Medhane Tadesse

The African Union and Security Sector Reform
A review of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction & Development (PCRD) Policy
Medhane Tadesse

The African Union and Security Sector Reform

A review of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction & Development (PCRD) Policy
Contents

Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 7
List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................................... 8
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 9
2. The Peace and Security Agenda .............................................................................................. 9
3. The Case for SSR ...................................................................................................................11
   The Urgency of Interfacing SSR and Regional Security Architectures .......................................13
4. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction & Development (PCRD) Policy of the AU ..............................15
   Beyond the PCRD ................................................................................................................. 18
5. The Imperatives of an African Framework for SSR .................................................................19
   I. SSR as a tool to resolve conflicts ...................................................................................... 19
   II. Lessons Learnt ............................................................................................................... 22
   III. Confronting Language/Regional Diversity ....................................................................... 24
   IV. Coherence and Complementarity ................................................................................... 25
   V. The Domestication of SSR .............................................................................................. 27
   VI. Gender and Transitional Justice ...................................................................................... 28
   VII. Security and Justice ........................................................................................................ 29
   VIII. Courting the Informal Sector. ......................................................................................... 29
   IX. Civil Society is Central. ................................................................................................... 30
   X. The Elephant in the Room: the African State ................................................................... 31
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 32
Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 33
References ................................................................................................................................ 35
Executive Summary

The process of establishing peace and security in Africa currently involves a number of intergovernmental initiatives including the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), with its planned African Stand-by Force (ASF), and the peace and security component of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The PSC provides a comprehensive framework for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts (including peace operations) at a continental level. At a sub-regional level, sub-regional organizations (also known as Regional Economic Communities-RECs), have taken the de facto lead in promoting peace and security. The last decade has also witnessed a huge increase in international efforts at Security Sector Reform (SSR). The African Union has acknowledged the importance of SSR to re-establish the architecture of the state, an essential component of post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development. While the AU has been increasingly active in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and other elements of conflict prevention and management, it has a substantially lower profile in post-conflict peace building activities in general and SSR in particular.

The Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) reflects the AU’s desire to be the lead actor in reconstruction efforts on the continent. The AU has sought to address SSR by finding a significant niche within the policy, which was adopted in 2006, to handle SSR processes on a case-by-case basis. Most SSR actors in Africa consider the development of the PCRD and the incorporation of SSR to be critical to any successful peace building initiative. The AU already has many SSR related elements in place and is currently developing an SSR policy, yet there is an urgent need to complement this process by developing sub-regional SSR strategies. There is a great need for African scholars and policy makers to rethink strategies to develop a continental framework for SSR. The AU, as a continent-wide organization engaged in conflict prevention and management, should take a higher profile in post-conflict peace building activities in general and SSR in particular.

With the increased focus on the security sector in Africa, the need for AU and Regional SSR strategies has never been more evident.

1. Within the framework of this paper, the term ‘regional’ refers to continental, while ‘sub-regional’ refers to the regions within Africa that sometimes coincide with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
1. Introduction

Nowhere in the world has human security in all its aspects proved more elusive than on the African continent. Africa has been the stage of some of the longest-running wars in the world, and basic security has proved elusive for both individuals and nations. No wonder, then, that the issue of conflict management has been at the top of Africa’s political agenda since 2003. Importantly, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is now recognized as essential to recovery from conflict, peace building, state building, and conflict-prevention. Over the past decade, the security sector has emerged as a vital element in national and international policy in conflict-affected societies as it is influenced by the broader human security agenda. Meanwhile, the increasing focus of development agencies on security governance issues has created the space within which a strategic emphasis on SSR has emerged. There is a pressing need for democratizing security institutions in Africa, and incorporating a strong and comprehensive SSR package into the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture can provide a framework and stimulus to this process. The AU has also recognized that conflict prevention and peace building cannot be achieved without post-conflict reconstruction in which SSR and Demilitarization, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is a major component.

While it is generally recognized that peace cannot be sustained without a more effective and accountable state security system, a comprehensive regional policy for SSR has thus far not been developed. This worrying gap has been central to how the policy paper has been envisaged and conceptualized. This study is particularly aimed at examining the AU’s policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), with a focus on its Security Sector Reform components. Often, democratic reforms across Africa are either denied or delayed, and when they emerge they are developed in a fragmented form, are usually designed to respond to particular exigencies, and need to be integrated into a comprehensive strategic and policy framework. This paper attempts to review some aspects of the PCRD, especially its SSR component (or the lack thereof), rarely studied by analysts and policy makers. Africa needs a regional framework for SSR, and this paper seeks to understand the imperatives of the process.

Thus, this study is based on the premise that an analysis of the PCRD, with a sharp focus on SSR and the approaches chosen so far by the AU, can to some extent contribute to our current and future understanding of peace building in Africa. It also provides an insight into the way the AU has approached SSR so far, identifies gaps and limitations, and lists important considerations around which an AU SSR framework can be developed, including specific direction for further research and policy processes.

2. The Peace and Security Agenda

Prolonged armed conflicts have devastated Africa. Between 1997 and 2006 there were 34 major armed conflicts in the world of which 14 were fought in Africa. But the character of the conflicts has preponderantly changed from conflicts between states to intrastate conflicts. Of the conflicts that occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa during this period, only three were between states. There has also been a marked increase in the intensity of these conflicts, leading to human catastrophes which threaten the fabric of societies. Affected countries are thus unable to ensure food security, basic services, safety and security. Some of these conflicts have also been transnational, that is, they have flowed across borders and into neighboring states.

The most obvious legacy of these conflicts is the militarization of governance. Not only are there direct effects to this, but equally critical are the ancillary impacts which create problems such as: the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, food insecurity, environmental degradation, the absence of rule of law and human rights violations. The complexity of this problem is compounded by the militarization of whole communities, mainly along national borders. This glaringly evident in most of the conflict systems across Africa, such as the Mano River in West Africa, the Central African region and the

1. http://www.un.org/Depts/ngo/list/list.pdf. Currently the United Nations has deployed 17 peace support missions, 8 of which are in Africa, more than twice as many than in each of the other continents.

IGAD sub-region. It has also resulted in political cultures of militarism, which gives precedence to martial values over compromise, mercantilism, and civic values.

A close examination of the causes of insecurity and continuation of conflicts in Africa indicates the complex and multi-layered nature of unfolding crises. A major contributory factor to the outbreak and continuance of conflicts include militarization in all its dimensions, particularly the use of power by African governments. The continent is rife with repressive and abusive security forces which turn disputes into violent conflicts. Also missing are security institutions that are consistent with democratic norms and supportive of human development goals. Any progress towards conflict resolution will largely depend on the democratic governance of these institutions in Africa. However, the approach of the international community to date indicates just how little has been learned about the significance of these processes.

The continent’s difficulties result not only from the magnitude of security challenges, but also from African states’ and organizations’ incapacity to respond quickly and effectively. Virtually all analysts of the African scene recognize that the longer-term answer to managing conflicts is to improve the capacity of African institutions at regional, sub-regional, national, and local levels to manage tensions and mediate disputes without recourse to violence and armed insurrection. While wide swathes of Africa are compelled to deal with problems in an ad hoc manner, there are promising signs of regional approaches to tackling shared security problems.

Regional peace and security initiatives have underlined Africa’s determination to come to grips with conflicts. While security problems exist, one finds different efforts by states, RECs and other international bodies to respond to them. Within Africa, a range of mechanisms and strategies has been developed in response to specific challenges. The process of creating unity and establishing peace and security in Africa currently involves intergovernmental initiatives including (at a regional level): the AU Peace and Security Architecture, the CSSDCA, and the peace and security component of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The AU as the principal regional organization has undergone a normative shift from non-interference to non-indifference. However, a clear trend is emerging toward formalization and institutionalization, particularly at the regional level.

The design of the African Union, and the rapidity with which it has been set up, reflect the tremendous surge towards unity and peace and security across Africa. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) in effect replicates some of the functions of the UN Security Council, including powers of mediation and arbitration. It provides a comprehensive framework for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts, including peace operations, at a continental level. The day-to-day work of the PSC is carried out in large part through the African Union Commission. Its main security components include two key bodies: the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) has a situation room to track wider security challenges, advise the AU leadership. As such it is potentially important in conflict prevention and peace building within APSA, especially in relation to creating norms and good governance of the security sector.

It is important to note, however, that in practice, security management in Africa will take place as much at the sub-regional as at the regional level. Indeed, a strong role is given to Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs), particularly with regard to security. The traditional concept of security is being redefined to include not only state stability and the security of nations, but also the safety and well-being of their people. This, in turn, has led to the redefinition of the security system, its nature and scope.

Security system is defined as including core security agencies (e.g. armed forces, police, paramilitary and intelligence services), security governance, management and oversight bodies and a public complaints commission charged with managing and monitoring security forces (e.g. the executive branch, ministries of defense, finance, internal and foreign affairs, national security councils, and budget and audit offices) as well as justice and law enforcement institutions. Other parts of the security sector that fall within the sphere of the security system include emergency services, border guards, and customs and immigration officials. SSR also includes civil authorities mandated to control and oversee security agencies. It encompasses all state institutions that have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion. However, security systems in Africa are no longer limited to individual countries. A security system

3. The Case for SSR

Democratization, socio-economic development and security are increasingly interlinked in theory and in practice. These connections are crucially important to Africa, where poverty and insecurity are rife. There has been a strong movement towards addressing conflicts on the continent requires a security sector that has a more nuanced understanding of security issues, thus linking SSR to broader conflict resolution and developmental objectives. The end of the Cold War has had a tremendous impact on concepts of governance, democracy and security. This is partly because the threat of a world war, conventional or nuclear, was greatly reduced and broad issues of human security, particularly democracy, became a rallying point.

The traditional concept of security is being redefined to include not only state stability and the security of nations, but also the safety and well-being of their people. This, in turn, has led to the redefinition of the security system, its nature and scope.

A security system is defined as including core security agencies (e.g. armed forces, police, paramilitary and intelligence services), security governance, management and oversight bodies and a public complaints commission charged with managing and monitoring security forces (e.g. the executive branch, ministries of defense, finance, internal and foreign affairs, national security councils, and budget and audit offices) as well as justice and law enforcement institutions. Other parts of the security sector that fall within the sphere of the security system include emergency services, border guards, and customs and immigration officials. SSR also includes civil authorities mandated to control and oversee security agencies. It encompasses all state institutions that have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion. However, security systems in Africa are no longer limited to individual countries. A security system
demands the involvement of a much greater breadth and depth of stakeholders.10 At regional and sub-regional levels new security formations are emerging which deserve attention from an SSR perspective. Although much of the SSR work will take place at the national level, regional military formations such as the African Standby Force (ASF) sub-regional brigades should attract the attention of SSR processes.

