research hopes to accomplish two general and two specific objectives. Hence, in this study, an attempt has been made:

• To find out sources of insecurity in the disputed border of Oromia and Somali Regional States, particularly in Mieso Woreda
• To assess the institutional capability of the local governments in conflict management.
More specifically, this study tries:

- To find out the role of local government in conflict management.
- To assess the extent to which present and past conflict have adversely impacted on the effectiveness of indigenous institutions for conflict management and resolution.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The research could be taken as a modest contribution in conflict management, peace buildings and conflict resolution attempts in the study area. The result could also serve as an input in policy formulation of the two regional states, in their effort to achieve a sustainable peace along their border.

1.6 Methodology

The methodology preferred to use in this study is qualitative one. The approach was selected due to its holistic nature. In contrast to the quantitative research method, qualitative research method takes a phenomenon in to parts and attempts to understand the meaning of experience (Patton cited in Merriam, 1998). Moreover, according to Flick (2002:27) “Qualitative research is of specific relevance to the study of social relations owing to the fact of polarization of life worlds”. On the same token, the issue under this study raises such social issue as relationships of people with different background. Furthermore, the perception of research participants which is difficult to quantify, can be best treated through qualitative research methodology.

The instruments used to gather primary data include individual interview and focus group discussion (FGD) with research participants. Semi structured interviews, discussions were made with both Regional State Security Bureau officials, current and former Woreda officials, elders, NGO workers. Interviews were also conducted in Addis Ababa with House of Federation Secretariat and with experts in the Ministry of Federal Affairs. In doing so, 18 key informants were interviewed. Participatory discussion was made on different issues which cannot be obtained by other means. Thus, two focus group discussions were organized in each Woreda representing both male and female groups of the community and discussions were conducted in a separate schedule. For the purpose of this study, interviews were conducted with people who are believed to have experience and knowledge about the issues in the study area.
1.7 Sampling Technique

Respondent selection techniques were mainly based on purposive sampling in both Woredas. This was because knowledgeable person with the desired expertise were to be suitable for the purpose at hand.

1.8 Sources of Data

In conducting this research, both primary and secondary data were used. Primary data were gathered through semi-structured interview while books, conference proceedings, reports and minutes were used as secondary sources.

1.9 Delimitation of the Study

The research focuses only in Oromiya and Somali Mieso woreda. In other words, it would not provide an exhaustive account of conflicts along the Somali and Oromo regional states boundary areas. Instead, the center of attention is the specific case of Mieso woreda.

1.10 Limitations of the Study

Regarding limitation of this particular study, the researcher could not include the views of the responsible officials of the Federal police which stationed in the study area due to their refusal to participate in the research. Although, the researcher speaks both languages, translators were hired to avoid communication gap which arises from dialectical difference.

1.11 Ethical Considerations

All research participants who were involved in the study were up on their willingness and consent. Research participants were told about the objectives of the research before the interview started. Moreover, tape recordings were done with their knowledge. Regarding the right to privacy, the research withholds the identity of each participant. In all cases, names are kept confidential thus collective names like “one of the higher officials” “informants” were used in the study.
1.12 Description of Meiso Woreda

Mieso woreda is found in Oromia Regional State, in west Hararge Zone. The woreda is located 400 Km. east of Addis Ababa on the high way to Dire Dawa. Mieso woreda borders with Afar Regional State and Somali Regional States woredas.

The woreda is divided in to 62 rural kebeles and the total population of the woreda is 130,458 (CSA, 2008). The economic activity of the woreda is mainly agriculture and the people who live in the border of the two regional states; their livelihoods largely depend on agriculture and livestock.

The Somali side of Mieso woreda is found in Shinile Zone of Somali Regional State (the official name of the woreda is Mulu). Most respondents in the research and the locals prefer to call the woreda Mieso. The Somali side Meiso woreda is located 12 km. to the east of Oromia Mieso woreda; the woreda is located along the Ethio-Djibouti railway line. The Somali side of Mieso woreda has borders with Afar and Oromia Regional States. The woreda consists of 12 kebeles. The people who are found in Mieso woreda are pastoralists and heavily depend on livestock for their food and as a source of income. The population is 71,497 (CSA, 2008). The Woreda is characterized by hot climate and dry land ecology.

1.13 Rationale for Selecting the Study Area

Despite their difference in the cause, nature and extent of the conflicts most of the border areas of Somali and Oromia Regional States experience conflict. The reasons, for selecting this particular Woreda include:

- The current relative security situation of Mieso Woreda is encouraging to conduct research.
- The closeness of the study area to Addis Ababa compared to other Woredas and its accessibility is the other reason to select this site.

1.14 Organization of the Thesis

The thesis has four chapters. The introductory chapter deals with background, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives of the study, significance of the study, methodology and delimitation of the study, limitations of the study, ethical considerations, description of the study area, and rationale for selecting the study area. Chapter two gives a brief theoretical framework regarding conflict, conflict management, theories of conflict and theories of mediation, the background of local government in
Ethiopia, and conflict management institutions in Ethiopia. Chapter three discusses the data presentation and analyses of the study under different sections. Finally, chapter four summarizes the findings of the study, and provides conclusions and recommendations of the thesis.
CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND

Conflict is not a new social phenomenon in the history of mankind. Conflict always exists as long as human beings live together and it is an inescapable human experience. In order to understand the role of local government, in conflict management, this section discusses the different definitions of conflict, theories of conflict and the concept of mediation, concepts of conflict management and local government.

2.1 Defining Conflict

Discussing in a narrower sense, conflict can be understood as “engagement in a fight or possible confrontation between two or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends” (University for Peace, 2005:322). On the other hand, Imobighe (2003:32) offers the following definition, “Conflict is a condition of disharmony in an interaction process and usually occurs as a result of clash of interest between the parties involved in some form of relationship. Clash of interest could occur because either they are pursuing their incompatible goals to pursue their chosen goal”.

Fisher on his part defines conflict as “a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have or think they have incompatible goals” (Fisher, 2004:4).

2.2 Conflict Management

Conflict management refers to the containment of conflict that has already broken out in the form of searching for solution that would reduce the levels of violence and prevent its escalation. Conflict management is concerned with the ways and means to controlling and harmonizing conflictual relationship with the objective being the creation of space for the long term resolution of the root causes of the conflict (Imobighe, 2003:7). As Fisher points out, the crux of conflict management is to eliminate the propensity of conflict to violence by encouraging positive behavioral change among parties involved in conflict (Fisher, 2004:7).

Regarding how conflict can be managed, Zartman (1996) has indicated that conflict
can be managed through strategies and through institutions. The conflict management process through strategies encompasses reconciliation, adjudication and augmentation; these strategies demand the conflicting parties’ commitment to reconcile with one another and their commitment to accept the decision of third parties. The ultimate objectives of these strategies are to handle and minimize conflict among parties who have different demands (Zartman, 1996:128).

The conflict management mechanism through institutions concerned with the implementation of strategies, processes of interaction between conflicting parties; this includes parties presentation of their demands based on this institutions propose a policy and strategy to manage conflicts. However, Zartman argues that the institutions which collect demands and grievances should demonstrate the dynamic process whereby conflicting parties can put their thrust on the institutions (Zartman, 1996:48).

Similarly, Ginty (2006) argues that any conflict management strategies should not direct towards addressing violence rather the effort and the strategies should focus on identifying and satisfying unmet human needs which leads to violence (Ginty, 2006:34).

2.3 Theories of Conflict

Frustration aggression theory, in explaining the causes of conflict assumes that human beings are goal-oriented and rational. Frustration is accumulated when an individual or a society is blocked from meeting their realization of goal; then it is natural to be aggressive and opt for conflict for the realization and fulfilment of their goals (Jeong, 2000:67).

On the other hand, the relative deprivation theory assumes that conflict erupts when raising expectation and the absence of progress towards for better life. In other words, the gap between people's values of expectation and capabilities and the wider gap between their perception and the reality on the ground lead people to make violence and unrest (Jeong, 2000:69).

According to the 'Realistic Group Theory', in order for conflicts to arise, first there should be real or perceived incompatible goal leading to inter-group competition that leads to misperception and hostilities. In other words, this theory assumes that hostility between two groups result from real or received conflicting goal that initiate inter-group competition. That is when groups engage in the reciprocally competitive and for starting activities as result each group development negative stereotypes about the other and enmity develops (Yagcioglu, 1996:32).
Furthermore, ‘Basic Need Theory’ assumes that deep rooted conflicts are caused by unmet or frustrated basic human needs; humans have needs which they aspire to realize and fulfil. These include the need to have identity, spiritual need, distributive justice the need to share resources equally. Burton (1990) cited in Jeong (2000:71) further emphasizes that these needs are basic; hence, they are neither negotiable nor traded. The denial and access to these needs makes people to take the option of violence in order to secure their needs.

The Basic Need theory is highly relevant for the conditions in the study area. This is because violent conflicts arise when people move from place to place to satisfy their basic needs. As a result, competition over scare resources like land and water is inevitable. The Oromo-Somali conflict has to be analyzed in this theoretical framework.

Moreover, Markakis asserts that despite many theories on the cause of conflict, the main driving force for group conflict is usually associated with access to control over resources (Markakis, 1998:5). This argument is also valid in analyzing the conflict in the study area.

2.4 Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Conflict is a fact, inevitable phenomena in human relationships; it is understood as the existence of incompatible goals, the act of achieving these goals through force eventually leads to violence, which is the ugly face of conflict. Violence ends up in a destruction of human life and resources. Once conflict turned in to violence it needs the commitment of all actors and those who have interest in the conflict to resolve and manage the conflict in order to bring the situation into the peaceful situation (Jeong, 2000:167). Once conflict broke out into violence there are different approaches to manage and resolve the conflict which manifested in the form of violence. This section of the paper discusses mediation as one of the approaches sustainable resolution of violent conflicts.

2.4.1 Mediation

Mediation was used as a conflict resolution mechanism prior to the late 19th century. However, at this particular period of time mediation is institutionalized in the international law to serve as a peaceful transformation of conflicts between states. Among the institutions which adopt and use mediation as a legal instrument is the United Nation (Paffenholtz, 2003:15, 17).

Mediation is a third party assisted approach to negotiation, existing both in ancient and
modern human history of conflict resolution, with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable solution. What is more, Hoffman cited in Jeong stated that mediation is “a process in which parties to a dispute attempt to reach a mutually agreeable solution under the auspices of a third party” (Jeong, 2000:181). The need of a third party emanates from parties in conflict whereby the disputants want to resolve on their own, the role of the third party in mediation is not as decision maker rather as a facilitator of the negotiation (Dejene, 2007:10).

2.5 Traditional Instruments of Conflict Resolution

In a country like Ethiopia which has a strong cultural heritage, traditional institutions and mechanism can either help to solve conflicts or play another significant role in the communities well-being, stability and security. In most parts of Ethiopia, conflict is a communal concern. Thus, it is very important to address, as well as to enhance the participation of all the communities. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are very helpful in this aspect, as they allow the community to handle their problems in their own way. This section highlights the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of the major ethnic groups who share border in the study area.

2.5.1 Oromo

The most well known institution of governance and indigenous conflict resolution institution is the Gada among the Oromos (Areba and Berhanu, 2008:169). According to Asmerom (1973), Gada is defined as a system of class (Luba) that succeed each other every eight years in assuming military, economic and ritual responsibilities. Each Gada class remains in power for a specific term, which begins and ends with a formal power-transfer ceremony. The Gada system has mechanisms to prevent violent conflicts so that it may not occur, and to solve it at a grass root level, if a violent conflict occurs. Currently, the Gaada system is not functional in Mieaso Woreda, and cases of conflicts are resolved by ‘Jarsaa Biyyaa’. The institution of ‘Jarsaa Biyyaa’ is used to resolve conflicts between groups or individuals and, the cases that it handles include cases criminal and commercial cases. (Areba and Berhanu, 2008:170).

2.5.2 Afar

In Ethiopia, Afar people inhibit the northeast ranges of the country. The people have one culture and one heritage that make the Afar people homogeneous group in Ethiopia.
Economic, social and political issues at the local level are handled by their traditional administrative system which is called ‘medaa’ (Dejene and Yigremew, 2000:28).

In most cases, intra-Afar conflicts are resolved outside the court. They generally tend to be handled by local mediation; resolutions by local mediators may take the form of negotiation or arbitration and are generally reached with reference to Afar norms and values. Most commonly recognized resolution mechanisms like reconciliation by elders and arbitration by tribe leaders and religious leaders are key participants in the process in preventing and resolving conflicts (Dejene and Yigremew, 2000:32).

Elders settle minor issues and more serious issues are brought to the attention of the tribe leaders. The traditional institution acquires its status of authority and power from the tribal law which varies from tribe to tribe and has complex rules (Getachew and Shimelis, 2008:95).

### 2.5.3 Somalis

The traditional conflict resolution mechanism which is found in all clans of the somali is ‘Xeer’, which literary means treaty or contract in English (Mohammed and Zewdie, 2000:187). According to the tradition of the ‘Xeer’, the communities’ elders are selected based on their knowledge, ability of speech and experience, and the elders investigate the issue presented before them and decide.

The other important traditional institution in Somali ethnic group is the ‘Odayaal’. When dispute arises ‘Odayaal’ from the disputant clans are selected to resolve the dispute between the same clan; if the dispute is between different clans the ‘Odayaal’ of each clan involves in resolving the dispute (Mohammed and Zewdie, 2000:190).

### 2.6 Local Government

Local government is a political unit that consists of all units of government under the national level. These levels can be provinces, districts, municipalities, villages which serve the people directly (Aldefer, 1964:2). According to Hart (1949:5), “Local governments are local, rather than of national importance”. Hart’s definition of local government is in terms of its importance and place in the national level of a given country.

Local government is also defined as the agency of the central power due to the nature of the power which local governments exercise; the power emanates from the central
agency (Loughalin, 1986:49). According to Kassahun, local governments are those legal entities with specific power and duties in a given jurisdiction below the national level (Kassahun, 2007:3).

2.7 The Emergence of Local Government Institutions

Local government stretches back to the early middle ages but little is known about the nature and function of these institutions. The true ancestor of modern local government system is probably that of the England local government which was established in the late nineteenth century (Alderfer, 1964:14). The rapid increase in population and Industrial Township demanded the establishment of local governments to satisfy the ever increasing needs of the new emerging society in terms of law and order. As a result, the Local Government Act was introduced in England in the late nineteenth century (Jackson, 1976:58).

The main feature of the Act was to give administrative power for the lower units and the act also allowed towns which had more than a population of 50,000. The Act also paved the way for the laws of local government in England (Jackson, 1976:58). In addition, the Act established an elected county throughout England which was independent of the country council, which was also exercising power at the local level (Hart, 1949:38).

During the post Second World War, the power of local government declined due to the launching of the welfare state. The introduction of the welfare state resulted in the considerable loss of control over important functions of local governments. The welfare Legislation of the 1940s took much of the responsibilities of local governments in England. And then during the years in the Second World War, the introduction of the legislation hindered the growth of local government in England (Warren, 1965:28).

The rapid economic growth in England in 1955 and onwards was a challenge and opportunity for the local governments of England. The new economic growth resulted in demands of local government involvement in, the new fields of areas environment and controlling pollution. These fields became the responsibilities of local governments in England. As a result of the new mandates of local governments, the expansion also reflected an increased public expenditure. However, politicians began to question the spending of local governments and urged to curb some responsibilities in order to decrease the considerable money which the local governments spend (Stoker, 1991:42).

Currently, local governments in England and Wales are organized in two contrasting
ways. In the Wales and some parts of England a single tier is responsible for all local au-
thority. On the other hand, the local government in the rest of England had a two tier
system; this tire in turn is divided between district and county council (Loughlin, 1986:7).
Local governments in England are characterized as a decentralized and the local units are
free from direct control of local lithotrities (Alderfer, 1964:7).

2.8 Local Government Institutions in Ethiopia

When the country was under Haillesilase I rule, the country’s local government structure
went through two major reforms. One was before the Italian occupation and the other
after the end of the occupation period. Before the Italian occupation, the number and
function of local government were different when compared with Menilk’s reign. During
the reign of Hillesilasie I, the country was divided in to 12 provinces and 74 sub-provinces.
These sub-provinces were divided into 360 districts which in turn were divided into 172
sub-districts (Alderfer, 1964:40).

These units of lower government were responsible to the then Ministry of Interior, which
was under the control of the emperor; appointments were made based on hereditary
line and for those who have moveable property were also appointed to the province
governor (Alderfer, 1964:40 ).

After the end of Italian occupation in Ethiopia and the restoration of the imperial rule, the
country’s government structures were revised. Based on the new structure, the country
was once again divided into 12 ‘awrajas’ (provinces) and a number of ‘woredas’. Under
the ‘woredas’. There were also “mislenies” and “Miktle mislene”. In terms of importance,
“mikitile-Mislense” was the least (Kassahun, 2007:45). Concerning their function and re-
sponsibility, there was no major difference from that of the previous government struc-
tures (Alderfer, 1964:45-46).

After the 1974 Revolution which overthrew the imperial regime, Derg slightly rearranged
the imperial pattern of local administration. After consolidating power, it reorganized the
previous twelve provinces and renamed the regions. The regions were in turn divided
into 102 sub-regions and in the country there were 550 districts (woredas) until the com-
ing of EPRDF to power (Kassahun, 2007:52).

After the demise of the Derg regime, EPRDF redrew the political map of Ethiopia. Cur-
rently, the country has nine ethnically based states and two self-governing administra-
tion. The new government structure eliminated the provincial system by making district
(woreda) the lowest unit of local government (Kassahun, 2007:60). At this time, there are 500 ‘woreda’ administrations in the country. This level of government structure has the power to elect its councils, executive committee, prepare its own budget, and has a court structure based on their respective regional constitutions (Meheret, 2002:132). In Ethiopia, ‘woreda’ can be taken as a strategic place in the state structure.

During the emperor’s regime, the Mieso town and its surrounding kebles were administered under the Adal and Gurgura Awraja of Harerghe Kiflehager (BPED, 2000:286). The Derge regime which took power immediately after the overthrow of the emperor followed the previous structure with little amendments until its overthrow by the rebel movement.

During the transitional government, Mieso and its surroundings were classified in both regional states and both regional states were claiming Mieso and its cluster as part of their own administrative unit up on administrative demarcation. After the end of the transitional period and the introduction of federal state arrangement which followed soon, Mieso Woreda was included in western Hararge Zone of Oromia Regional State by making Mieso town the seat of the Woreda administration. On the other hand, the Somali regional founded Mieso woreda by including the north of the Etho-Djibouti railway line, in the west up to the Afar Regional State districts.

Even though, the civil administration and official assignments were limited due to the argument over the Woreda, these responsibilities had been undertaken by Oromia Regional state with the presence of Somali Regional state structure in the woreda. As noted earlier, after the contested 2004 referendum result, Mieso town was allocated to Oromia Regional State. Somali Regional State government structure which was established in Mieso town left to the near-by Somail kebele and established a new woreda structure by the name Mulu Woreda. Some local officials and Somalis prefer to address the woreda by the same name Mieso woreda.

2.9 Conflict Management in Ethiopia

Jeong (2002) states that mismanaged conflicts erupt in violence and result in destruction of community; this destructive nature of conflict manifested in the form of violence is only reduced and controlled by conflict management strategies. Then conflict management is a cost effective intervention for countries with limited resource which cannot afford the wider and complex burden of post conflict situation as a result of over looked or unmanaged conflicts (Jeong, 2000:31).
The fact that Ethiopia is the home of more than 80 ethnic groups with their language, religion and other cultural identities living together, leads to the conclusion that conflict is inevitable as long as it is driven by the existence of incompatible goals. Moreover, the diversity of the country also urges strong and functional conflict management institutions at all levels of the government structure. This section tries to see the efforts made by government bodies to manage conflict and the perceptions towards conflicts.

To have an understanding of how conflict management in Ethiopia operates, it is important to examine how responsible bodies, practitioners and different actors who have direct involvement in conflict management understand conflict. Government officials and those stakeholders mentioned above perceive conflict as a taboo and resemble it with violence. The inability to distinguish violence and conflict by these decision makers leads them to conclude that conflicts can be resolved and managed by mere indoctrination of the people involved in the conflict about the destructiveness of violence rather than resolving the conflict (Trist, 2004:27). Furthermore, government officials take the option of handling conflicts by force.

The second point that should be raised here is conflict management in Ethiopia is not systematic. Although there are minor differences from place to place, in general, the process is not preformed in a systematic way. As a result, the intervention effort done by government bodies becomes costly, time consuming and unsustainable.

As Trsit discussed, the fact is that this unsystematic approach to conflict is the result of government officials’ inability to see conflict handling mechanism as a process. To substantiate her argument, she raises the case of Oromo and Somali boundary dispute whereby government officials from both side were busy in urging participant in the process to expose the perpetrators of the violence rather than discussing and identifying the root causes of the conflict (Trist, 2004:32).

The third point in relation to conflict management in Ethiopia is the fact that conflict has not usually been properly recognized and addressed until it becomes violence. The wrong belief of officials who are in different levels of administration that everything is in a peaceful situation while ignoring demands of different groups lead to government bodies to respond to conflict when the issue is manifested in violence and after the conflict resulted in death on both sides of conflicting parties. Similarly, the case of Somali Oromo border dispute can be raised. The disagreement over dispute began after the end of the transitional period but officials from both Regional States gave formal recognition when it erupted into violence in the year 2000 (Trist, 2004:40).
The fourth conflict management mechanism which is observed to have been widely used in the country as an instrument to handle conflict is organizing “Peace and Democracy Conference”. These conferences are organized by government bodies in which different parts of the society can be represented to discuss with government officials (Asnake, 2004:67).

The above discussion demonstrates the fact that conflict management in Ethiopia can be characterized as a ‘fire-brigade’ approach and the inability to handle conflicts as a process and lack of sustainability in the process leads government officials who are in different level to perform nothing before and after violence occurs.

### 2.10 Conflict Management Institutions

It is the prime responsibility of governments to manage and resolve conflicts. To discharge this responsibility, governments establish institutions to manage conflict at national and local level. This section discusses the major institution in Ethiopia which involves in conflict management.

In Ethiopia, the House of Federation which is the upper house of the country's parliamentary system is represented as the higher body for managing and resolving conflicts in the country. Pursuant to Article 62(2) of FDRE constitution, the house of federation is authorized “to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between states”. The House facilities all the necessary conditions to resolve disputes that may arise between the states provided that the concerned parties are willing to solve their disparities through dialogue and discussion. However, in case the parties are unwilling or the discussion fails, the House has the power to intervene and takes measures which could bring about temporary solution.

Regarding border disputes, the House gives decisions based on settlement patterns and the interest of the people in all the disputed areas. The border disputes between the border area of Oromia and Somali Regional state were attempted to be resolved through a referendum. The 2004 referendum in Mieso woreda can be taken as example.

The other important institution in Ethiopia in relation to conflict management is the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The Ministry is mandated by Proclamation 471/2005 of the federal government to work on conflict management activities especially in the so called “emerging regions”. .The Ministry also involves in conflict which arises from border dispute and ethnic conflict. This institution involves in facilitating the resolution of conflict under two
circumstances. The first is when Regions fail to resolve within or between themselves. The Regional States request the intervention of the Federal Government and the request comes to the Prime Minister’s Office. When the intervention is approved, the Ministry of Federal Affairs involves in facilitating the resolution of conflicts.

The other circumstance in which the Ministry of Federal Affairs involve is without the request of the Regional States. This is applied when cases that authorize the intervention of the Federal Government in Regional states are based on the Proclamation No.359/2003 which is referred as “System for the Intervention of Federal Government in Regions”. This authorizes Federal Government intervention under three conditions: in case of deteriorating security situation, when the constitutional order is endangered, and in cases of human right violation.

The Ministry’s major task is facilitating the resolution of conflicts through different mechanism, not necessarily resolve conflicts by itself. The mechanisms this particular institution uses are organizing “Peace and Democracy Conferences” to bring conflicting parties and different stakeholders together, deploying traditional conflict resolution mechanisms by bringing elders and traditional leaders together and demarcation between ethnic groups who are in conflict due to dispute over land after their mutual consent.

There are also institutions within Regional State which are directly and indirectly involved in handling conflicts in the country. These institutions are structured at Regional, Zonal and ‘Woreda’ levels. To mention some of the institutions, the Justice and Security Bureau, Neighboring Regions Affair and Conflict Resolution Bureau, Regional Police Commission and Regional Militia Offices. These Regional offices especially those in Oromia and Somali regional state seem to have failed to execute their responsibility by over simplifying cases of conflict at regional and national level. As a result, minor conflicts turn in to unmanageable and deadly violence (Trist, 2004:27).

There are many factors for the failure of these offices not to execute their responsibility. Regarding the offices in Somali Regional state, there are cases of overlapping responsibilities and mandates among regional bureaus due to unclear terms of reference. The other factors that have adversely affected the efficiency of the bureaus are lack of adequately trained and qualified manpower, failure to remain non-partisan on the part of the officials, the tendency to benefit from conflicts, manipulating clan politics and corruption associated with the occurrences of conflicts are some of the factors (Kelkelachew, 2004:17).
2.11 Traditional Institutions

The other institution which involves in conflict management and resolution in the country is the traditional institution. Ethiopia is rich in terms of tradition of mutual assistance, resource management and utilization, as well as conflict resolution mechanisms. People are very sensitive to their values and norms; in most parts of the country people especially in the pastoralist community, it seems that people obey their traditional leaders and elders rather than modern system such as the police and to a decision of courts. Indigenous institutions can either help to solve conflicts or play another significant role in community’s well-being, stability and security because in most parts of the country conflict is a communal responsibility (Trist, 2004:49).

The traditional mutual institutions among the Somali include the ‘Karan’, ‘quadan’, ‘hologoyo’. These traditional institutions play a significant role in time of economic hardship. They are ways of restocking and means to rehabilitate the clan members when dispossessed of their livestock due to cattle rustle, from another clan or drought. These indigenous, informal institutions having customary rules and regulation are also responsible to mange resources and play a decisive role in conflict resolutions. Elders of the clan make the important economic and political decisions. Leadership in most Somali traditional institution is hereditary (Trist, 2004:37).

Furthermore, the traditional institutions can play a significant role in conflict management. However, they are increasingly incapacitated due to different reasons. Most of the traditional institutions which are found in Somali clan are weak in relation to conflict resolution. To mention some of the factors, even though the Federal Constitution gives recognition for traditional institutions, government officials undermine this institution. The other factor is related to the traditional institutions’ leaders. Traditional leaders are preoccupied by the struggle for survival. This forced them to give less attention to their social responsibilities. The other factor is that traditional leaders often engage in party politics and become unable to be neutral since they are influenced by officials for political or financial gain. Hence, their credibility and acceptance by the clan members have deteriorated (Kelkelachew, 2004:19).
CHAPTER 3
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Meiso woreda has long been prone to conflict and intermittent violent conflicts that have taken place between the Oromo and the Somali clan, starting from the Derg period. The main cause of the conflicts was competition over grazing land and water. There used to be a culture of livestock raiding, which both groups practice from time to time. However, the conflict between clan of Somali, and the Oromo started to manifest itself in frequent and fierce violence after 1991, mainly due to boundary dispute between the newly established Oromia and Somali Regional States. Although it was attempted to end some of the border disputes through referendum and government officials usually report as if the causes have been settled once and for all, the violent conflicts continued to flare (Ahmed, 2004:95).

The following sections discuss on some of the violent incidents that took place in Mieso woreda. The purpose of analyzing the border conflict in Mieaso woreda is to identify actors involved in the conflict, to understand the roles and attempts made by local government bodies, and to investigate the Federals Government’s effort to resolve the conflicts. By doing so, it becomes clear to identify the potential partners in the effort to manage the conflict and to understand the impediment for the peace building process.

3.1 Conflicts in Diama

Diama is a small village located along the main highway and railroad that crosses the district from Addis Ababa to Harar and Dire Dawa. It is a border area between pastoralists and Oromo farming clan such as ‘Alla’, ‘Ittu’, ‘Jarso’ and ‘Noolle’. These clans practice mixed farming, livestock rearing which comprises substantial portion of the household economy, and Diama and Asebot Mountains are their grazing and watering areas. As the areas have water wells that serve all year round and have good dry-season grazing reserves, the pastoralists come to these areas to feed and water their livestock in the dry seasons or when there is drought in other parts of the region. Consequently, the area has remained prone to resource-based conflicts.
This particular violent conflict occurred in May 2000, following an incidence in which a large number of cattle unexpectedly crossed into the Oromo territory around Arba. The local Oromo farmers encircled the cattle and few herders that followed them and a clash broke out. The result was that two herders were killed and others sustained injury, while the rest fled to save their lives, leaving more than 600 of their cattle in the hands of the Oromo.²

The elders reported the incidence to the regional state and demanded for the return of their cattle. While the local Oromo administrators were trying to convince the Oromo elders to give back the raided cattle, another incidence that aggravated the situation occurred. On June 14, 2000, nearly a month after the first incidence, a group of Issas entered the livestock market in Mieso armed with rifles, despite the fact that the government banned entering towns with guns. A clash took place in which few Oromo farmers were wounded (some of them died, later on). This was followed by member of the Somali groups looting of the market as retaliation for the raid of their cattle and death of their men.

Again on June 19, 2000, early in the morning the pastoralists attacked inhabitants of Diama. They indiscriminately killed 39 Oromos including some children and women. Although other Oromo groups came for help from the surrounding villages, they only rescue some cattle, which were being taken away. The conflict resulted in the displacement of many Oromo households. The highway from Addis Ababa to Harar and Dire Dawa had also to remain closed to traffics for half day.³

The actors in this particular violent conflict were local clan armed men of the respective communities. The local governments’ involvement in the conflict in favor of their respective clans and regions intensified the conflict in different forms. As a result, the local government of both clans mobilized youngsters and local armed men alongside their clan, opened route for high flow of illegal arms from different places for the supply of the conflict.⁴

In an attempt to resolve the conflict, the Federal Army was called into the area immediately. Consequently, a half day discussion was held in the presence of officials from the Head of the Regional Affairs Office within The Prime Minister’s Office. The president of the

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² Interview with Oromia Mieso woreda official, Mieso, March 2009
³ Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009
⁴ Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009
two Regions, and other higher officials and the army arrived at the district the following day to contain the spread of the violence. During the half-day discussion they held with the Oromo farmers, they urged them to stay calm and promised to bring those who perpetrated the killing into the court of law.\(^5\)

Series of conferences involving elders from both conflicting parties were held and some 25 were arrested in ‘Gadamaytu’, a small town along the road to Djibouti. It is said that the elders first convinced the 25 persons to give themselves to the police promising to get them released after reconciliation and payment of blood money. But when it was heard that the incidence described as massacre and could not be settled by traditional means and alleged criminals would face trial by Oromia Regional State, a group came to the prison at night, opened fire at the jailers and freed the prisoners. The Oromo clan leaders accuse the local officials of Somali Regional State for facilitating the safer passage of the criminals and their failure to bring the perpetrators to justice. The clan leaders also stated it was the deliberate act of the officials not to bring them into court.\(^6\)

Bringing the culprits into justice could not be realized and the issue has seriously damaged the relationship between the two groups as well as the two Regional States. Especially the relation between the local government officials worsened, and they have been unable to cooperate in resolving conflicts. Although most of the livestock raided from both sides have been returned, the fact that the trial of the homicide did not take place has resulted in a lasting tension among the communities and the deterioration of their day to day relationships.

### 3.2 The Conflict in Bordede

Bordede is the second largest town and the biggest market center in Meiso district. Although the town consists of multi-ethnic communities, it is the ‘Hawiya’ clan of the Somali and the ‘Ittu Oromo’ that predominantly inhabit the rural villages. Near the town along the main highway from Addis Ababa to Harar and Dire Dawa, there is a customs’ checkpoint established by the Oromo regional state. It is a large source of revenue to the regional state as it also lies along the Ethio-Djibouti railway.

Although disagreement exists between the Oromo and the Somali starting from the transitional period, the conflict in the form of border dispute and ownership of the town was

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5. Interview with former Mieso Woreda official, March 2009
6. Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009
a new phenomenon that emerged with the new regionalization. The conflict became even more intense after the Federal Government as well as the regional governments of Oromia and Somali reached a consensus to end the long standing border dispute and ownership of the town by referendum in 2003. Conflicts and confrontation around the issue of referendum, specifically over control of the customs checkpoint flared. Both sides were trying to change the demographic combination in the area to their favor so as to influence the referendum.\textsuperscript{7}

The cold conflict grew into violent one. When one of the members of ‘Hawiya’ (Somali minority ethnic group) was killed by an Oromo on the 9th November 2004, the next day, a member of the Oromia State police was killed by Somalis of the ‘Hawiya’ clan while he was on duty at the customs checkpoint. These incidences entailed a series of revenge killings. A group of Oromo gunmen encircled Somalis in ‘Hardin’ area and eight Somali and five Oromo men got killed while more than a hundred houses, most of which belonged to the Hawiya were burnt down.\textsuperscript{8}

In fact, the Federal Army intervened the next day and a meeting of elders and local officials from both sides was held. Nevertheless, before anything positive came up the Hawiya retaliated by invading villages and burnt 77 houses belonging to the Oromo.\textsuperscript{9}

A month later, only a day after the Federal Army left the town, another violent conflict erupted. The violence took place when about 20 Oromo gunmen entered the town to get a post-mortem examination of a person believed to have been killed in a quarrel with his own brother. Alarmed by the situation, the ‘Hawiya’ living in the town took up their arms and exchange of fire followed in which one Hawiya elder was killed. The clash lasted for one day, and Somali gunmen killed about 10 men and wounded 12, they robbed 13 shops and raided 105 sheep, 801 goats, 153 donkeys and more than 30,000 Ethiopia Birr from residents of the town. Only one Somali was killed and three were wounded.\textsuperscript{10}

In retaliation, the Oromos invaded a nearby ‘Korra’ town and raided 66 camels and 247 cattle from Hawiya and brutal conflicts continued after the referendum was held in October 2004. According to the referendum result, the Oromo state won Bordede town. But sporadic and relatively minor skirmishes continued.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{7} Interview with former Mieso Woreda official, Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{8} Interview with Mieso Woreda official Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{9} Interview with Mieso Woreda official Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{10} Interview with Mieso Woreda official Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Mieso Woreda official Mieso, March 2009
Throughout the conflicts, the local government’s officials from both sides are said to play the greatest role in intensifying the problem. The officials mobilized their respective communities by supplying arms and ammunitions and even by utilizing relief grain for the very purpose. Local militia mobilized the local communities along ethnic lines in the name of defending regional state boundaries, on the side of the Oromos capitalizing on grievances arising from the Dima incidence. Moreover, various rebel groups operating in the area as well as local elites have had their influence in the intensification of the conflict, especially in relation to the question of border.\textsuperscript{12}

3.3 The “Invasion” of Mieso Town

Until the down of June 18, 2008, the situation in Mieso woreda remained relatively peaceful with the presence of minor misunderstandings and clash between herdsmen of the two ethnic groups. But at this particular day, heavily armed clan men suddenly invaded the town of Mieso. This deadly violent conflict stayed for two days, according to Mieso woreda security office, 18 people died and nine people wounded during the conflict. But Oromo elders argue that the number of people who died and wounded was much higher.\textsuperscript{13}

After two days of killings, looting and disorder in Mieso town, the Federal Police which was stationed in the area intervened and chased away the armed clan. After the incident, nearly 1,000 residents of the town who were mainly women and children left the town of Mieso.\textsuperscript{14} According to one key informant, the decision was taken by higher officials of Somali Regional States in fear of Oromo’s retaliation because of the grave damage was done. Safe passage of the residents were facilitated by the Federal Police, the people were settled in Dire Dawa and nearby Somali districts.\textsuperscript{15}

Turning to the causes of the armed “invasion” of Mieso town, one of Mieso woreda Security Bureau Officials put the causes of the conflict in to three. According to him, the first cause was Somali group’s ambition to expand their territory towards the resource rich areas of west Oromia. The second cause was few officials of the Somali Regional State attempt to regain the town of Mieso which they lost in the referendum. The third cause was to control the check points at ‘Bordede’ which earn considerable amount of money for the Federal Government through ‘chat’ revenue.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12} Interview with former Mieso Woreda official, Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{13} Interview with Oromia Mieso Woreda Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Oromia Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{15} Interview with former Somali Mieso Woreda official, Mieso, March 2009
\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Oromia Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
While discussing the June 2008 incidence, Oromo focus group participants blamed both Regional State, the local governments, the Federal Police. Concerning the Oromo regional state local government, the elders stated that the woreda officials in charge of security issues were not such active in curbing the conflict immediately before and after. During the conflict, they were afraid or waiting for an order to take action from the Federal Police. However, the Somali regional local government officials kept silent when armed groups on the Somali Regional state side mobilized their compatriots as far from Djibouti and pass through hundred kilometers to invade the town of Mieso. Complaining at the federal police, one of the focus group participants stressed, they didn’t take any action, when heavily armed Isa’s entered the town of Mieso, they were simply watching.

In discussing the June 2008 situation, the Somalia Regional State woreda official denied any direct or indirect involvement in the incident by saying we don’t control every pocket of the vast area… the pastoralists are armed with modern rifles and move in the area where we do not have enough government structure. In discussing the overall issue of the June 2008 incident, the Somali regional state Woreda official described the conflict by saying that conflict started with minor misunderstandings finally erupted to wider scale.

Moreover, the official noted that people in this area are armed; especially, the pastoralists in order to protect their camels, and not to attack other ethnic groups. He also asserts that due to the vastness of the area, they do not control every pocket of the woreda. Regarding the heavily armed men who attacked the town of Mieso, the officials said that these are non-Issa armed men who are operating in the area that they are not clear with but he said they are working with Federal Government to identify these groups who aggravated the minor conflicts between the two ethnic groups.

Commenting on the issue, a Somali elder noted that Conflict in this area is everyday business; I will not be surprised if something happens right now because everybody has interest out the conflict. Regarding this particular conflict, he said that the causes of the incident were Oromo ethnic group’s failure to pay for blood money to which they agreed for the killing of two herdsmen.

17. Focus group discussion with Oromos, Mieso March 2009
18. Interview with Somali Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
19. Interview with Somali Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
20. Interview with Somali Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
21. Interview with Somali elder, Mieso, March 2009
22. Interview with Somali elder, Mieso, March 2009
The discussion in the above section demonstrates that conflict in Mieso woreda started to flare since government change in Ethiopia. The information obtained from the community and local government officials suggests that in handling the conflict that erupted in this particular area, the local government officials did not start with the detailed assessment of the background of the conflict. Consequently, some very important activities such as, trying to identify and differentiate the root and the immediate causes of the conflict have not been considered satisfactorily. Besides, no proper background study had been implemented which led the local government officials to manage conflicts in a haphazard manner in the study area in the past few years and in managing conflict currently.

3.4 Causes of Conflict in Mieso Woreda

Mieso woreda and its surrounding are inhabited by different ethnic groups; the cluster can be regarded as a melting pot as a result of the multiethnic composition of the local population. The Oromo and Somali clans are the majority in the area. Different ethnic groups like Amharas, Tigrians and Gurage are found in the urban areas. Moreover, the cluster is also known for its chronic drought, which made considerable numbers of people dependent on food aid.

Historically, the two major indigenous groups in the Mieso cluster: Oromo and Somali have long-standing relationship characterized by both peace and conflict. The major causes of conflicts between these two groups which lead to sources of insecurity are further discussed below.

3.4.1 Competition over Natural Resource

Food insecurity due to the recurrent drought situation also accounts for some of the violence among farming and pastoralist ethnic groups which compete over grazing land, pasture and other scarce resources. This resource competition has the potential of escalating already existing local tensions.

The Oromo social system and culture prescribes to a sedentary way of life whose economy depends on agriculture. Farming is practiced by this particular ethnic group in the cluster; however, the Somali mode of life is dominated by pastoralist way of life which is characterized by frequent mobility in relation to seasonal change in search of grazing land and water.
As a result of deforestation and desertification in the cluster, the forests of Asabot Mountain and its vast grass land decreased and reached to the point where it cannot supply the huge livestock in the area with grazing land and water. On the other hand, the grazing land particularly the water wells dried and decreased in number as a result of climate change. The area which is owned by the Oromo’s is relatively rich compared to Somali inhibited areas, in terms of grass land and water. In times of dry season, the Somalis move towards the Oromo land in search of pasture and water for their livestock and settle in the area temporarily.

