

Mário Soares.

A Politician and President of Unwritten Constitutional Competences.

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1. Introduction

Mário Soares devoted his whole life to politics. He found his vocation in the office of President of the Portuguese Republic, which he occupied from 1986 to 1996. As the first civil President of the Second Republic, he shaped the functioning of the office and consolidated the role of the President as a moderator and arbiter of political life.¹ His rhetorical skills and charismatic personality helped create a close relationship to the people (by whom he is affectionately called *bucheixas*). The closeness to the people granted him the legitimacy to act as a fourth pillar of power, next to the executive, legislative and judiciary powers.

The constitutional competences for presidential intervention empower him to an indirect influence on the executive and legislative ambit. In the majority of cases, these means of influence have a “blocking” character. For instance: the President can impede the enactment of a law by making use of his veto power, but he is not involved in the process of devising that law.² In contrast, his unwritten constitutional competences, which are enacted through communication, are of a constructive nature. Soares' implementation of the presidential office played a major role in modeling their possibilities. He originated two instruments, which operate productively and which were adopted by his successors: the *Magistratura de Influência* and the *Presidência Aberta*. The first defines the mediating role of the President between political and social actors. The *Presidência Aberta* is a simple but effective instrument used by the President to call attention to specific problems, causing the need for a reaction from the responsible actors. Two *Presidências Abertas* will be highlighted in the course of this thesis. The first, held on the Azores, was considered a great success, where Soares acted as an intermediate authority between the regional and central Government. The second one, in the metropolitan area of Lisbon, had the contrary effect: Soares was perceived as the center of opposition, who deliberately wanted to impair the Government.

The present thesis is a political analysis of Soares' interventions and interactions during his presidency. The analysis will demonstrate, how large presidential influence is in Portugal in general, and how large Soares' influence was specifically. Soares mainly resorted to his unwritten constitutional competences. This thesis will examine why and when Presidents of a semi-presidential system such as Portugal follow this strategy. The assortment of examples of interventionist instruments will give an overview of the vast range of possibilities for presidential influence. Charismatic and rhetorical skills are of utter importance for the achievement of the President's goals in the area of foreign policy and national politics, when

¹ The Portuguese President's role as “moderator and arbiter” traces back to Benjamin Constant's *pouvoir neutre* (cf. Blaeschke, Axel/Gall, Lothar (Hrsg.), Benjamin Constant. Werke in Vier Bänden, 4. Band, Politische Schriften, Propyläen Verlag, Berlin 1970), which was literally transferred into the Portuguese Constitution of 1926 (cf. Gall, Lothar, Benjamin Constant: seine politische Ideenwelt und der deutsche Vormärz, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1963, S. 174).

² Cf. Gomes Canotilho, J. J./Moreira, Vital, Os poderes do Presidente da República, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra 1991, p. 111.

unwritten constitutional competences are applied. Therefore, in these areas this paper focuses upon Soares' speeches and interaction with other political actors. The these that Soares' won his battles with words, is to be documented.

The recourse to the historical development of Portugal and Soares' contribution during this time are essential for the understanding of the political situation in the 80s and 90s, the role of the President in the semi-presidential system and the exceptional position Soares occupied. The starting point is the *Estado Novo*, against which most of the later influential political actors offered resistance. After the Carnation Revolution in 1974, the fight for the definition of the Portuguese state began, in which Soares played a leading role and emerged as a winner. However, the political situation after the revolutionary phase was by no means stable. It was followed by a ten-year period characterized by power struggles within and between parties, political actors and the military. The most important milestone was the constitutional revision of 1982, which ended military dominance in politics and the state. The constitutional evolution is considered important for the understanding of the President's position in the political system, which is why it will be referred to in the course of this thesis: first in its original version of 1976, later under consideration of the revisions of 1982 and 1989. The role played by President António Ramalho Eanes will be emphasized, as he was the first President of the young democracy and made a great contribution to the consolidation process of the system.

This thesis largely makes use of Portuguese literature, due to the fact that German political science has not yet discovered Portugal as an object of investigation. Among the literature used, many works in form of interviews were analyzed, allowing a deeper insight behind the political scenes. The journalist and author Maria João Avillez is not only a known antagonist of Soares, but her book series in form of interviews, which cover most of Soares' political life, constitute a highly critical view on Soares' political performance and the answers were personally verified by Soares before their publication. Because of this, these books give an accurate overview of the political situation and motivation of Soares, which is why I will refer to them extensively in the course of this thesis. In March 2008, I had the possibility to converse with Mário Soares personally. A shortened version of the interview is presented in the Appendix.

2. Charisma and Rhetoric in Theory and Practice

Charisma and rhetoric are characteristics which are essential for a politician in a leading role. With a charismatic nature and a rousing rhetoric, a political leader can convince, achieve consensus and implement his positions without having to resort to authoritarian elements. These characteristics become particularly effective for the President of democratic, parliamentary regimes, because specific outcomes or the pressure for reelection are less relevant for the President than for the government or Parliament.

The origin of the term *rhetoric* can be found in the ancient world. Aristotle primarily allots rhetoric to political action. He concentrates on the study of the strength of rhetorical argumentation, i.e. on the analysis of the rhetorical process. The term rhetoric in its modern application rather has its foundation in Cicero's work, who placed his focus on the orator. In this sense, rhetoric is “the art of speaking well”³.

Three aspects pertain to the definition of rhetoric. First, it is the theory and practice of an effective and convincing speech, i.e. a mode of communication that intends to persuade (a persuasion technique), the art to incite effectively according to the situation. Second, rhetoric must be understood as the ability to deliver discourse of moral integrity. This means that the speaker does not only possess technically convincing skills but additionally has the capacity to resort to ethical-moral values. In addition, rhetoric is the art of esthetic sophisticated language in writing and speech.⁴

Soares is a master of the art of rhetoric. Soares says: “(...) mais do que agradar, gosto de convencer. Procuo ser persuasivo, gosto de discutir com as pessoas, (...) de as seduzir intelectualmente, conseguindo estabelecer empatias e laços afectivos.”⁵ Soares holds that he knows how to communicate with the people. He likes to speak to people, he likes the people and the likes to be amidst them.⁶ In Portugal there is a saying that Soares speaks to the stones and they reply; an indication that the belief that Soares masters the art of conversation is shared by the Portuguese population.

In regard to his presidency, which primarily concentrates on communication with the people, the adaptability of Soares' rhetoric to the addressee stands out. He involves the receptor in his argumentation and thus moves into the recipient's territory.⁷ Using this strategy in argumentation and choice of words, Soares connects to the addressee, presenting himself as a peer. By doing this in his role as President, he created a perception that he was a true representative of the people's interests. Soares uses a simple language, understandable for

³ Ottmers, Clemes, *Rhetorik*, 2. edition, J.B. Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart/Weimar 2007, p. 6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Círculo de Leitores Lisboa 1997, p. 216.

⁶ Cf. Appendix 1 “Interview with Mario Soares”, p. 122.

⁷ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 77.

everyone. His high level of education is brought to bear in the smoothness with which Soares works references to philosophers, political theories or historical aspects into his speeches.

In politics, rhetoric is directly connected to power: the one with the best rhetorical abilities wins the debate.⁸ The quality of the arguments is not relevant, only their power to persuade. The events in Marinha Grande during the election campaign in 1986⁹ are an excellent example for Soares' ability to turn situations to his advantage, even if they initially seem to be in his disfavor, by using the “right” rhetoric.

Yet without a charismatic personality, rhetoric abilities show little effect. One cannot attain charisma the way one learns the art of communication. According to Max Weber, the term charisma will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary. The effectiveness of charisma is dependent on its recognition by the ruled people. This approval must be one based on the devotion of the addressees, resulting from exaltation, affliction or hope. Charismatic rule is specifically irrational, in a sense of foreignness to norms, and only legitimate, as long as the personal charisma of the sovereign prevails, i.e. finds recognition.¹⁰

According to Weber, governance which solely builds on charisma is not possible, because charisma is an uneconomic power and therefore does not correspond to reality.¹¹ Hence, charismatic governance must change its character, if it is to prevail, by either becoming traditional or rational. In the process, various idealistic and materialistic interests must always be considered: those of the followers, who seek the continuity and strengthening of the community, as well as those of the administrative staff, which aims for a continuation of its relationships, in which its own position is pillared upon a stable foundation.¹²

In practice, this means that a political leader cannot establish his position on charisma alone. Nevertheless, the intense personalization of Portuguese politics encouraged the assumption of leading positions by charismatic personalities. In the context of party politics, this phenomenon was underpinned by the typical, strict hierarchical party structure and – resulting from this – concentration upon the respective party leaders. A good example can be found in the person of Álvaro Cunhal, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, who occupied the position for 31 years. Because of the general anticommunist atmosphere in the country, Cunhal did not always have the easiest office to fill, however – as an individual – he continuously obtained great respect and admiration from all political groups and social levels. In return, parties which periodically had no charismatic leaders, as was the case in the PSD between 1980 and 1985, struggled with inner-party disputes and disagreements, which lead to political stagnation.

⁸ Cf. Sloane, Thomas O., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, 624 ff.

⁹ Cf. Chapter 5.1 “Presidential Candidacy and Election in 1986 and 1991”

¹⁰ Cf. Weber, Max, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*, 5. edition, Studienausgabe, Tübingen 1980, p. 140f.

¹¹ Cf. *ibid.* p. 656.

¹² Cf. *ibid.* p. 143.

Soares passed through several stages of alternating charismatic dominance in the course of his political life. There were periods in which his charisma found recognition, and others in which it did not. These phases will be outlined in the course of this thesis. The years of Soares' presidency represent the chapter of his political life in which his charismatic nature was brought forth most advantageously. Whilst Soares was dependent on the support of the parties in the election campaign in 1986, he could have relied solely upon the appreciation of the people in 1991. The exponential increase of individual acceptance is based on the fact that the President does not have to produce outcomes or render accomplishments by which he is rated. By carrying out his office close to the public, he created a trust relationship with the people, and because of the direct election of the President, this bond legitimated him to execute power.

Soares is the unification of the two fundamental characteristics of a political leader, and he was always aware of this. As a result, he founded a specific style of conducting his presidency close to the people, the *Presidência Aberta*, and shaped the functioning of the presidential office until today.

It is worth mentioning that Soares writes his speeches himself, and he does this, in his own words, in a “mau costume, próprio dos advogados, de deixar tudo para a última hora do prazo”¹³. Many speeches are improvised all together and it could also happen that Soares had a written speech at hand, but decided to improvise to react to an unexpected situation. This was the case at the inauguration of the monument “*Aos Mortos do Ultramar*” on the 15th of January 1994¹⁴, where Soares silenced protestors with his improvised speech.

¹³ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 300.

¹⁴ Cf. Soares, Mário, Sublinhar aquilo que nos une, in: Soares, Mário, Intervenções 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 69f.

3. The Role of Soares in the Revolutionary Phase 1974-1976

3.1 The Opposition in the *Estado Novo* and the End of the Dictatorship

The Government of the first Republic was overthrown by a military coup in 1926 and was followed by a period of repression. António Oliveira de Salazar was voted Prime Minister in 1932, and established the *Estado Novo* in 1933 on the foundation of a new constitution: a military dictatorship with a corporate constitution, which rather corresponded to an authoritarian state tailored to Salazar.¹⁵ The *Estado Novo* was characterized by censorship of the press, prohibition of strikes, limited freedom of assembly and control by the secret police PIDE.¹⁶ Parties were forbidden, with the exception of the unitary party *União Nacional*, which was lead by Salazar. The only oppositional party which survived in clandestine circumstances was the *Partido Comunista de Portugal* (PCP). By permitting the formation of oppositional election alliances in anticipation of an election, presidential and parliamentary elections were reintroduced after World War II, but this procedure merely had the function of creating the appearance of democratic structures for the allies. Whilst the opposition used the liberalization to campaign their positions, the candidacies were drawn back right before the election to protest against the expected manipulation of the results.

Mário Soares actively worked in the opposition from the 1940s onward. He studied history and philosophy, followed by law, at the Lisbon University. The oppositional groups at the university were scarce: left professors were expelled from the academies and the few collegiate oppositional groups were formed by members of the communist party. Because of this, Soares approached the PCP and joined their juvenile organization – not as a communist, but as a governmental opponent.¹⁷ He participated in the foundation of the MUD Juvenil (*Movimento de Unidade Democrática da Juventude*), which was declared illegal in 1948. As a consequence, many members, amongst them Soares, were arrested. After being discharged, Soares became Secretary-General of the candidacy committee for the presidential elections of General Norton de Matos, who had executed the office of minister and ambassador in the First Republic. Although his candidacy was supported by the population, Norton de Matos pulled it back a couple of days before the election.¹⁸

In the course of the following years, Soares increasingly dissociated himself from the PCP. The cold war had a radicalizing effect on the procedural methods of the party and Soares, inspired by authors such as Arthur Koestler, Hannah Arendt and George Orwell, searched for a

¹⁵ Cf. Von Rahden, Manuel, Portugiesische Zeitgeschichte: von Nelkenrevolution bis zum Jahr 1997, in: Briesemeister, Dietrich/Schöneberger, Axel (Hrsg.), Portugal heute. Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, Vervuert Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1997, p.213-246, here p. 214.

¹⁶ The PIDE had the function of purging oppositional incentives, if they arose despite preventive measures. In 1969 it was renamed to PIDE/DGS as a sign of official liberalization, yet in reality its organization tightened even more. Cf. Sängler, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach "Europa": die Entwicklung von einem autoritär-korporativen Regime zu einer bürgerlich-parlamentarischen Demokratie, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 95 f..

¹⁷ Cf. Soares, Mário, Memória Viva, Editorial Quasi, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p.36.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.* p. 38 ff.

new leftist path which did not correspond to the Soviet pattern of communism. In 1953 he founded the *Resistência Republicana e Socialista* (RRS) with Tito de Morais and Ramos da Costa. Soares defines the general route for the secession from communism as follows: in a first step, one assigns the mistake to the people and not to the doctrine, then the doctrinal system is put into question, followed by the search for an alternative.¹⁹ The RRS represented the first phase. The actual alternative to the PCP was created with the foundation of the *Ação Socialista de Portugal* (ASP) in 1964 by RRS members in Geneva. Soares was voted the first Secretary-General. In its manifesto of December 1965, the ASP set the goal for the realization of democratic socialism in Portugal.²⁰ The communication medium of the movement was the „*Portugal Socialista*“, a form of party journal.

General Humberto Delgado, a military who had been involved in the coup of 1926, but subsequently worked against the regime, advanced as a candidate for the presidential election in 1958, opposing the regime candidate Américo Tomaz. Despite intimidation strategies by the PIDE, Delgado managed to elate the population and only lost the election due to massive electoral fraud. Delgado protested against the results, whereupon he was persecuted until being forced to take refuge in exile. He continued his oppositional work²¹ until he was murdered by the PIDE.²² Soares supported Delgado during his candidacy and represented Delgado's family in the murder trial.²³

In the 1960s, Soares alternated between imprisonment and monitored liberty because of his political activities, until he was deported to São Tomé e Príncipe for ten months in 1968. When he returned, Marcelo Caetano had inherited the office of head of Government of the *Estado Novo*, yet there was no change in the handling of the oppositional groups.²⁴ In 1970, Soares had no choice but to leave the country and go into exile in Paris, where he continued his oppositional work as Secretary-General of the ASP and made many contacts to European socialists, the most important being Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand and Olof Palme. These contacts proved themselves as very valuable in the later course of Soares' political career.²⁵

¹⁹ Cf. Mesquita, Mário/Soares, Mário, *Conservadores e Neoliberais não têm Soluções para o Futuro*. Entrevista concedida ao jornal *Diário de Notícias*, 19.04.1993, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 515-538, here p. 517.

²⁰ Cf. Sängner, Ralf, *Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“: die Entwicklung von einem autoritär-korporativen Regime zu einer bürgerlich-parlamentarischen Demokratie*, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 114ff.

²¹ Amongst others, with the foundation of the Frente Popular de Libertação Nacional (FPLN), which published information in foreign countries concerning the Portuguese situation, made foreign contacts and tried to organize foreign political pressure on the Portuguese government.

²² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 52 f.

²³ During the dictatorship, Soares mainly represented political defendants: resisting students, members of the African liberation movements, communist supporters and opponents to the colonial wars. Cf. Soares, Mário, *Uma Profissão Nobre*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 109-113, here p. 110.

²⁴ Salazar had a stroke on the 16th September 1968 and died from its aftermath on the 27th of July 1970. On the 27th of September 1968, Marcelo Caetano assumed all of Salazar's offices and tried to convert the *Estado Novo* into a *Estado Social* by a modernization of the system and liberalization of the state. The undertaking failed due to the huge influence of the *Ultras*, the hardliners within the system.

²⁵ Cf. Barreto, António/ Mónica, Maria Filomena, *Dicionário de História de Portugal*, Volume 9, Porto 2000, p. 448 ff.

In 1972, the ASP became a member of Socialist International,²⁶ followed by the compilation of the movement into a regular party, the Partido Socialista (PS), on the 19th of April 1973. The PS was founded with the support of the German Social Democrats in Bad Münstereifel and Soares was elected Secretary-General. The members residing in Portugal opposed the foundation of a conventional party,²⁷ but the exile members believed that an overthrow was possible in the near future, mainly based on the greater objectivity of information given by the foreign press. Soares was convinced that the dictatorship had to be overthrown from within the country, it was, however, essential for the party to be established by then, “para podermos tocar a música que o País devia ouvir quando o regime caísse”²⁸. The PS' declaration of intention of 1973 demanded the destruction of fascism by a socialist revolution, the end of the colonial wars followed by their independence and – as greatest priority – the formation of a pluralistic democracy. In an alliance with the PCP, a classless society was to be established. This alliance was essential for the PS because of the PCP's good anchorage in the working class: the PS had a small social basis, an underdeveloped organization level and little local presence. At the time of the revolution, the PS was a party of intellectuals and urban middle-class, whose foreign contacts were stronger than its domestic integration.²⁹

Another oppositional group worth mentioning was the *ala liberal*: a wing of independent deputies, who obtained their seats in Parliament over the party list of the União Nacional. This wing tried to implement a reform from within, the goal being the establishment of democracy. Their efforts, however, remained without success.³⁰ Soares was also invited to become a member of the *ala liberal*, yet he declined. For him, the *ala liberal* had the function of simulating liberalization, but in reality it was merely a government control device over the opposition.³¹

The efforts to end the dictatorship by political measures failed due to lacking cooperation between the oppositional groups and the well-trained secret police. Nevertheless, one can state that the civil resistance prepared the coup d'Etat.

The military, the main pillar of the *Estado Novo* itself, was responsible for the collapse of the regime in 1974, that represented the end of the dictatorship. The issue that led to the insurrection was the fact that the Government was not willing to end the colonial wars, which

²⁶ As the PS was not a party, it merely had the status of a observer. Full membership therefore was an argument for converting the ASP into a party.

²⁷ There were 7 votes against the transformation of the ASP into the PS, all from the delegates in Lisbon, who estimated an end of the dictatorship as very improbable, and who protested against the party out of fear of persecution by the PIDE/DGS. Cf. Mesquita, Mário/Soares, Mário, *Conservadores e Neoliberais não têm Soluções para o Futuro*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 515-538, here p. 525.

²⁸ Soares, Mário, *Dois anos depois*, Editorial Notícias, Lisboa 1998, p. 20.

²⁹ Cf. Sängner, Ralf, *Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“*, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 115f.

³⁰ Noteworthy members of the *ala liberal* were the founders of the PPD, Francisco Sá Carneiro, Francisco Pinto Balsemão und Joaquim Magalhães Mota.

³¹ Cf. Mesquita, Mário/Soares, Mário, *Conservadores e Neoliberais não têm Soluções para o Futuro*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 515-538, here p. 522.

persisted since the beginning of the 1960s. There were two groups offering resistance. First, the group around General António Spínola, who had a high position in the Armed Forces and who tried to approach the Government to achieve a political answer to the wars. Further, a group of young, leftist captains, who called themselves *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA) and believed that the colonial wars could only be terminated by an overturn of the regime. The MFA proceeded with the coup d'Etat on the 25th of April. It was a peaceful revolution, which was greeted by the population with great enthusiasm. Not even 24 hours later, Caetano surrendered and turned the power over to General Spínola.³²

A political program had been drawn before the execution of the putsch, which foresaw the insertion of a Junta after the coup; Spínola and the Chief of General Staff Francisco da Costa Gomes had declared their willingness to assume the leadership. In the night following the coup, the *Junta da Salvação Nacional* presented itself as the highest executive authority and the following three weeks could be described as peaceful anarchy. On the 14th of May, the Junta declared the dissolution of the old order and the validity of a provisional constitution.³³

The political development in Portugal must always be regarded with consideration to the military dominance, which was legitimated by the putsch of the MFA and persisted until the constitutional revision of the year 1982.

3.2 The Portuguese Parties and their Role in the Development of the Portuguese Democracy

Four parties surfaced within the first few weeks after the coup, and established themselves as the most important parties until today. These were the *Partido Socialista*, the *Partido Comunista de Portugal*, and the conservative parties *Partido Popular Democrático* and *Centro Democrático Social*.

3.2.1 Partido Socialista

Directly after the revolution, Soares did not lose time to exploit the benefits of his previous political actions. In his position as founder of the ASP and the PS, his leadership position within the party was guaranteed. At the same time, he cultivated good contacts to the PCP, which increased his reputation in the working class. Because of his contacts to the European heads of

³² More details on the colonial policy, the colonial war and the erection of military resistance and the putsch, cf. Appendix 2 “The Revolution of 1974 – Background and Performance”, p. 126 ff.

³³ The most important elements of the constitution were: 1) The JSN was composed of seven members, who beheld their mandate from the MFA; 2) The President was elected by the Junta, from one of its members; 3) The State Council consisted of 21 members, of which two-thirds had to originate from the military, and was elected by the Junta; 4) The provisional government was solely responsible before the President; its function included the general politics of the nation, legislation and the elaboration of an electoral law; 5) The Armed Forces possessed a high degree of autonomy.

state, it was unquestionable that he was to be sent abroad by the Junta to solicit the recognition of the new Portuguese state. By December 1974, when the first party congress took place, the PS defined itself through Soares. This extraordinarily high degree of personification would grow even more in the course of the years in which Soares was Secretary-General of the PS.³⁴

3.2.1.1 The Development and Role of the PS in the Revolutionary Phase

In the first months after the Revolution the PS was – as were all parties – engaged in expediting its organizational structure, clarifying ideological questions of principles, resolving policy issues and securing its position vis-à-vis competing political groups. The PS provided a significant part of the members of Government. Their main concern was the achievement of independence for the colonies and the abatement of the resulting domestic consequences.³⁵

The conflict between President Spínola and the Government over the decolonization process dominated the first months of the institutional development. Spínola wanted to integrate the colonies in a federal union, whilst the MFA, PCP, PS and Extreme Left insisted on their independence. The Government signed the treaty of independence for Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde on the 26th of August and a ceasefire agreement, including arrangements for the future independence of Mozambique, with the FRELIMO on the 7th of September. In an attempt to enforce his original intent for Angola, Spínola organized a deployment of the silent majority (*manifestação da maioria silenciosa*)³⁶, which took place on the 28th of September and was supported by the PPD and CDS. An alliance of MFA, leftist parties and the union foreclosed the demonstration before it had even started. The official position of the PS was beside the PCP and MFA, which declared the manifestation as a presidential coup. The PCP used the incident to its advantage and provoked a general shift to the left within the political and military instances: the conservative groups were excluded from all areas, some individuals were imprisoned and the MFA began to institutionalize itself on the political platform and reinforced its weight in the government. Soares contained himself, as he did not share the radical position of the party majority. He desisted from pushing his own position because he did not have sufficient authority at the time.³⁷ The deployment catapulted Spínola into the political offside and he resigned two days later. Costa Gomes, who had been the MFA's choice for the presidential office from the start, became Spínola's successor.

³⁴ Cf. Ferreira, José Medeiros, Portugal em Transe (1974-1985), in: Mattoso, José (Hrsg.), História de Portugal, Volume 8, Editorial Estampa, Lisboa 2001, p. 195f.

³⁵ Due to the demobilization of the Armed Forces and the regression of emigrants and *Retornados*, a massive unemployment and housing problem emerged.

³⁶ Soares, Mário, Memória Viva, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 109 and Sängner, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 179.

³⁷ Cf. Soares, Mário, Memória Viva, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 112.

The independence treaty with Angola was signed between Portugal and the Angolan movements on the 15th of January 1975. In November, the MPLA-leader António Agostinho Neto took over power without the consent of the other movements, which represented the beginning of the civil war.³⁸

The next hot spot was the fight for the domination of the labor union. The PCP and the *Intersindical*³⁹ pleaded for the legal determination of the principle of uniformity, which was enforced on the 21st of January 1975. The PS opined that the principle of uniformity did not serve the preservation of labor rights, but was rather an instrument for the PCP to control the union, which is why the PS vehemently campaigned against it. This dispute broke the PCP and PS away from another, consequently disrupting the political Left.⁴⁰

On the 11th of March 1975, Spínola and his supporters waged another putsch attempt⁴¹, which was, however, nipped in the bud after only three hours, by the prompt intervention of the MFA troops, who were backed by the Government and the majority of the population. On the same day, the PCP contacted the PS to claim its full support for a manifestation organized by the communists to demonstrate against the insurrectionists. Some of the PS members were known to be close to Spínola, and the party's anticommunist course of action following the debacle over the principle of uniformity coerced the PS to follow the PCP's request, as it could not afford to be marked as a betrayer of the revolution. Soares' main goal at this point was that the election to the Constituent Assembly would take place on the 25th of April, which is why he did not risk an opinion that would provoke an adjournment or annulment of the election.⁴² Consequently, Soares campaigned for the continuation of the revolutionary process during the manifestation and guaranteed Costa Gomes his party's support. On the same day, Soares let Costa Gomes promise that the elections would take place under all circumstances,⁴³ thereby reaching his fundamental aim.

The putsch attempt led to a further radicalization of the political Left: the third provisional Government was dissolved and in the fourth, all ministries were assigned to members of the MFA and PCP. Soares, who had been responsible for the foreign ministry, also had to clear his post, yet still operated in the Government as minister without ministry. The communists used the general shift to the left to push nationalizations. Two weeks before the 11th of March an

³⁸ Cf. Chapter 5.4.1 "Angola".

³⁹ The *Intersindical* was the only labor union center until 1978. In January 1977 it was renamed in: *Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores – Intersindical Nacional* (CGTP-IN), Cf. Sängner, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 465.

⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 180.

⁴¹ Two planes bombed military targets in north Lisbon and an assassination attempt was performed on Gonçalves and Costa Gomes. Spínola fled to Spain after the failure, which confirmed his intent.

⁴² Cf. Soares, Mario, *Memória Viva*, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 120 f.

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 121.

economic plan had been presented, which avoided nationalizations and would have been approved by the majority of the Council of Ministers. The coup attempt eviscerated that plan.⁴⁴

The MFA reacted to the coup attempt with the creation of the General Assembly and the Council of the Revolution (*conselho da revolução*), which took over the competences of the Junta and the Council of State. The MFA's institutionalization process was hereby completed. On the 11th of April 1975, the parties signed a constitutional platform, declaring their recognition of the MFA's institutionalization and their willingness to include the regulations of the platform in the constitution. With the exception of the PCP and the MDP, the party representatives signed with great compunction, yet they did not have a choice: the refusal would have thrown them into the political offside and would have provoked a postponement of the elections.

On the 25th of April 1975, one year after the Carnation Revolution, the first free elections for the Constituent Assembly took place. The PS won the elections, obtaining 37,87% of the votes, which corresponded to 116 seats in Parliament. The runner-up party was the PPD with 26,39% (81 seats), followed by the PCP with 12,46% (30 seats) and the CDS with 7,61% (16 seats). From the group of smaller parties, only two reached Parliament: the socialist MDP with 5 seats and the radical leftist party UDP with one seat. The MFA had invoked the population to cast blank ballots, hereby giving the MFA their confidence as the motor of the revolution and expressing their distrust towards the parties. With a voter participation of 91,66%, merely 6,95% decided to follow the MFA's appeal; the population clearly voted for the parties.⁴⁵ The outcome of the election demonstrated that the weighting in politics and military had not corresponded to the will of the people. Yet a correction of this disparity did not take place after the elections either. The fight for the establishing of correct proportions characterized the months following the elections.

In this context, three groups emerged: the grassroots democratic line, represented by the COPCON, Otelo de Carvalho and social movements⁴⁶; the communist line, represented by the PCP, MDP/CDE and the Prime Minister Vítor Gonçalves; and the social reformist line, represented by the PS, the moderate military around Melo Antunes and Vítor Alves, and assisted by the PPD and CDS. The first and second group's aim was to keep the revolutionary process alive, thus strengthening their own power. The group around Soares wanted to steer the development into a moderate direction and establish the representative legitimacy, which meant

⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 123.

⁴⁵ Cf. Results of the parliamentary election 1975, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008.

⁴⁶ The COPCON was a military unit, founded by the MFA, which had the function to execute the interests of the MFA, guaranteeing the progression of the revolutionary process. The COPCON was dissolved after the 25th of November 1975. The social movements formed a heterogeneous group and had no central coordination. Nevertheless, they opened new political and cultural spaces by their spontaneous composition and had an influence on the Portuguese development due to their complex relationship to the state apparatus. In the course of the revolutionary process, the parties collected the movements, and they lost their autonomy.

to reduce the influence of the communists and grassroots democrats in government, military and politics to the outcome of the election.⁴⁷

The conflict between the groups was observed by foreign countries from the angle of the cold war. The western allies feared that Portugal, governed by Álvaro Cunhal, would develop into a “Cuba of the West”⁴⁸. As Portugal seemed lost to communism, the country was regarded as an inoculation against communism for western Europe. The Soviet Union did not support the PCP in their efforts to gain power directly, yet it would have recognized the resulting state, if the PCP had been triumphant. In a conversation between Soares and Cunhal, the latter promised that the PCP would consistently pursue the continuation of the Revolution and the PS only had two possibilities: to become the PCP's affiliate or its enemy.⁴⁹ The PS opted to rise up to the challenge.

On the 1st of May, the first massive riots between the PS and PCP took place. In the previous year, the two parties had celebrated Labor Day conjointly. In 1975, Soares and Salgado Zenha⁵⁰ were violently detained from accessing the stage where Cunhal, Costa Gomes and Gonçalves had already taken their places. Thereupon, the PS demonstrated against the communists and the MFA on the streets of Lisbon. After this incident, excesses between socialists and communists took place on a daily rate.

The altercations came to their peak in the so called “hot summer” (*verão quente*). After the communists had taken over the journal *República*⁵¹ and the radio station *Renasença*⁵² in the course of their nationalization and disappropriation plans, the PS abandoned the forth provisional Government and was followed by the PPD. Mid-July a series of assaults, which were claimed by social movements, were made on facilities of the PCP in the north of the country. As the PS was not linked directly to the attacks, the incidents did not have negative implications for the reputation of the party. Nevertheless, Soares took advantage of the occasion to stress the fact that the people did not want to be ruled by communism.

Otelo de Carvalho retracted his support for Gonçalves in August 1975, leaving the Government with no military power and obliging Gonçalves to resign from his position as Prime Minister. The grassroots democratic and social reformist groups had mutually repelled the

⁴⁷ Cf. Sängner, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 184.

⁴⁸ Soares, Mário, *Memória Viva*, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 130.

⁴⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p.133.

⁵⁰ Salgado Zenha had been Soares' political companion since university and was considered the “second man” of the party.

⁵¹ The “*República*” had a long tradition as a republican and oppositional paper. The administration was assigned to members of the PS shortly before the revolution and by 1975 it represented the last non-communist paper. The takeover by the PCP was of such great importance, because freedom of press was thereby liquidated. Cf. Serrano, Estrela, *Jornalismo Político em Portugal, A cobertura de eleições presidenciais na imprensa e na televisão (1976-2001)*, Edições Colibri/Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa, Lisboa 2006, p. 132 f.

⁵² On the 18th of June 1975, the extreme leftist labor commission occupied the radio station. On the 29th of September, the Pinheiro de Azevedo-Government ordered the closure of the station. On the 21st of October it was reoccupied by extreme leftist groups and used to spread propaganda, whereupon, on the 7th of November, the station in Lisbon's quarter Buraca was bombed on governmental command. In late December it was finally returned to the church. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 134.

communist group, yet only the group around Soares, which had confronted the communists from the beginning, emerged victoriously from the conflict. The constellation of the sixth provisional Government, which Soares helped form, reflected this fact. Soares was ordered to Belém, where he was offered the position as Vice-President of government next to José Pinheiro de Azevedo, a member of the Council of the Revolution, who needed political advice. Due to the fact that Gonçalves was to be nominated High Commander of the Armed Forces, Soares declined the offer. A week later another meeting took place, in which the same offer was proposed, whereby Costa Gomes and Pinheiro de Azevedo conceded a point to Soares' opposition to Gonçalves. Although Soares still declined to become Vice-President of the sixth provisional Government, he helped them with its composition.⁵³

For the PS, the struggle still did not come to an end. The communist as well as the grassroots democrats tried to recover influence in the outer parliamentary area by resorting to the “power of the street”⁵⁴. By mid-November the incidents acuminated. In the beginning of November, for example, a group of extreme leftists and communist barricaded the Parliament, the government building and the barracks of the moderate military. Pinheiro de Azevedo and Soares anticipated that there would be further disturbances caused by leftist groups and decided to dislocate a part of the Parliament work, i.e. the elaboration of the constitution, to Porto, where the communists had already lost their support.⁵⁵

On the 25th of November parachutists, who were known to be allied with the PCP, occupied military bases and the control center of the television station RTP, and communist groups blocked the main streets leading out of Lisbon. A military group stationed outside of Lisbon advanced into the capital to counter the rebels. The military defense was coordinated by General Ramalho Eanes, who had not played an important role in the happenings until that date, but who arose as the hero of the 25th of November, after the quick and effective repression of the putsch attempt. In the night of the same day, Álvaro Cunhal mediated, on the request of Costa Gomes, between the state and the insurgents and achieved their withdrawal. The PCP emerged as the loser of the 25th of November, because the party was made responsible for the conflict.⁵⁶ Although Cunhal denied a direct involvement, the party's image was damaged. The PS did not plead for the prohibition of the communist party, because an interdiction would resemble the operation strategy of a fascist state and not that of a pluralistic, social state. Although the PCP remained in the Government, a “general purge”⁵⁷ of communist adherers was launched in the political institutions, the military and media.

⁵³ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Memória Viva*, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p.142 ff.

⁵⁴ Sängner, Ralf, *Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“*, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 185.

⁵⁵ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Memória Viva*, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003 p. 146 ff.

⁵⁶ These accusations cumulatively came from Soares, who – before the 25th of November – had already inculpated the PCP for radicalization during the *verão quente* in a four-hour television duel. Cf. Soares, Mário, *Parabéns, Dr. Cunhall*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 395-399, here p. 398.

⁵⁷ Sängner, Ralf, *Europas langer Weg nach „Europa“*, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p.185.

After the 25th of November, the victorious moderate military initiated a course of retreat, by which it slowly withdrew itself from the political happenings and returned to its original military function. The exception lay in the Council of the Revolution.

The 25th of November resolved the political battle for power. Instantaneously, a political normality, which had not existed until that point, established itself. The Government concentrated upon the massive economic problems in the country, the Parliament upon the composition of the constitution. Soares and his party emerged as winners: Soares was regarded as the motor for democracy, the PS entered the year 1976 as the de facto strongest party and could implement its influence in the constitution and in the elections for the first constitutional Parliament.

3.2.1.2 Organization and Composition of the PS

The party organization of the PS is highly centralized and concentrated on the Secretary-General. The National Congress (*congresso nacional*) is its highest decision-making authority. Its delegates, who are elected by direct and proportional party list system by PS' grassroots members, elect the Secretary-General, the National Commission (*comissão nacional*) and the Conflict Commission (*comissão nacional de conflitos*) and must be consulted before the renewal of the party statutes or program. The Secretary-General is responsible for the functioning of the other party instances and, with the exception of the Conflict Commission, is member of all instances. The National Commission elects 14 delegates from among its members into the National Secretariat (*secretariado nacional*), which directs the general course of the party. Within this party unit lies the core of political power. After the inner-party conflict, which arose from the disagreement over the reelection of President Eanes,⁵⁸ the Directive Commission (*comissão directiva*) and the National Secretariat were replaced by a Political Commission (*comissão política, CP*) and a Permanent Commission of the Political Commission (*comissão permanente da comissão política, CPCP*), which were both staffed by loyal followers of Soares. The result was a considerable power shift from the National Secretariat to the Secretary-General, marginalizing Soares' opponents from the inner-party decision making process. At the 6. party congress in 1986, when Soares left the party leadership, the National Secretariat was reintroduced and the Secretary-General, instead of being elected directly, was allotted the first position on the National Secretariat elections list. The power shift to the Secretary-General was herewith reversed and today the National Secretariat operates as the true center of political power.⁵⁹

Internal party democracy is distinctively low, and the exclusion of minorities likely, due to the fact that the majority group controls the highest caucuses and conflicts are dominated by

⁵⁸ Cf. Chapter 4.2.3 "The Election Year 1980".

⁵⁹ Cf. Sanger, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 408 ff.

personal contents. This phenomenon does not only characterize the PS's method of operation, but that of Portuguese politics in general: ideological matters and competence are often post-positioned to personal trust when selecting members for party lists, ministers etc., which is why it is often defined as partisanship.

The PS electorate is highly heterogeneous and the wide range of interests suggest irreconcilability. This heterogeneity was also reflected in the party instances until 1981. Soares, who led the moderate group within the party, had hoisted his party list to victory in 1974. The result was a wave of egression of left-wing party members, protesting the fact that the majority of the inner-party groups stood further left in the political spectrum than Soares' moderate group. Yet the withdrawals did not damage the party's image: whilst the PS counted 35.971 members in 1975, the number increased up to 80.594 members in 1975 and even 96.926 members in 1976.⁶⁰

As a conclusion, one may state that the PS is a party in which decisions are made from top to bottom and political power is concentrated in the topmost authority. Partisanship structures dominate the upper party level, which is detached from the grassroots level and does not perceive its problems. As persons play a greater role than ideologies, internal democracy is hindered.

