Peace and Conflict
Impact Assessment

Annex
Annex

Methodical Guidelines for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

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### Annex

**Overview: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment – The individual steps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument / Result</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>⇒ recommendations are available</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSPP-planning instrument has been completed (in addition to the Kursbogen-planning)</td>
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</table>

### I Conflict analysis
- **a)** Introduction for project staff
  - Brief workshop ⇒ sensitization and training

### II Conflict Sensitive Project Planning (CSPP)
- **a)** Identification of context
  - First reflections on potentials and limitations on the basis of the recommendations ⇒ determination of the working areas and their relation to the conflict situation
- **b)** Development of impact hypotheses
  - Systematically recording the connection between conflict situation, strategic objective and project target ⇒ CSPP-planning step 1
- **c)** Development of impact relations
  - Record short-, medium- and long-term assumed impacts, underlying assumptions as well as unintended side effects ⇒ CSPP-planning step 2
- **d)** Development of impact indicators
  - Record indicators for impact on attitudes, behaviour and context (ABC) ⇒ CSPP-planning step 3

### III Conflict monitoring
- **a)** Selection of independent experts / institutions
  - ⇒ local expert / institution identified (because FES resources are often insufficient to do this without further support)
- **b)** Determining the Terms of Reference for conflict monitoring
  - ⇒ ToR determined as well as criteria for conflict indicators specific to the FES-project (the latter to be developed in workshop with FES)
- **c)** Identification and procurement of relevant data and information
  - through commissioned expert / institution (integrate in ToR conflict monitoring)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d) Updating of conflict analysis and preparation of results</th>
<th>⇒ Information on changes in the conflict situation, underlying reasons and confirmation / recommendations for adjustments in strategy and working areas (e.g. twice a year)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV Conflict-related impact assessment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Analysis of conflict relevance</td>
<td>FES-office reviews the recommendations from the conflict monitoring with regard to the relevance of the working areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Recording of project-related impact</td>
<td>Group discussions / brief workshops ⇒ direct impact of activities (output) and checking of indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Analysis of conflict-related impact</td>
<td>Compare project output and project impact with conflict development. How did the project change the conflict situation, did the project activities contribute to conflict transformation? ⇒ recommendations for further work and strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V Adjustment of project / next phase of project</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>⇒ direct adjustment of working areas resp. new CSPP-Planning and Kursbogen-Planning</td>
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</table>
## Phase 1: Socio-political Conflict Analysis