Describing this tradition an Oromo elder said that they used to share the resources together when they come to the area for short time of settlement. The two ethnic groups used to resolve their misunderstandings which arise from the use of water and grazing land through traditional resource management mechanisms. But after the resource become scare he maintains, that the Somalis began to hold the remaining resources alone and they started to settle in the area for a long period of time unlike the previous period. Finally their prolonged settlement in the area resulted in seizing. The Oromo eventually are forced to protect their land from the invading pastoralists.23 The Oromo focus group participants relate the competition over natural resources with the recurrent drought and food insecurity in the area. One Oromo participants stated: “The drought is directly related with the conflict in two ways first we are unable to plough our land even when there is good rainfall because we are engaged with the Issa in conflict or in peace conference arranged by the local government officials. The other is the Issa let their camel to the farm which results in damage of the harvest.”24

Regarding the natural resource competition, Somali elders underscore the fact that the environment is not enabling these days for pastoralists. The dry season is becoming longer than the previous years and they are forced to stay at the Oromo area for longer time than the usual times. This resulted in Oromo’s fear of owing the land by the Issa’s permanently.25 This was also further noted in focus group discussion with Somalis. They asserted that there were mutual agreements between the ethnic groups using the resources in the past but now things have changed. While reflecting on their relationship, in the good old days our herdsmen were like brothers with the Oromo’s but now when they see each other they started to shout at each other and fight.26

23. Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009
24. Focus group discussion with Oromos, Mieso March 2009
25. Interview with Somali elder, Mieso, March 2009
26. Focus group discussion with Somali, Mieso March 2009
Elders of both Somali and Oromos believe that the recent drought actually affecting Afar and Oromo pastoralist made them to compete for resources particularly water and pasture; still the tension between the two continues. As information obtained from elders and local government officials in the area, this conflict is typically emerged as a result of Afar-Issa conflict which pushes back Somalis to the limited areas where water and pasture is already depleted due to the current drought and which forced them to settle close to each other and share the available resources.

3.4.2 Territorial Claim

The conflict between Oromo and Somali communities in the area is further grounded on the issue where the administrative border should be delimited. The post 1991 political change and the new regional arrangement in the country which resulted in the ethnic groups to have their own regional administration not only aggravated the already existing conflict over resource but also reshaped the conflict in terms of territorial claim. According to key informants, the causes of Oromo-Somali conflict in the areas in addition to resource competition is that it is one ethnic groups’ ambition over controlling other ethnic group territory. This claim of other’s territory is clearly seen on Somalis frequent clash with Oromos over Mieso which was allocated by referendum to Oromia administration.

According to Oromo focus group participants, the Somalis still do not accept the referendum result and they claim the town of Mieso and its surroundings as their own territories and they frequently try to gain the town by force and by creating tensions in the surrounding. The June 2008 incident is a good example.27 Commenting on the same issue one higher official in Mieso Woreda Security Bureau said that Somalis have strong ambition to control the fertile areas in every direction because their land is now becoming less hospitable to their livestock. As a result, they raise the issue of territorial claim and start to expand into two directions to have reserve land; the directions are in the border areas of Afar and Oromia Regional State.28 However, Oromo elders believe that it is purely the expansion policy of Somalis towards Oromo land in the name of administrative boundary. They recount how the Somalis evacuated the Afar from their place in the past thirty years and now how they want to do the same to Oromo’s. If it actually was an administrative claim it was resolved through the 2004 referendum.29

27. Focus group discussion with Oromos, Meiso March 2009
29. Interview with Oromoelder, Mieso, March 2009
Regarding the 2004 referendum and the aftermath conflicts in Mieso woreda, Somalis do not accept all the process and the result of the referendum. Elders stated that the referendum was conducted when the number of Somalis who were in the area was limited due to their seasonal movement, the Oromia Regional State exploited the opportunity and won Mieso town as a result. Somalis do not accept the outcome of the referendum and claim Mieso town especially the surrounding Kebeles.  

Moreover, Somali Woreda local officials describe the territorial claim of the Somalis out of their hand as they are responsible to enforce the 2004 referendum. The Somalis consider the officials as partisan to Oromos as a result of which they are simply reporting the issue to the Regional Council, to persuade the elders to give up their territorial claim.

The data presentation and the discussion in the above section shades light on sources of insecurity in Mieso woreda. The depletion of the environment in alarming rate resulted in chronic drought. This in turn led to the competition for resources between the two ethnic groups. The conflict is manifested in territorial claim of pastoralist Issa’s whose land has become unable to sustain their pastoralist way of life.

3.5 Actors and Factors in the Conflict

In the protracted conflict of Mieso Woreda, the actors are not only the two ethnic groups who live in the area. There are also internal and external actors who have their own interest in the conflict. Furthermore, there are also factors which trigger the conflict apart from the main underlying causes. The actors and factors of Mieso Woreda conflict will be briefly discussed in this section to show the other dimension of the conflict which makes the management effort complex and demanding.

3.5.1 Actors

In this particular Somali and Oromo conflict, the clans who are found in Djibouti support their compatriots in Ethiopia. The help of Issas’ from Djibouti is visible in time of conflict. The support ranges from propaganda transmission from Djibouti radio to firearms and voluntary fighters.

According to the higher official of the Mieso Woreda security bureau, they found Djibouti identification card from the dead body of an individual in the June 8, 2008 incident in

30. Interview with former Somali Miesoo Woreda official, Mieso, March 2009
31. Interview with Somali Mieso Woreda official, Meaiso, March 2009
32. Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009
Mieso town. Besides, the automatic rifle which he possessed is also considered as evidence to the Djiboutian involvement in the conflict. The reason behind the Issa’s who reside in Djibouti supporting those who live in Ethiopia, according to an Oromo elder, is their agenda of expansion and the belief that one day they will force the Oromos to evacuate from the area and seize the district permanently. The other reason why they help them is due to their ethnic affinity. The Issa who are found in Ethiopia and Djibouti are from the same clan. He further noted that during the two days conflict in Mieso in June, 2002 the Issas’ who live in Djibouti were chanting on the street of the city by saying the fighters evacuated the Oromos up to Chiro. This information was disseminated through Djibouti local FM radio.

The other actors which can also be taken as an internal actor because their network is also found in Ethiopia are those contraband traders who are active in the borders of the two country that help them in order to control the contraband route and free the area from law enforcement bodies. The contraband route stretches up to the central part of the country through Mieso.

These contrabandists also according to the same informant are arm dealers who supply the conflicting parties with automatic weapons, their arm trade connection reaching to the main cities of the country.

In addition, the other actors in the conflict who actively participate are demobilized soldiers. According to the west Oromia Zonal Security bureau official, these ex-soldiers involve in conflicts in support of their respective ethnic groups. Due to the involvement of militarily trained people in the conflict, the causality of the violence increased in the woreda as compared to before. In relation to other actors in the conflict, the Somali side woreda higher official said that they have found a paper which is written in Oromifa signifying the solidarity of OLF to the Ittu (Oromo) in the bushes of the woreda vicinity.

The other actors in this conflict are officials who have different positions in the administration of the local government of the woreda structure. According to the informants, and in which later on confirmed by the Somali side woreda administration official, the Woreda Security Office Head was found in mobilizing youngsters in facilitating the passage of arms from borders towns in the June 2008 conflict in Mieso town.

33. Interview with Oromia Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
34. Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009. The transmission of the information by local Djibouti radio was also confirmed by both local officials of the woreda
35. Interview with Oromia Regional State Security Bureau Addis Ababa, February 2009
36. Interview with West Oromia zone Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
37. Interview with Somali Mieso Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
38. Interview with Oromia Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
3.5.2 Other Factors

The major factors which contribute for the triggering of conflict in the study area are many. The primary factors in the areas which exacerbate the perpetuation and escalation of conflicts is the long standing culture of retaliation and the upholding of warrior cult. Pastoralists in the area feel humiliated if attack on a family or clan member remains unrevenge. These retaliatory acts receive positive reactions and are often praised by the community. Women have decisive role in this regard as they contribute towards sustaining this culture, praising the killer and ridiculing the other side labeled as “coward”. Actually, the absence of provision of law and order in the vast and remote Somali woredas which neighbors the Oromia woreda resulted in the rapid proliferation of small arms. The actors in the conflict armed themselves with modern arms like RPG, PKM, and AK47. On the other hand by virtue of its location near to the border of Djibouti, the people in the area have easy access to arms. This as a factor has escalated the conflict with heavier causality.

The other factor which contributes to the conflict is lack of functional government structure at Local and Regional level. The government structures especially on the Somali side are not capable of resolving or maintaining security in the area due to very limited number of staffs. On the other hand, the Oromia government structure is well organized and staffed but unable to offer effective means for the peaceful handing of such deep rooted conflict only through the existing Oromia government structure. As a result, the relatively well structured Oromia local government failed to function and manage in the area of conflict management due to the absence of coordination and cooperation from the parallel local government of Somali Regional local government.

3.6 Attempts to Resolve the Conflict

After having analyzed the conflict scenario of Mieso woreda actors, the root causes and aggravating factors, the following section discusses the attempts made by different bodies to manage the conflict. In order to resolve the Oromo-Somali conflict in Mieso, many attempts were made. The attempts can be categorized in to Federal level, Regional Governments level and traditional conflict resolution mechanism of the two ethnic groups.

3.6.1 Local Governments Attempts to Manage the Conflict

39. Interview with Somali elder, Mieso, March 2009
40. Interview with Oromia Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
The framework of how local governments manage conflicts is stipulated in the Regional States Constitution of the country. However, prior to the decentralization of power in the country conflicts were managed by different bodies which did not have the mandate to do so. Among the parties involved in conflict management in Mieso woreda is also the National Army. 

Although the intervention of the army can be taken as a measure to stabilize the situation due to its approximate position in the area, the army was accused by both conflicting parties in the use of force in which people got killed and wounded in the course of intervention and disarmament process. The intervention of the army is also in some cases up on request of the of two Zonal administration which had the vital power in the Regional Government structure and can be taken as an equivalent to the present day woreda level in terms of power and function. 

Before decentralization, the zone government structure officials used to manage and resolve conflicts through adjudication. According to a former Somali Zonal administration, there was no conflict management strategy in the woreda. There were no departments which address issues related with conflict and conflict management. Such duties were given to different bodies including the National Army which has been stationed in the area. The zonal officials visit the woreda when grave causalities are reported to the officials of the two Regions. 

After decentralization, the woreda level government structure secured considerable power and function; the local governments began to have a new approach to conflicts in the woreda. The woreda level structure allowed the two regional states to closely monitor the developments in their respective woredas. However, the change in governmental structure does not bring remarkable change in the overall conflict scenario of Mieso woreda. According to the Oromia side, Mieso woreda security bureau officials are working alone on issues related to security and conflict management. The Somali side officials are not cooperative in sharing information and in controlling arms trafficking in their woreda. Moreover, the Somali side woreda officials who are in charge of different positions related to peace and security are either in prison or deposed from their position due to the continuous power struggle and involvement in the conflict. As a result, the Oromia side Mieso woreda operates in the absence of coordination from the other side of Mieso woreda. 

41. Interview with Oromia Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009 
42. Interview with former Shinile Zone Administration official, Dire Dawa, April 2009 
43. Interview with former Shinile Zone Administration official, Dire Dawa, April 2009 
44. Interview with Oromia Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009 
45. Interview with Oromia Regional state Security Bureau official, Addis Ababa, February 2009
The conflict management strategy which both woreda especially the Oromia Mieso woreda follows in the area are organizing conferences for the local elders and community representatives on issues of conflict prevention. The other strategy which can be mentioned here is the quarterly discussion forum which comprises the neighboring woredas on issues related to security and conflict resolution.

Furthermore, the local officials mentioned the frequent discussion with the Somali Mieso woreda on issues of the overall activities and plan in conflict management strategies together. However, the attempts made by both woreda officials could not resolve the longstanding conflict between Somali group and Oromo. The Oromia side Mieso woreda administration official told me: the efforts that we are making in this woreda will not address the root causes of the problem; the conflict is related with lack of sustainable development, which we can not afford at this level. The Somali focus group participant commenting on issues related to local government officials and the institution which are in charge of security issues said, “We see the officials at conferences when the regional officials put pressure on them to handle the case they organize meetings and order us to resolve our disagreement in negotiation with the Oromo’s… we know why they are doing this, they want to stay in the position they have, they are unable to solve our problem rather they are securing their position at the expense of the conference reports to the Regional State”.

Regarding the institutions which are meant to manage and to resolve conflicts in the woreda, the participants complain there is only one office, the security affairs office which is usually unable to function due to less budget and lack of manpower. As a result, they do not consider the institution as viable for conflict management. One Somali elder focus group discussant stated that these days people are relying on their arms than government institutions for their problem with Oromo’s.

Both woreda officials who run the institutions related with conflict admit the people attitude and preference of dealing to conflicts in their own ways. The Mieaso woreda security office member said “The people reached to the point where they are not turning for the help of this institution and due to the complex nature of the conflict we are unable to deliver our duties and responsibilities.”

46. Interview with west Oromoia zone Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
47. Interview with Oromia Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
48. Focus group discussion with Somalis, Mieso, March 2009
49. Focus group discussion with Somalis, Mieso, March 2009
50. Interview with Oromia Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
3.6.2 Federal Government

The primary responsibility for resolving border disputes is the administration of the two regional states. After realizing that the two regional states failed to resolve the border dispute along their border area, the Federal Government started to take its own initiative such as organizing conferences for community representatives who are living along the border of the two regional states. The major one was the Peace and Development Conference that took place in Addis Ababa University campus from 12-15 February 2000, and in which about one thousand people including the representatives of the two regions, and elders from all clans of the two groups participated. Similarly, conferences at lower administrative levels followed.\(^{51}\)

The referendum and other agreed upon process during the conference stayed until December 2002 when a meeting organized by Ministry of Federal Affairs decided to invigorate the referendum process. The initiatives which can be mentioned in particular with Mieso woreda was the 2004 referendum. The Ministry of Federal Affairs with the National Electoral Board administered referendum in order to solve the border dispute. On the other hand, similar conferences at lower administration level followed. The consecutive conferences and meeting which were held in Mieso woreda were to familiarize the local community representatives and local officials on conflicts. The Federal Government also deployed Federal Police in Mieso woreda to intervene when conflict erupts in the cluster woredas.\(^{52}\)

The deployment of Federal police to intervene in conflicts in this particular woreda is not welcomed by both conflicting parties. They accuse the Federal police for being partial for the Oromos in time of conflict and disarmament. One key informant stated that the Federal Polices killed their compatriot, in many instances when they were at war with Oromos.\(^{53}\) On the other hand, the Oromos blamed the Federal police stationed in the woreda for being late to take action. The elders of the Oromo also complained that although there was a unit of Federal Police at Mieso town, the Police did not intervene during conflicts. One Oromo elder said “The government (implying the Federal Police) was watching us by binocular from a far while we are eating each other (Killing each other) the Federal Police intervened when we were both exhausted and incapable of continuing the fighting”.\(^{54}\)

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51. Interview with Ministry of Federal Affairs expert, Addis Ababa, February 2009
52. Interview with Oromia Regional state Security Bureau official, Addis Ababa, February 2009
53. Interview with Somali elder, Mieso, March 2009
54. Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009
3.6.3 Attempts of the Regional States

In the vast border woredas of the two regional states, conflict and tension become a daily activity since the establishment of Regional States in Ethiopia. Despite the occurrence of conflicts in the borders of the two regional states, there is no established mechanism to manage the conflict which arises from ownership of woredas. The two regional states preferred a political solution to the territorial dispute. This is by conducting referendum in the border woredas where conflict arises due to border dispute. After the controversial result of the referendum, the regional states started to organize peace conferences and discussion forums along the borders of the two Regional State.

These attempts were aimed to persuade community leaders to accept the referendum result and to persuade their respective communities on terms and resolutions of conferences. According to focus group participants, the process of organizing conference and discussions was not free from manipulation of political groups who have significant role in fuelling and creating mistrusts among Oromos and Somalis in Mieso woreda. In the recent conference which was held at Dire Dawa, one elder focus group discussant said that the higher officials who came from the regional state were warning us to settle our misunderstandings with the Oromos peacefully without discussing the new developments which followed after the referendum. Besides, the higher officials who were once in the position of Zonal administration had been mobilizing youngsters from the remote areas of Somali kebeles where Somalis are found.

Concerning those responsible for the management of conflicts at regional state level, one Somali elder informed me that: when the conflict between the Somalis and Oromos breakout, it gives Mr.x and Mr.Y new vehicles each. In response to my quest for explanation, this informant told me that these high-level officials responsible for handling of conflicts would get a reason to expand the budget of their office and by doing so to embezzle substantial portion of money, this only happens when such incidents occur.

Interviewed Somali Regional State officials also do not deny the fact that they could not manage conflicts in the way they would have liked and expected to do. But they attributed the failure to lack of sufficient budget, logistics and manpower. Regarding their conflict management strategies, the higher official replied by saying that organizing consecutive peace conferences are the way they try to handle conflicts all over the border woredas which are in conflict with their neighbouring woreda.

55. Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009
56. Focus group discussion with Somalis, Mieso, March 2009
57. Interview with Somali elder, Mieso, March 2009
58. Interview with Somali Regional States Security Bureau official, Dire Dawa, April 2, 2009
3.6.4 Traditional Conflict Management Mechanism

Both ethnic groups in Mieso woreda have rich tradition of resolving conflicts within their own ethnic group and with other ethnic groups. The institutions have good record in resolving conflicts which arise from resource utilization and cattle rustling. The significance and contribution of these institutions recently become less important in conflict resolution effort in the woreda. One Oromo elder stressed that the institutions are no more capable in resolving conflicts in the area due to the fact that conflicts involve political issues which is beyond the capacity and experience of the institutions to resolve. The elder further noted that previously they were resolving conflicts which arose from different cause with the elders but nowadays the cause and actors of the conflicts change dramatically since the beginning of regionalization in the country, the Issas began to claim the territory of Oromos as their own territory which both the elder knew the fact where the territory is.\(^{59}\)

On the other hand, the Issa elders accept the deteriorating role of the traditional institutions in conflict resolution by saying due to the involvement of political leaders in the process which is out of the norms of the traditional conflict resolution experiences, both political leaders who are found in different position pressure them to entertain their agenda on the gatherings of the two traditional institution leaders.\(^ {60}\)

Regarding the role and participation of the traditional conflict resolution institutions in management of conflict in Mieso woreda, both local government officials confirmed that they have good relationships and they involve these institutions in conflict resolution process and encourage them to take their own initiatives in the effort to resolve the conflict in Mieso woreda but due to different factors their efforts could not bear fruit in conflict management endeavor.

The Mieso Woreda Security bureau official said that the resolutions passed by the traditional institutions are not respected as earlier time by the parties in conflict due to the fact that the conflicts nowadays involve the issue of land ownership and the expansion of Issass in an alarming rate. Furthermore, these institutions need support from the local government in terms of salary for the elders and budget for effective function even on issues which they can resolve.\(^ {61}\)

\(^ {59}\) Interview with Oromo elder, Mieso, March 2009  
\(^ {60}\) Interview with Somali elder, Mieso, March 2009  
\(^ {61}\) Interview with Oromia Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
The Somali regional local government official commenting on the effectiveness of the traditional institutions said that the resolution passed by these institutions would not resolve the conflict in Mieso woreda because the issues which lead the two ethnic groups are not as such ordinary, the issue is rather the question where to demarcate a solid line of boundary between the two regional states border, which is beyond their capacity.62

The above discussion shows that the attempts to manage conflicts in Mieso woreda by organizing conferences by different levels of government officials. These frequent conferences are unable to solve the root causes of conflict in Mieso woreda. According to The information obtained from conflicting parties, proper resource distribution could address the root causes of the conflict in the study area.

Moreover, referendum as a mechanism to manage the conflict in this particular area resulted in hostility among the people. Currently, the two ethnic groups in Mieso consider the referendum result as a dividing line whereby people are not allowed to cross. They have the perception that the result of the referendum created border demarcation for one ethnic group’s sole area to reserve and to own it. Moreover, the traditional institutions which could have a positive role in resolving conflict is now unable to manage conflicts as they did before, due to the politicization of conflict in the area.

3.7 Local Government Capability to Manage the Conflict

Since the 2002 decentralization of power in Ethiopia, the woreda level enjoyed reasonable power and function under their jurisdiction. In line with the decentralization process, each regional state is engaged in building their institutional capacity with the help of the Federal Government. However, the Somali Regional State implemented power decentralization to woreda behind other Regional States, as a result, the conflict management and resolution tasks were hindered due to the absence of parallel government structure on the Somali side, Mieso Woreda. The zonal administration level in Somali regional State which was found in Dire Dawa made conflict management unsuccessful.

After the Somali Regional State decentralized power to woreda level, the problem with conflict management continued, at this time problems related with adequate staff. The woreda security bureau which comprises the ‘Woreda’ Police Unit, Militia Unit and Conflict Prevention Unit are headed by one person. On the other hand, the Oromia side of

62. Interview with Somali Mieso Woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
Mieso woreda Security Bureau which has direct involvement in conflict management is structured in different departments, to mention some of the departments: Conflict Prevention Department, Conflict Resolution Department and Department of Neighboring ‘Woredas’ are the structures which are found in the local government and the departments are well staffed and organized. According to security office member of Oromia side, despite the presence of departments in the woreda, the reason they fail to manage conflicts in Mieso cluster is due to the absence of local government structure with adequate staff on the other side of Mieso Woreda.63

In response to the poorly organized and staffed Somali Side Mieso Woreda Security Bureau, the higher official of the Woreda administration replied that the Regional Woreda Government structure is there. However, the reason being it is poorly staffed, due to the fact that Woreda has harsh climatic condition and poor security condition, civil servants are not willing to work there in Mieso Woreda, as a result of which the Bureau is forced to run the offices which have a pivotal role in conflict management by one person.64

From research participants’ response, it seems that the institutional capability of the Somali side of Mieso Woreda is poorly staffed which resulted in exacerbating the conflict in the study area and also due to lack of proper handling and communication with the neighboring woreda. The poorly staffed Somali Mieso woreda resulted in the safe haven for arm dealers who supply the conflicting parties with deadly weapon.

3.8 Local Government and the People

The local governments of both regional states are mandated by their respective regional state constitutions to maintain the peace and security of their Woreda. Accordingly, both Woreda officials engage in activities of resolving and managing conflict in their respective Woredas. The conflict management strategies which have usually been followed and practiced by the Woreda are organizing discussion forums frequently and convening “Peace and Development Conferences”. According to Somali local government official with the community leader and representative, the local officials aware the conference attendants how conflict and dispute under-developed the woreda and the need to resolve conflicts in a civilized and peaceful manner rather than taking arms to resolve disputes.

63. Interview with Oromia Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
64. Interview with Somali Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
Furthermore, they encourage the people to bring their cases to the court of law and to inform for those who are responsible in both woredas whenever minor disagreement happens between the two groups. This is because this minor disagreement leads to a wider conflict resulting in the death and displacement of the people of the two ethnic groups. In the discussions the officials also inform them to believe in the local government institutions that their case can be resolved through the institution. Similarly, the Oromo side of Mieso woreda also conducts such activities with the local communities on similar agenda.

The effort of both woreda local officials frustrated the people of the community in the study area. According to focus group participants, the situation in Mieso woreda is not going to be resolved by frequent and series peace conference forums. Lasting solution for the conflict is achieved by addressing the root causes of the parties in conflict; conferences and discussions tend to serve those who are in the woreda position by giving them the opportunity to embezzle government budget in the name of peace and conflict management.

Furthermore, the focus group participants stressed that after repeatedly appealing to the local government officials of both woredas on the provocative act of the Issa the local authorities could not protect them from the havoc. As a result, they started to protect and take measures on their own. One focus group participant described the local official’s role by saying, they are here in the position to fight for their daily bread and afraid of loosing their job if something wrong happens.

Moreover, the focus group discussant stress that the problem in Mieso woreda is not ordinary conflict which previously limited to issues about grazing land and water. Rather it is the ambition of Issas to control areas which are fertile. Such kind of issues which involves territorial claim cannot be solved by the two regional state local governments. This conflict might be solved through the direct involvement of the two Regional States and Federal Government.

From the experience of the research participants, it seems that the local governments’ institutions are not taken as an option to resolve the conflict in Mieso Woreda, after repeated failure of conflict management. As a result, the community who lives in Mieso woreda suffered from the consequence of the conflict which led to arming themselves to provide protection for their respective clans.

65. Interview with Somali Mieso woreda Administration official, Mieso, March 2009
66. Interview with Oromia Mieso Security Bureau official, Mieso, March 2009
67. Focus group discussion with Oromos, Mieso, March 2009
CHAPTER 4

4.1 Conclusions and Recommendations

Conflict is a natural phenomenon and occurs as a result of incompatible goals of human beings. Conflict can be driven by the unfulfilled needs and fears of the society expressed in different situations and forms: the sense of justice, identity, basic needs, rights of the individuals, rights of property and land. Such demands of a collective nature are often triggered by officials neglect, denial of human rights, persecution and bad governance. The management system handling the conflict and human interaction can create conflict as well as find the solution in a society.

In order to identify and address the precursor and the nature of the conflict, it is essential to consider a structural analysis of the root causes of the conflict. In connection with these, the study has reflected the long history of the conflict in Mieso Woreda to analyze and explain the role of local governments in conflict management and the broader systematic factors that led to the current crises.

According to the findings of the study, one of the underlying causes of conflict in Mieso woreda is the claim over land ownership as well as conflict over natural resources due to the population growth of both humans and livestock. Another major cause which changes the nature of conflict from competition over the use of the natural resources to that of claim for land ownership was found to be the physical demarcation of boundaries based on ethnic regionalism.

Regarding conflict management, the Federal Government Policy for conflict management in inter-ethnic dispute relies on consultation, negotiation and persuasion. It assigns the responsibility at first instance to the local political leadership and administrative authorities to contain and resolve conflict in their jurisdiction. It also encourages the rival groups to form joint-committees, which are strengthening with the participation of the federal government institution. In this respect, the findings indicated that the local governments in the study area manage conflicts after the conflict is manifested in violence. The study indicated that the mechanism to resolve conflicts in Mieso woreda could not address the root causes of the conflict. The finding of the study also demonstrate that the failure of local governments attempts to resolve conflicts emanate from the wrong con-
ceptualization of conflict among local officials who attempt to manage conflicts usually after the damages occur.

Pastoralist and agro-pastoralist groups dominate areas of eastern and southern Ethiopia. Together with Afar, Somali and many of the Oromos that live adjacent to Somalis are the largest pastoral nomadic groups in Ethiopia. Oromos and Somalis belong to the east Cushitic groups. They have a long history of interaction and are largely known for their mixing of cultural values especially along the area where ethnic interaction is high.

In line with the transformation of Ethiopia from a unitary state into an ethnic federation, both ethnic groups have been organized into separate regional states of Oromia and Somali regions. Moreover, related with the formation of the new administrative regions, issues of where the physical borders between the two states should be drawn raised immense concern and conflict. This resulted in conflict among different ethnic groups, in some cases leading to the outbreak of violence, killing and property damage. Some of the difficulties in settling such conflicts are the fact that states borders are being initially demarcated by the government without the involvement of the community. Yet, under the constitution any changes on the borders must be decided jointly with the states concerned.

Additionally, to demarcate geographical borders physically between the various ethnic groups in this broad area of double or unclear ethnic affiliation is difficult. For many smaller groups of people living in border areas between the Oromo and Somali region, to consider either the ‘Oromo’ or ‘Somali’ identity as the only criterion of inclusion into the region is rather an artificially imposed one. The relationship between Somali and Oromo is by no means clear and simple. There are Oromo speakers who genealogically claim Somali identity, there are webs of inter-clan ties between Oromos and the people of Somali and there are ritual cooperation and interdependency. The relationship between Oromo and Somali communities is far more complicated than any administrators ever dream of. Therefore, the most effective approach to solve conflicts in the Somali/Oromia regional border areas is to recognize the complexity of the problems. Any future attempt to physically demarcate the contested boundary should take into account the fact that the people have been living in an ethnically mixed setting since time immemorial.

A significant proportion of the people of the two regions living along the border have got mixed cultural, linguistic and identity backgrounds. Initial attempts by the regions to include part of the disputed boundary on a ‘pure’ ethnic line without the involvement
of the community can be seen to have failed. The politicization of ethnicity by the competing local authorities and local tribal elites of both regions that concentrate merely on parts of mixed cultural, linguistic and identity affiliation for their inclusion to either side without the involvement and free will of these people, has caused confrontation between the various ethnic groups.

Besides, the nature of conflicts that occur between the pastoral groups in the east and southern parts of the country, along Oromia/ Somali regional border is changing from conflicts caused by competition over resource use and access to grazing land and water points to permanent claims on land ownership which is now being fought in the name of boundary disputes between the Somali and Oromia regions. Therefore, any future attempt to demarcate the regions’ border administratively has to fully respect the group rights such as the right to freely choose which administration they want to belong to. This will only be achieved when the two regions authorities fully cooperate and the necessary conditions for free referendum are fulfilled.

4.2 Recommendations

There is no “quick fix” method in peace building process. The effort takes time and energy to achieve lasting peace. Thus, taking the findings of the study and from the above conclusion as a spring board, the following points are recommended, with regard to the question of what should be done to bring lasting peace to the study area.

• Somali and Oromos have rich experience of handling and resolving conflicts based on their respective cultures and traditions. The traditional authorities in the area hold great potential and responsibility for solving conflicts and working for sustainable peace. It is recommended that these already existing traditional systems of conflict-management should be recognized. Therefore, encouraging and strengthening the traditional rules of grazing and water resource management, demarcation of settlement areas and shared mobility are crucial issues to be considered.

• Boundary demarcation of countries, regions and districts has long been recognized as problematic in terms of who is demarcating whose land. In Mieso, the regional boundaries divide ethnic groups from their traditional resource bases. It is recommended that the demarcation of boundaries should be done with the involvement of ethnic groups living in the area.

• A reform of local government administrative structure as well as comprehensive ca-
Capacity building is strongly recommended in order to guarantee peace, law and order and to prevent violence.

- The Regional State together with the Federal Government should develop an effective mechanism to resolve the boundary dispute and to undertake meaningful dialogue between the State of Oromia and Somali. The community and traditional reconciliation mechanisms have to be linked into inter-state dispute resolution mechanisms. The boundary dispute should be resolved by mechanisms which are stipulated in the constitution. The rights of communities to choose and decide freely to which regional administration they want to belong to should be respected.

- Inter-regional security cooperation is needed to manage cross-border violent pastoral conflicts along the regions’ border; the two regions should cooperate in respecting and keeping law and order.

- The full accountability and control of local governments’ law enforcement bodies should be strongly promoted. Furthermore, local governments along border areas should be empowered in conflict prevention and management.

- All peace building initiatives and efforts should take in to consideration that peace building as a process and starts from grass root levels.

- In order to avoid violence as result of border dispute, local government officials should depoliticizes the issue of border and to focus on mitigating the conflict.

- The existing Joint social economic infrastructure activities should be scaled up and free from tribal thinking and corruption. The regional states along the border area should address the resource scarcity problem which is the challenge in the peace building process.

- The national politics should genuinely support the conflict management and peace building activities which arises from border dispute without favoring one party and alienating others.

- NGOs which are engaged in conflict prevention programs should be given more space in conflict prevention and resolution programs, as they are working closely to all stake holders in creating local capacity in the effort to manage conflicts.
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PROCLAMATIONS


THE STATUS OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN ETHIOPIA:
THE CASE OF ADDIS ABABA

By Solomon Hassen
1.1. Introduction

The notable economist John Start Milles said, “Security is the most vital of all interests and that security of a person and property are the first needs of society.” The provision of security was viewed as the most fundamental obligation and task of the state as the ‘Weberian State” was perceived to enjoy the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence. Gone are the days when the state, as a sole actor, enjoyed this monopoly over the provision of security.

Perceptions of security have changed over time largely because of the manner in which the state has performed its task of providing security to the general public and the growing private concerns. The private provision of security and military services challenges conventional assumptions about the roles of the nation state as the main protagonist in military affairs and as the guarantor of physical security for its citizens. Evidences suggest that even during the time when the provision of security was considered to be the main obligation of the state, other actors such as Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) were already on the scene and their presence tended to increase over time. (Bryden, 2006:46)

From the seventh century people were not fully convinced that security should remain the monopoly of the state but instead that other players, in addition to what the state does, should become actors in the security sector (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2005).

The escalation of individual and collective feelings of insecurity generated by the contemporary risks associated with social transition has been seen as one of the reasons for the transition from a state tailored security to one that is provided by private entities. Yet the meaning of the term “insecurity” has been subjected to considerable debates across the disciplines underpinned by questions such as to who or what should it apply, and who and what is it threatened by? (see Territf et al., 1999). In this respect the perception of insecurity usually contributes to the growth of private security companies.

Some critics of the provision of security by private firms have argued that regulating the industry would confer undue legitimacy on what are inherently illegitimate actors
These critics advocate a total ban on PSCs and the renationalization of security and military service provision. The extent of the demand for and supply of private security services around the world indicates, however, that a ban is unrealistic; it would be impossible to enforce and, importantly, would work against the aim of greater transparency and accountability in the security sector by increasing the likelihood that the industry would be pushed underground. Furthermore, most would agree that, even if it were practically possible, banning PSCs entirely is undesirable.

At the other end of the spectrum, a few commentators have argued that the market’s invisible hand will ultimately ensure an informal punishment of “bad” private security behavior and that for this reason regulation is unnecessary. This line of argument is equally untenable; the putative magic of the market has so far not been sufficient to discourage rogue behavior by individual firms and, even if it were, this market would not be capable of addressing the wider question of accountability (Nossal, 2003).

As police forces fail to cope with petty and violent crimes that emanate from a society in which gross inequalities of wealth and opportunity have started to prevail, and where the sanctity of life is mocked by the misery in which most are compelled to struggle for an existence, those with properties to defend have to pay for this service. When the comparatively well-off attempts to secure their possessions and personal safety against would-be-criminal, the result in Africa and often elsewhere, has been a proliferation of private security companies, and the apartheid of security (Small, 2006).

Ironically the growth of the security industry thrives upon the creation and dependency of a climate of anxiety and fear among the relatively wealthy, so that insecurity and security form an ever-accelerating spiral of subjective impressions.

There can be little doubt that in some cases the activities of private security companies, acting on behalf of and in collusion with multinationals and local elite are aimed at securing certain benefits for their paymasters to provide a particular value-added service. Sometimes, this may be to enable mineral exploitation to the exclusive benefit of certain companies or groups. The private security industry is wide ranging, and involves billions of dollars, with the greatest part of its business probably being entirely legitimate and conducted in accordance with generally accepted business practices, norms and standards. Companies are entitled to seek legitimate business. Governments must establish mechanisms for oversight and regulation, both individually and collectively where they exist and can do so.
In the absence, internationally, of official data on the security industry (de Ward, 1999) measurement of its growth has been problematic. It has therefore been impossible to quantify the expansion of security roles within mass private property environments although it can be argued that the industry’s profile and pervasiveness have been raised considerably through its presence in these territories (Jones and Newbura, 1998). Privatization demonstrates efficiency principles that can improve government performance. But on the other hand, privatization could have unintended costs as outsourcing may lead to corruption.

As public social life increasingly falls within privately controlled spouses, policed by security officers operating not in the public interest but in the interests of their employers or corporate clients, it becomes subject to a style of policing in its objectives, core functions and methods of operations. The effects of reliance on the private security sector depend on the nature of the state or other non state actors that contract PSCs and the strategic environment in which they are used. If PSCs are to be constructively engaged in a broader system of security governance by state and non-state actors, two main issues need to be addressed. First, there is the question of accountability. Without legal accountability of individual contractors, the use of PSCs will continue to be viewed with suspicion. Second is the wider question of legitimacy, if PSCs are to take an active part in the construction of security governance, they need to be viewed as legitimate actors by the state and other actors including the people who are the ultimate objects of the system and service supplied.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The expansion of private security companies in Ethiopia no doubt contributes to the bolstering of public safety in some respects and fills some of the security gaps left by the overstretched nature of the public security sector. The fact that private security companies are registered as business enterprise and the little legal definition given to their relationship with the existing security apparatus such as law enforcement agencies and in particular, the police poses a real challenge to the identification and accountability of private security companies in Ethiopia.

1.3. Hypothesis

The betterment or the impoverishment in the delivery of security by private security companies in Ethiopia has a direct correlation to their legal status (regulated or unregu-
Private security companies have a significant role to play in the provision of security to their clients. Although their primary mission is to respond to the security needs of their clients, their activities have an implication on the country’s security infrastructure for they are emerging to be an alternative security providers to that of the public security force. Hence for them to be reliable security actors and to contribute to the overall security of the country, they need to be well regulated, controlled and become more professional. If not, rather than improving the status of security in the country, they could well be a source of insecurity.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

Home to many international and regional organizations, Ethiopia would benefit tremendously from a well-regulated, monitored and competitive private security industry.

Hence the major objective of this paper is exploring if there are regulatory and legislated frameworks that clearly define the role and responsibilities of private security companies in Ethiopia. It is also to assess the scope of private security companies in terms of service delivery, their role as alternative security providers, and the employment opportunities they create, their approximate number and the challenges they are facing. There is a lack of empirical data focusing on the developing phenomenon of the private security sector and how it operates in Ethiopia.

Given the ever-increasing economic activities that are in the making in the country, there is subsequently a high demand for the provision of security by the private sector. Thus this research seeks to fill the knowledge gap that exists on the status of private security companies and serve as a reference to policy makers and stakeholders. The paper will try to identify the legal vacuums concerning this sector and assess the nature of private security companies in Ethiopia and show their potential as competitive security providers.

The research also aims at detecting the supply and demand dynamics that fuelled the growth of private security companies in Ethiopia. Private security involvement in the enterprise of law and order is quite substantial. Accordingly, this paper wants to find out if private security companies in Ethiopia abide by labour law, or if there is any other legislation that governs them. It also questions if there has been any sort of exploitation over the employees of the industry, the working conditions, and the training and recruitment of security guards.

Elaborating the major causal factors that led to the growth of the sector is the other ob-
jective of this research. The study as well attempts to identify the prospects of private security companies in developing into companies that could play significant role in the peace and security provision of the sub-region as security and peace have been and remain to be the scarcest commodities of the Horn of Africa.

There has been no scientific paper with empirical data focusing on the developing phenomenon of private security in Ethiopia. Thus this paper will try to shed light on this sector which is both an opportunity, if controlled, and a threat to the security of the country if not well regulated. The paper is a modest contribution to the sector by being the first in its nature. However it can by no means be a comprehensive one, thus I encourage anyone interested in the subject to conduct a more extensive study. It is my firm belief that after my findings, some sort of regulation that brings these companies into light would be adopted.

1.5. Methodology and Research Design

Both primary and secondary methods were used in the data collection. Primary data were collected through participant observation, in-depth interviews, questionnaires and site visits. This research also draws on an extensive reading of academic literature, daily media reports, experiences from members of the industry and the state security bodies. The areas that were visited included as many companies in Addis Ababa as possible.

1.5.1. Selection of Research Participants

In-depth interviews were conducted with high-ranking police and security officers, officials at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Trade and Industry, owners of private security firms and some of the guards.

1.5.2. Data Generating Mechanisms

Interviewing the guards enabled the student researcher to identify the names and locations of security companies as empirical data of any kind do not exist in Ethiopia on where security companies are located and how many they may be.

The researcher then arranged appointments with managers of the firms where possible. The open-ended questions allowed the respondents to state their views and provide wealth of information about the different issues related to the industry. Some of the
questionnaires were conducted by self-completion but most of them were face to face and this allowed more flexibility to both the researcher and the interviewees.

1.5.3. Design

This research was designed based on an exploratory study technique. Exploratory research is typically used when there is little or no previous research or theory on the subject under investigation. Exploratory studies can, in fact, be understood as “condensed case study research” or “a prelude for further more in-depth inquiry”. (Creswell, 1994. 81) As such this study seeks to provide some first steps into a new and little explored area of privatized security in Ethiopia by trying to better understand the legal and economic status of private security companies in the country.

Standard qualitative methodology was used for this exploratory study, including semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, personal observations, informal interviews and relevant documents. The study was structured in several sub-sections. As the impact of private security companies can never be solely attributed to their behaviour alone, the study touches upon the political, legal and social environments in which the companies operate as well as their influence on other actors such as their clients and the international community (especially other security actors) and the public in general.

The advantage of this research design (exploratory) is that it leads to original findings while its weakness could be that it does not allow other confirmations on the validity of the results of this study as no prior research study exists on private security in Ethiopia.

Sampling;

Systematic sampling was chosen as both random and non-random dressings were applied. The random one was used in the representation of security guards and the non-random served to extract information from company heads, legal experts and some people from the public security sector. This is because interviewing resourceful informants gives more precision than doing it in a random manner.

1.5.4 Data Analysis Strategy

In qualitative research, generation and analysis of data are often interwoven and take place concurrently (Sarantakos, 2005:16). “We should not generate data without substantial analysis going on simultaneously.”
Emphasizing these, Hamersley and Atkinson (1995:21) state that letting data accumulate without preliminary technique along the way is “a technique for unhappiness, if not total disaster”. Thus the study gives an analysis of the data collected throughout the study. The data were thematically categorized and analyzed. Thematic categorizations were partially drawn from the major points raised in the research questions. Finally all descriptions were written in a narrative form to provide a holistic picture in relation to the status of the private security companies in Ethiopia. Hence the research, in addition to offering some tentative findings, seeks to inspire and guide further research into this field.