SSR focuses on the challenges states face in using the instruments of force in a manner consistent with democratic norms and supportive of human development goals. The focus is in helping to ensure a security sector of appropriate scale which is effective and properly accountable to democratic, civilian authorities11 by introducing a series of changes described as Security Sector Reform (transformation/Governance). The focus on ‘governance’ of the security sector is important for efficiency and accountability. The problem, of course, is that pure or excessive emphasis on governance aspects may, and often does, work to undermine the operational effectiveness of security forces. Hence, there is a need particularly in the African context to strike a balance between the value of well-governed security institutions and the urgency to make them strong and operationally effective. Though ‘reform’ and ‘transformation’ could be used interchangeably, transformation entails both a process and product of a larger and fundamental reorganization and institutional building, particularly in areas attempting to emerge from authoritarian rule or total collapse of state institutions. Achieving this will be a long and complicated process, and will involve reviewing the very objectives and means of state security provision, including institutional cultures, systems, and processes.12

For the purposes of clarity and convenience and due to the fact that there is an emerging consensus on the word ‘reform’ around the AU and member states, this paper uses the terminology of Security Sector Reform (SSR) as understood in terms of gradually changing the security sector to become effective, managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance.13 Evidently, SSR is part of the wider governance reform programme. Ideally, the political context that the SSR agenda envisages thus requires a democratically elected government with the ability to exercise control and oversight of the security sector. Furthermore, oversight by democratically elected parliament is key. SSR is therefore about much more than the internal structure of the security forces; it promotes norms in relation to the proper relationship between the security sector and society at large. Hence, emphasis is also placed on the desirability of civil control of the armed forces, a clear division between internal and external security functions, and a strong civil society role in the formulation and monitoring of security policy.

Concepts of ‘human security’ have recently made inroads in African security thinking, resulting in intense, but legitimate, scrutiny of the security sector. Meanwhile, development agencies’ increasing focus on security governance has created the space within which a strategic emphasis on SSR has begun to emerge. The new thinking meant a change in global governance approaches, especially in the crisis-ridden African continent. Governments were faced with the challenge of establishing democratic accountability and control of security apparatus. Increasingly, African scholars and experts on peace and security have taken the view that the inability of African security organizations to provide a safe and secure environment for economic and political development arose to a large extent out of poor governance both of the state in general, but also of the security sector.14 African security institutions have played very different roles in facilitating, or forestalling, democratic transitions in general and SSR in particular.

SSR may be initiated for a variety of reasons. However, the most common and most appropriate reasons seem to be: conflict resolution, peace building, improved control of crime, the desire to enhance civilian and democratic control, fiscal reform and deficit reductions, human rights and good governance, or the desire to enhance the legitimacy of security institutions. In many African cases, SSR has been forced on states by external forces, either as part of rebuilding societies of conflict-affected states. A reformed/transformed security sector helps create a secure environment conducive to other political, economic and social developments. The economic dimensions of SSR are not only concerned with the consumption of resources by the security forces and revenue collection mechanisms. Although the provision of clearly accountable defense budgets is a key component of SSR, the impacts of SSR on development go beyond military budgeting. Security from disorder, violence and crime is fundamental to reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, more broadly, for sustainable economic, social and political development. Hence, SSR has its origins within these broader peace-building initiatives and is designed to link the development and security agenda at the policy and programming levels. There is a growing appreciation of the linkages between SSR and broader issues of development, conflict resolution and good governance.

While SSR is most needed in crisis and post-conflict contexts, it is clear that reform of the security system is not only relevant in fragile states, but also in traditional development situations, where un-reformed security institutions can have an adverse effect on the investment climate, democratization processes and the public’s sense of security. A security system which is subject to democratic control and is effective, efficient and reduces the risk of conflict, creates an enabling environment for development. SSR has now become a central component of efforts to overcome fragility and conflict in a number of countries.

The Urgency of Interfacing SSR and Regional Security Architectures

As SSR is a vital tool for conflict prevention and management, regional peace and security organizations need to promote and assist SSR processes. Since the end of the Cold War there have been increasing expectations that regional and sub-regional organizations should take on security functions. The complexity of conflicts, the multi-dimensionality of ‘wider’ security issues, the erosion of sovereignty, the transnational character of new security threats and wars, growing pressure on the UN system for peacekeeping, pressure for democratization and security sector reform, and the complex effects of globalization all lend themselves to regional solutions.15 This has forced Africa’s relatively weak states to pool some sovereign functions in order to address existential and other security threats. Security challenges are increasingly cross-border in nature, and hence solutions require regional approaches, including regional frameworks for SSR. SSR should have a regional character, form and substance, for several reasons: firstly, the major post-war regional security arrangements and organizations have taken on new responsibilities and have thereby broadened their role in peace and security. Secondly, entirely new regional organizations relevant to SSR have emerged. Thirdly, regional organizations are re-orienting and re-tooling in order to respond to new transnational challenges. Similarly, new, relatively complex, threats require new kinds of responses, which can only be fulfilled by a reconfigured security sector. Hence, the diffusion of non-traditional security challenges such as health issues (HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis), transnational terrorism, economic and political development which are increasingly seen as a legitimate challenge to security services and hence to their reform.

However, a recent development specific to Africa and the AU lends additional importance to a shared approach to SSR: the growing importance of sub-regional and regional security actors through the African Standby Force. This requires reform, most clearly in regard to inter-operability and a standardized doctrine. SSR also contributes to healthy inter-state relations, thereby strengthening regionalization. Additionally, a regional approach to SSR is more relevant to Africa, where many countries lack a security policy and the regional political and diplomatic terrain is highly fragmented.

Hence, the design and formulation of National Security Strategies (NSSs) are important preconditions for regional security as well as for reform of security institutions. When it comes to NSSs the process matters as much as the outcome: it should have a broad and long-term perspective, it needs to be inclusive enough to secure credibility and legitimacy, and be grounded in a realistic and comprehensive assessment of the situation of a given country. Indeed, a major prerequisite for

10. Security systems imply that security arrangements and functions are not limited to states, their respective security sectors or coalitions of adjoining governments only. A security system is broader than the core security agencies and is linked to the broader conceptions of a security community and embraces multi-layered actors at the local, regional and sub-regional levels including civil society organizations and the public at large.


12. Transformation as opposed to ‘reform’ of the entire state security institutions in Africa should, however, be at the heart of the peace and reconstruction processes.

13. In some regions of Africa such as Southern Africa the term ‘transformation’ is commonly used. In West Africa the term is less contested. Nonetheless, the use of the term matters a lot and often politicians in other regions (such as the Horn of Africa) view ‘reform/suggestively (as it implies change or dichotomy) and prefer ‘Governance’.


realistic and sustainable SSR is the development of national security strategies. This also helps in building confidence among states and contributes to ensuring the predictability of government decision making with regard to their neighbors. It is far easier for a government to carry out SSR which might involve, for example, downsizing its security services if it knows that its potential (or even actual) hostile neighbors are doing the same. Hence, by its very nature SSR is a deeply regional process.

The confidence and security-building aspects of a shared approach to SSR range from providing a stable regional environment to carry out sensitive reforms to sharing scarce resources for reform (financial, human and institutional). Moreover, external engagement in Africa is gravitating towards a regional approach; donor countries are increasingly seeking to address SSR and other good governance agendas at a regional level and to involve regional and sub-regional organizations. As the international community, hopefully, moves from ad hoc, often short-term projects to a more strategic engagement at a regional level there is a need to develop more sophisticated and comprehensive regional approaches to SSR.

Regional organizations’ engagement with SSR is based on the belief that an effective and democratic security sector will help to ensure peace and stability and promote developmental objectives in the continent. Reform of security institutions is usually considered at the national level. In practice, however, there are important regional and sub-regional considerations to be taken into account, and increasingly so in Africa. This is particularly relevant with regard to peacekeeping in its widest sense. Even when the term is not used (it is of relatively recent provenance and is still largely associated with donor agendas), key elements and concepts involved in SSR can be identified within the various components of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

SSR is now recognized as essential to recovery from conflict, to peace building, state building, and conflict prevention. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) in effect replicates some of the functions of the UN Security Council, including POWOs of mediation and arbitration. It provides a comprehensive framework for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts (including peace operations) at a continental level. Indeed, key to the PSC’s success is the development of a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP).

The AU has tried its best to ensure that all its policies and processes reflect SSR to some degree. Indeed, the framework for an approach to SSR can be found in a number of existing AU policies, treaties and solemn declarations including the Constitutive Act, the CADSP, and most importantly the Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The Constitutive Act establishing the AU is aimed at, amongst other things, promoting democratic principles and good governance, ensuring the effective participation of women in decision-making, promoting uniformity in defense and foreign policies and peaceful co-existence.17 Within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities the PSC itself is mandated to follow up on progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by Member States.

More specifically, the CADSP attempts to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the complex security issues in Africa with clear linkages to SSR. The document raises two key issues relevant to SSR i.e. the emphasis on human and other non-military aspects of security and the need for transparency on national defense and security policies. Moreover, it stresses principles of collaborative and collective security, drawing on continental and regional instruments, treaties and agreements already in place.18 It also provides for coordination between the peace and security functions of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Arguably, SSR is being given a role although an insufficient one in the regional and sub-regional structures of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). However, it is within the context of the PCDR that the AU is attempting to position itself to work on SSR. The Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) includes a number of key elements of SSR, including the promotion of efficient, accountable and professional defense and security forces operating under civil control and oversight and within strong legal and national policy frameworks. There is also a strong interface between SSR and the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation and Reintegration of former combatants (DDR/R), which often forms a significant element of PCDR. The adoption of the AU’s Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, which incorporates some elements of SSR, has made preparing this review and writing about the strategic imperatives of SSR and the AU all the more crucial.


4. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction & Development (PCRD) Policy of the AU

The AU derives its mandate from its Constitutive Act (Art 5) which establishes the PSC. Articles 3 and 4 of the same Act further illustrate the PSC’s objectives and duties. It is based on these and the Peace and Security Protocol that the AU opted to formulate the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development framework. In 2003, in Maputo, the decision was made to establish a Ministerial Committee for PCRD, a move which further established the AU’s role in Peace and Security. However a major decision to formulate the PCRD framework was made at the Executive Council’s meeting in Libya in 2005.18 As the number of internal wars in Africa fell, the AU prepared the political ground for the continent to take responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Past experiences had shown that peace processes need to be effectively complemented by sustained efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, with a view to addressing their root causes.19 The AU also recognized that conflict prevention and peace building could not be achieved without post-conflict reconstruction in which SSR and DDR were major components.