### Annex 1: Time sequence of conflict analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase/time sequence</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Examples in the Guidelines/Annex</th>
<th>Notes/suggestions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparatory phase</strong></td>
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</table>
| Approx. 6 months before the planned field phase | Selection of country/region  
Focus of study: Is the client interested in a sector area or a region, an over-view or specific details? | Project leader in the field and at HQ, direct superior, if an internal Peace and Conflict Unit exists, inform it | Selection criteria | The selection of consultants may be brought forward if their expertise is required for the focusing process. |
<p>|                      | Selection of consultant team | Project leader in the field and at HQ | Selection criteria |                  |
|                      | Terms of reference | Project leader in the field and at HQ, consultant where applicable consultation with specialist unit | Terms of reference |                  |
| <strong>Approx. 6 weeks before the field phase (3-4 days)</strong> | Desk study | Main consultant | Structure |                  |
| <strong>Approx. 3 weeks before field phase (1 day)</strong> | Departure workshop | Consultant, project leader at HQ, with specialist unit where applicable | Programme | Such workshops have proved to be very effective: experience shows that voting by e-mail or telephone is more costly. |
| <strong>Approx. 3 weeks before field phase</strong> | Making the first interview appointments in the field | Consultant in consultation with project managers in the field and local consultant | | The programme should leave gaps for additional interviewees to be chosen on the basis of the kick-off workshop in the field and the first interviews. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation phase (field phase)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal kick-off workshop</td>
<td>Consultant team, project leader in the field and staff relevant to the study</td>
<td>Interviewee selection grid, Question catalogues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Optional: external preliminary workshop</td>
<td>Consultant team, project leader in the field, external conflict expert(s)</td>
<td>Questionnaire for feedback</td>
<td>If the conflict is well known and thoroughly analysed, such a workshop is useful for updating the existing knowledge quickly and effectively.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-10 days</td>
<td>1st interview phase</td>
<td>Consultant team,</td>
<td>Pointers for conducting interviews, Question catalogue</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>½ - 1 day</td>
<td>Mid-term review</td>
<td>Consultant team, project leader where applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-10 days</td>
<td>2nd interview phase</td>
<td>Consultant team</td>
<td>Question catalogue</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>½ - 1 day</td>
<td>Internal evaluation and preparation workshop</td>
<td>Consultant team, project leader</td>
<td>Protocol, Recommendations grid</td>
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<tr>
<td>½ - 1 day</td>
<td>External evaluation workshop (scenario development)</td>
<td>Consultant team, project leader, external experts, partners, local staff</td>
<td>At the end of the field phase the study should be ready in broad outline (so allow for max. no. of working days in the field)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approx. 10 days after end of field phase (3-5 days)</td>
<td>Drafting of the final version of the report</td>
<td>Main consultant</td>
<td>Executive summary</td>
<td>Enough time must be scheduled for the discussion of the first draft of the study (2-3 weeks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Follow-up</td>
<td>Political factual discussion in Germany</td>
<td>Project leader at HQ or in the field, political decision-maker</td>
<td>Programme for expert discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>As soon as a public version of the study becomes available (1 day)</td>
<td>Political factual discussion in Germany</td>
<td>Project leader at HQ or in the field, political decision-maker</td>
<td>Programme for expert discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Political expert discussion in the field</td>
<td>Project leader in the field, political decision-makers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation of the recommendations</td>
<td>Project leader in the field</td>
<td>Conflict Sensitive Project Planning</td>
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</table>

**Next PCIA step: Conflict Sensitive Project Planning**
Annex 2: Structure of a Conflict Analysis

Structure of a country-related conflict analysis
Preliminary remarks/introduction

Executive Summary

I. Conflict analysis
   I.1 Structural causes of conflict
   I.2 Situational factors in conflict
   I.3 Bases for peace Actors

I. International response
   II.1 Political role of the international community
   II.2 Problem-oriented analysis of donor activities
      • Focal regions
      • Focal issues
      • Impact assessment and findings of the donors
      • Perception of the international organizations

II. Scenario Development

III. Recommendations
   Premises
   Priority areas
   General recommendations for programme planning
   Organization-specific Recommendations
      • Development of strategies
      • Key issues
      • Actor groups

IV. Appendix
   Abbreviations
   List of interviewees
   Literature
   Itinerary
   Guiding questions (where applicable)
   Charts/mapping (where applicable)
   Chronological outline (where applicable)
Annex 3: Departure Workshop

Programme

Methodological preparation of conflict analyses for Angola and Bosnia/Herzegovina

Workshop held at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), Hiroshimastr. 17, 10785 Berlin, on 5 April 2005 from 11 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.

The workshop is part of the methodological preparation of the conflict analyses for Angola and Bosnia/Herzegovina. The two consultants shall be informed about the work of the FES in the field of crisis prevention and civil conflict resolution and on the methodology to be applied in the course of conflict analyses. The consultants and their colleagues from the relevant country directors’ offices shall have an opportunity to ask the consultant in the conflict analysis for Colombia questions concerning the procedure followed and the practical adaptation.

The further steps to be taken, the assignment of roles in the team, the time schedule, etc. will be defined more precisely in the course of preparation.