1.6. Organization of the Study

Chapter one has introduced the aims of the study and provided a statement of the problem and a brief background of security in general and the privatization of security in particular. The second chapter attempts to elaborate the notion of privatization of security and the different actors that take part in security provision. The chapter also deals with the various conceptions attached to private security companies and thus gives a synopsis on major issues related to the private security sector. Chapter Three gives a background on private security companies in Ethiopia. It as well presents the private and public security landscape in the country. The fourth chapter analyses issues related to the sector, and based on the findings, it assesses the existence or non-existence of regulatory mechanisms on PSCs in Ethiopia. In addition to dealing with the service, the chapter also examines wage and working conditions of the guards, challenges opportunities in the industry and the contribution of the industry to the betterment of public safety and security in the country.

Chapter Five summarizes the findings of the study. It further indicates the measures that stakeholders need to take in order to ameliorate the current status of the private security sector in Ethiopia so that it becomes a viable alternative in the provision of security in the country in the future.
CHAPTER 2

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

2.1. Privatization of Security

Privatization of security has been a fast growing phenomenon over the years. The expansion of transitional networks in security reflects an increasing trend toward the privatization of security. This particular trend poses significant challenges to the ability of nation-states to control the security agenda. In the absence of effective legal or regulatory structures, such activities raise issues of legality, legitimacy and accountability in the sphere of security policy. The frequency with which concerns are raised about the legitimacy of operations of private security companies signals a seemingly instinctive reluctance to relinquish the role of the state as the provider of security. In the words of the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the world may not yet be ready to privatize peace. The roots of that scepticism cannot, however, simply be reduced to knee-jerk protectiveness about state power and sovereignty. Apprehension about a global industry for the provision of security services relates in principle to two legitimate and interrelated concerns.

Private companies have filled a void left by the historic role played by mercenaries. Some states are ceding direct control over important security operations to the private sector (Rotberrg, 2002:131)

Private security firms are also increasingly present in international conflict situations where states find it easier to outsource some security operations. Private security companies can be less costly than training large number of troops. Moreover, as contractors exist outside the control of nation-states, they lack accountability that military or intelligence personnel might have on private contractors (Musah, 2002).

Over the last 30 years the private security industry has grown exponentially worldwide. This growth was accompanied increasingly by calls in various countries for the imposition of regulation on the industry (FCO, 2002).

The absence of a regulatory framework for private security companies puts the operation
of these companies beyond government scrutiny. Under such conditions there can be no protection of public as well as state interests. The growth of private security from formation to operation in a country has to go hand in hand with their regulation (Dacosta, 2007).

Private security companies can contribute to improving the security situation in a country and thereby also further economic development provided there is sufficient and enforceable regulation. Lack of regulation would also be an implicit license for illegal behavior by such private companies to engage in serious violation of human rights.

Any private firm is motivated by one factor, which is profit; it is not in their interest to protect the common citizens that need protection but only to protect the rich. People with money can afford security, this does not only give the security contractors unjustified leverage in the development of the security sector, but it also undermines the law enforcement work and the notion of universal access to justice (Fayemi, 2000:230).

There is a growing acceptance that security is an essential public good, like education, health and clean water. To ensure the proper use of privatized security, it is essential that states develop comprehensive legislation regulating and controlling the work of the private security industry. States must ensure that the private security sector is a subject to democratic civilian control to ensure good security governance and the protection of human rights (Extra Assembly of the parliamentary Forum on small Arms and Light Weapons Meeting in Panama City, 2007)

A number of authors have commented on how fear of crime, both individual and collective, has become entrenched in the behavior of people and organizations. Drawing on Karl Marx’s analysis, the “commodification” of security reflects the alienation of security from our control and understanding. He saw this to be occurring within the shift in the locus of social control away from the state and towards the market. He saw people’s desire to achieve safety, freedom from danger, assurance and confidence as being translated into preoccupations with security environments, related to “a generalized paranoia and malaise in capitalist societies” (Clapham 2006)

Paradoxically, the more we enter into relationships to obtain the security commodity rather than each other to keep us safe and confident we feel; the more we divide the world into those who are able to enhance our security and those who threaten it, the less we are able to provide it for ourselves (Sandoz, 1999).
On the bases of analysis of contract sizes, operating expenditure in military budget and interviews with investors, Singer estimates that the number of PSCs operating worldwide is in the hundreds of thousands and that they account for combined annual global revenues of close to $100 billion (Singer, 2003). Earlier estimates of the scale of the industry indicated global annual revenues of $55.6 billion in 1990 and, on the basis of compounded annual growth of 7 per cent, projected an increase to $202 billion by 2010 (Singer, 2003).

The international community has yet to develop an agreed response to the emergence of the privatization of security, making it difficult for the provision of security by non-state actors operating transnationally. In 1998 the UN General Assembly adopted the international convention against the recruitment, use, and financing and training of mercenaries which makes mercenary activities illegal (International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing of Mercenaries). However, due to the unclear legal definition of private military companies and private companies, these are not covered by the UN conventions. This leaves the international legal parameters for the private security sector notably unclear.

In 1977 the Organization for African Unity (now AU) adopted the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa. Equally to the UN Convention, private military and private security companies do not fall under this convention.

One of the obstacles in analyzing the privatization of security provision lies in the intrinsic difficulty of finding reliable information. Despite operating in an open market and with companies often seeking legitimacy and promoting themselves as professional and reliable entities, the world of private security and military companies still retains an air of secrecy. There is no exhaustive list of companies operating within the private security sector (Goddard, 2001).

Needless to say that private security companies play a constructive role in the provision of security both internationally and at local levels. However, they need to be well regulated and their activities closely monitored. Failure to do so would mean that the private security companies could involve in illegal acts like mercenary. It was in this regard that conventions at international and OAU/AU level were drafted. Although the adoption of these conventions is worthwhile in fighting mercenary activities, they lack the capacity and coordination essential to enact them. Hence stronger regulatory measures need to be put in place both at international and local level for the PSCs to be law-abiding agents.
2.2. The Emergence of Private Security Companies

In contexts other than war, in everything from the protection of banks, public buildings, private homes, and shopping malls to the safeguarding of extractive industries, operations have been extensively contracted to private security companies. Many multinational companies and governments outsource their security requirements to private military and security firms. In some cases this may be done partly to dilute the employer’s accountability and to obscure public scrutiny of any negative human rights consequences of the security operations.

According to sociologist Max Weber’s conception of the modern nation state, a defining characteristic is the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, including the sanctioning, control and use of force (Weber and Parsons, 1998). Although this view of the nation state continues to inform and underpin most of the debate on international security, state exclusivity in the military realm is, in fact, historically an exception. The incidence of the supply of military services by private actors is as old as warfare itself. Ancient armies, from the Chinese to the Greek and Roman, were to a large extent dependent on contracted forces, as was Victorian Britain, the Italian city states of the Renaissance period and most of the European forces during the third year war of 1618-48. Similarly, private actors have played a role throughout US military history; contractors have supported the US military in every contingency since the American Revolution War of 1775-83 (Singer, 2003).

The rise of the contemporary international private military and security industry began in the early 1990s, with the emergence of private security providers with clear corporate structures. A variety of both demand and supply side factors have associated with the rise of the current corporate security sphere, although three factors are most often cited: (a) the dominance of post-cold war free models of the state, propelling a strong trend towards the outsourcing of traditional government functions; (b) the global downsizing of national militaries, providing a vast pool of trained former military personnel for recruitment by private companies; and (c) the gradual disengagement of the major powers from many parts of the developing world (International Peacekeeping, 2000).

Other commentators view the emergence of private security service providers as a logical progression from the privatization of military goods production (the armament industry) in Europe and North America (Krahman, 2005). According to the laws of a country, private security activity may be armed or unarmed; private security services may be of-
ferred on a strictly local basis or explored across national borders; or they may help with kidnap and ransom situations or provide training for either armed forces or civilians in hostile environments.

The nature of the services provided also depends on the client groups of a PSC. These can be governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private businesses or wealthy individuals. Furthermore, a clear distinction has to be made between services mirroring activities of the police and those of the military. Police-like tasks are almost always domestic in nature and include patrolling, riot control and tasks that have been outsourced from a country’s penal services, such as running a private prison. Military type tasks are usually services that have been outsourced from the armed forces, such as training, the maintenance of military equipment, or military aid to other governments. (Adams, 1999)

Consequently the private security industry in any given country reflects political, social and national idiosyncrasies. This, no doubt, affects the performance of the private security sector alongside the public force due mainly to the suspicion each harbors towards the other.

Over the last two decades, the emergence and rapid growth of private security companies (PSCs), in different countries have been discussed and analyzed from various angles. Scholars, the media, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations embarked on a discourse about the advantages and disadvantages of the private security industry. After the first phase of rather descriptive studies on the involvement of PSCs in conflicts, there has been an increasing emphasis on analytical and normative contributions, the first theme is the escalation of individual and collective feelings of insecurity generated by the contemporary risks associated with social transition. For instance, what the term “insecurity” means and related matters have been subjected to debates across the disciplines. The other point is the impact of globalization on the growth of private security actors. The ever widening gap between the rich and the poor was, therefore, believed to have created tension between the two making the rich see the poor as a source of insecurity to their wellbeing thus demanding more and more security by PSCs (see Territf et al. 1999)

Some commentators have argued that the growth of the private security sector in Africa is “symptomatic of state weakness and the failure of the state to provide physical security for its citizens through the establishment of functioning law and order institutions”
(Holmqvist, 2005:11). Others have emphasized the point that PSCs will grow where there is the establishment of parallel structures of power and authority (Reno, 1998). The proliferation of explanation is an indication of the fact that PSCs have grown to challenge state dominance of security relations. Their growth has given rise to a number of serious questions about the capacity of states to provide security for their citizens.

2.3. The Scope of Private Security Companies

2.3.1. Military Service Providers

It is misleading and pejorative to use the term “mercenary”, more correctly they are “military service providers” (MSPs). MSPs have little in common with the traditional image of a mercenary that stems from their activities in the 1960 and 1970’s. MSPs are lawful, profit-seeking companies with corporate structures. They provide the whole gamut of legitimate services that were formerly provided by national armies. These services include anything from logistics and mine clearance to facility protection and offensive combat operations. In fact, few militaries are currently capable of carrying out most of these tasks and none can compete with MSPs in terms of cost, speed and effectiveness. MSPs utilize former personnel of the world’s finest military organizations, and are unbound by bureaucratic red tape and outdated doctrines. Some companies fit into more than one category, but the categories can be used as general guidelines to better understand the military service industry.

1. Non-lethal Service Providers (NSPs) - NSPs are companies that do a variety of non-combat operations, including logistics for national armies, humanitarian operations, intelligence and mapping services, risk assessments for potential investors and mine clearance operations. Their clients are often non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and states (Mandal, 2000).

2. Private Security Companies (PSCs) - PSCs provide passive security for private and public facilities and operations in high-risk conflict zones. Their clients are generally from the private sector, especially multinational companies (MNCs) and resource extraction firms. However, they are sometimes employed by NGOs and states as well. PSCs guard resource mines, embassies and provide protection for personnel conducting humanitarian operations. They train indigenous security company personnel and provide security advice and risk assessments (Manda, 2000).

3. Private Military Companies (PMCs) - PMCs provide active military services to states
and multinational organizations; they are the most controversial of the MSPs. Their services include everything from the training of military units and strategic advice to actual combat operations (Ibid). The following concepts are worth mentioning in connection to this.

Public safety - Support mechanisms that sustain the life and vitality of a community’s health, safety, and social stability by performing such services as law enforcement, fire prevention, personal and facility security, disaster preparedness and emergency medical assistance. In some instances, public safety may refer to law enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue squads, and ambulance crews.

Regulatory body - Any state board, commission department or office, except those in the legislative or judicial branches, authorized by law to adjudicative proceedings, issue permits, registrations, licenses, or other forms of authorization to offer or to perform private security officers’ services, or to control or affect the interests of identified persons.

Oversight - Generally speaking, private sector operatives are subject to a much less strong system of scrutiny than public police. In addition, when looked at oversight of private policing and the private security industry the issue, that always comes to the force is that of “public” interest versus the client’s (paid for) needs. General characteristics of the growth of PSCs in the world can be identified under the context and peculiarity of each country and each region.

Private security agency - A person or body of persons other than a government agency, department or organization engaged in the business of providing private security services including training to private security guards or their supervisors or providing security guards to any industrial or business undertaking or a company or any other person or property.

Private security guard; means a person providing private security with or without arms to another person or property or both and includes a supervisor.

2. 4. Private Security Companies

The market for private security in a given country grows in response to the need of mass private property owners, who have typically sought to exercise their rights to preserve order and maintain control over the policing of their territories by employing security staff. Common law bestows on property owners the right to decide who may enter or remain
on their land. Private security officers acting on their behalf are empowered to uphold conditions of access to the land, and they could exclude any visitors who breach these conditions (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983). The term private security industry will be used to define this sector of the industry with specific references to contract security guarding or in-house security where it is necessary to make such a distinction.

2.5. Public –Private Security Relationship

The lack of understanding by private security operatives of the laws that regulate their activities could be a problem regarding control and monitoring of misconduct. This can be linked to a lack of compliance as well as lack of knowledge of the penalties for breaches of the law. The underlying principle in establishing policy partnerships between the private security industry and the police should not be whether or not the former replaces policing functions but rather where it can supplement and be supportive of overall policing actions (Small, 2006). In addition, there can be no talk of the provision of security outside the formal structures of the state. It is certainly not a question of privatizing crime (security) control but cooperation in the fight against crime and co-coordinating joint efforts in this regard. The bottom line is that the police afford or be seen to abdicate policing responsibilities and line functions (Tickler, 1998:20).

In order to better utilize professional security officers in crime prevention, there is a need to establish a more formal national forum where representatives from public police and private security can discuss and formulate solutions to their perceived problems in improving co-operations.

The ideal way out to the public private trajectory is balancing the two positions of these sectors towards efficiency and accountability in ways that do not threaten the rule of law. (Verkvil, 2007)

Coordination of private security is a necessary and essential activity for the mission of the National Police to uphold peace and calm of the population, and equally constitutes a salutary part of the national democratic society (Ekuikui, 2006).
CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN ETHIOPIA

3.1. The History of Policing in Ethiopia

Assessing the formation and growth of policing in Ethiopia will give a highlight of issues that have necessitated the creation of a public security force and the level and rate of criminalities that are common in the country. This is because it is always the feeling of insecurity and the need to be protected that leads to the demand for the provision of security by public and private security companies.

In traditional Ethiopian society, customary law resolved conflicts, and families usually avenged wrongs committed against their members. The private armies of the nobility enforced law in the countryside according to the will of their leaders (Kinfe, 2000). In 1916 the imperial government formed a civilian municipal guard in Addis Ababa to ensure obedience to legal proclamations. The general public despised the municipal guard, nearly all of whose members were inefficient at preserving public order or investigating criminal activities (Haile, 2000).

In 1935 the emperor authorized the establishment of formal, British-trained police forces in Addis Ababa and four other cities. Seven years later, he organized the Imperial Ethiopian Police under British tutelage as a centralized national force with paramilitary and constabulary units. In 1946 the authorities opened the Ethiopian Police College at Sendafa. In 1956 the imperial government amalgamated the separate city police forces with the national police force. Initially administered as a department of the Ministry of Interior, the national police had evolved, by the early 1970s, into an independent agency commanded by a police commissioner responsible to the emperor (Caaprini, 2003).

Local control over police was minimal, despite imperial proclamations that granted police authority to governors general of the provinces. Assistant police commissioners in each of the fourteen provinces worked in conjunction with the governors general, but for the most part Addis Ababa was under directed administration. The Territorial Army’s
provincial units, commanded by the governor general and by an unpaid civilian auxiliary in areas where police were scarce, assisted the national police force. In 1974 the national police numbered approximately 28,000 in all branches, including 6,000 in the Mobile Emergency Police Force; 1,200 frontier guards; and a 3,200-member commando unit with rapid reaction capability (Antoine, 2006).

As a result of insurgencies affecting a large part of the country in the 1970s and after, questions of internal security and public order became inseparable from the general problem of national security (Kinfe, 2004). Revisions made to the penal code in 1976 helped blur the distinction between political opposition to the government (defined as criminal activity) and categories of crime against persons and property. Army security services and counterinsurgency units assumed many functions formerly assigned to the national police’s paramilitary and constabulary units, and local law enforcement was delegated largely to the civilian paramilitary People’s Protection Brigades, drawn from peasant association and kebele defense squads (ibid). Although criminal investigation remained an important part of the mission of the national police, units of its heavily armed Mobile Emergency Police Force were employed in pursuing insurgents and rooting out political dissidents. The gradual isolation of the Mengistu regime during the 1980s meant that these and other measures designed to suppress internal dissent remained in force until the military government collapsed. (Kinfe, 2004)

### 3.2. The Development of the Private Security Sector in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia there is a long tradition of employing so-called “Zebegnas” as watchmen. However, there is no any written document that states when exactly uniformed private security guards were seen for the first time in the country. However, it could be said that the development of private security companies in Ethiopia is a post-socialist regime phenomenon. The Derg regime has no or little evidence of the establishment of private security structures to any elaborate extent. This was the case because the former regime was organized into militaristic formation and provided a typical example of the monopolization of the means of coercion in its maintenance of law and order (Kinfe, 2004).

The public police was the only establishment entrusted with the obligation of maintaining law and order and provision of security to the general public. Thus the concept of security was defined in a very limited manner. For instance, security was viewed in terms of prevention of uprisings to the ruling party by opposition elements. Thus it was any-
thing that was considered as a threat against the continuation of the regime. The government was more concerned with its security rather than the security of Ethiopians (ibid). Although the current government still heavily depends on its military and police force in maintaining order, it has shown a token of interest towards other partners including community policing agents and PSCs in its effort to maintain collective security.

The growth of the private security company in Ethiopia follows the continental dynamic. The growth conforms to the pattern in the developing world and in this sense fits into a global process of commodification of security. This means security becomes a commodity that anyone who can afford can order for. As it has been indicated above, this is a major departure from its original conception. Accordingly, PSCs have been flourishing in order to meet the need for a self-tailored security. However, as all PSCs in Ethiopia are local, the assimilation of international norms and skills of security through foreign PSC’s is limited.

The evolution of the PSC sector in Ethiopia can be attributed to two factors, which were critically important at different times. According to some interviewed informants from the PSC sector, the private security sector in Ethiopia has seen a steady growth during the early part of the 1990’s. This has historical explanation; following the fall of the previous regime, the country went through an extensive demobilization program with regard to ex-service men who were scattered all over the country after the military defeat. This consequently created a very high unemployed human resource in the country. This force was both a potential contributor to the economy, if well trained and reintegrated in the society, and at the same time it became a source of insecurity in the country for quite some time, as this was an armed force that was dispersed in the country. Hence many of the criminal activities like robbery, organized crime, hold-ups and petty crime incidents seen in the years that followed the change of government were perpetrated by members of the demobilized soldiers. On the positive side this high labor force nurtured the private security sector which was then emerging. One of the PSC’s that was established in 1992 comprising the demobilized high ranking officers and other Derg soldiers was the so-called “Tila”.

A second round of growth seems to have occurred during the first five years of the new Millennium, a time when investment and business have shown a remarkable success and

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68. Interview Personal with a security expert, Addis Ababa, March 2009
69. FGD, personal, Addis Ababa, March 2009
70. Interview with Asrat Worku, supervisor at Tila, at his office March 2009
when the country was engaged in an extensive privatization scheme as part of its economic policy. This, no doubt, has contributed positively to the growth of the private security industry. The presence of these companies is conspicuous in the premises of both private and public sector companies.

The development of the sector has been going hand in hand with the growth of the economy in general and the privatization policy in particular. Subsequently we could deduce that the growth in the economy has increased the demand for security as people needed more and more protection for their business and themselves. This trend in turn has made security to be a commodity, which people with money can afford to order for.

Private security personnel have been playing a large and growing role within the public social life. This is evident as the last few years have been marked by an increasing demand by the international community in Addis, the government, the business sector, hotels, factories, residential places and banks (these have been outsourcing part of their activities, including security to the private security companies). The effect of such change is that increasingly, as we conduct our daily routines in the city, we see areas and we use facilities that are policed not by the conventional police, but by alternative private agencies under different uniforms.

3.3. The Size of Private Security Companies in Ethiopia

It is difficult to estimate the size of the private security sector in Ethiopia with any degree of accuracy. No figures exist for either the number of companies, or employees, as many of the companies are unregistered and unlicensed. According to different interviews conducted for this study, the estimated number of private security firms in the country would be anything from 60 to 75. As will be seen below, majority of the companies are of middle size meaning each of them employs not less than 1000 guards. Though the sector is a very dynamic one that makes any exact estimation difficult, taking the average estimated number of employees working for the companies that are identified for this study and based on the rough estimation from company heads as well as interview with officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, there could roughly be well over 100,000 security guards currently working in the different PSC's in the country.

72. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
73. Interview with two PSC heads, Addis Ababa, March 2009
In personal terms the largest companies are TRUST, (with 2,800 employees) and Sebatu and his Sons Security Service (SIS) (with 2,345 guards). According to some informants from the sector, the first company that commenced to provide uniformed guards is Sebatu and his Sons Security Service, created in 1992. However it remains difficult to prove this with any form of accuracy as no documented material could be found.

In this regard, it is interesting to mention that almost all companies claimed said that they are the first private security company established in the country. This looks a strategy to attract clients and thus to appear more professional and experienced than others. In the words of some of the company heads, clients oftentimes tend to be interested in companies with longer experience than new ones.

According to Caparini (2006) those PSCs which have more than 1000 security guards could be taken as large size while, on the other hand, companies that employ between 500 and 1000 are considered to be middle-sized. Taking this figure as a yardstick, the table below summarizes the top 20 PSC employers in Ethiopia identified in terms of size.

**Table 1. Top 20 PSC employers in Ethiopia in terms of size**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of company</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>No. of Security guards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEBATU and His Sons</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEBACO</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Security Service</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Security Agency</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Security</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tila</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dejen</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC Security</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA Security Service</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Insurance Agency</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lion Security Service</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin Tang</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Security</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nekat Agency</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Information bulletins, company profile of different PSCs

**N.B.**
Large = more than 1000
Medium = 500-1000
Small = less than 500
3.4. Service and Market Dynamics

The commercial sector is the main market for private security, and virtually all businesses of large size in Ethiopia employ private security in one form or another as do international organizations, NGO’s and embassies. The most sought-after contractors are NGO’s, international organizations, embassies and other transnational firms. According to one informant, the reason behind this is the high remuneration they pay and their profile as international organizations.74

The residential market is yet much more limited, except for diplomats and foreigners and it tends to be the preserve of smaller companies and traditional night-watchmen or “gate swingers” due to its relatively low profitability. This market is, however, undergoing a rapid change, and a number of companies are currently in the process of developing more extensive residential security services. As the researcher has seen, for example, Besrat Gabreal which is a residential quarter with high presence of the diplomatic community, has houses with heavy and sophisticated security alarm system. At the moment these services are limited to a relatively small number of customers but the introduction of more sophisticated technology and rapid response capacities like those found, for example, in Kenya or Uganda is perceived by many in the industry as an important new business opportunity. PSCs that are able to offer these services may in the future be able to compete more effectively on prices against the lower-end manned guarding companies, while providing a superior service through a more sophisticated response capacity.75

The advantage of PSC’s for clients is that it saves work in administration, recruitment and organization, and the company in question does not have to deal with government procedures in the process of recruitment of its security guards. Thus their presence facilitates the clients in different respects. The other advantage could be that clients can ask the PSC in question for a change of the assigned security guards if they are not satisfied with the level of their service. While exercising this sort of freedom on their own, security personnel would be more complicated and procedural.76 PSCs also give the chance for the client to choose the kind of service they need. This, in turn, strengthens the efficiency of a private security company as it has to compete with others to attract the same customer.

74. Interview with a security expert Addis Ababa March 2009
75. Interview with Demeke, a security expert at -SEBACO,-at his office, March 2009
76. Interview with commander Teshome,-Addis Ababa, March 2009
CHAPTER 4

AN ASSESSMENT ON THE STATUS OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN ETHIOPIA

4.1. Wages and Working Conditions

A much-debated topic around PSCs is the payment of their staff. This is largely due to lack of transparency on the payment system. Neither clients nor PSCs themselves seem to want to disclose these figures as it is considered “(commercially) sensitive” information. Despite this “secrecy” around PSC salaries, most estimates converge around similar sums (350 birr per month).77

Given the high level of unemployment in Ethiopia, there is a ready supply of available labour force on the market. This phenomenon plus the absence of a regulatory mechanism towards PSCs have put many of the guards78 in a less comfortable position when it comes to negotiating for better working conditions and salary. Interviews with many of the guards indicated that most companies pay low wages which do not allow the guards and their families a descent living or even to the extent of affording food for their families. Most guards interviewed in Addis received about 350 birr per month, which is the minimum wage rate according to the country’s labour law.

This law states that an employer, be it a private enterprise or a government agency, should increase the salaries of its employees by 7% per year. Contrary to this law, many of the private security companies only pay the minimum rate even for those guards who served for more than ten years.79 The guards interviewed also added that their employers do not care about the life of the employees and all they are interested in is making more and more money as long as they pay the minimum wage required by the law. This, according to the guards, creates lack of commitment and responsibility visa- a-vis their work.

77. Interview with Metiku, a security guard working for –Dejen SecurityAddis Ababa, March 2009
78. FGD.- Addis Ababa, March 2009
79. FGD.- Addis Ababa, March 2009
Given the 28% official inflation rate (in 2008) and the increasing cost of living, these guards are far from putting ends together. For example, a one room rent in poor neighbourhoods of Addis costs at least 200 birr per month. Thus one really wonders how these guards manage to subsist throughout the month with the meagre salary they earn.

The exploitation is evident as many of the clients interviewed said that they pay from 750-2000 birr per guard to a PSC per month, with few exceptions to those guards deployed at embassies or international organizations that relatively have a handsome allowance. Thus the companies pay on average less than 30% of their earning sum from a client for a guard, thus keeping the rest for themselves. Such low pay could be an incentive for crime, particularly against those very clients that employed the guards. This is mainly because the minimum salary they earn is often insufficient and would barely feed a family of five.  

On the other hand the regular salary of an average PSC staff (guard) working for international organizations is estimated to be about 500-800 birr. Information from both clients (embassies, EU mission to Ethiopia) as well as representatives from the industry suggests that most of the salaries of guards deployed at international organizations and embassies are double or at times triple that of security guards working at private or business centres.

Although the minimum wage in Ethiopia is currently 350 birr a month, given the vast number of private security companies in the country, it is very difficult to generalize wages in the sector. When broadly considered, pay scales range from 350 to 1500 birr per month, the maximum being for top ranking supervisors. A significant number of companies, however, pay well below this bracket. Wages and working conditions tend to be better within the larger, more professionally run PSC’s. For instance, TRUST or S&S Security Service pay an average guard more than what small companies would pay their supervisors.

A common practice is to pay the guards according to individual contract, so that in effect guards at the same level and with the same experience earn different wages depending on where the company deploys them and their relation with the owners. This in turn leads to dissatisfaction and tension within the guard force, and this often remains to be a problem for motivation and commitment by the companies themselves. For instance,

80. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
81. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
82. Interview with Musa, a security guard at Dejen Security, Addis Ababa, March 2009
S&S Security Service is one of the two private companies that have a provident fund package (16% of their salary) for their security guards. This company also covers 70% of the medical bills of its employees and provides a monthly transport allowance while the public security sector does not have such an attractive package for its security personnel. In the past few years, there has been some turnover of high level public security officers attracted by the handsome allowance of some of the private security companies.

Interviews with some security guards illustrate that wages and working conditions in the private security sector are generally low and often exploitive, making retention of a qualified and committed guard force difficult. Sufficient remuneration for the employees is a key condition for a more efficient, committed and reliable private security service. Yet, the highly competitive nature of the sector as well as the ready supply of labour in Ethiopia seems to have contributed to the poor level of salary and working conditions.

4.1.2. Working Conditions

Some of the companies believe that their working conditions are satisfactory and are crafted in line with the labour law of the land. The guards are deployed following a shifting system; a guard after 12 hours of service is off duty for the following 24 hours. This is what has been stipulated by the Ministry of Labour with regard to working hours. Overtime payment for guards is also offered. In this respect, their working conditions seem to be fair.83

The down side, however, is that in most cases unlike the public police officers who are often on constant circulation either for patrolling or carrying out an operation, those in the private security sector are static to their assignment site. This means that they are in one location, such as guarding a business centre or an embassy complex for long periods of time. The job becomes monotonous as they spend long hours sitting on the same place. In addition, people do not usually pay due attention to them. At times some of these people treat the guards with contempt. This makes the latter hate the job as it creates low self-esteem in them.84 The other side of the job is that security work requires all time engagement, so the guards may have to work in the night, weekends, and holidays. It also requires them to be conscientious, despite the many hours that may pass without troubling incidents. However, according to the guards interviewed, the best part of the job which gives them professional satisfaction is the trust they gain from people they have never met before.

83. Interview with Miss Yezeit, Head of SEBACO, at her office, March 2009
84. Interview with Musa, a security guard working for Dejen Security, Addis Ababa, March 2009
One of the security guards who has been working for Dejen Security Company for the last five years said that there are personal problems that are typical to security guards. These, according to him, include low self esteem and a feeling of frustration because of the monotonous nature of guarding and grievances due to low payment and lack of motivation towards the job. As a result of these problems, there is a high rate of turnover among security guards in the company. He said that they have tried to air their grievances to the administration time and again but every time it declined to respond and they have even been told to leave the company if they are not satisfied. Some of them cannot see other immediate job opportunities. So, they opted to suffer the hardship for the sake of their families, while many of their colleagues have left the company.\(^85\)

The problem in relation to this that as most of the guards are primarily in the job not out of interest but necessity some of them tend to be less responsible and motivated. This, no doubt, can compromise the quality of the service they render. The other repeated complaint with regard to working conditions was the issue of deployment site. They bemoan that some of their colleagues earn twice or even at times three times more than their average salary just because the former have some sort of connections with the company heads or managers who deploy them at embassies or international organizations. This, according to them, makes them demotivated to the job efficiently. It was also said that they do not get proper and regular logistics; uniforms, rain-coat, torches, shoes and night dresses. Consequently they use their own salary to buy some of the equipment themselves. They blame the PSCs for exploiting them as the latter make big money out of contracts with clients and pay them only a third of it while it is the guards who do the entire job of guarding.\(^86\)

In the eyes of the guards, the PSCs are just brokers who only bring the employers and the employees together but they abuse their position to get richer at the expense of the security guards. As a remedy to this problem, one of the guards suggested the need to forming an association of security guards so that it could serve them as a syndicate. The formation of this syndicate may enable them to forward their grievances to the concerned government legal or labour authorities.\(^87\)

However, given the unorganized nature of the industry itself and the poor level of communications among the guards working for different companies, this proposition looks far-fetched in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, an extra effort on the part of the clients themselves could ease the situa-

\(^85\) Interview with Worku, a security guard at Dejen Security -Addis Ababa, March 2009
\(^86\) Interview with a legal expert who chose to be anonymous, -Addis Ababa, March 2009
\(^87\) FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
tion. For example, instead of making a bilateral agreement with the PSC, the clients could make one with the guards themselves. In doing so they can also increase the quality of service they get, as higher payment will always create a sense of responsibility in the minds of the guards.

4.2. Education, Recruitment and Training

Education and training impart appropriate attitude to an individual and this is important for the delivery of effective human customary services. It is an explicit requirement of human rights instruments to educate and train anyone doing security (Khumalo, 2004). However, in the case of Ethiopia, many of the guards that have been interviewed said that they only received from three days to one week training, except for those working for S&S Security Service and Trust who said they were trained for a month. Given the kind of challenges and the diversity of services these guards are assigned to carry out, the duration of the training is far from being enough.88

Given the different nature of the clients, guards of different capacities are deployed. This means those guards who can speak English language, have military experience, and are relatively younger and physically well-built are paid higher. These are the type of people that many embassies would like the PSCs to provide them with (ibid). According to one head of a PSC some of the very skilled guards are paid up to 1500 birr per month while majority earn between 350 to 500 birr per month. He also added that the better they pay their guards, the more they could attract people who are physically fit and this will increase the confidence of the PSCs’ clients in the service they receive. With regard to the reasons behind high staff turnover in his company, he does not see the complaints as a cause. He rather ascribed this to personal factors.89

Concerning recruitment, some of the company heads confirmed that they prefer applicants who are either ex-service men or demobilized soldiers from the previous regime. This, according to them, saves any expense related to training. They also said they have higher confidence in people with military background.90 When it comes to training delivery, most of the companies offer the training themselves and at times they hire trainers from police and various organizations. Some of the guards interviewed are critical of the training provided by the police. The training by the police on security is very scanty. Their

88. Interview with commander Teshome,- Addis Ababa, March 2009
89. Interview with the head of Security Core at his office, March 2009
90. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
training is bound to produce guards who have poor concept of security. The police focus on criminal procedures and this does not adequately prepare them for guarding\textsuperscript{91}

In those companies that provide security guards mainly for embassies and international organizations, after being recruited, new employees undergo a training program of one to three weeks. The training focuses on the basics of guarding and security. The role and function of a private security guard, first aid (although they seldom carry kits) unarmed (self) defence and unarmed combat. The companies also provide basic training or awareness-raisers on human rights. In some cases, the training program includes first aid delivery, fire fighting and the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. However, in practice, the knowledge of private security guards on these issues is very basic and generally not an issue of concern for PSCs\textsuperscript{92} as the law does not require any training at all for private security guards, and training is given on the PSCs own initiative. The level of training, therefore, varies significantly.

In the words of some company heads the training is supposed to help the guards have full-fledged capacity and is prepared on 50-50 theoretical and practical basis. The training is given to the security personnel comparing the responsibilities and duties they may have in pre-and post-accident events; few of the very developed PSCs manage their training component on phase by phase evaluation basis for its quality provision.

In the course of this study it was revealed that some owners of security companies are not in favour of employing educated security guards. One owner of company said that his experience has shown over the years that there is no need for having educated guards. The less educated the better. The uneducated ones tend to make better guards but they should be able to read and write. All the companies in the country do not have a stipulated level of education for employment. The majority of the educated guards hate the job. They may take the job but they continue to hate it and he believes that any company is better off with uneducated guard\textsuperscript{93}

The training component of, for example, S&S Security has been designed for two weeks. But currently the company is working with the Ministry of Education to develop a three month training program that will be certified by the Ministry. The PSC has also been working with police in terms of crime prevention. Furthermore, its security officers, whenever they come across criminal activities, inform the police.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{91} FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
\textsuperscript{92} ibid
\textsuperscript{93} Interview with Mr. Endalkachew, owner of S&S Security Service at his office, March 2009
\textsuperscript{94} Interview with Belay, a supervisor at S&S Security at his office, March 2009
The types of security training components included, for example, in the Guarantee Security company profile: meaning of security and security requirements of a client in general; organizations’ security requirements; techniques as to how to secure and protect themselves and the organization from an assault; work sharing among the security personnel; organization’s management work sharing during security operation; problems previously observed by the security personnel and suggestions for improving them; handling and utilization of guns; inspection procedures; preconditions to be met to select security system; security personnel’s duty during natural and man-made disasters; and coordination of various forces during emergency accident (e.g. police, fire brigade, traffic and legal accountability of the security. Following an assignment of security personnel, his/her strong and weak sides are evaluated and education on professional improvement is offered. 

Despite this well articulated training component, in the words of employees of this company, in practice, it only renders basic training for about three to five days. Thus the presence of the training manual rather seems to attract potential clients than to effectively carry it out.

The selection and training criteria for private security officer vary from company to company. They range from comprehensive training requirements to little or no training at all. The development of national minimum criteria for the selection and training of all private security guards is essential for enabling the private security industry to meet the need of providing effective security to its clients. Effective security requires workers who are familiar with all aspects of a facility’s security system for assessing and containing potential threats. Security personnel are required to be well versed in emergency procedures and able to work with an organization to ensure that emergency procedures can be implemented successfully. There is also no clear policy regarding the training of security guards. Some of the security companies request member of the police to train their staff on certain issues but such training is not accredited.

4.3. Economic Benefits and Employment Opportunities

The drastic rise of PSCs in Ethiopia is a response to a clear market demand for private security services. The main positive aspect of the private security industry that was widely

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95. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
96. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
97. ibid
acknowledged during the interviews was benefits to the Ethiopian economy and employment opportunities. At an elementary level, the development of security companies in Ethiopia has a lot to do with the desire by individuals to ensure personal safety and that of their families and properties. The private security sector could be seen as a major source of employment for the unemployed group of the society between 20-40 years of age. According to the rough estimation of people interviewed in the PSC sector for this paper, the sector employs more than 100,000 people. Given the high dependency ratio in the country, it is further estimated by people in the sector that the industry supports indirectly a total of 400,000—500,000 people all in all. Private security is thus an important part of the economy which provides much needed employment to a significant number of people at the lower echelon of the society.

Beyond the employment effect, other positive economic impacts of PSCs were acknowledged during the interviews held with PSC heads and the security guards themselves. First, as PSCs provide employment and tend to pay some part of their staff more than public security forces, the purchasing power of those individuals is also higher and it can benefit local businesses. Some informants from the sector considered the paying of taxes by PSCs (if it occurred), as contributing to the strengthening of the economy. However, some uncertainty surfaced during the discussion as to whether taxes were indeed being paid. This suspicion of tax evasion was not directed uniquely at PSCs but rather at the government as a failure to put appropriate policies on the PSCs.

The services that are delivered are based on a comprehensive risk management and security survey conducted at every post which needs a great attention from security point of view and takes past experiences and clients’ concern into consideration. Some of the logistic equipments given to their guards include uniforms, whistle, baton, torches, note book and pen, and umbrella. PSC personnel in Ethiopia, particularly those involved in escorting and guarding services can easily be identified because of their uniform. Their vehicles are also easily identifiable because their names, colours and logos are inscribed on them.

The PSCs are employed by many of the banks including the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Awash Bank, Nib International Bank, etc. Every branch of these banks has a PSC operating

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98. Interview with a PSC owner, Addis Ababa, March 2009
99. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
100. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
101. Interview with Mr. Getachew, Manager of Addis Security at his office, March 2009
at its entrance, especially during the day. PSCs are also employed by national governmental organizations like the Ethiopian Electric Cooperation, the Ethiopian Airlines, etc. However the government does not employ PSCs in the same way that private individuals or business do.\textsuperscript{102}

It was also noted that in the current climate of unemployment, particularly of uneducated ex-militia, there is an abundance of human resources that can be absorbed by PSCs. The PSCs can offer an employment opportunity for former soldiers who may not have the skills to take up other civilian jobs. In order for this effect to remain positive, however, those interviewed suggested that PSCs need to emphasize education and training of their staff, thereby contributing to the growth of a professional work force in the security industry. Thus, working for PSCs could function as part of a reintegration mechanism for former service men. However the different respondents interviewed from both the PSC sector and the public police were not certain if PSCs had lived up to their possible contribution to capacity building and training and felt that there was much need for improvement.\textsuperscript{103}

4.3.1. Payment Procedures

Before signing any contract with their clients, the private companies usually undertake a thorough study on the threats and vulnerabilities of the company in question with the view to assessing the general capacity of the organization as this directly relates to the rate of the fee. The following are some of the considerations taken before charging the clients: the status of the company (whether it is local, international or business), location (distance), the organization’s workload, vulnerability of the organization to danger and crime, and suitability of the organization for security operation.

Following this they give their clients a rate in tandem with the quality of their security needs. The amount of money the security companies charge their clients has a direct influence on the amount of the security guard’s salary. For example, a security guard who is keeping an embassy complex earns something between 700-1500 birr depending on the embassy’s pay scale.\textsuperscript{104}

On top of paying taxes to the government and salary to the guards, some of them incur extra expenses as they spend money on training security guards, supply complete

\textsuperscript{102. Interview with Miss Yezeit, head of SBACO at her office, March 2009}
\textsuperscript{103. FGD,-Addis Ababa, March 2009}
\textsuperscript{104. Interview with Mr. Getachew, Manager of Addis Security at his office, March 2009}
uniform and equipment, have insurance cover for the personnel. In exceptional cases,
few PSCs conduct research on new crime occurrences and their prevention systems
and provide relevant professional improvement trainings.