The AU’s prior experiences in conflict have shown the need for a holistic approach. Thus the PCRD document and process had to encompass issues ranging from early warning systems, to conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace support operations, reconciliation and beyond. The need for capacity building and democratic political process was also evident. The PCRD policy seems to comprehensively guide the African Union’s post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives. The policy seeks to provide a blueprint for recovery and reconstruction programmes in countries emerging from conflicts. Based on the aforementioned needs the Executive Council of the AU in its meeting of June 28-29, 2006, in Banjul, the Gambia, adopted a decision on the PCRD.20 The PCRD was formulated to serve as a guide to be tailored and applied to individual post-conflict situations. It was intended to improve timeliness, effectiveness and coordination of activities in post-conflict countries and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace in line with Africa’s vision of renewal and growth. More specifically, it was intended to consolidate peace and prevent relapses into violence; help address the root causes of conflict; encourage fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities; and enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse PCDR actors. The framework also goes as far as to elaborate minimum standards, indicators and benchmarks to evaluate a country/region/regions’ progress towards reconstruction and development. The PCRD stressed the need for peace agreements to be complemented by sustained efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, with a view to addressing the root causes underlying their outcome. The document stressed the importance of effective peace building and reconstruction in light of the fact that most post-conflict countries in Africa have a fragile peace and fall back into conflict within five years of signing a peace agreement. In short: the policy created the norms, values and blueprint through which the AU could achieve this aim.

Furthermore, the policy aims to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace in line with Africa’s vision for renewal and growth.21 Post-conflict reconstruction is a critical issue on the African continent given the number of countries emerging from the brutal civil wars of the 1990s and early 21st century. The policy’s main components are its four central objectives: 1. consolidate peace and prevent relapses into violence; 2. help address the root causes of conflict; 3. encourage and fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities; and 4. enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes.22 The scope of these activities encompasses six indicative elements: security; humanitarian/emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; women and gender.23 The policy objectives seek to improve timeliness, effectiveness and coordination of activities in post-conflict countries and to lay the foundation for social justice

20. 9th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, Banjul, the Gambia 28 to 29 June.
and sustainable peace.24 The PCRD could thus prove critical in enabling Africa’s war-affected societies to consolidate peace and promote sustainable reconstruction.

PCRD pays increased attention to the political, social and economic factors that contribute to the outbreak of conflict. This is a progressive step compared to past experiences in post-conflict reconstruction where the main aim was to get the country through elections as a successful indicator of sustainable peace and the road to recovery. It would seem from the above policy elements that the AU’s post-conflict rebuilding efforts are increasingly focused on the root causes of wars, which are critical to laying the foundations for a viable peace leading to long-term development. In order for a viable post-conflict state to emerge, as prioritized by AU policy, security, governance, socio-economic reconstruction, resource mobilization, as well as instituting human rights and justice, with particular attention to issues of gender, require a specialized and multi-faceted focus.

In this regard the policy identifies core principles to guide PCRD implementation on the continent, and offers short, medium and long-term approaches to the recovery, reconstruction and development processes, applying PCRD’s six indicative elements (see above) to substantive issues. The policy also outlines strategies for resource mobilization, identifies actors, governance mechanisms and processes, which go to the heart of some of the structural and institutional causes of conflict in Africa, and stipulates broad and necessary benchmarks and standards across its various components.

It is safe to say that one of the most important things that the AU’s PCRD policy has done for the peace and security agenda on the continent is to define and establish consensus among AU member states on a comprehensive and strategic approach to peace building. More importantly, it has re-emphasized continent-wide, high-level, political support and commitment to peace building by articulating basic principles and priority areas and providing broad benchmarks and indicators for achieving them. Recovering nations must develop comprehensive policies and strategies that address these areas within the unique context of the post-conflict environment. What is yet to be seen is whether or not the PCRD can be practically and effectively applied in the AU’s recovering member states. While the AU has made significant progress in addressing the PCRD needs of the continent during the past few years especially through the creation of normative frameworks the bulk of the work is yet to be done, particularly in bringing PCRD policy to bear upon the needs, gaps and challenges on the ground. Part of this would include establishing the envisaged AU Multidimensional Committee and related support structures urgently and speed-up the development of operational guidelines for implementing the policy in regions and nations. The AU can also serve as a contact organisation for more experienced partners (such as the UN and multi-lateral institutions) that want to assist in the reconstruction efforts.

The AU’s PCRD as with its Constitutive Act is a visionary document that will take years of resources and capacity building to realize. In terms of SSR the PCRD attempts to address some components of security sector governance for which the AU is to be commended. The AU thus mainstreams issues of SSR through all its indicative elements, which cover the entire spectrum of the reconstruction process.25 In terms of highlighting SSR, the PCRD is well-crafted and logically structured. This is particularly true in its focus on African security institutions and the general need for reform. In addressing the security sector in Africa the PCRD is divided into three main sections; the why, the what and the who?

The first section focuses on the why (i.e. the background) and the definitions of key principles. SSR is discussed in a post-conflict context as part of a larger post-conflict reconstruction discourse.26 As stated in the PCRD policy, the broader objective is “to create a secure and safe environment for the affected state and its population, through the reestablishment of the architecture of the state, including the elements of juridical statehood, defined and controlled territory, accountable state control over the means of coercion, and a population whose safety is guaranteed.”27 To this effect, the main objective of the policy’s security component is to promote the consolidation of efficient, accountable and professional defense and security forces operating under responsible civilian control and oversight. Then it moves on to the what which contains the principles, issues of gender, the issues of political governance, etc. The policy also goes on to mention necessary policy documents in areas such as regional approaches to security, small arms, civilian control over armed forces, etc. The third section addresses the who, i.e. the main target of the reform processes, the actors (including the stakeholders), but also very closely linked to these, funding and resource mobilization.

The process of developing the PCRD has been exhaustive and most of the security issues have been carefully calibrated. Meanwhile, more time and space has been devoted to the who, which articulates the kind of security institutions Africa needs for development and security. Under Article 19, it mentions the need for transforming, re-establishing and strengthening security institutions such as defense, police, justice system, etc. It will:

i. Pursue the transformation of organs of the state, especially those relating to security and justice.
ii. Restore and strengthen institutions of public law and order, including the establishment of an efficient police force.
iii. Establish mechanisms for the democratic governance and accountability of the security sector as a means of restoring public confidence.
iv. Facilitate security sector reform, including civil military relations, right-sizing and professionalization of the security sector as soon as demobilization efforts are begun.
v. Establish an efficient justice system that is accessible to all sectors of society, and functioning prisons, including appropriate rehabilitation programmes.
vi. Create appropriate and effective oversight bodies for the security sector, including parliamentary committees, national ombudsperson, etc.

Interestingly, the PCRD applies a broader definition of the security sector. The document states that its focus on strengthening legal frameworks, improvement of operational capacity and engagement of broad consultation and participation of civil society.

Moreover, the policy recognizes that security is gender sensitive and is related to justice and that a country’s transition provides unique opportunities to promote gender equality and gender justice for the future. It provides an opportunity to ensure that the re-establishment of the rule of law in a war-torn country and the strengthening of its systems and institutions for the administration of justice are done in a manner that takes into account the interests and needs of the entire population, including women,28 something which the human rights and justice section of the PCRD policy addresses. The PCRD also acknowledges that it must ensure the process of security sector transformation and recognizes and acknowledges the role of women and child combatants, addressing the specific needs and challenges that confront them. Gender is one of the AU’s six indicative elements that has to be addressed in the PCRD’s comprehensive framework, suggesting that it recognizes the importance of gender equality and meeting the specific needs of women in the post-conflict environment something which is critical to sustainable peace building, especially where women have borne the brunt of conflicts, mostly as victims of SGBV. These inclusions highlight that transitional justice challenges need to be addressed in order to make peace building processes successful.

PCRD highlights the need for the transformation of the security sector in Africa, lists the conditions this requires, and discusses the efforts needed to achieve such transformation. In this regard, it focuses on the need for capacity building of human resources in the sector. It mentions training for those in the sector as well as civil society organizations with the intention of making them partners in various endeavors. Finally, it sets standards and benchmarks such as the ratification of international instruments related to peace and security, right-sizing and professionalizing forces, civil oversight of the sector, etc. The AU’s PCRD policy is to be applauded in this regard as it includes a section on the security sector which is dedicated to ensuring the inclusion of SSR in all aspects of post-conflict recovery. It looks at the need to employ democratic governance of the security sector, including in planning and budgeting, to ensure that SSR is mainstreamed in reconstruction activities and prioritizes the development of strategies to be promoted. Understandably, the PCRD is comprehensive and broad in terms of post-conflict reconstruction, but rather thin on SSR. Most of the SSR components in the PCRD are usually designed to respond to particular exigencies in the broader debate on peace and security in Africa. They do, however, form essential entry points and building blocks for more organized and ambitious SSR programmes.

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
Beyond the PCRD

Although the AU is the main custodian of peace and security on the continent, it has only recently started to work on an SSR policy document. Developing a strong and comprehensive continental framework for SSR is a prerequisite for peace and security in Africa and the AU must address it robustly and effectively. As discussed above, some elements of SSR are included in the PCRD and other AU documents, but the framework, strategy and credibility of civil society partners to operationalize these concepts at a continental level is missing. As a consequence, SSR components of the PCRD are rarely implemented. Therefore, the decision by the AU Assembly of February 2008 in which it called on the Commission to develop an SSR policy framework is an important development. The precursors to this decision are UN and civil society-led consultations on SSR in Africa.

In its endeavor to draft an SSR strategy, the AU Commission has been closely assisted by African peace and security CSOs and the UN. An AU-wide dialogue on SSR was initiated in early 2007 among leading African CSOs. The first meeting organized by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) in cooperation with the CPRD was held on October 9-11, 2007. The meeting, interalia, 30

- reviewed experiences in African SSR
- identified core needs and challenges for SSR in Africa, including how to respond to capacity and resource needs, and, most importantly
- prepared the ground for Africa’s coherent input into the UN SSR agenda meeting in Cape Town in November 2007.31

has transpired as an African position by the AU in the UN meeting was largely the product of the civil society-led Addis Ababa meeting. Hence, African CSOs had a huge impact in calibrating and framing an African agenda and inducing the AU to have one.