3.2.2 Partido Comunista de Portugal

The Communist Party of Portugal (PCP) consolidated its position as the second largest party in the left political spectrum. The PCP seized the favorable moment after the 25th of April to flash into action. Whilst the party only counted 6.000 members at the time of the coup, the number of adherents grew up to 115.000 members in November 1976. The rapid accession met the Secretary-General's call to establish the PCP as a mass party. In contrast to the other parties, the PCP's goal was to keep the revolutionary process alive, instead of slowing it down. Its action strategies in the first years after the revolution must always be seen in this context.

The party quickly achieved a solid footing on the government level, in the media and in the labor union. Upon his arrival in Lisbon from exile in Prague, Cunhal proclaimed the “unity of communists, socialists, Catholics and liberals for the formation of a provisional government and free elections for the constituent assembly.”⁶¹ On the 15th of May 1974, the PCP entered the first provisional Government, occupying key positions as minister and state secretary in the Department of Labor. The PCP implemented its influence effectively on the local and regional

⁶⁰ Cf. Ferreira, José Medeiros, Portugal em Transe (1974-1985), in: Mattoso, José (Hrsg.), História de Portugal, Volume 8, Lisboa 2001, p. 193.

⁶¹ Sängler, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 193 f.

levels. By the end of 1974, the party occupied about 74% of the positions of the local administration.

In October 1974, the PCP approved its new party program, which built on the groundwork of the program of 1965 but was more moderately formulated. The extreme left parties and splinter groups were regarded as political opponents, due to the fact that they (unwillingly) cooperated with the counterrevolution by fighting against the provisional Government, the MFA and the democratic process.⁶² In contrast, closeness to the PS was emphasized and embodied by a political course of openness and solidarity between the two, with the aim to achieve a strong left entity. The collaboration of PS and PCP was supported by Soares as well as Cunhal, although the two parties competed for the same voter block. Both sides sensed the advantages of a cooperation: the PS benefited from the PCP's well-built organizational network, while the PCP availed of Soares' high reputation, especially in foreign countries, where Soares convinced the western allies of the legitimacy of a communist party in government and politics.

Due to the events of the 11th of March 1975, the PCP radicalized its political course and held the view that without essential turnovers in the economic and social regulations, the revolution would congeal. Consequently, the party took over the leading role within the process of nationalization and expropriation.⁶³ The incipient anticommunist campaign mounted by the PS in the year 1975 can be regarded as a tactical calculus to emphasize the socialist alternative in the left political spectrum and to strengthen the entity of the heterogeneous party base. The campaign forced the PCP into a defensive position on all levels. In the course of the *verão quente*, the PCP exploited left-extremist splinter groups to gain influence.⁶⁴ Yet precisely this move induced the PCP to be made responsible for the putsch attempt on the 25th of November 1975, which led to the expulsion of PCP members from all political institutions.

Despite the confrontation between the PCP and the PS, the communists repeatedly tried to enter an alliance with the socialists, who denied them the possibility for cooperation. Only after November 1975, the PCP reacted with anti-socialist tones, however trying to avoid an absolute disruption, as the PS was still regarded as its natural ally. Soares was attacked, but never the party base. This course of action enabled the rapprochement and cooperation between both parties in the late 1980s, which could only fully unfold after the era of Soares. Alliances between PS and PCP were mainly ventured upon the local level.

The radical positions of the PCP led to its isolation, which had crucial consequences for the party's further development. The PCP had overrated the revolutionary dynamic within the Portuguese population and the MFA and had overestimated its own strength. Instead, it underestimated "the adversarial strength, the latent existing anticommunism in the population

⁶² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 195.

⁶³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 196.

⁶⁴ Cf. Soares, Mário Parabéns, Dr. Cunhal, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 395-399, here p. 397.

and in the parties, the persistence of the old political and social structures, the foreign influence and the relevance of the legitimate foundation materialized by the outcome of the election”⁶⁵. The PCP maneuvered itself into the political offside by its inflexible attitude, rigid dogmatism, strict pro-soviet positions and the consequent ambition of the other parties to exclude the PCP from the political happenings.⁶⁶ Although influential on the local level, the party possessed little political ascendancy on the national level. Due to its inflexible mindset, the party did not play a distinguished role after the consolidation of the Portuguese democracy in 1976. Nevertheless, the PCP is an inherent part of the Portuguese democracy and even though it never got beyond an oppositional party on the national level, it secured itself a stable position in the left spectrum of the Portuguese party system.

The internal party organization corresponds to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. The party base is organized in so called cells (*células*). Their head is the Central Committee (*comité central*), which is responsible for all political, ideological and organizational work and defines the guidelines for all party units. Further, it decides about the exclusion of party members. The Central Committee is elected by the National Congress (*congresso nacional*), submitting the proposal lists for its members itself.

The Central Committee elects the Political Commission (*comissão política*), responsible for political leadership, the members of the Secretariat (*secretariado do comité central*), which directs daily affairs, and the Control Commission. In addition, it elects the Secretary-General, whose function is theoretically defined by the Central Committee, but who – in practice – determines the party's political course and its staffing. The strict hierarchical party structure and – similar to the PS and Soares – the personality of Cunhal, who held the position from 1961 to 1992, are factors responsible for the concentration of power in the office of the Secretary-General.

Up to the late 1980s, the top management of the party was dominated by an elite which had been affected by the political struggle in illegality during the *Estado Novo*. Persecution, imprisonment, conspirative action, political disputes with oppositional groups and long periods of exile in communist states dominated the lives of these personalities. This factor became noticeable in the structure, leadership style and internal democracy of the party. The strongly developed party apparatus on the regional and local levels was used as an execution and declaration unit for the strategies and programs decided on the national level.⁶⁷ The decisions made on the leadership level have a binding character and the members underlie a rigorous party discipline. All elections are public, the creation of fractions is forbidden and internal critique is

⁶⁵ Sängner, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 199.

⁶⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 430.

⁶⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 424.

countered verbally or with consequences such as the exclusion from the party.⁶⁸ Although the collective work of the leadership panels, the placement of the Secretary-General, the principle of unanimity for the elections of all instances and salary equality of all party functionaries are stressed by the party, in practice there is a lack of internal democracy and freedom of speech.

In the late 1980s a rejuvenation of the party was initiated, which redefined the party's principles.⁶⁹ Yet the changes in staffing did not annul the *regra de ouro* (golden rule) for the social composition of the delegates, which states that the majority of the central committee members have to come from the working class. In contrast to the other parties, social stratification in the leading panels and the delegation assembly correlates with the social base.⁷⁰

3.2.3 Partido Popular Democrático/ Partido Social Democrata

The Partido Popular Democrático was founded by representatives of the *ala liberal* on the 3rd of May 1974. It was engineered as a center-left party with a democratic understanding and humanist adaptation to Portuguese reality.⁷¹ The PPD defined itself as a conservative and capitalist party that supported the economic and social structures of the *Estado Novo*. In the first provisional Government, the party occupied two ministries, yet, due to the fact that it neither denied its liberal-conservative position nor its support for the Spínolista line, its influence on political happenings was reduced by the general shift to the left after the 28th of September. Its loss of power was compensated by a political reorientation, reflected in its program of principles, with the goal of attracting electors from the political middle to the non-Marxist left. The programmatic differences to the PS were minimal. Discrepancies were mostly embodied by persons, as the PPD members did not express radical socialist ideas. Instead, the members of the PPD aspired to system immanent changes.

Due to the leftist political climate and the ostensible power struggle between PCP, PS and the miscellaneous groups in the MFA, the PPD played a lesser role in the first year after the revolution. It profited from the incipient anticommunist propaganda, skillfully supporting the PS and profiling itself as a serious political partner. Especially in the conservative north of the country the PPD was able to expand its influence by advocating the preservation of private property and assisting the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises. The change in political atmosphere after the 25th of November allowed the party to represent its anticommunist and conservative ideals openly and reveal its true political identity.

⁶⁸ An example is Zita Seabra, who publicly fought for program and staff changes and was thereupon suspended from the secretariat and the central committee. A similar situation occurred with José Luís Judas, who also promoted increased internal democracy and was not reelected into the central committee in the next elections.

⁶⁹ The fundamental aims, formulated by classist, anti-Fascist and socialist parolés, were exchanged for moderate, socialist goals, which approved the democratic-representative state. The political understanding of leadership, however, did not change.

⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 423.

⁷¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 206.

Despite the success in domestic policies (or maybe due to them), internal ideological fragmentation increased: on the one side was the liberal-conservative wing around Sá Carneiro, on the other the liberal-social group around Mota Pinto. At the second congress in December 1975 Sá Carneiro won the elections, directing the PPD onto the conservative path, yet the internal conflicts did not come to an end, causing a high degree of instability for the party. Although, ideologically speaking, the social-democratic program was theoretically valid, a liberal-conservative policy was applied in practice, which demonstrates the high influence of the leading group and the meager options for intervention of the minorities within the party.

At the fourth party conference in October 1976 the party changed its name to Partido Social Democrata (PSD). When Sá Carneiro died in a plane crash on the 4th of December 1980, the PSD lost its dominant personality, who had shaped the party and led it to victory in the parliamentary elections of 1979. This vacancy on the uppermost level caused a flare-up of the internal party strife. Francisco Pinto Balsemão, a representative of the left wing, was elected as Sá Carneiro's successor. Although the PSD governed at the time, the party was incapable of action and appeared disoriented and weak because of the inner-party conflicts. These endured until the election of Cavaco Silva in May 1985. Cavaco Silva had a technocratic and authoritarian style of government, brought political allies into the governmental team, and assigned unimportant positions to his political opponents to avoid inner-party interference.

During his minority Government, Cavaco Silva profited from the economic recovery which initiated after the accession to the European Community in 1985, and led his party to an absolute majority in the re-elections of 1987. This vote granted Cavaco Silva absolute freedom of action both within his party and in the Government, giving rise to the *Cavaquismo*-phenomenon⁷².

The highest party authority is the National Congress (*congresso nacional*), which meets every two years and approves the party's political line. The National Council (*conselho nacional*) is responsible for the development and implementation of the political line. It controls the actions of all national instances and determines the fundamental political principles.

The National Commission (*comissão política nacional*) is the political leadership, coordination and execution unit. In contrast to the members of the National Congress and the National Council, who are elected by the D'Hondt voting system, the members of the National Commission are elected by a majority vote system. Its members are the party President, his substitute, the Secretary-General and nine deputies. The commission is responsible for concretizing the party's aims and criteria, defining the principles and government programs, and pre-electing the candidates for the presidential and parliamentary elections.⁷³ The party President

⁷² Cf. Chapter 5.5.3 "The Dictatorship of the Majority".

⁷³ Cf. Sanger, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 431 f.

chairs the Commission, is responsible for the presentation of political positions in the public, and represents the party in all state instances. His personal strength is decisive for his prospects of influence, as the Secretary-General, the vice-President and the floor leader also have notable options for achieving influence in the Permanent National Commission (*comissão permanente nacional*), where political decisions are made.⁷⁴

These same structures repeat themselves on the regional and local levels, which further minimizes the prospects of the party rank and file to influence national decisions. The statutes forbid the formation of different tendencies within the party. The members must act in accordance to the political line determined by the National Commission and the parliamentary deputies must obey its appointments. Internal democracy is scarce and the social composition, age and gender proportions of the party's leadership group does not correlate with those of the voter block.⁷⁵

3.2.4 Centro Democrático Social/ Partido Popular

The CDS was founded on the 19th of July 1974. The founders partly originated from the *Nova Direita Marcelista*⁷⁶, which had stood in rivalry to the *ala liberal*. This background underlines the party's conservative orientation. In its declaration of principles of 1974 the party takes on a liberal tone by emphasizing the goal of establishing a society built on the democratic and humanistic values of western Europe. However, in its positioning with respect to decolonization, its strong links to the Portuguese industry association, and its support for Spínola, the CDS showed itself as a conservative, middle-class party. As a result of these attitudes, the party was forced to disappear from the political arena after the events of the 28th of September 1974. By January 1975, the party conformed to the party laws and elected Diogo Freitas do Amaral for President and Adelino Amaro da Costa for Vice-President at its first party congress on the 25th/26th of January.⁷⁷

The events of the 11th of March 1975 were a harsh setback for the CDS, compelling it to linger in the background for the next couple of months. Despite poor preconditions, the CDS obtained 7,16% of the votes in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. Its electorate was mainly to be found in the conservative north; in the center and south of Portugal, the party could not achieve more than 5% in any district.

The CDS, just like the PPD, profited from the disputes within the left political spectrum in the year 1975. Growing anticommunism, the support given by the church, and the internal

⁷⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

⁷⁵ Cf. *ibid.* p. 433.

⁷⁶ The *Nova Direita Marcelista* was a group around Marcelo Caetano during his governmental period.

⁷⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 209 f.

contention of the PPD helped the CDS to an uprating of its influence. During the *verão quente* the party could already afford to criticize the constitutional platform openly and to demand a revision. Finally, the 25th of November legitimized the position of the CDS and permitted it to vote unilaterally against the Constitution on the 2nd of April 1976. The CDS disapproved of the socialist postulates and the economic section of the Constitution. In the parliamentary elections of April 25 1976, the CDS attained 16% of the votes, which made it the third largest party. After the setback of the 11th of March, the party had achieved its comeback by winning over the voters to the right of the middle of the political spectrum.⁷⁸

The CDS can be regarded as a mirror image of the PCP in the right political spectrum: it was a rigid, inflexible party, formed by personalities who had been politically active in the *Estado Novo* and who were not open for new, non-conservative ideas. The difference to the PCP was that the ideological and programmatic overlaps between PPD/PSD and CDS caused a struggle for the common voter block. Further, the CDS was regarded as a potential coalition partner. The collaboration with the PS between January and July 1978 proved that the CDS was even willing to productively work with a party which only shared a small common subset. After Sá Carneiro took over leadership in the PSD, which shifted the party into a conservative direction, the CDS approximated its natural ally.⁷⁹

The death of Amaro da Costa in the plane crash, in which Sá Carneiro also lost his life, was a severe drawback for the CDS and caused inner-party instability during the 1980s. Freitas do Amaral resigned from the position as party chairman in 1982 and two leadership changes followed⁸⁰, neither being able to find solutions for the unrest. After his defeat in the presidential election of 1986, Freitas do Amaral returned to party politics and achieved the long desired inner-party tranquility. The CDS changed its image into that of a party of the political middle, advanced a more conservative view on economic issues, and a more moderate view on political and social issues than the PSD.

The inner conflicts and the return to pre-revolutionary values in a time of upsurge caused the CDS to lose voters to the PSD; by 1987, about 50% of the electors had drifted. The liberal strategy introduced by Freitas do Amaral could not counteract the prevailing tendencies: in the parliamentary election of 1991, the CDS merely achieved 4,4%, as had already been the case in 1987. By 1995 the party recovered under the leadership of Manuel Monteiro and achieved 9,1% but has stagnated at that level since then. In the course of a revision of the statutes and organization, the CDS changed its name at the party conference in January 1993 into CDS/PP (*Centro Democrata Social/ Partido Popular*). Finally, Paulo Portas is worth mentioning, who was

⁷⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 210 f.

⁷⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 307 ff.

⁸⁰ Freitas do Amaral's successor was Francisco Lucas Pires, a young liberal who could not achieve a change in the conservative course of action. After his resignation in 1985, Adriano Moreira took over the position, yet resigned in 1987, when Freitas do Amaral returned.

President of the CDS/PP from 1997 to 2005 and who was reelected in 2007⁸¹. Under his leadership, the party has been following a highly populist course.

The CDS has a strongly centralized and hierarchical party organization. The composition of the individual party institutions enables the leading elite to restrict internal democracy and strengthens its own influence. The highest authority is the National Congress (*congresso nacional*), which votes on a new program and a renewal of the statutes every three years. The majority of the delegates are elected by the members, yet about 40% are functionaries of other national instances. All national units are composed by a similar method: partly elected, and partly automatically occupied by the president, government or fraction members. The National Council (*conselho nacional*) directs the party activities and defines the party strategy. The Political Commission (*comissão política*) supervises the implementation of the political line and determines the composition of the list for parliamentary elections. The Directive Commission (*comissão directiva*), led by the president, is responsible for the implementation of strategies and coordination of the political instances.

The CDS is classified as a party which represents clientele interests. Especially in the economic and foreign policy domains, the political program is determined by the social class that lost its influence through the revolution. There is a great discrepancy in the social composition, age and gender of the electors on the one side and the leading group of the party on the other, which contributed to the phenomenon of voter disaffection.⁸²

3.3 The Birth of the II. Republic: The Legal Validity of the Constitution and the Election to the First Constitutional Parliament

The victory of the moderates over the radical left in late 1975 called for the elaboration of a second constitutional platform, which should be understood as a revision of the first one. In February 1976, two months before the constitution came into force, the platform was signed. At this point, the corpus of the constitution had already been drawn, which explains why at the time of it taking effect on the 2nd of April 1976, the constitutional text was not in accordance with constitutional reality. The text of 1976, which contains a total of 312 articles, mirrors the unrest of the revolutionary phase, especially in its socialist postulates and the exceptional position of the military.

⁸¹ Between 2002 and 2005, Paulo Portas was Defense Minister and Vice Prime Minister in the PSD-CDS/PP coalition under Durão Barroso. In 2005 he resigned from all offices, due to the weak results in the parliamentary election. In 2007 he prevailed against José Ribeiro e Castro, achieving 75% in the run-off.

⁸² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 437 f.

The Armed Forces are defined as a part of the people, which identifies itself with the spirit of the MFA-program, thereby guaranteeing the progression of the revolution. They act over party lines, have the assignment to enable a peaceful and pluralistic transition of Portuguese society to democracy and socialism, and collaborate in the rebuilding of the nation. The constitution explicitly determines that members of the Armed Forces must respect the aims of the Portuguese people, which are anchored in the constitution, and are not permitted to apply their weapons, service or function, to enforce, influence or hinder a specific democratic political course.⁸³ This is an important aspect in the context of the COPCON's role during the revolutionary phase.

Portugal is defined as a sovereign republic, grounded on the principle of human dignity and the will of the people, with the goal of building a free and fair society that unites in solidarity.⁸⁴ The aim is a transition to socialism, in terms of the democratic execution of power by the workers. Next to the indivisible sovereignty of the people, the binding power of the constitution and political parties' contribution to the establishment and declaration of the people's will, the MFA is defined as the guarantor for the democratic achievements and the revolutionary process.⁸⁵

The MFA was institutionalized with the Council of the Revolution, which is specified as one of the political authorities next to the President of the Republic, the Assembly of the Republic, the government and the courts.⁸⁶ It operates as the council of the President of the Republic and guarantees the correct functioning of the democratic institutions, the fulfillment of the constitution and loyalty to the spirit of the Portuguese revolution. In addition, it is a political and legislative instance in military matters.⁸⁷ The Council of the Revolution consists of the President of the Republic, who presides over the meetings, and 17 additional military personalities⁸⁸.

In its characteristic as council of the President of the Republic, it has a consultant function and empowers him to declare war, agree to peace and declare the state of siege or emergency. As guarantor of constitutional implementation, the Council of the Revolution has the competence, either by its own initiative or by request of the President, to prejudge the constitutionality of any legal norm before its promulgation or execution. If it declares the legal norm as unconstitutional, the President of the Republic must apply his veto right. If the legal norm was initiated in Parliament, a promulgation can proceed if the Parliament reenacts on the legal norm with a two-third majority; this does not apply for governmental documents. In addition, the Council of the

⁸³ Cf. Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Article 273 and 275 (in the version of 1976).

⁸⁴ Cf. Article 1 (1976).

⁸⁵ Cf. Article 3 (1976).

⁸⁶ Cf. Article 113 (1976).

⁸⁷ Cf. Article 142 (1976).

⁸⁸ These are: the High Chief of General Staff, the Chief of General Staff of the three branches of service of the Armed Forces, the Prime Minister, as long as he is a military member and fourteen officers, eight from the army, three from the airforce and three from the marine, appointed by the respective branch of service.

Revolution can verify any legislative measure and declare its unconstitutionality.⁸⁹ The Council of the Revolution is supplemented by the Constitutional Commission⁹⁰, which consults and delivers judgments concerning questions of unconstitutionality.

As “guarantor for the loyalty of the revolutionary spirit”, the Council of the Revolution gives its opinion on the assignment and dismissal of the Prime Minister and on the execution of his suspensive veto right. In his function as political and legislative authority in military affairs, the Council of the Revolution enacts laws and regulations for the composition, practice and discipline of the Armed Forces and approves international treaties and agreements, including military questions.⁹¹

The considerable constitutional power of the President was based on his chair in the Council of the Revolution, because it possessed a range of power superimposing all other power sources, especially due to its juristic and legislative competences in all military matters. As a result of the absolute military character of the council, additional presidential competence as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and associated military loyalty understanding, the Council could be interpreted as a legitimation committee for presidential decisions, instead of a presidential consulting unit.

The government as well as Parliament are dependent on the President of the Republic: The Prime Minister is appointed and dismissed by the President whenever he feels the necessity to do so, and he has the right to dissolve Parliament after a previous, approving response from the Council of the Revolution. Considering his powerful position in the Council of the Revolution, this implied that the President could dissolve the Parliament whenever he pleased.⁹²

The deputies of the Assembly of the Republic are elected by legally defined electoral districts, whereas the number of delegates are determined by the number of electorates in the respective district. The candidacies are nominated by the parties, even though a candidate does not have to be a party member. The delegates are elected by party-list proportional representation, specifically, the D'Hondt method.⁹³ A legislative period spans four years; a new legislative period is not initiated in the case of parliamentary dissolution. The sessions run from the 15th of October to the 15th of July, whereas the President of the Republic can call extraordinary sessions at any time.⁹⁴

Next to their rights in the bylaws, the delegates have the authority to introduce bills, address the government with questions and request documents, information and ministerial publications

⁸⁹ Full particulars are defined in Articles 277-282 (1976).

⁹⁰ Die composition emphasizes the dominance of the Council of the Revolution: The chairman is a member of the Council of the Revolution; further it is composed by four judges, one citizen appointed by the President of the Republic, one by the Assembly of the Republic and two by the Council of the Revolution.

⁹¹ Cf. Article 145-148 (1976)

⁹² Details to the President's competences: Cf. Chapter 4.4 “The Constitutional Revisions of 1982 and 1989” and 4.5 “The President of the Republic: Functions and Competences”.

⁹³ Cf. Article 150, 152, 154 and 155 (1976).

⁹⁴ Cf. Article 174 and 177 (1976).

from the government. The deputies have the duty to participate in the plenary sessions, the acclamations and their respective committee sessions, and to assume their office in the Assembly and carry out their assigned responsibilities.⁹⁵

The Assembly of the Republic has the competence, among other things, to approve constitutional revisions, to adopt laws in all areas not subjected to the Council of the Revolution or the government, to accord the government its legislative power of authority and to approve the budget. With respect to its function as a control unit, the Parliament has the right to guard abidance by the constitution and the laws, to adjudge governmental actions and to ratify governmental decrees not passed by its exclusive legislative power.⁹⁶

With regard to other instances, the Assembly has the competence, amongst others, to adjudge the government program, to enact the motion of confidence and no-confidence and to comment the dissolution or suspension of the authorities of the autonomous regions.⁹⁷

Amongst other, Parliament owns the exclusive legislative competence for the regulation of the state of siege and emergency, the organization and responsibility for the courts (with the exception of the military court), the basic principles of the educational system and taxation, the funds for and forms of state interventions, nationalizations and collectivization of the means of production, the base of the agrarian reform, the currency system and the planning system. The delegates and the government possess the legislative initiative.⁹⁸

The government is defined as the authority appointed to guide general national politics, as well as the highest instance of public administration.⁹⁹ The Prime Minister is nominated by the President of the Republic, after a hearing with the Council of the Revolution and the parties represented in the Assembly of the Republic, and under consideration of the election results.¹⁰⁰ His office ends with the dismissal by the President. The ministers are appointed by the President of the Republic on proposal of the Prime Minister; their office ends with the dismissal of the Prime Minister. The government depends on the President as well as the the Assembly, whilst the Prime Minister is politically dependent on the President and – with respect to governmental responsibility – on Parliament.¹⁰¹ The Prime Minister's function is to lead the governmental course of action and to coordinate the measures of the individual ministers. He establishes the relationship between the government and the other state instances.¹⁰²

Up to ten days after the nomination of the Prime Minister, the government must bring forward its program, which is subsequently voted on by Parliament. Only an absolute majority

⁹⁵ Cf. Article 159 and 162 (1976).

⁹⁶ Cf. Article 164, 165 (1976).

⁹⁷ Cf. Article 166 (1976).

⁹⁸ Cf. Article 167, 168, 170 (1976).

⁹⁹ Cf. Article 185 (1976).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Article 190 (1976).

¹⁰¹ Cf. Article 193 and 194 (1976).

¹⁰² Cf. Article 204 (1976).

can evoke the program's rejection. The government can request the Parliament for a motion of confidence and the Assembly can bring in and vote on a motion of no-confidence by at least a fourth of its members or one fraction. If the motion of non-confidence does not pass, the originator cannot bring in another motion during the same session.¹⁰³

The government steps down when its program or the motion of confidence is denied and when two motions of non-confidence pass in a period of at least 30 days. The President of the Republic cannot dissolve Parliament due to the rejection of the government program, unless it is dismissed three times in a row. Parliament must be dissolved when the motion of confidence does not pass or if the vote of non-confidence effectuates a third governmental change.¹⁰⁴

The political function of the government includes the countersignature of some presidential measures¹⁰⁵, the negotiation of international conventions and the closure of international treaties and agreements which do not fall into the sphere of responsibility of the Council of the Revolution or Parliament. In its function as legislative authority, the government enacts decrees which are not subjected to the Council of the Revolution or Parliament. The government only possesses the exclusive legislative competence in affairs of its own organization and action. As an executive instance, the government is responsible for drafting the plan and budget, for delegating its respective implementation, and for directing the services and activities of the administration. Additionally, it decides on and implements all measures and provisions necessary for the advancement of economic and social development and for the gratification of the community's requirements.¹⁰⁶

The Council of Ministers, composed of the Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister and the Ministers, determines the general features of the political course of the government and advises about the motion of confidence. Furthermore it is the Council's right to approve legislative proposals, proposed resolutions and the budget.¹⁰⁷

The first parliamentary elections took place on the 25th of April 1976. The results were similar to those of the year before: the PS achieved 34,89% of the votes (107 seats), followed by the PPD with 24,35% (73 seats), the CDS with 15,98% (42 seats) and the PCP with 14,39% (40 seats).¹⁰⁸ Interestingly, despite its defeat in the *verão quente*, the PCP only lost a few votes in comparison to the election in 1975.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ Cf. Article 196 and 197 (1976).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Article 198 (1976).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Article 136 g), i), l), Article 137, 1 b), c), and e) and 138 a), b) and c) (1976).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Article 200, 201 and 202 (1976).

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Article 187 and 203 (1976).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Results of the parliamentary election 1976, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008.

¹⁰⁹ In 1975, the PCP ran alone and achieved 12,46%, the MDP 4,14%; in 1976 the two parties formed the APU-coalition and only lost 2% added together. Due to the voting procedures, the coalition even gained 5 seats in Parliament. Cf. *ibid.*

Soares waited until after the presidential election to form a government. The PS strongly engaged itself in Ramalho Eanes' election campaign, as only he guaranteed a socialist government: the PSD and CDS had a majority in a coalition, yet Eanes promised to nominate Soares as Prime Minister, should he win the presidential election.

4. The President of the Republic

4.1 The Election of President Ramalho Eanes

In 1976, Mário Soares was interpellated to candidate for the presidential office. He would have had sufficient support from the PCP as well as the PPD¹¹⁰ to win the election, and within the PS there were many who supported the idea. Yet the party direction, including Soares, believed that the “situação político-militar (...) não estava ainda suficientemente madura e estabilizada para a eleição de um Presidente civil”¹¹¹ and decided against that option.

Soares met with the Group of the Nine¹¹², which was amongst the PS' allies since the events of the 25th of November, to agree on a military candidate. The four candidates considered were Costa Brás, Firmino Miguel, Pires Veloso and Ramalho Eanes: all military personalities who had played an important role in different phases of the revolutionary years and who had demonstrated their loyalty to the PS. The final choice was to be made by the Group of the Nine, who agreed on the 41-year-old General Ramalho Eanes.

Eanes was an outstanding general, but did not possess political experience.¹¹³ Soares described him as a timid, unconfident and argumentatively unprepared man, who sought a sense of security by remaining silent or giving reserved comments when confronted with delicate questions.¹¹⁴ The relationship between Eanes and Soares based on mutual trust and Eanes showed great commitment to correcting his political shortcomings.

When Eanes was publicly announced as the candidate backed by the PS, the PPD and CDS also guaranteed him their support. Due to his narrow rhetorical skills and his faint charisma, Eanes would have had little success in winning the election without the assistance of the large parties. Soares avoided appearing together with Eanes throughout the electoral campaign to avoid Eanes going under.¹¹⁵ As the campaign's slogan was “Eanes para a Presidência, PS para o Governo”¹¹⁶, Soares rather advertized a PS-Government than to actively participate in the presidential electoral campaign.

Further candidates were Octávio Pato, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Pinheiro de Azevedo, who all fought for the votes of the leftist electorate around the PCP. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who had emerged as the hero of the revolution and possessed excellent rhetorical skills, was able

¹¹⁰ Octávio Pato, later the PCP's candidate, addressed Soares as the PCP's representative, for the PPD, Sá Carneiro conversed with Soares regarding the candidate question; both assured him their support.

¹¹¹ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p.23.

¹¹² The Group of the Nine (*Grupo dos Nove*) represented the moderate group within the MFA, whose protagonist was Melo Antunes. It was known under this name because nine members of the MFA signed a document in August 1975, declaring their moderate position.

¹¹³ Cf. Soares, Mário, Memória Viva, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 172 and Popović Baldani, Dragiša, Eanes: Entre o Ontem e o Amanhã, Nova Nordica, Lisboa 1986, p. 21.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p.27.

¹¹⁵ Soares remembers an occasion in which he was seated next to Eanes and a fisher approached them and said: “Ó Mário Soares, veja lá o que está a fazer! Nós vamos votar neste homem por sua causa.” The media also showed more interest in Soares than in Eanes when they appeared together.

¹¹⁶ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 31.

to assert himself better than the other candidates, yet his image had been severely damaged by the unrest in 1975. Soares tried to convince Pinheiro de Azevedo to give up his candidacy in favor of Eanes, yet without success.¹¹⁷

On the 27th of June 1976, General Ramalho Eanes was voted first President of the II. Republic with 61,59% of the votes, which can coevally be understood as a victory for the PS. None of the rival candidates reached the 20%-mark: 16,46% voted for Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, 14,37% for Pinheiro de Azevedo and 7,59% for Octávio Pato.

Two weeks later, Eanes was elected Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMGFA). In the political situation of 1976, the required stability could only be achieved by the unification of political and military leadership in the person of the President. Yet that Eanes was CEMGFA as well as the head of the Council of the Revolution and President of the Republic led to the fact that there was no clear separation of politics and military. The parties increasingly saw the will of the Armed Forces implemented by presidential activities, which led to their resolve to dissolve the Council of the Revolution in the constitutional revision of 1982.¹¹⁸

4.2 The Politics of Soares vs. Eanes 1976-1986

4.2.1 The Socialist Era 1976-1978

The revolutionary phase terminated with the legal validity of the constitution, the parliamentary elections, Eanes' introduction into the presidential office and the formation of the first constitutional government. A transition phase to a stable political landscape began, which, however, could only establish itself in 1987. Ralf Sanger speaks of five phases of political development¹¹⁹ characterized – amongst others – by instability.¹²⁰ He calls the first phase the Socialist Era, which endured from June 1976 to the summer of 1978.

Soares decided to form a minority government, which started its work on the 16th of June. Amongst the decisive factors for this decision was firstly, the fact that Salgado Zenha had declared that the PS would not enter a coalition, not right nor left, in February 1976. This led to a self-reinforcing process which brought forth the slogan “So, so, so PS!”, which in turn made it impossible for the PS to cooperate with another party.¹²¹ Secondly, Soares was convinced that all parties would stand behind him collectively to support him with the rebuilding of the country. This notion was nourished by the positive relationship and attitude of all parties following the

¹¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.* p. 29 ff.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Rato, Vasco, Ramalho Eanes, in: Costa Pinto, Antonio/Rezola, Maria Inacio, *Os Presidentes da Republica Portuguesa*, Lisboa 2001, p. 240-250, here p. 247 f.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Sanger, Ralf, *Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“*, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 299 f.

¹²⁰ The average governmental term until 1986 was one year, parliamentary elections were held every two years.

¹²¹ Cf. Avillez, Maria Joao, Soares. *Democracia*, Lisboa 1996, p. 40.

election on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by his position within his own party. Soares relates that “naquele tempo, no PS, ninguém estava em condições de me dizer não. (...) Quem decidia livremente era eu. Daí a responsabilidade ser toda minha.”¹²² In 1996, he acknowledged that it had been a mistake to form a minority government without concessions to the other parties; he even described it as arrogant behavior, and emphasized that the PS should have collaborated more with the PCP and should have conducted coalition negotiations with the PPD. The PS only ended its isolation strategy at the third party congress in March 1979 by introducing a new program, which resulted in an approximation strategy toward the PPD.¹²³

One of the first political measures of the first Government was the revision of the principle of uniformity law, which regulated the labor union, allowing the creation of parallel union centers and annulling the legal obligation of the employers to dispense compulsory contributions directly to the union. On that condition, the PS and PSD founded another umbrella organization in October 1978, the *União Geral dos Trabalhadores* (UGT). It was conceived as a reformer union with neo-corporative tendencies, the aims being of an economic-pragmatic nature, in contrast to the class union CGTP-IN, in which political-ideological objectives were in the foreground. With the foundation of the UGT, the Portuguese labor movement was split into two party-dependent union centers.¹²⁴

In the area of employment policy, the socialist Government made a series of concessions to the employers, for example the introduction of fix-termed work contracts and the revision of the dismissal laws, which facilitated layoffs. The purpose had been to dynamize the employment market, yet instead the new laws triggered a wave of dismissals. The unsocial measures led to a fierce relationship with the CGTP-IN and to a loss of newly won territory within the working class. In August 1977 the “Lei Barreto”, a land reform law, which included an end to disappropriation and the repatriation of property to the former farmers, was approved.¹²⁵

On the 28th of March 1977 the Government applied for accession to the EC, which was a primarily politically motivated measure, yet simultaneously backed the PS' induced deregulating economic strategy. EC-accession became Soares' personal crusade, who had to struggle against severe criticism in the first years of the Republic.

The financial sector was regarded as highest priority due to the devastating economic condition of the country. The expansive growth policy, which was financed by foreign loans and an increase of the indirect taxes, had led to a cumulative indebtedness and did not show an effect. A new strategy was implemented with the austerity package approved in February 1977, which abolished the subvention on convenience goods, increased the sales tax, the prime rate, the postal tax, the gas and transport tax, liberalized state cost controls, introduced government

¹²² Ibid., p. 38.

¹²³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 40.

¹²⁴ Cf. Sanger, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 473 f.

¹²⁵ Cf. Avillez, Maria Joao, Soares. *Democracia*, Lisboa 1996, p. 63.

incentives for savers and devalued the Escudo.¹²⁶ Initially, the PPD, CDS and the trade association shared the responsibility for the harsh austerity policy. Despite austerity, the country stood before bankruptcy, forcing the Government to apply for further credits from foreign countries. The condition of the western investors was a previously negotiated agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To meet the IMF's conditions, another austerity package had to be approved, which would worsen the life conditions of the working class and reduce their rights even further. As a precondition for an agreement, the IMF demanded a consensus in the vote on this package. In November, the PS, in cooperation with the social partners, submitted a memorandum, and Soares linked its approval to the legitimacy of the Government; that is, if the parties overruled the memorandum, Soares would call for a vote of confidence. Although Eanes advised against going ahead with the vote of confidence, Soares risked it all the same: he misconceived that the parties would not jeopardize the negotiations with the IMF by overturning the Government.¹²⁷ The memorandum was turned down, due to the fact that the opposition was not willing to share the responsibility for the unpopular austerity policy without actually being part of Government. The PCP submitted the offer to accede to the vote of confidence if Soares was willing to make concessions, which was not the case.¹²⁸ On the 7th of December the vote of confidence failed with 100 to 150 votes.

As the negotiations with the IMF were endangered by the fall of the Government, Eanes immediately assigned Soares to form a new government. Soares dismissed the possibility of forming another minority government, ruled out a coalition with the PPD due to their internal instability, and dialogs with the PCP failed. Thus, by process of elimination, the only possible partner for a cooperation was the CDS; the accord was signed on the 19th of January.¹²⁹ Eanes welcomed the conciliation of PS and CDS in his speech of the 30th of January 1978, yet he also announced that the alternative to the alliance was a governmental program for national salvation, which would find a permanent, majoritarian support in Parliament.¹³⁰ This solution was implemented by the presidential governments. Soares countered the opposition's critique that PS and CDS were too different ideologically and programmatically, to accomplish practical solutions with the argument that they had three mutual goals: stabilization of the Portuguese economy by a treaty with the IMF, accession to the European Community and the fight against social woes within Portuguese society.¹³¹ On the 6th of June 1978, the IMF-treaty came into

¹²⁶ Cf. Sanger, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 302

¹²⁷ Cf. Avillez, Maria Joao, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 68 f.

¹²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 69 f.

¹²⁹ The agreement did not represent a coalition, but a PS-Government with CDS cooperation and parliamentary support: three representatives of the CDS were included in the Government as independent ministers.

¹³⁰ Cf. Eanes, Ramalho/Soares, Mario, Na posse do II. Governo Constitucional: discursos proferidos pelo Presidente da Republica e pelo Primeiro-Ministro na posse do II. Governo Constitucional em 30 de Janeiro de 1978,, p. 8.

¹³¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 22.

force. Soares, who had been one of the influential leaders during the negotiations with the IMF, lost his position of power with the conclusion of the agreement.