4.4. Major Activities of PSCs and Duties of the Guards

The activities of the private security companies in Ethiopia are not only limited to the
provision of guarding services. They also recruit and employ drivers, janitors and housekeep-
ers. Since this study is limited to assessing activities related to security provision, the fol-
lowing are some of the activities which PSCs in Ethiopia carry out with respect to security:

Radio alarm response service - This type of service involves the monitoring of all vehicles
electronically for positions and status, armoured response for incidents, self-testing dig-
ital alarm transmitters equipped with anti-tamper devises, and automatic commercial
and domestic alarm systems.

Perimeter protection and access system - Under this category the PSCs carry out inte-
grated and modular control systems, multiple zoned electric fences, automatic vehicles
access barriers, acoustic and micro-phonic cable perimeter detection systems (especially
for embassy complexes and international organizations in Addis), and external building
security hardening.

Facility management - This involves security vetted ancillary and temporary personnel,
background and security vetting services, ID card services and personnel database sys-
tems, building and ground maintenance scheduling, environmental control equipment
maintenance, and security, safety and fire procedural training.

Electric security system - This encompasses automatic intruder alarm systems for com-
mmercial and residential applications, cluster alarms with area enunciators for townhouse
and flat complexes, fixed and remote panic button systems, structure cabled installations
to certified standards, covert surveillance equipment services, retail security systems and
point of sale monitoring, banking, digital recording systems, and digital incident record-
ing cameras with integral data storage.

Manned guarding and dog patrols - These consist of continuous supervision by radio
dispatched mobile patrols, electronic guard alert systems and electronic attendance/
incident reporting, remote site security teams, diplomatic protection unit, and in some
cases, trained attack and sniffer dogs, and incident response. Thus, according to their
deployment site and nature of the PSC, security guards carry out the aforementioned tasks at different stages.\textsuperscript{105}

Security core - This, in addition to its main objectives of providing guarding services, is one of the few PSCs engaged in fire fighting as well. It imports and installs security materials and fire fighting equipments (fire alarms, fire extinguishers, fire hoses) metal detectors, mirror inspection etc.

In addition to the above activities, the PSCs in Ethiopia are also involved in a wide range of activities or services that include video surveillance, security patrols, executive protection, and security for hotels, malls, banks, schools, hospitals, apartments, warehouses and commercial centres.

Some of the security companies like the Ethiopian Fire and Security PLC are fully engaged in the supply and installation of security equipments and training of guards and other clients on the use of these technologies. The following are some of the safety materials that they install for different organizations: Colour CCTV system complete with digital multiplex and recoding facility, installation of intruder alarm system complete with detection and alarming devices, video and audio door phones, electric security fences, perimeter security system, wired and wireless intercom, security locks, walk-through metal detectors, and personnel protective instruments and safety shoes and gloves.

The activities of some private security companies also incorporate risk management and security survey. Specifically, they deliver their services based on a compressive risk management and security survey that will be conducted at every post which needs a great attention from security point of view and taking into consideration past experiences and client’s concern. All plans will be executed based on the recommendation of the clients. The procedure of guarding will be kept confidential and used as working document available on each site and it will be signed by the clients and the company.\textsuperscript{106}

The bigger PSCs have also the intention of introducing new technology in the use of protection lighting, utilization of different alarm systems, metal detector applications, communication radio net working and telephone system.

\textbf{4.4.1 Major Duties of Security Guards}

According to the structure of many companies, security guards perform the following

\textsuperscript{105} FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Mr. Belay, a supervisor at S&S Security Service, Addis Ababa, March 2009
duties directly under the leadership of shift leaders: opening gates to allow entrances or exit of employees; trucks and authorized visitors; checking credentials before admitting anyone to the premises of their duty station; issuing passes at own discretion or on instructions from supervisors; directing visitors and vehicles to parts of the premises; inspecting outgoing vehicles to prevent unauthorized removal of property or products; implementing security instructions and standing orders vigorously; informing shift leaders whenever something unusual happens in the premise; and arriving on time to ensure their presence at assigned posts; and wearing clean and neat uniform.\textsuperscript{107}

Considering the number of personnel/manpower that the clients may take from the PSC and other conditions, the security personnel should be free from any criminal acts, are in good health and physically fit, have a complete training and are ready for operation, have high sense of ownership and discipline and are free of any addiction. The qualities demeaned by the clients determine what they should pay the PSCs in return.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{4.5. Industry Standards and Regulatory Issues}

\textbf{4.5.1 Monitoring and Review}

The biggest hurdles that industries in several African countries have to overcome when considering self-regulation are the competitive nature of the industry and the risk of competing trade associations vying for privileged access to government (Kamenju et al 2004). In Ethiopia there are at present no restrictions on the formation of PSCs and there are no stated pre-conditions or requirements for their foundation. One of the most alarming aspects of Ethiopian security companies is that although they are increasing in number, they are completely unregulated. Currently there is no regulation or policy framework relating to the legal and procedural operations of PSCs.\textsuperscript{109}

The value of any policy recommendations for the regulation of PSCs depends, first and foremost, on an appropriate definition of the different activities in the private security sector. Regulation will only make sense if the activities that are to be subject to control are well delineated and understood (Musah, 2002). In Ethiopia there appears to be little or almost no monitoring standards in the sector. Licenses of the PSCs, like those of any other business organizations, should be renewed every two years by written application to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Many companies continue to work without a li-

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Mr. EndalkAchew, owner of S&S Security Service, Addis Ababa, March 2009
\textsuperscript{108} ibid
\textsuperscript{109} FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
cense, a problem that is recognized by those that are “legitimate”.

At present, there is no formal and independent body to serve the Ethiopian private security industry that monitors the behaviour of the companies and sanctions misconduct. This non-oversight/unmonitored situation raises questions around private actors. To who are the personnel of a private security company ultimately accountable; the police, client or the company bosses? The only action that has been taken so far by the Ministry of Labour with regard to some private security companies alongside other business agencies was in the month of September 2008. The ministry published on the government daily newspaper list of those companies that it found were not abiding by the agency law. According to this measure the companies were officially cancelled and asked to cease operation. This move created a panic on the part of both the private security companies in question and their clients including many of the embassies, UN agencies and the international organizations that entirely depend on these companies for their protection. But later some of the big companies including Sebatu and his Sons Security Service were able to resume their activities after having been fined and given a warning.

This incident happened due to the absence of any legal arrangement that monitors the PSCs. According to some of the companies’ heads, this kind of arbitrary measure leaves the industry with no guarantee as the sector is not recognized as security provider in any legislation or by the Ministry of Federal Affairs, which is responsible for security related issues. The government does not have any stipulated mechanism to oversee and monitor the activities of these companies. As a result, according to these interviewees, the companies’ future depends at the mercy of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and also Trade and Industry. This situation needs to be changed if the sector has to grow and become a reliable ally to the public security force. Some sort of monitoring and controlling arrangement needs to be put in place with regard to regulating and controlling the private security companies. PSCs should be independent so that they could be seen as companies with high responsibility than just business enterprises.

While signing a contract with clients, PSCs take a big responsibility of protecting the well-being of their clients, their property as well as their confidentiality. Thus by accepting to protect people we are taking a huge risk that comes along. In this regard we try to make sure that we put the right guards in place for these challenges. Yet unless the sector is

110. Ibid (FGD)
111. FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
given some sort of attention from the government, we will have a lot of difficulties to properly carry out our responsibilities.\textsuperscript{112}

Different members of the industry and guards in Ethiopia want to see the declaration of tighter regulations, the imposition of sector-wide standards for training as well as a minimum wage for the guards to be raised over time like that of employees in other sectors. In particular the company heads are keen to ensure that the sector is free of those operating without licenses, and without regards to standards and security principles. It is a frequently expressed hope among many guards interviewed for this study that a new regulatory authority responsible for the oversight and regulation of PSCs will set up within the next few years. However, given the lack of any interest or initiative so far on the part of the Ministry of Federal Affairs or other concerned government offices, a degree of scepticism is warranted concerning the adoption of any regulatory mechanism in the foreseeable future.

It is very vivid that in the absence of effective regulation, improvement of standards is most unlikely to occur. The urge for higher standards is a sign that a gradual professionalization of the sector, spearheaded by few leading companies, is taking place. To the extent that competitive pressures force an increasing number of companies to conform to higher standards, the quality of service may eventually increase over time.\textsuperscript{113} A matrix approach to regulation would consist of regulatory schemes at different levels, namely the regional, the national, and the international as well as within the industry. These different regulatory schemes would have to be complementary and ideally mutually reinforcing. Rather than covering every single one of these levels, it is essential to ensure that different regulatory frameworks are interlocking.\textsuperscript{114}

It follows from the above that Ethiopia needs to put in place a comprehensive national regulation that would comprise mandatory standards in areas such as health and safety and other employment-related issues such as minimum wage, insurance, vetting and training of security guards. Moreover, the regulation may comprise provisions such as national company law. Further components of national legislation could be license for individual companies or for specific contracts.

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Mr. Endalkachew, owner of S&S Security Service, Addis Ababa, March 2009
\textsuperscript{113} FGD, Addis Ababa, March 2009
\textsuperscript{114} Interview with a researcher at Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, March 2009
4.5.2. The Issue of Licensing Weapons

The debate on arming PSCs is receiving a growing attention in most countries of the world. The reason behind this is that PSCs could be co-opted as a strategic partners in collaborative programs, in investigations, information sharing, and building of rapid response teams (Holmqvist, 2005).

One of the key challenges that the Ethiopian private security sector is facing with regard to weapons procurement is the absence of a law that allows the PSCs to carry guns. Presently security guards are not empowered by law to carry guns while on duty. Instead, they carry sticks (dulla). This in effect compromises the higher standards and quality of service. It also hampers their activities as they look unprepared in the face of any criminal encounter better armed than the guards. There is no stipulated law that allows PSCs to own armament. The trend is that clients such as business, humanitarian, diplomatic or international organizations usually have the right to have their police carry a registered gun for the purpose of self defence. Using this leverage they sign a special agreement with the security companies whereby their guards could use the fire arms with the purpose of protecting the clients. Indirectly some of the private security companies end up carrying a fire arm.\(^\text{115}\)

There is a clear concern across the PSC sector that their unarmed status is becoming increasingly a constraint in their operations. A few companies appear to circumvent the problem by arming a small portion of their guards through individual firearms licenses, a practice that is not only illegal but also officially unrecognized. On the other hand, some of the clients like the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Electric Corporation, private banks and big companies have arms registered by their company names. These companies, when contracting PSCs, sign an agreement that enables the PSCs to use the weapons owned by the clients for the protection of the latter. For instance, TRUST, one of the leading companies in the sector, is owned by the Medroc Business Consortium, thus the PSC’s sister companies have a legal status to have firearms for their safety. This, by de facto, allows TRUST to have easier access to firearms than other PSCs.

Some industry representatives advocate selective arming as a future model, where a small, highly-trained component of some PSCs is allowed to operate a restricted armed-response capability, but they recognize that this would require effective regulation and

\(^{115}\) Interview with Mr. Getachew, Manager of Addis Security at his office, March 2009
oversight. The majority of PSCs, however, show very little enthusiasm for arming guards, with many stressing that arming the sector would be extremely damaging as the poor salary and the consequent frustration among the guards could force them to resort to violence using the fire arms at their disposal, thus threatening the customers’ safety. Instead, they advocate a solution that involves closer co-operation with the police.

Opining on this Mr. Hagos, General Manager of a PSC, stated that given the very low level of vetting being practised in the recruitment of guards and the poor knowledge of firearms use by many company heads, including myself, allowing the guards to be armed would increase insecurity as criminal elements could associate with the guards who are not well-paid and pose threat to the very client they are supposed to protect.\(^{116}\)

The extent to which any regulatory mechanism on firearms could be introduced depends on the government’s ability to regulate the industry itself. More importantly, virtually all future successful regulatory structures for the private security sector should rely upon a high degree of industry involvement. Yet in the eyes of some of the owners, effective moves to regulate the Ethiopian private security industry are likely to exacerbate divisions within it. Whereas policies that avoid acrimony are unlikely to be effective, it will be very difficult for the government to institute an effective regulatory regime if deep and unresolved issues persist within the industry.

4.5.3. Professionalization and Market Mechanisms

While the self regulation of the private security sector in Ethiopia will indeed have to acknowledge the need for external intervention, the professionalization of the industry and the market are mechanisms which operate within the governance ideal. According to this approach, market mechanisms themselves can help to address some of the problems with the transformation from government to governance. This is to suggest that competition in the private security sector could facilitate standards of transparency and accountability in line with the expectations of customers and stakeholders.

Moreover, market pressures can increase coordination and improve efficiency as more efficient companies will be getting a greater share of the market. The progressive consolidation of the private security industry will enable new corporations to emerge and establish their own institutionalized training facilities and develop codes of ethics and operation standards. Market mechanisms and the professionalization of the industry will

\(^{116}\) Interview with Mr. Hagos owner of a PSC at his office, March 2009
thus be complemented by contracts between firms and consumers which would ensure the direct control of employers over the provision of private security. 117

The suitability of market mechanisms and the increasing professionalization for addressing governance failures in terms of transparency, accountability, control, coordination and efficiency, however, can be questioned for the same reasons as other governance mechanisms. Even if market mechanisms in general are effective in providing greater transparency and accountability to consumers and shareholders, they do not generally improve openness and responsibility towards the greater public. Indeed, it has been argued that market principles can work against transparency since companies fear that the publication of sensitive data would undermine their competitiveness (Small, 2006).

Similarly, market rules and regulations hold a company primarily accountable to its shareholders and customers, but not to the public interest. In fact, shareholders are interested in increasing profit margins and public interest in effective and efficient security services by well-trained, but more expensive, personnel. The same argument applies to the control of private policing and military firms, which lies in the hands of those who own and hire them rather than the government.

In Ethiopia some of the private contractors offer greater accountability and professionalism. Only few companies comprise ex-military and professionally trained personnel equipped with the appropriate skills and expertise. Furthermore, while the private contractors are not immune to abuses and problems, the nature of private competition itself is underrated as a mechanism for the future regulation and preclusion of such mischief. Besides ethical concerns, private companies have to preserve their commercial reputation.

In the words of Ato Melaku, General Manager of Guarantee Security, private operations are first and foremost subject to contractual constraints. Contractors’ performance is largely dependent on and gauged by their contractual agreements. Companies strive to fulfill their contractual obligations to the best of their abilities as successfully fulfilled tasks increase the likelihood that they will be employed again in the future. Thus it is up to the employing organization to establish the framework and set the limits to private contractors’ activity and to insist on accountability; this is a logical arrangement since private contractors should, by their nature, be contractually accountable to their clients.

117. Interview with Mr. Endalkachew, owner of S&S Security Service, Addis Ababa, March 2009
At the end of the day economic gain is the reason why private security actors are operating in Ethiopia; the country’s peace and stability has little place in their agenda. However should future legislative frameworks that are unwieldy overly sweeping and draconian be avoided, the private sector will be able to make significant contributions to peace and stability and legislation rather than hinder the sector unreasonably.

4.6. Is There Any Working Relationship between the Different PSCs?

According to informants from the private security sector, there is almost no working relationship between the different private security companies in the country. Rather, they see one another as business rivals rather than potential partners. This poor relation could be partially a reason for the failure of an attempt to establish an association of private security companies in Ethiopia, which was initiated by the head of Sebatu and his Sons Security Company in 2003. During the interview with some company heads on the reasons for this failure, it was indicated that they prefer to remain merely as business actors than organized security service providers. They also said that their understanding of the security services is one that aimed at making money. Opining on that Ato Endalkachew Sebatu, the General Manager of S&S, said that it is a pity that many of the people out there working on this industry could not see the long term advantage of forming an association of private security companies.

The existence of such an entity would help the industry to have a common stand on the provision of security and standardization of the training component of individual companies. This would in turn create a strong and organized private security force with wider scope of security provision. In doing so, they could, apart from increasing their capacity and income, deliver a better service to their clients; through international best practices on the sector, and thus become a reliable alternative in the Ethiopian security arena.

S&S is one of the largest companies in Ethiopia with more than 2500 security guards deployed in Addis and elsewhere in the country. It is a member of the American Private Security Companies’ Association. It has got different certificates for having participated in international workshops on private security. This has helped the company to put a standard training manual in place and also adopt practices from other companies working in the area. Hence forming an association of different private security companies will primarily benefit the companies themselves.

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118. Interview with Mr. Endalkachew, owner of S&S Security Service, Addis Ababa, March 2009
119. Interview with Mr. Belay, a supervisor at S&S Security Service, Addis Ababa, March 2009
According to one informant, many of the PSCs in this country are not mission-oriented but are rather business-oriented. Consequently they do not seem to care much about the bigger responsibility of maintaining security. PSCs are in a way taking over the government’s exercise over sovereignty. When those powers of protecting the safety of part of the citizen are delegated to them, they should not have been undermining this responsibility.\textsuperscript{120} What we could deduce from these interviews is that there is currently a clear lack of understanding among the different private security companies on the importance of forming an association and strengthening cooperation within the sector. Should the private companies want to benefit from their services and thus increase the standard of the sector, they need to consider establishing an association which could serve as platform for the PSCs. In order to better utilize professional security officers in crime prevention, there is a need to establish a more formal national forum where representatives from public police and private security can discuss and formulate solutions to their perceived problems in improving co-operations.

4.7. Relationship between the Police and Private Security Forces

The relationship between private security providers and the public police is important in the effective delivery of security. In Ethiopia, this relationship is influenced by the lack of any clear regulatory framework for the private sector, and the absence of clear and consistent policy framework structuring the public-private security relationship. This is in part a consequence of different levels of policy jurisdiction making specific arrangements with private security providers in their areas, and in part due to the absence of any associations (private security syndicates) on the part of the industry that could have played a strong role in being a bridge between the companies, police and other security structures in the country. For these reasons, there is at present little formal co-operation between the public and the private security sector.\textsuperscript{121}

The capacity of the private security companies as potential partners of the police in the provision of security seems to be underestimated. Walking along the streets of the city, one realizes a strong presence of armed security men who are members of the Federal Police. But on the other hand, in front of big buildings and business centres, we see uniformed private security guards. This phenomenon demonstrates unnecessary high presence of security personnel in the city. Had there been a strong relationship between the

\textsuperscript{120}. Interview with a security expert from the Ethiopian Police College,- Addis Ababa, March 2009
\textsuperscript{121}. FGD Addis Ababa, March 2009
two forces, a great number of security personnel could have been used for other deployments through a collaborative scheme thus saving both human resource and the money spent on them for other purposes.

Currently, some levels of co-operations take place between the police and the private sector, but most of these are ad-hoc and not formalized. On a day to day basis, however, the most important form of co-operation between PSCs and the police is in the form of responding to incidents and alarms from clients. As the private security sector is unarmed, accordingly the PSCs rely on police backup for any serious incidents.122

Most security companies report that they feel unprepared in the face of any confrontations with criminals at the sites where they are guarding. This poses a serious challenge as responding with non-armed guards provides limited security for clients, and at the same time places the guards in significant danger. Regarding armed response services, current practice is to send one vehicle to the incident and another to the nearest police patrolling unit. Guards are instructed to contact their supervisors and withdraw and wait for the police in cases of any serious incident. This also puts the clients in a more vulnerable situation.123

There is a clear feeling among most PSCs that this arrangement is unsatisfactory. As the company owners point out, PSCs and police have a common interest in preventing crime. However, the police are well armed while the PSCs are not entitled to carry arms. This situation not only puts us in vulnerability but also not only potentially delays effective response time, making the risk worse in case there are no police officers nearby the scene.124

As a result, one can say that the relationship between police and PSCs in Ethiopia today is of a private nature. As some of the owners themselves were high ranking ex-police officers including the former police commissioner of Addis Ababa, they, in case of need of police, have easier access to the system than other ordinary PSCs.

Several representatives of the sector interviewed for this study, stressed the need for the relationship to be formalized and documented in order to minimize its arbitrary and ad-hoc nature. Given adequate level of co-operation between public policing and private security companies, the private sector can act as a “force multiplier” increasing security for

122. Interview with the Deputy Police Commissioner of Addis Ababa, at his office, March 2009
123. Interview with Mr. Hagos, owner of a PSC at his office, March 2009
124. Interview with Mr. Kassa, Supervisor at Addis Security, at his office, March 2009
all sectors of society. A lack of co-operation on the other hand, could result in a gradual “privatization” of public policing.

The lack of understanding by private security operatives of the laws that regulate their activities could be a problem regarding control and monitoring of misconduct. This can be linked to a lack of compliance as well as lack of knowledge of the penalties for breaches of the law. The underlying principle in establishing partnership policy between the private security industry and the police should not be whether the former replaces policing functions but rather where it can supplement and be supportive of the overall policing activities. In addition there can be no talk of the provision of security outside the formal structures of the state. It is certainly not a question of privatizing crime (security) control but co-operation in the fight against crime and co-coordinating joint efforts in this regard.
Ethiopia’s Private Security Industry is an important employer and player in the security sector but it is in a danger of getting out of control. The rapid growth is likely to cause upheaval if the sector is not regulated.

The regulation of private security companies can take a broad variety of forms. In recent years there have been increasing trends towards an increase in the regulation of the private security in most European and some African countries and with it a strengthening of the “government principle”, i.e. the centralization of political authority over private security and private policing within government agencies (Waard, 1999; Weber, 2002).

Licensing should define the services PSCs and be granted for fixed periods and only after strict criteria have been met and background checks on personnel completed. Firearms controls should also be introduced. Legislation may establish a clear distinction between PSCs and public security sector actors, and stipulate minimum requirements for the transparency and accountability of PSCs. Direct relationship between specific political parties and PSCs needs to be prohibited.

In situations whereby cases of alleged misconduct or criminal offences can be reported and prosecuted, an independent ombudsman should be nominated within a government department. The ombudsman, as an independent actor, would collect complaints against companies, investigate and process them (Gumedze, 2007).

A system of industry self-regulation such as voluntary codes of conduct should be encouraged. To ensure that PSCs are committed to professional and transparent service delivery, training regimes for PSC staff should be created and overseen by the state and licensing should be dependent on completion of such training.

Obstacles to reform include the potential to create a security vacuum in PSCs absence, a lack of distinction between the responsibilities of state and non-state security actors. The government needs to focus on initial regulation that can be easily implemented until
capacities allow for more comprehensive laws. It can as well establish clear rules about the collaboration between PSCs and governmental security forces. The government has to also put in place clear requirements as to the qualifications of PSC staff in terms of training and clean criminal records.

Another aspect of the industry members’ wish and effort is the instigation for increased pressure for the arming of private security companies. According to some informants including company owners, PSCs currently are prevented from doing their jobs properly as unarmed guards could be confronted with armed criminals. This is regarded as hindrance to the effective provision of security by the private sector.

It is the belief of this paper that any move towards arming the private security sector is likely to be counterproductive in the absence of an effective regulatory framework. It is important to note that many company owners and the clients have strong reservation to such a separate legislation, arguing that it would seriously affect the general security situation in the country. But on the other hand, if PSCs are allowed to be armed together with the proper regulation mechanism, they could play a central role in the betterment of general security in the country by being a strong partner to the public security apparatus.

The effectiveness of governmental regulation in addressing governance failure such as lack of transparency and accountability, control, coordination and efficiency in the private sector rests on the government’s ability to strengthen principles in dimensions which have progressed further than others towards governance. Notably, state regulation can impose limits on the transitional operation of private security firms in Ethiopia - the functions which private security firms may take on, the internal structure of private security companies and their implementation.

One of the key mechanisms of governmental regulation is the introduction of license for individuals and/or companies operating in the private security sector (South, 1988; 900.) A second element has been the introduction of minimum training standards (South, 1988; 91). For PSCs to contribute their part in the country’s endeavour to bring a more peaceful and secured environment, the current status needs to be carefully revised. As it has been seen earlier the Ministry of Labour and Trade are the two authorities that are in charge of the activities of PSCs in the country. However, their mandate has very little bearing on security related responsibilities.

In the future both licenses and training certificates can variously be acquired from governmental departments such as the Ministry of Federal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and
the Federal Police. In addition, the Ministry of Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority which has the mandate of maintaining internal and external state and public security activities of the country should be given the responsibility to monitor the activities of the PSCs and to issue licenses for the possession or use of arms, firearms and explosives should have to prescribe conditions under which explosives may be sold; and issue permits to persons who deal with explosives and repair arms and firearms. Its objective should be to execute policies and laws on state and public security, immigration nationality and refugees.125

The government needs to also encourage the formation of associations whose task would be bringing together the different private security companies in the country and setting standards whereby the industry can be governed and increase its efficiency thus becoming more accountable. These associations could partially be governed by the government and the private security companies themselves. The associations can go as far as giving licenses to new ones using the discretions they have set. Moreover, the government can enforce these regulations and penalize non-compliance with the law. Governmental regulation thereby will create clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Malpractices of private security firms will either be subject to criminal prosecution or, if the result of insufficient regulation, they can be attributed to governmental policy. Licensing will also enable governmental and non-governmental bodies to obtain and publish reliable data on the private security firms and to enhance the transparency of the industry.

Should any regulatory mechanisms be effective in the future, the PSCs have a responsibility with regard to assuring clear identification of PSC staff and vehicles (IDs, clearly distinguishable uniforms, special number plates for vehicles). They need to make training an important and ongoing element of quality service. This should also include training on appropriate behaviour in interactions with civilians.

Further, while giving licenses to PSCs, amendments of legislation could give the regulating authority the following functions:

• Develop a registration system and maintain a computerized data base consisting of all registered security officers and security business.

• Undertake finger print classification of all those wanting to enter the security industry, both as employers and employees, to ensure that people with serious criminal convictions do not enter the security industry.

125. Interview with an immigration officer at his office, March 2009
• Undertake inspections and prosecution of security businesses which break the law, especially fly-by-night companies. There should be regulations requiring arms and armammunitions to be kept in proper custody.

• Employees who are detailed to use arms should not be left to resort to the use of the firearms in order to negotiate for any conditions of service and must follow the proper channels for settling industrial disputes.

• Guards and escort service employees must wear uniform while on duty. These uniforms must be adequately described and notified to the public through official news papers. No uniform, dress or parts belonging to a PSC may be the same in style, colour, and texture of the government service forces or another PSC.

• Distinct colors of uniforms will ensure that personnel are easily identifiable. This requirement will also be viewed as a way of preventing errant individuals from claiming that they belong to a given PSC.

Organizations have to renew their operation licenses annually; an operation license should be renewed annually on application, subject to proven satisfactory performance by the applicant for the previous year, and proof of payment of appropriate fees for the category of security services for which a renewal of license is sought.

Some of the major reasons for regulating PSCs in Ethiopia are:

• To ensure they do not adversely impact the peace and security of the country and its people,

• To ensure that their use is both legal and legitimate and does not contravene human rights; to ensure that they do not undermine government policy,

• To prevent them from causing economic damage to their commercial clients,

• To ensure they are made accountable both for their actions and for those of their employees,

• To make certain that they are as transparent as possible to prevent them from shifting between legal and illegal pursuits and to guarantee that they do not in any way undermine the sovereignty of the country.
Laws should be enacted to control the sector and regulate the operations of PSCs. There is a need for the government to draw a distinction between PSCs and business enterprises. The framework should provide directions on working conditions; set a minimum amount of capital required to start a security firm; set minimum wages, academic qualifications, training, codes of conduct, and the nature and maintenance of communication equipment. In order to inject professionalism and discipline into the private security sector, there is a need to establish an independent body to regulate the sector with essential expert knowledge and enforce standards and bring sanity to the sector.

Examples of what is happening in some countries and their experience with private security companies could help draw lessons that can be relevant to defining policy and legal framework and mechanisms for coordinating, controlling and monitoring PSCs and their operations. Without proper regulations, the sector may pose more risk than benefit to security. This is because the sector can continue to attract investors who want to make quick profits by taking advantage of the absence of regulatory act. Accordingly, policies and guidelines that define the relationship between PSCs and official security organs must be put in place.
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CROSS-BORDER PASTORAL CONFLICT: THE CASE OF DASSENETCH AND NYANGATOM IN SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA

By Teshome Mekonnen
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

1.1.1 General Aspect of Conflict and Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa

Conflict is not a new phenomenon. It exists whenever incompatible activities occur, in all countries and at every level of society (Teshome 2003: 85). Conflict per se is by no means a negative force; rather it is a natural expression of social difference and of humanity’s perpetual struggle for justice and self-determination. If managed non-violently, it can be positive, a source of immense creativity and progress. The challenge, however, is to avoid the violent expression of conflict without suppressing the root causes completely.

The Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict–prone regions of Africa. The region is ethnically dynamic and politically volatile. Violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa have caused suffering and extensive damages to life and property. It also has had an adverse impact on the overall economic development and security in the region. The region has been closely associated with recurrent cycles of drought, famine and food insecurity and large-scale population displacement, grinding poverty, political instability and even state collapse in the case of Somalia. Conflicts within the Horn of Africa are frequent, complex, and occur at different levels. They can be inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, or cross border in dimension. Excluding inter-state wars, violent conflicts that have plagued the Horn mostly manifest themselves as pastoralist conflicts (livestock raiding or rustling, violent disputes at watering points, etc.), highway banditry, abductions, generalized insecurity, and other crimes.

Such pastoral conflicts in the Horn stem not only from competition over pastoral resources, but also from borders and boundaries established without taking into account the needs of pastoralists, from weakening of customary conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, from curtailing mobility, and from a proliferation of small arms.

Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa is one of the most important economic activities from
which millions of people derive their livelihoods. In terms of the number of pastoralists, an estimate made in the 1980s indicates that three of the top five countries in the world are found in this sub-region. Sudan has the highest pastoralist percentage globally while Somalia and Ethiopia rank third and fifth respectively (Sandford 1983: 2). These semi-arid and arid areas, where the pastoralists in the Horn are living, are found adjacent to each other and in most cases in peripheral areas of their respective countries and cover large tract of land. Thus, it is important to undertake country case studies within a comparative framework to bring out not only the structural similarities and differences in pastoral conflicts in different countries, but also to find out the extent of interconnections across borders and their causes. This study tries to investigate the causes of pastoral cross-border conflicts by taking Dassenetch and Nyangatom ethnic pastoral groups, as case studies. These ethnic groups are found in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region of Ethiopia, in the southern tip of South Omo Zone, where North West Kenya, South East Sudan and South West Ethiopia share borders.

Map 1: The Study Are
1.1.2 Pastoralism in Ethiopia

Most of the available studies on pastoralists in Ethiopia estimate that pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in Ethiopia constitute roughly 10-12% of the total population. According to these studies, these groups occupy some 60% of the country’s land mass, mainly the arid and semi-arid areas of the country (Hogg 1997; Sandford and Yohannes 2000). The majority of pastoralist communities in Ethiopia belong to the Somali, Oromia, Afar, Gambella and SNNP regions. Borena, Afar, Somali, and the pastoralist Southwest Ethiopia, where the case study groups belong, are peripheral areas of the country, bordering on the neighbouring countries.

Pastoral areas contribute to national wealth by making dry land productive. Most of the livestock population in Ethiopia comes from the pastoral areas. According to some studies, the pastoral areas account for 28 percent of the cattle in Ethiopia; 26 percent of sheep; 60 percent of goats and 100 percent of camels (Mohammud 2005: 8; Belachew 2004:22).

The pastoral areas are also rich in natural resources including surface and ground water, minerals and a wide range of flora and fauna. The deposit of natural gas, geothermal, metallic and non-metallic minerals as well as the existence of many national parks and wildlife sanctuaries are clear indications of the rich resource potential of pastoral areas. Therefore, these parts of the country should not merely be considered as producing exclusively livestock. They have multiple economic and social purposes such as livestock production, irrigation, minerals, tourism and important bio-diversity.

In spite of existing and potential resources, the pastoral areas are the most underdeveloped areas in the country. These regions are prone to drought, famine and conflict. Pastoralists are actually the most marginalized communities, both politically and economically, particularly in the past regimes of Ethiopia.

1.1.3 Pastoralism in SNNPR

The Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) is one of the nine regional states in Ethiopia. The region lies between 40º 27’ and 80º 30’ latitude North and 34º 21’ and 39º 11’ longitude East covering a total area of 113,539 km2. The region represents 10% of the total national land surface and is inhabited by 15,042,531 people (CSA 2008). There are 45 ethnic groups in the region, each with distinct languages and cultural settings. About 80 % of the population in the region lives in the highland - an area representing 40 % of the regional land holding, while the remaining 20 % live in the arid and semiarid areas that represent about 60 % of the regional land surface.
The highland communities (with a density of 400-600 people/km2) practice subsistence mixed crop-livestock agriculture with about 0.5 ha of land per household. The livelihood of the pastoral communities, on the other hand, is mainly based on livestock production. Livestock are, thus, the principal source of subsistence for pastoralist communities, providing milk and cash income to cover family expenses for food grains and other essential household requirements mostly consumer goods (SNNPRS Conservation Strategy 2005 and CSA 2008).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Pastoral conflicts in the past were less devastating as they mainly involved the use of traditional weapons such as bows, arrows and spears. However, the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons has significantly increased the lethality of these conflicts. Indeed, the pattern and forms of the recent violent conflicts in pastoral areas have become more frequent and more unpredictable. They have also exhibited marked escalation in violence and geographical spread. These conflicts have involved large-scale livestock raiding and seizure of neighbouring ethnic group’s territories by armed forces, which has virtually becamewarfare.

As a result of this, cross-border conflicts among pastoralist groups along the international borderlands have currently become a common occurrence. According to CEWARN’s (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) field reporting and data analysis, “... the resultant violence and the death rate of conflicts in the pastoral zones are far higher than anyone had expected. Over the three-year period, 2003-2006, CEWARN has been collecting information and monitoring cross-border pastoral conflicts in two pilot areas/ Karamoja cluster and Somalia cluster/ and has recorded over almost 2,200 conflict-related deaths in the region, of which at least 150 were women and children. Over the same period, around 138,000 livestock were lost in more than 1,500 violent incidents.

The alarming July to September 2007 record of CEWARN, reported by field monitors located in the Karamoja Cluster, includes the border areas of southern Ethiopia, northern Kenya, and northern Uganda. CEWARN reported eighty-six human deaths and more than 3,800 livestock losses within a period of only three months. There are also reports on raids with more than 6,000 livestock stolen, in the Turbi massacre in July 2005 where over 80 people including 25 school children of Marsabit District in Kenya were killed in a violent attack that was carried out by armed parties from Ethiopia and Kenya (CEWARN Situation Brief, www.cewarn.org). The above described violence and the Turbi massacre
show how the conduct of warfare has changed and that modern raids are no longer part of traditional cultural practices. These incidents highlight the potential regional implications of pastoralist conflicts. In this connection, conflicts in the pastoralist zones must be considered as a serious source of internal insecurity and regional instability of the Horn. This study focuses on cross-border pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa, taking the case of Dassenetch and Nyangatom pastoral groups in Southwest Ethiopia.

The study tries to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the causes of the conflicts?
2. Who are the actors in the conflict?
3. What types of relationships do the Dassenetch and Nyangatom peoples have with their respective neighbours and what is the impact of the relationship on peace and security of the area?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objectives

The general objectives of the study are:

1. To attain a better understanding of the nature, causes and dynamics of violent inter and intra-clan pastoral conflicts in the study area.
2. To undertake an analysis of cross-border pastoral conflicts, with a view to developing appropriate strategies for coping with the challenges of conflict resolution and mitigation, and thereby contributing to sustainable development and peace building.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To study and analyse the dynamics of various internal forces contributing to conflict within the pastoral communities of Dassenetch and Nyangatom.
2. To study the immediate and long term effects of conflicts on different sections of the community.
3. To analyse how pastoral conflicts are being interwoven with other conflicts, such as ethnic conflicts.

4. To explore if the present day conflicts have adversely impacted on the effectiveness of indigenous institutions for conflict management and resolution;

5. To find out how major actors - government, livestock traders (outsiders and pastoralists) and small arms dealers - affect the dynamics of conflicts in the various pastoral communities.

1.4 Methodology

The overall approach seeks to understand the concepts and the theories that deal with conflict and the issues associated with it. Thus, the study employed multi-disciplinary approach that mainly involves theories of the causes of conflict. The study further seeks to apply a framework of analyzing the behaviours of the major actors in the pastoral conflict between or among the conflicting parties around the Dassenetch and Nyangatom woredas.

The literature search began with well resourced libraries in the country: the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Graduate Library at the University of Addis Ababa and other libraries.

The second phase of the research was visiting offices of international and local NGOs in the capital, which contain a wealth of information about the present situation and events in the lowland region where they are operating, and browsing through these materials. Ethiopian government bodies have the longest record of working in the lowland region, and their archives contain documents and reports going back for decades. Thus, the researcher has managed to arm himself with the necessary materials before starting the field work.

The next phase of the research was conducting a series of interviews with stakeholders. Local officials, who proved to be approachable and open to discussion, were the first to be interviewed.

The official version of events was balanced by the second group of stakeholders to be interviewed, which were representatives of NGOs. By and large educated and experienced, they offered a critical perspective on general issues, and especially on the role played by the local administration.
It was during these visits to the countryside that the researcher came into contact with the third group of stakeholders, community elders. During the visits to the countryside, the researcher had an opportunity to approach members of the local community and elicit information and opinions about events.

To obtain qualitative information from subjects in the case study area, the researcher used qualitative methods by utilizing tools for analyzing conflict situations. An open-ended questionnaire was used to collect primary information and interviews were held with the informants described above.

1.5 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

Both external and internal factors have affected the research area. These factors might influence the reliability and validity of the study results. During the study, some of the respondents might have had high degree of emotional involvement with their ethnic groups. However, although they largely lacked neutrality, they still provided valuable information about the conflict. The responses appeared to adhere to a script, the official version of events, from which they were unwilling to diverge during the discussion, especially in matters relating to conflict. Their attitude was often defensive, since they were often directly involved and felt responsible. The interviews with community representatives, elders and youth, and NGOs working in the area have been used to fill the gaps. The very frequent turnover in the office at the district level was another limitation. Most incumbents were recently transferred, appointed, or elected to their position, and pleaded ignorant of past events. To minimize the gaps the researcher tried to communicate with former officials.

1.6 Scope of the study area

This study covers Dassenetch and Nyangatom woredas. The two woredas are found in SNPR, South Omo Zone where Southwest Ethiopia, Northwest Kenya and Southeast Sudan meet and share border.

1.7 Organization of the study

The thesis has five chapters. The introductory part deals with background, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, scope of the study, methodology, and organization of the study. The second chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical framework
used for analyzing findings. Chapter three deals with profile of the study area, the effect, the changing nature and types of conflict. Causes of conflicts in the study area are also dealt with in this chapter. The fourth chapter deals with the potential for conflict management and peace building. The fifth and the final chapter is the conclusion.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Theoretical Approaches to Pastoral Conflict

Each society in the modern world contains subsection or sub-system more or less distinct from the rest of the population. The most fitting generic term to designate this fraction of the whole is ‘ethnic group’. An ethnic group is defined here as a collective notion/element within a large society, having real or putative common ancestry, memories of shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of the people-hood. Examples of such symbolic elements are kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypic features or any combination of these (Schermerhorn 1996:17). There are debates and controversies, among scholars due to the growing need for proper understanding of the concepts and theories of ethnicity.

Scholars have been trying to develop a theoretical approach to ethnicity and different causes of conflict for a long time. Some, like Donald Horowitz (1985), Gurr (1970), Rothschild (1997) and Azar (1990), agree that the ethnic conflicts experienced today, especially in Africa are deep-rooted. Ethnic conflicts are dangerous and complex because they cause massive humanitarian suffering (for instance in Rwanda) and civil wars (for example the Biafra War), create large numbers of refugees (for instance, in the former Yugoslavia), and have the potential to destabilize neighbouring states (as in the Balkans, the Caucasus, East and Central Africa, and West Africa). They can also be far difficult to manage than conventional conflicts between states, because the forces driving them are social or cultural rather than political, and hence far less amenable to political solutions.

Generally speaking ethnic conflict is a form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes and potential remedies along an actually existing and perceived discriminating ethnic divide. This is mainly practical in the pastoral areas where pastoralists are governed by their traditional mechanism and tied with their clan/ethnic group by blood and other means.
2.2 Causes of Pastoral Conflict

An important question regarding pastoral ethnic conflict is What are the root causes of conflict? Studies show that the factors vary substantially from country to country. A conflict may have a mixture of causes that need to be recognized and understood. Conflicts can arise from differences of perception, incompatible goal or power-imbalance, and others reasons. There are different theories, which deal with causes of pastoral conflicts.

Economic factors (uneven development) have been identified as one of the major causes of conflict in Africa. Theorists believe that competition for scarce resource is a common factor in almost all ethnic conflicts in Africa. In multi-ethnic regions like the Horn, ethnic groups violently compete for resources along ethnic lines. Relative deprivation theory offers an explanation based on an ethnic group’s access to power and economic resources (Gurr 1970).