The Cape Town UN SSR meeting under the co-chairmanship of the Slovaksian and South African governments adopted a number of recommendations for rolling out SSR in Africa. The objectives of the workshop were similar to what was articulated by previous SSR workshops organized by the ASSN. The outputs of the meeting provided some broad, but key, policy directions which stressed the importance of local ownership, focusing on capacity building of African states to undertake SSR, bringing other regional and sub-regional organisations on board, as well as streamlining the role of external actors. Most importantly, it favoured a robust UN role in supporting SSR activities in Africa. 32 The report of this conference was launched at the AU headquarters in January 2008, resulting in the AU Assembly’s decision to “develop a comprehensive AU Policy Framework on SSR, within the context of the Policy Framework on PCDR.” 33 As a response to this (and a follow-up to the persistent calls from CSOs) an AU SSR cell was created in early 2009 at the AU headquarters. A permanent AU SSR office devoted to Africa’s security sector was established within the Defense and Security Division (DSD), and is already interacting with African CSOs and the UN. Strengthening the SSR Unit and strongly interfacing it with all departments of the AU should be a major priority. In this regard CSOs and the UN have a pivotal role to play.

Until recently, the UN lacked a common framework and general strategy for SSR. Field missions often have limited capacities in this strategic area, including human resources, to implement SSR mandates in support of national authorities (an exception is work done by UN Agencies such as the UNDP and in particular police reform; for instance in Mali). The UN has so far not accorded a priority status to SSR in Africa, even in its own peacekeeping operations. It played a low-key role in SSR where other key global players were running the show (Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Liberia are relevant examples). A move by the UN to help the AU move towards a regional SSR framework has taken place recently: the

Cape Town meeting and a recent (March 2009) workshop on “An AU Policy on SSR” held in Addis Ababa witnessed the active involvement of the UN’s Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).34

The Cape Town meeting can be seen as a watershed in the UN’s role on SSR in general and its involvement on SSR in Africa in particular. Since then the UN has approached SSR in Africa in a more strategic manner. In this regard the January 2008 report of the United Nations Secretary General (UNS) was critical. The Report, entitled “Security Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting SSR,” identifies the establishment of a partnership with the African Union as a priority.35 Partly related to this was a UN-AU consultation on SSR held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between 22 and 25 March, 2008, with the aim of providing input and support to the development of an African SSR Strategic Framework and United Nations Policy on Security Sector Reform. The goal was to provide a forum for feedback from the African Union and regional stakeholders on the United Nations emerging approach to security sector reform. The United Nations can still provide strategic frameworks for global SSR in which regional organizations are major players. At the very least, a better form of partnership is needed at every level between UN bodies, governments, NGOs and regional organizations. In fact, the UN has a major role to play in supporting and directing the AU to develop its own regional SSR framework.

Hence, enabling the AU to develop and own its own SSR policy so as to secure the confidence of the UN is a major priority. Nonetheless, like its other engagements (such as peace support operations) in the continent, the UN’s role in SSR is replete with challenges. In addition to lacking its own strategy, the UN does not have an effective interface with Africa’s regional and sub-regional institutions. One of the preconditions of a workable SSR framework in Africa is creating a synergy between the existing processes and institutions, enabling them to complement and support one another. Achieving greater coherence of SSR activities within Africa requires a clearer mechanism for coordinating with the UN.

5. The Imperatives of an African Framework for SSR

The AU has sought to address SSR by finding a significant niche within the PCDRD and handle SSR processes on a case-by-case basis. This approach has shortcomings, and an argument can be made that SSR requires a new approach and mechanism as well as support in a much more strategic, patient and regional way. This should include reviewing existing research initiatives so as to determine whether additional case studies are needed to understand better how an AU framework should be developed and operationalized. The discussion below will help identify some of the major shortcomings of the PCRD and outlines major areas of research and policy process. Meanwhile, this can also help to formulate concrete and consolidated recommendations on a future AU framework for SSR. This adds up to create the context within which the African Union can make its mark and develop and advance its own articulation of SSR policy for the continent.

The following are the key themes around which the proposed AU framework for SSR could be built:

I. SSR as a tool to resolve conflicts

The fact that the most detailed components of SSR are located in the PCRD implies that SSR is important in a post-conflict context. Incidentally, the most comprehensive SSRs have been attempted in the aftermath of conflict (such as in Sierra Leone and Sudan) as part of a peace agreement. Outside of this context, most African governments are modest and selective in what they attempt to accomplish in the security system.36 While SSR is most needed in crisis and post-conflict contexts, it is clear that security system reform is not only relevant in fragile states, but also in traditional development situations where


33. African regional Workshop for SSR. March 23-25, 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. As this paper was being written, the DPKO from the UN, the DSD from the AU and the ASSN/CPRD were concluding the Addis Ababa meeting on African SSR. The writer chaired the Tripartite Strategic Meeting of the UN, AU, and CSOs (ASSN) which, more or less, agreed on tentative proposals and a timeframe to push the process of developing an AU SSR framework forward.

34. UN Report (A/63/859/5, 2008/3).

35. A Survey SSR and Donor Policy.
un-reformed security institutions can have an adverse effect on the investment climate, democratization processes and the public’s sense of security. Meanwhile, a security system which is subject to democratic control and is both effective and efficient helps reduce the risk of conflict, thus creating an enabling environment for development. While the emerging peace and security architecture covers the entire conflict continuum from prevention to peace building and reconstruction, and is supported by a number of institutions and mechanisms, SSR is mainly related to a post-conflict situation which makes the whole exercise incomplete.

The importance of including SSR in all processes related to conflict prevention, management and resolution is fundamental. Practical examples include countries which are not exactly post-conflict, such as Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Here SSR processes are crucial, and the AU needs to be prepared for the task. The AU will not run short of entry points to push for an SSR agenda in a pre-conflict situation. The AU’s own norms and standards in particular those related to instruments of political and security cooperation will play a major role in mediating and conflict resolution. All regional organizations have developed peace and security architectures similar to the AU. In some cases they play a conflict resolution role in their respective regions, most prominently the role of ECOWAS in West Africa, which is in the process of drawing up its own SSR concept and action plan. In principle, much of the continental security architecture is in place. In practice, the SSR components are weak and dispersed. As a result, considering SSR as an important component of regional peace initiatives and prevention mechanisms remains pivotal. Regional organizations could also incorporate SSR as a major element in their peace and security strategies. For instance inserting a strong SSR component into the IGAD peace process opens a window of opportunity for the AU to take a more proactive role in the peace process.

The AU’s own norms and standards in particular those related to the governance of the security sector. In the elaboration of National Unity Governments (GNUs), and constitution-making processes could also serve as additional entry points. Clearly, NEPAD acknowledges that failures of governance are central to insecurity and underdevelopment. This realization has given rise to the concept of ‘peer review’, whereby NEPAD states (and civil society organizations to an undetermined extent) will be required to evaluate critically each other’s economic and governance performance. It does not, however, seek to establish separate structures for the governance of security in Africa. Neither does it try to incorporate a strong SSR component into its peer review modalities. Hence, incorporating SSR into the APM would be a lot. As such, the SSR agenda is wide and beyond conflict and post-conflict contexts as a tool for prevention in more stable contexts and as a normal process of public sector reform. Inserting SSR as a major component of the APM will comfortably locate SSR as a conflict prevention tool in African countries, and will help take the agenda to all member states national capitals.

Another important entry point is the negotiation and drafting of Peace Agreements (PAs). Much of the burden of introducing SSR has fallen on PAs. In fact, SSR probably provides the answer for the question ‘why do some peace processes succeed and others do not?’ Common to most of the peace processes in Africa run by individual states or international organisations is the lack of a detailed and workable security framework. Without a framework most of the negotiations in process, in for example, the Horn (excluding probably the Comprehensive Peace Agreement-CPA) have remained ad hoc, incoherent and unlikely to achieve a sustainable agreement. What we have learned from the flawed peace processes in Sudan (particularly the Darfur Peace Agreement-DPA and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement-EPA) and Somalia is that it is essential, prior to engagement in a peace process, to undertake a serious analysis of the nature, character and specifics of a conflict. Peace processes need to be viewed as part and parcel of long-term political processes of nation building, and deadlines are neither realistic nor are they helpful. While the AU has extensive involvement and experience in brokering peace agreements, it has little role or experience in the implementation of their SSR provisions, and thus limited involvement in this critical and sensitive area. A regional framework is aimed, among others, at filling this gap.

Peace processes and mediation are major subjects of their own which require specialized studies, expertise and resources. In this regard, strong preparation and relevant external technical assistance can be a key factor in assisting parties (mainly rebel groups) in effectively addressing security arrangements. Often rebel groups regret what they have signed, because they were poorly prepared for the task.36 Security arrangements that lend serious consideration to incorporating DDR and SSR packages seem to have better chances of success than those without it.37 The AU is involved in several mediation and peacemaking efforts, and SSR is a missing element in these processes. The PCRD has stressed the need for peace agreements to be effectively complemented by sustained efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, with a view to addressing the root causes underlying their failure. However, the AU has been almost completely sidelined in current SSR exercises (in Liberia, the DRC, Burundi, South Sudan, etc.) where its role is limited at best to that of an observer. SSR provisions in Peace Agreements often negotiated with AU involvement and/or support have tended to lack comprehensiveness with a correspondingly narrow view (such as in Liberia and Burundi) of the security sector.38 The AU should bring its extensive experience in negotiating PAs to bear on creating more consistent and comprehensive SSRs and more consistent implementation.

Beyond mediation the AU is heavily involved in peacekeeping and peace building missions where SSR and DDR are critical elements. They involve measures targeted at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management at all levels, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. This long-term process can involve the reconstruction of social and political institutions as well as conflict resolution initiatives, and virtually always involves SSR. The AU/UN has been engaged in peace support operations, although to a much smaller extent and magnitude. Until June 2004 it deployed military observer missions in Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia-Eritrea. Since it began undertaking peace mission operations involving military observers in 1997, the AU/UN has deployed 10,400 military observers, protection forces and civilian police.39 The statistics indicate that the involvement of Africa in peace support operations has been relatively significant compared to the other continents. While the AU has been increasingly active in PSOs and other elements of conflict management, SSR has been missing and needs to be tackled head on.

The involvement of the AU in peace support missions within Africa is likely to increase rather than decrease, even if the magnitude of the operations may not be on the scale of AMIS (Darfur), the biggest AU operation so far. In this regard the UN remains indispensable. It has also been recommended that the mission planning process carried out by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should include consultations with regional organizations as well as troop contributing countries.40 This is particularly relevant to SSR not just because of the UN’s role in cooperation with the African security architecture regarding mediation and peacekeeping in its widest sense, but also since a number of bodies of the UN, including DPKO and the UNDP, have developed an approach to SSR, and a specialized Unit for SSR has been established under the Office for the Rule of Law. These UN initiatives should be interfaced with the emerging approaches of the AU and the RECs, given that the APSA forms part of the global collective security system headed by the UN Security Council.41 More recently, the AU has been involved in cooperation with the UN in Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Somalia and currently with significant scope in Darfur. With respect to Darfur, on August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council approved a significant innovation in terms of cooperation with a regional organization, agreeing to provide substantial UN military and logistical assistance to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Resolution 1706).