Due to the focus on economic problems, the social ambit had been neglected, causing massive critique against the Government. In order to disclaim responsibility for society's bad condition, the CDS provoked the disruption of the alliance with the PS: in a public ultimatum, Freitas do Amaral demanded government alterations, which were denied by Soares, whereupon the CDS resigned on the 24th of July.

The relationship between Soares and Eanes deteriorated increasingly. Whilst in 1976 Eanes had been considered an inexperienced politician who stood in a certain dependency to the parties, by 1978 he had formed the opinion that the parties were responsible for the political instability, which he – as President of the Republic – tried to countervail. The breach with the PS (and with the parties in general) was consolidated by Eanes' speech on the 25th of April 1977, in which he criticized governmental actions and emphasized the deficits within the country. He left his position as a moderator and became a political player by trying to correct the governmental course of action.¹³² The PS censured Eanes' conduct, as the party had supported him in the presidential elections and had helped him to his victory. Apart from the fact that the first Government was perceived as a political laboratory, in which policy-making had to be learned by all actors, the Government was criticized by all parties: the left parties made the accusation that the Government had sold out the revolution and was acting as the USA's puppet; the right parties propagated that Soares was playing the communist's game.¹³³ Considering the fact that Soares headed a minority government, he had hoped for some support from the President. One year later, in his speech of the 25th of April, Eanes even sharpened his verbal attacks. This speech and the increasing interference in internal issues of the PS signaled the beginning of *Eanismo*¹³⁴.

The case Medeiros Ferreira sharpened the hostility between Soares and Eanes even more. The civil war in Angola escalated and became an arena of the cold war. Portugal tried to mediate, which was a difficult task due to the fact that the EC-negotiations were regarded as the priority of Portuguese foreign policy and this political course was not justifiable in Luanda. In the scope of a PS-decision, Soares sent Manuel Alegre, who had good contacts to the MPLA, to Luanda, in order to achieve a separation between conciliation and foreign policy, creating an informal atmosphere for a dialog, instead of the sending the foreign minister Medeiros Ferreira.

¹³² Cf. Rato, Vasco, Ramalho Eanes, in: Costa Pinto, António/ Rezola, Maria Inácia (Hrsg.), *Os Presidentes da República Portuguesa*, Lisboa 2001, p.240-250, here p. 247.

¹³³ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Memória Viva*, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 163 f.

¹³⁴ *Eanismo* (just as *Soarismo* and *Cavaquismo*) was always disavowed by its protagonist. These phenomenons do not represent a planned political course of action. As the terms contain a negative aftertaste, the theory that these phenomenons are artificially created by the protagonist's greatest opponents is a possible explanation. In the case of *Eanismo*, the source of the term can be ascribed to Soares, who named the group within the PS that supported Eanes in his reelection in 1980 (Cf. Chapter 4.2.3 "The Election Year 1980"), as *Eanista*. Cf. Popović Baldani, Dragiša, *Eanes: Entre o Ontem e o Amanhã*, Lisboa 1986, p. 289.

On the base of this decision, Medeiros Ferreira, who felt passed over, demanded conditions for his further disposition in the Government; Soares reacted with his layoff. Further, he threatened with his own demission, if Eanes should refuse to sign the reduncancy letter. The reason for the importance of this case and the fierceness and quickness of Soares' reaction lies in the fact that Eanes had been in contact with some of the ministers, e.g. Medeiros Ferreira, regarding an inner-party separation from Soares' political line. Therefore, Soares interpreted the case of Medeiros Ferreira as a direct power game with Eanes.¹³⁵

After the CDS had left the Government in July 1978, Soares asked for authorization to form a new government. Eanes denied his request and urged Soares to step down, which he refused, whereupon Eanes reacted with his dismissal on the 28th of July. Soares had strategically provoked this reaction. He knew that the Parliament had no intent of bringing forward a vote of non-confidence, so Soares would only have to step down if the President laid him off. Due to the fact that Eanes did not succeed with the dissolution of Parliament, but introduced the presidential governments, for which he bore the responsibility, his distrust in the parties was highlighted and it showed that he aimed at taking the political reins into his own hands.¹³⁶

4.2.2 The Presidential Governments

In July 1978, a group of socialists formed around Medeiros Ferreira, António Barreto and Sousa Tavares, advocating an increase of presidential power, and thereby the subordination of the parties to this power. This group developed into the so called “*Presidentialists*”. In autumn, the group left the PS and presented the *Manifesto Reformador* in April 1979. Its most controversial innovation was the referendum. The PS resisted vehemently against any form of referendum, because – at this time and in this context – it was constructed as a fortification of the President at the cost of the parties.

With the support of the *Presidentialists*, the PCP and public opinion¹³⁷, Eanes appointed Alfredo Nobre da Costa as Prime Minister on the 29th of August. As a previous hearing with the parties represented in Parliament did not take place, Eanes violated article 190 of the constitution, yet no consequences followed. Nobre da Costa was regarded as Eanes' straw man, which is why Parliament declined the governmental program on the 8th of September, causing the withdrawal of Nobre da Costa on the 13th of September. The parties voted against a presidential government and emphasized that they were not ready to voluntarily clear the political field.

¹³⁵ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia Lisboa 1996, p. 64 ff.

¹³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³⁷ The disability of the parties to achieve a consensus, discredited them before the public and strengthened the President. Hence, the feeling was created that a government that had the President's support was desirable.

Eanes was not impressed by this defeat. At the end of October, he again presented an own candidate: Mota Pinto. Sá Carneiro (PSD) interpreted this appointment as a direct affront by Eanes and refused his support; Mota Pinto had been a former member of the party and Eanes had known that the nomination would cause great contention within the PSD.¹³⁸ The PS feared that the public would not understand another refusal of the Government, and that it would rather discredit the parties even further. Therefore, the PS-deputies abstained from voting the government program, with the consequence that, despite the dissenting votes of the PSD and the CDS, the program was not denied by the majority and Mota Pinto became the next Prime Minister.

The Government profited from the first results of the austerity policy: the economic balance improved, financial deficits decreased and an internal economic recovery was in motion. These conditions allowed the Government to loosen the austerity policy. Yet the parties still showed resistance. When the budget was declined in April 1979, Mota Pinto wanted to resign, yet the President did not approve. Another rejection of the budget in June forced Eanes to comply. He dismissed the Government and called an interposed parliamentary election for the 2nd of July.¹³⁹ Eanes accused the parties of being the main culprits for the stability crisis. He had appointed the presidential governments to achieve stability, due to the fact that the parties were not capable of finding a consensus, neither within the parties themselves, nor in alliances.¹⁴⁰ Yet with the presidential governments, Eanes excluded the parties. Additionally, the influence of the *Presidentialists* played an important role, as the PS was vehemently opposed to them.

Eanes appointed Maria Lourdes de Pintasilgo as the transitional Prime Minister. Although this Government was meant to be a mere interim solution until the elections, many important social and political laws were passed and social measures that had been initiated by the Soares Government, were finalized. This showed a proximity to the socialists which was not welcomed by the PS. The initiation of Pintasilgo as Prime Minister can be interpreted as a political maneuver on the part of Eanes, who – in view of the presidential election in 1980 – was eager to establish a closeness to the left electorate to gain their support, after an approximation to the PSD had failed with the appointment of Mota Pinto.¹⁴¹

In the parliamentary election in December 1979, the AD-block, a coalition of PSD, CDS and PPM, achieved a majority and Sá Carneiro was nominated Prime Minister. Actually, the PS and PCP achieved 46,13% compared to the 45,26% of the AD-block, yet due to the voting system,

¹³⁸ Cf. Sängler, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 311. Mota Pinto was one of the PSD-founders. 1975 he had a dispute with Sá Carneiro and resigned from the party.

¹³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 312 ff.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Popović Baldani, Dragiša, Eanes: Entre o Ontem e o Amanhã, Lisboa 1986, p.183.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Portela, Artur/ Soares, Mario, Soares Responde a Artur Portela, Lisboa 1980, p. 20.

the alliance of the conservative parties obtained 128 seats in Parliament, in contrast to the 121 of PS (74) and PCP (47).¹⁴²

Before entering the alliance with the CDS, Sá Carneiro had proposed a cooperation with the PS: Soares as President, Sá Carneiro as Prime Minister and a parliamentary collaboration of PSD and PS. Sá Carneiro had expressed his doubts that the PSD would achieve a majority, and announced that if Soares declined, he would have to contact the CDS. Due to continued inner-party instability in the PSD and the conviction that the country was still not ready for a civil President, Soares rejected the offer. In his view, the balance of power between PS and PSD had to be defined by the parliamentary election.¹⁴³ In addition, there was an inner-party majority within the PS disfavoring an approximation to the PSD.¹⁴⁴

The presidential governments caused a growing tension between the parties and the President, which strongly affected future political development and the relationship between the political instances.¹⁴⁵ The resolution of the parties to curtail the President's competences and to constrain the military's influence resulted from this power struggle and formed a strong bond between PS and PSD to achieve this goal. Sá Carneiro symbolically staffed the ministry of defense with a civilian – the first since 1926. Cavaco Silva, the later Prime Minister, was nominated minister of finance until the death of Sá Carneiro.

4.2.3 The Election Year 1980

The priority of the AD-Government was the achievement of a majority for the parliamentary election on the 5th of October 1980. The Government ended the austerity policy, an expansive economic policy resulted in an ascent in employment rates, and an anti-inflation policy achieved an increase of actual wages. The positive atmosphere was mirrored in the election results: the AD attained a gain whilst the PS fell from 27,33% to 26,65%.¹⁴⁶ The PS had formed an alliance with the UEDS and the ASDI, the *Frente Republicana e Socialista* (FRS), as a reaction to the block construction of the other parties, as the PCP had also formed an alliance with the MDP/CDE, the *Aliança Povo Unido* (APU). By means of the FRS, the PS was only able to hold its result from the previous year, whilst the other blocks achieved increases. In the local elections in October, the PS also performed badly.

¹⁴² Cf. Results of the parliamentary election 1979, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, 8.11.2008.

¹⁴³ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 98 f.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. "Soares: Um Retrato", Entrevista concedida a O Independente, p. 353, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 3, Lisboa 1989, p. 335-358.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Sängner, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 315.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Results of the parliamentary election 1980, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, 8.11.2008.

The AD-block nominated its own candidate for the presidential election on the 7th of December: General Soares Carneiro. This was mainly due to the personal dissonance between Sá Carneiro and Eanes¹⁴⁷ and the different views on the function and duties of the President. Sá Carneiro's goal was to reduce the President to a representative instance by constitutional revision. His conception was fortified by Eanes' repeated interference in the Prime Minister's affairs, which had reduced his decision-making autonomy. Eanes had, for example, publicly criticized government policy and had vetoed the reform law concerning the separation of the industrial sectors. The veto showed a political motivation on Eanes' part, in which he lay aside his function as political referee.¹⁴⁸ With the victory of Soares Carneiro, the PSD would have achieved their goal, due to the fact that he had already supported a constitutional revision along the lines of the PSD during the election campaign.¹⁴⁹ In addition, Sá Carneiro declared he would resign from the position of Prime Minister, should Eanes win the presidential election.¹⁵⁰

The question concerning the presidential candidate became a crucial test within the PS. The majority of the executive committee regarded itself as *Eanista* and defended the party's closeness to the President. Further, there existed a group around Salgado Zenha that did not consider itself as *Eanistas*, but that advocated Eanes' reelection all the same. In contrast to these groups stood a group, who rejected his reelection, for example the unionists. In the spring of 1980, Soares had ensured Eanes the PS' support. This assurance was based on the fact that, on the one hand, no other candidate seemed appropriate at the time and he rejected the possibility of running himself.¹⁵¹ On the other hand, there had been an approximation on Eanes' part, who had accepted conditions stipulated by the PS. These were, firstly, the abandonment of further presidential governments, and secondly, the covenant to redirect the presidential office into a civilian direction. This included the separation of the presidential office from his position in the Council of the Revolution, as well as the promise to resign from the office as CEMGFA. Further, Eanes had assured the PS that he would not approve the AD-Block's project, extracted from the *Manifesto Reformador*, to use the referendum as an instrument for constitutional revisions.¹⁵²

When the results of the parliamentary election were published, Eanes delivered a speech in which he declared that he identified himself with the social model of the AD-Block¹⁵³ and not with that of the FRS. The PS felt betrayed, as it had supported Eanes whilst the AD-Block had

¹⁴⁷ The relationship between Sá Carneiro and Eanes worsened rapidly and profoundly, leading to the cessation of verbal communication. The relationship between Sá Carneiro's successor, Francisco Balsemão, and the President was likewise cold and aggressive.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Sängler, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 319

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Rato, Vasco, Ramalho Eanes, in: Costa Pinto, António/Rezola, Maria Inácio, Os Presidentes da República Portuguesa, Lisboa 2001, p. 240-250, here p. 249 f.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Popović Baldani, Dragiša, Eanes: Entre o Ontem e o Amanhã, Lisboa 1986, p. 222; Due to the death of Sá Carneiro in a plane crash shortly before the election, the threat was not effected.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 94 and 117f.

¹⁵² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁵³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 121.

put all its effort in preventing his reelection.¹⁵⁴ In addition, Eanes broke the previously signed cooperation agreement with the PS. Although Eanes' speech suggests opportunistic behavior on his side, the approximation to the PSD was a strategically clever move: At this point, the votes of the socialist electorate were secured, and with his declaration he showed himself close to the conservative voters, additionally suggesting he stood above party lines. As the President is elected directly by the people, the approximation to the electorate was of more consequence than that to the parties.

Soares drew back his personal support for Eanes and temporarily stepped down from the position of Secretary General, in order not to influence the further course of the party's decisions.¹⁵⁵ Soares was criticized for this move by the whole party, especially by Salgado Zenha, who accused him of placing his personal interests above party interests. The National Secretariat voted for the continuation of support for Eanes. Sá Carneiro and Amaro Costa presumed that Soares' drawback would benefit their own candidate and asked Soares to publicly support Soares Carneiro – a plea, which Soares obviously rejected.¹⁵⁶ Soares' resignation can not be regarded as a political power move, considering the fact that at the time the polls suggested a victory for Eanes in the election. Yet by retracting his personal support, a confrontation strategy was facilitated for the future, especially in view of the upcoming constitutional revision.

Eanes lost 5% of votes in comparison to the election of 1976,¹⁵⁷ yet he reached an absolute majority in the first ballot with 56,44%. Soares Carneiro achieved 40,23% of the votes. The remaining candidates were Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, Pires Veloso, Galvão de Melo and António Rodrigues, none achieving more than 2% of the votes.¹⁵⁸ Eanes relied on his personal base in the population. Due to his decisions in the previous years against the parties, he was considered an independent arbiter and stabilizing factor – the opposite of what the parties alleged him to be. Although Eanes still lacked a charismatic personality and his rhetorical skills were not impressive, he profited from the fact that Soares Carneiro was an equally inconspicuous personality and that Eanes had established a great degree of popularity and had an excellent election campaign team at his disposal. The electorate voted against the uncertainty of a conservative block and the security of proven practices.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Popović Baldani, Dragiša, *Eanes: Entre o Ontem e o Amanhã*, Lisboa 1986, p. 231.

¹⁵⁵ After his resignation, Soares was summoned to candidate again, yet he declined, being well aware that he could not win the election at this point and a failure would represent his political death.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *Democracia*, Lisboa 1996, p. 124 f.

¹⁵⁷ In absolute numbers, Eanes gained votes: in 1976 it had been 2.967.137 votes, in 1980 3.262.520 (Cf. Sängner, Ralf, *Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“*, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 646). The numbers confirm that Eanes was well accepted in the population. The battle merely took place between the President and the parties.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Results of the presidential election 1980, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008. Soares voted for Galvão de Melo, which merely represented a protest vote.

¹⁵⁹ In sociopolitical terms, the Portuguese people are of a conservative nature, which explains such decisions. Nevertheless, there is a theory that the political left represents the majority and the PSD only achieves majorities, when it can win over the electors of the middle-left. Cf. Avillez, Maria João, *O Espírito Civil da Revolução*. Entrevista concedida ao jornal Público, 24.04.1994, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 9, Lisboa 1995, p.349.402, here p. 396.

4.2.4 Approximation PS-PSD: Eanes' Downfall

At the party conference in May 1981, Soares was reelected Secretary-General and his list won the election with a majority of 60,9%.¹⁶⁰ The reelection was one of his most important political victories: victory represented the legitimization of the implementation of his positions; the consequence of a defeat would have been the end of his political career.¹⁶¹ In addition, the results of the election of the party conference had consequences for the PS' relationship to Eanes. If the *Eanista's* list had achieved the majority, Eanes would have indirectly taken over the party. As the exploitation of the PS did not succeed, Eanes provoked the disruption of the party in his second term, the result being the foundation of the PRD.

The group around Salgado Zenha offered resistance to the political course of Soares. In July 1982, Zenha was suspended by the party directorate, allowing an unhindered continuation. This step was only legitimized by the local elections in December 1982 and the parliamentary elections in April 1983, in which the PS achieved majorities and Soares' social-democratic course, which included the dissolution of the FRS and a approximation to the PSD, was confirmed. After his apparent knockout in 1980/81, Soares achieved an inner-party and political comeback by the parliamentary election in 1983.¹⁶²

The approximation to the PSD was possible after Francisco Pinto Balsemão took over its leadership in December 1980. The mutual goal was the constitutional revision, which would redefine the presidential competences and dissolve the Council of the Revolution. Eanes threatened to withdraw from his office, should the parties pursue their course. The fact that Eanes did not withdraw, although the parties continued the constitutional project, damaged his reputation. His inconsequential behavior revealed that the threat was a mere pressure instrument for the preservation of his own interests.¹⁶³

The negotiation partners signed an agreement in the summer of 1982, which was rejected by Eanes and the PCP, but which achieved the necessary two-third majority in Parliament. The settlement was passed on the 12th of August and published on the 30th of September.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, the Defense and Armed Forces Law came into force in December of the same year, establishing the separation of military and political power, and subordinating the military under a civil power. Eanes vetoed the law, yet it also achieved the required two-third majority in Parliament.¹⁶⁵

Due to the focus on the constitutional revision, the economic problems of the country were neglected. The Balsemão Government had pursued a strategy of economic recovery on credit,

¹⁶⁰ Next to Soares' list, the lists of Guterres and of the Ex-Secretariat, represented by Salgado Zenha and Jorge Sampaio, advanced for the election.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 158.

¹⁶² Cf. Sängner, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 419 f.

¹⁶³ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 167 ff.

¹⁶⁴ Closer details to the constitutional revision, cf. Chapter 4.4 “The Constitutional Revisions of 1982 and 1989”.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Sängner, Ralf, p. 327 ff.

which ran the country into debt. The divergences between the PSD and the CDS increased and were aggravated by the demands of the PS during the constitutional revision, to which the PSD had to comply but which were not compatible with the positions of the CDS.¹⁶⁶ The local elections in December 1982, in which the governing parties lost percentages, were an indicator for the discontent of the population with the Government. As a consequence, Freitas do Amaral (CDS) stepped down from all party and government offices, yet this move should also be regarded in view of the presidential elections in 1986, to which he was nominated as candidate for the AD-parties. Balsemão stepped down from his position as Prime Minister and the Government was dissolved on the 23rd of December.¹⁶⁷ Eanes attempted one last rescue effort for the AD-Block by appointing Vítor Crespo (PSD) as Prime Minister. He tried to avoid an agreement between PSD and PS and to secure his own, long-term political influence. His efforts failed, so he dissolved the Parliament and called for elections for the 25th of April 1983.

The fall of the Government came to soon strategically for the PS. The party had recovered considerably and would presumably achieve a majority in the next parliamentary election, yet it was unlikely to achieve an absolute majority, which would be needed to negotiate a new agreement with the IMF and go through with a strict austerity policy to stabilize the economy.¹⁶⁸ The PS and PSD had shown great consensus skills during the elaboration of the constitutional revision, opening the possibility for a coalition. The first dialog between Soares and Mota Pinto, who had taken over the leadership within the PSD, took place in February 1983, ending the bipolarization strategy. In this phase, the party leaders agreed on a collaboration of the two parties, independently of the election results, for the stabilization of the economy.¹⁶⁹ The political motivation behind a *bloco central* was the creation of a counterbalance to the *bloco eanista*, which was very strong at the time and which played an important role until the parliamentary elections of 1987.

The electors voted for a grand coalition: the PS achieved 36,11%, outreaching its election results of the year 1976, the PSD achieved 27,24%, followed by the PCP (in the APU-Alliance) with 18,07%. The loser of the election was the CDS, which had campaigned for the continuation of the AD coalition and fell to 12,56%.¹⁷⁰

Although the coalition dialogs between PS and PSD were initiated the next day, the two party leaders wanted to legitimize the alliance within their respective parties to secure its support. In the PS, the members were called to vote by referendum to decide between a coalition either

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *Democracia*, Lisboa 1996, p. 169.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Sängner, Ralf, *Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“*, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 329.

¹⁶⁸ Soares gambled for more time in 1982: the PS brought in a motion of non-confidence, demanded the immediate dismissal of the executive and the dissolution of Parliament. The reason why this strategy implied winning time was based on the rivalry with Eanes: the assumption was that the more pressure came from the PS, the less Eanes would meet its demands. Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *Democracia*, Lisboa 1996, p. 172.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 176 f.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Results of the parliamentary election 1983, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008.

with the PSD or the PCP; 80% voted for the grand coalition. On the 8th of May, the National Council of the PSD equally voted for a coalition with the PS. After a long period of negotiation, the coalition treaty was signed on the 4th of June. The finance ministry was hard to staff, as no one wanted to be responsible for the unpopular but necessary measures.¹⁷¹ Ernâni Lopes, Portuguese ambassador in the EC, finally accepted, under the condition of absolute support from Soares and Mota Pinto. Considering the fact that it was a priority of the Government to conclude the negotiations for Portugal's accession to the EC, which had been neglected in the past years, Lopes turned out to be the ideal staffing.

Given the severe economic situation, Soares asked the President to give a speech regarding the condition of the nation, supplementing Soares' own speech introducing the Government on the 9th of June. Soares emphasized the need to inform the people how severe the situation was, so that they could understand and be prepared for the upcoming necessary cuts. Eanes refused, so Soares addressed the population himself. Soares called the people to remember the difficult starting point, when revolting on the streets because of the upcoming austerity policy. In order to lead the course of the country away from the abyss, all would have to work together in solidarity and with pragmatism, common sense, sacrifice and time. Only in doing so would there be hope for melioration.¹⁷² In addition, the Government rejected any form of institutional war. The President of the Republic, as well as Parliament and the courts, could count with the Government's respect and loyalty.¹⁷³ Party interests would take up a subordinated role to the national interest, the foremost being combating the crisis with the goal of rebuilding Portugal. “Assim, dirijo aos portugueses a minha última palavra: lancemo-nos ao trabalho; demo-nos as mãos, solidariamente. A tarefa é de todos. Vamos recuperar a esperança. Em conjunto, seremos capazes de vencer o tremendo desafio.”¹⁷⁴

The relationship of Soares and Eanes was very formal and reserved, but always respectful and cordial. In their weekly meetings, only the political agenda would be worked through, thus avoiding their personal dissonances. The Government was not confronted with resistance from the opposition, as CDS and PCP were a minority and their political positions were so incommensurate that cooperation was impossible. The only danger for the *bloco central* lay in the different opinions of PS and PSD and the internal conflicts within the social-democratic party.

The first crisis arose in October 1983. At the party conference of the PS, Maria Belo introduced a legislative initiative for the legalization of abortions. Soares tried to convince the delegates that, although the initiative was sensible and necessary, the timing was the worst possible, as the position of the PSD was irreconcilable and the issue could lead to conflicts

¹⁷¹ Soares first asked Vítor Constancio, Vasco Vieira de Almeida and Francisco Veloso, who all declined.

¹⁷² Soares, Mário, *Recuperar a Esperança*, Discurso do Primeiro-Ministro na posse do IX Governo Constitucional em 9 de Junho de 1983, p. 3 ff.

¹⁷³ Cf. *ibid.* p. 11

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14

within the Government. His appeal was drowned in the enthusiasm of the congress and the party voted for the initiative, laying a ticking bomb under the Government.¹⁷⁵ On the 26th of January 1984 the law was presented in Parliament. Members of the PSD threatened to resign from the Government and the church withdrew its support. When a successful passing of the law seemed irreversible, Mota Pinto, who initially had also rejected the law, assuaged the conservatives within the PSD,¹⁷⁶ and to regain the church's confidence, Soares visited the Vatican. The symbolism of the journey alone and Soares' reception by cardinal Casaroli, followed by an audience by the pope João Paulo II, settled the conflict between the church and the PS.

The restrictive austerity policy was tightened to meet the conditions set by the IMF for a second agreement. The consequence of the economic measures was a proliferation of strikes. The workers primarily went on strike due to back wages and the unemployment rate of 10,4%, of which only 13,3% drew unemployment benefits. In the district of Setúbal, the black flags of hunger were hoisted; the Government reacted with the an emergency plan. The greatest resistance was not given by the unions, but by the PCP, which started a campaign against the Government. Until today, one can see the graffiti-slogan “Soares, Rual!“ on the walls of Lisbon, which were written at the time.¹⁷⁷ Yet the Government carried on with its austerity course: after a short term recession to expedite economic development, a redistribution could be undertaken. In Soares' words: “Não se podem comer omeletes sem, primeiro, partir os ovos.”¹⁷⁸ Soares called for a vote of confidence right before the closure of the negotiations with the IMF to legitimize the economic course of action.

The candidate question for the presidential election of 1986 caused the next crisis in the coalition. In mid-1984, the PS declared it wanted to nominate its own presidential candidate. Although Soares did not affirm his candidacy, it was a likely scenario due to his position in the party. In view of his close relationship to Mota Pinto, the conservatives within the PSD feared that he would declare his support.¹⁷⁹ At the PSD's party congress in November 1984, support for the potential candidate Soares was overruled. Soares urged for a new coalition agreement, in which the right to nominate an own candidate was permitted. The treaty was signed on the 11th of December.

In February 1985, Mota Pinto was unseated, which can be marked as the beginning of the end of the grand coalition. After Cavaco Silva's list achieved a majority at the party congress in May, he was elected party President on the 2nd of June. Cavaco Silva was a economic technocrat, who had previously worked at the *Banco de Portugal*. His economic and social stipulations were

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 205 ff.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 206.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 217.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

¹⁷⁹ It was, in fact, Mota Pintos intention: in private, he summoned Soares to candidate and offered him the PSD's support. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 222.

unacceptable for the PS; on the 4th of July Cavaco Silva declared the end of the coalition, the PSD resigned from the Government on the 14th and Eanes called for parliamentary elections for October 1985.

Soares' last action as Prime Minister was signing the accession treaty with the EC on the 12th of June: this was the greatest accomplishment for the *bloco central* and Soares' personal victory. In mid-1985 an economic growth effectuated by the austerity policy and strengthened by the EC-accession gained ground, yet the PS did not profit from it. In early 1985, party members had urged Soares to step down from his position as Prime Minister and had called Ernâni Lopes to loosen the austerity policy in order to avoid a political massacre in the presidential as well as parliamentary elections. Lopes refused to yield to the campaign pressure and rejected a premature abandonment of the austerity policy. According to the agreement at the beginning of the legislative term, Soares supported Lopes and was equally indisposed to give up his position. He feared that the negotiations with the EC would be at stake if he resigned from Prime Minister.¹⁸⁰

In early 1986, the PS elected Almeida Santos as Secretary-General, yet he only occupied the position until June, when he was substituted by Vitor Constâncio. The internal calmness, which had been established in the PS after 1981, preserved the party from tension, but also hindered the debate about Soares' successor and a constructive discussion concerning the party's future political course. These contentions were only attended to after Soares' withdrawal. Thus, in 1986 the PS had to hold its ground in the face of the electorate, defend itself from the PRD's influence, rebuild its internal order and redefine its ideological course.

4.3 Eanes, the Political President: The PRD

In the course of the year 1984, a movement arose around the figure of Eanes which united leftist as well as conservative political currents, demonstrating closeness and unity in contrast to the political conflicts of the other parties. In July 1984, Eanes declared that he would follow a political course after his presidency: “Se a acção governativa dos partidos políticos existentes não der uma resposta satisfatória aos problemas do País, é evidente que, depois do meu mandato, vou exercer uma acção política.”¹⁸¹ In February 1985, the *Partido Reformador Democrático* (PRD) was founded, amongst others by Manuela Eanes, the President's wife, establishing an official connection to Eanes.¹⁸² As Eanes still occupied the presidential office, he could not participate actively in the foundation or composition of the party.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁸¹ Popović Baldani, Dragiša, Eanes: Entre o Ontem e o Amanhã, Lisboa 1986, p. 302.

¹⁸² Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 257.

Strengthened by the fact that the PRD entered the political arena whilst the other parties fought against a legitimacy crisis, the party achieved sensational 17,92% in the parliamentary elections in October 1985.¹⁸³ The electorate primarily came from the left political spectrum, which mainly explains the PS's bad results with a mere 20,77% of the votes (corresponding to a loss of 15,5%). Eanes had been successful in his strategy to create an alternative to the PS. With the replacement in the directory of the PSD in spring 1985, the party avoided carrying the consequences for its share of responsibility of the government actions. The recession was not associated with Cavaco Silva, as he had been Mota Pinto's adversary. The PSD achieved 29,87% and Cavaco Silva formed a minority government.¹⁸⁴

The following months were dominated by the campaign for the presidential elections.¹⁸⁵ The PRD nominated its own candidate: Salgado Zenha. This candidacy can be interpreted as a provocation pointed at the PS, and as a power play between Soares and Eanes due to Zenhas history in the Socialist Party. Zenha was additionally supported by the PCP, which damaged rather than fortified the PRD's image. The approximation to the communists caused a left-shift away from its original position as a party of the middle and provoked internal conflicts between the leftist and conservative groups. The differing political currents surfaced more and more after the failure in the presidential election and invalidated the PRD's principle of unity.

In October 1986, Eanes was elected party President. He gathered persons of trust in the party's directorate, repeating the nepotistic behavior the PRD had criticized in the other parties, and thus degrading its credibility. Although the party statutes declare ethical values, transparent processes, and the ability to create a dialog, the party organization draws a different picture: the PRD is strictly hierarchically organized and adjusted to the President's interests. The President is the representative of the party and coordinates all political activity. He is the chair of the National Leadership Commission, which defines the concrete actions of the party and nominates the candidates for national and European elections. The National Convention is the highest party instance, which – like the CDS – is partly composed by elected members and partly by a fixed pool of delegates of the other party units. The tasks of the National Convention include the approval of the strategic political action line, the alteration of the party program and statutes and the election of the members of the other party units and of the President.¹⁸⁶

When Vitor Constâncio took over leadership of the PS in 1986, a left-shift followed, causing the PRD to lose parts of its left electorate. As a consequence, the PRD sought an approximation to the PSD and offered a cooperation. The PSD vehemently refused, due to its increasing social

¹⁸³ Its election campaign concentrated on the critique regarding the other parties, e.g. the partisanship and the power-political motivation of the parties. The PRD wanted to set itself apart by presenting itself as the “Party of the Honest Men” and “The moral Party”.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Results of the parliamentary election 1985, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Chapter 5.1 “Presidential Candidacy and Election in 1986 and 1991”.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Sanger, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 446.

prestige, which was suggested by opinion polls. Hereupon, Eanes changed the course of action into an offensive direction, indulging in the same power-play behavior the PRD had accused the other parties of following in its program and during the election campaign. For the second time, the party discredited itself in the eyes of the electorate.

On the 3rd of April 1987 the PRD brought in a motion of non-confidence without previous consultation with the left parties. This action led to the people's irrevocable loss of trust in the PRD, as a successful government was overthrown out of power-political reasons. Despite extensive doubts, the other left parties voted for the motion, which passed with 134 to 108 votes. Soares dissolved Parliament on the 28th of April and called for new elections for the 17th of July.¹⁸⁷

For the first time in the II. Republic, a party – that is, the PSD – achieved an absolute majority with 50,22%, followed by the PS with 22,24%, the APU with 12,14% and the CDS with 4,44%. The loser of the election was the PRD, which fell to 4,91%. The party had discredited itself by its actions, amongst which the motion of non-confidence was the most important. The electorate, which had mainly come from the conservative wing of the PS, wandered off to the PSD; in 1994 it returned to the PS.

After the devastating results, Eanes withdrew from the party's leading position, yet the PRD did not recover and finally became a splinter party.¹⁸⁸ Despite its ephemerality, the PRD played a central role in the political dynamic of the late 1980s. Further, its existence reinforced the party-political action of Eanes during his presidency, which was declared as such by the parties, yet never seen so by the people. When Eanes dissolved Parliament in 1985, the PS had a percentage of 36% - much higher than the election results of the PSD after the elections. One could interpret that Eanes knew that the PRD would profit from elections at that particular time – at the expense of the PS – which is why he did not let the PS continue to govern, but had no objection to a PSD government with 6% less support in Parliament. The fact that Eanes brought in a motion of non-confidence against the Government he had approved only two years earlier as President can only be interpreted as a power game, considering the coalition plans between PS and PRD. The strategy was cut off by Soares and the PRD was catapulted into the political offside.¹⁸⁹ When the population realized that the PRD did not set itself apart from the other parties, the people felt betrayed and saw no reason for the existence of a party of the middle, whose electorate already felt represented by both the PSD and PS.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Chapter 5.2.1 “The Dissolution of Parliament 1987”.

¹⁸⁸ In the election 1991, the PRD merely achieved 0,61% of the votes. Cf. Results of the parliamentary election 1991, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Chapter 5.2.1 “The Dissolution of Parliament 1987”.

4.4 The Constitutional Revisions of 1982 and 1989

A constitutional revision can be passed by Parliament with a two-thirds majority. The President of the Republic cannot refuse to announce the revision law. It is only possible to revise an amending act five years after the day of its proclamation.¹⁹⁰ The constitution of the Portuguese Republic was revised six times, in the years 1982, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005.

The constitution of 1976 was already a target of criticism when it came into effect. The main points of attack were the socialist contents in the political and economic section, the political function of the military, especially the exceptional position of the Council of the Revolution, and – connected to this point – the extensive layout of the President's competences. The detractors held the opinion that the constitution did not correspond to social and political reality, but was merely an expression of the communists' ideas.

Three different groups emerged with the beginning of revision work in 1980. The first included the AD-Government block, the industry associations and parts of the church, who committed to an exhaustive revision, eliminating the ideological content and extending the government's role. The aim was the achievement of greater political stability by dissolving the Council of the Revolution and subordinating the Armed Forces to a civilian ministry. Further renewals were the discharge of the government with the approval of the absolute majority in Parliament, an alteration of the electoral law, the limitation of the President's function to mere representative role, the introduction of the referendum and the annulment of the government's obligation to see to the “construção do socialismo”¹⁹¹. Liberal features for the creation of a free market system were proposed for the economic section.¹⁹²

The second group was represented by the PS, which campaigned for a partial reform, yet without changes in the socialist content. The goals were similar to those of the PSD, albeit with a different emphasis, whereby Parliament, and not the government, was to be strengthened. The limitation of the President's competences was also a priority of this group. A mixed economic system was envisioned for the economic sector, which meant the coexistence of state, corporate and private sectors. As Soares dominated the PS at the time, its demands therefore being his, and as the Government parties were dependent on the PS' cooperation for the achievement of a two-third majority (thus yielding to the socialist vote in many points during the negotiations), the constitutional revision of 1982 is regarded as Soares' personal victory.

As a third group, the PCP, CGTP-IN and parts of the leftist military fought against a constitutional revision, due to the expected annulment of the socialist postulates.

After a long political negotiation period, the revised constitution was published on the 30th of September 1982 and came into force 30 days later. The first revision concentrated on the

¹⁹⁰ Cf. The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Article 286, 287 and 288 (2001).

¹⁹¹ Article 185 (1976).

¹⁹² Cf. Sanger, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 383 ff.

political section, gave the regime a civilian character and ended the custodianship of the Council of the Revolution.

When the PSD achieved its absolute majority in 1987, the next constitutional revision was initiated, concentrating on the economic section. The PSD was still dependent on the PS to achieve a two-third majority. To put the PS under pressure, Cavaco Silva declared in the run-up to the revision that the PS “tem na mão a chave da revisão constitucional; se quiser pode bloqueá-la.”¹⁹³. By doing so, Cavaco Silva artfully shifted the responsibility for a possible disagreement between the parties onto the PS.

The socialist postulates were, with the approval of both parties, finally removed and replaced with democratic ones. The constitutional text was thereby adapted to reality.

The preamble, which the AD-Government already wanted to eliminate in 1982, has endured without any changes until today. It declares that the Revolution of the 25th of April 1974 overturned the fascist regime and gave the Portuguese people their fundamental rights and freedom back. The constitution defends national independence, guarantees the fundamental rights of the people, determines the basic features of the democracy, secures the priority of constitutional legality, and opens the path for a socialist social system under consideration of the will of the Portuguese people. The preservation of the preamble suggests that the Portuguese people chose to conserve the revolutionary spirit within their constitution.

The President's competences were curtailed in extraordinary degree, which is mainly explained by the replacement of the Council of the Revolution by the Council of State and the Constitutional Court. The Council of State, presided by the President of the Republic, is his political consultant instance. In contrast to the Council of the Revolution, which was staffed with military delegates, it consists of civil members.¹⁹⁴ The Council of State took over the functions of the Council of the Revolution, with the exception of military affairs, which were assigned to the Ministry of Defense, and all competences concerning constitutionality control, which were assigned to the Constitutional Court.¹⁹⁵ Due to the exclusion of these tasks, the Council of State can be regarded as a presidential adviser unit.

With regard to defense policy, the President maintained a great portion of power, despite the transmission of its arbitration to the Ministry of Defense. The President, as an independent actor, had the function of preventing a governmental abuse of the Armed Forces, as had been

¹⁹³ Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política*. Volume 2, *Os anos de governo em maioria*, Temas e Debates, Lisboa 2004, p. 72.