11 a.m. Welcome and introduction
Purpose of the workshop, explanation of the programme and agenda, getting acquainted

11:10 a.m. Presentation of the revised FES/GTZ Methodological Guidelines for Conflict Analysis
Elucidation of individual steps and areas covered in the new guidelines as well as changes in relation to the former version of the guidelines which the consultants still have

11:20 a.m. Methodological experience acquired in the “conflict analysis for Colombia”
Summary presentation of the conflict lines in Colombia – Methodological procedure and, in this connection – difficulties in the use of the guidelines and proposals for their improvement and user-friendly application – Development of impact hypotheses and recommendations to the FES

11:50 a.m. Discussion

12:30 p.m. Lunch break

13:30 p.m. Presentation of the desk study and planning stage of the conflict analysis for Angola
Summary presentation of the conflicts in Angola on the basis of the desk study: What methodological challenges may arise in the course of applying the guidelines? How does the consultant think they should be tackled? What methodological/conceptual questions are still open?

2:00 p.m. Discussion

3:00 p.m. Coffee break

3:15 p.m. Presentation of the desk study and the planning stage of the conflict analysis for Bosnia/Herzegovina

Summary presentation of the conflicts in Bosnia/Herzegovina on the basis of the desk study: What methodological challenges may arise in the course of applying the guidelines? How does the consultant think they should be tackled? What methodological/conceptual questions are still open?

3:45 p.m. Discussion

4:45 p.m. End of workshop

Participants
Consultants for the conflict analysis Bosnia-Herzegovina
FES, Unit for Development Policy/Group for Peace Development
FES, Unit for Development Policy/Africa
FES, Unit South-Eastern Europe
Consultant for the conflict analysis Columbia
Consultant for the conflict analysis Angola
Annex 4: Terms of reference

Analysis of the potential for peace and conflict in Sudan

Terms of Reference

1. Background of the study
It seems very likely that a peace treaty will soon be signed in Sudan. After decades of civil war this is a unique opportunity for Sudan that must be supported by the international community. However the peace deal is not comprehensive: not all the important actors are involved, nor have all the key questions been sufficiently clarified. Democracy and human rights are still far off. Furthermore in the west of the country (Darfur) a new war has broken out.

The peace deal offers many new openings and opportunities for promoting democracy and peace, but it is also fraught with risks because of the high degree of pressure for political action that is to be expected. One of these risks is that, without anyone wanting it to happen, violence and conflicts could be aggravated, even perpetuated.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the German Development Service (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst – DED) intend to support this peace process to the best of their ability and contribute to the cause of democracy and peace with their respective programmes. For this reason both organizations consider this a suitable moment to have an analysis made of the potential for peace and conflict in Sudan.

Although it is not possible at this stage to anticipate all the constellations and situations that will arise out of the actual peace deal, this analysis should be helpful in guiding the future work of the FES and DED.

This practice- and programme-based analysis is to be carried out by a consultant, who will be supported by one person from DED and one from FES, plus a methodology expert and a local expert.

2. Aims of the analysis

2.1. The purpose of a conflict analysis (actors, levels, dynamics) is to gain a better understanding of the present political situation in Sudan. This is meant to serve as a basis for conclusions on possible political developments (scenarios) following a peace deal (best case, worst case, realistic scenario).

2.2. The idea is to improve the strategic orientation of the current and future DED and FES programmes aimed at effective peace promotion and crisis prevention. This involves the formulation of strategic considerations and operational proposals for the systematic inclusion of the conflict perspective in the planning and control of social policy cooperation programmes, specifically by
• identifying possible, project-related areas of activity for conflict resolution with the instruments of the political foundations, the DED (programme planning), suitable executive agencies, strategically important target groups (strategy planning) and
• identifying possible conflict-escalating or de-escalating impact of socialpolitical policy cooperation programmes on the basis of impact hypotheses (impact assessment)

2.4 Possible development of proposals for the institutionalized monitoring of the conflict dimension in FES and DED programmes: As far as data collection and analysis permit, the aim is to suggest approaches for a regular impact observation system for the DED and FES programmes.

3. Subject of analysis (questions serving the investigation):
With the aid of the desk study and data collected in the field four successive areas are to be analysed and evaluated:

3.1 Analysis of potential for peace and conflict
Subsidiary questions:
• Conflict analysis (actors, levels, and especially dynamics): Does the peace deal take account of the main causes of conflict?
• Scenarios concerning political developments after a peace deal or after a failure to reach one.
• Role of the changing state institutions at central government level with regard to the potential for peace and conflict
• Role and function of civil society organizations and groups?
• What potential support is anticipated for the peace process? Opportunities and risks of the transitional period (human rights, democratization?)