There has been little SSR in APSA peace operations, and SSR has tended to be the preserve of the UN. The few instances of AU sanctioned training of security forces and SSR in peacekeeping operations have been distressing. For example, it was only after the United Nations Mission in Burundi (UNMB) took over from the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) that a specialized SSR unit (or rather DDR/SSR) was established in terms of the power sharing arrangements of August 2000, and in practice one of the key elements of SSR—democratic oversight—received little attention for a significant period of time.

36. Medhane Tadesse, ‘Peace Processes, War on Terror and SSR in the Horn of Africa’. Workshop on Interfacing SSR and Peace Keeping Operations in Africa. January 21-24 2009. Maputo, Mozambique. The AU Darfur Abuja negotiations found that the parties, particularly the rebels, were poorly prepared to address security issues and this problem was never effectively addressed, contributing to the confusion and lack of clarity which plagued and compromised the whole process.

37. Among the peace processes in the Horn the CPA is an exception as it incorporates more elements of SSR and DDR than others, which explains why it fares better than, for instance, the DPA or the Somali peace process.

38. They are usually limited to military, police, paramilitaries, and (much more rarely) intelligence. Furthermore, they lack full, consistent or predictable implementation.


40. South Africa reportedly used its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and especially its presidency (March 2007 to April 2008) to press for closer links between the council and the AU on security and conflict issues and some progress has been made in this regard.

The UN operation in the DRC, MONUC, remains the largest DDR/SSR programme in Africa, but here too there is a wide- spreading view that the programme’s lack coherence, clarity and expertise, despite the existence of a Joint Commission on SSR. The ‘hybrid’ AU/UN mission in Darfur contains little in the way of SSR, in part because DDR is so problematic. Whatever the peace agreement was in Darfur, it was not accompanied by a robust security arrangement and a strong SSR/DDR component. In contrast, there has been a strong SSR element in the UN mission in Southern Sudan. But again, this has been a UN rather than an AU function (not to mention the few donor-supported civil-society-led SSR processes).42

Developing an AU SSR framework will also help to avoid the problems associated with troop-contributing countries. The AU usually requests support from member countries to help in the training of security forces, such as in Burundi or Somalia. Training of security forces in both conflict and post-conflict situations is being provided by several African countries at the request of the AU, often such training is inappropriate since most African countries are not well-suited to the task. The majority of African countries do not subscribe to SSR principles, nor does the AU have the capacity to supervise their activities and ensure whether the trainings provided have been carried out according to SSR principles.43 An African framework would be helpful in addressing this problem both in terms of building on norms and standards, but also in the implementation, developing policies and guidelines and best practices for implementation of SSR in the field. Hence, the AU could develop a watchdog capacity on SSR not only for external actors, but also for African governments willing to train other countries’ security forces. Furthermore, the future SSR framework should be included in the doctrine and training programmes for the African Standby Force, as the doctrine already recognizes the possibility of including SSR processes into its complex missions.44

II. Lessons Learnt

A major consideration in designing an AU SSR policy is Africa’s SSR experiences. A missing element in the PCRD is ‘lessons learnt’. This perpetuates the Europeanization of thinking on SSR in Africa which leads to an artificiality in the whole exercise. There is a lot to learn from a number of countries which are not supposed to have led SSR processes per se, which is often referred to as ‘SSR before SSR’ in Africa. It is very important to try to develop the exchange of experience and lessons learnt among African countries themselves. The reality is that there have been quite a few national efforts at reforming security institutions over the past 20 years. Unfortunately these have not been systematically studied and documented. A look at the literature of civil-military relations shows that individual states ranging from Nigeria, Cameroon and Senegal to Ethiopia and South Africa, which witnesses an explicit SSR framework, and other African states as they moved toward constitutionalism or from war to peace have initiated a number of processes, many of which need to be consoli- dated and brought together.

The South African experience shows that national dialogue is an essential part of security sector development and democratization and that genuine national or regional ownership calls for sustained commitment (mainly in terms of resources) on the part of national authorities and international stakeholders. In several ways the nature of states and political systems determines the degree of reform. There seems to be a consensus that South Africa’s SSR has set new standards both in terms of inclusiveness and consultation, but also the comprehensiveness of its scope, transparency, and ownership, which was primarily (if not entirely) indigenous. In this and other cases, indigenous concepts and approaches have been devised which may be even more far-reaching than the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) SSR concept.45 There are other instances too which could be considered as SSR, although these have been limited to countries emerging from conflict where donors have, to varying degrees, been actively involved, such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The prevalence of post-liberation regimes (most glaringly in the Horn of Africa) also defines the peculiar concept and context of civil-military relations in many African countries.

42. On the other hand the fact that the UN SSR Task Force is still under the DPKO very much suggests the lingering old view and association of SSR with post-conflict and peacekeeping operation, which needs to be reconsidered.

43. A prominent example the case of Egypt, a country with one of the most repressive police forces in the world offering help to train the Burundian police.

44. see Chapter 7 of ADF doctrine.

45. The DAC approach to SSR was first laid out in the 2001 DAC Guidelines on helping Prevent Violent Conflict and subsequently developed in the DAC policy statement and paper on Security Sector Reform and Governance (The DAC Journal, Vol.2, No.3, 2001)). The OECD-DAC SSR handbook is considered as a blueprint for SSR.


In a number of other countries (including Uganda, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Eritrea) there have been discrete initiatives focused on elements of the security system which have been influenced by SSR principles, but which have fallen short of a fully-fledged SSR programme. It is noteworthy that there have been situations where post-conflict SSR, mainly DDR, have been driven exclusively or predominantly by indigenous forces, such as in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. It is important, however, to stress that even post-liberation regimes are not monolithic. For instance, the degree of donor involvement in the two SSR cases in the IGAD sub-region differs significantly: high in the case of Uganda, low in the case of Ethiopia. One can compare this to other similar cases. There are those post-liberation regimes led by a dominant single party (often a former liberation movement), and are highly militarized, including post-liberation militarization (as in Zimbabwe and Eritrea) and which act as a stumbling block for either domestic or international pressure for reform. The common denominator in post-liberation regimes is that their revolutionary legacies continue to shape the reform processes in general and civil-military relations in particular, despite the waning of the original revolutionary project.46 In this case, policy development as a whole is weak and the executive branch of the government often continues to wield disproportionate power. Although there are exceptions (notably South Africa), African political parties thus have a weak policymaking capacity in relation to security issues. At the other end of the scale there are those very weak states, both in conflict and post-conflict situations, which are highly vulnerable to both internal and external pressure for reform. Clearly, the opportunity for reform is relatively wide in both weak states and in post-conflict peace building countries (South Sudan, Sierra Leone, DRC, Liberia, Somalia), and genuine democratic transition (South Africa, Ghana, and to some extentSomaliland). Another scenario is where democratic change is either delayed or completely denied and the space for reform is at least temporarily closed (Eritrea, Zimbabwe, most of the North African countries, and Djibouti to a lesser degree). Evidently, the major push for SSR has always been the process of democratization. The changing global environment has obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform. New constitutions sanctioning more democratic governance frameworks for security systems have come into being which have created the need to develop more effective responses to security problems, although this is occurring place in a variety of terrains. This commitment to ‘good governance’ includes the adoption of democratic norms for the governance of security. Most of these reforms are intended either to reduce budget deficits or to channel more public resources into development or as part of political transitions following regime change or peace agreements. The trickledown effect of this is that indi- vidual reform activities are currently happening in many African countries. Several of these have launched far-reaching reforms of their security institutions, though these differ substantially in terms of sponsorship, philosophy and focus, not to mention the different and ever-changing contexts such as the political balance of power (e.g. in coalition governments, parties etc). There is a naturally assumed importance as most issues have to be negotiated. Some degree of reforms is occurring (or is allowed) in response to: growing international pressure for democratization and a desire to enhance human rights; the need to develop more effective responses to security problems, including crime, fiscal reforms and civil service reforms intended either to reduce budget deficits or to channel more public resources for development or; as part of power sharing agreements following the conclusion of war. The notion that reforming security institutions is something alien to the African experience and that donors have to put it on the agenda is misguided. Thus, a policy framework could be a very good vehicle to convey past experiences from the AU and to stimulate broad-based debate between both the political class and the elites in the military and other security institutions. It is therefore necessary to get the backing of the political class in SSR to ensure that it is done properly. African countries have experience in SSR and this should not be ignored in formulating SSR policy. The first step would be to recognize and appreciate the diversity of the SSR terrain in the continent.
III. Confronting Language/Regional Diversity

The African continent presents a diversified terrain for SSR processes, and sharing experiences is all the more necessary because important SSR principles, concepts and words have differing meanings and connotations in French or Portuguese. This is also relevant because the nature and mission of security forces varies from region to region. A recurring example is the gendarmerie. It is a sort of militarized police, with more than policing functions, the gendarmerie exists in francophone Africa and not in anglophone parts. The relationship between legislatures, the executive and the administration is determined by a variety of factors, including the colonial heritage. The pace of reform is relatively slower in francophone African countries than in anglophone parts. This has to do with the nature of governance structures inherited from colonial times. France transferred the tradition of ‘presidentialism’, or executive dominance, in defense and security matters and a concomitant marginalization of legislators and civil society; a weak tradition (as in France itself) of civil society analysis and discuss on ‘security’ issues.

It will be difficult to have a continental policy framework without having some degree of harmonization on national security legislation. One way of overcoming this challenge is by formulating a parallel track of National Security Strategies (NSSs), which the AU could encourage member states to develop. This is an extremely important requirement for realistic and sustainable SSR processes. Hence, a major consideration should be the cultural differences inherited from colorization not only in terms of language but also in terms of institutional, organizational and procedural structures in francophone, anglophone, and lusophone countries. Thus, a policy framework could be a good vehicle to convey past experiences from the AU and the REC’s about SSR so that the rest of the document is informed by those lessons. The disparity in SSR processes has geographic (regional) dimensions as well. In this regard SSR is more advanced in Western and Southern Africa, as well as in Central and Eastern Africa, while North Africa is the least affected by the whole development.

In terms of geographical coverage, Southern Africa followed by West Africa was probably best served through SSR, although there were significant country differences here as elsewhere. The dialogue on security and defense reviews have become more and more accepted in the two sub-regions, and to some extent in the IGAD sub-region (Ethiopia, Uganda). A critical factor is the nature and capacity of the regional organization. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has fared better than even the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has, on the other hand, made little progress in security cooperation given its inauspicious origins as a functional organization combating drought and political and diplomatic fragmentation in the region. There is slow movement in Central and Eastern Africa, albeit with intractable challenges. While North Africa has been involved in every aspect of SSR, Southern Africa was exceptional in terms of the availability of both official and non-official support for SSR. The progress made in Southern Africa is attributed to several interrelated factors, the most prominent being the democratization of a major regional power and the transformation of the regional conflict (developments in South Africa and the conclusion of the war in Angola respectively).