¹⁹⁴ The members of the Council of State are: the President of the Republic, the President of the Assembly, the Prime Minister, the President of the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman, the Presidents of the regional governments, the former Presidents of the II. Republic who were not dismissed, five citizens elected by the President of the Republic for the duration of his mandate and five citizens elected by the Assembly for the duration of a legislative period and in accordance with the principles of proportional representation. Cf. Article 145 and 147 (1982) [2005: Art. 142]

¹⁹⁵ These are determined in article 148 (1982) [2005: Art. 145]

the experience until 1974.¹⁹⁶ In 1982, the Supreme National Defense Council, chaired by the President of the Republic, was founded as a consultant unit for all affairs concerning national defense and the composition, function and discipline of the Armed Forces.¹⁹⁷ In this way, the President has direct influence upon defense policy. His function as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces is not a mere representative function, but gives him the right to direct communication and previous consultation concerning specific assignments.¹⁹⁸

The institutional interdependence of the President, the government and the Parliament were redistributed. The government, which is still dependent on the President as well as on the Assembly, can be overthrown by Parliament if it votes on a motion of non-confidence with an absolute majority (previously, two motions of non-confidence within a time-span of at least 30 days were necessary). The PSD's proposal to introduce a constructive vote of non-confidence was rejected. Further, the following occasions now lead to the demission of the government: the beginning of a new legislative term, the acceptance of the Prime Minister's resignation by the President of the Republic, the death or long-term absence of the Prime Minister, the rejection of the government program by the absolute majority in Parliament, and the rejection of a confidence vote. The President of the Republic can dismiss the government after a hearing with the Council of State and under the condition that such a step is necessary to secure the proper functioning of the democratic institutions.¹⁹⁹

Parliament cannot be dissolved during the first six months after its election or the last semester of the term of office of the President of the Republic.²⁰⁰ In the case of a parliamentary dissolution, the new Parliament begins a new legislative term, which previously was not the case.²⁰¹ The President's obligation to dissolve the Parliament when motions of non-confidence provoked the third change of government or when the government program was rejected three times in a row, was annulled.²⁰²

From 1982 onwards, the absence of the President of the Republic had to be approved by Parliament, it assisted him in his assumption of office and could initiate an impeachment process.²⁰³ These new elements represent a form of parliamentary control over the presidential office. The competences of Parliament were successively augmented with every constitutional revision. Competences that were part of the President's domain before 1982, i.e. the

¹⁹⁶ This explains why in 1976 all competences concerning the Armed Forces were withdrawn from the government.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Article 274 (1982)

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Gomes Canotilho, J.J./Moreira, Vitel, *Os poderes do Presidente da República*, Coimbra Editora Coimbra 1991, p. 101 ff.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Article 198 (1982) [2005: Art. 195]

²⁰⁰ Cf. Article 175 (1982) [2005: Art. 172]

²⁰¹ Cf. Article 174 (1976 and 1982) [2005: Art. 171]

²⁰² Cf. Article 198 (1976 and 1982) [2005: Art. 195]

²⁰³ Cf. Article 166 (1982)

authorization for the state of siege or emergency and the empowerment to declare war or peace, were gradually transferred to Parliament.²⁰⁴

A small, yet very important reformation is the Prime Minister's obligation to inform the President of the Republic on all domestic and foreign policy issues in his weekly meetings with the President.²⁰⁵ Before 1982, the constitution also dictated a communication between Prime Minister and President, yet it was not so explicitly formulated.

A new element was introduced in 1989 with the referendum concerning questions of considerable national interest, initiated by Parliament or the government and submitted to the President.²⁰⁶ The proposal is subjected to an obligatory briefing regarding its constitutionality and legality by the President. There are, however, complexes of topics which are excluded from the possibility of a referendum, such as those for which Parliament has exclusive legislative competence, constitutional revisions and budget, tax and financial issues.

The economic section was changed in such a way that Portugal inherited a mixed economic system as proposed by the PS. Until 1976, the economic and social order was based “no desenvolvimento das relações de produção socialistas, mediante a apropriação colectiva dos principais meios de produção e solos, bem como dos recursos naturais, e o exercício do poder democrático das classes trabalhadoras”²⁰⁷. In 1982, a coexistence of state, private and corporate proprietary areas was established. The “collective appropriation of the most important means of production, property and natural resources” introduced in 1976 was only changed in 1997 into the “liberdade de iniciativa e de organização empresarial no âmbito de uma economia mista”²⁰⁸, although in 1989, in preparation for this step, article 290, which defined the content of article 80 as criteria that could not be revised, was modified. The expropriations and nationalizations which had occurred after the revolution were defined as “conquistas irreversíveis das classes trabalhadoras”²⁰⁹ in 1976. Reprivatization was effectuated in two steps, by first allowing it with an absolute majority vote in Parliament in 1989 and then annulling the article all-together in 1997.²¹⁰ The state intervention competences for private enterprises were successively reduced and since 1989 merely have a compensatory function.

In the course of denationalization, the second chapter of the economic section, which determined the property system according to the means of production, was annulled in 1989. The third and fourth chapter, which described the elaboration of the economic plan and the agrarian reform, which had been viewed as “um dos instrumentos fundamentais para a

²⁰⁴ Cf. Article 137 and 138 (1976, 1982 and 1989) and Article 164 (1982)

²⁰⁵ Cf. Article 204 (1982) [2005: Art. 201]

²⁰⁶ Cf. Article 137, 164 and 118 (1989)

²⁰⁷ Article 80 (1976)

²⁰⁸ Cf. Article 80 (1976, 1982 and 2005)

²⁰⁹ Article 83 (1976)

²¹⁰ Cf. Article 83 (1976, 1989 and 2005)

construção da sociedade socialista”²¹¹, were extremely curtailed and modified. The chapter regarding the regimentation of the trading system, in which the state could intervene in price formation and price control, was equally annulled in 1989.²¹²

In summary, one can say that the revision of 1989 modified the mixed economic system into a Western European model of market economy and enabled Portugal to participate in economic competition.

4.5 The President of the Republic: Functions and Competences

The exact definition of the Portuguese political system is controversially discussed in the literature of political science until today. It is a mixed system, in which Parliament stands alongside a President who is legitimized by direct election and who possesses a series of autonomous intervention competences. Scruples against defining the Portuguese system as semi-presidential are rooted in its differences to the French system, which serves as a model of semi-presidentialism. For the same reason, Portugal's system is also referred to as a parliamentary system with presidential dominance.²¹³

The key aspect is the position of the Prime Minister in relation to the President of the Republic. In France, the Premier is not elected by the Parliament, but chosen and appointed by the President. Thus, in periods in which there is no cohabitation, the Premier depends solely on the President's trust. In fact, the Premiers interpret their office as “first assistant to the State Chief” and lead the “government in terms of presidential instruction”²¹⁴. The subordination of the Premier is not anchored in the constitution, but is implemented in practice. The Premier's dependance on Parliament is only unveiled in periods of cohabitation, when the Premier comes forth as the true head of the executive. A strict separation of governmental and presidential autonomy does not exist.

In Portugal, this is different, due to the fact that the government is subject to a double responsibility at all times, having to answer to the President on the one hand and Parliament on the other.²¹⁵ Thus, the Prime Minister's dependency on the President is lower than in the French system. The President of the Republic also nominates and dismisses the Prime Minister yet, since the constitutional revision, he is obligated to previously hear the Parliament and to consider its distribution of power; he is only authorized to dismiss him when the regular functioning of the institutions is not given. This vague formulation leaves much room for

²¹¹ Article 96 (1976)

²¹² Cf. Article 109 and 110 (1976 and 1989)

²¹³ Cf. Gomes Canotilho, J.J./ Moreira, Vital, *Os Poderes do Presidente*, Coimbra 1991, p. 9 ff.

²¹⁴ Cf. Kempf, Udo, *Das politische System Frankreich*, 4. akt. und erw. Ausgabe, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2007, p. 85.

²¹⁵ Cf. Article 190 (2005)

interpretation. Just as de Gaulle formed the presidential office in France, Soares shaped that of Portugal: since his mandate, the Portuguese President only uses his power to dissolve Parliament and dismiss the Prime Minister when this contributes to the stability of the country.

The French strategy to dissolve Parliament after a presidential election in order to achieve a parliamentary majority, is not pursued in Portugal due to the fact, amongst others that the President is not part of the executive. Although the French constitution entitles the government to lead the politics of the nation,²¹⁶ the *domaine réservée* of the President, i.e. foreign and defense policy, has been respected by all governments. Even in periods of cohabitation, there has been no interest on the part of the Premier to detach the President from his general foreign policy competence, which can be explained by the fact that since the mid-1980s most Premiers aimed for the presidential office. The cooperation of the double executive is institutionalized with the Council of Ministers session, which is presided by the President. The actual decisions are usually already made in the weekly meetings of President and Premier.²¹⁷ In the Portuguese case, executive power is exclusively assigned to the government. The President does not automatically preside the Council of Ministers, but has to be invited by the Prime Minister to do so. The decisive point of presidential influence on executive policy is, analogously to France, the weekly meeting of President and Prime Minister. No concrete decisions are made here, yet the Prime Minister integrates the President's positions into his decision making process, with a nod to the President's veto rights at the end of the legislative process.

Even after the constitutional revision, which curtailed the President's competences extensively, the characteristic features of a semi-presidential system remained: 1) The direct election of the President; 2) The President's remarkable intervention competences, especially in the appointment and dismissal of the government; and 3) The government's dependency on the political trust of the President as well as of Parliament.²¹⁸ The characteristic leeway of a semi-presidential system between constitutional text and reality is also given in the Portuguese case. In addition to these constitutional criteria, Duverger refers to the parliamentary distribution of power and the President's position within this setup as decisive factors in defining whether the President turns out to be a representative, an omnipotent figure, or if he shares power with the Parliament.²¹⁹ Before the constitutional revision, Eanes represented the third type; due to the redistribution of power after 1982, the character of the Portuguese President evolved in the direction of a representative figure.

An interesting point of view can also be found in Jorge Miranda's remarks on semi-presidentialism. In addition to the constitutional criteria, a semi-presidential system only exists

²¹⁶ Cf. Constitution of the French Republic, Article 20.

²¹⁷ Cf. Kempf, Udo, *Das politische System Frankreich*, 4. akt. und erw. Ausgabe, Wiesbaden 2007, p. 73.

²¹⁸ Cf. Duverger, Maurice, *A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government*, in: *European Journal of Political Research*, Heft 8 1980, p. 165-187, here p. 166.

²¹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 165.

when 1) there is no parliamentary majority or 2) when parliamentary and presidential majority are distinct: “Na primeira hipótese, verifica-se uma tripartição perfeita de centros de poder; na segunda, um dualismo de Presidente da República e de Parlamento e Governo agindo em sintonia política”²²⁰. The Portuguese case met the criteria up to 1995, when for the first time the presidential and parliamentary majorities coincided. By then, the character of the political system had been formed, explaining the assumption of the thesis that Portugal is indeed a semi-presidential system.²²¹ It is necessary to emphasize, however, that the Portuguese President is not chief of the executive, but he nonetheless has remarkable intervention competences at his command.

The President of the Republic represents Portugal, guarantees national independence, the unity of the nation and the regular functioning of the democratic institutions.²²²

Any citizen who is entitled to vote and is older than 35 can run for presidential office by submitting a collection of supporting signatures from a minimum of 7500 elective citizens to the Constitutional Court at least 30 days before the election.²²³ The presentation of a candidate is directed to the people and not to the parties. Although a successful presidential election usually requires the support of a party, according to the constitution the candidacy does not illustrate a political move. In contrast to France, where the election of a President predicts a particular political course of action, the Portuguese President is summoned to act above party lines and is perceived accordingly by the people. A candidate can hold party political functions, yet as soon as he is elected, he is expected to give up all other functions. In order to reduce party political influence on the presidential election, the constitution determines a respite of at least 90 days between presidential and parliamentary elections.²²⁴

The President is voted in general, direct and secret elections and must attain an absolute majority. If this is not the case in the first ballot, a second ballot decides between the two strongest candidates. The candidacy for a third mandate, after two concluded consecutive mandates, is forbidden.²²⁵ The direct, absolute election of the President grants him a legitimacy, which unofficially leads to the obligation of the government and Parliament to follow his suggestions. The presidential term spans five years and is therefore longer than a legislative term, creating stability and continuity in the institutional landscape.²²⁶

²²⁰ Miranda, Jorge, O sistema semipresidencial Português entre 1976 e 1979, in: *Revista da Faculdade de Direito de Lisboa*, Vol. 25 (1984), p. 193-220, here, p. 201.

²²¹ In addition, Soares – the subject of this analysis – defines Portugal as a semi-presidential system, partly explaining his interpretation of the reach of presidential intervention instruments.

²²² Cf. Article 120 (2005).

²²³ Cf. Article 122 and 124 (2005).

²²⁴ Cf. Article 125 (2005).

²²⁵ Cf. Article 123 (2005).

²²⁶ Cf. Article 121, 126 and 128 (2005).

The President decides on the execution of a referendum initiated by the Parliament or the government,²²⁷ which has to contain a question of considerable national interest.²²⁸ He examines the proposals for a referendum with regard to their constitutionality and legality. If the President disapproves a proposal, it cannot be reintroduced in the ongoing legislative term.²²⁹

The President is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, presides the High Council of National Defense and appoints and dismisses, upon the proposal of the government, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, as well as the Chiefs of Staff of the three branches of service.²³⁰ In contrast to the French President, the Portuguese President does not have the power of decision in defense policy, yet he can influence it all the same.²³¹ After consulting with the government and Parliament, it is the President's competence to declare the state of siege and emergency.²³² In addition, it is his duty to speak out on any situation which could threaten the life of the Republic.

The President has the right to release or change penalties, after consulting the government. He awards decorations in accordance with the law, and performs the office of Grand Master of Portugal's honorary orders.²³³

Further, it is the President's responsibility to enact laws, executive laws and regulatory orders and have them published, and to sign both resolutions of Parliament that pass international agreement as well as the rest of the government's decrees.²³⁴ Associated with this competence is one of the most important presidential options for intervention: the veto right. The constitution schedules that within 20 days after the admission of a parliamentary bill, or after the publication of the Constitutional Court decision referring to the constitutionality of such a bill, the President has to promulgate the bill, or exercise his veto right by sending a justifying message requesting its reconsideration. The same applies for governmental degrees for enactment, the deadline here being 40 days. The President's veto can be overruled in the first case, if the Assembly of the Republic confirms its original vote with the absolute majority of its members in full exercise of their office; in this case, the President is obliged to enact the degree within eight days. In the area of external relations, the boundaries between public, private and cooperative sectors with regard to the ownership of the means of production, and the regulation of electoral acts provided by

²²⁷ Cf. Article 115 (2005).

²²⁸ In the cases affecting the autonomous regions and the local communities, the President possesses the decision-making power. Cf. Article 232, 2) and Article 256, 3) (2005).

²²⁹ The same applies when the referendum is answered negatively by the electorate. In addition, the referendum only has binding character when over 50% of the eligible voters participate in the voting procedure.

²³⁰ Cf. Article 133 o) and p), 134 (2005).

²³¹ Cf. Chapter 4.4 "The Constitutional Revisions of 1982 and 1989".

²³² Cf. Article 134 d) and 138 (2005). Article 19 defines that it can be declared for the whole sovereign territory as well as for parts of it, whereby an effectuated or immediately impending aggression by foreign Armed Forces must be given.

²³³ Cf. Article 134 I) (2005)

²³⁴ Cf. Article 134 b) (2005).

the constitution, a two-third majority of the present members, and greater than an absolute majority of all members in full exercise of their office, is required to annul the veto.²³⁵

In his function as the guardian of the constitution, the President can ask the Constitutional Court for a prior review of the constitutionality of any bill, decree for enactment or provision within international agreements that is submitted to him for ratification.²³⁶ This has to be done within a time limit of five days from the date of admittance. The Constitutional Court then has to come to a decision within 25 days, although the President can reduce the time limit in cases of emergency.

When the Constitutional Court declares a decree or resolution as unconstitutional, the President must veto the statute and return it to the body that passed it. The decree cannot be enacted until the responsible instance expunges the rule declared unconstitutional or, where applicable, the Parliament confirms the rule with a two-third majority. If the statute is reformulated, the President can request prior review of the constitutionality of the new version.²³⁷

Further, the President can provoke the legal invalidity of a decree by inactivity.²³⁸ In some cases²³⁹, decrees require the countersignature of the government. The absence of the countersignature equally implies the legal invalidity of the measure.²⁴⁰

The veto right is also betokened as an intervention right. It represents the constitutional grounds for presidential control over the legislative process.

In respect to other instances, the President presides the Council of State.²⁴¹ In accordance with the election law, the President determines the dates for the presidential, parliamentary, European and regional elections. He has the right to call extraordinary sessions of the Assembly of the Republic and direct messages to the national as well as the regional Parliaments. After the previous hearing of the Council of State and the parties represented in Parliament, it is the President's competence to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic.²⁴²

With respect to the government, the President has the right to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and discharge the government,²⁴³ to nominate and discard the members of government upon the Prime Minister's proposal and, on request of the same, to preside the

²³⁵ Cf. Article 136 (2005).

²³⁶ Cf. Article 278 (2005).

²³⁷ Article 279 (2005).

²³⁸ Article 137 determines that if the President should fail to enact or sign any of the acts provided for in Article 134(b), the said act shall be legally invalid.

²³⁹ This applies for acts pursuant to Article 133 h), j), l), m) and p) as well as Article 134 1) b), d) and f) and Article 135 a), b), and c).

²⁴⁰ Cf. Article 140 (2005)

²⁴¹ Cf. Chapter 4.4 "The Constitutional Revisions of 1982 and 1989".

²⁴² The Assembly of the Republic, however, cannot be dissolved during the six months following its election, during the last six months of the President of the Republic's term of office, or during a state of siege or emergency. Cf. Art. 172 (2005).

²⁴³ The President of the Republic may only remove the government when it becomes necessary to do so in order to ensure the normal functioning of the democratic institutions and after first consulting the Council of State. Cf. Art. 195 2) (2005).

Council of Ministers. It is not regulated that the appointed Prime Minister has to come from the strongest party in the Assembly; as long as he is supported by the majority of the members of Parliament, the President may nominate any Prime Minister of confidence. With respect to the appointment of the ministers, the President is not obliged to comply with the Prime Minister's proposal.²⁴⁴ In practice, the only President to exercise the right for the creation of presidential governments was Eanes.

Further, it lies in the President's responsibility to dissolve the self-governing bodies of the autonomous regions, either at his own instigation or upon proposal of the government, and only after a hearing with the members of the Assembly of the region in question and the Council of State. In addition, he appoints and discharges the ministers of the national government for the autonomous regions, upon the proposal of the government and after a hearing with the Council of State. Upon the proposal of the government, he also nominates and dismisses the President of the Audit Court and the Attorney General of the Republic. Moreover, five members of the Council of State and two members of the Supreme Judicial Council are appointed by the President.²⁴⁵

Within the bounds of international relations, the President nominates (upon the proposal of the government) the ambassadors and extraordinary envoys, accredits the foreign diplomatic representatives and ratifies international treaties. In the case of effective or imminent aggression, the President declares war and makes peace, both upon the proposal of the government and after a hearing with the Council of State or by the authorization of Parliament.²⁴⁶

The President of the Republic can be viewed as the fourth pillar of power²⁴⁷ – next to the executive, legislature and judiciary – which secures the balance between political entities by employing his regulating and compensatory competences. The President is: 1) a policeman, by monitoring the government's course and the parliamentary majority with regard to constitutionality and securing the compliance of the rights of oppositional parties; 2) an arbiter, by regulating political life, conciliating political and social conflicts, and – when necessary – dismissing the Prime Minister or dissolving Parliament, and 3) a firefighter, by assisting in crisis situations or institutional cessation.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴ Cf. Gomes Canotilho, J. J./Moreira, Vital, *Os Poderes do Presidente da República*, Coimbra1991, p. 48.

²⁴⁵ Cf. Article 133 (2005).

²⁴⁶ Cf. Article 135 (2005).

²⁴⁷ Cf. Gomes Canotilho, J. J./Moreira, Vital, *Os Poderes do Presidente da República*, Coimbra1991, p. 32.

²⁴⁸ Cf. *ibid.* p. 67 f.

5. The Presidency of Mário Soares 1986-1996

During his candidacy, Mário Soares declared he would be the President of all Portuguese people, and not only of those by whom he was elected.²⁴⁹ This principle was to become the guiding idea during the whole of his presidency. He never tired of making direct contact with the people, in order to become acquainted with and understand the social reality of the country. He institutionalized this concern with the *Presidências Abertas*, which became an integral part of the execution of the presidential office. In addition, Soares regarded it as the President's task to mediate between social, regional and political groups and national political institutions by creating a dialog between them. The President's role within this form of communication is referred to as his *Magistratura de Influência*.²⁵⁰

The regulated exchange of information with the whole political-institutional structure allowed Soares deep insights into state affairs and legitimized his function as moderator and arbiter of the political game. Using his right to address the political institutions and the public, Soares stated his view on the political course of the government,²⁵¹ yet never violating the government's autonomy. The consequence was that although his interventions clearly increased both in quantity and quality during his second term, Soares always operated in accordance with the constitution.

Whenever frictions between the President and the Prime Minister occurred, Soares used the weekly meetings to bring his positions to bear. When the divergences between government and President were of greater extent, he imparted his viewpoint through a written communication to the Prime Minister. Only in cases, when the freedom, rights and security of the people were at risk, did he opt for public promulgations, as was the case in June 1991, when he gave a speech about the freedom of press in the Assembly.²⁵²

5.1 Presidential Candidacy and Election in 1986 and 1991

The candidacies for the presidential election in 1986 were shaped by the political chaos of the previous year. Freitas do Amaral was the only conservative candidate, supported by the CDS and PSD, whilst Mário Soares, Salgado Zenha and Lourdes Pintasilgo competed for the votes in the left political spectrum.

The first to announce her candidacy was Lourdes Pintasilgo. Due to her congenial way of being, she received a large support from the population. Eanes and the PCP let her believe that

²⁴⁹ Cf. Soares Mário, *Unir os Portugueses, Servir Portugal*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções*, Lisboa 1987, p. 23-29, here p. 26. The maxim to become the “*Presidente de todos os Portugueses*” was, however, already used by Eanes. Cf. Popović Baldani, Dragiša, *Eanes: Entre o Ontem e o Amanhã*, Lisboa 1986, p. 147.

²⁵⁰ Cf. Merkel, Wolfgang/ Stiehl, Volker, *Das Politische System Portugals*, p.657.

²⁵¹ Article 133 d) and 134 e) (2005) gives the President this right.

²⁵² Cf. Avillez, Maria João, *Soares, O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 64 f.

she had their support. When they nominated their own candidate (Salgado Zenha), Pintasilgo lost her voter base, which eventually devolved into scattered leftist groups. In the course of the election campaign, she was requested to give up her candidacy in favor of Zenha, yet she declined.

Salgado Zenha was supported by Eanes²⁵³, the PRD, the PCP, some socialists and the military of the 25th of April. During the election campaign it became clear that, although he was a well-known political and moral authority, he was very hard to sell: his rhetoric was dry and he used a judicial language which was hardly understood by the common people. He did not attain the enthusiasm within the population that Soares and Pintasilgo evinced. In the course of his political career, Zenha had always appeared conjointly with Soares, who had dominated the public performances, which explains why Zenha was not used to stand in the spotlight.

Soares announced his candidacy in late 1985. He did not have the intention of running for Prime Minister again and he wanted to clear the position as Secretary-General of the PS which he had occupied for thirteen years, because it was his conviction that “em democracia, os cargos devem ser transitórios.”²⁵⁴ He believed he could be beneficial for his country as President of the Republic. It was his aim to consolidate the democracy and to advance the idea he had for and of Portugal. In summary one could say: he wanted to “Unir os Portugueses e Servir Portugal”²⁵⁵. The constitutional revision had changed the political-military situation, having as a consequence that Soares was willing to run “para poder civilizar – no sentido não-militarismo – o regime democrático português, e dar-lhe uma nova geração.”²⁵⁶

Soares' starting position was very bad due to the fact that he was made responsible for the restrictive austerity policy and its consequences. In addition, three candidates fought for the same electorate in the left political spectrum. The polls suggested that only 8% of the voters opted for Soares, yet he did not let the prognoses influence his campaign and compiled a nationwide election campaign with the MASP (*Movimento de Apoio Soares à Presidência*). His supporters within the PS were a mixed group of historical figures, such as Manuel Alegre, but also members of the ex-Secretariat, such as Vitor Constâncio, António Guterres and Jorge Sampaio. In addition, the MASP obtained support from the USA and Germany.²⁵⁷ New strategies, such as audiovisual marketing, broadcasting time and debates between the candidates, were applied in the election campaign. The most important election campaign element, and the

²⁵³ On the 16th of November 1985, Eanes publicly declared his support for Salgado Zenha. Cf. Rato, Vasco, Ramalho Eanes, in: Costa Pinto, António/Rezola, Maria Inácio, *Os Presidentes da República Portuguesa*, Lisboa 2001, p. 240-250, here p. 250 f.

²⁵⁴ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *Democracia*, Lisboa 1986, p. 243.

²⁵⁵ “Unir os Portugueses e Servir Portugal” was the election campaign slogan. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 243 and 308.

²⁵⁶ Appendix 1 „Interview with Mário Soares”, p. 120 f.

²⁵⁷ Two election campaign technicians from the USA, who had organized campaigns for Reagan and Carter, assisted the MASP, yet their proposals were rejected, due to high implementation costs and low estimated response from the Portuguese people. From Germany, the campaign manager of the SPD was sent to Portugal by Willy Brandt. He initiated a series of practical ideas which were implemented in the campaign. Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *Democracia*, Lisboa 1996, p. 271.

discipline best dominated by Soares, was the campaign journey throughout the country, in which he practically went from door to door, taking note of the people's concerns. This form of action, close to the people, was reenacted later with the *Presidências Abertas*.

As competition in the left spectrum was very high, it was the strategical course of the campaign to reach the voters of the moderate left and middle. Soares' aim was to assert himself against the other left candidates in the first ballot.²⁵⁸ Although Soares and the MASP did not expect the PCP's support in the second ballot, they wagered that, for tactical reasons, their electorate would. If Soares should win the first round, his chances of winning the election all-together in the second ballot were therefore very high. The same strategy was followed by Freitas do Amaral, though with a different outcome. He reckoned that the PCP electorate would not vote for Soares in the second ballot due to the historical dissonances between Soares and the PCP, whereas the socialist electorate would vote for Salgado Zenha should he win the first ballot. Therefore, the PSD also favored Soares' victory in the first ballot.

During the whole course of the election campaign, Freitas do Amaral received the support of the conservative block and was considered the odds-on favorite from the beginning. Since the 25th of April, he had effected a political career revealing his democratic belief, yet he had an unfavorable background which was utilized by Soares during the campaign. Freitas do Amaral descended from a traditional and conservative family: his grandfather had been a close friend of Salazar, his father a friend of Thomaz and he himself a pupil of Marcelo Caetano. For Soares it therefore stood to reason that he should illustrate Freitas do Amaral as the “old Portugal”, which nobody wanted anymore, and himself as the “new Portugal”.

Soares especially scored in the TV debates, which were decisive for the outcome of the election. On the 2nd of January 1986, Soares and Zenha had their debate, which was – due to their history – shaped by great emotions. Zenha calculated that Soares did not have a chance against him; Soares would at most achieve the 20% of votes from the PS, whereas he could count with the 18% of the PRD and 15% of the PCP. He did not accept that the logic of a presidential elections does not work that way.²⁵⁹ He attacked Soares on the personal level, by declaring that he did not belong to his family and that no identity or contact was possible between them. This personal hostility, which Soares did not feel despite their political dissonances, left him so perplex that he failed to answer back with the same aggressiveness. The people accredited Soares human ingenuity for not resorting to the same munition when being attacked.²⁶⁰ In the TV debate with Freitas do Amaral on the 9th of January, Soares comported himself with caution because he did not want to scare off the electorate of the middle.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ It is important to stress that none of the parties assumed that a candidate would achieve an absolute majority in the first ballot. Therefore, the election campaign strategies all included two ballots.

²⁵⁹ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, *O espírito civil da revolução*. Entrevista concedida ao jornal *O Público* em 24.04.1994, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 9, Lisboa 1985, p. 351-402, here p. 394 f.

²⁶⁰ Avillez, Maria João, *Soares*. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 282.

²⁶¹ Cf. *ibid.*

The crucial factor for Soares' victory over the other candidates in the left political spectrum was the campaign date on the 15th of January in Marinha Grande, where catastrophic conditions prevailed due to the restrictive policy of the grand coalition. At his arrival, a member of the MASP, who had already been roughened up by the waiting masses, told Soares to turn back, since he had been told if “o Mário Soares entra na Marinha Grande, será morto!”²⁶², yet Soares insisted on driving on. The enraged crowd waved the black flags of hunger whilst Soares fought himself through the scores of people, also being physically assaulted, up to the gates of the factories, where the TV-teams were already standing. In an emotional interview, Soares declared that the factories were not the property of the communists neither of Moscow, that Portugal was a free country and that he had the right to circulate wherever he pleased.²⁶³ This scenario demonstrates how Soares has the gift to turn situations to his favor by using the right action and word choices. The incident in Marinha Grande did not only give his own campaign new impulses, but also damaged the image of the candidates who were supported by the PCP, even though the communists disclaimed any responsibility for the blockade. Freitas do Amaral equally had a campaign appointment in Marinha Grande a few days after Soares and was confronted with the same scenario. In contrast to Soares, he decided to turn back and not face up to the crowd, which let him seem weak.

The elections took place on the 26th of January 1986. Freitas do Amaral achieved 46,31% in the first ballot, Mário Soares reached 25,43%, Salgado Zenha 20,88% and Lourdes Pintasilgo 7,38%. Soares had accomplished winning the majority of the left votes; the run-off election proceeded on the 16th of February between Soares and Freitas do Amaral.

The new strategy had to be carefully thought through, because it was important not to scare off the electorate of the middle, yet simultaneously it was necessary to win over the left voters. After their defeat in the election, Salgado Zenha as well as Pintasilgo called upon their electorate to vote for Soares. Due to the strict acclamation discipline within the PCP, Cunhal did not want to risk his members abstaining from the election, thereby facilitating Freitas do Amaral's victory. However, Cunhal clearly called upon his adherents to vote for the lesser of two evils by declaring: “Tapem-lhe a cara com a mão esquerda – essa horrenda figura! - mas com a direita, não esqueçam, ponham a cruzinha no lugar certo”²⁶⁴, because right of Soares there was nothing but fascism.²⁶⁵ On the 4th of February, the TV debate between Soares and Freitas do Amaral took place. It was a historical moment because of Soares' extreme superiority in dominating the discussion. In the media, it was referred to as a “political massacre”.

In the second ballot, Soares won with a narrow majority of 51,18%, Freitas do Amaral achieved 48,82%. When the definite results were published, Soares gave his first speech in

²⁶² Ibid., p. 288.

²⁶³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 290.

²⁶⁴ Soares, Mário, Parabéns, Dr. Cunhal, in: Soares, Mario, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p.395-399, here p. 399.

²⁶⁵ Geringes Übel, *Spiegel* Nr. 9/1986, p. 196.

Saldanha as President of the Republic and announced that there was no presidential majority.²⁶⁶ His intent was to countervail the political polarization that had been promoted with the presidential election. The reaction to this approach throughout all political parties was one of surprise, as the expectation had been that Soares would dismiss the government and dissolve Parliament after his election, as his role model Mitterrand had done.²⁶⁷

Before his official inauguration, Soares conducted a series of symbolic gestures with the purpose of illustrating that he saw himself as the President of all Portuguese people. An example was visiting the home of a couple of elderly, poor women in the district of Guarda, which he had passed during his election campaign. Next to pictures of holy figures, the women had put up a photography of Soares and he had promised to come back if he should win the election. With this symbolic gesture, Soares wanted to demonstrate that he would not forget the poor population.

Amongst the range of Soares' role models were the presidents of the first Portuguese Republic, for example Bernardino Machado, António José de Almeida and Manuel Teixeira Gomes.²⁶⁸ In addition, Soares quoted François Mitterrand, Charles de Gaulle and John F. Kennedy as inspirational figures for the execution of the presidential office.²⁶⁹

Soares' reelection in the year 1991 took place far less dramatically, which is reflected in the election outcome: with 70,35%, Soares was elected by the people into his second term. The rival candidates were Basílio Horta (CDS) with 14,16%, Carlos Carvalhas (PCP) with 12,92% and Carlos Marques (UDP) with 2,57%, personalities Soares characterized as “uninteresting candidates”²⁷⁰ during the election campaign.

During a long period of time, it was uncertain if Soares would even offer himself as candidate for the election. In 1990 he often expressed his scruples on this head. The conclusions of his first term were positive and he doubted a second mandate would result in personal profit. Further, Soares had projects beyond the political arena which he wanted to pursue. The decision to run for reelection was incurred by the insistence of political figures, who convinced him that the need for his influence, in terms of the *Magistratura de Influência*, was acuter than ever due to the upcoming critical situation of the country. Soares therefore saw it as his duty to run again.²⁷¹

Even before his reelection, Soares positioned himself against the demand of some of his adherents to introduce a constitutional revision, allowing a subsequent third presidential mandate. Soares commented the issue as follows: “dez anos (...) representam um lapso de

²⁶⁶ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 306.

²⁶⁷ Cf. Soares, Mário, Memória Viva, Vila nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 180.

²⁶⁸ Teixeira Gomes was the last President before the dictatorship, who resigned from office after only two years, because he disagreed with Salazar's political course. In 1986, Soares characterized the country as similarly unstable, due to the disordered party landscape and the polarized country. His first priority was therefore to create a national unity climate and to act as an assuasive authority within the political life.

²⁶⁹ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. Democracia, Lisboa 1996, p. 316.

²⁷⁰ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 219.

²⁷¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 210.

tempo, politicamente, enorme. Se viesse a ser alargado, o regime correria o risco de se transformar numa espécie de monarquia, sujeita a eleições.”²⁷² The discussion about the extension of the duration of the presidential terms was therefore terminated by Soares' standpoint before it even arose. It is interesting, that Soares took on a position which suggests that he was not aiming for an amplification of his political power.

The PSD, upon the proposal of Cavaco Silva, declared its support for Soares' reelection in March 1990. The decision was made without prior consultation with, or approval of, Soares. It represented a strategic move of Cavaco Silva: Soares was held in high esteem by the population and his reelection was considered to be self-evident.²⁷³ Although Cavaco Silva met Soares in weekly intervals, he opted not to communicate the intent of his party, because a negative attitude on Soares' part was to be expected. Soares as well as Cavaco Silva knew that he did not need the support of the PSD. By giving Soares its support, the party positioned itself safely by betting on the victorious candidate. In 1990, Cavaco Silva explained the support with the fact that the first term had proceeded harmonious. This surely was a reason that did not speak against Soares; it was, however, strategical motives which spoke for him.²⁷⁴ Later, Cavaco Silva declared that the priority was to achieve an absolute majority in the parliamentary election in October 1991. An own, beaten candidate would have put that goal at risk. Cavaco Silva knew that Soares would cause more hassle for the Government in his second mandate, yet it was necessary to support him to achieve the absolute majority. The PSD, who had hoped for more abstinence from the president due to its support in the election campaign, repeatedly accused Soares of not acting according to the parliamentary party proportions, but as a counterforce to the Government.²⁷⁵ Soares defended his actions with the argument that he had already emphasized during the election campaign that he was “socialista, republicano e laico”²⁷⁶, to clarify that PSD support would not influence his proceedings.

5.2 The Application of the Intervention Right

5.2.1 The Dissolution of Parliament 1987

In the whole of his mandate, Soares only saw himself faced with dissolving Parliament once. Prior to a presidential visit to Brazil, Hermínio Martinho (PRD) informed Soares that his party was going to propose a motion of non-confidence. The time was suspicious, because the Government had been successful and had received positive feedback from the population.

²⁷² Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 29.

²⁷³ The fact that Soares' reelection was considered secure, is also reflected in the fact that Ramalho Eanes's reelection was not discussed in 1991, but only in 1996.

²⁷⁴ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 213 f.

²⁷⁵ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 403.

²⁷⁶ Avillez, Maria João, *Soares. O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 221.

Soares advised against the motion and informed Cavaco Silva as well as Vitor Constâncio about the PRD's scheme. The PSD had no objection to elections, as the polls suggested increased support from the population, and it could count on achieving a majority. Constâncio first regarded the PRD's initiative as irresponsible. Although the initial reactions of the PS let Soares believe that it would vote against the motion, the inner-party atmosphere changed and in the end, the PS voted for it. There are two possible explanations for the redirection: 1) Together with the PRD and PCP, the PS had a parliamentary majority and saw its chance to form a government, in form of either a coalition or a collaboration; 2) The PS held the opinion that the PSD's minority government would not last much longer. If the PS was forced to initiate a motion of non-confidence later, it would seem as if it had indirectly given in to the PRD's demands, making the PS look weak.²⁷⁷

Soares, who was in Brazil by the time, let the party leaders know that he would not approve a coalition that had no prospect of enduring, meaning precisely the alliance that was later proposed: a PS/PRD coalition with the parliamentary support of the PCP. From 1985 to 1987, the opposition had been in the majority, yet had failed to apply that majority because the left parties had been at odds with each other and had detained themselves from deciding on legislative initiatives. On grounds of this instability and because such a coalition did not conform to the will of the people, Soares did not authorize the formation of the proposed government.

The PS had counted on Soares' support, therefore pushing its luck with the non-confidence vote. The relationship between the PS directorate and Soares worsened and deteriorated further with the candidacy of João Soares in the mayoral election for Lisbon in 1989.²⁷⁸ The hostile relationship between Soares and Eanes also played a role in his decision: the approval of a government with PRD involvement would have strengthened the party as well as Eanes, denegation weakened it accordingly. In a sense, the tables were turned around this time, Eanes being dependent on Soares' decision.

Although Soares was well aware that parliamentary elections would favor the PSD, he decided to dissolve the Assembly on the 28th of April and called for elections for the 19th of July, thus painting a picture of himself as an arbiter, who stood above party lines and acted in the people's interest.²⁷⁹

The PSD attained an absolute majority in the parliamentary election with 50,2%. Although the votes are attributed to the party, the high personification of Portuguese politics legitimized Cavaco Silva's actions as an individual. The percentage the PSD achieved was similar to that of Soares in the presidential election. This equilibrium could be responsible for the well-balanced relation between Prime Minister and President during Soares' first term, in which no major

²⁷⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Chapter 5.5.1 "Discord with the PS".