3.2 Analysis of the existing and planned DED and FES commitment and hypotheses concerning the impact of these programmes on the potential for peace and conflict
Subsidiary questions:
• Evaluation of the relevance/sensitivity to conflict of existing programmes: regional and specialist focal areas, instruments, target groups, levels, partner organizations
• Degree to which projects reflected the conflict dimension
• What experience has been gathered to date concerning measures of conflict resolution and peace promotion? Were there any observations as to whether the measures had a de-escalating or escalating impact on the conflict?
• What significant experience has there been of cooperation with state institutions?
• How intensive is the networking and consultation with other actors offering social policy cooperation in the region?
3.3 Recommendations for devising FES and DED programmes for Sudan (the two organizations get a chapter each), including possible proposals for conflict-sensitive impact observation in the planning and implementation of programmes

- What are the comparative advantages of the FES and DED and how can greater use be made of them with regard to resolving the conflict in Sudan?
- Short and medium-term areas of activity concerning conflict resolution with the instruments used by political foundations and the DED?
- Suitable executive agencies and strategically important target groups to ensure maximum coverage of civil society structures in the field (mapping).
- Coherence and consultation with other actors involved in German and international development cooperation (DC) (Avoidance of contradictions and duplication of FES and DED programmes, especially with international donors and organizations)
- Drafting of recommendations regarding the applicability of the classical instruments of political programmes and proposals for innovative types of measures in different conflict situations and phases
- Possibilities of setting up a system of longer-term impact observation

4. Results of the analysis: Final report

Analogously to the subjects of the investigation the final report consists of three parts.

First part: Conflict analysis (actors, levels, and especially dynamics): potential for peace and conflict in Sudan, scenarios;

Second part: Hypotheses on the impact of present or future FES and DED programmes on the potential for peace and conflict

Third part: Recommendations for making the work of the FES and DED programmes in Sudan even more conflict-sensitive from the point of view of democracy and peace promotion

Copies of the final report should reach the parties to the treaty by 31 May at the latest, and of the final draft by 30 April. The report should not exceed 40 pages (excluding annexes).

5. Tasks of the consultant commissioned for this analysis

The consultant bears overall responsibility for drawing up the analysis. Her remit covers the following specific tasks:

During the preparatory phase in Germany: 2 - 15 March 2004: 10 consultant days

- Carrying out of an analysis of the potential for peace and conflict on the basis of what is known as a desk study (study of documents on Sudan) in consultation with the resource persons from DED and FES in a preparatory phase in Germany (may not be completely formulated by the time of departure)
Proposal for interview guidelines, selection of interviewees and organizations to be visited in a preparatory phase in Germany. These proposals must be cleared with the resource persons from DED and FES.

Familiarization with the methodology of the impact-related conflict analysis, especially with that contained in the FES guidelines.

Study of the project documentation by DED and FES regarding their commitment in Sudan; interviews with leading officials of both organizations.

Attendance at a preparatory workshop on 2 March 2004.

During the implementation phase in the field: 17 March - 6 April 2004:

21 consultant days

- Heading the team (consisting of the consultant herself and the resource persons from FES and DED) in consultation with the Khartoum offices of FES and DED
- Informing headquarters of interim results if communications permit
- Carrying out the interviews with the support of resource persons from the FES and DED and recording the results
- Planning of interviews and order of visits in consultation with FES and DED Sudan
- Presentation of the results in Khartoum at the close of the implementation phase

In the follow-up phase: 7 April - 31 May: 5 consultant days

- Preparation of draft of final report by 30.4.
- Revision of draft and submission of the final version of the report by 31 May
- Transfer workshop held at FES on experience of application