What is missing in West Africa, despite the progress in many areas of SSR and the slow transition from war to peace across the region, is the democratization in some countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Niger, Gambia, as well as the major regional power, Nigeria. Authoritarian or personal rule persists in some countries, although it is often dressed up as democracy. An abiding theme of this discussion is that democratization is the largest in Africa (the ones in the West, South, East or North) will have a profound impact on regional SSR processes. The end of apartheid and armed conflict in Southern African has transformed security dynamics in the region and facilitated far-reaching measures of demilitarization, security system restructuring, and regional integration. Nonetheless, some aspects of liberation mythology and narrative still linger in most of the countries, further complicating SSR processes.

As one of the most militarized and conflict prone regions, little progress has been registered in the Horn of Africa. The region is also home to a unique governance mode: former liberation movements in power. The SSR concept and policy agenda have thus far had limited ‘buy-in’ in the sub-region and the task of developing and implementing SSR has been a politically sensitive undertaking; is clearly more challenging and carries greater political risks and constraints in the Horn, a region beset by structural obstacles to reform. Security systems are at the heart of the political process in the region and efforts to reform them inevitably run up against vested interests, as well as suspicion that intellectual, CSOs and donors may be using reforms to press their own agendas. The necessary political space for reform and transformation with regard to the security sector is lacking. Paradoxically, and against all odds, it is here that successful attempts to develop a regional SSR strategy have taken place, embedding other regions to do the same.

The main contextual factors for SSR in the Horn include the post-liberation regimes in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the recently concluded Ethiopian-Eritrean war, the long-running conflict in the Sudan, the collapse of the state in Somalia, and the possible remilitarization of the Horn by Afrique came-called ‘war on terror’ and ‘liberation narrative’. The security terrain varies from strong and highly militarized parties which have usually been in power for many years; and weak political parties manipulated by powerful, often wealthy, individuals (‘big men’) and pursuing personal rather than ideological agendas. Different contexts range from the most conducive and likely to engage governments directly (Southern Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea) to challenging (Ethiopia, Uganda, Djibouti) and nearly impossible (Eritrea). Debates on national security strategy and defense reviews (as in the case of Ethiopia and Uganda) provided some opening for longer-term defense transformation programmes. Ethiopia’s National Security Strategy was publicly debated in 2004, although the process and modalities were less satisfactory. The Defense Review in Uganda, culminating in 2003, was carried out in a broadly consultative manner and involved an assessment of military and non-military threats to the security of the state and its population.

Most of the recently initiated reform processes in Central Africa were externally driven either through the UN or Western powers or both. They were attempted in a very specific post-conflict situation. This refers to the RECAM programme, EUCFOR Congo, EUCFOR Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). Locally driven SSR processes have made little progress in the community of Central African states.

North Africa, however, is the most problematic. The Maghreb is lagging behind in terms of good governance and the spread of democratic norms, values and principles. It would be an exaggeration to say that the term ‘SSR’ is not widely known in the sub-region. This is true in terms of processes, institutions and norms. It is not only the norms and principles that are far behind other sub-regions, but also the process of building a regional architecture for peace and security. This may have been due to the traditional security concerns and concomitant lack of transparency in that part of the continent.

The limited availability of entry points and information as well as the weakness of civil society in the Maghreb may also reflect the lack of significant security system developments, which would be consistent with the sub-region’s limited movement toward political liberalization. This reinforces the argument that the process of incorporating SSR into the African Union and regional organizations cannot be separated from the wider process of establishing democracy, good governance, institutional capacity and peace across the continent. In the long-term, security is best guaranteed by democratic, accountable and stable governments presiding over a democratically governed security sector. The huge disparity among Africa’s sub-regions remains a structural logjam for a workable SSR framework in the continent. This makes the issue of complementarity and coherence among the different regional initiatives even more pivotal.

IV. Coherence and Complementarity

A more complex set of problems arises in the relationship between the African Union and pre-existing peace and security institutions, especially the sub-regional organizations (otherwise known as Regional Economic Communities or RECs). While for historical reasons there had never been a structural relationship between the OAU and the RECs, this could change with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Africa and Northern Africa. This legally binding document defines the areas of cooperation, among others as “[…] the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; […] post-conflict reconstruction and development; […] arms control and disarmament; […] counter-terrorism and the prevention and combating of trans-national…

51. The Horn of Africa SSR Strategy was prepared in early 2008 by the Center for Policy Research & Dialogue (CPRD), a regional think tank in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Implementing the strategy remains ever more important.
organized crime, [...] capacity-building, training and knowledge-sharing.” Furthermore, the parties “shall cooperate to facilitate the effective implementation of the Continental Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.”

However, the nature of the MoU being rather general, the question remains: what kind of interface is required among the UN, the AU and the RECs and how might this be achieved? Should this interface comprise several structures specific to the functions of RECs (e.g. one for peace and security, one for SSR, one for economic integration, etc.) or one single interface? The MoU states that the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa is the primary role of the Union, and that “the RECs shall be encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts within and among their Member States” and to “undertake peace-making and peace-building efforts”, as well as deploy peace support missions. However, the division of responsibilities and tasks is not sufficiently spelled out. For instance, where does the responsibility fall for implementing SSR in Peace Agreements in the Horn of Africa? Does it fall to IGAD? Or if IGAD does not succeed, does it revert to the AU? What will be the exact reaction and role of the UN? What will be necessary for the AU and NEPAD to fulfill their role in providing guidance and direction, including the practical help vested in them? How should the regional and sub-regional institutions (without regional SSR strategies) pursue regional SSR processes and national security?

These questions are all the more relevant because new structures of security are emerging at the continental level. Prominent among these is the Committee for Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) which consists of the heads of intelligence services in Africa. CISSA has been endorsed by the AU and forms part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It acts to exchange intelligence, pool resources and develop capacities to deal with African security challenges. Devoid of independent analysis, the increasing reliance of the PSC on CISSA could potentially be both a challenge and an opportunity. Which voice is most listened to at the AU among CSOs, the Continental Early Warning System or CISSA means a lot to the future direction of SSR in Africa. The widespread perception about modern day intelligence services in Africa (both national and continental) is that they serve under whoever they operate. Calibrating security-related information from covert sources and national intelligence agencies is one thing; cross-examining them with independent sources of information is quite another. We can, however, afford to be optimistic about CISSA. Given that intelligence is often the most neglected dimension of SSR, and debates around the reform of intelligence are only just becoming public in Africa, CISSA could play a vital role in supporting SSR processes and institutions.

Clearly there is a need for mechanisms to promote and monitor consistency among the different security-related regional initiatives as well as between RECs’ policies and their compatibility with the long-term aim of regional convergence. Ensuring that issues of governance and human security continue to receive appropriate emphasis becomes a key priority of regional peace and security organizations. They are important as a framework for collective security and military cooperation; conflict management, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention; and, norm-setting in the security sector. The SSR concept will have greater ‘buy-in’ in these collective security mechanisms, which are increasingly defining common values, norms and principles of state behavior, exercise increasing influence in force restructuring and disposition in member countries. A regional SSR framework is a major vehicle to ensure increased coherence in this regard. SSR provides an important opportunity for aligning national security systems with the AU/REC African Peace and Security Architecture and in harmonising African security systems overall. Complementarity must be linked with inter-operability, and in the view of the ASF and its regional Brigades, this remains critical. Probably the best way to pursue this policy framework is to target the regional infrastructure. In sum, SSR becomes a unique opportunity to disseminate the core principles of the APSA and create coherence and synergy between the different processes in Africa.

A priority for a workable peace and security architecture in Africa is creating synergy between existing regional SSR processes and institutions, enabling them to complement and support one another. Indeed, if the AU undertakes comprehensive preparations it is well placed to co-ordinate a number of initiatives that can lead to complementary strategies. It can build the framework under which a wide range of other actors (eminent persons, NGOs, regional organizations intervene in the cause of SSR. It should be mentioned here that regional approaches to SSR will likely form the building blocks of not only the AU, but also the UN’s global SSR approach. Slowly, common terminologies and frameworks are emerging in Africa’s sub-regions in relation to security. This needs to be further solidified and deepened. Hence, all sub-regions should develop regional SSR strategies that feed and complement one another and slowly create coherence and synergy.

V. The Domestication of SSR

Attempts at Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Africa have proliferated during the last decade. Changing strategic environments brought about by the end of the Cold War and linked with the phenomenal spread of democratic norms, values and aspirations have provided the context for much of this and the significantly expanded institutional capacity for peace-related activities and SSR. Such a development warrants policy responses from the AU. The last decade has also witnessed a huge increase in international efforts at SSR. External players and their institutions have played a pivotal role in re-conceptualizing the security-development relationship and the promotion of an SSR agenda in Africa, partly as a consequence of their involvement in peace processes, but also as a direct result of the changing regional relationships affecting their own security concerns. Most SSR in Africa today is run and/or supported by external actors, not only the UN and EU, but also national and bilateral actors (while a small number of African states have also become involved). Nonetheless, Africans are finding the role of external players has unpleasant political and security side effects, both at strategic and programmatic levels. As a result, the role of external actors/donors25 has come under assault in recent years.

A problem common to almost all donors is that too little emphasis has been placed on understanding the political and economic conditions that lead to security, or how the interests of national and external actors in security reform programmes differ. Outsiders frequently underestimate the complexity and long-term nature of SSR in developing and transition states, in the process attributing the lack of reform to a failure of political will when other considerations may equally be at play. The dangers of incomplete and crude analyses are that donors may apply inappropriate pressure on governments, putting them to move more quickly than is advisable. The issue then is not simply that outsiders may lack a picture of how things work in the security domain, but that national ownership of the reform processes that donors are trying to ‘support’ can be undermined because of weak linkages between locally-rooted research and policy making processes. External actors are not all ‘sovereign’ agents; ‘contracting-out’ and privatization of SSR contracts means that Private Military Companies (PMCs), international consulting companies, and NGOs are becoming increasingly involved in this area, and will likely become more so in future. However, the general agreement among scholars26 is that the straddles of SSR that have been initiated in Africa under the banner of peace-building and/or democratization either by donor influence or by local decisions have often been piecemeal rather than through an integrated strategic planning framework. SSR programmes have, by and large, been negotiated and implemented directly between individual African states and external actors with little (if any) reference to the AU/RECs. Conceptual and design frameworks have also largely reflected foreign models. While these external actors are in many cases well-intentioned, it would be unrealistic not to expect that they have their own national interests and geopolitical agendas reflecting the heightened security profile of Africa and African issues. The issue is further complicated by the role of new powers (such as China) and the increasing military engagement of traditional global actors from outside the region, especially the US and NATO. Furthermore, the primary focus has been on adopting the rhetoric of Western norms resulting in ‘cosmetic reforms’, rather than concrete initiatives to strengthen the governance and viability of the sector, particularly through the creation of a public and political environment conducive to meaningful SSR.