²⁷⁹ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 26 ff.

conflicts arose. Yet the absolute majority equally led to the consequence that the PSD could virtually govern without parliamentary control, explaining why Soares increasingly resorted to his function as a control authority, for example by employing his veto right. In his first term, this aspect played a minor role: the presidential vetoes were small in its number and thematically benignant.

5.2.2 Vetoes and Constitutionality Control

Whilst Soares did not veto many decrees in his first term, the number increased exponentially in the second, expressing increased aggressiveness in the execution of his mandate. The effectivity of the vetoes did not increase because Parliament could subsequently confirm its vote, allowing the decree to become operative. Nevertheless, Soares pursued this strategy by reason of its political effect: due to the veto, the media would report extensively on the subject, allowing the opposition to express its standpoint.²⁸⁰

For the Government, the vetoes signaled the President's will to make difficulties. It had hoped for presidential support for the demanding and unpopular reforms, but the opposite was the case.²⁸¹ Interestingly, the same accusation was made by previous governments, including Soares', with respect to Eanes. The differences were that, on the one hand, the former governments could not base themselves on an absolute majority, allowing the Assembly to execute its control function, and consequently reducing the need of an intervening president. On the other hand, Eanes actually did play a party-political game, confirmed by the foundation of the PRD, whilst the charge on Soares cannot be verified by concrete actions.

5.2.2.1 The War of the Flags

As a result of the Revolution, the archipelagos Azores and Madeira were declared autonomous regions. Both regions had been neglected by the *Estado Novo*, and they regarded their autonomy as an opportunity to follow their own interests, consolidate their individuality and increase their importance. By the end of the 1980s, the Azores had consolidated its idea of a progressive autonomy, increasing its independence by a series of laws and provisions. One of these laws, which rather had a symbolic character, was passed by the national Parliament in July 1986, equating the national and regional flags. Soares consulted the parties, who acknowledged their mistake, admitting that they had not been conscious of the content with regard to the flags. On the 3rd of September 1986, one day before his official visit to the Azores, Soares vetoed the

²⁸⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 273 f.

²⁸¹ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 416.

law. The relationship between Soares and the President of the regional Government, Mota Amaral, was tense during the whole of his visit: Soares explained the motivation behind his veto, illustrating that the decree called national sovereignty into question and that, especially at the time, national solidarity was of the uppermost importance. Despite a slight détente, the relationship between the autonomous region and the President only normalized with the *Presidência Aberta* on the Azores in May 1989.²⁸²

5.2.2.2 The Labor Law

An alteration of the labor law had already been on the agenda of the PSD's minority government, because it was shaped by the revolutionary legislation of 1975 and collective tendencies did not correlate to the economic situation of the late 1980s. The liberalization of the dismissal regulations had been a priority, as the PSD regarded these as an obstacle for effective competitiveness of enterprises and the modernization of the economy, and hindered the creation of jobs. During the minority government, the PS and PCP had blocked legislative changes to this effect, yet after 1987, the Government had no parliamentary resistance to passing the law. In February 1988, the Government sent a query to Parliament asking for legislative power on the matter, which was granted. After a hearing with all the social partners, the raw version of the law was sent to the Assembly.²⁸³

Resistance was greater than expected: On the 28th of March 1988, the two labor union headquarters UGT and CGTP-IN organized a general strike for the first time. The Government showed no reaction to the protests.²⁸⁴ Soares refrained from any comment – a reaction that would not have been observable in his second term. Although he was holding a *Presidência Aberta* at the time, where he had the media's attention at his disposal, he decided against an institutional confrontation. Nevertheless, he sent the decree to the Constitutional Court in April, which declared some of the measures as unconstitutional. As the decision had been made with six to four judges, the Government accused the Constitutional Court of being ideologically biased. Cavaco Silva addressed the nation via television, dramatizing the situation and depicting the court's decision as an obstacle for the country's development. He stated that Portugal was in need of reforms and that the Government was on the right path, if one considered the positive results and the opinions of foreign authorities.²⁸⁵ The aim of this speech was to regain the public opinion after the general strike, and to pressure the Constitutional Court to a less restrictive

²⁸² Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 34 f.. Details to the *Presidência Aberta*, Cf. Chapter 5.3.1 “The *Presidência Aberta* of 1989 on the Azores”.

²⁸³ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria, Lisboa 2004, p. 57 f.

²⁸⁴ Cf. Chapter 5.5.4 “The Right to Indignation”.

²⁸⁵ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria, Lisboa 2004, p. 63.

reading of the constitution in the future, due to the fact that increased presidential intervention was expected.²⁸⁶

With slight changes, the law was passed by Parliament on the 20th of July 1988.

5.2.2.3 The Asylum Law

In August 1993, Soares vetoed the decree nr. 128/VI, which regulated asylum rights and refugee status. In his message to Parliament, Soares pointed out that many Portuguese citizens had been dependent on the asylum of free nations during the dictatorship and it was now Portugal's turn to show solidarity. Although it was not the President's competence to propose solutions, Soares highlighted two aspects of the law that called for revision: the removal of the reference to the asylum right out of humanitarian reasons (which could also be political) and the diminution of the fundamental guarantees in legal matters.²⁸⁷

The asylum problem had assumed alarming proportions and required immediate measures to curtail the admission of asylum-seekers. In many cases, asylum was used as a backdoor for economic immigration, and not out of political persecution. An emigration wave from Africa and eastern Europe had begun which would hit Portugal harder than before due to restrictive measures in other European countries, such as Germany or France. It was therefore necessary for Portugal to introduce its own restrictive measures to avoid drastic outcomes.²⁸⁸ Portugal wasn't able to master such an emigration wave, as could be observed in the increase of slums inhabitants in and around Lisbon and Porto. At first, the majority of the residents were of African origin, yet since the end of the cold war, the slums are increasingly dominated by immigrants from eastern Europe.

After the Parliament adapted the law, Soares enacted it. Although he would have welcomed a stronger revision, another veto would have been ineffective, because the decree would have been passed in Parliament without further changes.²⁸⁹

5.2.2.4 The Introduction of Tuition

Cavaco Silva already wanted to approach the problem of university funding in 1991. The Government's argument was that because the universities were primarily financed by the tax payers, the education of the wealthy was being co-financed by the poorer citizens, creating a

²⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁸⁷ Cf. Soares, Mário, Veto ao Decreto nr. 128/VI, sobre o direito de asilo e estatuto do refugiado, in: *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p.503-505, here p. 503 f.

²⁸⁸ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 420.

²⁸⁹ Cf. Delgado, Lina de Lonet/Maruo, António, Não se nasce democrata. Entrevista concedida ao jornal *O Público*, 16.09.1993, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994 p.567-573, here p. 571.

social injustice. The tuition was to be specified by the Council of Rectors and would vary between 180 and 300 Euro according to income, whereby families that did not exceed a certain income would be exempt from payment. After the decree was introduced in the Assembly in May 1992 and passed on the 14th of August, student demonstrations were organized throughout the country. Soares was accused of encouraging the uproar by publicly declaring his solidarity with the students and exercising his veto right. When excesses occurred between students and the police, Soares criticized the conduct of the PSP – a statement which, according to the Government, was not within the President's competence.²⁹⁰ The Constitutional Court declared some of the decree's provisions as unconstitutional, forcing the Government to rephrase those passages.

In December 1993 Soares used his veto right once more regarding a governmental regulatory diploma for an adjustment of the tuition. The reasons for the veto were, first, that the legislative project was approved before the upcoming decision of the Constitutional Court, and that the Court had declared some of the provisions as unconstitutional. In addition, the fact that the Minister of Education was dismissed shortly after the decree's approval due to the civil resistance from students, professors and the Council of Rectors, could not be ignored. The third motive Soares specified for his veto was a relevant petition, which at the time was still in Parliament awaiting approval.²⁹¹

On the 20th of December 1993, the Minister of Education Ferreira Leite called for an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers, to discuss Soares' veto. Her argument for the continuation of the governmental course was that a drawback would violate the constitutional rules and that decision-making was assigned to the Assembly and not Belém.²⁹² Soares' intervention was declared as party-political play that aimed at reanimating the student insurrection.²⁹³ Although there were also votes within the PSD to give in to public pressure, Cavaco Silva persisted in his course of action. The Government was forced to redraft the governmental regulatory diploma into a parliamentary decree, employing its absolute majority to pass it.²⁹⁴

²⁹⁰ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 303 ff.

²⁹¹ Cf. Veto ao Decreto-lei que estabelece normas relativas ao sistema de propinas, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 509-510, here p. 509f.

²⁹² Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 305

²⁹³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 421.

²⁹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 304.

5.2.2.5 Interventions in the Media

In June 1991, Soares sent a message to Parliament, accusing the Government of abusing the news services as a governmental organ.²⁹⁵ Strong criticism was directed at the information director of the RTP, José Eduardo Moniz, with the assertion that information pluralism and the independence of the broadcast station were compromised. In addition, the news were manipulated, as the oppositional parties were hindered from presenting their opinions.²⁹⁶ Soares welcomed the beginning privatization of the two main daily papers (*Jornal de Notícias* and *Diário de Notícias*). It was, however, essential that the privatization was carried out in conformance with the constitution, which determines that the State guarantees for the freedom and independence of the media from political and economic power.²⁹⁷ The PSD suspected Soares of benefiting the PS with his intervention, considering its timing right before the parliamentary election. Cavaco Silva downplayed the accusations, admitting that “[n]ão quer isto dizer que este ou aquele membro do Governo não procurasse às vezes pressionar jornalistas para que divulgassem esta ou aquela notícia do seu agrado. Mas isso era coisa feita por múltiplas entidades políticas, económicas e sociais.”²⁹⁸ Further, he argued that during the Soares-governments the manipulations had been more severe.²⁹⁹

The instrumentalization of the mass media was, in fact, an old phenomenon: Salazar had already disseminated propaganda by means of the media. After the revolution, television remained under public law, but was misused as a governmental instrument. The administration was appointed by the Government, letting the television act as a megaphone for governmental positions (including Soares' Government).³⁰⁰ When backed by an absolute majority, such a scenario becomes exceedingly dangerous because oppositional voices are suppressed and media coverage becomes clearly pro-Government. In the face of this threat, Soares wanted to “apresentar um cartão amarelo (ou mesmo vermelho) ao Governo”³⁰¹ with his intervention. In the course of the ten years of *Cavaquismo*, the cases in which anonymous internal sources sent the media information about political scandals increased. This was due to a series of reasons, amongst others the exclusiveness of the *Cavaquismo's* opinion. The sources were members of the ministries, the office of the public prosecutor, courts and the presidential office.³⁰² This led to accusations between political actors of allowing information leaks.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Informar: Um acto moral, uma urgência cultural*, in: Soares Mário, *Intervenções* 6, Lisboa 1992, p. 125-131, here p. 125.

²⁹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 126

²⁹⁷ Cf. Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Article 38 (2005)

²⁹⁸ Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 412.

²⁹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 411

³⁰⁰ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Televisão e Diversidade cultural*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 129-138, here p. 132.

³⁰¹ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 231.

³⁰² Cf. Serrano, Estrela, *Jornalismo Político em Portugal. A cobertura de eleições presidenciais na imprensa e na televisão (1976-2001)*, Lisboa 2006, p. 229

The consequence of the resulting debate was the appearance of two new private broadcast stations, which was conducive to pluralism and also affected the content of public television. The emergence of the private stations however also triggered a shift to market-driven journalism, which concentrates mainly on shock subjects while neglecting state subjects.³⁰³

Two years later, in 1993, Soares defined the information services as the fourth pillar of power (next to the executive, legislature and judiciary), television being the organ of politics. He therefore called for more ethical approach, deontological severity and professional preparation. Along these lines, the independence of the information services from political or economic interest groups and the establishment of pluralism was to be regarded as the most important goal of modern democracy. Public television should set itself apart from private services, not as a competitor, but as an alternative, by allowing minorities to voice their views and providing a culturally valuable, educating program. In contrast to private television, which is a business directed at consumers, public television must be seen as a provision of service, addressing the citizens.³⁰⁴

In April 1993, a conflict arose between journalists and the parliamentary group of the PSD. The journalists had been denied access to the floor on which the directory of the PSD group had their offices for security reasons. With the argument that this represented a form of censorship, the journalists began an information boycott of parliamentary work. The oppositional parties joined journalists by taking a vow of silence in the plenum. At the weekly meeting of Prime Minister and President, Soares pointed out the earnestness of the situation and declared that the regular functioning of the democratic institutions was at stake, which was a legitimate reason for the dismissal of the Government. Cavaco Silva therefore understood Soares' declaration as a threat. Soares pressured Cavaco Silva to restore order, otherwise he had no choice but to address the nation in his speech on occasion of the 19th anniversary of the 25th of April. Cavaco Silva countered that it was not in his competence to interfere in the parliamentary group's affairs. On the 24th of April, the differences were settled without the interference of the Prime Minister, which was a great relief for Cavaco Silva.³⁰⁵

5.3 The *Presidência Aberta*

Soares introduced a series of innovations for the execution of the presidential office which were not written in the constitution, but which made presidential work more transparent and effective. First, he introduced the *Intervenções* book series (one book per year in office), which

³⁰³ Cf. *ibid.* p. 213

³⁰⁴ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Televisão e Diversidade cultural*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 129-138, here p. 133 f.

³⁰⁵ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 413 f.

documented the essential articles and speeches of the President. The intention of these publications was to take responsibility for his actions and to increase transparency for the people.³⁰⁶ In addition, Soares invented the *Presidência Aberta*, a communication and influence instrument which became an inherent part of the President's exercise of office. The idea emerged during the election campaign, in which he contacted the people extensively and became acquainted with their problems and demands. From that experience, Soares decided to become an accessible President for the people. When he first announced his idea of the *Presidências Abertas*, the response was not one of enthusiasm: the root of apprehension lay in a comparison to Eanes, who had attacked the Government with his provocative speeches against the executive power. Nevertheless, Soares decided to proceed with the *Presidências Abertas*; their implementation brought to bear that their purpose was not to provoke but to “aproximar o País real do seu máximo representante e de dar voz, expressão e ressonância àqueles que a não tinham”³⁰⁷. In the run-up to the first *Presidência Aberta*, Soares informed the Prime Minister of his intentions and declared that he would include all political parties and social partners in equal measure, so Cavaco Silva gave his consent to its taking place.

The approach of the *Presidência Aberta* corresponds to the former royal journeys: the President resides in a specific place for an amount of time, forcing all, i.e. the Prime Minister, the members of the Council of State, lobbyists etc., who wish to speak with him to equally visit the location. The closure of a *Presidência Aberta* was celebrated with a grand dinner to which many famous personalities originating from the region in question were invited. Due to the enormous media presence that established itself in the course of time, the visited location became the center of political happenings whilst Soares was there. In a politically as well as economically strongly centralized country such as Portugal, this resulted in a great impulse for the respective region. Soares did not only employ the *Presidências Abertas* to call attention to the region's problems and promote the dialog between regional and national Governments, but also to establish direct contact to the people, thus deepening the communication between politics and the population. Soares speaks of presidential competences which are not embodied in the constitution, but which carry great potential when wisely implemented. One of these competences is that the President has the right to directly contact the people and communicate with them; generally speaking, the President can express his positions in the midst of the people.³⁰⁸ This is what Soares achieved with the *Presidências Abertas*.

One of the publicly named reasons for the inception of the *Presidências Abertas* was to “ampliar as (...) justas reivindicações [das populações]”³⁰⁹. This sentence was widely discussed in the media and Soares had to defend himself against the allegation that his intent was to create

³⁰⁶ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 71.

³⁰⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁰⁸ Cf. Appendix 1, „Interview with Mário Soares”, p. 121.

³⁰⁹ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, S 75.

demagogy, it being the Government's competence to attend to the problematic situations in question. Soares' intent was to force the political parties to action: the Government to govern and the opposition to point out unfulfilled governmental promises. In order not to play a party political game, Soares tried to act as an arbiter, regulating the *Presidências Abertas* in such a way that neither the Government, nor the opposition could profit from them.

The first *Presidência Aberta* took place from the 16th to the 25th of September 1986 in Portugal's birth town, Guimarães, which was chosen because of its historical significance. The city symbolized both the respect for Portugal's past as well as the innovation in preparation for the future.³¹⁰ The *Presidência Aberta* was extremely successful. After his stay in Guimarães, Soares was requested to conduct *Presidências Abertas* in many other regions. Because of its success and the realization of its great potential, Soares decided to expand this instrument of influence.³¹¹

In the course of his first term, Soares visited Bragança in February 1987, Beja and Évora in October 1987, Guarda in March 1988, Portalegre in March 1989, the Açores in June 1989 and Coimbra in July 1990. In July 1988 he carried out an exceptional *Presidência Aberta* in the form of a river cruise on the Rio Douro. He deliberately chose poor regions with individual challenges and, during the first years, visited them during the cold seasons, when the needs and problems of the simple people were greater. This way, the country's attention was efficiently called to the problematic reality of the regions by the *Presidências Abertas*. In addition, Soares carried out systematic *Presidências Abertas* which focused upon specific topics, such as nature conservation or education.³¹² He would gather a team of specialists around himself and force meetings between these and the responsible ministers or state secretaries. In a sense, these systematic *Presidências Abertas* functioned as a lobby in the name of the people. In his second term, only three *Presidências Abertas* took place: from the 19th to the 28th of September 1992 in Viana do Castelo, from the 30th of January to the 14th of February in the metropolitan area of Lisbon and from the 4th to the 21st of April 1994 the systematic *Presidência Aberta* concerning environment and life quality, for which he toured the entire country. Interestingly, Soares did not carry out any more *Presidências Abertas* after January 1995, when Cavaco Silva announced his withdrawal from the party executive committee, although there were many requests. This circumstance could suggest that the *Presidências Abertas* actually did develop into an oppositional instrument against the Government of Cavaco Silva.

Despite there being fewer *Presidências Abertas* in the second term, their effect was larger, their character more aggressive, the topics more critical and the attributions of governmental responsibility more severe. This did not only arise by reason of a change in Soares' course of action, but primarily because the national problems changed and the social situation

³¹⁰ Cf. Coelho, Mário Baptista (Ed.), *Mário Soares: Uma Presidência Aberta 1986-1991*, Lisboa 1991, p.266.

³¹¹ Cf. Appendix 1 „Interview with Mário Soares“, p. 121.

³¹² Cf. *ibid.*

deteriorated: during the PSD's first election period, the economic situation had meliorated in consequence of the cash injections of the EC and the impact of the prior austerity policy; it had been the period of the so-called “*vacas gordas*”³¹³. The PSD-Government had predominantly invested in the construction of the country's infrastructure, i.e. road construction, and neglected important sectors such as education, health or social security. Soares repeatedly called the Government's attention to the aggravation of the social situation, which already adumbrated before the parliamentary election of 1991. However, the gloomy prospects were not yet perceivable by the population, leading to the PSD's second absolute majority. The citizens only felt the downswing after the election and expressed their resentment. Due to the fact that the Government ignored the people's concerns, Soares gave them a voice with the *Presidências Abertas*.

Although a central characteristic of the *Presidências Abertas* was the integration of all parties and interests, its criticism was nonetheless polarized: on the one hand, Soares was accused of ingratiating himself with the PSD, especially when he consistently acted loyal to the Government, e.g. during the *Presidência Aberta* on the Azores. On the other hand, he was equally accused of playing the game of the leftists, when accentuating deficits which were attributed to governmental neglect, as was the case during the *Presidência Aberta* in Lisbon.³¹⁴

5.3.1 The *Presidência Aberta* of 1989 on the Azores

The *Presidência Aberta* on the Azores had exceptional preconditions and thus differed from those of the other regions. The archipelago is an autonomous region, and discord between the regional and national governments had arisen because the Azores' demand for more autonomy had not been conceded by the national authority. The relationship to Soares was also encumbered because of his veto in 1986. Soares was accompanied by the President of the regional Government, Mota Amaral, and the responsible Minister of the Republic, Vasco Rocha Vieira, during the whole of the *Presidência Aberta*, which included a tour of all nine islands³¹⁵, forcing an intensive dialog between the actors. The foremost goal of the *Presidência Aberta* was to establish that dialog, allowing the regional and national authorities to become acquainted with each other and acknowledge one another.

Soares had tried to grasp the soul of the Azores by means of the writings of the Azorian author, professor, and publisher Vitorino Nemésio, yet he only really understood the core of

³¹³ The period of the “*vacas gordas*” represented a time, in which the country was well off, and a lot of money could be spent.

³¹⁴ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 87 f.

³¹⁵ The archipelago consists of: São Miguel, Santa Maria, São Jorge, Terceira, Corvo, as Flores, Faial, Pico and Graciosa.

“*Açorianidade*”³¹⁶ in the course of the *Presidência Aberta* that allowed him to truly experience the diversity and simultaneous unity of the different islands. The original character of the Azores results from the phenomenon that it represents a distinct, and at the same time Portuguese, cultural space, resulting from five centuries of isolation from the continent in which its people developed an own way of thinking, living and practicing religion.³¹⁷ Soares described the message he wanted to bring to the Azores with the *Presidência Aberta* in three terms: autonomy, singularity and solidarity. Soares defined autonomy in terms of the political concept for a region like the Azores, and as delineated by the constitution. Singularity not only meant its geographical singularity – with all its great internal diversity –, but also included the historical dimension, which made the Azores a product of its isolation, and its cultural identity, embodied by its unique forms of being, feeling, and expression. Soares perceived the term solidarity as a national unity designed to correct regional asymmetries.³¹⁸

Soares' visit to the island Corvo, inhabited by no more than 300 residents, was especially memorable. It was the first time that a President of the Republic visited the island. His accommodation was the house of a simple, elderly man, who was familiar with all the island's stories. From this island, Soares gave the speech he qualifies as the most emotional of his mandate. The “*Mensagem de Solidariedade*” was directed to all marginalized and disadvantaged persons and was received with great emotion by the population.³¹⁹

In this speech, Soares describes and emphasizes the isolation and lack of prospects of the Azorian people, who, on the one hand, must receive the nation's solidarity, but on the other hand are to be regarded as models in the immense hopefulness and willingness to work hard with which they face the future.

“Desta ilha, onde a solidão face ao oceano condiciona as existências, (...) pensei ser oportuno dirigir a todos os Portugueses uma mensagem sobre o dever e as exigências da solidariedade de toda a Nação relativamente aos mais débeis, no plano económico, aos mais desprotegidos ou isolados – quer se trate de pessoas, quer de regiões.

Terra de modestos recursos naturais, habitada por um pequeno agregado populacional, longe de tudo, a ilha do Corvo poderá ser vista como um ponto sem valor ou realce. Não é assim. Os habitantes do Corvo são portugueses dos melhores, de uma rara qualidade humana. Têm direito à nossa solidariedade, e por isso, deve constituir para todos nós um dever irrecusável apoiá-los, na mais larga medida das nossas possibilidades.

³¹⁶ A term created by Vitorino Nemésio, describing the uniqueness of the Azores. The *Presidência Aberta* was named after Nemésio's poem „*Quando o mar acaba, o coração começa*“, which Soares quoted as final words of the *Presidência Aberta*.

³¹⁷ Cf. Soares, Mário, Testemunho e Memória, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 4, p.119-228, here p. 119 ff.

³¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 122 f.

³¹⁹ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 82.

(...) A coragem da gente do Corvo é surpreendente – como a sua sabedoria, que vem de outros tempos, o espírito de sacrifício que a caracteriza, a tranquilidade com que aceita a sua condição e a esperança com que encara o futuro, que deseja construir em solidariedade.”³²⁰

In the same spirit, Soares also underlined the necessity for solidarity in the modernization strategies in the context of the European Community. This modernization could not be performed at the expense of social and regional disparity, since no solid and continuous economic development could be achieved without a statutory framework and the reduction of inequalities. One should not accept that the progress of a minority result in the marginalization of the majority. Under consideration of this aspect, Soares called the responsible actors, in the Government as well as the opposition, to implement daring changes. The excluded regions were easily to be identified and it was the

“responsabilidade do Estado democrático agir com determinação, rigor e vontade política, para esbater e compensar essas desigualdades, criando as melhores condições de desenvolvimento às zonas mais periféricas e às comunidades mais desfavorecidas. Só assim o desenvolvimento terá uma verdadeira dimensão social, e ninguém se sentirá excluído da dinâmica de progresso que for possível criar.”³²¹

Soares compared the isolation on Corvo with the isolation Portugal experienced during the years of dictatorship from the great happenings in the world and in Europe, resulting in an exclusion from the prospect of progress. On the basis of the freedom it achieved, and by virtue of its active voice in the EC, Portugal had now gained infinitive options.

“Atrevi-me a dizer aqui – em nome de Portugal – às mulheres, aos homens e aos jovens que encontrei no Corvo que não deixaremos, colectivamente, que sejam esquecidos na estratégia de desenvolvimento e modernização de Portugal, em que estamos empenhados. Bem gostaria que esse fosse um compromisso e um empenho nacional de todos os responsáveis, a qualquer nível.

Porque se alguma coisa é certa – e aqui, neste isolamento face ao mar, bem se compreende – é que, mais do que o progresso material, o que importa é a qualidade humana das pessoas e o aperfeiçoamento da sua condição. O desenvolvimento, por mais sofisticado e tecnológico, tem como último destinatário o homem.

E os homens, qualquer que seja o seu lugar de nascimento, raça, cor, sexo ou condição social, *nascem livres e iguais*. É uma verdade que há muitos séculos foi anunciada, mas que só agora, neste fim de milénio, começa a atingir um valor verdadeiramente universal.”³²²

The *Presidência Aberta* on the Azores had tangible results. The discord between Mota Amaral and Rocha Vieira could be assuaged and Mota Amaral appreciated that Soares was not his opponent, but rather his ally, as long as national sovereignty was not endangered. Autonomy was

³²⁰ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Solidariedade: Contra as Desigualdades e o Isolamento*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 4, p.133-138, here p. 133 f.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

clearly delimited by the national interest, which included the interests of all fractions, yet at the same time their mutual solidarity, and respect for the regional particularities were of essential, bonding value. Soares consistently held a position corresponding to the Government's and ended the game of political extortion that had been played during Eanes' mandate, in which the regional Government had sought support either from the President of the Republic or from the national Government, playing them off against each other. With regard to the autonomy issue, Soares never permitted the smallest hint of divergences between him and the Government to arise or allowed the position of the national minister to be undermined.³²³

The result of the *Presidência Aberta* was a redefinition of the relationship between the region and national State as a “tranquil autonomy”³²⁴. The term tranquil was used because autonomy “aprofunda-se – como a democracia – no sentido de que se enriquece e se interioriza na consciência dos cidadãos que a vivem”³²⁵, in contrast to the often used term of *progressive autonomy*, which suggests a self-contained concept. The consolidation of autonomy could only be achieved by permanent dialog between the actors, because “[s]ó o diálogo é gerador dos consensos e dos compromissos tão necessários para regular, por via democrática, a natural conflitualidade de interesses divergentes.”³²⁶. In his concluding speech, Soares thanked the media for its extensive coverage, allowing the nation to become acquainted with the reality of the Azores.³²⁷

Following the *Presidência Aberta*, Soares visited the coastal area of the USA. The Portuguese community there is also referred to as the “décima ilha açoriana”³²⁸ which became noticeable during his stay, for example, when Soares was in San José, California, and was served traditional food of the island Terceira.

5.3.2 The *Presidência Aberta* of 1993 in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon

The *Presidência Aberta* that gained the most attention in the media and caused the most debate took place in February 1993 in the metropolitan area of Lisbon. It provoked a psychological shock across the nation, as it revealed a dark reality which stood in sharp contrast to the “Democracy of Success” promoted by the Government.

From the 30th of January to the 14th of February, Soares showed the country a reality which the population had tried to refute and which had been ignored by the Government: the slums, social ghettos and extreme poverty that surrounded Lisbon.³²⁹ The PSD Porto accused Soares of

³²³ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 83.

³²⁴ Cf. Soares, Mário, A Autonomia Tranquila, in: Soares, Mário, Intervenções 4, p.149-152.

³²⁵ Soares, Mário, Autonomia e Solidariedade, in: Soares, Mário, Intervenções 4, p.145-148, here p. 147.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Cf. Soares, Mário, A Autonomia Tranquila, in: ibid., p. 149-152, here p. 150.

³²⁸ Soares, Mário, Testemunho e Memória, in: ibid., p.119-128, here p.127.

³²⁹ Cf. Soares, Mário, Intervenções 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 25 f.

pursuing the “objectivo de apresentar um quadro artificial e catastrofista da realidade da Área Metropolitana de Lisboa”³³⁰, therefore distorting reality. In addition, he was reproached of manipulating the media to illustrate a third-world picture of the greater area of Lisbon in order to cast doubt upon the credibility of the progressive governmental work.³³¹

The pronouncement that reality was distorted by the *Presidência Aberta* is, however, out of place: the slums surrounding Lisbon are a challenge which the Portuguese state has not been able to master until the present day. The slums originated in the aftermath of the revolution, when masses of *retornados* and immigrants poured into Portugal from Africa. The country had not been prepared for such a large number of immigrants, so, due to the lack of housing, the people settled down in the *favelas*. As a result of the miserable social conditions within the slums, massive drug and crime problems developed, further aggravating the social downward spiral for its inhabitants.

This *Presidência Aberta* was not the first time Soares expressed his concern about the slums surrounding the industrial cities. During the *Presidência Aberta* on the Azores, when he declared disregard of minorities as a consequence of progress unacceptable, he already alluded to the poverty of the slums inhabitants, who were neglected and ignored by the State and at whose cost the country's modernization was pursued.³³²

Not only the slums were an integral part of the *Presidência Aberta*, but also the poorer neighborhoods, in which thousands of families lived in housing close to collapse with no canalization or warm water. Further, the estimated 3000 homeless people, street prostitution and the elevated drug problem were not forgotten by Soares during the *Presidência Aberta*.³³³

In answer to the accusations made by the PSD, which also contained the question of the legitimacy of presidential interference in such topics, Soares argued that it could not be the solution to ignore existing problems. To be acquainted with the truth, without sparing any unpleasant details, was rather a fortification instrument, allowing and forcing the Government to corrections of that reality; he had therefore rendered the nation, and indirectly the Government, a service. The argument of those who used a supposed “institutional guerrilla conflict” between Government and President to gloss over the neglect of solving problems at hand had nothing to do with reality. The political impartiality which Soares adopted as a rule of conduct did not force him, in his function as moderator and arbiter, to

“estar silencioso – muito menos a aceitar ser silenciado – a fingir que não entendo aquilo que se passa à minha volta ou, nos momentos difíceis, a assobiar para o ar, para aparentar distração ou

³³⁰ Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 422.

³³¹ Cf. *ibid.*

³³² Cf. Soares, Mário, *Solidariedade: Contra as Desigualdades e o Isolamento*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 4, p. 133-138, here p. 135.

³³³ Cf. *Abschied von der Grazie des Verfalls*, *Der Spiegel* 12/1993, p. 178.

fugir às preocupações e responsabilidades. Se assim procedesse (...) estaria a ser parcial a favor do poder estabelecido, pecando por omissão.”³³⁴

Neither the Government nor the opposition could expect his disinterest or inattentiveness and it was not legitimate

“tentar apagar a minha acção ou a minha voz, por incómodas que sejam (...). Tenho responsabilidades perante o País, que me foram conferidas pelo voto popular. (...) É o meu dever avisar, chamar a atenção, em privado e em público (...) suscitar o debate, mesmo inquietar, quando me pareça ser caso disso.”³³⁵

Soares acknowledges that there were words and actions on his part that were displeasing for the Government, as it never is comfortable to see reality in the eye when it is an ugly one. Yet it is indispensable that someone exist with the capacity and the braveness to do so, as this is part of the rules of the democratic game.³³⁶

The Government regarded the *Presidências Abertas* with distrust: it saw them as a medium invented by Soares to create difficulties and a podium for the oppositional parties on which they could attack the Government.³³⁷ Usually Cavaco Silva complied to Soares' request that ministers participated in the *Presidências Abertas*. On the day before the *Presidência Aberta* in Lisbon, however, Cavaco Silva called back his ministers, out of fear that the apprehension that it would become a massive attack against the Government.³³⁸ Yet this course of action was the Government's greatest possible mistake. The population interpreted the absence of the ministers as a sign that they could not justify the problems at hand. The Minister of Public Construction Planning, Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral, was the only one who decided to participate, and could thus explain his policy. The result was that only he was judged positively, whilst the citizens were stunned how the rest of the Government remained deaf and silent. During Cavaco Silva's weekly meeting with the President, only the agenda was discussed and the journalists' questions regarding the *Presidência Aberta* were ignored.³³⁹

The pressure under which the Government stood due to this *Presidência Aberta* was so great that Cavaco Silva presented the “*Plano de Erradicação das Barracas nas Áreas Metropolitanas de Lisboa e Porto*” on the 9th of March 1993. The program envisioned the demolition of the barracks and the construction of social housing on state ground. In addition to a solution to the habitation catastrophe, the Government envisioned the creation of jobs due to the projected construction work.³⁴⁰

³³⁴ Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 26.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

³³⁷ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 421.

³³⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 422 f.

³³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 423.

³⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 287.

Soares vetoed the program and ordered the verification of its constitutionality. The Constitutional Court did not confirm his doubts; for the Government, Soares' actions clearly represented resistance against the Government that aimed at delaying the correction of problems.³⁴¹

5.3.3 Soares, The Cultural President

In order to promote culture, Soares organized a conference series “*O Balanço do Século*”, to facilitate the dialog between culturally interested citizens with internationally renowned personalities in the areas of philosophy, science, literature, economics and education. Amongst the invited guests were Noberto Bobbio, Mário Vargas Llosa, John Kenneth Galbraith, Umberto Eco, Manfred Eigen and Karl Popper. Popper had great political influence on Soares even before the foundation of the ASP. Soares holds the view that his work “*The open society and its enemies*”, his moral influence, his dedication to freedom and his confidence in truth and reason have shaped modern democracy.³⁴² The predominance of leftist guests at the conferences led to the interpretation that Soares wanted to promote democratic socialism in modern society.

Further, Soares participated in other conference series, such as “*A Experiência do Mundo*”, which was of a philosophical nature, “*Pacem in Maribus*”, which dealt with maritime topics, and “*A Ciência em Portugal*”, which was dedicated to natural science.

Soares made a point of participating in many cultural events during his Presidency. Due to extensive media coverage around his person he hoped thereby to awaken or revive public interest in culture. He inaugurated exhibitions of artists such as Júlio Pomar, Carlos Botelho, Julio Resende and Maria Keil, awarded writers, for example Camilo Castelo Branco and José Saramago, and decorated musicians, as was the case with Maria João Pires. The endless list of Soares' cultural appointments is based on his outstanding cultural interest, which had remained unnoticed before his Presidency. Until 1986, Soares' interests were perceived as being limited to politics. As President, Soares could instrumentalize his office to publicly pursue his interest for culture, thus promoting Portugal's cultural life.

³⁴¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 288.

³⁴² Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 93.

5.3.4 Interpretation and Conclusions

“O caminho faz-se caminhando!” With this citation of the Spanish poet António Machado, Soares describes the development of his *Presidências Abertas*.³⁴³

Until his presidency, Soares was the prototype of a party politician: the PS could only be mentioned in the same breath as Soares and vice versa. During the election campaign in 1986, Soares discovered that, as President of the Republic, he could break free from party political power struggles by creating a new relationship of trust with the population. Herein Soares identified the opportunity for true party independence, which corresponded to his interpretation of the presidential office. The speech on the day of his election, in which he denied the existence of a presidential majority and presented himself as the President of all Portuguese people, can be interpreted as a symbol of disentanglement from his party and of turning toward his new ally: the people.

Backed by the positive feedback of the first *Presidência Aberta*, Soares recognized its potential to strengthen the principle of democracy in the country by creating communication between the political elite and the population. It is likely that Soares' will to create this dialog was based upon his own experience as Prime Minister and Secretary-General, when such a communication had not existed; due to ignorance, Soares had therefore not governed according to the will of the people. During the *Presidência Aberta* in Lisbon, Soares defended his actions, arguing that the executive should be acquainted with the reality of its country and that he had done the PSD-Government a favor by uncovering the deficits, since in this way they then knew *to what* they had to react.³⁴⁴ This argument can be interpreted as criticism of the shortcomings in internal democracy of the regular channels of information. In the presidential office, Soares perceived the chance to compensate these democratic deficits by acting as the interface of all communication. “Não se pode isolar no seu Palácio, tem que ouvir os outros; mais do que falar, tem que os ouvir. E tem que discutir o que ouviu.”³⁴⁵

The *Presidência Aberta* was not designed as an instrument of political influence, yet there is some evidence that it developed into one. This however was not due to any ambition for power on Soares' part, as will be shown later in this thesis, but rather a reaction to *Cavaquismo*.³⁴⁶ The *Presidências Abertas* intensified the dialog between President and neglected actors, uncovering the growing discrepancy between the Government's course of action and the will of the people to which Soares felt himself in duty bound. As *Cavaquismo* drowned the voice of the minorities, Soares opened a discussion forum for them with the *Presidência Aberta*. In addition, Soares could

³⁴³ Cf. Appendix 1 „Interview with Mário Soares“, p. 121.

³⁴⁴ Cf. Chapter 5.3.2 “The *Presidência Aberta* of 1993 in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon”.

³⁴⁵ Cf. Appendix 1 „Interview with Mário Soares“, p. 123.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Chapter 5.5 “Soares, a Party Political President?”.

accelerate processes involving subjects he considered of priority by forcing communication with the responsible national actors.