Critchley and Terriff (1993:333) argue that resources directly result in conflict when (i) they are becoming increasingly scarce in a region, (ii) they are essential for human survival, and (iii) the resource can be physically seized or controlled. They assert that direct conflict over renewable resources will be rare, but competition over scarce resources will have a strong indirect effect on the propensity for conflict. Limited availability of resources places stress on society, which makes the society less stable and more conflict-prone.

Another major cause of conflict is psychological, especially the fear and insecurity of ethnic groups during transition. It has been opined that extremists build upon these fears to polarise the society. In addition, memories of past traumas magnify these anxieties. These interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that leads to violence (Jeong 2007).

According to Lake and Rothschild (1996), the theoretical approach which emphasizes ethnicity as a cause of conflict, is a sign of a weak state or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties. In this case, states act with bias to favour a particular ethnic group or region and behaviours such as preferential treatment fuel ethnic conflicts. Therefore, in critical or difficult political situations, the effectiveness of governance is dependent on its ability to address social issues and human needs. The failure of national institutions to recognise and accommodate ethnic differences and interests will create conflict.

The theory from the primordial school stresses the uniqueness and the overriding importance of ethnic identity. From their point of view, ethnicity is a biological and fixed
characteristic of individuals and communities (Geertz 1963).

The other theoretical approach is the instrumentalist argument, notably that of Donald Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985). In an anthropological study of ethnicity he argued that claims to ethnicity were the result of manipulation of symbols, history, and political myths by social elites and leaders in their pursuit of advantages of power (Horowitz 1985).

The famous constructivist theories are associated with the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth. He defined ethnicity as a label that classifies a person in terms of his or her identity, determined by origin and background, as well as a form of social organization maintained by marked boundaries between who is included and who is not. However, these boundaries can change, expand or contract to include or exclude people, depending on different situations.

The nature of ethnicity is therefore ever changing. Scholars’ attention has also shifted to the nature of ethnic conflict and violence following the resurgence of ethnic conflict and even genocide in some societies like Rwanda, Bosnia, and Zaire, especially after the end of the Cold War era.

An important theory on conflict and conflict management is Burton’s (1979; 1997) human need theory. This approach to ethnic conflict explains that ethnic groups fight because they are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. These include peoples’ need for identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy. This theory provides a plausible explanation of ethnic conflicts in Africa, where such needs are not easily met by undemocratic regimes.

This paper uses Burton’s theory to explain causes of conflict in the study area, because it provided cogent reasons for the conflicts in the case studies. The human needs theory was introduced to debunk the other theories that attribute causes of conflict to the innately aggressive nature of human beings. The importance of this theory to conflict management is that it moves beyond theories that blame African conflicts on a primordial past. Instead, it points to ineffective institutions unable to satisfy the basic human needs of their citizens. Whenever such non-negotiable needs are not met, conflict is inevitable (Burton 1990).

As of other African countries, the problem of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia largely depends on the level of state effectiveness, accountability, and transparency in handling the demands of diversity.
Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize that proper analysis of conflicts is very important in order to avoid wrong prescription for the problems. Failure to find solutions to Ethiopia’s cross-border pastoral problems will have devastating social and economic consequences in the Horn; region that is already worn out by conflict, poverty and disease.
CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

3.1. Profile of the Study Area

3.1.1 Geography and Administrative Arrangement

South Omo Zone is one of the 13 zones and 8 special woredas in SNNPR with an area of 22,000 square kilometres. The zonal town Jinka is located 781 km from Addis Ababa. The Zone is located at 4.27'-6.26' North and 34.57'-37.49' East. Its elevation ranges from 360-3300 m.a.s.l. It is bounded by Gamogofa and Keffa zones, Konta and Basketo Special woredas to the north, Konso and Derasha special woredas to east. Borena Zone of Oromiya Region to south east, Kenya and Sudan to the south west and Benchi Maji Zone to west (CSA 2008).

The Zone is divided into eight woredas of which Hammer, Bena/Tsemay, Dassenetch, Nyangatom and Salomago are known to be pastoral woredas while the other three are mixed farmers. The agro-classification of the Zone shows that 0.5% is highland, 5.1% mid highland, 60% lowland and 34% semi-arid (CSA 2008).

3.1.2 Demography and Ethnography

The lower Omo River Valley is a zone with many unique features in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) of Ethiopia. One of them is the presence of more than a dozen quite distinct ethnic groups that live intimately close to one another, yet retain fiercely defended distinctive identities, languages and customs that are ancient and materially primitive, as well as territories. The size of their population ranges from very small to miniscule; the largest group is less than 200,000 people, the smallest only a few hundred (SNNPRS Conservation Strategy 2005; CSA 1994).

It is not surprising that, the zone which is home to thirteen distinct ethnic groups and a few others that are in a process of assimilation or extinction has long been a major attraction for anthropologists and more recently for tourists.

The zone is home to an estimated population of 577,673 (CSA 2008_first draft) out of
3.1.3 Economy

Based on diverse topography and climate, the local economy of the South Omo is classified into two. These are lowland agro-pastoral areas and settled farming areas found in the middle altitude. The diverse topography and elevation result in having strikingly different environments within the zone over short distances and marked variations in climate and vegetation. Here groups have adapted to micro niches that afford sustenance for limited numbers. On the escarpment to the north they have adapted to rain fed cultivation and an agro-pastoralist mode of production. Wetlands in the lower Omo River delta also support primitive cultivation that shifts with the river’s moods, while the surrounding countryside is scorched and arid, fit only for livestock raising on the move. The periodic rise and fall of river flow affects upstream and downstream groups differently and requires constant adjustment (SNNPRS Conservation Strategy, 2005 and discussion with SOZ Agricultural Department Expert; Jinka, 2009-4-10).

Cultivation and livestock raising are the dominant economic activities in these zones. Over the greater part of it, the two are combined in the mode of production known as agro-pastoralism, but the mixture differs according to climate differences. Settled cultivation predominates in the centre and northern parts of the zone, where the people also keep herds of cattle, and flocks of goats and sheep around the villages. Transient cultivation without settlement is also practised in the south and west in the flood plains of the rivers, especially the Omo and Mago. While the people depend on cultivation to supplement their diet, they primarily rely on the livestock they raise in a system of mobile pastoralism they have practised for ages. (SNNPRS Conservation Strategy, 2005 and discussion with SOZ Agricultural Department Expert; Jinka, 2009-4-10).

3.2. The Nature of Conflict

3.2.1 The Extent and Distribution of the Conflict

Traditionally, conflicts have been endemic to pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa. The conflicts have been between different ethnic pastoral groups, as well as within ethnic groups. The majority of the conflicts have been over access to pastoral resources (grasslands, water and livestock). Most of these conflicts have been going on over a long period of time, with very little attention paid to resolving them. Even today, most such conflicts go unnoticed and unreported – unless large-scale killing and damages
take place and the state intervenes militarily (Markakis 1992; Fukui and Markakis 1994).

As respondents testified, conflicts in South Omo have been revolving around a variety of ‘low intensity’ conflicts, some of which are linked to wider cross-border and regional conflicts. Domestic disputes over pastoral resources have, in some cases, had spill-over effects on neighbouring countries since often the same ethnic group lives in more than one country. Violent cattle raids, perhaps the most well known and obvious form of conflict, are one symptom of much deeper conflicts and fractures. The roots of these conflicts lie in a combination of political, socio-economic and ecological factors: a long history of economic and social marginalization by the central government, increased competition over resources, reduced access to land, water and other natural resources due to increasing demographic and environmental pressure, and reduced access to credit, markets and extension services (Karamojong Conflict Baseline Study Report 2005).

According to the elders in the study area, for centuries, raiding other groups for livestock has been a traditional method of replenishing herds in the wake of drought and disease.

Young men from the pastoral and agro-pastoral groups carry out both theft and raids of the livestock.

While conflict in the study area is frequent, it is also unpredictable. The elders and other persons interviewed confirm that conflict is not steady and unrelenting. Instead, it is characterized by periods of relative calm and then sudden outbreaks of violence. The periods of peaceful relations may be punctuated by small episodes of cattle raiding, and after a series of such raids, one group may mount a major response and violence will escalate. In some cases, there is no escalation. For these reasons conflict between groups can be described as recurrent rather than continuous. This is also supported by the IGAD conflict early warning and response mechanism situation brief (Yohannes, Kassaye and Zerihun 2005; CEWARN Situation Brief, www.cewarn.org).

Conflict springs particularly from the necessity for groups to share access to sparse and patchy dry-land resources. Maintaining the pastoralist way of life requires constant negotiation as groups move around to try to ensure adequate pasturage and water. The common property tenure systems for access require a high degree of inter-group cooperation, which will at times be extended to external groups (Grahn 2005).

Ethnic groups in the study and neighbouring areas are heterogeneous and internal conflicts do arise. Some elements in an ethnic group may benefit from conflict at the expense
of more marginalized elements. Groups in the study area will also have both positive and conflicting relationships with groups inside and outside the area. According to interviewees in the study area, some of the alliances and positive relationships are long standing (Nyangatom and Toposa, Dassenetch and Erbore can be good examples) while others last for only a short period of time (Nyangatom and Turkana can be cited as an example), even though they speak the same language and share many common socio-cultural values. In connection with the above fact which is testified by all the respondents, territorial and political affiliations have long been fluid in this region. This is an understandable response to perpetual scarcity and periodic drought. Alliances are political and expedient rather than deeply rooted in a singular cultural or ethnic tradition. This fluidity serves a vital economic function, because it allows pastoralists to avoid the harshest impacts of unpredictable weather patterns and accelerates recovery from livestock losses by reducing uncertainty (Yohannes, Kassaye and Zerihun 2005).

Alliances of convenience may be established when members of two or more groups combine forces to raid yet another group. When Nyangatom and Turkana are in clash, Nyangatom and Toposa will create an alliance to support each other; sometimes the Dassenetch also join them even though it may not be effective because of the similarity of the languages and physical appearance of the parties in the conflict (It is difficult for Dassenetch to physically differentiate Toposa and Nyangatom from their temporary common enemy, Turkana). Some experts working in the area describe the situation as characterized by “frequently shifting” alliances. For all of these reasons, conflict in the study area is very difficult to pin down and even more difficult to predict. The hot spots of today may be peaceful tomorrow. Thus, monitoring is needed to determine whether small tensions are emerging and could under certain conditions give rise to violence (Karamojong Conflict Baseline Study Report 2005).
Conflict Map
Actors Relationship Analysis

Key

- Circle indicates involved parties
- Line indicates a link, a fairly close relationship
- Indicates broken relationship
- A bold line a very Close relationship
- Indicates predominant direction influence
- Indicates discourse or conflict
- Indicates issue of the conflict

SOURCE: RESEARCHER OWEN WORK
3.2.2 The Effects of Violent Conflict

While reversing development processes and undermining trust, conflict in the study area has had direct and indirect effects and many negative consequences such as recurrent climatic extremes, socio-political marginalization, fragile environments, unfair market conditions, and suffering and death of the most vulnerable. It also has worsened the condition of an already impoverished people. Many informants reported the decline in cattle per capita, one clear sign of poverty.

Many people have been killed or maimed in the conflicts (far larger number than in the past when spears or bows and arrows were used in place of small arms) and even more have been rendered destitute. One respondent expressed the effect as follows, People used to fight using sticks, spears and bows and arrows, but now since they are fighting with rifles a lot more are being killed (Interview Omoriati, 2009-04-05). The number of people impoverished by conflict is large. They desperately need assistance to survive and become economically active again.

The existence of widespread conflict, as informants mentioned, is a major hindrance to effective development. It interferes with normal trade and local development efforts, and greatly reduces the willingness of government officials and NGO staff to work in the areas. The climate of insecurity is a serious impediment to improving economic and social conditions, which are essential to effective, long-term reduction of poverty.

According to the interviewed elders, large areas have been abandoned because of conflict. This includes valuable grazing areas on the borderlands between the neighbouring conflicting ethnic groups and the bank of the river which is favourable for farming and grazing. This happened some times in the past between Dassenetch and Nyangatom on the bank of Omo River.

The crowding of people and animals (because of conflict) into the more secure areas puts heavy pressure on the available resources and is believed to be causing environmental degradation in some areas. Because crowding fuels competition, it also promotes conflict.

The violent conflict as explained above also had negative effect on civil security. The civil insecurity for more than a year has limited access to cultivable land, which has resulted in limited crop cultivation and below-normal harvests. Household food stocks remain low and many households mainly depend on borrowing from relatives in urban areas and wild foods for their subsistence (Markakis 1992).
3.2.3 The Changing Nature of Conflict

Over the past 20-30 years there has been a significant increase in violent conflict in the case study and adjoining areas. This point was widely expressed and often emphasized by individuals interviewed in the study area.

People used to fight using sticks, spears and bows and arrows, but now since they are fighting with rifles many are being killed (Interview Omoriati, 2009-4-18). …The only thing youngsters respect is the Kalashnikov; previously it was only the elders who had guns; now it is in every one hand and this changed the balance of power. In most cases the youngsters as well as the ethnic groups who had large number of Kalashnikov are not willing to call elders for peace, rather they want to solve conflicts by power of guns, thus violence increased in the area in the past 20 years. (Interview with elders in the study areas, 2009-4-20).

An increase in the level and severity of conflict over the past two and three decades was widely reported by informant from the case study area. The reasons (discussed more fully in the following chapter) include the widespread lack of economic opportunity (in particular the lack of alternative livelihoods for the youth); the enormous increase in the availability and use of modern weapons; the politicization of conflict (notably, but not only, as a result of the civil war in Sudan); and the introduction of commercial raiding (in which individuals hire and pay raiders to steal livestock for sale at market). At the same time, at least one informant indicated that in some parts of the study area, the increased state capacity and growing stability of the federal government have led to less frequent violence, in contrast with the period of the Dergue, when social disorder and government oppression and systematic marginalization were very high.

According to the interviews, which were explained above, not only the level (scale) of the conflict but also the nature of the violence has also changed over the past 20 years. The traditional rules that governed raiding and warfare in the case study and surrounding areas have loosened and have been at least partially replaced by more random violence.

Women, children and the elderly were not often killed or injured. The raiding groups could abduct young children and girls, but they were assimilated into the kidnapping groups and not treated as slaves. Recent years have witnessed extreme levels of violence against even women and children. Many residents of the study area are appalled and infuriated by these changes, and it is an important factor stimulating efforts at reconciliation and peace building. However, the increase in violence has also led to increased
animosity and hatred, and a strong desire for revenge. These factors further inflame the situation, leading to further violence (Yohannes, Kassaye and Zerihun 2005; CEWARN Situation Brief, www.cewarn.org).

Many believe that the enormous increase in modern weapons has played a key role in both the increased levels and the changing nature of violence. Traditional raiding and warfare required long training and special skills, and some of these are no longer needed when modern weapons are used (Markakis 1992; Grahn 2005).

These changes in the scale and nature of conflict in the region have led some to conclude that traditional methods of conflict resolution alone cannot effectively deal with current conditions, unless they combine with modern methods of conflict resolution and peace building.

3.2.4 Border

The extent and seriousness of the problem are magnified by the fact that the area and population involved are not limited to South Omo within Ethiopia, but include large adjacent area and kindred populations in northern Kenya and southern Sudan. Nowhere is the artificial and ineffective nature of state borders more obvious than in the case of the boundaries that divide South Omo Zone from Kenya and Sudan. Drawn during the colonial powers’ scramble for Africa, borders throughout the Horn were drawn through the pastoralists’ lowlands conveniently considered no-man’s land (See map in Annex 3). They divided pastoralist communities, curtailed their freedom of movement, and marked the beginning of economic decline in the pastoralist zone. Understandably, pastoralists greatly resent these restrictions and normally ignore the borders, which are impossible to the police anyway (Markakis 1992).

There is hardly any conventional cross-border trade in this zone, but there is a thriving arms trade specialising in automatic weapons and ammunition. The Toposa who live across the border in Sudan are well known arms traders. They have a long lasting alliance with the Nyangatom in South Omo, who were the first to acquire automatic weapons from the Toposa in the 1980s and used them to fight against the Mursi, notably in 1987 (Interview with a woreda official; Omoriati, 29-04-16).

Another cross-border activity is raiding for livestock. Sometimes this involves crossing three borders. For instance, on 20/1/06, Toposa from Sudan and Nyangatom crossed through the South Omo Zone to attack Turkana in Kenya. When, as it often happens,
raiding involves bloodshed— in this case the toll was around 30 lives— revenge raiding is inevitable. This is often indiscriminate, in that it is directed at the nearest community that belongs to the raider group, whether it was involved in the raid or not. In this case, Turkana revenge may hit Dassenetch in Kenya or in South Omo (Interview with Woreda Official; Omoriati, 29-04-16).

According to community members in the study area, the other complicating factor in the cross-border dimension of conflict in this region is related to events in Southern Sudan where the majority of the Toposa, Nyangatom, Turkana and Dassenetch live closer to the Sudan border. Border crossing is uncontrolled, and population movements, illegal commerce, arms trade, livestock raiding and looting are carried out unhampered. Insurgents in one state find refuge across the border, and criminals evade punishment the same way (even officials who were in either of the states local administration). Border control requires inter-state cooperation and this was impossible when civil war raged in the Sudan. It may prove possible once Southern Sudan has an effective administration in place.

3.2.5 Types and Levels of Conflict

Social conflict is a universal phenomenon as old as human society. Social conflict is the result of group competition in the process of seeking basic need satisfaction. It is inevitable so long as material resources are unequally distributed within society, iniquitous discrimination persists in social interaction between communities, and groups are excluded from political participation in decision making. Eliminating social conflict is impossible and may be undesirable. Preventing social conflict from escalating into collective and organised violence is often possible and desirable. It may not even be desirable when violence is the only possible means available to the oppressed to redress injustice (Burton 1979; 1997; Markakis 1992; Galtung 2004).

The term ‘social conflict’ allows considerable room for interpretation. A distinction is made between violent and non-violent conflict, although some argue that unless non-violent conflict is managed, it risks turning violent. The cases included in this research involve violent conflict. Another distinction is made between political and non-political conflict, although one can argue that since violent conflict will inevitably invite state intervention, ultimately all conflict is political. In this case, political is taken to mean challenges to the state, such as secessionism, or to the incumbent government, such as political insurgency. Such types of conflict were not addressed in this research. Another typological distinction is made between recurrent and one-off instances of conflict, although again it can be argued that if a conflict is not sustainably resolved it will most likely recur. Yet
another distinction is made between organized/planned and unorganized/spontaneous conflict, on the assumption that the latter type is more easily managed. The study area has experienced both types of conflict (Hugh, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 1999).

Alternative typologies of conflict list categories of basic human needs that are manifested through membership in social groups and secured collectively through group mobilization. Among them are security (physical and material), identity (ethnic, cultural, religious), recognition (social), participation (political), and development (adaptation to socio-economic change). The most common typologies of conflict follow the above categorization, and are guided by divergent perceptions of what human needs most commonly feature as bones of social contention and causes of violent conflict (Burton 1997). Presumably, this is an objective approach to the contradictions or faults embedded in the structure of society that need to be resolved as a prerequisite to conflict management. Its weakness is that it tends to focus on differences rather than contradictions, and to make difference the essence, rather than the form, of conflict. Thus we get ‘ethnic conflict’ as the most prevalent type, implying that ‘ethnicity’ is the contradiction and cause of conflict, not simply a form of mobilization. This provides a facile explanation, and lifts the burden to seek the reasons that provoke ethnic group mobilization. The same objection applies to ‘religious’, ‘cultural’, ‘identity’ and other alleged types of social conflict (Horowitz 1985; Geertz 1963).

The last distinction is based on the scope and level at which conflict is waged. Scope refers to geographical extent, and level refers to social unit and administrative division involved. All three can vary widely, and range from local to national and, through cross-border links, even attain inter-state regional scope, in an ascending order of complexity and management difficulty. This distinction in the case study area, where pastoralist conflicts are very complex and take place within several levels, can be categorised as intra-community conflicts, inter community conflicts, and cross border conflicts. (Hugh, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 1999).

Intra-community conflict is the lowest level and most limited in scope, without necessarily being the least difficult to resolve. Community is the group with a recognized distinct identity and self-awareness, whose members interact socially through institutions and processes they do not share with members of other communities. An ethnic group or a tribe constitutes a community. Intra-community conflict involves sections, or sub-divisions, of an ethnic group of a tribe whose members are drawn closer together by ties of blood kinship, ties to a particular territory, sharing of a particular resource, or a special vo-
cation, and act as corporate units in defence of their parochial interests. Clans and castes are similar groups in the pastoralist community (Hugh, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 1999). Inter-community conflict raises the issue to a higher level. It is a fairly common phenomenon in the lowland periphery, and reaches a peak in South Omo where, according to the records of the Justice and Security Bureau of South Omo Zone, 204 people were killed and more than 80 were wounded in inter-community conflicts in four districts, during 2000-2005 (Markakis 1992; Fukui and Markakis 1994).

Cross-border conflicts take place across the international borders of the South Omo pastoralist groups (the case study area) where conflict exists between one tribe in one country against another tribe in the neighbouring country (for example, the Merile of Ethiopia or the Toposa of Sudan, fighting the Turkana of Kenya). Due to their complexity, cross-border conflicts between the above groups and others in the case study and nearby area pose a challenge to conflict analysis and management.

### 3.3 Causes of Conflict

The causes of conflict among ethnic groups in the case study area are varied and complex. Conflicts are triggered by multiple ecological, economic, socio-cultural and political factors rather than single causes which account for the frequent, unpredictable, and intermittent conflict in the study area.

There is also difficulty to put clearly distinction either between causes and outcomes of the conflict in the study area. Here what appears to be a cause appears as a consequence too and at the far end the two appear to merge. Some issues emerging as causes as well as results pose a challenge to the analysis and design of strategies and programs to address them. The complexity of the cause-effect relationship is probably one of the main reasons why different conflict resolution and peace building initiatives are not able to bring an end to conflict in the area.

A combination of socio-cultural, economic, political, and environmental factors has led to intensification of conflict in the area of study and its compartment. Most of the respondents generally agreed on a number of factors leading to conflicts in the study area. However, different people give differing emphasis and significance to varied causes. This section provides a more detailed discussion of the causes of conflict identified in the study area. They are summarized and categorized in the model of structural or root causes, proximate causes and “triggers.” As discussed in subsequent sections, reducing violent
conflict and promoting peace in the case study and nearby areas will require addressing all three levels of causes.

3.3.1 Structural Causes of Conflict

a) Competition for Scarce Resources

Different anthropologists have invested considerable effort to study and explain the phenomenon of conflict in the antique cultures of South Omo, and have produced several books and innumerable monographs and articles on the subject (Fukui and Turton 1979; Fukui and Markakis 1994; Galaty and Bonte 1991). There is general agreement that the root cause is intense competition for resources that are scarce in the arid lowland environment. The study of pastoralism in the Horn of Africa shows that communities on the move in search of pasture and grazing land, permanent sources of water and unhindered access to routes leading to these resources frequently compete and fight over them. Moreover increasing resource scarcity due to climatic change, loss of land and water to cultivation, and other reasons have led to increasing intensity of conflict in the pastoralist zones (Markakis 1992).

South Omo is no exception to this trend as explained earlier. Similarly, many of the interviewed pastoralists and individuals working on peace building and development activities in the study area confirmed that the most frequent conflicts and the identified single most important factor are linked to competition over access to scarce resources (grazing land and water).

Previously we [the number of pastoralist] were not many, grazing land was also large enough for us. The land currently occupied by new settlers from the highland area, the wild life conservation /park (South Omo National Park) and land allocated for investment belonged to us. All these reduced our resources (pasture land and water) significantly and led us to compete and fight for scarce resources (Interview, Nyangatom and Dassenetch, 2009-04-21).

This resource scarcity is the result of climatic change that has affected the entire region of the Horn, reducing precipitation generally and river flooding in particular on which many groups in this zone rely to supply a vital part of their diet. Proof of this is offered by the sever reduction in the size of the lakes (Turkana/Rudolf) in the southernmost edges of the zone, and the drying out of rivers such as the Elmo and Mara rivers in Salamago Woreda. Frequent shifting of river direction is another cause of conflict on the floodplains, as com-
Communities have to shift location and find new sites for cultivation. Although this is difficult to document, the increase human and animal population in recent decades is believed to have contributed proportionately to pressure on resources and consequent conflict.

Yet another cause of conflict, again common to the lowland periphery of the study area, is the marked trend to cultivation and the shift from mobile pastoralism to a more or less settled agro-pastoralism. This leads to intense competition for productive land on higher ground and on river banks, and frequent clashes between herders and cultivators. According to the respondent this is practical in the case of Nyangatom and Dassenetch were they clash in the bank of Omo River.

The international boundaries imposed by colonial powers initially and later accepted by respective countries, in many cases cut off pastoralists from their traditional dry season and drought reserve areas (see map in Annex 3). Similarly the expansion of mixed farming ranging from small plots to large commercial holdings, parks (South Omo National Park), new settlement by people from highland areas, demographic changes within and surrounding plateaus forced them to live in the semi-arid and arid pastoral zones, with less access to land than in the past. Thus, there is intense competition between pastoral groups for the remaining areas suitable for dry season grazing. While competition for resources (specifically dry season grazing areas) has been identified as the root cause of many conflicts in and near the case study area, this competition is itself a consequence of the combination of the various structural causes of conflict in the area.

b) Socio-cultural Values

According to the interviews and discussions held in the study area, the socio-cultural set up of pastoralists provides fertile ground for the breeding of relentless conflicts. Historically, in the socio-cultural system, pastoralists have never created states with their specialized apparatus for external defence and internal law enforcement. Instead, households and kinship groups looked after themselves. The age-grade system is found throughout the lowland areas in the Horn. Cohorts of males of near the same age pass through a hierarchy of grades, each serving a distinct function lasting for several years. The function of the warrior grade is fighting on behalf of the community, under the supervision of the elders who make the decision (Interview with experts, Awassa, 2009-04-29).

The warrior ethos is enshrined in pastoralist culture, which also validates and glorifies violence against outsiders. In most pastoralist communities, the passage to manhood is mediated through a violent act: killing a wild animal, or better, killing a man. In some of
them, such a feat is prerequisite to marriage.

Several times peoples have gathered and talked about conflict resolution with government officials, NGOs and church leaders but basically members of the community still want to marry [and need cattle for bride wealth] through traditional way, want prestige… by killing the neighbouring ‘enemy ethnic group’ which is praised by our elders and the community. Therefore, no solution yet for violence occurs in the area (Interview, Omoriati, 2009-04-19).

Men aspire to perform such acts in order to get praise and status in their community. The respect and prestige also goes to his family as whole, for instance, his wife will get priority access to water points or special status during rituals or other ceremonies performed by the ethnic group. This cultural practice is accepted by the community, but remains one of the principal factors that trigger inter-ethnic conflicts in the zone (Yohannes, Kassaye and Zerihun 2005).

The cost of getting married (dowry) is another factor driving raiding. In some areas, the family of a young man may pay a very high bride price to the family of the chosen bride. This dowry is paid in kind (cattle or shoats). The number of cattle and shoats that will be paid during marriage is so high that young men who do not have assets can hardly meet such an expense.

The high bride price (Nyangatom) 80-120 cows and more than 200 sheep and goats and (Dassenetch) 50-70 cows and 70-100 sheep and goats are payable. The number of wives a man has indicates his wealth. This tradition forced our youngsters to engage in raiding and theft to accumulate the required cattle (Interview, Dassenetch and Nyangatom2009-04-19).

In the case study area, particularly among Nyangatom and Dassenetch community, it is extremely difficult for a young man or his family to obtain the required number of livestock through normal means. These factors clearly encourage a young man to steal or to raid. The availability of modern weapons makes it at least feasible to procure larger number of animals than was traditionally possible via raiding. Therefore, dowry is one of the principal causes of cattle rustling.

Another factor driving youth is taunting by girls and women. Females, in the study area, in songs and dance, sometimes encourage young men to prove their bravery and gain wealth by raiding (Interview with instructor; Omoriati, 2009-04-16).
c) Environmental Degradation/ Changes

Many people in the world align their behaviour in concert with their natural environment. Nowhere is this more visible than among pastoral communities who herd their livestock in the world’s arid and semi-arid lands, which cover about one-third of the Earth’s land surface and nearly two-thirds of the African continent (Behnke and Kerven 1994). Rainfall variability in precipitation in these dry zones affects forage availability, livestock production, access to water resources and ultimately the human security of pastoral communities. In this sense, variability in precipitation may directly or indirectly influence conflict or cooperation among pastoral communities (Discussion with Experts of SOZ Rural and Agricultural Development Department, Jinka, 2009-04-21).

According to the expert of Agricultural Development Department of the zone, this is true in the study area of South Omo district where conflict indicators change drastically when there is a change in climatic conditions, especially with reference to drought, which is caused mainly by decreasing rainfall and rainfall variability. The long term environmental changes in the study area characterized by worsening climatic conditions have increased competition over diminishing scarce resources. Dwindling resources compel pastoralist communities to fight with one another.

We do not know what is happening to our area, things are not as they were in the past ….the rain reduced and changed its pattern, the size of river and lake also reduced in size and in some cases rivers dried…. Thus we do not have enough pasture land and water for us and our cattle… frequent drought and some times floods killed significant number of both human beings and livestock. (Interview, Omoriati, 2009-04-18). …If there are no cattle there is no life, thus we clash in search of available resources … (Interview, Omoriati, 2009-04-18).

According to a respondent, the frequency of drought has increased the speed and degree at which surface water dries up (rivers and lake). This resulted in reduced water availability for human and livestock consumption. Scarcity of pasture which occurs during drought and the dry seasons also forces pastoralists to take their livestock to graze in enemy territories. This would result in violent conflict among pastoralists.

The reduced workload that is common among pastoralists during dry season is also another factor for increased conflict in the area. During dry seasons pastoralists have less work to do; they have more free time to engage in raiding in order to acquire livestock for payment of dowry.
The food deficit which is mainly caused by drought in the area also causes conflict. At this period raid incidences naturally increase as people attempt to cope up with the situation brought by droughts (CEWARN situation brief, www.cewarn.org).

In general the above points clearly show to what extent environmental changes affect traditional raiding, and this raiding is clearly tied to the prevailing tribal or clan peace in the case study and surrounding areas.

d) Poor Governance and Marginalization of Pastoralists

According to the respondents, the government policy towards the pastoralists had never been friendly, but the current government had tried to fill the policy gap even though there are still some problems.

Thus, by endorsing inappropriate policies and poor implementation of programs and interventions, states play an integral role in perpetrating pastoralist conflicts. In the opinion of pastoralist communities in the study area, there was widespread criticism of government responses to conflict: the government’s lack of appropriate and effective policy to deal with violent conflict. At the same time, case study area residents generally recognize that it is the responsibility of the government to protect the life and property of its citizens. However, the State’s obligation and duty to provide security to its citizens is conspicuously under siege in the area. This has greatly contributed to the spiralling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions.

Police and security forces are either unable or unwilling to confront cattle rustlers, who are the main causes for the death of our brothers …. (Interview, Nyangatom, 2009-04-18). Governments have often considered conflicts among the pastoralists as a localized issue, rather than a national one. Government response to intercommunity conflicts is relatively slow, inconsistent, and provocative. Government operatives are ineffective in the recovery of stolen livestock. We are not clear why they are acting in this way…whatever the case the government policy and attitude towards us had a lot of contribution for conflict in our area…. (Interview, Nyangatom and Dassenetch, 2009-04-23).

According to respondents, the failure of governments to arrest the perpetrators of conflict and cattle thefts (implementing the rule of law) paves the way for counter revenge and escalation of conflict. The community and other peace actors in the study area also find it difficult to understand why it is hard for governments and security forces to foil impending raids even after a tip off.
The police here are under capacity, both in terms of training and number. They can’t even control the town if some serious problem occurred, let alone the countryside. There are very few vehicles and communication materials in addition to the problem already common in the area like infrastructure (Interview with former administrator Jinka, 2009-04-27).

The most upsetting, as explained by the respondents, is the feeling that the security appears to be feeble and powerless to contain livestock raiding, and to curb availability, illicit transfers, and unlawful use of guns which take the lion’s share in the peace and security of the area. The availability and the possession of guns by every individual changes the influence and the trust of cultural mechanism which operate in the area. An elderly interviewee testified this situation as follows: The only thing youngsters respect is the Kalashnikov [not traditional authority]; previously it was only the elders who had guns; now it is every one hand and this hand changed the balance of power…(interview, Omoriati, 2009-04-05 ). The respondent also explains how the availability of gun and unlawfulness create gaps between and among ethnic groups: When the Toposa and Nyangatom got these new weapons, they no longer had to make peace with us according to the traditional arrangements rather they prefer to impend their interest by guns…” (Interview, Dassenetch 2009-04-05).

As a result of this weakening of both traditional and modern institutions, and conflict management structures, inter-ethnic conflicts in the case area and its surrounding have become endemic. In the traditional system in the past, the elders formed the authority in planning and organizing battles, but they also played a crucial part in resolving conflicts. As stated above the authority and power of the elders, in the study area, is gradually shifting and becoming irrelevant (due to presence of illegal guns and to current commercial, political, educational and administrative developments). However, the elders are still capable of influencing decisions and enforcing traditional punishments to preserve ritualized inter-ethnic peace agreements in the case area.

e) Poverty and Underdevelopment

Poverty and underdevelopment in the case area cause conflict among pastoralists. According to a respondent, pastoralists do not receive proportional consideration in the mainstream development programs in their region. Coupled with lopsided distribution of national resources, this has significantly added to tribal discontent. In comparison with the past two regimes the current government policy and its application has improved
the situation even though there is a lot to be done by both Regional as well as Federal Governments.

Poverty, exacerbated by conflict, is increasingly becoming the main source of vulnerability in the area. Strong sentiments of deprivation and neglect by government are a fertile ground for ethnic clashes and inter-communal violence. Lack of employment opportunities to absorb victims of fatal livestock raiding was also cited as a cause of sustained conflict in the study area. According to a respondent in the area, insecurity and fear affect levels of food production at the household level due to a reduction in the quality and quantity of livestock. Reduction in quality and quantity leads to hunger and increased poverty. Physical insecurity bars people from moving to market places to buy and sell foodstuffs and participate in other income generating commodities. Insecurity sparks a whole new cycle of poverty, limited resource and conflicts.

While poverty was most often cited as a catalyst of conflict, it was also said that conflicts often worsen poverty and deprivation and lead to cyclical hostilities. Generally, poverty is one of the most evident characteristics of the case study area. The residents have extremely limited access to education, health services and safe water supplies compared to the majority of the populations of the country. Physical and administrative infrastructure is poorly developed in the area. Livestock is the basis of the economy in the area, yet opportunities for livestock marketing are meagre. It is important to recognize that there are very limited economic opportunities for the population of the study area.

3.3.2 Proximate Causes of Conflict

Proximate causes of conflict in the case study area include politicization of conflict and regional instability, the enormous increase in modern weapons, self defence, decline of traditional values (increased levels and non-traditional nature of violence) and the introduction of commercial raiding. Most of the time the proximate causes listed above are the effects of violence which create a vicious circle of influence and the result of external influences to the area.

a) Politicization of Conflict and Regional Instability

According to officials and expertise working in the field, pastoralists in the Horn have been adversely affected by several decades of instability in the Eastern Africa region. The civil war and related problems in South Sudan since 1955, the many years of civil war and internal rebellions in Uganda, nearly two decades of civil war in Ethiopia and the disinte-
igration of its army in 1991, and the collapse of the central government in far off Somalia in 1991 has also played a destabilizing role. Each of these factors has contributed to the general atmosphere of insecurity and lawlessness in the region; has led to the enormous increase in the availability of modern weapons; and increased destabilizing influences into the Horn in general and the case study and neighbouring areas in particular (Interview with officials and elders in Jinka, Awassa, Omoriati).

The most important external factor affecting conflict and related issues in the case study and neighbouring areas is the existence of two major actors, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLA, competing for allies among the various ethnic groups in southern Sudan. In the pursuit of their own objectives, these two actors forge alliances with members of certain ethnic groups and then arm and support these groups. In some cases, the actors arm and support different elements within, or different territorial sections of the same ethnic groups (for example, the Toposa and Nyangatom). There are also problems related to dual citizenship, even though it is not legal, mainly in the case of Nyangatom. There were individuals who were in the Ethiopian administration some time back and have now become part of the SPLA administration after the war. This also creates instability in some cases in the area.

b) Self Defence (Arms and the Men)

Historically, in the socio-cultural system, pastoralists have never created states with their specialized apparatus for external defence and internal law enforcement. Instead, households and kinship groups looked after themselves. The so-called age-grade system is found throughout the lowlands in the Horn, which requires men to pass through a generation grade system from childhood, to warrior youth, to married adult, and to elder. Defence is the task of the warriors, law enforcement the task of the elders (Interview with elders and experts in the field, Omoriati, Jinka and Awassa (April, 2009).

Toposa, Nyangatom and Turkana posses a large amount of firearms. Their arms must be dispossessed by neighbouring government authorities. Other neighbouring community have purchased and possessed a lot of firearms to protect themselves (for self defence) from those highly equipped… (Interview Omoriati, 2009-04-13) …The police here are under capacity. Thus the community competed and equipped themselves with modern weapons [for self defense]…In addition, having a gun is also a criterion to be a man and a man is responsible to protect his family from enemy (Interview with former administrator Jinka, 2009-04-26).
Although the lowland periphery was brought under Ethiopian rule over a century ago, the presence of the state has not been conspicuous there until recently, especially in its capacity to provide adequate security and maintain order. The restructure of the state by the EPRDF has shifted the burden of state administration to local governments run by local people. This obviously is a great advance because it brings government closer to the people and opens the possibility of gaining their trust and confidence.

Unfortunately, according to woreda officials of the case area, local governments do not have the means need to carry out the task assigned to them. Law enforcement bodies are grossly undermanned.

According to the interview, the weakening of both modern and traditional management in the study area forced the men to equip themselves with modern weapons to defend their life and property.

c) Availability of Modern Weapons and Arms Trade

As explained earlier, the administration’s lack of capacity and regional instability, encourages the people’s reliance on self defence, and the undiminished demand for weapons that feeds a flourishing arm trade in the region. The elders also confirmed that firearms reached South Omo Zone more than a century ago in the hands of Emperor Menelik’s soldiers.

The Ethio–Somali war in the 1970s was a source of older style weaponry. It was the conflict in Southern Sudan that first introduced the ‘klash’ (Kalashnikov) in the region, raising the scale of violence to extreme levels. The Nyangatom were the first to get them in the 1980s from their Toposa allies. The disintegration of Ethiopian army in 1991 released a flood of automatic weapons in the region, making the ‘klash’ the weapon of choice for every warrior. This fuelled a marked escalation of conflict in South Omo in the next few years.

While it is officially illegal, and it is not carried openly in the towns where there is an administration, no serious effort is made to control or suppress the trade in arms. The lack of border control alone would render such an effort futile. A load of guns is occasionally seized, but there is no record of an arms trade having been prosecuted in the court. As long as demand exists, given the imperative of self defence, the market will find a way to meet it. Attempt to suppress it will only raise prices (Interview with woreda officials of the study area).
d) Decline of Traditional Values

According to the interview and discussion in the case area, traditionally, livestock raiding is not considered a crime and successful raiders are respected. Killing an enemy in battle earns respect. Livestock raiding has long been one of the most important methods of restocking herds after drought or other calamity. All mentioned traditional-cultural practice were authorized by the group’s elders and were blessed, and even sometimes instigated, by the “seers” (diviners or prophets).

When… got these new weapons, they no longer had to make peace with us according to the traditional arrangements [rather they prefer to accomplish their interest by force].” (Interview, Dassenetch, 2009-04-05) “… currently to our area, the community particularly the youngster are not willing to submit themselves to elders and traditional system as it was in the past …. (Interview, Omoriati, 2009-04-09).

Based on observation in the field, it is interesting to note that urban sources felt that there had been a greater degree of erosion in role of elders than did rural elders in the study area and other pastoralists. Both elders and youth stated that raiding does sometimes occur without the formal sanction of elders. In the study area, elders may sometimes act in the interests of preventing a retaliatory cycle or they may also act to protect their authority by demonstrating that unapproved raids will be rewarded with severe penalties while the practise is different because of the power of gun in the hands of youngsters.

However, it is still true that male elders and opinion lenders generally play a key role in decision-making. Traditional structures and methods of conflict-resolution still do provide an important starting point for developing peace and development strategies in the region.