Resource persons from DED and FES

The consultant shall be supported by a short-term expert from the DED, a staff member of the FES, a representative of the FES Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt) to document the proceedings, a Sudanese expert in Khartoum and possibly another in southern Sudan.
Conflict analysis and development of options for the activities of the social policy cooperation programme FESCOL/Friedrich–Ebert-Stiftung in Colombia

Terms of Reference

Aims of the study

1. Drafting of strategic considerations and operational proposals on the systematic inclusion of the conflict aspect in the planning and control of the social policy cooperation programme of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Colombia, especially:
   
b) Identification of possible areas of activity for conflict resolution with the instruments of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, suitable executive agencies, strategically important target groups (strategy planning)
   
c) Findings on possible conflict-escalating impact of social policy cooperation programmes and (the absence of) donor coordination (do-no-harm aspect)

Procedure and course of study

- Before departure: Drafting by the expert of a desk study on the potential for conflict within Colombian society (focal areas: actors, structures, dimensions, dynamics at national level and provincial level). Prestructuring, examination and adaptation of the desk study between project managers and expert. The desk study structures the field phase and provides theses that are later tested on the basis of interviews.

- In Colombia: Carrying out of a two-week mission by the team in the period 18 - 29 October 2004 to analyse possible approaches to social policy cooperation in relation to project aims and measures taken (for the composition of the team and assignment of tasks see below).

- After the field phase: Report by the expert on the current situation regarding the conflict; drafting of recommendations in relation to the applicability of the classical instruments of political programmes; and proposals for innovative types of measures in different conflict situations and phases on the basis of scenarios (1st draft with possibility of feedback followed by second and final version).

Regional focusing

- The regional focus of the study is on Medellín, Cali and Barrancabermeja.

- Apart from the capital Bogotá, the two main centres of the country are Medellín and Cali. Medellín is the centre of the drug problem and the town is the main base of the paramilitaries. Medellín also plays an important role in the demobilization of the armed conflict actors. Cali was chosen chiefly because of the city’s political influence on the surrounding districts of Cauca and Nariño. It is also intended to investigate Cali’s significance as a centre of organized civil resistance.
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Annex

- Barrancabermeja is the headquarters of the European Union’s peace development programme for the Magdalena Medio region and the main civil conflict-resolution initiative (peace laboratory). The city is also the centre of the oil industry and the headquarters of the country’s principal trade-union movement. The region around Barrancabermeja is important because it is the home territory of another conflict actor, the guerrilla movement, and at the same time the base of one of the most powerful paramilitary groupings.

**Anticipated results in detail**

**Country expert**

1. Analysis of the present conflict situation in Colombia

   - Structural causes of conflict and conflict-escalating factors
   - Key actors and actor groups (potential for peace and conflict) with the emphasis on the changing capacities and the conflict and post-conflict perceptions of the principal actors
   - Consequences of the conflict for the civilian population
   - Strengthening the focus on conflict-reducing types of activity suited to the work of the FESCOL programme

2. Overview of social policy cooperation programmes and measures of international actors and the FES in Colombia aimed at resolving conflicts and promoting peace

   - Taking stock of existing approaches and important experience
   - Identification of gaps and possible new areas of activity/cooperation for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, especially in view of the constantly changing conflict situation and/or conflict containment strategies
   - Identification of potential partners, initiatives and measures
   - Finding ways of improving the networking of executive agencies and partner structures
   - Identification of conflict-escalating factors relating to the project and measures taken
   - Pointers to deeper conflict-related project evaluations within the framework of FES activities

3. Collaboration and support for the methodological evaluation:

   - Possibilities of setting up a system of longer-term impact observation and conflict-monitoring

**Local expert**

- Identification of suitable interviewees in consultation with the external consultant and the team
- Contrasting and supplementing the external desk study
Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Colombia

- Collaboration on the content and drafting of the terms of reference
- Collaboration in commenting on the desk study

While the study is in progress:

- Attendance of office manager and academic assistant at the internal working meetings: Kick-off workshop and closing workshop
- Logistical support in the field, organizing accommodation for working meetings in the field

After the implementation phase:

- Cooperation on drafting, discussion (if necessary adaptation) of conflict study recommendations
- Setting up, if appropriate, of a monitoring system as follow-up mechanism to the conflict study

Time frame and scope of study

Before departure:  
- Methodological workshop on preparation of political conflict analysis 1 days
- Preparation of desk study 4 days

In Colombia:

- Kick-off workshop, interim evaluation, closing workshop approx. 2
- Analysis of conflict situation and programmes of international actors approx. 11
- and analysis of case studies (including interviews, talks with staff, current and potential partners)

After the field study:

- Preparation of final reports 6
- Debriefing workshop 1

Total time 25
Annex 5: Programme of the kick-off workshop in the field

Agenda (aims) of the kick-off workshop

Item 1: General meeting to get acquainted

Item 2: Information/creation of transparency on:
- Framework of the investigation
- Method/team (assignment of roles)
- Procedure/seletion of interviewees
- Objective/desired result
- Use by the project

Followed by: Feedback session (questions, comments, proposals)

Item 3: Adaptation of the method to the context of Colombia
Feedback on:
- Selection/relevance of the subjects of the investigation (interviewees, conflict perspectives, sectors)
- Cultural peculiarities (organization, communication etc.)
- Interview guidelines

Item 4: (optional)
The work of the client organization and the conflict (discussion)
**Annex 6: Chart showing categorization of interviewees**

This chart helps to classify the interviewees before the interview (who can make relevant statements about what field?) and afterwards to document what was actually said about what subjects.

**Method of arriving at proposals:**

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<td><strong>I</strong></td>
<td><strong>II</strong></td>
<td><strong>III</strong></td>
<td><strong>III</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Analysis of the conflict</td>
<td>Sectors relevant to the development of the conflict</td>
<td>Sectors/ probable impact of socio-political programmes (political foundations)</td>
<td><strong>Within the sectors</strong></td>
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<td>Current development</td>
<td>Specific actors</td>
<td>Future scenarios</td>
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<td>International response/ other programmes</td>
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<td>Possible counterparts</td>
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<td>Specific cases (best practice)/ impact hypothesis</td>
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Annex 7: Interviews in the conflict context

At least two representatives of the team should conduct the interview so that the statements can supplement one another and be assigned their proper significance (cross checking, transparency). Care should be taken to ensure that men and women are equally represented in the team. In cultures where men and women have clearly differentiated roles it may be a good idea to split the team.

The location of the interview should be adapted to the political situation: e.g. public places, office of the client organization, etc. The wishes of interviewees in this regard should be taken into account. Requests to have other persons present should also be respected: such persons often function as corroborative witnesses.

The interviewing technique must be decided upon before the interview. No matter what method is chosen, it should be rigorously adhered to in the interview.

The aim of the interview must be made clear at the outset (e.g. the obtaining of information on the political situation). The interview must not arouse any unjustified hopes (e.g. for aid funds).

The art of the interview consists in being frank and honest (no hidden agenda) while still being able to read between the lines (what does this statement really mean?). The basis of the interviews are the guiding questions, which are uniformly formulated for all interviews so as to ensure that the answers are comparable. While the guiding questions determine the structure of the interview, their formulation and sequence should be flexible and adapted to the flow of the conversation.

The interviewees should be informed in advance of the areas of interest to give them time to prepare themselves. If expressly requested, guiding questions may be sent in advance. This, however, entails the risk of a monologue in which the casual but significant remarks of a “natural" conversation are absent.

In group interviews it is important to observe the interaction between different hierarchies or ethnic groups. If the team has spent a certain length of time at a given place, it is worthwhile mentioning the team’s place of residence during interviews and offering an opportunity to continue the conversation. This gives individuals an opportunity of saying what they might not dare to say in the group (e.g. in front of a person in authority).

Interpreting should if possible be done by a neutral professional interpreter so as to ensure quality and avoid any influencing of the interviewees. Ideally the interpreter should be a permanent member of the team. Under no circumstances should a person higher up the hierarchy interpret for one of his subordinates who is being interviewed.