5.4 The Power Struggle between President and Government in the Area of Foreign Policy

Although Soares and Cavaco Silva had their differences, there was never a conflict between President and Prime Minister as had been the case during the mandate of Eanes. The distribution of responsibilities was well-defined on the institutional level, even though the PSD felt that Soares transgressed his competencies during his second term.³⁴⁷

Some tension arose in the area of foreign policy due to the fact that Soares thought it strategically advantageous to be allotted tasks in this area more frequently. His high international renown would have facilitated the Government's work in a number of cases. Further, the Government could have shared responsibility in difficult situations. However, fearing that Soares would dominate foreign policy work, the Government denied Soares cooperation during negotiations and did not support him when he acted independently. Before his reelection, Soares declared he would strive for more involvement in foreign and defense politics.³⁴⁸ The Government's attitude remained unchanged, forcing Soares to take on a representative role. Yet in a semi-presidential system, representation takes on a higher significance, power politically speaking, than in a parliamentary system: although the President does not have the right to act in the name of the executive, he speaks on the basis of his own legitimacy, in the name of the nation, and is permitted to represent these positions.³⁴⁹

During Soares' mandate, there were almost no content-related dissonances between the Government's and the President's positions. This is due to the fact that communication regarding foreign policy functioned very well during the weekly meetings: Cavaco Silva informed the President about the development of bilateral relationships, Portugal's positions and participation within the EU, NATO and other international organizations, and about the Government's positions regarding international conflicts. Soares in turn informed the Prime Minister about his state visits and contacts with international personalities. Because of this good communication, Portugal had a uniform voice with regard to national interests.³⁵⁰ The exception to this rule was encountered in the peace process of Angola. Although Soares' role in the peace process was rather immaterial, it will be considered in detail here.

³⁴⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁴⁸ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 228.

³⁴⁹ Cf. Gomes Canotilho, J.J./Moreira, Vital, *Os poderes do Presidente da República*, Coimbra 1991, p. 84.

³⁵⁰ Cf. Silva, Anibal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 444.

Angola, Mozambique and Timor are three countries in which conflicts flared up particularly intensely after their independence. Portugal is partly responsible for their situation, which explains why the quest for peace has been a priority of Portuguese foreign policy, even though its effective influence has been minor in all three cases.

The President's competences in foreign and defense policy are often underestimated. Although the President does not have a right of initiation, he has so-called blocking competences at his disposal. He can, for example, refuse to ratify an international treaty. The consequence is that although the Government negotiates the agreement, it will be in continuous communication with the President as to its contents, since they can only come into force if he gives his consent. The President therefore has an indirect voice in this ambit.³⁵¹ He also has an unofficial say in the choice of the foreign minister because the interaction between the two is more intense than with other ministers. Due to the fact that the President appoints the ministers – meaning that the Prime Minister's proposal can be rejected – the President's wishes are usually catered to.

5.4.1 Angola

The independence of Angola was declared by the MPLA-leader António Agostinho Neto on the 11th of November 1975, yet peace was not established. A total of eleven movements fought each other in Angola, the two largest being the MPLA and the UNITA, whose armed conflict was additionally escalated by the cold war.³⁵² The takeover of leadership by the MPLA, who govern Angola to this day, occurred without the consultation of the other movements, and thus led to the outbreak of civil war.

Portugal attempted to act as a mediator between MPLA and UNITA. The development of the African ex-colony was of great importance for Portugal, because it carried partial responsibility for its situation. The blame was mainly laid on Salazar, who had not implemented political measures to end the war. Yet the first Governments of the II. Republic were also accountable for the situation, as they had given Angola its independence without any transitional solutions.

As the foreign minister João de Deus Pinheiro was occupied with EC-related work, José Manuel Durão Barroso, who was then state secretary of the foreign ministry, took over the negotiations for Angola. The Portuguese Government regarded the withdrawal of the Cuban soldiers, who fought for the MPLA as the first step towards ending the Angolan conflict. This would enable a dialog with the USA and the retreat of the South-African soldiers, who

³⁵¹ Cf. Gomes Canotilho J.J./Moreira, Vital, *Os poderes do Presidente da República*, Coimbra 1991, p. 89 ff.

³⁵² The MPLA is considered a Marxist party, which was supported by the Soviet Union until 1990; the UNITA obtained support from the USA.

supported the troops of the UNITA. With the drawback of the international actors, the war could evolve into an internal conflict, which could allow a dialog between MPLA and UNITA. In August 1988 an agreement between Angola and South Africa, regarding the retreat of their soldiers was drawn up; in December a treaty for the retraction of the Cuban troops followed.³⁵³

The Portuguese Government held the view that the war could only be terminated by means of a direct dialog between MPLA and UNITA. In contrast to the MPLA, the UNITA showed its disposition for a dialog. Cavaco Silva therefore opted for an exclusive relationship to the MPLA, establishing the needed level of trust to persuade it to communicate with the UNITA. This strategy required the rejection of official contact to the UNITA.³⁵⁴ It was here that Cavaco Silva and Mário Soares differed, as Soares was in favor of direct contact to the UNITA. Soares regarded Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA, as equal conflict partners; for Cavaco Silva, Eduardo dos Santos was the negotiation partner, while Savimbi represented the party that was expected to give in. In the perception of the MPLA and the Portuguese people, Soares favored Savimbi, which led to his exclusion from all negotiations to prevent damage to the Government strategy.³⁵⁵

On the 22nd of June 1989, a summit conference was held in Gbadolite, Zaire, concerning the Angolan conflict. President Mobutu Sesse Seko from Zaire moderated between UNITA and MPLA. The summit took a catastrophic course, demonstrating that the African path would not lead to peace: a document was voted on that included the perpetuation of the one-party system in Angola. In addition, the UNITA was expected to agree to its proclamation of armistice, Savimbi's temporal emigration, and the immediate termination of support from the USA and South Africa. After both Eduardo dos Santos and Savimbi accepted the document, it turned out that President Mobutu, who wanted to promote himself as a conciliator, had handed out two different documents. All involved proclaimed the meeting in Gbadolite as null and void and none of the actors abided by the provisions.³⁵⁶ Soares, who visited Zaire shortly after the confusion of Gbadolite, thanked President Mobutu for his efforts. Mobutu had played an important role in finding of a peaceful solution for the Angolan crisis and his initiative had advanced the peace process and helped create a climate of understanding between UNITA and MPLA.³⁵⁷ Despite the confusion, Gbadolite had been successful in one point: it demonstrated both the UNITA's and MPLA's will to lead a constructive dialog.

After Mobutu's loss of credibility, Savimbi and Eduardo dos Santos asked the Portuguese Government to moderate in the conflict. For the relationship between Portugal and Angola, this represented rupture with the past: due to the repressive colonial politics it had conducted for

³⁵³ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 215 ff.

³⁵⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 217.

³⁵⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 129 f.

³⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 221 f.

³⁵⁷ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Desenvolvimento e Liberdade*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 4, p. 371-375, here p. 372ff.

decades, Portugal could not impose itself as a mediator but had to wait until Angola requested its support.³⁵⁸ Under the auspices³⁵⁹ of Durão Barroso, the first meeting took place in Évora in April 1990. The elaboration of a nine-point-plan was discussed, yet the main concern of the gathering was an approximation of the conflicting parties. In a second meeting in Oeiras in June, the program was revised. On the 18th of July, Barroso and Savimbi signed the document “*Pontos acordados como linhas gerais na discussão havida entre a delegação portuguesa (...) e a Delegação da UNITA (...) com o fim de aprofundar o processo conducente à paz em Angola*”. It included: 1) the Angolan state had to recognize the UNITA as an opposition with whom it had to find a path to peace; 2) the Angolan state had to accept party pluralism with all its transparency; 3) in the next round of negotiations, the UNITA was willing to undertake first steps for an armistice; 4) the UNITA was willing to accept the United Angolan Armed Forces, and 5) the UNITA would advocate human rights and fundamental freedoms.³⁶⁰ A copy of the document was sent to Eduardo dos Santos, who signaled his readiness to induce a constitutional revision which allowed party pluralism, therefore acknowledging the UNITA.³⁶¹

The third round of negotiations took place in Lisbon in August 1990, in Sintra in October and in Bicesse in November. From October onwards, the negotiations took place in two separate sub-commissions: the Commission for Political Principles and the Commission for Military Issues and Armistice, staffed by representatives of the UNITA, the MPLA, Portugal, the USA, the Soviet Union and observers of the UN. The final negotiation stage took place in Estoril in April 1991. Savimbi and Eduardo dos Santos were called upon to find approval of the treaty by the 15th of May amongst their own ranks: on the 13th of May, the directory of the UNITA accepted the agreement and issued the command to stop military operations. On the next day, Eduardo dos Santos equally complied.

On the 31st of May 1991, Savimbi and Eduardo dos Santos signed the peace treaty *Acordos do Estoril* in Lisbon, which contained four documents.³⁶² The signing ceremony triggered new difficulties between Cavaco Silva and Soares. Soares had urged his participation in the ceremony due to its formal character, which called for the presence of Portugal's constitutional representative; the Government rejected the demand.³⁶³ Since attendance represented a public display of the responsible actors, Cavaco Silva did not want Soares to obtain the credit for the Government's diplomatic success. In addition, the completion of the peace treaty took place four months before the parliamentary elections. “Se não estivéssemos a quatro meses das

³⁵⁸ Cf. Soares, Mario, *Intervenções* 4, p. 47.

³⁵⁹ Zaire was still the official moderator, which is why the term “Moderator” was avoided in the Portuguese context.

³⁶⁰ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 230.

³⁶¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 225 ff.

³⁶² 1) The agreement regarding the ceasefire; 2) The fundamental principles for the introduction of peace in Angola; 3) Concepts for the solution of the existing dissonances between the government of the People's Republic of Angola and the UNITA; and 4) the protocols of Estoril. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 243.

³⁶³ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 144.

eleições legislativas, em que o objectivo do PSD era conquistar de novo a maioria absoluta, talvez o Governo tivesse cedido à ambição de protagonismo do Presidente da República e evitado o conflito. Mas qual Governo que, em período eleitoral, não procura dar a máxima visibilidade aos sucessos por ele conseguidos?³⁶⁴ Another argument of the Government was that in a similar case in June 1985, Prime Minister Soares, and not President Eanes, had signed the accession treaty to the EC. The Government accommodated Soares by offering him a seat next to the delegates during the ceremony, thus preserving the dignity of the head of state.³⁶⁵ Soares declined and instead invited all participants to a dinner following the ceremony, during which he praised the protagonists of the treaty and welcomed the path to peace and freedom in Angola that had been opened.³⁶⁶ Further, he had the opportunity to receive Savimbi as well as Eduardo dos Santos individually.³⁶⁷

In early September 1991, Cavaco Silva made the first official state visit to Angola, where he was received with great euphoria. He only met Eduardo dos Santos and only visited Luanda and Luena, where the MPLA had organized a reception. Due to the unilateral representation by the MPLA during his stay, Cavaco Silva was accused of publicly supporting and favoring one group. Soares' first invitation to Angola was extended whilst the partners were still negotiating, which explains its rejection at the Government's recommendation. The next visit was planned for 1991, in which he was only to visit Luanda and meet Eduardo dos Santos. Soares, who wanted to achieve the approximation of the two groups, requested the permission to circulate the country freely and contact the population as well as Savimbi. The Angolan Government declined his appeal, causing Soares to cancel the visit.³⁶⁸

As it turned out, Soares' involvement would have been advantageous for the Government, as it would have been able to share the responsibility for the failing of the peace treaty. On the 30th of September 1992, the MPLA won the first parliamentary elections of Angola. The UNITA refused to accept the results, whereupon eleven generals withdrew from the newly founded Angolan Armed Forces on the 5th of October, which represented a violation of the peace treaty. The UN, which had acted as an election monitor, declared the election legitimate and officially published the results on the 17th of October: the MPLA achieved 53,7% of the votes, the UNITA 34,1%. The acts of violence increased exponentially after this point. On the 30th of October, the UNITA attacked the airport of Luanda; on the next day the armed forces of the UNITA and MPLA entered into heavy combat against each other. The UN mediated between

³⁶⁴ Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 410 f.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.410

³⁶⁶ Cf. Soares, Mário, *A paz na concórdia angolana*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 6, Lisboa 1992 p.193-195, here p. 193 ff.

³⁶⁷ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 146.

³⁶⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 102 f.

the two and achieved a ceasefire within the capital on the 2nd of November, yet the combats persisted throughout the country.³⁶⁹

The biggest mistake during the peace negotiations had been that the full disarmament of the conflicting parties did not precede the elections. The members of the MPLA as well as those of the UNITA had been guerrilla warriors during decades, shaping their mentality and behavior. Although the MPLA and UNITA clearly carry the responsibility for the reintroduction of the armed conflict, the influence of the West is not to be underestimated. The actors involved in the peace treaty, i.e. Portugal, the USA, the Soviet Union and the UN, wanted to introduce democratic measures into an unstable framework too quickly. Despite Portugal's efforts to achieve a peaceful situation in Angola, the Government's lack of experience in the moderating role led to premature measures for which Angola was not yet ready.³⁷⁰

After the failure of the peace treaty, Portugal retreated from its role as mediator and the UN took over. The dialogue was renewed in January 1993, whereby the *Acordos do Estoril* remained the foundation for a new settlement between UNITA and MPLA. On the 19th of May 1993, Bill Clinton recognized the Angolan Government against Soares' recommendation. On the 15th of September, the United Nation Security Council sanctioned the UNITA, attempting to dissuade Savimbi from his course of warfare. A week earlier, a delegation of the UNITA had applied for an official visit to Portugal, which Cavaco Silva accepted under the condition that they were only to be received by functionaries of the foreign ministry. The Government assessed the fact that Soares received the delegation anyway as a lack of institutional solidarity. In addition, Soares' behavior countervailed the pressure imposed on Savimbi by the international community to renew the peace dialog. Three weeks after the imposition of the sanctions, the UNITA declared its acceptance of the election results and its future cooperation with the UN.³⁷¹

In November 1993, the negotiations for a new peace treaty began in Lusaka, in which the UN took in the role as a moderator, whilst Portugal, the USA and Russia assisted as observers. On the 15th of November 1994, the *Acordos de Lusaka* were signed by all participating actors, resulting in relative tranquility in Angola until 1998.

In January 1996, Soares flew to Angola for the first and only time as President of the Republic, where he met Eduardo dos Santos in Luanda. He refused to meet Savimbi outside of Luanda, because he did not want to support the idea of the “two Angolas”³⁷². He therefore requested a meeting with Savimbi, whose residence was unknown, in Luanda. Soares had hoped to arrange a meeting with the two party leaders, resulting in an approximation of the conflicting parties, yet Savimbi declined, which made Soares' efforts ineffective.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 247 ff.

³⁷⁰ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 144 ff. und 330 ff.

³⁷¹ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 255 f.

³⁷² Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 333.

The armed conflict, which resumed in 1998, only terminated after Savimbi was killed by the Angolan Armed Forces on the 22nd of February 2002 near Luena.³⁷³ Subsequently, a new peace treaty was signed between the Government and the UNITA. The MPLA still constitutes the dominating power in the country, and one still cannot speak of peace, despite the absence of war. The developments in Angola were attentively observed by Portugal and many attempts were made to settle the conflicts between MPLA and UNITA, yet Portuguese influence on the Angolan development remained minimal.

The MPLA's opinion that Soares showed sympathy for the UNITA and hostility towards the MPLA, especially towards Eduardo dos Santos, hindered the formation of the CPLP (*Comunidade dos Países da Língua Portuguesa*) during Soares' mandate. On the 10th of February 1994, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Portugal, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe decided on the foundation of a Community of Portuguese Language Countries. The date for the foundation summit, which had been set for June 1994, was rescheduled to November due to the cancellation by the Brazilian President. The Angolan Government then declared its non-participation, due to its indignation towards a comment made by Soares regarding the Angolan conflict; in turn, the other African states showed their solidarity with Angola. Soares had sent a letter to Eduardo dos Santos as well as Savimbi calling for the termination of the warfare operations. At the same time, he congratulated them on the ongoing peace process of Lusaka. The authorities in Luanda interpreted the letter as an affront and interference in the internal affairs of Angola on the part of Soares. This fierce reaction is based on the fact that Soares was always perceived as an ally of the UNITA and opponent of the MPLA.³⁷⁴

After the polemic that arose due to this letter, the participating countries first agreed postpone the foundation summit to July 1995, and then finally to early 1996. In a private conversation with Cavaco Silva, Eduardo dos Santos assured that Angola would support the foundation of the CPLP and would advocate its implementation as soon as Soares terminated his mandate.³⁷⁵ The foundation summit took place in July 1996 under President Jorge Sampaio and Prime Minister António Guterres.

³⁷³ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 257.

³⁷⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 445 ff.

³⁷⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 448.

5.4.2 Macao

In contrast to Angola, the negotiations with the People's Republic of China regarding Macao proceeded successfully. In this case, Soares, Cavaco Silva and Pires de Miranda, Foreign Minister at the time, worked together closely and agreed on all points of the take-over of the region by China. Unlike the African states, Macao was never apprehended as a colony, but as a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration. The transition which took place here was therefore only an administrative-political act, which did not evoke resistance from the population or political groups. The negotiations began in 1986 – two years after the finalization of the negotiations between China and the United Kingdom regarding Hong Kong. The only disagreement Portugal had with China pertained to the date for the transition: whilst China wanted to take over the administration for Macao and Hong Kong simultaneously, Portugal insisted on December 1999. Due to the unreserved cooperation of the President and the Prime Minister, Portugal could put through its demand.³⁷⁶ On the 13th of April 1987 the *Declaração Conjunta Luso-Chinesa* was signed.³⁷⁷

5.4.3 South Africa

Soares had a very interesting encounter with the South African President Frederik De Klerk in October 1989. A month after De Klerk replaced President Botha, João Soares suffered a severe plane crash and was brought to the hospital in Pretoria. At the time, Soares was on a state visit in Hungary, which he concluded as planned, before – after a short stay in the Netherlands – flying privately to South Africa. In his speech in Holland, Soares had condemned South Africa for violating human rights by *Apartheid*, but had added that first signs of hope could be observed in the actions of the new Government, whereby the situation as a whole still was far from the establishment of righteous circumstances.³⁷⁸

The foreign minister Pick Botha received Soares at the airport in South Africa and invited him to a lunch with De Klerk. As João Soares' condition had stabilized and De Klerk insisted upon the meeting, Soares agreed. De Klerk explained the country's internal situation and delineated the planned measures for a change, which however did not correspond to a break with *Apartheid*, and asked Soares for his opinion. Soares answered with two examples. The first was that of Portugal 1968, when Caetano took over leadership. He had promised a liberalization, which he did not adhere to due to cowardice and weakness towards the *Ultras*. Five years later, the system was destroyed and Caetano lost his position. Soares' second example was Spain,

³⁷⁶ The Chinese negotiation partners had verbally attacked Soares as well as Cavaco Silva with statements such as, that Portugal was too small to assert claims. Independently from one another, Soares and Cavaco Silva did not give in to the attacks, knowing they could count with reciprocal support.

³⁷⁷ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 147 ff.

³⁷⁸ Cf. Soares, Mário, Por uma Europa mais Forte, in: Soares, Mário, Intervenções 4, p. 307-311, here p. 308 f.

when Adolfo Suárez assumed power and pledged to a democratic transition. At the time, Soares had asked Suárez if such a transition also implied the legalization of the communist party in Spain. Suárez had answered that that was not possible because the military would never agree to such a measure. Soares had emphasized that the world was waiting for a breach with the past and that the legalization would be a clear symbol for a serious transition to democracy. A couple of days later, Soares had received a call from the Spanish Prime Minister, informing him that he had decided to declare the PCE a legal party. He had brought up the courage to fight against the old regime and had seen the necessity of a rupture with the past.³⁷⁹

Soares argued that De Klerk's situation was similar: only by releasing Nelson Mandela and publicly rejecting the politics of *Apartheid*, would the world believe that his aim was a true transition to democracy. “Mas também lhe digo: se hesitar e ficar a meio caminho por falta de coragem, alguém, um dia, mais tarde ou mais cedo, a vai fazer por si.”³⁸⁰

A couple of days later, before Soares returned to Portugal, Pick Botha brought him a message from De Klerk at the airport, informing him that he would pursue a true transition – or breach – in respect to the country's politics and declare the immediate release of the political prisoners, with the exception of Nelson Mandela who would be released a couple of months later. Soares let De Klerk know that if he should really proceed with these actions, he would be welcome in Portugal at any time; De Klerk adhered to his promises.

Due to De Klerk's concessions, Soares rallied the European states to support South Africa constructively from 1989 onwards. In a speech in France, Soares declared he had spoken to De Klerk, whose Government had started a reform policy to end *Apartheid*. Soares called to encourage and support De Klerk's politics, which were embedded in a highly complex situation, to overcome the phase of condemnation, and to begin a honest, constructive dialog with South Africa.³⁸¹ Soares propagated the same thing one month later, in November 1989, in Zaire. In this speech, he emphasized that De Klerk's reform policy would be conducive to political stability in the south of Africa in the long run.³⁸² In Portugal, Soares also used this argumentation in a series of speeches³⁸³; the stabilization of South Africa could contribute to the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique.

Cavaco Silva equally promoted the dialog with South Africa. De Klerk asked him to encourage the EC to set signals of support for his political course. Portugal's position was that the sanctions on South Africa should be annulled to stimulate the continuation of the new political course. Cavaco Silva imparted this position to François Mitterrand, Michel Rocard and

³⁷⁹ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 172 f.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 173.

³⁸¹ Cf. Soares, Mario, Portugal e França: A atualizar uma relação secular, in: Soares, Mário Intervenções 4, p. 313-318, here p. 316.

³⁸² Cf. Soares, Mario, Desenvolvimento e Liberdade, in: Soares, Mário, Intervenções 4, p. 371-375, here p. 374f.

³⁸³ For example, the New Year's speech “Merecer a Sorte de Sermos Portugueses”, in: Soares Mario, Intervenções 4, p. 69-74, here p. 71.

Giullio Andreotti and picked up the subject at the European summit in Dublin in June 1990. Although the partners did not come to an agreement at this point, a willingness to neutralize the sanctions was declared, as soon as clear signs of the dismantling of *Apartheid* became visible. At the summit in Rome, the EC annulled the ban on new investments, which marked the beginning of an approximation between the EC and South Africa.³⁸⁴

Nelson Mandela was released on the 11th of February 1990. Soares received him in October 1993 in Portugal, when he was still the President of the ANC. In May 1994, Soares went to Mandela's inauguration, where Mandela facetiously proposed to found a “Liga dos Presidentes, ex-prisioneiros políticos”, as there were more than in enough in the world.³⁸⁵

5.4.4 A Missed Opportunity

During the Golf Conflict, in January 1991, Jassir Arafat, who had a good relationship with Soares, wrote him a letter asking him for mediation to the West. Soares wanted to send the ambassador João Diogo Nunes Barata to Tunisia to discuss the subject with Arafat in detail. After Soares showed the letter to Cavaco Silva, the Prime Minister declared that although the Government would not forbid Soares' acting as a mediator, it would not support him either. The reason was the apprehension that such an action could lead to a dispute with the EC, which had expressed itself emphatically against Arafat and had suspended contact to the PLO after Arafat had declared his solidarity with Saddam Hussein in 1990. Before Soares had decided on further action, the Portuguese press learned of the letter's existence and Soares was accused of double diplomacy. As the domestic damage under this circumstance would have been larger than the external effect, Soares decided against pursuing the cause further.³⁸⁶

Soares' critique of the Government's reaction was that only a political apprentice could believe

“que as iniciativas diplomáticas ficam em absoluto bloqueadas em função de resoluções da CEE, ditadas pelas circunstâncias. Estas modificam-se, as coisas evoluem naturalmente, e nada se passa por forma linear (...). Quando convém politicamente aos Estados – e está em jogo o interesse da paz –, eles sabem muito bem inovar e interpretar com realismo as decisões, saltando por cima de normas pré-estabelecidas, que se revelam obsoletas.”³⁸⁷

Another interpretation of the Government's reaction is that Soares would have been the protagonist, which was something Cavaco Silva wanted to avoid.³⁸⁸ This explanation seems coherent with the situation in Portugal and the relationship between Cavaco Silva and Soares in

³⁸⁴ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 271 f.

³⁸⁵ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 309.

³⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.* p. 105 ff.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 106.

³⁸⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 107.

the early 1990s; if Arafat had sent the letter to Cavaco Silva, the Government surely would not have missed the chance to act as a mediator.

Portugal is a small country with only a few resources and minor influence upon the political affairs of the world. The fact that Arafat turned to Soares personally, was a nonrecurring opportunity for Portugal to step into an important role, in which it would have been able to present itself as a conciliating and moderating actor in the global political context. As Soares could not comply to Arafat's plea, the PLO-President turned to Norway, which took up the mediator role. Thus, this became the beginning of the peace process leading to the Oslo Accords.

5.4.5 Czechoslovakia

A thesis of Samuel Huntington indicates that the Portuguese Revolution inspired a series of transitions to democracy: first Greece and Spain, followed by Latin America, i.e. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Huntington even goes so far as to allege that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the eastern European countries peered to Portugal as an example of a successful democratic transition. He argues that the occurrences in Portugal triggered the so-called third wave of democratization, which had a snow ball effect upon other countries with authoritarian systems, since they demonstrated that democratization was possible, how it could be achieved, and which imminent dangers should be avoided. Empiric studies show that demonstration effects are strongest where there is either geographical closeness or cultural similarity. Hence, Portugal had a direct influence upon Spain, Greece and Brazil, which spread further from these countries.³⁸⁹

This theory could explain a curious interaction Soares experienced with President Vaclav Havel in December 1989. Previously, Soares had become acquainted with a group of young, Portuguese artists in Porto, who were on their way to Prague to congratulate their Czechoslovakian colleagues on the Velvet Revolution. A few days later, they called Soares whilst in the company of Havel, who wanted to invite Soares personally to his presidential inauguration. Soares had not known Havel until then, which explains his surprise at the informal invitation, which, however, he accepted after the Government's and Parliament's authorization. Soares flew to Prague, where he was received by Jiří Dienstbier, who later became the Czechoslovakian foreign minister. Dienstbier explained that the European chiefs of state and representatives of the USA and the Soviet Union had protested against Soares' attendance during the ceremony, as he would have been the only invited international representative. To avoid diplomatic difficulties, Soares stayed away from the ceremony. Subsequently, Havel and

³⁸⁹ Cf. Huntington, Samuel, *The third wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1991, p. 21, 46 and 100 ff.

Soares drove to a fair, where they inaugurated the monument in commemoration of Jan Palach together. On invitation of Soares, they later dined at the Portuguese embassy. During dinner, Havel showed pronounced interest in the Portuguese process of transition after the revolution, presented the Czechoslovakian situation in detail and solicited Soares' opinion. In the evening, Soares gave a speech at a convention which was greeted with enthusiastic applause. In summary, the visit had been very spontaneous and unplanned, yet was characterized by great euphoria.³⁹⁰

What made this unusual encounter especially peculiar was that although Soares was received with great euphoria in Czechoslovakia and it had been a great honor to be the only participating international representative, he was the target of harsh criticism in Portugal. The PSD accused him of having transgressed the Foreign Minister's competencies with the goal of distinguishing himself. Soares countered these attacks by entitling them as an example of the Portuguese parties' provincialism.³⁹¹

5.4.6 The Ibero-American Summit

Cavaco Silva and Soares entered a dispute prior to the first Ibero-American summit. Carlos Salinas de Gotani, the Mexican President and host of the first meeting, sent the official invitation to Soares in July 1991, which he accepted without previously consulting the Government, although attending it lay in the Foreign Minister's competence. The Government reproached the Mexican authorities of disregarding the Portuguese system. It felt marginalized and declined participating in the summit. After Salinas de Gotani sent a messenger personally inviting the Government and Soares convinced Cavaco Silva that the historic, cultural and linguistic bonds between the participating countries represented important reasons for cooperation and the consolidation of a dialog, the Government accepted the invitation.³⁹²

Cavaco Silva was not happy with the summit's format because Portugal did not obtain the same degree of representation as Spain: Soares was intended to speak for Portugal, whilst the Prime Minister was granted this role for Spain. Cavaco Silva therefore demanded to be given the same position as the Spanish Prime Minister. Further, a strict separation between the inaugural speech and the governmental discussions of the agenda was indispensable. As Salinas de Gotari had not answered shortly before the summit, the Government declared it would not participate, leading to a great conflict between Cavaco Silva and Soares. Soares argued that one could not abstain from participating in such an important alliance on the grounds of mere pedantic formalities. Cavaco Silva however regarded these formalities as a question of principles: the formal dimension had to be correct at the first summit, as it would be adopted at all future

³⁹⁰ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 175 ff.

³⁹¹ Cf. *ibid.* p. 179.

³⁹² Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria, Lisboa 2004, p. 404 f.

meetings. Three days prior to the summit, Salinas de Gotari approved the changes demanded by Cavaco Silva.³⁹³

In the media, the dissonances between the President and Prime Minister were depicted as an institutional guerrilla war. To counteract this image, they agreed that Soares present a joint statement to demonstrate their unity.

At the summit, Cavaco Silva and Soares cooperated very well. At the forth Ibero-American Summit in June 1994, Cavaco Silva spoke of Soares in positive terms before the media for the first and only time, after Soares had led a harsh counterattack against Fidel Castro. The relationship between Soares and Fidel Castro was contradictory: on the one hand, they sent each other gifts, which were also accepted, on the other hand, the diplomatic tone between them was harsh and partly aggressive. They met in Quito, Ecuador, on the inauguration of President Rodrigo Borja. At the first Ibero-American Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico, Soares answered the question as to what he thought of Castro with the comment that he was a political dinosaur and a remarkable, even impressive animal, yet which did not belong in modern times;³⁹⁴ thereupon their relationship degraded. At the third summit in Brazil, Castro gave a speech describing the difficult situation in Cuba as resulting from aggressive US politics and their blockade, and called upon the community's solidarity. Soares approached Castro after the session and, in the presence of General Rodriguez, President of Paraguay, expressed that the organized outer blockade corresponded to an internal blockade which originated from Castro's politics. Soares proposed the release of the political prisoners and the creation of freedom and human rights in Cuba; when such conditions were given, the community would be prepared to demand the lifting of the USA's blockade. Castro changed the subject without commenting Soares' remarks.³⁹⁵

It was precisely this topic that led to a verbal outburst on Soares' part on the aforesaid fourth summit in Cartagena de Índias, Columbia, which Soares attended with Cavaco Silva and the foreign minister Durão Barroso. Castro decried that Cuba had always shown solidarity with the attending countries, yet did not receive any in return. He addressed the Portuguese representatives and emphasized that Cuba had assisted with the Revolution 1974 and had shown solidarity with Angola by hindering the racist, South African group around Savimbi in assuming power. Soares asked Cavaco Silva for the floor and countered:

“O Senhor nunca foi solidário com Portugal. Foi-o, sim, com a União Soviética e com o Partido Comunista Português, quando este quis tomar o poder em Portugal. Em África, não foi solidário com Angola, participou activamente num plano de soviétização de Angola e da África Austral. (...) Se insiste em invocar a nossa solidariedade, exigimos, pelo nosso lado, que cumpra aquilo que nos traz aqui e de que sempre falamos quando nos encontramos nestas cimeiras: reforçar a democracia e o respeito pelos direitos humanos. Não se compreende nem se aceita que mantenha, ao fim de

³⁹³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 406 f.

³⁹⁴ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Salvar Cuba!*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p. 311-324, here p. 316.

³⁹⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 317.

trinta anos, as prisões de Cuba cheias de presos políticos. O saldo da sua «revolução» avalia-se pela falta de liberdade, pelo regresso à prostituição, ao jogo e à droga e a um turismo para ricos, num país empobrecido e decadente – pior do que no tempo de Batista – que expressa o fracasso total e clamoroso da sua política e sua pseudo-«revolução». Reconheça que são verdades tudo isto (...) antes de nos pedir solidariedade e, sobretudo, não nos exija nada, sem antes restituir a liberdade ao martirizado povo cubano. Se o fizer, então, sim, conta com a nossa solidariedade para reclamar o fim do bloqueio a Cuba e para ajudar maciçamente o povo cubano a viver melhor e com mais dignidade.”³⁹⁶

Although this speech was extraordinarily aggressive and polemic, Soares was praised by the majority of the participants, since it expressed their own positions.

5.4.7 Interpretation and Conclusions

Foreign policy is regarded as the most prestigious area of politics. For the head of state of a parliamentary democracy, it will be the main focus of his attention, not only due to his constitutional competences, but also because of his function as representative of the nation. Next to the head of Government and the foreign minister, the President is the actor, who shows most presence abroad, has the most information at his command and socializes the most.³⁹⁷ He represents the country as a unity, in contrast to the Prime Minister or the foreign minister, who advocate a specific policy corresponding to the Government's course of action. The stronger the presidential component in a political system is, the more influence the President will have. In France, for instance, foreign policy is primarily the President's business; in Germany, in contrast, it is the Government that determines foreign policy. The extent of presidential influence, however, is not defined by the constitution a priori, but is determined by constitutional practice. The manner in which the first actors after a constitution comes into effect conduct their mandates shapes the practice of successive actors.³⁹⁸ Hence, a tradition of constitutional practice is initiated that is hard to modify a posteriori.

This tradition was created in Portugal by Cavaco Silva and Soares. Soares strove for a greater prominence in foreign politics, whilst Cavaco Silva successfully delimited the President's role. Yet the motivation of the two actors is unclear: was the dispute between them based upon a power struggle, or was it a search for the answer to the system immanent question of how much influence the President should generally have in foreign policy?

In the case of Angola, Soares apparently tried to enforce the right to have a say in the matter. When approaching Savimbi, he filled the gap that had been generated by the governmental

³⁹⁶ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 317 f.

³⁹⁷ Cf. Jochum, Michael, Der Bundespräsident im demokratischen Prozess der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, Güterloh 2000, p. 35; Although Jochum describes the German President, in my opinion, these statements can be generalized.

³⁹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 22.

course of action. This would have been a good strategy for entering the mediating game if the MPLA had not resisted. A success, however, would have amounted to playing off the Government. Nothing indicates that an inclusion of the President would have advanced the negotiations and moderation in the Angolan case. Thus, this case can be interpreted as a power game on Soares' part.

Cavaco Silva was conscious that his interaction with Soares in the area of foreign policy would determine future practice. This is best revealed by his, on first sight apparently stubborn, deportment regarding the official format of the Ibero-American Summit. His demands on this topic express his understanding of the political system: foreign policy is the Government's responsibility, whilst the President is the country's representative. The fact that he did not exclude Soares completely, but relocated him to the "right" position, is an indication that, in this case, his concern was not Soares as an individual, but rather the representative positions filled by the Prime Minister and the President during the summit.

Soares' insistence on more influence in foreign policy, does not necessarily imply that he had an understanding of the political system diametrically opposed to Cavaco Silva's. In most cases, Soares was actually contacted by foreign political actors, as a result of his close relationships to other party and state chiefs, which he had established before his presidency. The fact that Cavaco Silva did not deploy Soares as a trump to achieve foreign policy goals and strengthen Portugal's role was met by total incomprehension on Soares' part.

It is questionable whether the expansion of political scope that Soares fought for would have provoked a change in the institutional relationship of Prime Minister and President. In the example of the "missed opportunity", Soares was chosen to act as a mediator not because of his office, but because of his personal relationship to Arafat. Governmental support in this matter would therefore have strengthened Soares as an individual, but not the presidential office. Cavaco Silva's denial of support indicates that he aimed to avoid exactly that. However, he oversaw that if Soares had succeeded with the Government's support, it equally would have profited from the outcome.

Cavaco Silva overestimated the impact Soares could have had if he had been granted more political leeway in foreign politics. A more generous margin would have strengthened Portugal's role internationally, albeit limited to the period of Soares' mandate. A change in the relationship between Prime Minister and President of the Portuguese Republic would have been improbable, since Soares' endeavors were limited to specific situations which unfolded coincidentally and in a personal context, and did not aim at expanding the presidential competences on principle.

5.5 Soares, a Party Political President?

Soares played such a major role in the consolidation process of the Portuguese party landscape that he was repeatedly accused of conducting party politics during his presidency. He was credited with supernatural skills, e.g. that he could control the actions of the party leaders as if they were marionettes. These accusations came mainly from the parties and were beefed up by the sensationalism of the Portuguese media.

During his second term, such allegations were primarily made by the PSD. Cavaco Silva always contained himself in order to avoid conflicts between Government and President. He also advised his ministers to refrain from commenting the presidential actions and to leave it to the party to express criticism. At the party congress in November 1992, Cavaco Silva criticized the President for the first time in a public speech, referring to him and the oppositional parties as the “forças de bloqueio”³⁹⁹: “Chegámos a um ponto em que qualquer corporação de interesses que não goste de um diploma aprovado pelo Governo diz imediatamente que vai pedir ao Presidente que requeira a sua inconstitucionalidade.”⁴⁰⁰, hindering the accomplishment of solutions for the given problems. According to Cavaco Silva, the *Magistratura de Influência* had evolved into a *Magistratura de Interferência*.⁴⁰¹

5.5.1 Discord with the PS

The first conflict arose between Soares and the PS. The Secretary-General Vitor Constâncio accused Soares of interfering in party politics, obstructing ideological development and staff succession. This accusation was based on a manifest that had been signed by the so-called *Soarista*-group in Summer 1988. In the manifest, Constâncio's leadership was challenged, although he had been voted Secretary-General by 90% of the delegates few months earlier. Soares disclaimed his involvement and dissociated himself from the *Soarismo*-phenomenon, as he had already done during his days as Prime Minister. Soares rather regarded the movement as an inner-party group that did not have a leader and thus made use of Soares' name.⁴⁰²

The feeling of a conspiracy against Constâncio was heightened by the appearance of João Soares on the political floor. In the time his father was Secretary-General, João Soares had never strived for a high position in the party, to demonstrate that he was politically independent and did not want to be seen as his father's marionette. Yet, precisely this arose, when he campaigned for Secretary-General in 1988. Constâncio also rejected João Soares' wish to run for the office of Lisbon's mayor, because he interpreted his candidacy as a direct interference of Mário Soares.

³⁹⁹ Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 419.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

⁴⁰¹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁰² Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 54.