In general the function of decision making and representation of the community to outsiders falls on the elders even though it is eroded currently. An important role elders played in the past was to manage conflict within the clan and with outsiders, by controlling the activities of the young warriors. For a number of reasons discussed above, the elders’ capacity to perform this role has been undermined, and this is a key contributing factor in the recurrence of conflict in this region.

e) Commercial Raiding

Both elderly and youngsters state that the introduction of commercial raiding repre-
sents a major change for the worse in the case study and neighbouring areas. Powerful, wealthy individuals, including livestock traders, arms dealers and others, sponsor the raids. According to the informants, this situation is mainly observed by the Kenyan side livestock traders and some time the arm dealers also had part in it.

Here, young men are hired to carry out a raid, and the organizers may provide guns on credit to the raiders. Raiding and counter-raiding expeditions frequently cross the borders to Kenya and Sudan creating international incidents.

When the commercial raiders sold cattle in distant markets, the ability to locate and restore these cattle to rightful owners becomes impossible. Thus, commercial raiding also causes a reduction in the per capita numbers of cattle among pastoralists of the study area. This increases the pressure on those social and cultural requirements that cattle fulfil. This affects peace and security of the pastoralist community and becomes a cause of conflict in the study area.

3.3.3 Immediate Triggers of Conflict

Several factors can trigger violent conflict between groups in the study and nearby areas, including a specific violent incident, a series of livestock thefts, a raid, a government operation, traditional taunting by girls and women, and an inflammatory speech both by traditional leaders of the community and politicians.
CHAPTER 4

POTENTIALS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE BUILDING

Conflict management is a three stage process involving conflict prevention, mediation and resolution. Conflict prevention refers to intervention efforts designed to prevent social conflict from progressing to a violent form. Such efforts fall into two categories: (1) those intended to address structural root causes of conflict, (2) those intended to address conjunctural factors that can exacerbate tension and trigger violence. Conflict management is a complex process involving a series of mechanisms and methods, traditional and modern, and an array of actors/stakeholders, ranging from community elders to central government decision makers, whose relevance to a given conflict is determined by its nature and level (Woodhouse and Duffey 2000).

Conflict management is a key concern in all organized communities, and all have clearly defined rules to manage conflict, as well as procedures and institutions to enforce them. There are two types of rules, procedures and institutions: traditional and modern, and the same holds for actors/stakeholders involved in conflict management.

This research paid particular attention to conflict management and peace building capacity in the case study and neighbouring areas.

4.1 The Role of Government

Respondents pointed out that the government should, apart from facilitating development, provide security to its citizens within insecure pastoral lands.

4.1.1 The Role of Federal Government

Potentially the most important actor and stakeholder in conflict management is the Federal Government of Ethiopia, which has the constitutional responsibility to intervene according to proclamation number 359/2003. The Ministry of Federal Affairs is the agency charged with executing this responsibility, and the Conflict Prevention and Security Affairs Department is the frontline unit in dealing with requests for assistance from the regions addressed to the Ministry. Requests for assistance come when regional govern-
ments are unable to handle conflict that has sparked widespread violence. At this point, federal action is in the ‘fire fighting’ mode, and federal police is the instrument of intervention.

Federal intervention is also frequently required to help resolve violent conflicts, which have defied local and regional attempts to manage them. In principle, the federal government wants the regional governments to shoulder what is properly their own responsibility. The federal government is often compelled to intervene, however, especially when matters of national security/constitution are in danger. Human rights violation reports and intervention requests come from regional governments; for example, when major transport routes are blocked or essential installations are endangered. A method used by the federal government is to institute committees composed of representatives of both parties and the security and national defence forces at the appropriate level. They are provided with a budget, transport and other assistance to carry on negotiations until a solution is reached. The federal government also organised conflict management training sessions for all concerned regional officials in conflict prone areas and less developed regions as a means to improving government response to conflict. The federal government in collaboration with different stakeholders is also supporting joint peace committees at regional, zonal, woreda and community levels.

Another method used is to hold a referendum in disputed areas to let the people settle the issue by majority vote.

4.1.2 The Role of Local Government

In the federal system of government in Ethiopia, communities are granted political recognition and administrative responsibility with share of power at the provincial and district levels. The advantage of decentralisation and local government run by local people is that the administrations are sensitive to the need of the people they govern, and of their own limitations as well. Fully aware of the role weapons play in serving the need for self defence and the futility of attempting to ban them, in view of the administration’s inability to secure the country’s border and to enforce law and order within, they refrain from aggravating the situation with arbitrary, coercive action and resort to force. Instead, the preferred approach is negotiation with the conflicting parties and reconciliation with the aim of containing the conflict and securing a lasting peace. Punishment of the guilty is a secondary consideration, one that is also subject to lengthy negotiations between the authorities, the elders, the culprits themselves and, if the process goes that far, the courts.
Another recognized function of the local administration is that the authorities become involved when an act of violence is reported to the police, which is not always the case, or when they learn of impending serious conflict from spreading. This requires persuading the family or group of the victim not to retaliate until the identity of the criminal is established and negotiation for the return of stolen property and compensation for the lost lives with the latter’s family or group commence.

4.2 The Role of Civil Society

Over the past couple of decades, international and local NGOs have become prominent actors in conflict management in the lowlands. Before that, matters of security and conflict resolution were mainly viewed as a government domain as the state moved to exert its power through military purges of the “errant” communities. Later on the government change in Ethiopia brought new strategy of conflict management, and it became apparent that peace building and the resolution of conflicts was not just a matter of maintaining law and order but that it had a socio-economic dimension to it in view of altered livelihoods, displacements, and loss of lives and property (Interview, Jinka, 2009-04-25).

The universal requirement placed on NGOs that every project, whatever its design and purpose, must have a conflict resolution component /mainstreaming conflict/has resulted in ample funding that has become available from abroad for this purpose. Following this, different NGOs have become operational in the study and other conflict prone areas of the country. In the study area civil society interventions at first began with religious institutions. The efforts in this field are guided by the prevalent perception of conflict generation, particularly among faith based groups, that conflict is provoked by misunderstanding and a breakdown of communication between groups. Accordingly, their efforts focus on promoting dialogue and understanding, and rely heavily on elders to bring rival factions together (interview; Jinka and Awassa, April 25 and 29, 2009).

Normally, NGO contributions take the form of funding dialogues, and likewise support initiatives that may emerge from these, such as joint peace committees, early warning arrangements, guarding of disputed resources, etc. One weakness of NGOs in peace-making, as in all other endeavours, is lack of sustainability. It is not only that NGO personnel change all too frequently, and NGO directives often shift focus, but that NGO projects have limited life spans and are phased out without regard to local conditions or consultation with communities. When funding ceases, the projects inevitably collapse; the lowland periphery in Ethiopia is littered with their remains (Interview with woreda officials,
In general civil society organizations in the case study and nearby areas dwell mostly on facilitating and conducting peace dialogue meetings between communities as well as on advocacy for pastoralist issues intended for the national and regional platform.

### 4.3 Socio-cultural Values

#### 4.3.1 The Role of Elders

Elders play a key role in the many-sided negotiations, with their peers on the opposite side, the authorities, and their own community that must be persuaded to abide by any agreement that is eventually reached. This role is quite ambivalent, for them, themselves may or may not be directly implicated. They also state that belligerent actions such as raids fall into two categories. When the community is collectively involved, the raiding party is advised and blessed by the elders before setting off. More often than not, livestock raiding is a freelance operation involving a few young men, who set off from the cattle camps that are located far from the settlements and away from elder’s supervision.

To begin the process, the authorities ask the elders to produce the criminals. This is not always easily done. Very often, the elders of a group accused of the offence deny their group’s involvement. There is not much the authorities can do then because, as one official put it, “the police are afraid to investigate on their own”. Most of the time, the alleged criminals flee across the border in Kenya or Sudan to find refuge with relatives. Pressed to comply, the elders may bring forth individuals who may or may not be the real offenders, and who will not be convinced, for lack of evidence, if they are brought to court.

Elders have also been engaged in negotiations, peace talks, community fora, etc. between different ethnic groups in efforts to come to agreement on grazing rights. While competition and conflict over resources is common, cooperation and mutually beneficial solutions are also put forward by elderly negotiations and peace talk. This kind of multi-levelled relation tends to promote resource conservation and increases the overall carrying capacity of the land because they allow for all available pasturage to be used instead of having the kind of no-go zones that dominate in some parts. The elders also play significant role to sustain peace agreement reached between/among the conflicting parties by using the already existing intermarriage culture of the community, the conflicting ethnic groups widely practice intermarriage as a means to facilitate social harmony and cement peaceful relationships.
In general elders have the power to sanction war or peace with rival groups. The elders send peace emissaries to the opponent party once the toll of a conflict becomes too great or if it has reached a stalemate. They also have positive contribution in the integrated peace committee which is set and led by local administration in the study area. In this and other activities, elders play significant role in managing conflicts.

4.3.2 The Role of Women

As discussed earlier, the wife of a killer is granted respect and is given a special status within the community. The negative impact of conflict on women and children resulting from loss of husbands and sons, livestock and source of livelihood, increases their workload. They also fear going out of their villages, as they are often the targets of attacks, (they could be raped, maimed and killed). This will make it difficult for them to fetch water, collect firewood or go to the market; they may suffer from long-term physical and psychological impact of conflict. As a result, women have taken the initiative to engage in the mass campaigns for peace to convince the broader population to back the peace effort (Interview; Omoriati April 12 and Jinka April 23-2009).

On the whole, women may well be the strongest proponents of peace building activities in the case study and neighbouring areas. Recognizing the important role women play in conflict and peace building is very significant to sustain the peace in the area.

4.4 Poverty

In one or other ways the interview, formal and informal discussion with different groups in the study area, justifies that the most salient finding in regards to structural peace capacities is the importance of recognizing how poverty and lack of opportunity, low levels of education, and ignorance all fuel or deepen violence in the study and neighbouring areas while at the same time, traditional peace capacities exist and can be leveraged to improve conflict conditions. The need for economic development is palpable and the inclusion of a conflict management component by government strategic objectives could dramatically enhance the likelihood that development efforts at the very least “do no harm”.

Particular development initiatives like Alternative Basic Education in the study area should take into account pastoral patterns of migration and need for mobility by providing both a primary school curriculum relevant to pastoral life and teachers that follow family groups as they move during seasonal migrations. Thus families do not have to choose between abandoning pastoralism and education for young people.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Conflict is a collective activity. It takes more than one to cause and to resolve a conflict. It is clear from the research discussed earlier that conflicts in the case study areas have multiple causes and that many of these causes are linked to socio-cultural, economic, and political issues. Having this in mind, some conclusions drawn from the findings of the study will be discussed below. Though they may not provide all of the answers, they will add to the already existing body of knowledge in the study area.

Even though conflict in the study area is often tied to natural resource availability, it stems from multiple and compounding factors. Thus, any attempt to intervene and mitigate the conflict must examine all these complex cause and effect relationships. The problem of escalating conflict in the study area is worsened by the fact that competition for the shrinking resources is increasing due to changes in environment. Rising poverty levels within the case study communities also make traditional coping strategies less effective. An attempt to address conflict in the study area necessitates a deeper understanding of the root causes of conflict through a comprehensive analysis.

The dynamics exhibited in contemporary cross-border conflicts overwhelm both customary and formal mechanisms of conflict prevention and reconciliation. The integration of customary and formal instruments of conflict resolution and the strengthening of grassroots capacities for peace hold the key to finding a sustainable solution to these conflicts. Conflict prevention, mitigation and response strategies with potential for long-term sustainability must address the underlying issues that cause cross-border conflicts.

Local conflicts also easily take on cross-border dimensions, both internally, in terms of the administrative borders of districts and sub-districts, and externally, in terms of national borders. A multi-layered approach is therefore required, from a range of different actors to address the conflicts in a sustainable way. There is also an imminent need to sort out historical and developmental problems related to some of the groups in conflict, in the study area.

Many previous efforts to reduce conflict were disjointed and failed to yield results be-
cause they were not conceived from the participation of people at the centre of conflict, and most of the peace building initiatives have been reactive rather than proactive. Most of them have been externally driven and forced on the local people. To change the fundamental approach to these initiatives, there is a need for a coherent policy on conflict and resource management in the study area and for pastoralists in the surrounding areas. Therefore new policies should be developed with full participation of the pastoral groups so that they accommodate the aspirations and needs of the target communities.

Finally, strengthening community policing will help empower and restore confidence of the traditional authority within the modern system of government. The widening relationship gap between the traditional authority and the modern leadership needs to be reduced through an approach to managing conflict and sustaining peace in the area.
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THE NEXUS BETWEEN FOOD INSECURITY AND CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF JILLE TIMMUGA WOREDA

By Yohannes Buayalew
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Ethiopia is one of the developing countries which often suffer from severe food shortage. It is believed that, poverty is deeply widespread and continues to be one of the most crucial challenges for the Ethiopian Government. According to Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED 2006) Strategy Document, “some 31 million people live below the poverty line; and between 6 and 13 million people are at risk of starvation each year” (2005:24). In fact, Bureau of Rural Development of the Amhara Regional State Survey (2003) shows that the food poverty line; the minimum food required per adult, per annum is very low throughout the country in general and, in the Amhara National Regional State in particular.

The Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) covers an area of 170, 150 km2 and has a population of 17,214.056 (Population Census Commission (PCC), 2008). The region is currently divided into 11 Administration Zones and 151 Woredas. According to the report made by Food Security Disaster Prevention and Coordination Office (2003), out of the total Woredas, only 52 of them are recurrently food insecure while 25 Woredas are identified as being in transitory phase in their food insecurity. Based on the relief assessments (BoRD 2003), 3 to 3.3 million people are facing both chronic and transitory phase food insecurity in the region. In spite of considerable efforts made by the regional government, the local communities and the donor agencies to decrease the number of food insecure households, 6.3 million people or 34.7% of the Region’s rural population still continue to be food insecure.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Evidence has shown that, in spite of the dramatic advances in science, technology and modern agriculture, local and global food shortages are still recurrent and they could not easily and effectively be controlled. Food insecurity is often treated as a humanitarian and an isolated phenomenon but the risk is much higher than it appears on any assess-
ment. Unless plans for appropriate courses of action are implemented, with due attention, it will definitely be sources of instability and may affect the national security. The case in point is the current Global Food Crisis (GFC) which is affecting many countries and manifests itself in form of malnutrition, starvation and civil war in various parts of the world.

Ethiopia is one of the countries that have been largely exposed to recurrent droughts and food shortage. Indeed, conflicts continue to be more inevitable in the country or in some parts of regions. Poverty, hunger, loss of hope and uncertainty persist only to leave the given communities in a desperate situation eventually leading to mass unrest and calling for social risk.

In an attempt to treat the link between food insecurity and social conflict, one should be able to substantiate through various means in search of some solutions for the basic problems. Different scholars (e.g. Swamnathan 1994) argue that food insecurity and the periodic occurrence of political instability are highly intertwined. On the one hand, political instability creates and aggravates food insecurity and on the other hand, extreme poverty, lack of life opportunities, and scarcity of resource may contribute to an escalation of social unrest which may be turned into a violent social unrest. As noted by Swamnathan (1994), hunger anywhere threatens peace everywhere. Poverty and deprivation are seen as the underlying factors behind endemic conflicts and the resultant civil war. Hence, there is a crying need to carefully study such problems in an integrated manner. Using Swamnathan’s contention that hunger is a threat to peace as its basis, this thesis has therefore attempted to assess the overall situation of National Security (NS) including the non-military security threat in relation with food insecurity.

1.3 Research Question

The key research question that current study seeks to answer is: To what extent is food insecurity related to conflict and vice-versa in the case of Jille Timmuga Woreda of Oromia zone in ANRS? Other related issues will be addressed as a supplement to this crucial question. Related questions that the study attempts to investigate include: how does food insecurity aggravate conflict and/or how does conflict affect food security? Are food security and peace complimentary to each other? What factors affect the Regional State’s peace in particular and the country’s peace and national security in general? Other issues such as proper management of natural resources, equitable resource sharing, and the main factors that are believed to played key roles upon the nexus between food
insecurity and conflict or food security and peace will also be carefully examined. Identifying policy options which eventually reduce conflicts arising from food insecurity and resource scarcity is another focus area of the current study.

1.4 Objective of the study

1.4.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study is to examine if there is a link between food insecurity and conflict in Jille Timmuga Woreda of Oromia zone of the Amhara National Regional State.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

• To explain and analyze the relationship between food security and peace.

• To investigate the impact of conflict on food security.

• To identify the main factors which contribute towards the relations between food insecurity and conflict, and vice-versa.

• To find out how food insecurity affects the political stability of the study area.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Protracted conflicts in Ethiopia are believed to have been manifested in the form of civil and interstate wars. Recently, the country has, however, been enjoying relative peace. There are at least no massive military conflicts comparable to the ones that occurred a decade ago. However, the deep-rooted and an ongoing cycle of poverty, recurrent drought, food shortage, and inability to address these problems in due time coupled with the capacity limitations; often lie at the heart of potential civil strife. Therefore, it is believed that studying such types of social problems scientifically and systematically is very crucial to come up with possible solutions and avoid social calamities.

More specifically, this study will have the following significance:

• It provides an input for policy makers to realize the extent of the problems of non-military security threats such as lack of food insecurity and poverty related problems.
It provides some relevant findings and propose recommendations, which will help the Amhara National Regional State and other similar regions as a whole in the country to be used as a potential reference and input in their policy making process as well as plan of actions to bring about sustainable peace. It aspires to give some insights for those wishing to conduct related studies.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

This study has encountered some limitations. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the limitations were identified in advance and it has been attempted to minimize them. The following are the limitations that have been identified ahead of time and been minimized:

A) Lack of Adequate Budget

Conducting an extensive research such as this requires a reasonable research fund. Doing the research undertakings of Jille Timmuga in the countryside requires a fair amount of expense. Since the research requires collection of the necessary data through observation and in-depth interview and questionnaires, considerable amount of resources were required. However, the budget allotted for the research by the University was found to be less than the required budget and lacked a minimum element of fairness.

B) Limitation of Data

The data collection period (March 2009) was found to be inconvenient for sample households because of the dry season. During this season, the semi-pastoral people of this district usually move far away in search of grazing pasture and water for their cattle in the buffer zone of the neighboring Woredas. The inaccessibility of sample households on time coupled with seasonal transhumance had forced me to extend the data collection time. Some respondents were also reluctant to spare their scarce time to give the necessary data. As the time for data collection was prolonged, the data collectors and enumerators inevitably needed additional amount of money. As a result, I was forced to pay extra amount of money from my personal resources in order not to compromise the quality of the data collected.

1.7 Scope of the Study

Conflict is a broad concept and is a multi disciplinary in nature; accordingly it is difficult to address some of the basic factors related to every conflict. Therefore, this thesis focuses
only on non-military security threat narrowing down in to the relationship between food insecurity and conflict. Moreover, this study was conducted to identify the relationship between food insecurity and conflict in Jill Timmuga Woreda. This study covers 20% of the Kebeles and 15% of the population in the selected Kebeles. Hence, it is more restricted to the sample population and only in the major factors of food insecurity and conflict. Although this thesis has restricted scope and certain limitations, its finding could provide solid foundation for more detailed concern in the field of study.

1.8 Method

The research method designed for the purpose of this study is case study one. The Woreda and its Kebeles have been selected according to the following procedures.

1. Based on the information collected from the regional Food Security Coordination and Disaster Prevention Office and the Bureau of Administration and Security Affairs, Jille Timmuga Woreda is reported to be one of the drought prone, food insecure and conflict ridden Woreda. It has also been labeled as having relatively serious problems among such Woredas in the ANRS.

2. Based on the conflict map charted by Jille Timuga Woreda Administration, the Kebeles which are chronically food insecure and conflicting areas were carefully selected.

The information regarding the Woreda and each Kebele was obtained from Regional Offices and Woreda Administrative Offices respectively. Moreover, the accessibility to oral informants and the availability of concrete evidence on the question of food insecurity and conflicts were considered.

1.9 Sampling Design

To make this research feasible and scientific, different sampling designs have been designed. More specifically, two sampling techniques namely, purposive sampling design and simple random sampling, are employed. The drought prone Woreda of Jille Timmuga and its vulnerable Kebeles were selected as the study areas based on purposive sampling design. On the other hand, to ensure the representation of the study respondents and households were selected randomly.

In order to obtain reliable data, it was decided to sample 20% of Kebeles in the Woreda and sample of 205 households (10 percent per Kebele) from the target population. The
decision is made based on the following requirements:

- Considering the value and importance of the data collected.
- The need for data of best quality.
- The capability to effectively manage and control the survey operations as well as the availability of resources for such survey.

The sampling frame is developed based on the master list of the office of the Jille Timmuga Woreda Administration. The resulting number of households in each Kebele was selected with the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS), size being the number of households in the Kebeles. Then questionnaires were dispatched to 205 people participants selected to fill in the questionnaire. The overall responses of the survey are finally computed and they are to be about 190 (92.6%) of the selected households as is presented in the Table1 below:

Table1. Sample Kebeles, Number of Households Responded, and Response Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of kebeles</th>
<th>No. of Questionnaires</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispatched</td>
<td>Returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fugnan Denbi</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goda</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerbi Mudi Wachoo</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerbi Diria Gelmma</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>205</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As observed in Table1 above, the numbers of questionnaires dispatched and returned are different for each Kebele. The number of households varies from one Kebele to other. Hence, it was first decided that the distribution of questionnaires is based on the proportion of households of each Kebele. The sampling technique of PPS is applied to improve the resulting estimates of the survey. Similarly, to obtain balanced information about our topic and the study area in general, questionnaires were distributed for both sexes. Among the total respondents, the proportion of female headed households was 42 (22.1%) and the rest of the respondents, 148 (77.9%) were male headed households.
Prior to disseminating the questionnaires four data collectors and enumerators were hired for each Kebele. One day training was given for data collectors and enumerators on how they approach, ask, fill the questionnaires and collect the data. In addition to the questionnaire, it was decided to collect data from key informants through interview. It was planned and interviewed, A total of 15 peoples, working in the area and representing different organization and administrational institutions focusing on regional officials, administrators at grass root levels and representatives of civil society, were interviewed.

1.10 Data Collection

For the purpose of this study both primary and secondary data are carefully collected. The primary data were obtained through questionnaire and interview method. Questionnaires were given to the heads of sample household at each Kebele levels. In addition, regional and local government officials and civil society’s representatives were interviewed. Secondary data were also collected from the Regional Government and Offices of the Woreda as well as Non-governmental Institutions working in and around the area of Jille Timmuga Woreda.

The data were collected from different sources, reports and other official documents available in the respective institutions in consultation with knowledgeable persons who have been working on the subject of food security and the security affairs. As noted earlier, as a whole, primary data (qualitative and quantitative) as well as secondary data were gathered. The collection of data through different instruments was done in order to triangulate the result of the data and reach at logical conclusion.

1.11 Data Entry and Processing Mechanism

The data collected from 190 heads of households are edited, coded and finally entered into computer. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS for windows version 15.0) software was used for data clearing, data entry and all the data tabulating and data processing.

1.12 Data Analysis

Descriptive statistical tools have been employed to describe and present the data collected from the questionnaires. It is important to note here that the first basis of data analysis is an ethical consideration about objectivity and neutrality rather than experience and
personal emotion or perception. Therefore, based on the above justification the present researcher has tried to carefully analyze and evaluate the data pertinent to the objectives and stated problem of this thesis.

1.13 Structure of the Paper

This paper has five chapters. The first chapter deals with the overall introduction of the study, the objectives of the research, the research design and methodology among other things. The second chapter covers the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of study population as well as attempts have been made to give information and insight about the background of the study area and its population. The third chapter focuses on conceptual framework and review of the relevant literature. The fourth chapter presents the results, interpretation of the data and discussion of the study. The final chapter deals with major findings conclusions, and recommendations.
CHAPTER 2

CONTEXT

This chapter deals with contextual issues related to one particular Woreda, namely, Jille Timmuga of the Oromia zone in Northeastern part of the Amhara National Regional State. The framework used to assess common relationship and comprehensive description of the area may be beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, discussing the demographic setting, geographical locations, climatic aspects, natural resources, and socio-economic conditions is hoped to provide a better insight on the background of food insecurity and conflict of the area under study. Before dealing with the specific study area of Jille Timmuga, a contextualized brief discussion at the country’s and regional level, with an emphasis on food security and conflict, is quite essential.

2.1 The National Context

Ethiopia has suffered much from frequent disasters such as drought, famine, civil war, and mass internal displacement. The country has also some of the worst poverty-related indicators even in Sub-Saharan African standards. As it is stated in MoFED(2006), income poverty is widespread and deep throughout some of its regions. Some 31 million people live below poverty line and almost 6 to 13 million people are at risk of starvation each year. There is also such extreme vulnerability, with the dramatic rise and fall consumption from year to year due to drought, disease, or other related family shocks (MoFED 2006).

Long-term based sustainable growth remains a challenge despite the relative improvements witnessed in the past few years. The economy grew with an average of about 5% per annum over the period 1999/2000 to 2004/05 adjusting for population growth; average per capita income rose only by about 2.1 % per annum. Major disruptions and shocks in the 1970s and 80s seem to have resulted due to decline in economy. And the relatively better performance of the 1990s and early 2000s has just recently helped to reverse the situation and elevated incomes to rise. In 1994 the Government adopted a strategy of Agricultural Development Led Industrialization. The strategy put emphasis on agriculture as the primary surplus generator by taking advantage of backward and forward linkages to fuel the transition to a more modern economy. This approach basically
remains sound as it places an appropriate emphasis on raising the incomes of the rural population consisting 85% of the population and, (over 90% of the poor) and those who are almost exclusively engaged in agriculture. However, the full potential of agricultural growth has not yet been realized, and intensification of the strategy is still crying needs (MoFED, 2006).

It is quite undisputable that there has been encouraging progress in recent years with respect to some basic aspects of life in Ethiopia. Since 1996, the literacy rate has increased by 50%, while the rate of malnutrition has fallen by 20%. The share of the population with access to clean water has risen to 38%. According to the Welfare Monitoring Survey, there has been a steady decline in the reported incidence of illness. Nonetheless, human development indicators in Ethiopia still remain at low levels in the world (MoFED 2006).

With regard to conflicts in Ethiopia, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRA) document which was prepared by Ethiopia, reasonably reports that the root causes of conflict in Ethiopia are poverty and lack of good governance. According to APRA, since the advent of the federal system in the country, competition for natural resources has been manifested mainly in the form of intense nature or manipulation of resources such as pasture land and water. Such resources have become increasingly scarce due to population pressures, environmental degradation etc (APRM 2009).

### 2.2 Regional Context

The ANRS is largely a region of rural population of about 87.27% all of which are dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood (PCC 2008). This indicates that above 87.27 percent of the population gains its income directly or indirectly from agriculture. According to the report made by Bureau of Rural Development (BoRD 2003), the region is one of the surplus crop producing areas in the country. Through the implementation of the agricultural extension program, some outstanding results have been achieved in terms of increase in productivity. Nevertheless, the situation at the household level is quite different and most households are facing severe food shortage every year (BoRD, 2003). BoRD further explains that suffering from both chronic and transitory food insecurity remains a common feature of several households.

The problem is mainly caused by insufficient and scarce agricultural products, severe land degradation and poor soil fertility. Moreover, erratic rainfall, lack of alternative off-farm and non-farm income, lack of appropriate technology, insufficiency to use the avail-
able water resource for agriculture, increased population pressure, lack of adequate so-\n
2.2.2 The Location of ANRS
According to BoRD, the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) is geographically situ-\nated approximately between 90021’ to 1400’ North latitude and 36020’ and 40020 East\nlongitudes. The total area is estimated to be 170,150 square kilometers. Its immediate\nneighbors are five regional states and one international boundary (the Republic of the\nSudan in the North West). The neighboring regional states are: the Benishangul Gumiz\nRegion in the West, the Oromia Region in South, Afar region in the East, and Tigray region\nin the North (BoRD 2003).

2.2.3 The Demography of the ANRS
Based on the 2007 PCC, the ANRS has a total population of 17,214.056. Out of this total\npopulation, 87.27 percent is living in the rural areas while 12.63 percent of the population\nis reported to be urban dwellers. In terms of the age structure, the proportion of children\nunder the age of 15 is about 32.2 percent of the regional population. The percentage for\nthe age group ranging between 15-64 years is 63.84 percent of the total. The proportion\nof those aged 65 and above years is about 3.6 percent.

2.2.4 The Climate of the ANRS
According to Central Statistical Authority (CSA 1996), cited in BoRD (2003), the recorded\nannual mean temperature of the ANRS ranges from 12.4c0 to 27.8c0. Moreover, the mean\nannual rainfall has been reported to be between the ranges of 598.3 mm to 1692 mm.\nThe Southern Plateau and the Central parts of the Region usually receive about 1000 mm\nof annual rainfall (BoRD 2003). The Northwest and Northeastern part of the region bor-\ndering with the Sudan, Tigray and Afar regions usually receive the lowest amount of rain\nfall, which is less than 700mm. The region, however, used to receive the highest percent-\nage (80percent) of the total rainfall of the country (BoRD 2003).

2.2.5. Natural Resources of the ANRS
It is important to note that section selectively presents the basic natural resources that\nare pertinent and quite related to food security. More specifically, it dwells on the regional\nland use and water resources. With respect to land utilization, out of the total area of the\nregion, 27.3 percent is under cultivation; 30 percent is left for grazing and browsing; 2.1
and 12.6 percents are respectively covered by forests, and bush and herbs. On the other hand, 18.9 percent are not currently used for production purposes and the remaining 9.1 percent is settlement sites, swampy areas, lakes, etc (BoRD 2003).

In addition to land resource, the region has three major drainage systems. These are the Abay, the Takezze and the Awash drainage basins. Besides, Lake Tana, which is also the biggest Lake in the country, is located within the region. There are also other relatively small lakes such as Zengena, Gudena Yetiba and Hike located within the region. The region is also rich in underground water. However, none of these water resources has yet been significantly exploited in the development package either by ANRS or by federal government or on the private basis (BoRD 2003).

2.3. The Jille Timmuga Woreda

Jille Timmuga is one of the drought-prone Woredas of the Oromia zone of the Amhara National Regional State. About 93 percent of the population is living in the rural area (PCC 2007). This population is currently engaged in agricultural practices where crop and livestock productions are the main sources of livelihood.

According to the World Vision Ethiopia (WVE, 2005), the major food crops cultivated in the area of Jille Timmuga are sorghum, maize, teff, pulses. And all these and other crops are mainly cultivated with rainfall. In addition, cash crops such as onion, tomato, tobacco and pepper are also cultivated using traditional and modern irrigation methods. The major types of livestock raised in the area are: cattle, goats, equines and poultry. These are believed to generate important marketable wealth and provide farmers with economic security particularly in time of crop failure and in the events of high social insecurity (WVE 2005).

2.3.1. Location

Jille Timmuga Woreda is located in the Oromia zone of the Amhara National Regional State at about 268 km North East of Addis Ababa. It is stretched between 100 02’N to10025’N and 39055E to 40012’E longitude (Ethiopian Map Authority (EMA) 2005) as cited in WVE (2005). It is bordered by Artuma Farsi Woreda in the North, Ephrata Gidim Woreda in the West and the Afar National Regional State in the East. According to WVE (2005) its total area is estimated to be 544.58 square kilometers. It has 20 administrative Kebeles and of these Senbete is a capital town of the Woreda.
2.3.2. Demography
The total population of the Jille Timmuga Woreda is 102,934 of which 52,308 are male and the rest 50,628 are female (PCC 2007). The dominant ethnic group in the area is Oromo. It accounts for 85% of the population while Amhara, Argoba and others constitute only about 14% and 1% respectively (WVE 2005).

2.3.3. Climate, Ecology and Land
The mean annual temperature of Jille Timmuga Woreda ranges from 200c to 280c and more than 250c for semi-arid and arid zones, respectively. The hottest month is May while the coldest month is November (WVE 2005). The annual mean rainfall is 930mm. The normal rainfall is bimodal in character. From January to April it has small rains while from June to September as elsewhere in the majority of Ethiopian region is the main rainy season of the Jille Timmuga Woreda (BoRD 2003).

According to WVE’s (2005), since the last two decades the area has had rainfall scarcity. Obviously, that has not been conducive for sufficient rain-fed agricultural activities of the area. High degree of rainfall variability is the typical characteristic in the pattern of rainfall which shows such a drastic vulnerability nature and a noticeable inconsistency in terms of its onset, cessation, distribution, and amount. This in itself and along with other related factors has aggravated the eventual deforestation of the surrounding mountains and the related flat land of Jille Timmuga Woreda. The agro ecology of the Woreda is characterized as arid and semi-arid (Waynadega and qolla) region. Jille Timmuga’s altitude ranges between 1200 and 1800 meter above sea level (WVE 2005).

Hence, natural disasters, for instance, climatic catastrophes and the calamity of drought which have negatively affected the agricultural production have contributed for food insecurity in this volatile district. These have led to incessant conflicts and chronic ecological crisis. The geomorphology of the landscapes of the Woreda is comprised of: hilly area (about 22.3%), plane or flat land formation (about 39.7%), undulated area (31%) and the swampy plain (which is only about 7%) (WVE 2005).
3.1. The Concept of Food Security

FS is usually associated with food self sufficiency and the need to cultivate and earn more food. However, in reality it is linked with the problem of poverty, employment, income generation and peace. Hence, it is a broad concept and a cross cutting factor having its own implications for a number of different sectors of a given economy in a certain area including that of Jille Timmuga. FS has been defined in multiple ways. The definitions can be summarized in three dominant theories. These are Environmental or demography, Neo-Malthusian and Entitlement theories of food security.

Environmental theory conceives food insecurity and famine as direct consequence of food shortages mainly resulting from climatic variables. Climatic variables may attract widespread attention as was the case during the droughts of the 1970s in the Horn of Africa, which caused large scale famines. These famines were explained as results of lack of capacity of the socio-political system to deal with external (climatic) shocks. The dominant response was a massive food aid and other related emergency relief intervention.

Neo-Malthusian theory comes to a similar policy recommendation in its call for increased agricultural production. According to this theory, food insecurity and famine are the result of shortage of food availability due to the rising demand (demographic pressure) and stagnated production. Even if this view has lost much of its attraction, it is still pursued by leading think tanks such as the World Watch Institute (WWI), which has reasonably warned of a “new era of food security” in the area (Devereux 2000).

In the early 1980s, the hypothesis of declining carrying capacities and failure in food supply were categorically rejected by Amartya Sen, whose “entitlement theory” of famine
makes a distinction between availability of food and people’s ability to acquire it. This ability is reflected by people’s “exchange entitlements” or livelihood sources, which include production-based entitlements, owner-labor entitlements, trade based entitlements and inheritance and transfer entitlements. According to this view, famine and other food related emergencies are economic disasters principally caused by failures of demand, or by a sharp decline in people’s entitlements, which leads to inability to command enough food for subsistence even when markets are well stocked. In order to prevent famine, therefore, the theory are argues, intervention should be strengthening people’s access to food either by production of food or by the exchange of other commodities or services in return for food (Sen 1981). This economic view of food security is also repeated in the World Bank’s definition of food security (access by all people at all time to sufficient food for an active and healthy life” (World Bank 1986:8).

Food insecurity can also further be defined as the lack of food access by all people to adequate food for active and healthy life style. It is a result of lack of income to acquire food from domestic production /or food imports (Sisay 2003). Sisay further advances his explanations that food insecurity is directly related to an absolute poverty and argues that, focus on food production alone cannot solve the food security problem. Indeed, it has both supply (production) and demand (income) dimensions. More important still, Webb, Von Braun and Yohannes (1994) largely focus on the impact of famine on food security. According to them, food security represents the absence of conditions necessary for famine. Conversely, food insecurity, an endogenous outcome of the result of resource availability and of policies and potentials dictating resource exploitation can be seen as one of the root causes of any cruel famine. However, the antonym of famine-plenty is not sufficient for food security. Not all food insecure nations and not all food insecure people are equally, or even necessarily, vulnerable to famine (Habte-Wold and Mzx Well 1992; Watts and Bohle 1992 cited in Webb and von Braun 1994).

However, since 1990s, an increasing number of researchers widely have argued that food insecurity as a political phenomenon is not caused by lack of food production or market deregulation. They contend that it is caused by political powerlessness. Keen, a chief proponent of this argument has, for example, stressed that “a lack of lobbying power within nation (and international) institutions” is the main reason for food insecurity (Keen 1994:16).For Keen, it is wise to carefully consider the wider political and institutional contexts which explain as to why famine ridden areas are those which are the most politically vulnerable. In a similar vein, De Waal claims that “famine is caused by failure of political accountability” (de Waal 1997:11). Rather than the availability of food and people’s access
to food, the theory of political famine argues that the interventions should focus on state reconstruction, good governance and accountability which are significant factors.

**Food Security Vs Different Levels of Analysis**

Thomson and Metz (1997), define the objective of food security as assuring to all human beings the physical and economic access to the basic foods they need in such a desperate nature. This definition implies that there are three different aspects of food security: availability, stability and access. The definition of food security accepted by the committee working on world food security characterize this definition in its part as physical and economic access to adequate food for all household members, without risk of logging such access (Thomson and Metz 1997). Thomson and Metz have also elaborated that there is a possibility to further explain food security at household, regional and national level.

In fact, food security (be it at national or regional level) is perhaps best described as a satisfactory balance between food demand and food supply at reasonable prices. It can be said that a country is food secure when all the individuals in the country are secured in terms of food. Here, changes in food security can be identified over time by rising prices. Those changes will differently affect first the poorest, as they usually spend a higher proportion of their income on food. Thus, the absence of an imbalance between food demand and food supply which does not necessarily mean that all households in the nation are food secured. It means that if they suffer from food insecurity, it is because of the lack of entitlement to food, what economists would call as effective demand. They have no way of expressing their full need for food in the market place (Thomson and Metz 1997).

Therefore, it is clear that food security at one level does not imply food security at the lower level of aggregation. Many countries which are food secure at national or regional level may contain groups of the population who suffer from severe food insecurity at micro-level. Similarly, food security at household level does not necessarily imply that all members of households are food secure in all sense of the word.

**Food Security as element of Human Security**

According to Commission on Human Security (2003), human security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different types of freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take
action on one’s own behalf. Similarly, as human insecurity increases, people will have no other choice but to further degrade environment for their survival. As a result, not surprisingly, people will fight over scarce resources.

**Types of Food Insecurity**

The most widely accepted definition of food security is by and large a secure access by all people at all times to adequate food for a healthy and active life (World Bank 1986). The time dimension of food security is implicit in the phrase “at all times”, but this definition does not distinguish between different degrees or durations of food insecurity, which is essential for programming purposes (Devoreux 2006). Due to this reason, definitions of chronic and transitory food insecurity have been developed afterwards.

**Chronic Food Insecurity**

Chronic food insecurity occurs whenever people are unable to meet their minimum food requirements over a sustained period of time (DFID 2004). When individuals or groups of people suffer from food insecurity, all the time, they can be understood as those who suffered from chronic food insecurity (Thomson and Metz 1997). According to Devereux (2006), chronic food insecurity is often explained in terms of “structural deficiencies” in a given local economy or food system and is explained in terms of “poverty”, “lack of assets” and/or “inadequate access to resources”. It finally appears that chronic food insecurity is, therefore, the result of persistent structural vulnerability in terms of food.

**Transitory Food Insecurity**

Transitory food insecurity is primarily a result of short term shocks and fluctuations in food availability and access. Transitory food insecurity occurs whenever households face a temporary decline in their access to food (Thomson and Metz 1997). Transitory food security can be further divided into temporal food insecurity and cyclic or seasonal food insecurity. Thomson and Metz (1997), indicate that temporal food insecurity occurs when sudden and unpredictable shocks, such as drought or pest attack, singularly or jointly affect a household’s entitlements. For urban households, sudden unemployment may also be a cause of transitory food security. Seasonal food security on its part occurs when there is a regular pattern of inadequate access to food. This is often linked to crop seasons. Particularly, the difficulty for households in their attempts to maintain enough amount of food from one harvest season to another one.

In general, if a person gets hungry for a single day; can this be labeled as a transitory food insecurity or is a minimum period of several weeks or months required? A hungry season
may be placed in natural time frame of usually 2 to 3 months around cyclical food insecurity in tropical agricultural systems (Devereux 2006). Devereux further explains that ambiguity exists about precisely when transitory food insecurity ends and chronic food insecurity begins.

The Severity Dimension of Food Insecurity

According to Devereux (2006), perhaps the simplest way of thinking about different intensities of food insecurity is in terms of the amount of food intake by picking 2,100 Kcal as an average daily energy requirement.

Vulnerability and the Vulnerable Groups to Food Security

Devereux points out that vulnerability to food insecurity is often defined as a direct concept in its own right. Strictly speaking, however, vulnerability and insecurity is essentially the same thing (Devereux 2006). According to him, food insecurity does not only describe situations where current food intake is inadequate. This is apparent from the phrase “at all times” in most standard definitions of food security. Rather, it is useful to separate “current food insecurity” from the risk for “future food insecurity”.