Formal interviews form the basis of the analysis by ensuring that the procedure followed and the conclusions drawn are transparent (uniform guiding questions, cross checking in the team, possible commitment to paper) and legitimising the team’s stay in the country. Informal interviews serve a supplementary purpose and help to make sense of what one has been told. One can, for example, mention certain points in the form of small talk while taking one’s leave after an official appointment. In some cultures a rest in the shade of a tree offers an opportunity to get talking to members of the population, as do attending Sunday mass, shopping in the market, using the Internet café in the youth centre, dropping in to tea rooms, making casual acquaintances, etc.

If no interviews have taken place (refusal, failure to turn up, etc.) the name of the interviewee should be noted for possible follow-up questions or analyses at a later date.
If an interviewee recommends him or herself as a **further resource** (e.g. for monitoring or scenario development), a note should be made of this.

Apart from the interviews, attention should be paid to the **surroundings**: road blocks, presence of uniforms, young people bearing arms, casual acts of violence, etc. These observations reinforce the statements made by the interviewees and offer a useful gambit for commencing interviews (“To get here we had to pass five road blocks – is that more than there were last year?”).
Annex 8: Interview questions

Questions selected from the conflict study for Georgia, commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 27 June to 3 July 2004

General

What are the main challenges facing Georgia at the moment?
What are people discussing/talking about amongst family, friends, in the street?
What are the next three years likely to bring?
Assuming you had the power to change anything, what would you do?

Political situation:

Why happened to the bloodless “Rose Revolution”?
What has changed since Saakashvili came to power in your town/in the country in general?
How do you explain it? Could the same thing happen to Saakashvili as happened to Shevardnadze? What happened to the government? What are they doing now? Who has replaced them?
How would you describe the current political system? How is the opposition performing?
Are they uniting their forces? What role does the (local) governor play in a centralized state?
What are the most important elements of a democracy from your point of view?
Where do you see a potential for violence? Are xy groups more prone to violence than others?
Could dissatisfaction translate into violence? What forms of protest are observable, and what forms are conceivable?
How do you see the relation between internal and external conflicts?
What are the main differences between the existing regional conflicts?
Are people more susceptible to ideological influences in Tiflis than in the countryside?
Do you see a relationship between civil society and peaceful conflict transformation?
How would you like to see pressure exerted on the government?
Do you see any actors who can contribute to de-escalation? What interests are they pursuing?
Do mayors play a particularly important role?
How do people look back on the totalitarian past? Where do discussions about it take place?

Socio-economic situation

What social groups in Georgia are the most frustrated? Do you see a danger of some groups joining forces and acting/protesting violently?
Apart from the education provided by the state, are there other options for civic education?
Are people informed about their right to receive compensation? How do they file claims?
Do members of the Armenian minority file claims as well?
What radical economic reforms are conceivable?
Does the construction of the pipeline meet your expectations?
How do you regard the question of trade with Turkey?
When men spend most of their time abroad earning their living, what happens when they return?
Judiciary/police

Are you satisfied with the judicial reform?
Reductions in the number of policemen: Where are they going, what is happening to their weapons?
Do you see a specific role for women in the police, any promotion programmes?

Religion

What role does religion play in your region?
Does religious violence take place?
Do you see signs of fundamentalism? What are they and how can they be identified?
Who was responsible for the failure of the concordat with the Vatican?

Ethnicity

What is needed to integrate the different ethnic groups?
What forms of protest do they choose? Who emerged as the leader of the protest?
Does the Armenian government have a strong influence on Armenians in Georgia?
What is the influence of local and central media on inter-ethnic relations?
Are Armenian newspapers on sale?
Is it true that some minorities live outside the legal system because the state cannot control them?
Is the Georgian language an important part of citizenship? Should ethnicity play a role in determining nationality? Does Saakashvili represent the Georgian people?
How do you read the new constitution: Is Georgia as a nation defined by culture (or territory)?

Information/media

Where do you get your information from?
How do the mass media act in the whole setting? Do the media reflect the society they represent?