Instead, Jorge Sampaio campaigned for the office, and included João Soares in his team as his substitute. Sampaio ventured to do what had been considered a tabu under the leadership of Soares: he negotiated a coalition with the PCP, os Verdes and the MDP, for which he even found support from groups that stood left of the PCP, such as the UDP. The coalition achieved the absolute majority on the 17th of December 1989 and was reelected in 1993.⁴⁰³ This innovative strategy was advantageous for the subsequent course of Sampaio's political career. After Constâncio resigned from his position as Secretary-General, declaring that the PS could not evolve due to Soares' interference, Sampaio was voted his successor on the 19th of December 1989, opening up the possibility of his future presidential candidacy. João Soares had made a clever move by occupying the second position in the coalition, first because he profited from the PS/PCP-coalition and second, because he automatically moved up to mayor when Sampaio won the presidential election in 1996. Nonetheless, João Soares continues to struggle against the preconception that he is his father's marionette to this day.

An interference on Soares' part in inner-party affairs can neither be proven nor disproved, as there is evidence to both effects. It is a fact, though, that Soares did not renew his commitment in the PS after the conclusion of his presidential mandate. He did not even renew his membership card; the one he owns had been a gift from the party.⁴⁰⁴

5.5.2 The Media's Distortion of Reality

When Manuel Monteiro took over leadership of the CDS/PP, Soares' interest in the party increased. Monteiro and Paulo Portas gave the party a new character, broke with the past and converted it into a populist party. Because Soares believed that this new PP would increase its sphere of influence, especially among the youth, he wished to become acquainted with its protagonists. He did not receive Monteiro more often than the other party leaders, but was nonetheless accused of building a tactic alliance with the PP to undermine the PSD's position in the right political spectrum.

In May 1992, Monteiro brought forward an initiative for a constitutional revision to make a referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht possible. Since a constitutional amendment was necessary to bring the Portuguese constitution in line with the European one, the additional expenses would have been minimal.⁴⁰⁵ The PCP as well as Soares supported the initiative, causing a great polemic due to the fact that Soares was an established EC-supporter whilst the PP and PCP were objectors. Soares positioned himself in this way for tactic reasons: he argued

⁴⁰³ Serra, João B., Jorge Sampaio, in: Costa Pinto, António/Rezola, Maria Inácio, Os Presidentes da República Portuguesa, Lisboa 2001, p. 264-272, here p. 269 f.

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Appendix 1, „Interview with Mário Soares“, p. 124.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. Soares, Mário, Democracia e Cidadania, in: Soares, Mário, Intervenções 8, Lisboa 1994, p.299-309, here p. 302.

that the population, who had directly profited from Europe and still felt its positive influence, would approve the referendum. With a positive referendum result, the state would have additional legitimation for the conversion of the Community into a Union, and the population would later not be able to object that it had not participated in the decision. Thus, a referendum could legitimize future European politics. The official statement of the PS and PSD was that they were generally against using referendums for the ratification of international treaties, yet it seems more plausible that their position was rooted in fear of a negative outcome. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Europe's attention turned to the East, and Portugal had to anticipate cuts in the long run. Until then, Portugal had been one of the poorest countries of the EC and had received an extraordinary amount of financial support, which would now be contested by the eastern European countries. This sentiment started spreading within the population in the early 1990s and, according to the evaluation of the PS and PSD, could have led to a negative outcome of the referendum, which both parties wanted to avoid.

A Pro-Referendum-Movement developed, comprising political personalities from all political camps. It filed a petition, requesting the Assembly's consent for the referendum. As the members of the movement opposed Cavaco Silva and António Guterres whilst creating a connection to the President, it appeared that Soares was the hub of the opposition. In reality, Soares remained noncommittal and did not take on the movement's leadership as Ramalho Eanes probably would have done. The movement's efforts remained fruitless; an active participation on Soares' part would probably have changed this, yet he decided against a commitment to avoid involvement in the party political game that was being played.⁴⁰⁶ This example brings up the question whether Soares actually used the parties and social partners to interfere in policy, or if it was rather the parties and social partners who sought contact to the President because of his media presence, which they could use to make their positions public.

In 1988/1989 the UGT fought for its image: 36 functionaries of the union center, amongst others Secretary-General José Manuel Torres, were accused of misapplying European subsidies.⁴⁰⁷ Thereupon, the UGT asked for a hearing with Soares to explain their situation. Upon leaving the Palácio de Belém, the functionaries made their statements to the reporters who had been waiting at the gates. Due to the location, which suggested a direct association with Soares, the media distorted the statements, implying that Soares shared the functionaries' opinions. The false conclusion overlooks that the President of the Republic is considered the last political authority to which citizens can and should turn, and that this possibility cannot be denied. In this specific case, then, that Soares fulfilled his duty to hear the UGT functionaries at

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 253 ff.

⁴⁰⁷ The case was one of the longest legal proceedings in Portugal. On the 17th of December 2007 the functionaries were found not guilty. Cf. Torres Couto diz que foi feito Justiça, in: *O Público* <<http://ultimahora.publico.clix.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008 and UGT, *O chamado „Processo UGT“*. A sua História.

their request; it does not imply in any way that Soares wanted to demonstrate his support for them.⁴⁰⁸

The fight against the distortion of reality by the media was directly addressed by Soares in a speech in November 1993. In the previous month, Soares had improvised a speech at the conference “Anos 60-90, Portugal, A Europa e o Mundo”, in which he emphasized and described the most important accomplishments of each decade. In the last sixth of his speech, which was dedicated to Portugal's future, Soares described the country's situation with the words “crise; insegurança, falta de confiança no futuro próximo; incerteza”⁴⁰⁹. He indirectly criticized the Government's handling of the crises in the Portuguese productive sector and education system, and referred to the emerging problems with racism. Probably the most polemic issue was, however, that he stressed the necessity of an intensified dialog and the consolidation of democracy,

“em oposição ao hegemonismo partidário ou à arrogância do poder. A necessidade de aumentar os *consensos democráticos*, entre os portugueses, passa pelo esclarecimento da opinião pública e pela prática da solidariedade. As políticas de solidariedade (...) nem sempre têm sido bem sucedidas e compreendidas pelos seus destinatários (...) Não se resolvem, de resto, com a política dos «pacotes conjunturais».”⁴¹⁰

This critique was discussed endlessly in the media, while the following sentences of the speech were ignored, in which Soares stated:

“As dificuldades de hoje são ultrapassáveis. A consciência delas é a primeira condição para as poder resolver com seriedade. É por isso que é essencial falar sempre a *linguagem da verdade* e encarar as dificuldades de frente. Importa apelar à participação de todos. Em democracia, todos os cidadãos são responsáveis e não só aqueles que exercem funções de poder político. Convido-vos pois (...) a tomar consciência plena do *estado da Nação* e a intervir cívica e responsabilmente a nível das respectivas esferas de actividade. Com determinação, sentido crítico, civismo e sem medo.”⁴¹¹

In the introducing words of his speech in November, which was also improvised, he admitted his error in choice of words, announced that this speech would not contain any polemic statements and added:

“Portanto, Senhores Jornalistas, com todo o respeito, estou convencido que a partir de agora não lhe vai interessar, substancialmente, o que irei dizer. (...) não irei abordar temas *da* actualidade (assuntos políticos escaldantes, «guerrilhas» institucionais ou partidárias, os que gerem controvérsia e dão bons títulos para as primeiras páginas) embora possa eventualmente referir temas *de*

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. O Presidente, Lisboa 1997, p. 277.

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. Soares, Mário, Anos 60-90, Portugal, a Europa e o Mundo, in: Soares, Mário, Intervenções 8, p.327-345, here p. 343.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid. p. 344.

⁴¹¹ Ibid. p. 345.

actualidade, mas noutro sentido, porque interessam ao futuro e começam a ser debatidos em certos círculos restritos.”⁴¹²

Although Soares was often misrepresented by the media, he had an excellent relationship with them. Indeed, he did not use his good contacts to the television and press to pursue political strategies, but “he made an art out of it. He believed in his talent and his magic.”⁴¹³ Cavaco Silva's situation was the contrary: he did not command the talent to seduce journalists and did not have the skill to improvise, which explains why he could not answer questions to polemic topics and often remained silent instead. When he was asked about his relationship to the media in January 1994, he answered that he read the newspaper five minutes in the morning and five minutes at night, because he was a busy man and 95% of the things written about him, his meetings with the President and the Government, were pure fabrication.⁴¹⁴ This statement was harshly criticized by the media and worsened their relationship further; Cavaco Silva realized that there were “verdades que um primeiro-ministro não deve dizer”⁴¹⁵.

5.5.3 The „Dictatorship of the Majority“

Soares' greatest conflict with the PSD arose at the end of his second term and was triggered by an interview with the *Diário de Notícias* on the 26th of November 1994, which caused tension on the party political level. In the interview, Soares spoke of the ruling “ditadura da maioria”⁴¹⁶, which resulted from the fact that Parliament had developed into the Government's “resonance box” instead of acting as a control unit. Soares argued that the Portuguese constitution was not crafted to accommodate absolute majorities; when a majority was created by means of a coalition, it was automatically limited by the parties' necessity of negotiating a consensus they could work with. In the situation in 1994

“A actual maioria (...) tem vindo a dar lugar a uma concentração excessiva de poderes nas mãos de um único homem, simultaneamente chefe do Partido maioritário e Primeiro-Ministro. (...) [N]ão há correspondência absoluta entre maioria e estabilidade. (...) A estabilidade é conseguida prioritariamente por um saudável relacionamento institucional. Não tem necessariamente a ver com a maioria, porque sabemos que o actual Primeiro-Ministro (...) é acusado de seguir políticas diferentes. (...) Quando se muda de políticas abruptamente, sem explicações ou motivações claras, não se está necessariamente a gerar estabilidade. Depois, a que assistimos? Digo-o com mágoa: a

⁴¹² Soares, Mário, *O Século XX Português, Imagens, Discursos, Personalidades*, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p.347-361, here p. 349 f.

⁴¹³ Serrano, Estrela, *Jornalismo Político em Portugal. A cobertura de eleições presidenciais na imprensa e na televisão (1976-2001)*, Lisboa 2006, p. 255. [Translated by R.S.] In contrast, Guterres maintained a systematic contact to the media to sell a planned image. Cf. *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 483.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁶ Cf. Bettencourt Resendes, Mário/ Soares, Mário, *Mário Soares. Moderador e Árbitro*, 2. Edição, Editorial Notícias, Lisboa 1995, p. 34

uma progressiva degradação da política e da credibilidade pública dos políticos. (...) [T]emo que se generalize a percepção no País, e principalmente entre a juventude, que se caminha para uma forma larvar de «ditadura» da maioria, descaracterizadora do nosso sistema político-constitucional.”⁴¹⁷

Soares continued by stating that a commingling of the party, the Government and the State had commenced and that a phenomenon of osmosis had established itself that was difficult to explain but which troubled him. To the interjection that as President of the Republic he possessed the power to intervene in this development, Soares responded that in a first phase, he would ring the alarm bells, only then resorting to the atomic bomb, i.e. the dissolution of Parliament. Soares labels the image of the atomic bomb as a perspicuous comparison: after Hiroshima, the atomic bomb was only employed as a dissuasive weapon; the dissolution of Parliament should be understood likewise: Soares was only prepared to make use of this weapon when all other means failed.⁴¹⁸

In the interview, Soares had to respond to the accusation that he expressed his divergences with the Government publicly, whilst Cavaco Silva proceeded in a more reserved and discrete manner. Soares countered that he had responsibilities towards the Portuguese people, who had elected him to act as the moderator and arbiter of the nation's life. The population expected clarifying words from the President. He emphasized that the President was not dependent on the majority, the Government or the Assembly, but on the contrary, the Government was dependent on the President, who additionally had the constitutional power to dissolve Parliament. Soares did not regard himself obligated to the Government because it had supported him in the presidential election of 1991. During the election campaign he had stressed that he was socialist, republican and laicist, to make clear that he would not reorient himself politically because of this support; the PSD could not complain that it had not known what would come or who Soares was.⁴¹⁹ Soares goes so far as to suggest that the PSD only achieved its second absolute majority because he was President: the voters gave the PSD the majority so that it could accomplish the political goals it had promised, knowing that Soares would intervene if necessary.⁴²⁰ This theory is unfounded, since it includes facts that cannot be verified a posteriori. The PSD's second absolute majority rather based on the social and economic upturn which was clearly noticeable for the population in the early 1990s, resulting in a renewal of its confidence.

The polemic caused by this interview led to the discussion of the President's role in the political system in the media and politics. The key question was whether the President even had the right to speak publicly on such topics, which expressed values and included warnings. Soares' argument was that in his function as moderator and arbiter of the nation's life it was his duty to express his opinion.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., p. 33 f.

⁴¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, S 29 f.

⁴²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 51.

“Como poderia moderar se o não fizesse? Como poderia arbitrar se, simbolicamente, não apitasse ou não assinalasse certas faltas? Evitar fazê-lo, para não desagradar à maioria parlamentar, tendo uma legitimidade, pelo menos, idêntica à dela – e, conseqüentemente, para não desagradar ao Governo, que do Presidente, aliás, constitucionalmente, depende – equivaleria a colocar a questão: para que serviria então um Presidente, eleito directamente pelo Povo, independente dos partidos, com os poderes constitucionais de que dispõe?”⁴²¹

Although at the time the PSD denigrated Soares' interference as party political play which favored the PS and damaged the PSD, in 2004 Cavaco Silva argued that an absolute majority actually needed an attentive President who could prevent that Parliament succumb to the temptation of power abuse.⁴²² Cavaco Silva could not express this opinion openly in 1994, yet it indicates that – on a private level – Soares' actions were regarded as legitimate by his main adversary. Another interpretation would be that Cavaco Silva wanted to legitimate presidential interference with regard to his own upcoming presidency.

Interestingly, criticism of the statement concerning the dictatorship of the majority only arose after the September interview, although Soares had repeatedly commented on the subject before. In the preface of the *Intervenções 8* of 1993, for example, he wrote:

“[A] estabilidade não pode confundir-se com ausência de debate, nem muito menos com *situacionismo*, por forma a inibir a participação dos que não estão de acordo ou que contestam, mesmo minoritariamente. A democracia implica (...) o respeito pelos direitos das minorias e a garantia da sua intervenção na vida pública, em termos de alternância.”⁴²³

Further, in an interview in April 1994, Soares described *Cavaquismo* as a form of “situationalism”, which displayed an unhealthy symbiosis of State, party and a confusing accumulation of interests that was concentrated around one person and did not permit reflection or criticism.⁴²⁴ He added that *Cavaquismo* – the situation created by Cavaco Silva – was worse than the politician himself, i.e. that Cavaco Silva was a politician with outstanding qualities who had done both good and bad for his country, but that *Cavaquismo* was a situational opportunism.⁴²⁵

In the opening speech of the congress “*Portugal: Que Futuro?*” on the 8th of Mai 1994, Soares also referred to the democratic deficit of an absolute majority. He stressed that the golden rule of democracy was alternation of party political power,

“sem formas de perpetuação no poder nem excessiva hegemonização de um partido em relação aos outros – o que é sempre perigoso, no plano funcionamento da democracia – e de modo a que a fronteira entre os aparelhos partidários e o aparelho do Estado esteja bem demarcada e seja

⁴²¹ Ibid., p. 12 f.

⁴²² Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 404.

⁴²³ Soares, Mário, *Intervenções 8*, Lisboa 1994, p. 28.

⁴²⁴ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, *O espírito civil da revolução*, in: *Intervenções 9*, Lisboa 1995, p.351-402, here p. 398 f.

⁴²⁵ Cf. *ibid.* p. 398.

absoluto estanque. Os fenómenos de osmose entre os interesses partidários e os do Estado são sempre nefastos em democracia.”⁴²⁶

In the context of the party crisis – a European phenomenon at the time – Soares especially criticized the lack of transparency of the democratic regulations for party functioning and financing, the excessive pragmatism of proposed solutions, and “a arrogância tecnocrática de certos quadros, alheios às preocupações dos simples cidadãos, e com exigências de clientelas ávidas de benefícios, nem sempre legítimos.”⁴²⁷

“*Portugal: Que Futuro?*” was a congress organized by a group of independent citizens at which Portugal's problems were debated and solutions for the future were suggested. In the run-up to the congress, the parties brought forth the accusation that it aimed at forming a leftist alliance to found a new party and select a presidential candidate. As Soares gave the initial speech of the congress and publicly supported it, it evinced parallels to the *Eanista*-movement in 1984, which had led to the foundation of the PRD. One reason for this assumption was that the party crisis – especially the question whether the party system really represented the Portuguese people, or whether it rather succumbed to clientelism – was one of the main subjects of discussion. The parties showed resistance because they believed it to be their exclusive competence to discuss such problems. Soares supported the congress because he believed that the civil society shared the responsibility to find solutions for the problems at hand. During his whole mandate, Soares had called on the population to show more initiative and had expressed his apprehension of stagnation; this congress represented a citizen initiative and therefore deserved his support. The subjects on the agenda were not only designed to express the participants' diffidence towards the Government, but also to trigger inner-party discussions. Despite the parties' initial resistance, this goal was actually achieved: in the course of the months after the congress, the inner-party discussions regarding e.g. more transparency in the party financing were taken up in the PSD as well as the PS.⁴²⁸

In the opening speech, Soares listed – apart from his aforementioned criticism regarding the absolute majority – the reasons for his participation in the congress. First, he welcomed the discussion within civil society, since its goal was not to take over power, the solutions were of a disinterested nature and did not aim for immediate results, in the sense of a legislative period with reelection motivated by prospects of reelection, but rather for middle- and long-term solutions.⁴²⁹ With regard to the party crisis, Soares added that the problem was mainly a cultural one, in which primarily young people increasingly dissociated themselves from the parties. He emphasized the need to invest in education, including the teaching staff. In a diagnose of the general situation of the country, Soares asserted that back wages, reduction of actual earnings,

⁴²⁶ Soares, Mário, *Abrir as avenidas da discussão*, p. 81, in *ibid.*, p.79-93.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 82.

⁴²⁸ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 292 ff.

⁴²⁹ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Abrir as avenidas da discussão*, p. 79, in *ibid.*, p.79-93.

child labor, temporary employment, increasing unemployment and enterprises standing at the verge of bankruptcy were once more part of reality. In contrast to the situation in the mid-1980s, however, the situation also included increased globalization and the opening of Europe to the East. It was therefore fundamental that Portugal represented and fought for its own project in the EU, and did not only report as an obedient pupil.⁴³⁰

5.5.4 The “Right to Indignation”

Another highly polemic maxim fathered by Soares was the “right to indignation”⁴³¹. The initiative was triggered by two occasions upon which the Government denigrated demonstrations as party political shows of power and did not treat the protests as indications of serious problems. The first occurrence was the general strike on the 28th of March 1988, organized by the UGT as well as the *Intersindical*. The strike was a reaction to the draft of a labor law facilitating dismissals, which had been introduced in Parliament in February.⁴³² As not all enterprises joined the strike, Cavaco Silva provocatively visited factories and firms that did not participate, to play down the situation and demonstrate that the Government would not yield.⁴³³ Soares, who was at a *Presidência Aberta* in Guarda at the time, accepted hearing the union leaders two days prior to the strike, which the Government interpreted as a symbolic demonstration of his support. On the 30th of March, Cavaco Silva was meant to drive to Guarda to the weekly meeting with the President, but previously informed him that he would not appear if Soares also received the unionists. Due to the fact that the *Presidência Aberta* defended institutional solidarity, and that a breach with the Prime Minister would have deviated from this motto, Soares gave in to Cavaco Silva's demand. For Cavaco Silva it was “[f]elizmente que foi assim, porque a população também não compreenderia a minha atitude e eu não ficaria bem-visto.”⁴³⁴ In 1988, Soares contained his opinion, merely expressing his disapproval via the institutional level by ordering the verification of the law's constitutionality. In 1994, however, when the Government's reaction to the voices of protest was similar, Soares publicly took the offensive.

In mid-1994, a demonstration took place on the bridge Ponte 25 de Abril, which at the time was the only connection from Lisbon to the South. After Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral, Minister of Public Construction, announced that the bridge toll would be raised, truck drivers blocked access to the bridge on the 24th of June and honked without cease.⁴³⁵ Cavaco Silva was at an EU-

⁴³⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 87 f.

⁴³¹ The “*direito à indignação*”. This term entered the political vocabulary in Portugal with Soares.

⁴³² Cf. Chapter 5.2.2.2 “The Labor Law”.

⁴³³ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 60.

⁴³⁴ *ibid.* p. 61.

⁴³⁵ The Portuguese term for such a “hooting concert” is “*buzinação*” since the incident in 1994; this form of demonstration has established itself in the course of time, whereas it is always accompanied by the meaning of the “*direito à indignação*”.

summit on Corfu at the time; he instructed Fernando Nogueira, the Government's second man, to take adequate action to reestablish the free circulation of traffic – if necessary by removing the blockading vehicles with military tow trucks. Cavaco Silva instructed the Interior Minister Manuel Dias Lorenço to let the police intervene to restore public order and the citizen's free circulation.⁴³⁶ It came to massive riots between the police and the protestors throughout the day; in the evening the military removed the vehicles. A confrontational climate against the Government had developed which it attempted to assuage by means of a partial concession of the protesters' demands: the toll-free period, which was usually limited to August, was extended to July, and regular users of the bridge were promised rebates. The protests flared up again in September, yet the Government interpreted them as party political provocations due to the fact that personalities of the extreme left, the PCP, and PS participated in the demonstrations. Although another blockade did not take place, drivers blew their horns when they used the bridge until December, in protest of the Government's ignorance.

The Government was informed that activists were planning to block the bridge and the main routes to Lisbon and that they had called to civil insubordination. Thereupon, the Government publicly announced that the police was prepared and possessed the means to guarantee the abidance of the law, the security of the people, and the preservation of public order. The announcement had the purpose to intimidate the protestors and demonstrate that the Government would not allow the state authority to be questioned.⁴³⁷

On the 22nd of September, during the weekly meeting of Prime Minister and President, the protests and the Government's reaction were the main topics of discussion. Soares accused Cavaco Silva of wanting to drown the voices of the people, whereupon Cavaco Silva answered that the Government would not play along in the party political game, but would observe the situation in such a way as to guarantee internal security and democratic legality. The Government was doing its best to implement measures necessary for the country's progress, even if they were unpopular, without fear of displeasing interest groups or corporations.⁴³⁸ Thereupon, Soares broke off the conversation with the words: “olhe que eu avisei-o!”⁴³⁹.

On the next day, at a press conference, Soares attacked the Government and declared that the people had the right to indignation when they were victims of injustice. He repeated his statement in an interview with the RTP on the 27th of September. Soares declared the right to indignation as a human right, with the explanation that “toda a gente tem o direito de expressar a sua indignação porque é um país livre”⁴⁴⁰. In an improvised speech on the 28th of September 1994, at a seminar of the Chamber of Lawyers, he expounded what he meant. In a

⁴³⁶ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 459.

⁴³⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 461 f.

⁴³⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 429 f.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 430.

⁴⁴⁰ Appendix 1 „Interview with Mário Soares“, S 124.

Constitutional State it was not enough to proclaim rights or to consolidate them in the law, but one also had to live by and apply them, and strengthen the civil awareness that the people's rights were guaranteed and respected. The participation of the citizens was the greatest weapon in achieving this.

“[A] indignação perante a injustiça é um sentimento de grande mérito. Aqueles que gastam palavras como Liberdade, Igualdade, Solidariedade, Fraternidade, aqueles que as invocam, mas depois, na prática, fazem o contrário, corroendo-lhes o significado, esses têm que contar com o direito à indignação.

Os cidadãos têm o direito a indignar-se perante a injustiça e a manifestar essas formas de indignação. Como chefe de Estado, tenho dito sempre aos portugueses que há leis e que as leis se fazem para serem cumpridas e respeitadas. Vivemos num Estado de Direito Democrático, o que quer dizer que, dentro da Lei, todos os cidadãos têm liberdade total de expressão e de associação. (...) E têm também direito a manifestar a sua indignação, sempre que tenham razões para tal. Eles saberão se as têm ou não.

(...) Quando os cidadãos se demitem de expressar os seus pontos de vista, quando deixam de participar na vida pública, porque não têm interesse nisso, ou acham que não vale a pena, ou temem poder ser perseguidos ou discriminados, quando os cidadãos deixam de se indignar contra as injustiças e contra as iniquidades, então deixam de ser cidadãos. Demitem-se da sua função e, nessa altura, as sociedades correm riscos graves. Quando, pelo contrário, participam e estão activos, quando suscitam a contestação no seio da própria sociedade, então essas sociedades podem progredir.”⁴⁴¹

The Government accused Soares of encouraging the protests with the “right to indignation”, leaving his position as arbiter and becoming a political player. Yet Soares' intent was to counteract the Government's negating reaction, at the same time responding to the voices of the population, as well as to publicize the existing problems the Government was consistently belittling. Although the protests concerning the bridge taxes dwindled, the incident left a negative aftertaste in the population: over a period of six months, a hooting concert took place on the bridge, yet the Government remained deaf.

5.5.5 The Last Polemic

Three weeks before the party congress of the PSD, on the 23rd of January 1995, Cavaco Silva announced at a press conference that he would not re-run for the office of party President. A posteriori, Cavaco Silva explained that he simply wasn't in the mood for party politics any more, and wanted to engage himself as an economist and professor again.⁴⁴² He remained in the office of Prime Minister until the end of the legislative period, instead of transferring it to the new

⁴⁴¹ Soares, Mário, O direito à indignação, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 9, Lisboa 1995, p.143.149, here p. 147.

⁴⁴² Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p.481.

party leader because he feared that Soares would otherwise dissolve Parliament, and early elections would have been detrimental to the PSD.⁴⁴³ With his announcement nine months before the parliamentary election, however, Cavaco Silva had indirectly already resigned from Government.

At the party congress on the 19th of February, Fernando Nogueira, who was also the Minister of Defense, was elected the new President of the PSD and Eduardo de Azevedo Soares, the Minister of the Sea was voted Secretary-General. Because of these inner-party changes, Cavaco Silva announced his intent of modifying Government staffing on the 23rd of February: Nogueira was to leave the Defense Ministry and ascend to the position of Vice Prime Minister, and Azevedo Soares was to quit the Ministry of the Sea. Soares rejected Nogueira's change-over to Vice-Prime Minister, with the explanation that the change was a maneuver in preparation for the upcoming elections. The oppositional parties brought forward motions for parliamentary dissolution, Soares arranged hearings with all parties and social partners, yet decided against dissolution on the 6th of March. The PSD accused Soares of artificially delaying the decision on the parliamentary dissolution, exploiting the situation that Cavaco Silva had abandoned party leadership to let the PSD look bad, whilst facilitating a victory for the PS. With regard to the governmental modifications, Cavaco Silva criticized that the oppositional parties – via the President – could not decide on the governmental setup.⁴⁴⁴ Nogueira as well as Azevedo Soares resigned from the Government, whereby Nogueira's absence from Government may have contributed to the bad results in the parliamentary elections in October.

After this polemic, Soares and Cavaco Silva's relationship relaxed and in the weekly meetings mainly foreign policy issues were discussed, although Soares continued to veto a series of decrees. Cavaco Silva described the last six months as follows:

“Eu próprio sentia-me aliviado e descontraído, propenso mesmo a apreciar as qualidades de lutador político do Presidente. Nesse aspecto, talvez tivesse aprendido alguma coisa com ele. Não lamentava os combates travados, embora sentisse que tinha cometido alguns erros políticos. Apesar de, nos últimos anos, ter sido eu o seu adversário privilegiado, tinha de reconhecer que Mário Soares, (...) era, de facto, um grande político.”⁴⁴⁵

The PS won the parliamentary election in October with 43,7%, followed by the PSD (34,12%), the PP (9,5%) and the PCP (8,7%).⁴⁴⁶ António Guterres named Soares as one of the reasons for the PS's victory, because he “permitiu criar nos Portugueses a possibilidade de se identificarem com outra coisa que não a imagem gerada pelo poder, tal como era exercido pelo Primeiro-Ministro.” This way he helped the PS indirectly, by “ajudando a cortar o laço que o País dera com o então Primeiro-Ministro.”⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 489.

⁴⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 437 ff.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 442.

⁴⁴⁶ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 364.

⁴⁴⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 360.

5.5.6 Interpretation and Conclusions

There are no indications that Soares tried to act as a party political President, as already suggested in the chapter concerning the *Presidência Aberta*. His interventions against the Government's course of action were based upon his understanding of democracy and his interpretation of the constitution concerning the presidential function.

The dialog with the Prime Minister was very intense, and Soares only resorted to public intervention when all other means failed. For example, Soares only started the offensive with the “right to indignation” after the discussion with Cavaco Silva failed in their weekly meeting. In most cases, the positions which Soares tried to enforce correlated with those of the opposition, yet this can be explained in ideological terms: Soares had always abided by his political principles in the course of his political career and this did not change during his presidency. Due to the fact that he had shaped the PS from the beginning, many of the party's standpoints corresponded to those of Soares, even after the changes in personnel of 1986. In addition, the political atmosphere in the country had shifted in favor of these views towards the end of Cavaco Silva's second legislative period, as the outcome of the election in 1995 demonstrated.

Soares understood it as his duty to be a non-party – not impartial – President. The consequence was that in his constitutional understanding, the function of the President was not to preserve distance to all parties,⁴⁴⁸ but to seek their *closeness*, in order to fulfill the nonpartisanship of his office. The goal was to establish an equally intensive communication with all institutions, parties, interest groups and citizens, and to act as the interface of communication in order to best detect the will of the people in whose name the President should speak and act. With the creation of the *Magistratura de Influência* and the *Presidências Abertas* Soares launched two instruments which approximated this goal rather well.

In summary, the fact that the interventions against the Government became more drastic towards the end of his second term were not due to Soares' wish to effectuate a changeover of power and leverage the PS to victory, but rather because he did not see the fulfillment of the people's will in the actions of the Government. Despite the fact that Soares believed that the Portuguese constitution was not adequate for absolute majorities, *Cavaquismo* additionally aggravated the democratic deficit by ignoring the minorities. Soares therefore regarded it as his challenge to act as a balancing instance to revive the democratic principle. The statement that a majority did not equal stability, indicates that he considered *Cavaquismo* a true threat for democracy and therefore proceeded against it so resolutely. Yet more often than not, he did so, not on his own initiative, but merely in reinforcement of the voices of the people.

⁴⁴⁸ This is suggested in the German literature broaching the issue of nonpartisanship of the President of the Republic. Cf. For example, Eschenburg, Theodor, *Der Bundespräsident ist mehr als eine Repräsentationsfigur*, in: *ibid.*, *Zur politischen Praxis in der Bundesrepublik*, Band I, *Kritische Betrachtungen 1957-1961*, München: Piper, 1964, p. 130.

5.6 The Candidacy of 2006

Although Soares had declared his retreat from politics after his presidency, he was continuously called upon as a political reference. In the year 1999, Soares ran for the office of President of the European Parliament at Guterres' request, yet lost the election to Nicole Fontaine due to a majority shift in the parliamentary election.⁴⁴⁹

Soares' decision to run for the office of President of the Republic seemed more drastic. Shortly before the announcement of his candidacy, he had repeatedly declared that he did not wish to return to politics. The PS, however, was in a problematic situation: Cavaco Silva, who was considered the favorite, was already in the race and the PS could not agree on an own candidate. The party Executive Committee had already received a refusal from Jaime Gama, António Vitorino, Vítor Constâncio and António Guterres. In addition, Manuel Alegre was running for office without the support of the party. Alegre, who had supported Soares' party line since the first party congress in 1974, lost the election for party leader in 2004 against José Sócrates, whereupon he fell out with the Executive Committee.⁴⁵⁰ If Alegre had won the presidential election, a disruption within the party would have been the consequence. Soares considered himself a member of the PS as well as Alegre's friend, and therefore was a nonpartisan in the conflict. After a period of hesitation, Soares accepted the candidacy, exclusively to do the PS a favor, “porque não houve outros candidatos, e como tem que haver um, candidatei-me. Mas não foi por grande desejo.”⁴⁵¹

Soares' election campaign began late and the chances for victory were very slight, yet a similar development as in the campaign of 1986, in which a strong candidate of the conservative camp ran against a split left and in which Soares prevailed, was hoped for. The campaign strategy aimed for a second ballot. *For the same reasons as always*, thus his campaign slogan, the people should trust him,⁴⁵² whereas Cavaco Silva was illustrated as “an eucalyptus tree, under which all life dies off.”⁴⁵³

Cavaco Silva won the election with 50,54%, followed by Manuel Alegre with 20,74%, Mário Soares with 14,31%, Jerónimo Sousa with 8,64%, Fransisco Louçã with 5,32% and Garcia Pereira with 0,44% of the votes.⁴⁵⁴ The strategy of repeating the course of events of 1986 failed. As the results showed, it would have been better for the socialists to find a consensus between the PS and Alegre, instead of bringing forth another candidate.

⁴⁴⁹ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Memória Viva*, Vila Nova de Famalicão 2003, p. 192.

⁴⁵⁰ Cf. Ribeiro, Anabela Mota/ Páscoa, Elsa/ Costa, Maria Jorge, Mário Soares. *O que falta dizer. Pensamentos de uma vida política*, Cruz Quebrada 2005, p. 18.

⁴⁵¹ Appendix 1, „Interview with Mário Soares“, p. 124.

⁴⁵² Zuber, Helene, *Der Greis, der brüllte*, *Der Spiegel* 3/2006, p. 117

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁴ Cf. Presidential Election Results 2006, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições* CNE, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008.

It is noticeable that in all presidential elections from 1976 to 2006, one conservative candidate stood against up to five leftist candidates.⁴⁵⁵ Yet despite the split left, only Cavaco Silva managed to win the people over and that, *nota bene*, with a very narrow majority.

Soares' defeat is based on a series of factors. First, it played an important role for the population that Soares was already 81 years old. Although he was at his best intellectually, his physical condition dwindled, impairing the effective implementation of the office. Furthermore, many people interpreted the candidacy against Alegre as a stab with a knife on Soares' part. In addition, the late campaign beginning and Soares' lack of motivation were relevant factors.

⁴⁵⁵ In 1976 four leftist candidates and no conservatives were nominated, which traces back to the political circumstances of the time. Thereafter, there was only one conservative candidate against five left candidate in 1980, three in 1986, three in 1991, three in 1996, four in 2001 and five in 2006. Cf. Presidential Election Results 1976-2006, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições* CNE, in: <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 8.11.2008.

6. Jorge Sampaio and Cavaco Silva: Development or Replica?

In addition to Jorge Sampaio (PS), Jerónimo Sousa (PCP) and Alberto Matos (UDP), who gave up their candidacy in favor of Sampaio, and Cavaco Silva (PSD) were nominated for the presidential election of 1996. Cavaco Silva didn't want to run for the presidential office, yet felt obliged to do so in his party's interest. He delayed the announcement of his candidacy until after the defeat in the parliamentary election on the 10th of October 1995, since he had believed that the party would not need him should it be victorious. Ramalho Eanes originally had the intent to run too, yet drew back in favor of Cavaco Silva.⁴⁵⁶

The election campaign of Sampaio, who had announced his candidacy in February 1995, started strong, yet faded continuously. In contrast, Cavaco Silva's campaign started weak and gained ground rapidly. Soares perceived a parallel to his own campaign in 1986, with the difference that Cavaco's weak start was mainly due to his apparent indifference and lack of commitment.⁴⁵⁷ Sampaio won with 53,91%; Cavaco Silva achieved 46,09%.⁴⁵⁸

Jorge Sampaio devised his political path with discretion and efficiency. He had the patience to wait for the right political moments to advance. He owned a great moral correctness and sensitiveness, had a contained way of being and seldom took in extreme positions or gave aggressive speeches. Sampaio's political style was the exact opposite of Soares' in many respects.

During the ten years of his mandate, Sampaio remained true to this style. Although he also wrote books, recording the most important speeches and interventions (“*Portugueses*”), conducted *Jornadas Temáticas*⁴⁵⁹ and vetoed decrees when necessary, he did not emulate Soares. Next to subjects that had already been focused upon by Soares (education, health, poverty, development of regions etc.), Sampaio also brought up new topics which were considered tabu, such as drug addiction and abuse, during his *Jornadas Temáticas*. As a symbol that his understanding of the constitution implied that the President had the duty to mobilize the country, publicly proclaim his opinion on important topics, and stimulate new ideas, he renamed the *Magistratura de Influência* in *Magistratura de Iniciativa*.⁴⁶⁰ He believed that the Government was only responsible before Parliament, even though it also had to inform the President about its course of action so that he could guarantee that it was conducive to the national interest; in the process, the President acted as the interpreter of the national interests.⁴⁶¹ Analogously to Soares' declaration

⁴⁵⁶ Cf. Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, *Autobiografia Política. Os anos de governo em maioria*, Lisboa 2004, p. 496 ff.

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, p. 366.

⁴⁵⁸ Cf. Results of the Presidential election 1996, in: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, <<http://eleicoes.cne.pt>>, on the 9.11.2008.

⁴⁵⁹ „*Jornada Temática*“ was the term used by Sampaio for the *Presidência Aberta*. He conducted a total of 18 *Jornadas*, which lasted between one to nine days, Cf. Sampaio, Jorge, *Com os Portugueses: Dez Anos na Presidência da República*, Porto 2005, p. 580.

⁴⁶⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 181 and 195.

that the President was the moderator of the political game, Sampaio formulated that the President had “moderating capacities”⁴⁶².

Sampaio was a President who avoided provoking conflicts with the Government. His political situation was thereby different to that of Soares, as there was no cohabitation until 2002 and after 2005. The resulting conformance in ideals reduced the probability of presidential intervention. The number of vetoes confirms this fact: whilst Sampaio vetoed 26 government diplomas and sent one to the Constitutional Court during the PS-Governments,⁴⁶³ he vetoed 37 diplomas during the PSD-Government.⁴⁶⁴ In addition, he used his veto power eight times on parliamentary decrees during the PS-majority and verified three for unconstitutionality,⁴⁶⁵ whereas he vetoed four decrees and sent six to the Constitutional Court during the PSD-majority.⁴⁶⁶ As the distribution of the vetoes shows, his presidency would not have run so smoothly in a cohabitation situation.

During his inauguration, Sampaio defined the objective of being a citizen friendly President as the keynote of his mandate.⁴⁶⁷ Yet Sampaio never achieved the closeness Soares had, mainly because of his poor rhetorical skills. He did not have the talent to adapt his style of speech to the addressee; his speeches often appeared like an analysis, using complicated juristic terms, instead of a direct response to the people, as it had been the case with Soares. In conclusion, one may say that although Sampaio took over Soares' methods in respect to the execution of the presidential office, and had a similar understanding of his function, he always remained true to his own style.