Just as food insecurity can be further divided into chronic and transitory, so can food security be divided into security against chronic food security and security against transitory food security (Devoreux 2006). Thus, achieving food security requires not only achieving an adequate level of food consumption but also maintaining this level at low risk over time –i.e. by reducing vulnerability to food insecurity.

There are many available sources which deal with the risks to food security. Thomson and Metz (1997), identify the main types of entitlement that contribute to vulnerability to food security. These are productive capital, non-productive capital, human capital, income, and claims. These can be including natural risks ranging from climate shocks such as drought to diseases and pests. Risk could also come from changes in state institutions and policies, removal of subsidy program and imposition of taxes, changes in property rights and changes in market conditions. Conflict and breakdown of rule of law could also generate chaos which may in turn hamper many households leading them to food insecurity and ultimately to vulnerability (Thomson and Metz 1997).

Different social groups can be classified in accordance with their vulnerability. Thomson and Metz (1997) identify some of the criteria as:

- Geography /administrative zone, urban-rural
• Ecological- by climate conditions, accessibility

• Economic – occupation, level of income, formal or informal sector, size of land holding, types of crop grown, migrant labor, female headed household

• Demographic- male-female, pregnant, lactating, preschool children, school-aged children, elderly.

Inevitability the application of these criteria however, varies based on the reality of specific socio-economic situation of countries. The common vulnerable groups are unskilled landless, subsistence farmers, low income farmers, pastoralists, unemployed and female-headed households (Thomson and Metz 1997).

### 3.2. The Rationale behind Conflict

Conflict can generally be defined as an interaction between interdependent social groups, who perceive incompatible goals and who also expect interferences from the other parties if they attempt to achieve their goal (Draman 2003). Conflict is in general the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. This could happen in a broader span of time and a wider class struggle than armed conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2007). As stated by Corvette (2007), it is an incompatibility of cognitions or emotions within individuals or between individuals or social groups. She further defines that conflict could be perceived as something which can really happen in the ground by involving opposite individuals, families, groups, etc.

According to Galtung (1996), conflict could be viewed as a triangle with contradictory, attitudes, and behavior as its vertices. Contrary to this, however, the wider sources of the underlying conflicting situations, which include the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals, is generated from a mismatch between social values, on the one hand, and the social structure on the other hand. This author further uses the term attitude to refer to parties’ perception and misperception of each other and of themselves. Behavior would include cooperation or coercion, gesture, conciliation and hostility (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2007).

A conflict structure without conflict attitude or behaviour is nothing but latent (or an ordinary structural) one. He perceives conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As a conflict dynamics develops, it becomes a manifest of conflict formation as parties’ interest
clash or the relationship they are in becoming oppressive. Conflicting parties could then organize themselves around this structure, to pursue their unlimited interests.

3.2.1 Views and Approaches towards Conflict

Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social changes. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that would arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints. Nevertheless, the way we deal with conflict is a matter of habit and choice. It is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligence choices (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2007). Ramsbotham and colleagues have found that there are five approaches to conflicts—manifested either due to concern for self or concern for another. These are:

1. High concern for self, low concern for other: this is a “contending” style.
2. More concern for the interest of others than self.
3. Low concern for both self and other i.e. to avoid conflict and withdraw.
4. Balance concern for the interests of self and others leading to search for accommodation and compromise.
5. High regard to the interest of self and other it implies strong assertion of one’s own interest, but equal awareness of the aspirations and needs of the other, generating energy to search for a creative problem solving outcome (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2007).

In addition to the above classifications of several theoretical views and approaches to conflicts, Corvette (2007) has identified three widely recognized views of conflict which are briefly discussed below:

**The Traditional view** refers conflict as something bad and should be avoided. This general approach to conflict fosters both avoidance and competitive behavior in interaction.

**Human relation view** conceives conflict as natural and sometimes functional and other times dysfunctional. According to this view, conflict can be a mechanism through which views and opinions are aired and through which an opportunity to creativity and persuasion can be matured. Conflict would also increase communication and integration. This general approach to conflict encourages maintaining an open mind to conflict.
Interaction view underscores that conflict is inevitable and that maintaining and managing a certain degree of it would actually be helpful. It views conflict as a positive force except when it is misdiagnosed, improperly avoided, or mismanaged. Some examples of positive effects from conflict include multiple views, diversity in all aspects, cohesion, meeting deadline, and creativity.

3.2.2 Theories of Conflict

There are several types of theories on conflicts which seem to have developed through time. Some of the prominent major theories linked with peace and security studies include: human nature, psychoanalytic, systems frustration aggression, relative deprivation, human needs and economic theories of conflict. Human needs and economic theory of conflict is the theory discussed at length because of its direct bearing with the core theme of the present study: food insecurity and conflict.

Human Nature

Several well-known psychologists point to unconscious human urges in explaining potential and drive for violent behavior. Sigumun Freud has theorized the role of the unconscious in the manifestation of destructive behavior. According to Jeong, some extend their arguments further to point that violent behavior is genetically programmed into human nature. It is even further suggested that savage human behavior originates in animal past (2005). In the view of ethnologists such as Konrad Lorenz (1996) as is cited in Jeong (2009), aggressive human behavior reflects a survival enhancing instinct. Humans, like other animals, are endowed with fixed patterns of behavior oriented towards preservation species.

According to this theory, conflict and the root causes of war lie both in human nature and human behavior. Humans by virtue of being human are prone to aggressive behavior. However, the theory of aggression, which links the problem of fighting and war to inherently violent human sense, were challenged in the sense that social experience has a dominant impact on individual behavior and that cooperation is something as common as competition in social relations. Human behavior is therefore socially learned, and war is not a common phenomenon in some societies (Jeong 2005).

Frustration- Aggression

An excessive level of frustration is accumulated when an organism is blocked from pursuit of a goal. According to the frustration-aggression theory, human beings, as goal oriented organisms, naturally become aggressive when they are prevented from achieving
what they usually desire. A natural build-up of blocked energy seeks release, and aggressive action is directed to the source of one’s frustration (Jeong 2005). Glossop (1993) claims that stress and violence in a given society can be generated from frustrated expectations related to rapid urbanization and economic depression. However, the extent to which frustration generates aggression is uncertain. Human behavior can be affected by a social environment, and frustrated feelings can be controlled through various adaptive mechanisms. People can be educated to behave differently; cultural settings also influence patterns of behavior as demonstrated by experiences of non-aggressive societies (Jeong 2005).

**Psychoanalytic**

From the psychoanalytic perspective, the perception of an enemy can be formulated in a way to protect oneself from contamination by a possible boom enraging of psychic content. Another group member is perceived as a “container” of unacceptable psychic content previously built into unconscious mechanisms (Volkan 1990). A perceived threat produces a narrow definition of group boundaries and sharp distinctions between friends and foes. Unthinkable actions can be induced by dehumanized image of the energy reinforced by nationalistic propaganda (Jeong, 2005). In this theory, one group becomes an enemy to another through unconscious psychological and stereotypical images of our energy which is created by projecting our own unwanted psychic material on the opposing groups.

According to psychoanalytic understanding, the sense of self is formed in the first few months of life and it can more firmly be established in early childhood. A child develops a positive attitude in response to rewarding experiences with the outside world but a negative attitude after having disappointing experiences. Those feelings are associated with pain and fear of being attributed to a relationship to the outside world, more specifically to other groups (Mack 1990).

**Relative Deprivation**

Relative deprivation can be defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities (Jeong 2005). According to Gurr (1970), value expectations could lead people to believe that they are rightfully entitled to certain goods and needs and conditions for life. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping. An inevitable gap between anticipated reality and the manifest reality of life conditions serves as a precondition for widespread social unrest. Therefore, according to this theory, relative deprivation results
from the combined effect or rising expectations and a lack of progress toward demand for a better life.

When people do not have hope or expectations for more than they achieve, they tend to be less discontented with what they have. However, rising expectations increase the intensity of feeling of deprivation (Jeong 2005). Jeong further argues that an individual or collective sense of entitlement tends to rise faster than can be fulfilled. In general, the expected ability to satisfy basic material and social needs rises disproportionately to what society is able to and does deliver. According to him, disproportionate allocation of benefits combined with poor economic performance could generates further anger and emotional frustration. Unequal opportunity can also be blamed for socially inferior or status and inadequate material well-being. The basic element is that social chaos is likely to occur whenever people feel seriously frustrated or threatened for their inability to meet their targeted gains. They consider these gains as something they deserve or hold on to as cherished values. Rapid social change frequently raises expectations that can not easily be satisfied, either because the modernization process falters, or because some groups experience the burdens of change without proportionate benefits which one could generally expect (Rubenstein 2003). Rapid social change, coupled with uneven distribution of wealth and power, tends to generate feelings of growing gap between immaterialized expectations and perceptions about existing economic, social and political conditions (Jeong 2005).

Human (basic) Needs

Human needs theory argues that certain needs-for example, the needs for security, food, shelter, recognition and identity-are both universal and non-negotiable. People further demand their satisfaction and they will not hesitate to put their own lives and the lives of others at risk in order to achieve their desired objectives (Rubenstein 2003). The satisfaction of basic needs is required for human development as well as the survival of human beings in both physical and social terms. Lack of biological needs result in an imbalance nature in the individual’s life supporting systems or those which causes death. Food and shelter are important for human physical survival, and the satisfaction of the needs does not require large amount of marketable goods and services (Jeong 2005).

The basic needs theory rejects the prior assumption that violence originates in the very nature (i.e. evil, aggressive) of humans or unconscious psychological dynamics. Biological and physical needs are intertwined with mental requirements in the satisfaction of other needs. As Jeong clearly puts it,
“Basic needs contain more than psychological dimensions and include such primary emotions such as fear, anger, depression and happiness. Psychological needs are likely to socially produced wants, desires or preferences. Thus, people can suffer from damage to self esteem as much as from a lack of food. Fear, violence, unemployment and marginalization, generate conditions for human misery” (2005:70). Therefore, the struggle to satisfy basic needs is a key motivational factor behind human behavior and social interactions. Indeed, human beings can occupy the very center in an attempt to undertake most appropriate unit of such analysis (Ronen, 1998).

The basic needs are ontological, while interests and values are relatively temporal and historically determined. Since the pursuit of ontological needs places power on individuals and groups, basic needs cannot be curbed nor negotiated (Burton 1990). Unlike interests, needs are ontological and non-negotiable, so that, if conflict occurs, it is likely to be intense, vicious and, from a traditional clause-wizens perspective, ‘irrational’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2007). According to this theory, the most explosive source of conflict in the modern era is the desperate need experienced by members of social and politically disempowered groups for a recognized and defensible group identity (Rubenstein 2003).

The legitimacy of authority can here be established by the creation of institutions which could serve the needs of energy. Poverty, economic inequality and social injustice need to be reduced to avoid obstacles to the basic needs. Causes of many other violent conflicts in 20th century can also be found in the suppression of human needs (Jeong 2005). Conflict analysts like Azar, identified deprivation of human needs as an underlying source of protracted social conflict. Azar notes (1990) “Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict” (cited in Ramsbotham 2007:86).

Economic Theory of Conflict

Collier (2002) finds patterns in the origin of civil war, distinguishing between those causal factors that are broadly consistent with an economic motivation. While some attribute contemporary conflicts to fundamental differences arising from ethnicity or religious beliefs, such differences are evidently insufficient explanations and rather conventional. That is mainly because many multi ethnic or multi-religious communities live peacefully here and there in various parts of the world. In fact, the vast majority of multi ethnic societies are at peace (Stewart and Brown 2007). Rather, people fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political
or both. According to Stewart and Brown (2007), the following are the most important points which explain the economic motive of conflicts.

A. Group Motivation:

Groups which can be engaged in internal conflicts are often united by a common ethnic or religious identity. In many situations, the majority of the people do not perceive ethnic or religious identities as overriding importance implying the need to look beyond religions and ethnicity, as such, in search of the root causes for “ethnic” conflict. One hypothesis which can be temporarily forwarded is that it is where there are significant underlying differences in access to economic or political resources, providing both leaders and followers with a strong motive to fight, that ethnic or religious differences can lead to violent mobilization of different social groups to enter the time and phase of incessant conflicts. According to Stewart and Brown (2007), differences in groups’ access to economic, social, and political resources are defined as Horizontal Inequalities (HIs). HIs are multidimensional, involving access to a large variety of resources along economic, social and political dimensions. Along the economic vector, it is not just income that is crucially important, but also access to employment and to variety of assets (e.g., land, credit, education). Along the social vector, access to service (e.g., health care and water) and to assets (e.g., housing) can form relevant peace. The political vector includes power at the top and remains at lower level and bureaucracy at all levels, in the army, the police and often public bureaus.

B. Private (Individual) Motivation

The private motivation hypothesis has its basis in rational choice economics, arguing that the net economic advantages of war to some individuals motivate them to fight further. In this approach, group identities are regarded not as independent factors but as instruments, credit to help fulfill and further boost the private motives of those who fight (especially ringleaders). War confers individuals with some benefits which are to particular categories of people: it permits people, especially undereducated young men, to acquire employment as soldiers; it gives wider opportunities to engage themselves in looting, to profit from shortage and from aid; to traffic arms; and carry out illicit production and trade. In situations where alternative opportunities are few, because of low income and poor employment, and the possibilities of enrichment by war are considerable, wars are likely to occur here and
there and might last long. Conflicts may persist for some powerful actors so they can benefit through the manipulation of scarce resources, smuggling illegal objects (items), and so forth and only to finally have no interest in resolving the conflict.

Collier and Hoeffler (as cited in Stewart and Brown 2007), put forward econometric evidence to support the “greed” hypothesis, arguing that conflicting situation increase as the share of primary product exports in GDP rises supporting the view that conflict is caused by the greedy individual.

C. Failure of Social Contract

The third explanation of violent conflict singles out grievances. It derives from the view that social stability is implicitly premised on a social contract between the people and government. According to this (hypothetical) contract, people accept state as long as it delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions in terms of employment and incomes. With economic stagnation or decline, and weakening state services, the social contract breaks down, and violence results. Hence, high (and rising) level of poverty and a decline in state services is expected to be cause of conflicts. High vertical inequality might also be associated with such a failure, unless accompanied by populist measure of compensating the deprived. Considerable evidences from the econometric studies clearly show that conflict intensity is higher among countries with lower per capita incomes, life expectancy, and economic growth (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). Certain types of economic structures perpetuate a situation where basic standards that are necessary for survival can not be met. According to some statistical sources, the loss of life attributed to malnutrition and starvation exceeds the number of people who have been killed in war (Fischer 1993). The social contract theory incorporates poverty as one of the component parts of the explanation of conflicts. While poverty and underdevelopment are certainly parts of the social contract failure, low average income in a society does not necessary imply a failed social contract. Some poor countries such as Tanzania seem to have succeeded in delivering sufficient, if minimal, social service and physical security and avoided chronic conflict (Stewart and Brown 2007). Additionally, Collier argues that poor countries have a higher incidence of conflict because poverty could easily prepare grounds to rebellious activities. Poverty might make people desperate or hungry (2007).
D. “Green War” (Environmental Scarcity)

The essence of this perspective is that the declining nature of natural resources could often intensified by population pressure, is a major cause of violent conflict. There are three dimensions of environmental scarcity that may lead to conflict. The first one is “supply induced scarcity”, linked with the depletion and degradation of an environmental resource. The other one is “demand induced scarcity”, linked with population growth and the consequent extra pressure on existing resources. The third dimension is “structural scarcity,” which arises due to unequal distribution of resources concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individuals or social groups.

In environmental change and resource scarcity, there are still two lines of arguments. According to Gleditsch (2007), such line of arguments can be categorized as neo-Malthusian (pessimists) and optimists. Radical environmentalists tend to prefer the image of “Spaceship Earth”, a repository of limited resource which capitalism is rapidly squandering. The limits to growth were a prime example that predicts scarcities in a number of strategic mineral and other raw materials. Similarly, others predicted world food shortages. Optimists, on their part, have argued that improved technology and human ingenuity will continue to enable mankind to overcome material scarcity. They also argue that the current UN projections for world population do not exceed the number that can be fed even at the present level of agriculture.

In conclusion, this debate has obvious implications for conflict scenarios. As argued by Gleditsch (2007), if the optimists are correct, resources are not generally scarce and predictions of increased strife over resource are unlikely to come true. Nevertheless, if the environmental pessimists are correct, we are constantly eroding the carrying capacity of the environment and overuse of resource is beyond sustainable levels. If that is the case, we should expect the competition for resources to get ever fiercer, eventually to the point that it may break the norms of non-violent behavior (Gleditsch 2007).

3.3. Food Insecurity as a Cause and Consequences of Conflict

Food and economic insecurity and natural resource scarcity (real and perceived) can also be the major sources of conflicts. Denial of the right of food has been linked with popular uprising and civil war in Central America and Mexico (Messer, Colen, and J. D’Costa 1998). Extreme poverty, inequality, and declining per capita income (Collier 2007) and inter group competition over land and water resources (Markakis 1998) are closely related
with conflict. These are the basic motives and opportunities of combatants which can easily be correlated with the economics of civil war.

Persistent poverty and oppression can directly lead to hopelessness and grievances which in turn easily aggravate civil unrest. When the government fails to meet the basic needs of the people, the state can become haven of terror. Much of the deprived people in rural areas are mainly those who are poor in their living standards and the highly undernourished—representing food insecurity in its most extreme level and the worst form of poverty. According to Commission for Africa (2005), war and poor governance bring economic decline and the reverse is true as well. The Commission further argues that investing in development is itself investing in peace and security.

Collier contends that conflict is more likely to occur among poor counties, and conflict can easily affect countries which generally have higher the levels of poverty and the lower growth rates (2007). Least developing countries with more people living under poverty are more vulnerable to conflict. Such countries can be described as fragile state and these are states with severe social conflict, political unstablity or experiencing violent conflict (Salih 2008). According to Nafziger and Anvinen (1997) a state of stagnation in agricultural production can lead to social tension which fuel conflicts. Although causes of conflicts are many, they often have roots in lack of access to resources and food. Slow growth of food production per capita has been identified as major causes of conflict (Nafziger and Anvinen 1997). One reason why food insecurity is associated with armed conflict is that most countries are now able to prevent food insecurity in peace time (Dreze 2002). Nevertheless, no consensus has been reached among scholars upon whether food insecurity (extreme poverty) is a cause for violent conflicts.

The existing literature mostly concentrates on two explanations for the origin of conflict. These are respectively that of greed and grievance (Justino 2006). According to him, the greed explanation widely emphasizes the role of lootable rents in producing inter group rivalry for their control, while the grievance concept refers to historical injustices, poverty and inter group inequalities. Collier (2007), on his part, argues that there is no statistical evidence for the relationship between ‘grievances’ and violent conflict across samples from over 100 countries. On the other hand, Deininger (2003) as cited in (Justino 2006) provides a strong support for the ‘grievance’ hypothesis. Using community-level panel data for Uganda between the year 1992 and 2000, he shows that lack of economic development has been a key factor in increasing the incidence of civil strife. His study further demonstrates that increased perceptions of poverty by communities increases
the propensity of conflict escalation between two survey years by almost 22%. In addition to this, Levy (2007), asserts that competition over scarce resources, coupled with the degradation of those resources by desertification, deforestation, rising sea levels, pollution, and environmental disasters, will generate famines, economic and social disorders, political instabilities and serious domestic and international crises. He further explains that the scarcity of resource, sometimes compounded by environmental degradation, droughts, floods, and famines, often lead people to migrate in search of economic security. This movement can in turn, contribute to conflict or exacerbate existing conflict. This scenario is most likely to work in developing countries that generally lack the wealth and institutional capacity to respond to environmental crisis (Levy 2007).

Why would the chronically poor engage in chronic violence? The first motive is lack of choice. Many individuals are forced to enter army career (military career) either through peer pressure or through force (Justino 2006). The available studies have focused on two mechanisms that can potentially lead to the involvement of the chronically poor in local conflicts and any public violence. As demonstrated by Justino, both social discontent and the search for better socio-economic opportunities can lead the poor to easily join any public violence or conflicts. Social discontent and frustration resulting from precarious living conditions can act as triggers of conflicts. The primary causal sequence in political violence is first, the widespread of discontent; secondly, the politicization of such dissidents, and finally its nature which can easily be matured against the wider political objectives and the principal actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence (Gurr 1970).

While not necessarily a direct cause of conflict, chronic poverty may contribute to sustain it through its association with perceived injustice and forms of exclusion. In many instances, extreme poverty has provided the motivation for effective recruitment and mobilization of the masses (Justino 2006). Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) as cited in Justino (2006), provide evidence of combatants’ profiles. Based on survey information from a representative sample of 1043 such combatants had involved in Sierra Leone’s protracted civil war. They found that the majority of fighters across the two factions were largely uneducated (more than 30% never attended school) and very poor (the majority lived in mud houses, indicative of very low standards of living in Sierra Leone). Many fighters were those of who left schools before the beginning of conflict either because they could not afford school fees or schools were shut down.

If we take the multidimensional aspect of food security, we may find other mechanisms
that may account for the possible impact of food insecurity on conflict. As regards to resources, Collier (2007) has shown that the improvements in variables often bundled within the ‘grievance’ heading may contribute towards decreasing the livelihood of violent conflicts. He further argues that prioritizing investment in education and health, government’s commitment to peace is likely to keep the population content. Increasing equal opportunities in the access of excluded groups to education may also minimize social tension.

Similarly, using state-level empirical evidence for India, Justino (2006), shows that in the medium-term (over a five year period), public expenditure on social services and improvements in education enrolments have been effective means of reducing civil unrest. That is so because they directly control or undermine important sources of conflicts, notably poverty. This pattern is not, however, consistent with evidences from the suicide bombers in Israel and Palestine. In most case people involved as suicide bombers are those with high levels of education and in fact, this which may be inconsistent with instant of chronic income poverty (Justino, 2006). Another important major point to be addressed is that poor people are involved in violent local conflicts partially in search of new opportunities. According to Justinio, violent conflict may constitute a viable alternative to unemployment for many. When joining militias or military groups, young men may get access to food and clothing as well as recognition and a sense of becoming valuable which may not be available otherwise (2006). The work of Humphreys and Weinstein (2004), cited in Justin 2006, reveals a similar scenario. Looking at the context of Sierra Leone, they report that “RUF combatants were promised jobs, money, and women. During the war, they received women, drugs, and sometimes more valuable goods”. The CDR further helped to meet the basic needs of the members and provided increased security for their families. Material benefits, however, both those promised and those received, were typically at best sufficient to satisfy basic needs. Most fighters were not directly engaged in the lucrative trade in natural resources; and, when the groups encountered valuable resources, these were sent upwards through the organization. “If leaders of the factions did, in fact, make large fortunes from these industries, these profits do not help to explain the motivations of the vast majority of combatants. Throughout the conflict, most of the fighters particularly those in RUF, remained to have focused on basic needs—access to security, food, and education” (Weinstein 2004: 2-3, as cited in Justino, 2007:12).

In addition, conflict may also create opportunities for looting and creating access to power mechanisms for the group which becomes the winner. An instance of such cases is the mass scale looting carried out on many levels within the Democratic Republic of the Congo by rebels and foreign soldiers (UN 2001).
3.4. Conflict as a Cause and Consequences of Food Insecurity

It is widely accepted that conflict will affect the levels of food insecurity in any given economy and that the dynamics of food security generates conflicts. It can be argued that this could also affect post conflict contexts. According to Messer, Cohen and D’Costa (1998), conflict can destroy land, water, biological, and social resources for food production, while military expenditures lower investments in health, education, agriculture, and environmental protection. The authors further argue that conflict leads to food insecurity through such deliberate acts as sieges of cities stripping of victims’ assets, destruction of markets, elimination of health care, and breakdown of communities. Other consequences of war are less intentional. People, including farmers and pastoralists, lose their livelihoods when work places become inaccessible. Fondo (2008) also states that the conflict influences the food supply through several channels. Conflict mostly takes away those of working age (human capital) to serve as soldiers. Destruction of land, house, infrastructure, equipment, etc (physical capital) is another consequence of conflict. Related with this is the destruction of environment, closely tied with physical capital in terms of mining land, burning forests, using chemicals, destroyed the environment and make it difficult to produce food.

The widely used method designed by Messer, Cohen and D’Costa (1998), to compare differences between food production in peaceful and war time suggests that a close relationship exists between conflict and the declining per capital food production in Sub-Saharan Africa during the years 1970-93. It shows that countries experiencing conflict on average produced 12.4 percent less food per capital in war years than in peace time. Comparison of wartime and “peace-adjusted” trends shows that since 1980, peace would have added 2 to 5 percent to Africa’s food production per capital per year.

According to Darman (2003), Stewart and Fitzgerald (1993), have accomplished a very good job of laying down the direct and indirect effects of conflict on poverty and food insecurity. They set out two useful distinctions, in which they show four principal ways in which conflict widens the gap between people’s needs and their entitlements. This includes public livelihood, social livelihood and their entitlements. On the other hand, we have direct and indirect impacts. As they clearly demonstrate, there is a negative impact on life chances and livelihood of households and communities as a result of destruction caused by conflict. In addition, negative results inevitably occur because of the targeting civilian population, their assets, networks and social capital. Generally, we can say that growth and social welfare either stagnate or fall due to conflict.
As Goodhand (2001) notes that conflict has both direct and indirect costs. The direct impact includes battlefield deaths, disablements and displacements which have long-term costs for any society. Chronic poverty is likely to increase due to higher dependency ratios caused by an increased proportion of the old, women and disabled in the population. Quite a number of people die due to wars as a result of lack of basic medical services, the destruction of rural life and transport and collapse of the state, than from direct battlefield death.

Goodhand (2001) further argues that war can lead to entitlement collapse and famine. Drawing up on the literature on famine and conflict, one can distinguish a continuum from vulnerability to external shocks to starvation and finally to death. According to him, war has a range of effects on poor people’s entitlements. Firstly, there is likely to be an increased reliance on direct entitlement as households retreat into subsistence level. There is also a serious and progressive depletion of rural asset base, in particular the loss of land to production by mining shortened time farms lead to more opportunistic behavior and the consequent degradation of natural resources. Conflicts over access to resources in question become scarce in absolute terms. For example, conflict over grazing and irrigable land can be mentioned. Moreover, market and civil entitlements are likely to decline due to insecurity, lack of mobility and lack of trust. The erosion or collapse of state service lead to a decline of public entitlements for instance in a sharp rise in infant mortality rates. Finally, extra legal entitlements may become increasingly significant with a rise in opportunistic or predatory behavior. For the poor, rising up a gun becomes a rationale behind their livelihood strategy.

3.5 Summary of the Section

The narrow definition of security has been the subject of change the much of time. There are critical concerns among security analysts that the strategy of expanding the concept of security to include different aspects of human security such as food, poverty and environment as a serious concerns of the contemporary conflict analysis.

As seen in the preceding section of the literature review, the concept of food insecurity is viewed in various ways. In view of the environmentalist, food insecurity is a direct consequence of food shortages as a result of climatic variables. While Neo-Malthusian theory focuses on availability of production affected by demographic pressure, entitlement theory makes a distinction between availability of food and people’s ability to acquire food. On the other hand, some analysts argue that food insecurity is caused by failure of political accountability rather than the availability of food and people’s access to it.
Food security can be achieved at different levels at national, regional, household and individual level. Among these different levels, the household level of food security is perhaps the most important. That is because household is the basic economic unit that determines the level of consumption at individual level. Moreover, the degree of food insecurity varies from place to place and from individual to individual. There are basically two types which can be categorized as chronic and transitory food insecurity.

The theoretical parts regarding conflict in this study show that conflict generally is a clash of interest or the pursuit of incompatible goals between one or more individuals or social groups. Traditionally, conflicts have been viewed as bad and something to be completely avoided. On the other hand, human relational theory conceives conflict as a natural phenomenon—sometimes functional and other times dysfunctional. Interaction theory of conflict, on its part, underpins that conflict is a positive force which helps certain degree of social interaction except when it is mismanaged by every party concerned with it.

The theoretical framework of this study also shows those different types of conflict theories such as human nature, frustration-aggression, psychoanalytic, relative deprivation, human needs and economic one. The human nature conflict theory generally advances the contention that human being is by nature aggressive and destructive. It thus views violent behavior as genetically programmed into human nature. According to frustration aggression theory, human beings, as goal oriented organisms naturally become aggressive whenever they are prevented from achieving their expected desire. The psychoanalytic perspective on its part mainly focuses on psychological problem of human being. It seems a narrow definition of group boundaries and sharp distinctions between friends and enemies; and, therefore, one group becomes an enemy of another through unconscious psychological process. In view of relative deprivation theory, conflict can be aggravated by unsatisfied expectation. Hence, an intolerable gap between expectation and reality of life conditions serves as a precondition of widespread unrest. Likewise, human need theory of conflict stresses that basic human needs are non-negotiable and universal. The struggle to satisfy the basic needs is a key motivational factor behind human behavior and social interaction. The economic theory of conflict further gives due emphasis that people mainly fight over fundamental issues related to the distribution and exercise of economic power. It also identifies four economic explanations of conflict. These are generally categorized as individual motivation, group motivation, failure to social contract and environmental scarcity.

Finally, the theoretical part of the study indicates that there is relationship between food
insecurity and conflict. Clear consensuses have been established on the impact of conflict as a cause and effect of food insecurity. However, there have been different agreements on the impact of food insecurity as generator of conflicts and the resultant consequences. Some school of thoughts don’t limit themselves to the sources of conflicts to food insecurity. They argue that there are decisive elements such as struggle over power, ethnicity and identity. On the other hand, others believe food insecurity has a direct correlation with conflict as a cause and effect. This suggests that, hunger, human misery, extreme poverty and perceived luck of justice are the fundamental causes of some conflicts of difficult natures.

3.6. Conceptual Framework

Designing a conceptual framework for food insecurity and conflicts is not an easy task as there are a lot of disagreements about the specific relationship between them. While one school of thought contends that food insecurity generates conflict, another school of thought argues that only the reverse is true. However, understanding the two way relationships between food insecurity and conflict will open-up opportunities in which food insecurity is both a root cause and a consequence of conflict. The relationship is bilateral in the sense that food insecurity generates conflict and conflict exasperates food insecurity. Therefore, a well defined conceptual frame work provides a broader context which is critical to make interpretation of food security and conflict indicators, the designing of data collection, and analytical plans. The nexus between food insecurity and conflict is a broad and complex concept which can only be determined by several factors including the general political set up and socio-economic situations. Hence, there is no single and direct factor of relations between food insecurity and conflict.

While the symptoms and the causes of food insecurity and conflicts could vary among different countries and over time, widespread poverty, inequality, and the related hunger, human misery, hopelessness, and perceived lack of social justice are the principal causes underlying armed conflict and terrorism (Anderson 2006). According to the common food security definition, food security can be affected by decline in income, reduction of agricultural production, depletion of assets, environmental degradation, and competition over scarce resources and lack of nutrition. Moreover, the range of significant factors which lead to food insecurity of households and individuals in the country are: chronic poverty, adverse change in climate, rapid population growth, poor infrastructure, limited arable land, inappropriate policies, diseases, poor water and sanitation (Dynamic Development Studies and capacity Building Consult, 2007).
According to Anderson,

Poverty, hunger, and food insecurity together with a very unequal distribution of incomes, land, and other material goods, generate anger, hopelessness, and sense of unfairness and lack of social justice. This, in turn, provides a fertile ground for conflict which can be exploited by individuals and groups with a desire to cause conflict—whether it is armed rebellion, civil war, revolution, or national or international terrorism. This is not to say that poor and hungry people are terrorists. Rather, the point is that the existing human misery and perceived unfairness serve as a moral and political foundation for those who, for whatever reasons, wish to promote armed conflict or terrorism (2006:1).

Anderson further indicates that people with nothing to lose may also be willing to be recruited to execute violent act if they are convinced that it would contribute to justice for the population group of interest or it would serve a higher goal, including those promoted by religion and politics.

Figure 1: Analytical Relationship between Food Insecurity and Conflict

Hence, based on the above presentation of conceptual relationship and supporting evidences, this thesis provides a simplified illustration of conceptual framework. One has to note that both conflict and food insecurity are interconnected and do cause and/or impact one another.
CHAPTER 4

FOOD INSECURITY AND CONFLICT IN THE STUDY AREA

This chapter deals with the treatment of our subject by taking relevant characteristics of the sample households. It serves as a solid part of the background of the analysis of the study area. It also provides and further interprets the possible relation of food insecurity and conflict by examining factors that have been associated with food insecurity and conflict. This is done by using both primary and secondary data. The analysis includes information on the pattern between food insecurity and conflict by further incorporating the actors of the conflict as well. Moreover, it deals with the impact of conflict, upon vulnerable groups touched by the conflict and food insecurity. It also looks into the coping mechanisms the local communities have been using in order to curb the problems. In simple words it assesses people’s perception on food security and conflict, and fear of the future risk.

4.1 General Characteristics of Sample Households

This section focuses on the analysis of the basic characteristics of the sample HHS. This includes the principal demographic variables such as, gender, age, and level of education, occupation, marital relations, family size, religion and ethnic background.

4.1.1. Gender, Age and Education

The distribution of gender, age and educational background of heads of HH is well presented in Table 2 below. The overall sample population is 190(9.26 percent) of which 77.9% and 22.1% respectively constitutes male and female. When we look into the age structure of sample households, the majority of heads of households belong to the age category ranging between 18 to 40 years. This by itself constitutes 74.7% of the total sample population where 37.9% of this ranges from 18-30; years and, 36.8% ranges from 31 to 41 years. The rest of the sample population is 17.4% and 7.9% were those aged between 41 to 50 years and above respectively.
Table 2. Gender, age and level of education distribution of the sample HHs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender, Age and Educational background</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>77.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>37.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college diploma and above</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grade 9-10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grade 5-8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grade 1-4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reading and writing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no formal education</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>66.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the survey result, in terms of educational background of the sample respondents, illiteracy rate is found to be higher. Almost 66.3% of the sample household heads are reported to be illiterate without having formal education. Likewise, 12.6% of the sample population was reported that they were not able to attend formal education; they said they can read and write. Most of these households have got limited access to basic education, which is claimed to be acquired through some informal and traditional religious education as well as literacy campaigns. Generally, as shown in the above table, 78.9% of heads of households were not educated implying that there are difficulties of easily alleviating problems of food insecurity and conflict. As a result, efforts on conflict resolution and adoption of new agricultural technologies need more commitments than literate people. Such needs and especially education has its own impact to improve the level of food security and conflict. However, about 6.8% and 7.9% of the sample households are found between grade 1-4 and 5-8 respectively. Similarly, about 1.6% of the sample population attended a high school level (from 9 to 10 grades). Of the total sample
size, only a very few percentage of the respondents had acquired certificate (1.1%) and diploma and above (3.7%).

4.1.2. Distribution of Marital Status, Religion and Ethnic Composition

As indicated in Table 3 below, the marital status of the sample households indicates that the large majority heads of households (75.8%) are married. In contrast, the percentage of heads of households who have never been married was very low: 16.3%. From the survey result, it was also possible to learn about 7.9% of the sample households have been living in broken families due to divorce. Regarding religion, while the vast majority of the population (97.9%) reported to be Muslim a very small proportion of them (1.6%) answered they were Christians. Only 0.5% of the population said they belonged to other religions. In terms of ethnicity, the Ormo constituted highest majority (94.2%) followed by very distant proportions of the Amhara (2.1%) and the Argoba constituting 1.1%. It is worth noting that that 2.6% of the sample population did not respond about their ethnicity.

Table 3. Marital status, religion and ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>75.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>97.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amhara</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromo</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>94.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argoba</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.3. Distribution of Sample Household Occupations and Family Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self employed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>82.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government employee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private employee</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of family under households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above five</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>37.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4. Occupation and number of families under household**

Table 4 shows the distribution of occupation and family size of the sample households of the study area. According to the survey result, the heads of household of the sample population are engaged in different activities. Not surprisingly, the great majority of the respondents, 82.6%, of them are farmers. On the other hand 6.8%, 5.3% and 4.2% of the total sample population reported to be self employed, student and private workers, respectively. It is only 1.1% of them who are employed in government institutions.

With respect to family size per household, about 37.9% of the sample households contain over 5 members. Whereas 21.1% of the households have got four members, 13.2% are found to have five members of household. The whole data reveal that the great majority of the households (72.2% of the total sample population) are found to have four or more household family members of families under households. This in turn implies that as number of family (children) increases, the dependency ratio of the households—that is the proportion of non-economically active persons may also increase.
4.2. Food Insecurity and Conflict Patterns: Does It Increase or Decline?

Based on the conducted field study, the occurrence of food shortage and conflicting situation revealed that Julle Timuga Woreda have been suffering from food insecurity and conflict problems. According to the survey result, over the last 10 years, there wasn’t a single year when the Woreda had adequate food and peaceful situation. Even though the magnitude of food shortage and intensity of conflict varies from time to time, starvation and conflict is a dominant phenomenon of the Woreda.

It was also attempted to see whether conflict increased or declined in the area. Most of the sample households responded that conflict has regularly increased over the last 10 years as it is indicated in figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Intensity of Conflict over the last 10 Years

As can be observed in the figure above, out of the total sample population 163 of the respondents (85.8%) have claimed that conflict has increased over the last 10 years. On the other hand, only a very small proportion (10%) of the sample households believe that conflict has declined over the last 10 years in their locality. The other 4.2% of the sample size have no idea whether conflict has increased or not.
When asked to give reasons for the increase in conflict over the past 10 years, the respondents indicated the following as the major reasons: hunger, drought/ famine, conflict over pasture land, competition over water resources, dispute over land, competition over food aid, ethnic conflict, grievance on local officials, religion intolerance, conflict due to political differences, theft, revenge, grievance on higher officials, and other similar related factors. Summary of their responses is presented in Table 5 below.

**Table5.** Factors behind the conflict over the last 10 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunger / poverty</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>73.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>43.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought/famine</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>66.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute over land</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict over postural land</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>63.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict due to political differences</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance on political differences</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance on higher officials</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>35.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition over food aid</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>45.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict over water</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>59.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>46.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For those who believe conflict has declined over the last years i.e. 10% of the respondents, the reasons listed above do not make sense. They believe there are improvements which influence peaceful co-existence among the diverse elements of the study area. Reasons provided by these respondents for the improved peace and security of their locality include: improvement in agricultural production, decreasing level of hunger/poverty, improvement in ethnic equality, climatic change favorable for food production, expansion water utilization and irrigation, equal land distribution and efficient use of land, and peaceful and democratic rule can be regarded as the major reasons. In agreement with these respondents, Ato Gemita, Area Project Manger of the World Vision Ethiopia, stated the following reasons/ factors that have contributed to the decline of conflicts in the Woreda.
Information from secondary data, community discussion and situational observation indicate that conflict in the area is declining form time to time in terms of magnitude and type. Factors that have contributed to the declining nature of conflict over the past years are: community awareness on peace building and conflict resolution, management bodies at all levels (community, zonal and Woreda administrators, and non-governmental organization) have given due attention to peace building, and the reduction of live stock per households which contributed to reducing the number of people who move from one place to other in search of livestock feed. This has significantly contributed to reduce conflict over grazing land and to peace situation of the area (Quoted, from interview, Senbete, 2009).

However, the data obtained from official documents, other informants and most respondents, show that conflicts in Jille Timmuga Woreda have not improved over the years. According to informants there are factors that show the level of conflict in the area including the increase in death rate of people due to such conflict, internal displacement, burning houses, loss of assets and food crops. Indicative of this is what an interview has to say:

Though the government has been trying to achieve peace in the area for the last decade, there are challenges which have not been resolved yet. The situation is not consistent. Sometimes we achieved a relative peace, when there is adequate rainfall and food, but the reverse is true when there is drought and food shortage (Quoted from interview with Ato Endiris, Seibete, 2009).

Thus one can roughly conclude, from the above evidence that the trend of conflict and food insecurity in the area is quite uncertain. While there are droughts or hunger, there is conflict, because people could not settle on their locality, instead, they move from place to place in search of animal feed for their livestock. They could compete over scarce grazing and water resources for their own survival and for the lives of livestock. In such situations, conflicts seem to have increased that in turn seem to have brought about adverse effect on food security and loss of assets as well as the lives of many people. Unless intervention is made to reverse the patterns of conflict and food insecurity, achieving sustainable peace in the area seems quite difficult. The most frequent factors mentioned by informants and respondents were: shortage of farm land, land fertility problem, in adequate rainfall (moisture stress), food shortage, land degradation, water shortage and grazing land. These have contributed towards aggravating protracted conflict and food shortage in the area. As per food insecurity pattern, the data obtained from regional Food
Security Disaster Prevention and Coordination Office (FSDPCO), clearly indicate that “There was no any single year since 1950, where there was no drought in most parts of the region and mainly in the eastern part of the region” (FSDPCO, 2003:24).