Thus a crucial issue associated with this is the need for indigenous norms and principles. Since the demand for SSR may come predominantly from donors, and is not ‘owned’ by indigenous forces or grounded in local norms or culture, they also tend to be relatively shallow and unsustainable. The focus on spreading Western norms and practices to inform how security structures should be governed often comes at the expense of a sustained injection of technical and financial support to help countries address the many barriers to change. Not surprisingly, the Europeanization of thinking on SSR leads to anti-
ficiation. In some respects this has to do with the narrow focus of certain SSR processes: most of the reforms initiated by external donors are intended to reduce budget deficits or to channel more public resources for development, or as part of political transitions following regime change or peace agreements.

From the perspective of many aid recipients, SSR has been associated with cuts in security expenditures, efforts to emasculate the security forces, and external meddling in political matters, all of which can create resistance to donor approaches.60 There is also a significant conflict between fiscal and security objectives in many donor-supported SSR programmes. Furthermore, donor interventions have tended to be characterized by lack of co-ordination, even between departments of the same government. There are very few experiences of integrated international assistance programmes, bringing together development and security actors that could be used to inform policy and programming. Efforts to harmonize security and development policies have in practice suffered from a lack of ‘coherence’ among international donors. Even where there has been some coherence, the voice of those most affected by poverty and insecurity tended to go unheard, with all too little impact on policy. Moreover, both the problems and the solutions have tended to be externally defined: although donors are ready to acknowledge the need to consult with local stakeholders, they have been less prepared to contemplate fundamental reassertions of their own policies and programmes.

Arguably, Africa is the largest ‘market’ for SSR and SSR-related services. African ownership, however, remains limited. This is where the AU should step in. This is not a matter of the AU/RECs displacing external actors (ideally that is merely feasible nor necessary), but of ensuring more balanced partnerships and monitoring to ensure better alignment between SSR conceptualisation and design and African realities. In a way the AU should serve as a watchdog for external players engaged in SSR in Africa. There is a need for African scholars and policy makers to rethink the strategies that could best guide external involvement in SSR and canvass its intended benefits.

The AU needs its own policy framework to guide international stakeholders as they engage in security sector reform in Africa. This is to ensure that SSR activities in Africa are demand-driven and framed to the needs of African societies. Donor-supported SSR programmes are helpful, but the orientation should be changed and an African framework should guide their content. The AU should develop an African framework for SSR that prioritizes the continent’s needs and concerns and which will reflect African ownership. In this way the AU can make its mark on the SSR stage.

VI. Gender and Transitional Justice

Another significant element in an African SSR package is the focus on gender and transitional justice. Gender Based Violence (GBV) has been, and continues to be, a feature of virtually all recent armed conflicts in Africa61. As recently as ten years ago, most GBV committed during periods of armed conflict has been either condoned or ignored. This silence is in significant measure a function of deeply embedded cultural assumptions that acquiesce to the ‘inevitability’ of violence and exploitation of women and girls. The AU’s PCRD policy addresses this issue in its section on human rights, justice and reconciliation where it affirms, “total rejection of impunity, as expressed in Article 4 (o) of the AU’s Constitutive Act.”62 Thus its policy formulation, implementation and resource mobilization strategies must be geared toward the realization of this fundamental principle.

As it is one of the six indicative elements to be addressed in the PCRD,63 gender is one of the AU’s priority areas. The AU recognizes the importance of achieving gender equality and meeting the specific needs of women in the post-conflict environment as critical to sustainable peace building, especially in light of the nature of recent conflicts where women have borne the brunt of the conflict. The issue of equality and justice cannot be achieved without a broader framework linking SSR to justice, particularly transitional justice issues which can make or break peace building processes. However, the issue of justice is not limited to transitions. There is a consensus that SSR becomes ‘SSR’ when it occurs in the context of rule of law (RoL), and that only the existence of RoL guarantees that security will be delivered accountably, equitably, and with due respect for human rights, in a context where security agents are fully subject to the laws of the land, and all citizens—the weak and vulnerable in particular—have unimpeded access to due process and equal protection of the law. How a regional SSR framework would contribute toward improving access to justice (as a condition of sustainable security and a value in its own right), in both the procedural and substantive sense, remains a challenge.

VII. Security and Justice

SSR practitioners and activists alike tend to focus narrowly on issues of security to the exclusion of justice and rule of law issues (with the exception of policing and corrections). Unfortunately, this focus is a manifestation of a bigger problem of definition and conceptualization. Advocates of transitional justice do not often take issues of SSR on board (other than in a critical issue is the sequencing of justice and SSR on the one hand and justice and peace on the other. Innovative approaches are required to deal with the most complex aspect of timing and of when and how to conduct SSR processes and integrate them into modern and traditional justice mechanisms. Inserting SSR into transitional justice processes, therefore, remains a challenge. Thus, it is important to explore how all strands of SSR can be brought into the transitional justice community, including priorities and sequencing, examples of good practice and successful programming, support to transitional justice, staffing requirements, financial instruments and use of vetting mechanisms all directed towards building an SSR-sensitive justice regime. Moreover, justice reform is often seen as expensive, complex and protracted. Often, the legal framework of the prevailing security sector does not provide much room for oversight and intervention by judicial institutions. Lack of coherence between policy communities can be further complicated by the fact that security and justice issues are often handled in a disjointed manner by different units or ministries at headquarters and field levels. A discourse on a regional framework for SSR could be an ideal place to resolve this issue and promote the inclusion of SSR into transitional justice processes. Definitely, the ability of the AU to influence and shape the SSR content of justice depends on the AU itself developing an African SSR policy informed by clear and African-centered SSR principles and modalities.

VIII. Countering the Informal Sector

Any policy deliberation on SSR in Africa, if it is not going to be decorative, needs to give serious consideration to the informal sector. Institutions and processes that are often traditional, informal and indigenous play a crucial role in the provision of security and sometimes in the governance of security in Africa. To some degree, it is now recognized that delivering security and justice in fragile and post-conflict states is not limited to or monopolized by the state, but is in reality multi-layered, involving many overlapping (even competing) structures and agents, including ‘traditional’ and ‘customary’ institutions, such as village chiefs, councils of elders, age groups and non-formal societies. There is also ample evidence that, where the state is weak or absent, the latter may be responsible for up to 80% of service delivery at the local level.64 Africa is a continent in which institutions and processes that are often traditional, informal and indigenous play a crucial role in the provision of security and sometimes in the governance of security. However, by no means all of these local mechanisms are ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ in nature. A growing role is played by ‘popular’ and non-formal organs (vigilante organizations, ‘neighborhood watch’, ‘people’s courts’, etc) that have emerged sometimes spontaneously and in response to specific local demands, which may contest both state and traditional institutions and are themselves highly mutable over time.65 Equally important, non-statutory security services often enjoy a legitimacy that is not always extended to the formal security and justice sector, which is widely viewed as alien, inaccessible and corrupt, in addition to genuine (and serious) issues of capacity. Since the real focus of pro-poor service delivery is local customary and non-formal structures, rather than the state, it is at this level that reconstruction must begin. This is related to the peculiarities of the African state discussed.

61. J. Ward, “If Not Now, When?” Addressing Gender Based Violence in Refugee, Internally Displaced and Post-Conflict Settings, A Global Over-
63. Ibid.
64. Ball, N., Biezeheul, Tom Hamilton-Baillie, and Fumi Olomosakin, Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa, FID London and Glasgow, Evaluation Working Paper 23, 2007. This was further articulated by Eboe Hutchful (Director of ASDR and Chair of ASSR) in his explanatory note dated July 11,2009. It is worth underscoring that the relevance of these customary and non-formal institutions extends beyond post-conflict conflicts, as their role in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, etc. suggest.
below. Any policy package on SSR at a regional or national level should take into account the co-existence of different legal and juridical arrangements, and their contradictory as well as symbiotic functioning.66 Clearly, there is a dire need to review existing research initiatives and determine whether additional case studies are needed in order to understand better how non-state providers of security and justice operate. The AU should conduct a study on this or base its policy on the latest work on non-state security and justice providers. The same is true with most of the policy imperatives, such as the African SSR experience, outlined above. There is a need for the AU to make considerable progress on developing more detailed and coherent guidelines for the planning and implementation of security and justice programs.67 Any SSR policy in Africa should try ‘hard’ to interface the formal with the informal sectors of security provision.

IX. Civil Society is Central

Africa has the distinction of being the only continent where civil society began to actively engage in SSR research and policy processes long before states and regional organizations began to take the issue seriously. Central to all SSR processes in Africa is the role of civil society. Clearly, the role of CSOs varies from region to region (discussed above) as it is related to levels of democratization and the progress of political transitions. Perhaps the area on which agreement among analysts is broadest is the appropriateness of civil society’s role in the development and implementation of SSR policies and programs in Africa. Civil society organizations can and will continue to play a critical role in two respects: mobilizing the resources and constituency for reform and involvement in policy processes. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and CSOs have played a crucial role in encouraging the AU to calibrate its approach towards SSR so that it is comprehensive, holistic and sustainable. Hence, a vital element in any SSR framework, and one which is unique to Africa, is the recognition that SSR is a civil society-led process. There is a strong institutional and knowledge base of SSR within African civil society. It is out of this rationale for this stems from the weak process of knowledge generation and assimilation among policy makers and security personnel.