Cavaco Silva, in contrast, has not found his own style until today. He tried to acquire Soares' style in vain, which he had observed for ten years as Prime Minister, thereby knowing its potential influence. Until today, Cavaco Silva does not possess the social attributes a President should have. His profile is one of an executive politician, but as President, he lacks historical, philosophical, political and juristic knowledge and interest. He is a technocrat and economist who did not publicly show interest for the Portuguese, European or global developments, neither before nor after the ten years years as Prime Minister.⁴⁶⁸ In addition, he lacks the features of a “People's President” who is capable of interacting with the population. Since he tries to distinguish himself as a citizen friendly President nonetheless, his actions often seem awkward and implausible.

⁴⁶² Ibid., p. 236.

⁴⁶³ Of a total of 3326 diplomas; therefore Sampaio vetoed 0,8% of the diplomas. Cf. *ibid.*, p.575 f.

⁴⁶⁴ Of 1041: that is 3,5% of the diplomas. Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁶⁵ Of 679 of passed laws, which corresponds to 1,6%. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 576 f.

⁴⁶⁶ Of 241 laws, so 4,1%. Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁶⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 233.

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. Ribeiro, Anabela Mota/ Páscoa, Elsa/ Costa, Maria Jorge, Mário Soares. *O que falta dizer*, Cruz Quebrada 2005, p. 77 ff.

On the basis of Sampaio's *Jornadas Temáticas*, Cavaco Silva launched *Roteiros*, which are divided in *Jornadas*⁴⁶⁹ of respectively two days. Until today, Cavaco Silva has conducted five such *Roteiros*: the *Roteiro para a Inclusão* from May 2006 to April 2007, the *Roteiro da Ciência* from June 2006 to May 2008, the *Roteiro do Património* from July 2007 to January 2008, the *Roteiro da Juventude* from October 2008 to June 2010 and since November 2009, the *Roteiro das Comunidades Locais Inovadoras*.⁴⁷⁰

The first *Jornada* of the *Roteiro para a Inclusão*, in May 2006, was aimed at revealing the conditions of the peripheral regions, the aging of society and their exclusion. In the second *Jornada* in July, the focus was set on the problem of child abuse, child poverty and domestic violence. In October, during the third *Jornada*, attention was turned to the demographic development, especially concerning urbanization, aging and immigration. The last *Jornada*, in December 2006, concentrated on the integration of handicapped in society. During every *Jornada*, Cavaco Silva visited different regions of the country in Soares' style of the *Presidências Abertas*.

At the close of the *Roteiro* in April 2007 stood the conference “*Compromisso Cívico para a Inclusão*”, which was attended by personalities from politics and civil society who discussed how organizations could contribute to social inclusion. Cavaco Silva gave the closing speech, in which he broached the problem of the “Portugal a duas velocidades, de contrastes sociais muito marcados, em que as imagens de progresso e modernidade conviviam paredes meias com as do atraso e da exclusão. Um dos indicadores reveladores deste dualismo é o da desigualdade na repartição do rendimento.”⁴⁷¹. On the four *Jornadas*, he had seen enormous potential in the experience, willingness and competence of neglected population groups, who were ready to be mobilized for the aim of a greater social cohesion. Cavaco Silva called on the poorer regions to show more own initiative. For this purpose, not only a stronger decentralization, but a greater cooperation between the local Governments was necessary. Social facilities were in need of improvements in their organization, resource administration, and transparency regarding the deployment of state subsidies. Cavaco Silva welcomed the initiative of some organizations that had disengaged themselves from exclusive state financing, thus acquiring more autonomy.⁴⁷² In Cavaco Silva's opinion, the most important instrument to achieve social inclusion was schooling. Hence, the increasing number of dropouts who entered the employment market without qualification was of great concern. It was indispensable to work preventively, showing the students how important graduation is. The family was even more important than the state initiatives, the schools, or enterprises. The reason for many cases of social exclusion could be

⁴⁶⁹ „Roteiro“ can be translated into “itinerary” as well as “list of topics”, which is an accurate notation for Cavaco Silva's intent with them. „Jornada“ can be translated into “journey”.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. Presidência da República Portuguesa, <<http://www.presidencia.pt>>, on the 05.07.2010.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. Cavaco Silva, Anibal, Intervenção do Presidente da República na Conferência “Compromisso Cívico para a Inclusão” on the 14th of April 2007, in: *ibid*.

⁴⁷² Cf. *ibid*.

found in family dysfunction. The aim should therefore be the achievement of more solidarity within the families.⁴⁷³

The content of the speech demonstrates that although Cavaco Silva tried to appear as the “Father of the Nation”, broaching the issue of social problems and approaching the population, time and again his assets as an economist stand in the foreground. He recommends precise solutions for existing problems – more so than Soares – in many cases arguing economically instead of politically. A second mandate is strongly dependent on whether he will be able to convince the population of his political style and how it responds to it.

⁴⁷³ Cf. *ibid.*

7. Conclusions

The President of the Portuguese Republic's possibilities of influence depend upon his interpretation of the constitution and his relationship to the Prime Minister. The understanding of the Constitution is important because it determines whether the President favors presidential influence on executive and legislative politics and is willing to implement it accordingly. The relationship to the Prime Minister not only plays a role in the party political – and thus ideological – context, but also on a personal level. The President can influence executive politics when a relationship of trust exists in which the Prime Minister follows the recommendations the President brings forth in the weekly meetings. In such a scenario, the probability is very high that the President will assume the chair of the Council of Ministers at the Prime Minister's request. This constellation prevailed during Sampaio's mandate, yet his reading of the constitution included presidential reservation regarding the shaping of policies. Therefore, his influence on the institutional level remained small.

When the relationship between the President and Prime Minister is distant and the President seeks to intervene, he will only achieve an influence by resorting to his unwritten constitutional competences.

The implementation of unwritten constitutional competences

	Constitutional understanding: no intervention	Constitutional understanding: intervention
Relationship PR-PM: distant	Low presidential influence	Unwritten constitutional competences
Relationship PR-PM: good	Low presidential influence	High presidential influence

Source: Own composition

Soares' reading of the constitution also impelled him not to intervene in policy conceptions. This included, for example, that he promulgated laws he did not agree with, as long as they were constitutionally consistent.⁴⁷⁴ Yet, as his interventions towards the end of his mandate prove, it did not imply that he should restrain himself in his function as moderator and arbiter. In his interpretation, the “dictatorship of the majority” called for his intervention. Soares hindered *Cavaquismo* from becoming a form of “Presidentialism of the Prime Minister”⁴⁷⁵, by implementing his unwritten constitutional competences, influencing the governmental course of action.

⁴⁷⁴ Cf. Uma Conversa no Martinho da Arcada, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p.447-494, here p. 479.

⁴⁷⁵ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 4, Lisboa 1995, p.37. Soares did not agree with the theory of “Presidentialism of the Prime Minister” of Adriano Moreira, which asserts that the parties had lost their power since they could no longer intervene on the parliamentary level. In addition, presidential moderation was to have become equally difficult. Cf. *ibid.*

Soares as well as Cavaco Silva described their personal relationship as cordial. In contrast to the media propaganda, the personal relationship was actually good, although reserved. The discrepancies came to bear on the political field. The greatest differences existed in their respective understandings of democracy: Cavaco Silva relied on the parliamentary majority of the PSD, which legitimized his governmental course of action, even if oppositional minorities resisted against it. Soares' position – also before his presidency⁴⁷⁶ – was that in a democracy, the opposition has a say, even if it represents a minority. Cavaco Silva's governmental style increasingly silenced these voices and treated them as annoying whistle stops on the way to the original aim. In the context of the blockade on the *Ponte 25 de Abril*, Cavaco Silva wrote: “A sequência das actuações visando adensar a tensão política foi a habitual: declarações e conferências de imprensa dos partidos da oposição, preocupação manifestada por parte do Palácio de Belém e depois pedidos de audiência ao Presidente da República e declarações do próprio. Era um filme que eu já conhecia.”⁴⁷⁷ Due to the fact that this behavior was an attack on Soares' comprehension of democracy, it provoked an increasing aggressivity in the President's conduct, which in turn fueled the blocking department of the Government, which felt coerced into a defensive position.

A party political motivation behind Soares' interventions is improbable because he effectively disengaged himself from party politics after his presidency. Instead – as announced – he committed himself to projects on the cultural and social level.⁴⁷⁸ In addition, in the ten years of his presidency, he was accused of conspiring with all parties. Yet the suggested inconsistency cannot be found in his ideational path, which has been very stable since 1976.

Soares believes that the President possesses the biggest intervention power, when he does not act in *power-counteracting power* dimensions, but “se situar acima dos jogos partidários (...) como referência democrática, isento, em relação directa de confiança com o Parlamento, o Governo, os partidos, as forças sociais e, principalmente, os cidadãos.”⁴⁷⁹ With this strategy, Soares brought his influence to bear. Guterres wrote: “é notável a sua capacidade de parar e escutar atentamente uma opinião que depois analisa em detalhe”⁴⁸⁰ Soares contrived to listen and respond to all opinions in equal measure. Due to the fact that he did not forget to hear the population, it became his greatest ally. With the *Presidências Abertas*, Soares established a relationship of trust with the people. The presence of the highest representative of the

⁴⁷⁶ Cf. Soares, Mário, *Recuperar a Esperança*. Discurso do Primeiro-Ministro na posse do IX Governo Constitucional em 9. Junho 1983, Lisboa 1983, p.10.

⁴⁷⁷ Cavaco Silva, *Autobiografia Política*, p. 429

⁴⁷⁸ The largest project was the establishment of the *Fundação Mário Soares*. This represents a cultural project in the public interest, with the aim of democratic education. In addition, he organized conferences, taught at the University of Coimbra, was President of the *Comissão Mundial Independente dos Oceanos* and is President of the administration council of the *Fundação Portugal-Africa*. Cf. Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 408f.

⁴⁷⁹ Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 4, Lisboa 1995, p. 38.

⁴⁸⁰ Avillez, Maria João, Soares. *O Presidente*, Lisboa 1997, p. 374.

Portuguese State in the regions gave the people the feeling that they were important and heard. Although Sampaio and Cavaco Silva also undertook *Jornadas* and *Roteiros*, they never achieved the high degree of attentiveness from the media, politics, and society that Soares had. The reasons for this was, on the one hand that the *Presidências Abertas* were a novelty, breaching the strong centralism of the state. On the other hand, Soares' personality was responsible for the success of the *Presidências Abertas*. Soares defines the politician, amongst other things, as a seducer: “sedutores dos auditórios para que falem, dos eleitorados que os elegem, dos partidários que os apoiam e, às vezes, dos próprios adversários que mais os incomodam.”⁴⁸¹ Measured against this definition, Soares was a career politician.

The intensive dialog with all actors on all levels is indispensable for the decision to implement the highest constitutional competences, i.e. the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of the Parliament. These decisions should be made according to the will of the people, which is why the President must always follow up on the development of the political atmosphere. In this respect, Soares demonstrated political sensitiveness when he did not approve of the PS/PRD coalition in 1987.

In the area of foreign policy, Soares primarily played a representative role. His opinion was, however, often sought over unofficial channels. This can be explained by the leading position Soares held in the media during the revolutionary phase, in which foreign countries turned their attention to Portugal, by which he acquired a high degree of familiarity. Hence, in the context of the democratization processes of the third wave, Soares was the natural contact person. In addition, Soares' charismatic and sympathetic personality, as well as the ease of contact he grants anyone, were responsible for his popularity. Further, his close friendship to equally charismatic personalities, such as Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, or Jassir Arafat, increased his international prestige. Although Portugal has a voice as NATO- and EU-member, the country does not play a noteworthy role in global politics. The fact that the Government did not take advantage of the foreign policy opportunities created by Soares – from which it would have equally profited – suggests a power-political motivation on Cavaco Silva's part, who did not want to share success with Soares. Considering the fact that Soares shaped the execution of the presidential office, Cavaco Silva played the more important part in defining the roles in foreign policy: if he had granted Soares a greater protagonism, this would probably have persisted after the Soares Era. Yet this only applies to the rare individual cases, in which Soares was contacted by virtue of his office, and not due to his personal relations.

Even when the two variables named above (the constitutional understanding and the relationship between President and Prime Minister) are collocated in such a way that the presidential influence is high, he will never acquire the power influence of a French President.

⁴⁸¹ *ibid.*

This is due to the extremely high significance of the parties in the Portuguese system, which can be traced back to the decades of repression during the *Estado Novo*. Eanes' failed presidential governments prove that this governmental form was not desired. Soares' role in respect to this understanding of the system is not to be underestimated. In his days as oppositional leader, he and Sá Carneiro showed the highest resistance to the presidential Governments. Although he esteemed Mota Pinto as well as Lourdes Pintasilgo personally, he fought on principle: the Governments had no parliamentary support and therefore no legitimacy.⁴⁸² After Soares had advocated the curtailment of the presidential competences in reaction to this episode, he was elected President himself. Soares did not dissolve Parliament, as had been expected, to establish a presidential majority, but was true to his principles of 1978/79 and announced that such a majority did not exist.

There is evidence that the influence Soares sought did not have governmental contents, but rather the governing style as its ultimate aim. During his first term, in the course of his “Idea for and of Portugal”, Soares was primarily engaged in creating of a relationship of trust with the people. The aim was an approximation of politics and society. The number of *Presidências Abertas* was higher than in the second term, the number of vetoes was smaller, and when conflicts with the Government arose, they were not carried out in public. In his second term, Soares built up a pressure instrument in cooperation with civil society that had great repercussions, limiting the Government's power. The basis for this lies in his interpretation of the constitution: that it was the President's duty as moderator and arbiter of the political game to curtail power abuse on the Government's part. His reelection with 70,35% of the votes additionally legitimized Soares' role as arbiter.

In the Portuguese system, the boundary between the executive and the President is not statically defined, but always dependent on the relationship between them. The cohabitation constellation during Soares' mandate did not condone presidential influence. Due to the fact that *Cavaquismo* violated Soares' comprehension of democracy by stifling the voices of minorities, Soares resorted to the power potential of the public opinion to restrict the government's power, by using his unwritten constitutional competences. In this respect, Soares' indirect influence on the Government was formidable.

⁴⁸² Cf. Uma Conversa no Martinho da Arcada, in: Soares, Mário, *Intervenções* 8, Lisboa 1994, p.447-494, here p. 479.

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- Correio da Manhã <<http://www.correiomanha.pt>>
- Der Spiegel <<http://www.spiegel.de>>
- Diário de Notícias <<http://dn.sapo.pt>>
- Jornal de Notícias <<http://jn.sapo.pt>>
- O Público <<http://www.publico.clix.pt>>
- Library of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung <<http://library.fes.de>>
- Constitution of the Portuguese Republic in the Versions of 1976, 1982, 1989 and 2001 on <<http://www.verfassungen.de>>
- CGTP-IN <<http://www.cgtp.pt>>
- União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT) <<http://www.ugt.pt>>

Appendix

1. Interview with Mário Soares



On the 17th of March 2008, I had the opportunity to converse with Mário Soares. During the interview, I was able to experience his rhetorical skills and his charismatic personality. These are characteristics that repeatedly helped him accomplish his goals in the course of his political career and which have, by no means, lost impact force at 83 years of age.

A shortened version with the most important information is provided subsequently.

Rebecca Sequeira: *O que levou o senhor a candidatar-se à Presidência da República?*

Mário Soares: A convicção de que poderia ser útil ao meu país, depois de ter conseguido várias batalhas – a primeira foi a da descolonização. As Nações Unidas e os nossos próprios aliados na Europa condenavam-nos por ainda ter colónias e nós não tínhamos nenhuma maneira de estabelecer a democracia sem descolonizar previamente. Portanto, a minha primeira preocupação quando cheguei a Portugal foi descolonizar, a segunda democratizar, a terceira desenvolver. A democracia prevista não era um regimento socialista do estilo comunista ou proletário como houve na Alemanha de Leste, o que queria era uma democracia ocidental. Portanto foi isso que se fez: uma segunda democracia ocidental.

A partir daí, tivemos grandes conflitos, primeiro com os comunistas, depois com os militares que queriam ser uma espécie de guarda sobre a própria constituição, e institucionalizaram-se com o Conselho da Revolução. Depois, a adesão à Comunidade Europeia foi muitíssimo importante para o desenvolvimento do país. Durante os meus três governos e durante o período de oposição a conviver no partido, eu consegui fazer isto.

Quando se pôs o problema da candidatura a Presidente da República pela primeira vez, eu fui partidário de que um militar, escolhido pelos militares, devia ocupar o cargo para consolidar o regime, antes de um candidato civil. O Sá Carneiro, por exemplo, quis-me empurrar para me candidatar à Presidência da República em 1976, mas eu não quis, porque ainda não havia uma situação madura no país para que isso fosse possível. Em 1986 pensei que me devia candidatar para poder civilizar – no sentido não-militarismo – o regime democrático português, e dar-lhe

uma nova geração. Esta perspectiva vinha da minha experiência como Primeiro-Ministro, na qual tive choques com o Presidente da República. Sabia bem, que quem tem o poder executivo não é o chefe do estado, é o chefe do governo, porque nós somos um regime semi-presidencial. O regime francês é um regime semi-presidencial, mais acentuado que o nosso, porque o Presidente francês tem mais poderes que o nosso. Mas, o Presidente da República tem grandes poderes ao contrário do que se dizia, que não tinha poderes nenhuns. Eu digo: tem grandes poderes! Tem a bomba atómica à sua disposição! O que isto quer dizer? Primeiro, o Presidente da República pode demitir o Primeiro-Ministro, se quiser. Segundo, tem a possibilidade de dissolver a Assembleia da República. São as duas armas máximas que pode ter, mesmo não tendo as armas convencionais, ou o poder convencional. Isto era a teoria política que era admitida por todos os constitucionalistas.

Pois, mas há mais dois poderes que o Presidente da República tem, muito grandes, desde que os saiba utilizar. O primeiro poder é o de contactar o povo directamente, falar directamente ao povo e exprimir-se junto ao povo – daí as Presidências Abertas. O outro poder é que o Presidente da República tem uma Magistratura de Influência. Ele tem influência por ser eleito directamente pelo povo e portanto tem uma maioria e pode utilizar essa maioria, que é uni-pessoal, exercendo uma Magistratura de Influência. Foram os dois grandes poderes que inventei e implementei com êxito, sem ter grandes problemas com ninguém.

RS: *A Presidência Aberta e a Magistratura de Influência são terminologias que o Senhor inventou. Já tinha uma visão concreta como ia realizar as duas quando se candidatou ou foram-se desenvolvendo com o tempo?*

MS: „O caminho faz-se caminhando!“ É um verso do poeta espanhol António Machado – um grande poeta. Quero dizer: eu comecei a adaptar as Presidências Abertas.

A primeira que eu fiz foi na sede da nacionalidade: em Guimarães. Do que é que se constitui a Presidência Aberta? É uma coisa simplicíssima: o Presidente desloca-se para um sítio qualquer, instala o seu alojamento num gabinete de um Governo Civil ou de um Presidente da Câmara e obriga todas as pessoas que querem falar com ele, vir à região correspondente. Foi um êxito total, porque as pessoas se sentiram como se a capital viesse a Guimarães, ou a capital do Estado era Guimarães durante esse tempo.

Foi de tal maneira um êxito que eu pensei: “bem, isto é útil, portanto faço isto mais vezes.” Fui fazendo as Presidências Abertas em regiões mais pobres. Mais tarde comecei a fazer Presidências Abertas sistemáticas sobre, por exemplo, o ordenamento do território, em favor da defesa da natureza e do ambiente, a preservação dos rios ou a destruição da orla marítima. Quando visitava as localidades correspondentes, rodeava-me de técnicos e grandes especialistas ambientais. Provoquei uma mobilidade enorme. Pelo facto que o Presidente lá estava, todos os

meios de comunicação estavam aí porque andavam atrás de mim para ver o que estava a fazer daquela vez. E assim muitas forças sociais foram activadas.

RS: Então as Presidências Abertas tinham a intenção de provocar reacções do governo?

MS: Eu queira dar visibilidade às pessoas e às coisas que se devia ao país. A Descida do Douro, por exemplo, foi uma experiência extraordinária. Partimos na fronteira, descendo o rio e quando cheguei à costa iam umas 300 embarcações ao meu lado. As pessoas faziam isso, porque se sentiam reconfortadas, porque a ideia que tinham era esta: “Lisboa é a capital, ninguém se interessa a não ser Lisboa, não se interessam nada por nós.” Eu era um Presidente da República que fazia a Presidência noutros sítios, distribuí a Presidência em rotação daqui para ali.

RS: Mas também fez a Presidência Aberta aqui em Lisboa.

MS: Também fiz. Justamente por causa de Lisboa ser um dos sítios mais poluentes, com mais problemas ambientais do país. Era para mostrar esta evidência e mostrar os problemas sociais: a pobreza. Onde se encontra a pobreza não é no Alentejo, nem em Bragança, mas certamente nos arredores das grandes cidades onde tem os imigrantes, os de África, em primeiro, e agora os dos países de leste.

Mas isto não teve nenhuma complicação. Não houve resistência, porque todos os partidos políticos, os sindicatos e os militares também eram chamados a ir, de modo que estava lá representado todo o país. Foi uma movimentação que se fez a todo o país, e que se punha a discutir os problemas das regiões em que se estava.

RS: O Senhor atingiu uma influência muito grande com as Presidências Abertas. Os seus sucessores não tiveram esse impacto.

MS: Bem, primeiro, foi novidade. Depois, cada um tem as suas características. E eu tinha uma característica que era bem conhecida, que sei comunicar com as pessoas, gosto de falar com as pessoas, eu gosto do povo, gosto das pessoas e gosto de estar entre pessoas. Não me faz nenhum mal se aparece gente a dizer: “Ó, seu malandro, você ganha mais do que eu!” Que falem! Eu gosto! E isso é uma faculdade. As pessoas têm ou não têm. Ou gostam dos outros ou não gostam. Como há pessoas que não falam. Ou falam pouco. Estão metidas com elas próprias, são tímidas, são cheias de complexos. Eu não sou assim, tenho a vocação para a conversa, para falar com os outros.

RS: *Também houve outros modos de influência. Houve as Presidências Abertas e a Magistratura de Influência. Qual foi o método mais eficaz?*

MS: Foram as duas coisas. A coisa com a Magistratura de Influência, era que eu, a propósito de cada questão, ouvia as pessoas que a faziam. Havia um problema com a saúde, falava com os médicos ou com os enfermeiros ou com os professores da universidade, havia um problema ambiental falava com os economistas, com os ambientalistas – com todos mesmo que estivessem uns contra os outros. Convidava-os todos a irem ao Palácio ou para onde estava, e havia discussões abertas etc. Deu-se uma movimentação e uma confiança nas pessoas, porque as pessoas se sentiam ouvidas. O Presidente tem que ouvir. Não se pode isolar no seu Palácio, tem que ouvir os outros; mais do que falar, tem que os ouvir. E tem que discutir o que ouviu.

RS: *Exactamente. Com o governo?*

MS: Com o governo, é claro. Normalmente, o Primeiro-Ministro vinha-me visitar em todas as Presidências. Visitar para despachar! Mas, além disso, eu ia com muitos ministros. Se eu estava a tratar de um problema de militares, por exemplo, pedia ao Primeiro-Ministro: “Olhe, gostaria que cá estivesse o Sr. Ministro da Defesa” e eles me mandavam o Ministro da Defesa, e eu falava com ele e com militares e ouvia-os e discutia com eles, com o ministro da saúde, com o ministro da educação, com o ministro das obras públicas etc.

RS: *...para haver uma comunicação contínua entre toda a gente. Acha que a sua formulação “o direito à indignação” contribuiu para a mudança política com a vitória de Guterres?*

MS: Não diga isso. O direito à indignação foi uma questão que eu fiz porque houve, em primeiro lugar, uma greve geral, o que foi uma novidade com os sindicatos. No entanto, começou-se a dizer, que a greve geral não podia ser e que os sindicatos não podiam fazer a greve. Eu, nessa altura, estava na Guarda, numa Presidência Aberta. Foram lá os sindicatos a dizer que a situação estava muito mal, e tive um confronto com o governo porque tinha ouvido os sindicatos. O direito à greve é um direito constitucional. Portanto, toda a gente pode fazer greve, desde que estejam de acordo com a lei e não se pode fazer questão sobre as pessoas por fazer greve. E isto é com os sindicatos, tive que ouvir os sindicatos e falar com eles. O governo fechou as torneiras à empresa e a greve acabou por ser despachada, ponto: uma greve normal, mas podia ter sido uma rebelião.

Depois disso houve o acontecimento na Ponte 25 de Abril. Os camionistas queriam impedir o aumento das portagens com um buzinao. E as pessoas estavam indignadas, porque o ministro

começou por dizer, que os camionistas não tinham o direito de buzinar, que incomodavam os outros. Eu declarei o direito à indignação como um direito humano como qualquer outro, porque toda a gente tem o direito de expressar a sua indignação porque é um país livre.

RS: *Porquê é que se recandidatou em 2006?*

MS: Bem, isso é mais difícil de explicar. É que eu, realmente, não me queria candidatar. Tinha acabado de fazer 80 anos, uns amigos deram-me um jantar de homenagem. Fiz aí um discurso porque houve muita gente que puxou a questão da minha candidatura e eu disse que eu não queria ser mais nada em política. Acabou. Para mim, basta. Eu não queria ser Presidente da República, apesar de já ter sido durante dez anos.

Mas entretanto o Partido Socialista entrou numa situação difícil. Já tinham perguntado ao Gama, ao Vitorino, ao Guterres e ao Constâncio para se candidatar e todos recusaram. E então quem é que se estava a querer lançar na Presidência? O Manuel Alegre, que tinha estado contra o líder do Partido, que era o Sócrates. Portanto, se ele ganhasse, podia haver uma divisão no partido muito grave. E eu não sou militante de nenhum. Sou do Partido Socialista, e o Manuel é meu amigo. Eu tenho aqui o meu cartão de militante [mostra-me o cartão]. Eu nem queria ser militante, eu entreguei o meu cartão quando fui Presidente da República e depois não fui buscar, mas eles resolveram dar-me isto. Bem, eu aceitei.

Portanto, eu percebi que o Partido Socialista estava numa situação difícil, que podia ser muito grave. E por isso, pensei, se ninguém segue e toda a gente tem medo é tempo de mostrar que nestas situações, em qualquer eleição, ou se perde ou se ganha. Entrei muito atrasado, ninguém esperava a candidatura, houve uma grande confusão sobre as razões da candidatura e perdi as eleições, portanto acabou. Mas isso não teve importância.

RS: *Então fez para o Partido?*

MS: Sim, realmente fiz para o Partido. Foi fundamentalmente por causa do Partido, porque não houve outros candidatos, e como tem que haver um, candidatei-me. Mas não foi por grande desejo.

RS: *Se calhar ainda me podia descrever o relacionamento político com Cavaco Silva quando ele era Primeiro-Ministro e o Senhor Presidente da República?*

MS: O relacionamento foi sempre bom, nunca foi mal, foi cordial, sempre cordial. Tivemos uma competição dura nesta última eleição: ele era candidato e ganhou, eu era candidato e perdi.

Mas agora, somos membros do Conselho de Estado. Não sou amigo íntimo, não lhe dou abraços, mas o relacionamento é correcto e normal.

***RS:** Muito obrigada.*

2. The Revolution of 1974 – Background and Performance

The trigger for the end of the *Estado Novo* were the colonial wars in Africa. The relationship between the *Estado Novo* and the African colonies Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau was settled in the *acto colonial*, which granted the colonies a restricted autonomy and the integration into the Portuguese system. Yet reality was branded by repression and exploitation: the economic structures corresponded to Portugal's needs, whereas the colonies were reduced to the role of a commodity exporter; on the employment market, forced labor was a daily occurrence. Political-administratively the colonies were subordinated to the central administration in Lisbon. The African population was divided in “civilized” (or “assimilated”) and “non-civilized”⁴⁸³ people and instead of an integration, an ethnic and cultural assimilation was aspired.

The UN-Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 regarding the independence of the people, forced the Government to pass a new colonial law. As a consequence, the *acto colonial* was included into the constitution and the colonies were officially integrated in the Portuguese state. Despite the redraft in the constitution, the colonial policy still corresponded to a racist repression system for the exploitation of African society. As a consequence, the first liberation movements emerged in 1955.

The catalyst for the wars were the riots in Angola, carried out by the liberation movements UPA in the north of the country and the MPLA in Luanda, which accounted for hundreds of mortal victims, especially within civil society. Salazar, who assumed that only a short-term conflict would follow that would be decided in favor of the *Estado Novo*, sent troops to Angola to terminate the uproars. At latest in 1964, when in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique the movements PAIGC and FRELIMO also accounted for riots, the Government should have reacted politically to the situation. High-ranked military personalities had demanded a political solution at an early stage,⁴⁸⁴ yet the Government ignored the warnings and reacted with a fortification of the military presence in the conflict area instead.

The consequence was an extensive increase of the military budget, which accounted for over 40% of the overall budget in 1965 and climbed above 50% by 1973. This had devastating implications for Portugal's economic situation: as the country did not possess a domestic defense industry and financial support for further economic sectors was neglected due to the enormous military expenses, the economic development was inhibited. The expenses were financed by a fiscal reform, a tax increase, and international raising of credits. As the income from the colonial imports could not cover the expenses, there was no economic legitimation for the continuation of the wars. The reasons were of a political and ideological nature and diverted

⁴⁸³ The differentiation was denoted „*estatuto de indígena*“ (indigenous status), in which the distinction between „*assimilados*“ (the civilized people, who mastered the Portuguese language and culture, who therefore obtained the same rights as the Portuguese people) and the „*indígenas*“ (non-civilized people, who had no rights), was made. Hence, a two-class society existed.

⁴⁸⁴ General Botelho Moniz, for example, had already demanded a political solution to the colonial problem in 1960.

from the domestic problems of the country. Accordingly, the regime was dependent on the loyalty and support of the Armed Forces.⁴⁸⁵

The military situation in Africa worsened increasingly. The military leaders in Lisbon played their own war, lacking knowledge of the situation at the fronts. General Spínola, who was appointed military governor in Guinea-Bissau in May 1968, believed that the war could not be won by military intervention and tried to integrate African people in the state administration and African soldiers in the army, in order to win the people over for the Portuguese interests. In addition, he contacted the PAIGC and tried to initiate negotiations. His strategy was successful, until the Portuguese central administration stopped and prohibited its expansion. Spínola was pulled off from Guinea-Bissau and later even dismissed. He propagated that the combat operations had to be ceased at once, the liberation movements recognized and the colonies integrated in a federal union. In early 1974, he published the book “*Portugal e o Futuro*”, in which this solution was formulated. The book's effect were grand, as the state's propaganda was revised for the first time, depriving the legitimacy of the African wars.

In 1973, a maladroit governmental move, which attacked the traditional hierarchy of the military, had a politicizing effect of the military ranks, which were stationed at the African fronts. In summer 1973, the Government passed two decrees (the *decreto-lei* n° 353 and 409), which – in order to compensate the lack of regular officers – enabled officers liable to military service the access to the regular cadre after only a short training. For the regular officers this implied a disregard for their rank, as the regular cadet formation was equated to the training of the military service. In addition, the soldiers observed an increasing discrepancy between the African reality and the Portuguese propaganda, which rumored that the liberation movements were controlled by foreign actors and proceeded against the will of the African people.⁴⁸⁶ On the base of professional interest and the fear of having to carry the responsibility for the expected defeat in Africa, a movement of the captains, later renamed in *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA), was founded in September 1973.

In December 1973, the Government drew back the laws and tried to assuage the uproar by an increased salary, yet the ball had already begun to roll. In November, the movement had already discussed three options for further proceeding: 1) A government putsch, subsequently assigning the power to a military junta to democratize the country; 2) Elections, supervised by the military and anticipated by a referendum defining overseas policy, giving the Government the chance to legitimize its rule; 3) A rehabilitation of the military prestige and the achievement of a political solution to the colonial problems via institutional channels. At first, the third

⁴⁸⁵ Cf. Sanger, Ralf, Portugals langer Weg nach „Europa“, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, p. 86ff.

⁴⁸⁶ In addition, more and more intellectuals were forced to deploy in the crisis areas. The reason was a correlation between educational curriculum and military career, i.e. those who wanted to go to university, had to run through the corresponding military path. These intellectuals conducted a sort of elucidation under the officers, stimulating the discontentment-spiral.

solution found most support, yet after a short period of time, the movement's priorities shifted in the direction of a putsch.⁴⁸⁷

On the 16th of March 1974, members of the military joined forces for a coup for the first time, yet it was nipped in the bud. The reasons for the failure were weak organization, lack of communication between the units and the ignorance of many officers. The Government lulled itself into a false sense of security after the victory over the insurgents. Only one month later, under the leadership of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, another attempt was made. This time, a detailed military operation schedule was elaborated in addition to a political program, which was drafted by Melo Antunes and Vítor Alves. It foresaw the implementation of a Junta after the coup, presided by General Spínola and Francisco da Costa Gomes. The revolution was initiated by two agreed upon songs, which were transmitted via radio: at 22:55 of the 23th of April 1974 “*E depois do Adeus*” by Paulo Carvalho commenced the movement and at 0:25, the censored song “*Grândola, Vila Morena*” by José Afonso symbolized that the putsch was irreversibly launched.

The commanders of the military units were arrested by MFA officers and corporals and teams were enlightened, whereupon the majority joined the movement. The military head quarters in Lisbon and Porto, as well as the television and radio stations were occupied. At 4:30 the first transmissions of the MFA were broadcasted over the radio: the population was called upon to remain in their homes, creating an evacuation situation, which enabled the military to occupy the capital. Yet the population resisted the appeal and surged into Lisbon's center.⁴⁸⁸ The revolution was therefore shaped by euphoric civilians, who celebrated the end of the dictatorship before Caetano's official cession of power.

Caetano fled into a caserne in Lisbon in the early hours of the 25th of April and refused to capitulate. He only gave in after Spínola showed up,⁴⁸⁹ yet with the condition that Spínola take over leadership. Caetano was transported out of the barrack in a tank, brought to Madeira and subsequently ordered to Brazil into exile. The Junta presented itself as the highest executive authority and kept watch over the progression of the revolution during the revolutionary phase.

The coup mainly proceeded so quickly and peaceful, because of the regime's lack of support. Only the PIDE/DGS resisted for a short while, yet surrendered on the morning of the 26th of April, whereupon all political detainees were set free. According to a report, the people wore red carnations in their hair and in the breast pockets of their jackets. In addition, they were

⁴⁸⁷ Cf. Ferreira, José Medeiros, *Portugal em Transe (1974-1985)*, in: Mattoso, José (Hrsg.), *História de Portugal*, Volume 8, Editorial Estampa, Lisboa 2001, p. 21

⁴⁸⁸ The presence of the civilians helped the MFA, because they unknowingly blocked the way for the few troops loyal to the government. A conversation these troops and their commander, which was recorded by the MFA, documents how the troops communicated that they could not implement the instructions due to the great run of civilians on the streets. The civilians could not differentiate between the troops, which is why they assumed they were of the MFA and euphorically embraced them.

⁴⁸⁹ The reasons for Spínola's appearance are unresolved until today. There is a speculation that there had been a previous consultation between him and Caetano. It is, however, a fact that the MFA had designated Costa Gomes as the chairman of the Junta, which was hindered by Caetano's maneuver to render the power to Spínola.

symbolically inserted in the muzzle of the guns and tanks. Under the slogan “*O povo unido jamais será vencido*” civics marched the streets of Lisbon, giving the so-called Carnation Revolution its peaceful character.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. Saraiva, José Hermano, *História de Portugal*, 5. Ed., Mem Martins 1998, p. 546.

3. List of abbreviations

AD	Aliança Democrata	Coalition of PSD, CDS and PPM
APU	Aliança Povo Unido	Coalition of PCP, MDP/CDE and PEV
ASDI	Acção Social Democrata Independente	Leftist splitter party
ASP	Acção Socialista Portuguesa	Preliminary organization of the PS
CEMGFA	Chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas	Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
CDS	Centro Democrático Social	Social-Democratic Center until 1993
CDS/PP	Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular	Social-Democratic Center since 1993
CGTP-IN	Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores – Intersindical National	Communist-affiliated Labor union headquarters
COPCON	Comando Operacional do Continente	Operation command of the MFA
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique	Liberation movement in Mozambique
FRS	Frente Republicana e Socialista	Coalition of PS, UEDS and ASDI
IMF	International Monetary Fund	International Monetary Fund
JSN	Junta da Salvação Nacional	Junta of the National Salvation
MDP/CDE	Movimento Democrático Português/ Comissão Democrática Eleitoral	Leftist splitter party (integrated in the Bloco de Esquerda today)
MFA	Movimento das Forças Armadas	Movement of the Armed Forces
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola	Liberation Movement in Angola
MUD	Movimento de Unidade Democrática	Oppositional movement in the <i>Estado Novo</i>
PAIGC	Partido Africano de Independência da Guiné e de Cabo Verde	Liberation Movement in Cape Verde
PCP	Partido Comunista de Portugal	Communist party
PIDE/DGS	Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/ Direcção Geral de Segurança	International State Defense Police/ Directory of General Security
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization	Political, paramilitary organization founded in 1964
PPD	Partido Popular Democrático	Preliminary party of the PSD
PPM	Partido Popular Monárquico	Rightist splitter party
PRD	Partido Renovador Democrático	Democratic renewal party
PS	Partido Socialista	Socialist party
PSD	Partido Social Democrata	Social-democratic party
PSP	Polícia de Segurança Pública	Security police
RRS	Reistência Republicana e Socialista	Preliminary organization of the ASP
UDP	União Democrática Popular	Extreme leftist splitter party
UEDS	União da Esquerda para a Democracia Socialista	Leftist splitter party
UGT	União Geral dos Trabalhadores	PS- and PSD-affiliated Labor Union
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola	Liberation Movement in Angola
UNO	United Nations Organization	United Nations Organization
UPA	União dos Povos de Angola	Liberation Movement in Angola

Source: Own composition