As observed in the literature on food security, chronic food insecurity is explained in terms of structural deficiencies in the local economy or food system and explained in terms of poverty pattern, lack of assets and/ or inadequate access to resources such as land and water.

### 4.3 Factors Related with Food Insecurity and Conflict

There are many jointly related factors that can be associated with the dimensions of food insecurity and conflict. There are also a number of ways of addressing matters related to food insecurity and conflict. In this study, low level of income, hunger, extreme poverty, agricultural production, and depilation of assets, lack of job opportunities, environmental degradation and competition over meager resources are considered as important factors to be treated.

#### 4.3.1 Low Level of Income

Informants have identified that low income is one of the important characteristics of food insecurity and factors behind conflicts. They have especially mentioned that those landless (mainly youths and females) are living with uncertain situation from day to day; they do not even know what would happen the next day. They find themselves worrying for their next meal.

This research has shown that landless and low income social groups are hopeless about their future. Besides, they do not have identified options to earn income for their basic needs like food. Non-agricultural or off-farm activities have often been overlooked as means of income. Instead, many of these households are engaged in activities such as fetching water, collecting firewood and charcoal making to survive and ensure their future life. However, this by itself can lead to conflict with other competitors—those who seek to preserve the forest or other people who sometimes want to use the resource exclusively. In such situations, conflicts automatically increase to win and gain advantage over others. Above all, it has created major causes for deforestation which in turn leads to climatic change and has in turn a negative impact on sustainable development. According to some data from the survey questionnaire, let alone the landless households, even most of the farmers who have land have not achieved the minimum required food
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essential due to such severe shortage of income and other related factors.

The heads of households were asked to say how much Birr they earn per day. Sadly enough, while the vast majority of the respondents (76.8%) answered they only earned a maximum of Birr 2 and below per day, about 18.9% of them responded that their income could be between 3-5 Birr per day. It is only a very small proportion of the sample households who said they could earn over birr 11 a day (6.1%) and between 6 to 5 birr only 2.1% (see Table 6 below).

Table 6. Household income level per day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 2 Birr and below</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Birr 3-5 Birr</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Birr 6-10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 More than 11 Birr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table clearly shows that the proportion of households with low income groups in the study area is very high. As per the international standard generally speaking almost 98.4% of the respondents were to be found under poverty line in which their income per day is reported to be below $1 Dollar. In spite of this, as indicated by PASDAP, in most developing countries, income report of households is likely to be underestimated when compared with consumption expenditure report. Income is erratic and seasonal so much so that it may be very difficult for respondents to calculate and recall immediately what they were asked.

4.3.2 Hunger

Food and economic insecurity is a major source of conflict. Again, conflict destroys resources which could play a significant role for loss of production. This study has revealed that hunger and hopelessness have been creating a breeding ground for desperation, discontent and conflict.

Based on the data obtained from Office of Agriculture and Rural Development of Jille Timmuga Woreda, and the survey result, it could be said that hunger causes conflict and at the same time results from food insecurity and conflict. Table 7 and 8 show the food balance sheet and shortage of food in Jille Timmuga Woreda.
Table 7. The food balance sheet of Jille Timmuga Woreda (from 1997-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>No. of population</th>
<th>Food demand per year (Quintal)</th>
<th>Actual crop production (Quintal)</th>
<th>Less seed 6% (Quintal)</th>
<th>Net crop production (Quintal)</th>
<th>Food gap/year (Quintal)</th>
<th>No. of people who need food assistance</th>
<th>Length of food aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>94995</td>
<td>179,542</td>
<td>122,774.6</td>
<td>7366.8</td>
<td>114,869</td>
<td>-64673</td>
<td>20,418</td>
<td>3-6 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>97750</td>
<td>184,747</td>
<td>194,599</td>
<td>11,677</td>
<td>182,922</td>
<td>-1825</td>
<td>6065</td>
<td>6 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>95,114</td>
<td>179,765</td>
<td>234,710</td>
<td>14,082.60</td>
<td>220,628</td>
<td>40,863</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>3 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>97,872</td>
<td>184,978</td>
<td>179,208</td>
<td>10,752</td>
<td>168,455</td>
<td>-24791</td>
<td>55092</td>
<td>6-9 month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in Table 7, the peoples of Jille Timmuga Woreda have suffered from food shortage. The actual crop and net crop production has not been sufficient to meet the food demand per year per quintal. The Woreda has produced adequate and same surplus food crop only in the 2007 fiscal year. The rest of the fiscal years 2006, 2007 and 2008 were characterized by serious food shortage in which the food gap was reported to be 64673, 1825, and 24791 quintal per year for those years respectively. The number of people who needed food assistance in the Woreda were 20,418 in 2005; 6065 in 2006, and 1760 in 2007. Nevertheless, the Woreda had to depend on food assistance in those years. The number of people who were food-aid dependent highly accelerated in 2008 fiscal year. Almost 56.3% of the population was not able to feed themselves.

It is worth noting that for those households who were not able to cope with shocks, food aid was provided for 3 to 9 months for most of the years 2005-2008. While the provision of food assistance was only for 3 months in 2007, in 2008 the assistance lasted between 6 to 9 months. Similarly, the food aid had to be continued for 6 months and between 3 to 6 months in 2006 and 2005 fiscal year respectively. According to most of the informants,
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the problem is structural one which cannot be solved by food assistance; they believe food assistance does not address the root causes of hunger. According to them, recurrent drought, environmental degradation, conflict, soil erosion, deep rooted chronic poverty are the root causes of hunger.

The sample households were also asked the number of times they consume food per day with their family members. Table 8 below shows that 5.3% of the households have access to take food only once a day. On the other hand, 31.6% and 62.1% of the sample households have reported that they consume twice and three times per day respectively.

Table 8. Distribution of sample HHs food intake per day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 No response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Once a day</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Twice a day</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Trice times a day</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above data, it can be derived that even though food shortage has occurred in most parts of the ANRS, the magnitude is so much serious in the Eastern part of the Region. This indicates that persistent hunger is one of the major problems in the area and it has its own negative impact on peace and stability as well as food security.

4.3.3 Extreme Poverty

Generally speaking poverty in Ethiopia is a widespread phenomenon. As well established in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MoFED, 2002), Ethiopia is one of the countries categorized in the bottom ladder of development with multifaceted poverty. Measured mainly in terms of consumption, set at a minimum consumption requirement of 2,200 calories per adult per day, and also including non-food consumption requirements, the estimate of 1995/96 shows that 45.5 percent of the population were below the poverty line. The paper further explains that while the magnitude of its poverty is immense, there is an indication of a significant decline in the 1990s.

Keeping the above scenario in mind, the level of poverty and its effect on food insecurity and conflict in the ANRS with the specific reference to Jille Timmuga Worda is indicated as follows. Absolute poverty is estimated to affect more than 49452 people or 48.04% of the
population of Jille Timmuga. The number of people living with poverty is very high even compared with the regional average which is estimated about 33% of the population. This study has shown that the large majority of the poor are found in Eastern part of the Region in Jille Timmuga Woreda. Even though both the number of poor people and their prevalent percentage of the total population is decreasing from time to time, it should be noted that improvements have been registered only after food security program intervention. The rate of improvement of well-being, however, still remain slow.

The poverty trap failing to generate enough income from farming and, other rural activities to escape the human suffering is expressed in high level hunger, starvation and malnutrition. Such conditions could create fertile ground for conflicts to be hatched. According to this study, rural poverty is closely associated with access to natural resource such as land and water. However, these resources are very limited and scarce especially in areas that experience recurrent drought. Thus, conflict over such resources is very common among the people in order to survive.

Based on the data collected for the purpose of this research, poverty is found to be one of the important factors behind conflicts. Therefore, this thesis revealed that against some of the available literature, hunger- a reflection of extreme poverty could be either a factor or a consequence for a given conflict. Even though many studies have given due attention to the hunger-conflict nexus to simmering discontent in rural areas, local outbreak of violence, this does not seem to be the case in the study area.

4.3.4 Agricultural Production

This section attempts to describe the general features of agricultural production in the same households in terms of types of major crops, the availability of water irrigation and the irrigable land, the presence of double cropping seasons and factors affecting the performance of agricultural production. The major food crops cultivated in the study area are: tef, sorghum, maize, and pulses using rain fed cultivation. The normal rainfall is bi-modal in nature and the small (belg) rainy reason is from January to April, and the main (meher) season from June to September. In addition, cash crops such as onion, tomato, tobacco and pepper are cultivated in the Woreda using traditional and small scale irrigation methods (WVE 2005). However, other agricultural activities like horticulture and agro forestry practices are very limited in the study area.

In an attempt to achieve reasonable output in agricultural production, informants were asked whether people have produced adequate food production over the last 10 years.
Almost all informants unanimously agree that an adequate food production was not produced during the last 10 years. Even though due efforts have been made to increase agricultural production through agricultural inputs, extension packages and introduction of agricultural technology, the production increment has been rather limited showing a marginal increase at one time, and a drop of production at another time. Therefore, according to them adequate food/agricultural production has not been achieved until now.

Figure 3 below shows that the distribution of sample households’ food production and for how long household members can have adequate food supply.

**Figure 3: Adequacy of Food Production for the Members of HHs**
As can be observed in Figure 3 above, almost 46.3% and 40% of the households can only afford less than 3 months and between 3 and 6 months respectively. Similarly, the share of households between 6 to 9 months seems to be 7.4%. Moreover, very few households (about 1.6% and 3.7% of the sample population) have been able to achieve to cover their food on personal production between 9 to 12 months and over 12 months respectively. This study has tried to reveal that most of the households in the study area do not possess adequate food production. It further indicated that people in the study area are highly vulnerable to hunger and starvation which in turn becomes one of the root causes of local conflicts. The most frequently mentioned causes for lack of agricultural production are: crop disease (84.7%), conflict (79.5%), deforestation (72.6%), soil infertility (72.6%), drought (63.2%), moisture stress (60.5%), pests (63.4%), population growth (57.4%) and other similar factors (see Table 9).

**Table 9: Factors affecting agricultural production (Multiple answers are possible)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Vulnerability to drought</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>63.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pests</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>57.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Crop disease</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>84.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Deforestation</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>72.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Soil Infertility</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>72.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Climate Problems</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Uneven distribution of land / Inequality in land holding /</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>38.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Land scarcity</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Use of fertilizer</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Flood</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>58.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Moisture stress</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>60.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Conflict</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>79.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Population growth</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>57.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Others</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>44.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the most effective means of tackling the adverse impact of moisture stress, drought and lack of water is irrigation. Nevertheless, the practice of water conservation and irrigation has been rarely practiced in the study area. In addition to this, the imple-
Implementation of irrigation practices are mostly carried out on small size household basis by households utilizing small streams and similar water sources both for cultivating crops and vegetables and for their animal drinking. Due to this, lack of water for both crops and animals was found to be a serious and permanent constraint in the study area.

Due to scarcity of water, dry land ecology, and shortage of rainfall, human and cattle population have not adequately enjoyed food sources of any sort. According to WVE (2005), the livestock population is not proportional with meager resource potential. In order to overcome these problems the local communities have practiced to go to distant places (above 60 km) with their livestock as far to the area of Borkena Valley and further across east up to Afar national Regional State.

As a result, according to key informants, the intensity of inter-ethnic conflict has been intense in and around the study area. Accesses to adequate water and pasture land are the most significant factors which have aggravated local conflicts. Despite variations among key informants’ views, there seem to be a consensus among them that major conflicts in the study area are attributable to limited agricultural production, scarce pasture and water resources.

They further note that other additional factors such as ethnicity are only sometimes serving a cover up for the root causes of the local conflict. It could be said that it is only one key informant who has got a different view on how conflict in the area emanates from and here is what he has to say:

though there have been conflicts within the same community, the level of conflict with other ethnic groups such as with the Afar is rather harsher. The level of awareness of understanding between the Afar and Oromo people is almost the same because the Oromo are semi-pastoralist. As pastoralist, the Afar people are accustomed to carrying firearm and taking revenges against other ethnic neighbors, in this case the Oromo local people, without trying to identify the criminals. Such act seems to have aggravated ethnic hatred and fueled conflict (interview, Senbete, 2009).

However, the survey results indicated that most of the informants were against the above assertions. Thus, as noted earlier it could be said that the current study revealed that lack of food, water and grazing are closely linked with conflicts observable in the study area.
4.3.5 Competition over Resources

Among different resources, land is one of the most determinants of household productivity and food security in the study area. Its impact on the stability of peace in the district cannot be underestimated. The large proportions of households in the study area are unable to offer sufficient food productions since landholdings are limited and unequally distributed.

As can be seen in Figure 4 below, the share of landholdings ranges from less than 0.5 hectare to above 2 hectares. The average land holding in the study area is between 0.5 and 1 hectare. Worse still, about 14.7% of the households sample reported to be landless as most of them directly or indirectly are dependent upon their respective family. Renting, sharing cropping with landholders by investing inputs labor, and borrowing from family for limited times are frequently mentioned as means of access to land by those who do not possess land. On the other hand, the amount of landholdings varies from household to household. While 24.2% of the landholders have less than or equal to 0.5 hectare, and 14.7 percent of them possess land between 0.5 and 1 hectare. The other 28.4%, 14.2% and 4.2% of the sample households have above average landholding amounting between 1 to 1.5, 1.5 to 2, and above 2 hectares respectively.

**Figure 4: Amount of Land Holding of Sample HHs**

![Figure 4: Amount of Land Holding of Sample HHs](Image)
This study has thus shown that land scarcity and uneven distribution of land have further exacerbated the situations of landless members of the communities. Moreover, the data clearly indicate that those people with larger plot of land holding have a better capacity of possessing annual food requirements, while those households with no or limited landholdings have found it difficult to cope with shocks.

Land holding households were asked whether resource based conflict happened on their locality. The summery of their answers is presented in Table 10 below.

Table 10: Resource Oriented Conflict (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dispute over land</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>81.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition over food aid</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>53.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft on assets and food crops</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition over water</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>74.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute over grazing land</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>85.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict due to hopelessness</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>47.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that there have been various resource based conflicts in the study area. Contrary to some of the theories which advance the idea that scarce resources can not be sources of conflict, the responses of the respondents indicated that scarce resources appear to have been the causes of the local conflict as well as food shortage. According to the respondents 85.3% of the conflicts in the study area occurred as a result of competition over pastoral land. Moreover, dispute over land (81.5%), competition over water resource (74.2%), fierce competition over food aid (53.2%), conflict due to the ranging pessimism (47.9) and finally theft on assets and food grain were identified as the major causes of several local conflicts. Other factors such as problems among ethnic conflict, religious and political differences have their connection by about 60% but having their role of secondary status.

4.3.6 Environmental Degradation

About 90% of the target population live in rural area and their livelihood, directly or indirectly depends on environmental resources. Nevertheless, the data obtained from different resources show that environment has been degraded in a high magnitude. Obvi-
ously, this has undermined quality of life of tens of thousands of the people of the study area and in a way has exposed some of the poor to extreme poverty.

The data obtained from the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Woreda under study indicated that almost 13,655.44 hectares (27.6% of the total land) suffers from soil degradation. This suggests that 27.6% of the performance of land has been largely or irreversibly destroyed and can no longer be reclaimed or re-used for farming. In addition, 9234.5 hectares (18.7%) of the land is mountainous out of which only about 799 hectare of the total is covered by forest. Farm land in the area is only 13,981 hector (28%). Out of this, the 12,000 hectares are cultivated land. However, this land is also in precarious situation as it suffers from continuous degradation and soil erosion.

Therefore, the environmental degradation has been manifested in the form of soil fertility depletion in agricultural land, massive soil erosion and deforestation. This in turn had negative impacts on both food security and stability. It contributed much to the declining resources which would undermine the source of livelihood of the diverse rural communities. Moreover, as unanimously described by some key informants, environmental degradation is threatening the sustainability of agricultural production and food security of the study area.

This study also revealed that both manmade and nature induced environmental degradation are an important factors contributing to both food insecurity and social conflicts. Degradation or depletion of natural resources, unequal distribution of resources and population pressure are currently rampant in the study area. And in some case they seem to be some of the main competition triggering factors over scarce resources, particularly water, arable and grazing lands. Continuous competition over resources among farmers has increased abandon of sustainable methods and exploitation of marginal lands in a desperate effort. This is happening partly because of their keen interest to secure their short term income and feed their families. The prevailing poverty in the study area has in turn been found to be a serious threat to environmental degradation. As indicated earlier, 72% and 44.2% of the sample households are engaged in producing charcoal and firewood for sale in their attempts to cope up with food insecurity and one can imagine the possible impacts of such activities. To say the least, they deplete the environment; they result in food insecurity; and they possibly inbreed conflicts over scarce resources.

4.3.7 Depletion of Assets

As it is already stated, the combination of different factors such as competition over
scarce local resources, climatic changes, environmental degradation, extreme poverty, low level of income, and local chronic conflicts have all in all left a lasting imprint upon to the lives of the people in the study area. As a result, the area has been exposed to recurrent drought and repeated crop failure which actually worked against food security.

As shown in the review of the literature, the widely acceptable definition of food security has the following three components: adequacy of food (effective supply), adequacy of access (effective demand) and reliability of both availability and access. In the study area these three components don’t exist on the ground. Instead of food security, drought, poverty and shortage of food are the permanent features of the diverse community.

To make matters worse, failures in production are exacerbating adverse market conditions characterizing the study area. According to informants, most of the time, crop price has been sky-rocketing. Similarly, the price of commodity that farmers could demand such as sugar, oil, clothes and other industrial products are shooting up in market centers. On the other hand, the livestock price dropped down during drought and hunger seasons. The severity of the protracted drought in the study area was also aggravated by large scale livestock mortality. Due to shortage of animal food and lack of adequate water in the dry seasons, the contribution of livestock to food security has been greatly affected and adversely undermined. This has in turn led to loss of potential sources of income of the farmers.

4.3.8 Lack of Job Opportunities

According to the information obtained from the Woreda Agricultural and Rural Development Office, 27,744 of the total population are young people. Most of them are currently dependent upon their families. While most of the youth are dependent on their families, around 3499 people are still remaining unemployed.

As indicated earlier, some 14.7% of the sample households are landless farmers. Moreover, 24.2% of the sample households have a share of land that is below average landholding. Added to that, about 794 women 1785 young people are clearly identified as landless and they float here and there in the district without access to the local resources.

The implication of these data is that many people in the area are either small landholders or landless. This is basically because the overwhelming majority of the local communities earn their livelihood directly or indirectly from agriculture. Those who are landless or do not have adequate land suffer from unemployment. This problem is more evident if we
look into condition of other non-agricultural activities. As most of our informants agree, it seems that that off-farm employment opportunity was limited; and, the income that a given household could derive from them was not adequate. Responses from the interviews indicate that incomes obtained from non-agricultural activities did ensure food security to households engaged in the activities. That is because off-farm activities were found to be limited and less reliable sources.

Several interviewees unanimously and frequently suggest that lack of sufficient labor demand, skills and knowledge accompanied by reluctant position to engage in non-farm activities seems to be the major causes of lack of employment opportunities in the study area. In addition to this, the demand of local product and shortage of capital to engage in such activities were also other constraints still prevalent in and around the area under study.

Food for Work (Safety-net) project has been one of the major employment opportunities in the study area. Data obtained from the Jille Timmuga Woreda, show that many people (often the very poor and a great number of people who were food insecure) have participated and earned their income from this project. Nevertheless, the sustainability of this project is under question; and, it would not be considered as reliable sources of employment opportunity. It is, instead, nothing but short term solution for those who have suffered from hunger in rapid pace.

4.3.9 Failure to Meet Food Security Program

Based on the National Food Security Strategy, the ANRS has adopted a food security program since 1998. The overall objective of this program has been to ensure food security within range of 5 to 7 years for population of 2.5 million residing in such drought prone and chronically food insecure Woredas of the region. This program particularly emphasized on increasing income and food availability of the rural population, if possible, at household level. To meet the above objective, a clear goal was set to at least 1.7 million people feed themselves by the year 2004; if that goal was to be attained, it was thought that the relief dependent population size will be reduced by 90%..

Having that objective in mind, the present study has attempted to assess whether or not the objectives and goals set have been achieved in the study area. According to the data obtained from Jille Timmuga Woreda Food Security Coordinating Office, to date, the regional government has allocated a budget of Birr 40,597,837. From this financial budget, Birr 37.430, 287(92.2%) was already utilized. Based on the criteria set for the report, there
were 9,416 heads of households identified as those who benefited from food security program. The minimum target to be achieved was a successful transition to graduate from food insecurity to food secure households which were planned to attain 1883 heads of households. Generally, from the year of intervention to date, it was expected to graduate a total of 5,649 heads of households. Sadly enough, only 67 (1.2%) heads of households graduated from the targeted households.

From the above data, one can easily conclude that even though the importance of food security program is indispensable; and, some budget allotted by the government to that end, the result has proved to be a failure. Such failure of a designed program has many factors. Most of them can be associated with lack of graduation concept in the rank of local authority, professionals as well as beneficiaries. Absence of clear criteria or standards to recruit beneficiaries during the establishment in the year 2008 can be mentioned as additional factor. Rainfall scarcity and the development of dependency syndrome for aid have also been identified as contributing factors. Moreover, lack of monitoring and inspection mechanisms and practices were other factors attributable to the failure of this program. Meanwhile, informants claim that there have been causes such as abuse or misuse of budget to other improper activities. It was one of the problems for not achieving the food security program that could lead to public grievance and local instability to eventually aggravate conflict.

Generally speaking, even though the food insecure households are not expected to achieve the intended result due to the aforementioned factors, some other activities related to the program were found to be successful. For example, as a result of the intervention of food security program, it was possible to improve education, health care, road construction, water coverage, and sanitation.

4.4 The Impact of Food Insecurity on Conflict and Vice Versa

In contrast to many of the various theories reviewed, there are basically two major theories, namely psychological and economic that argues there is a direct link between food insecurity and conflict. In psychological conflict theory, the frustration-aggression theory and the relative deprivation theory as a whole suggest that individuals become aggressive in the events of obstacles (perceived and real) to or against their success of life. Likewise, the economic theory of conflict also argues that poverty, underdevelopment, competition over natural resources, lack of income and rent could trigger conflicts. The results obtained from this survey are consistent with the psychological and economic
theory. In other words, the findings of the present study contradict the claims of other theories that dismiss the link between food insecurity and conflict. The results of the study indicate that food insecurity is likely to lead to conflict.

In light of that, when asked whether they that food insecurity has affected peace and security in their particular area, most of the sample households answered in affirmative. For example, 178 of the households (93.7%) have agreed the effect of food security is directly associated with conflict. Among the total sample households, it is only 2 respondents (1.1%) of who said that there is no direct relationship between food security and conflict. On the other hand, 10% of the households responded that they had no idea whether one affects the other or not.

Respondents who responded that there is link between food insecurity and conflict identified some possible reasons for the link. The reasons identified in a descending order include: dispute over grazing land, competition over food aid and other natural resources such as water, land, conflict due to hopelessness and looting of properties and food grain. Conflict has, therefore, played a key role by hindering the achievement of food security. In line with some of the literature, the present study corroborates that there is a direct link between conflict and food insecurity. The effect of conflict on food security is summarized in the following figure:

**Figure 5: The Effect of Conflict on Food Security**

![Figure 5: The Effect of Conflict on Food Security](image)

As shown in the figure, about 83.68% of the sample population believes that conflict has negatively and directly affected the condition of food security. In spite of that there are a few respondents (7.37%) and who disagree to that. There are also some respondents (7.37%) who indicated neither agreement nor disagreement.
The survey results also indicated that impacts of conflict on food insecurity are affecting almost 64.2% of the households. Respondents indicated that conflicts have been breaking the social interaction and local market activities. In addition, the declining of land cultivation and the displacement of people from their locality was reported to be 58.4% and 71.1% respectively. Likewise, lack of engagement in the working place due to fear of conflicts and then diverting the youth (active working group) from working environment to involve and participate in local conflict are important factors accounting for 75.8% and 67.4% respectively. Furthermore, the impact of conflicts have largely affected the lives of people and animals in terms of causalities (death and wound), burning of houses, looting properties and food grains and internal displacements. Some of the consequences of conflict, especially the adverse effects of local conflicts on the lives of people, as presented in the table below:

**Table 11:** Impact of Conflict on Human Crises in Jille Timmuga Woreda (1995-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>196</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>297</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Office of Oromia Nation Zone Police in the ANRS*
Table 11 shows that the impact of conflict on human crises in the study area from 1994 to 2008. As can be seen from table, the total 297 casualties of people over the last fifteen years have deaths of 197 and 101 wounded people.

### 4.5 Vulnerable Groups of Conflict and Food Insecurity

From the present study it was possible to observe that land holding, wealth status, age and sex were the sources of vulnerability of the local people in the study area. The results of the study further suggest that poor people, unemployed and landless adults, youth, and women are found to be vulnerable to conflict and food insecurity. Even though, efforts are being undertaken now and then to address the problems of marginalized members of local communities such as landless youth and women, the improvements recorded were very slow.

**Table 12: Degree of Vulnerability to Conflict and Food Insecurity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of group</th>
<th>Very vulnerable</th>
<th>Vulnerable</th>
<th>Some times</th>
<th>Rare</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in the table above, there are certain groups of society with some degree of vulnerability to conflict and food insecurity. The social group that is most vulnerable were women accounting for 31.1 %of the group. That was followed by migrants consisting of 23(12.1%). In comparison with women and migrants, other social groups were not very vulnerable. When we look into some resistance to vulnerability, the sample respondents pointed out that elders, youth, people with disabilities and migrants are found in the range between 49 and 18 in their descending orders. However, the result shows that women are still vulnerable for there was only 1 sample to be resistant for vulnerability.

In most of the literature on conflict studies and that of food insecurity, the most vulnerable groups in the rural households are unskilled, landless, subsistence and, low income farmers and those rural communities cornered in the remote areas.
4.6 The Chief Local Actors of Conflicts

The root causes of the local conflicts are explained more or less in the previous sections of this thesis. However, there have been no discussion groups seriously aggravating conflicts in the locality. As elaborated in various literatures, there are those labeled as “Conflict entrepreneurs” and who actually benefit from conflicts. While the majority of people are negatively affected by the impact of the conflict, the authors and architects of these conflicts like to perpetuate and do their best to make the best out of a protracted violence. During the survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether such phenomena exist in their localities.

Table 13: Conflict Entrepreneurs (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Illicit and Illegal traders</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>71.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Clan leaders</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>50.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Religious missioners</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Local thieves</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>78.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Local administrators</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Members of local militias</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Political parties</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the above data, it can be argued that local thefts, illicit and illegal traders have by and large played key roles in aggravating local conflicts. As presented in Table 13 more than about 78.4% of the sample households have reported that those involved in local thefts have occupied the most significant position as chief actors of conflicts in the study area. In the same vein, about 71.6% of the respondents believe that illicit and illegal traders (i.e. contrabandists) have intensified and aggravated the prevalence of local conflicts. Besides, clan leaders (50.5%) religious missionaries (26.6%) and some illegal political parties (20%) are mentioned as champions of actors of the local conflicts. Local administrators and members of militias are also mentioned as actors of local conflicts though their contribution here is as minimal as their role is limited to only 10.5%.

A lesson can further be drawn from the above data as to why these groups of people have been involved in escalating local conflicts. Most of the illicit traders, those involved in local thefts, clan leaders, the illegal political parties and the religious missionaries have their own hidden agenda to directly embark on the process of local conflicts for different
reasons. Nevertheless, the chief interests and strategies designed by such actors of the local conflicts are quite similar.

When involved as conflict actors, escalating local conflict, it can be said that they have some clear objectives and strategies. As an objective, conflict actors often aim at making maximum profits and incentives in terms of economic, political and spiritual spheres. As a strategy, they try to protect themselves by triggering the earlier conflicts in their attempts to divert people’s attention to cover their illegal activities. They could propagate people by magnifying problems to finally make people feel their sense of self-help in which they can be treated or denied. Thus, any threat perceived by people to identify such as identity related issue has produced strong responses. Their responses have been both aggressive and defensive. Therefore, in doing so, they have benefited from the construction, reconstruction and strengthening of given exclusive identity, privileging their own economic interest and gaining powers by instigating one group against other neighborly social groups.

4.7 Coping Strategies, Perception and Future Risky Areas of Insecurity

This section attempts to provide the major coping strategies, which people could take in the events of shock and the perception of existing situation with respect to food insecurity. In addition, it presents fear of insecurity that people have anticipated for the future.

4.7.1 Coping Strategies

Given that the diverse communities of the study area are definitely food insecure, the reasonable question is what should they do in the occasions of food shortage? Households could possibly resort to a number of mechanisms to ensure their need as regards to food consumption. While coping strategies and mechanisms appear to vary in terms of time and sequence, certain common patterns can easily be observed. According to Webb, Bravn and Yohannes (1992), the first response to such crises is to possibly preserve assets; the second stage is the disposal of depletion of assets; the final stage necessarily involves actions that may go against prevailing social norms.

The rather widespread coping practices or mechanisms usually consist of sale of fire wood, food for work, purchasing cheaper grain, sale of household items, daily wage labor, relying on relief assistance, sale of charcoal and livestock sales in their descending order. Moreover, the repeatedly mentioned mechanisms by sample households are
migrant labor, reduction of consumption and changing food habit. The following table presents a summary of responses from the sample household:

**Table14: Coping up mechanisms of the study area (multiple responses are possible)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Daily wage labor</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>46.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Migrant labor</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Food- for – work</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>66.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sale of fire wood</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>72.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Reducing consumption</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Changing food habits</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sale of household items</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>47.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Livestock sales</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Relying on food assistance</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Resettlement</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sale of agricultural equipments</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Purchasing cheaper grain</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>54.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sale of charcoal</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>44.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.7.2 People’s Perception Vs Food Insecurity and Conflict

The scientific concept of food insecurity and conflicts necessarily fall with people’s perception about them. The mass experience in a continuously dynamic environment can shape their understanding and interpretation of food insecurity and conflicts.

As to food insecurity and conflicts, an overview of perceptions of sample households is presented below. As one can which observe from the summery, there are common understandings among the local people drawn from their lives and experiences.
Summery of People’s perception of food Insecurity Vs conflicts in Jille-Timmuga Woreda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Food Insecurity</th>
<th>Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of having 3 meals per day</td>
<td>• Clashing on scarce resource such as arable land, water and grazing land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of sufficient income to buy food grain to all members of households.</td>
<td>• Lack of tolerance between people and individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of producing adequate food production</td>
<td>• Intense competitions over communal resources such as land, forest, water and grazing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of having adequate assets such as land and oxen</td>
<td>• Hatred and revenge among clans, individuals and ethnic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High degree of dependency on food aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor working culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Absence of alternative job</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both situations, one can easily understand that people usually feel secure whenever they produce adequate grain; and, having sufficient income to curb problems that would arise from food shortage or from resource scarcity. The existing food insecurity and conflicting situations can easily be resolved in terms of producing sufficient food grain, a possible accumulation of wealth like livestock with adequate grazing land, and water cultivation. Furthermore, respondents of public opinion reveal that there are relationships of food insecurity and conflicts in the study area.

4.7.3 Future Risk

Several factors undermine the increase of frequency of instability in the study area. According to this survey, resource scarcity, coupled with environmental degradation, population pressure, recurrent drought and the chronically food insecure situation may collectively or singularly be sources of future conflicts.

Currently, there are some improvements in the making, even though the achievements have not been finalized. The inability to meet the basic needs of the people, mainly the
need for consumption of basic resources, is likely to affect stability in a rather wider way. Irregular consumption of natural resources would be one of the basic reasons for future conflicts. Although resources such as water and pasture are still in scarce state, even for current consumption, their scarcity is increasing at a rapid pace that a serious depletion can arise in the year ahead. This is particularly true of water, grazing and arable lands. The problem is even compounded given that population is predicted to grow with an alarming rate. Obviously, mankind needs food, shelter, clothing and energy and other necessities in their arithmetic reality. It is, therefore, the combination of these factors, more than any things else, which may contribute to the growing intensity of competition over local resources.
CHAPTER 5

MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding chapters examined factors related to food insecurity and conflicts. In this study a central analysis was made based on the data observed from interview and questionnaires as well as available secondary sources by giving due attention to sample households primarily engaged in rural agricultural activities. In an attempt to address the research questions, this study has sought to dwell on the following specific objectives stated in the first chapter:

• To explain and analyze the relationships of food insecurity and conflicts;
• To investigate the impact of conflicts on food security;
• To identify the main factors and variables contributing to the relations of food insecurity and conflicts and vice versa, and
• To find out how food insecurity can adversely affect social stability.

In this chapter it is attempted to summarize the major findings, make some conclusions, and forward few recommendations.

5.1 Major Findings

As indicated in the theoretical framework of this study, a clear-cut consensus has not been reached among scholars about the possible relationship between food insecurity and conflict and vice versa. Nevertheless, this study has shown that there is a relationship between food insecurity and conflicts. The data gathered from various sources have indicated that conflict and food insecurity are highly interrelated and do cause and/or impact each other. More specifically, the following major findings have been drawn on conflicts and food insecurity.

• Lack of income has been identified by this study as one of the significant factors of food insecurity and conflicts. This study clearly shows that for those who have no
land or for those with small landholding householders, there is very limited option to earn income. The survival strategies adapted by these poor farmers eventually encouraged competition by any means over the existing scarce natural resources around. This in turn has contributed as conflict escalator mainly in terms of competition to record clear advantages of one social group over another.

- As already shown in the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study, hunger and pessimism have created a fertile ground for conflict and food insecurity. The findings drawn from the current study have clearly indicated that hunger has direct relation with conflict. For instance, because of the relatively high level of food security in the year 2007 people’s causality was very low. Similarly, human suffering from hunger in the same year also declined. This might have been due to a relative income in agricultural production above the required amount of food demand by then. Besides, the number of people who needed food aid highly decreased to 1,760. Contrary to that, conflicts were highly accelerated in 2008. Subsequently, 21 people were killed and other 8 were wounded in that year. In that fiscal year, the number of people who badly needed food assistance increased at alarming rate estimated about 55,092. The declining tendency in agricultural production was a direct contributing factor for the gap of food grain of 24,791 quintal (see Table 7). The current study has thus revealed that if there is a hunger, the incidence of conflict is likely to increase under such circumstances. Implied from that is a decline in human suffering from starvation can be considered a positive for it balances the relation between peace and security.

- In this study, extreme poverty has been identified as being one of the key factors of food insecurity and conflicts. A poverty trap failing to generate income, high level of hunger, starvation and malnutrition are found to be fertile grounds for prevalent conflicts. According to this study, poverty is closely or directly associated with access to natural resources such as water, farm, and pastoral lands. The scarcity and poor management of these resources coupled with high competition among the local communities have been found to be sources of conflict and food insecurity in our study area.

- The existing poor performance in agricultural production has also been a major factor in aggravating food insecurity and conflict in the study area. While agricultural production has declined due to multifaceted problems, conflicts increased in higher rate of occurrence. The intensity of conflicts in turn can play a negative role in
decreasing agricultural production. 78.5% of the sample households unanimously agreed that the contribution of local conflicts have adversely affected the agricultural production in the study area.

- Land scarcity is perhaps one of the most determinant factors of food insecurity and conflicts. Since the large proportion of households are either land less or have very small holdings, they could not fulfill their food requirements. Instead, they have been found to be dependent upon someone else for food assistance. They have also been found competing over scarce communal land holdings. The problem of land scarcity and its proper utilization is further exacerbated by increasing demand for land due to population growth and less productivity of land. These has negatively impacted the task of maintaining peace and security in the study area.

- This present study has also revealed that environmental degradation increased in higher magnitude. This has in turn crucially undermined the mass livelihood by inviting extreme poverty and poor quality of life as well as food insecurity. Both man-made and naturally induced environmental degradations have become important factors contributing to food insecurity and conflicts.

- The combination of different manmade and natural calamities such as competition over scarce resources, climate changes, environmental degradations and local conflicts have put a great impact on depletion of the people’s asset in the study area. As a result, the area is clearly exposed to recurrent food shortage and failure in crop production.

- Lack of job opportunities was also found to be one of the major causes of food insecurity and conflicts. The data obtained from sample households has shown that a large proportion of people, especially those who are landless youth and women are found to be unemployed. These groups of people have suffered from food insecurity and perceived in their turn that they are gradually marginalized from the track of the ongoing development initiatives and activities. This, in turn, have crucially brought such adverse effects, which contribute to pessimism leading to competition, and thereby conflict.

- Failure to meet the food security program is also one of the factors, which has not yet ensured the status of food security of the people of the study area. Due to different factors such as aid dependency syndrome, lack of continuous re-assessment of the program and the monitoring mechanisms, and the miss management of the
existing resources, the objectives of food security program have proved a failure in the study area. In general, the findings have clearly revealed that the major factors contributing to the relations of food insecurity and conflicts are by and large lack of income, hunger, extreme poverty, decreasing in agricultural production, competition for resource, environmental degradation and lack of job opportunities as well as failure to meet the food security program.

### 5.2 Conclusions

This study has given due attention to identifying some of the basic factors which are related to food insecurity and conflicts. Not only is the subject of food insecurity and conflict a broad concept, but it is multidisciplinary. Since the topic is of broad concept and of multi-disciplinary in nature, it is not surprising for it to be debatable and lacking some consensus on how these two do correlate and jointly decide the life of all people of the study area.

The literature consulted for the purpose of this study reveals that clear consensuses have been reached upon the impact of conflict to food insecurity. Nevertheless, some differences among scholars have been observed on whether or not food insecurity can generate local conflicts. In an attempt to arrive at reasonable conclusion, this study tried answer that one crucial research question: to what extent is food insecurity related to conflict and vice-versa? The subject assessed here is whether or not the two factors, i.e. food insecurity and conflicts have any sort of relations or influences to each other. The current investigation has identified factors that aggravate food insecurity and conflicts. The factors identified include: extreme poverty, hunger, low income level, decline in agricultural production and lack of job opportunities. Moreover, competition over scarce resources (land and water for example), environmental degradation and resource depletion reasonably relate to food insecurity to conflict and vice-versa.

The patterns of conflicts and food insecurity have become more severe due to lack of sustainable solutions for such problems. In fact, though efforts have been made by both the regional government and other stakeholders, it was not possible to register a tangible break-through to change the existing food shortage and recurring local conflicting situation.

Based on the data obtained from respondents, the chief actors of local conflicts, identified in this study are, people involved in thefts, illicit and illegal traders. These groups of
people have been reported to have played key roles in aggravating the conflicts. Clan leaders, religious “missionaries” and illegal political parties are also among the principal actors behind such conflicts.

As well established in this thesis, the bilateral relations of food insecurity and conflicts have clearly shown to diminish the level of food security and, this by itself clearly impact on the life of the people of the study area. People’s perception about food insecurity and conflicts is well described in this thesis in greater detail. Finally, the future risk to security due to recurrent food insecurity and the possible conflicts has to be initially related with the scarce resources, environmental degradation and by making these two correlated factors not only chronic as such but also giving them a protracted nature.

5.3 Recommendations

The recommendation addressed here presents some options for policy implications and practical interventions to improve the level of food security and thereby to maintain peace and security of the study area. To that end, the following recommendations are forwarded:

- Food insecurity, as shown by present study has a strong link with local conflicts, overall poverty situations, income generation, job opportunities, and available natural resources. It is now commonly accepted that economic development is an essential prerequisite for sustainable solution to avoid the problems arising due to food insecurity and conflicts. Therefore, there is a need to implement properly and carefully designed a poverty reduction policy involving integrated rural development programs. Such a policy would elevate the income and the welfare of the rural poor in many ways. Furthermore, increasing access to food and minimizing vulnerability through sustainable environmental protection such as water and soil conservation, forestation and recovering areas which are exposed to degradation will assure the improvement of household food security and income which in turn will contribute towards positive impact on peace and security.

- In order to curb the prevalence of food insecurity and local conflicts, strong efforts and action should be undertaken to promote non-agricultural income or off-farm activities. These would particularly be beneficiary for small landholders and, landless people. These people should be given opportunities for raising their income from off-farm activities and fulfill their basic requirements. That should, however,
be done without compromising environmental protection. Instead, it is possible to encourage them to safeguard the development of environment through incentives such as donation to cultivate mountainous lands with forests and eventually benefit from such endeavor.

• The Regional Integrated Food Security Program should be carefully reviewed based on the available evidences on the interventions made so far in such a way it is relevant to the needs, priorities, and circumstances of particular areas such as the area under study.

• Lastly, until sustainable food security and peace can be achieved, focus has to be given for short term solutions. In line with that, safety net program should be continued along with its objective to protect the life of the people. Moreover, the existing conflict resolution mechanisms should be employed at maximum level to resolve the prevailing problem at hand.
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