Apart from their research and policy development roles, CSOs can also be a ‘watchdog’ regarding accountability processes in good governance and SSR, and in the evolution of the APSA. The success of the SSR agenda in Africa will be significantly increased if it is a government-sanctioned process that is conducted in a participatory manner, supported and deemed appropriate by the international community and local civil society organizations. An enhanced civil society role is critical in the formulation and monitoring of security policy and in generating public interest, understanding and engagement in SSR. Various significant developments within the African Union point to the need for AU-civil society collaboration in SSR. The AU’s Constitutive Act legitimizes the intervention of civil society in its peace and security agenda, while the African Common Defense and Security Policy (ACDSP) articulates civil society’s valuable role. It was along these lines that the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), a network of civil society organizations working on SSR, and the Center for Policy Research & Dialogue (CPRD), a regional think tank dealing with SSR issues in the Horn of Africa, have had several consultations over the last three years with AU departments in preparing the ground for an African SSR policy framework.66 From the AU side, the Peace and Security Directorate, the Political Affairs Department, and the Citizens & Diaspora Organizations Directorate (CDSO) were in one form or another involved in the AU-civil society collaboration in SSR. Central to this process was the creation of a forum for dialogue on SSR between the continental-wide civil society networks, such as the ASSN, with the African Union and the UN. However, support for such an initiative has been slow and international stakeholders in SSR in Africa, with the exception of the UN, have yet to show commitment to the process. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that in terms of capacities at a sub-regional level, civil society’s engagement with SSR issues is most advanced in Southern and West Africa.70 The capacity of civil society groups in other regions has yet to be developed. Community NGOs, independent media and independent research and advocacy institutions are increasingly seen as important in monitoring the security sector and ensuring transparency, thereby providing the checks and balances that are necessary for promoting democratic control of the security sector. The viability of a continental approach to SSR owned by the AU is, to a large extent, dependent on the extent to which it allows robust civil society involvement, and is informed and responsive to it. The AU must draw on African CSO technical expertise at the local, national, regional and continental levels. Nonetheless, whatever the level of civil society involvement and activism, confronting the nature of the African state (and the problems associated with it) is critical to moving any process of reform forward.

X. The Elephant in the Room: the African State

Irrespective of its capacity to deliver, the African state remains central to security. It cannot be replaced, as this would be neither possible nor useful. The turn over of this argument is that regardless of the difficulties to be encountered, there is no alternative other than engagement with the current governments. The same is true with parliamentarians. However deficient their legitimacy is, engaging parliamentarians on SSR is critical. Parliamentarians remain one of the most hopeful entry points for SSR in Africa. The challenge is to strengthen the capacity of parliamentarians to undertake oversight duties and develop their awareness on security and defense matters. Furthermore, due to the nature of political and security systems, initiating and consolidating the SSR agenda in many parts of Africa would be mainly the task of the government assisted by a robust civil society. The general political and security situation in most African countries dictates that the best way to approach the SSR agenda is to start by increasing the awareness on the security sector with the ultimate objective of bringing security issues into the public domain. Further, the debates themselves would be instrumental in creating an effective constituency and a vehicle to push the SSR agenda in a sustained manner. This is based on the belief that security should be seen as a public policy issue and that both the civilian policy sectors and civil society should be invited to provide input to the policy formulation processes. This could also minimize the negative stereotyping among many politicians about the security role CSOs should play in Africa.

There is a widespread perception on the part of governments that an SSR agenda driven solely by civil society groups (and in most cases by the donors behind them) shows less interest in strong and formidable security institutions. As a result, CSOs should re-adjust their position from a mere focus on governance aspects to taking the operational effectiveness of African security institutions seriously. To this effect SSR needs to be requirements-based, drawing upon existing realities, interests, and supportive of conflict resolution and capacity building in each country. The focus should be on how governments actually perceive and define their security problems. SSR in Africa should emphasize the benefits governments get from SSR, such as developing their capacity to best resolve current and immediate problems in terms of security and development. A priority should be on developing a better understanding among governments that the SSR agenda is useful for creating well-governed and operationally effective security institutions and that it helps to resolve their security problems. Governments may be more receptive to the SSR agenda if it is presented as a framework to structures thinking about how to address their security challenges as a civil society consultation.

As the structural limitations of the African state become more evident, the need for new approaches the extra mileage to SSR in Africa has to be underscored to avoid undermining the whole SSR project. It is wise to assume that the history, nature and character of the African state are fundamentally different from the modern European state. This probably explains why external pressures on SSR, in several cases, have not led to the desired outcomes. However, it is not enough to acknowledge this gap; practical ideas on how on how to bridge it must be presented.71 An SSR policy, if it hopes to be applicable, needs to address the gap between the state and society in Africa. Often, the state in Africa is a highly contested terrain where different nationalities, sub-nationalities, ‘ethnic groups’ and communities fight amongst themselves for the appropriation of resources and political power. Most states face difficulties in representing the interests and characters of their populations. They have yet to create inclusive, representative and legitimate political processes and systems. Consequently, federalism, and in some respects the dichotomy, involving security and justice was further discussed by Eboe in his piece entitled “Building More Robust Linkages between Security and Justice in ASSN Work.” July 2009.

66. Represent this conference, a small number of members at this conference, a small number of members at this conference, a small number of members at this conference, a small number of members at this conference, a small number of members at this conference, a small number of members at this conference, a small number of members at this conference. 67. Here, as in other cases close cooperation between the Peace and Security Department and the Department for Political Affairs of the AU is needed.

68. Prominent among these was the conference on SSR, which was organized at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa (July 13-14 2006) and attended by experts in the field from around the world and practitioners from across the region.

69. Examples include the ASSN which is housed in the African Security Dialogue & Research (ASSDR) in Accra, Ghana, and the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) and the IIS and SADSEM in Southern Africa.

70. In other words: there are issues to be tackled (such as the artificiality of the state in Africa) alongside aiming at the governance of the security sector. Understanding the nature of the state will go a long way to seriously in a realistic and strategic manner.

71. The dilemma, and in some respects the dichotomy, involving security and justice was further discussed by Eboe in his piece entitled “Building More Robust Linkages between Security and Justice in ASSN Work.” July 2009.
such states suffer from political instability and institutional disarray and pose real challenges to reform and democratic transition. This has remained the main source of instability, leading to years of conflict and violence.

In recent decades the fight over the state has been at once violent and strange, and their legitimacy is highly contested. A SSR policy framework for Africa (if it is not going to remain superficial) has to address the central question of the gap between the state and society. What is at stake is the disarticulation of the state in Africa. Many of the states cannot deliver even basic security. SSR could help by creating strong states that can deliver. Democratization in the largest states (as mentioned above) is thus critical. SSR should be grounded in a fundamental rethink of the state and the inherited (post-colonial) security institutions and concepts, which have been manifestly problematic under African conditions. This specificity needs to be recognized in any major policy imperative and SSR policy needs to be grounded in the milieu of the African state: SSR should be viewed in the context of nation and state building in Africa. The AU SSR policy framework should therefore be realistic, probably humble, and generic enough to permit its development in a particular political and historical context.

Conclusion

Regional peace and security initiatives have underlined Africa’s determination to come to grips with its conflicts. Within Africa, a range of mechanisms and strategies have been developed in response to specific challenges. The African Union has acknowledged the importance of Security Sector Reform to re-establish the architecture of the state, an essential component of post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development. The framework for an approach to SSR can be found in a range of existing AU policies, treaties and solemn declarations, including the Constitutive Act and the Common Defense and Security Policy. The AU has tried to ensure that most of its policy documents reflect some degree of SSR, but they are fragmented and have a narrow focus, so far not allowing for a coherent SSR framework to be put in place. However, the AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy framework has demonstrated the organization’s commitment to promote “sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict.” The policy aims to encourage a timely, effective and coordinated response to recovery and reconstruction efforts by addressing the challenges of security, humanitarian assistance, socio-economic development, political governance, human rights, justice and reconciliation as well as issues of gender. The PCRD is comprehensive and broad in terms of post-conflict reconstruction, but rather thin on SSR. Other than explaining the need for reform and enumerating the target groups, the document says little about the strategic and substantive considerations required to initiate long-term and comprehensive SSR strategies in Africa. Furthermore, the implementation of the PCRD policy has not made headway.

While the AU’s attempt is encouraging, it has shortcomings, and a case can be made that SSR requires a new approach and mechanism and should be supported in a much more strategic, patient and regional manner. Africa is the largest “market” for SSR and SSR-related services. African ownership, however, remains limited. The AU should provide that. Meanwhile, new concepts (such as SSR and human security) are entering into all of the AU’s important policy documents and security discourse. The AU should develop an African framework for SSR that prioritizes the continent’s needs and concerns which will reflect African ownership, making sure that the orientation and content of reforms are guided by an African framework. Developing a strong and comprehensive continental framework for SSR is a prerequisite for peace and security in Africa and the AU must address it robustly and effectively.

Recommendations

1. Coordinate the mobilization of resources for SSR in Africa.
2. Facilitate vetting and mobilization of African SSR expertise and capacity (maintain register of existing African capacity for SSR).
3. Build coherent regional consensus on engagement with donors and global military players. Help design a united African position on every aspect of engagement with external actors. Serve as a watchdog and norm-setter of external security actors. This helps to ensure a more balanced partnership (as well as monitoring, etc.), which ensures better alignment between SSR conceptualization and design and African realities.
4. Provide a framework to guide stakeholders’ engagement in security sector reform in Africa. This ensures that SSR activities in Africa are demand-driven and framed to the needs of the African states themselves.
5. Provide a monitoring and evaluation regime for SSR in Africa, particularly with regard to peacekeeping operations.Greater focus and priority should be given to troop-contributing African countries for particular SSR tasks. SSR should inform the ASF doctrine and training curricula.
6. Most importantly: encourage targeted research, facilitate policy processes and dialogues and experience-sharing around the 10 major policy directions (substantive recommendations) discussed in section 5 above.
7. Allow a stronger role for civil society. Although Africa’s regional peace and security architectures basically respond to the needs and decisions of governments, analysis and insights needed to determine the effectiveness of these processes are available mainly from civil society. The challenge for the AU will therefore be to develop a reliable and confident relationship between the PSC and civil society. Identifying an SSR cluster within the CSO (ECOSSOC) process and engaging with it in a sustained and strategic manner may help greatly. Much is needed from the UN to help ongoing initiatives effectively interface between Peace and Security CSOs and the African Union.

72. For further annotation on this particular issue see Medhane Tadesse’s writings on the nature of the state, notably “Conflict Resolution Best Practices in Africa”. Reports from the Tswalu Dialogue, July 2009.
73. African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
8. Develop better and more systematic coordination and communication between the UN, the AU and sub-regional organizations on matters of the security sector, including an MoU between the AU and RECs which clearly defines the division of tasks and responsibilities.

9. Encourage and support member countries to develop National Security Strategies including elements of SSR. Similarly, RECs should review their regional peace and security strategies in order to integrate SSR elements.

10. Encourage and support the Pan-African Parliament as a forum of dialogue on issues related to the governance of security in Africa. Strengthening the capacities of political parties and parliaments to deal with security issues is, therefore, a key concern of SSR in Africa. Regional parliaments should engage the RECs on the issue of SSR.

11. Seek the support of the UN as the most politically neutral and legitimate among the international players to strengthen the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations to undertake peace operations. In this regard, an increase in the number of SSR training courses for peace operations offered in African military schools would greatly help.

References

1. 9th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, Banjul, the Gambia, 28 to 29 June 2006.
32. UN Report(A/62/659;S/2008/39)
33. www.unifem.com