International response

Do you think INGOs should be active on both sides (South Ossetia)? Can INGOs do anything to reduce tensions? Can you give an example of INGOs exercising a positive influence?
Who has exercised or is still exercising a positive influence?
When did the UN or the OSCE intervene effectively? Are peace-keepers a good mechanism for de-escalating conflicts?
What factors should donors take into account?
Are external values considered to be an unwanted influence in internal affairs?
Which neighbouring states have an influence on your region/country?

Youth

Pupils/children:
What courses do you attend at the youth centre?
If you were mayor of your town, what would you do?
What are the problems your parents complain about?
If you had lots of money, where would you like to live?
What do you want to do after leaving school?
In which language do you communicate?

Teachers:
What kind of problems do the children come to you with? What do they tell you?
What kind of questions do they ask?
How do you solve the language problem within your (mixed) school courses?
Questions selected from the conflict study for Sudan, commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst, 17 March to 6 April 2004

Structure of organization (local and international)
How long has/have the organization/interviewees been working in Sudan?
Do you work with Sudanese staff? What criteria do you apply when selecting staff?
Does your organization provide any kind of handbook/guidelines on how to work in conflict situations? Do you equip members with conflict resolution skills? Do you intend to have a unit on “Conflict Resolution” (or a cross-cutting issue)?
How have political developments influenced your work in recent years?
Have you changed your programme as a result of the peace negotiations?

Organization activities
What is the current attitude of your organization towards the SPLM/Government?
Are your activities carried out in close cooperation with the SPLM/Government?
With whom do you have links/contacts and with whom do you cooperate?

Political situation
What are the elements of a “just” peace? What lessons have been learnt from the former Addis Ababa Agreement?
What obstacles do you see to the agreement? Do you think that the agreement adequately addresses the root causes of the conflict?
How can one best ensure a democratization process? Do people believe in a referendum?
What kind of preparations would be needed to hold a referendum/election? What result would you expect? Do the government and the SPLM provide a good basis for a shift to democracy?
What interest does the northern government have in allowing democratic elections in the universities?
If the SPLA comes to power, what will change? What can be done to help the SPLM to become a civil government? Would the SPLM be able to build democracy? If not the government and the SPLM, who is going to bring about the change? Do you see any new political parties emerging? Is the two-party way in the north a good way?
Whom do you trust at the national level/at the international level?
If so many people are dissatisfied, why aren’t there any demonstrations/public protests?
Do you see any new conflicts arising? Will cases like Darfur help bring about political change or is it an obstacle? How can we avoid a situation like that in Western Sahara?
When you face a problem in your community, e.g. cattle invading a field, who do you turn to?
What is the normal procedure?
Chief: What kind of problems do people come to you with?

Security
Have you seen any improvement in terms of security during the past three years?
Is there a need to hold on to arms as the current partner can quickly turn back into an enemy?
Can you imagine that after a peace agreement it will be easy to get people to hand in their arms? Do you have any idea how this could be organized? Is there a role for outsiders?
How do you prevent pupils coming armed to school?
Ethnic
Do you believe in the “African way”? Would it be right to talk about racism in Sudan? If so, what is needed to overcome it?

Media
What is your opinion of the recently published southern newspaper “Sudan Mirror”? What media do people in remote areas get their information about the negotiations from?

Civil Society
Can you see a change within civil society organization, in terms of number, quality, scope of operations, etc. in recent years? Do you see growing pressure coming from civil society? Can you imagine civil society as a political opposition? Is civil society prepared to play a monitoring role in relation to the government? Are the peace committees already in place and functioning? Is the atmosphere conducive for young people to assume positions of leadership? How are young people integrated in the traditional parties?

Economy
Are you confident that peace will improve the economic situation? Do you see a chance for social harmony? What might the consequences of economic imbalance be? How did oil contribute to the current situation and what role will it play in the future? How has foreign investment developed in recent years? Who are the main investors? What sectors have they invested in and what resources have they used, e.g. labour? Who is present in the markets? What about returning Arabs, will they be able to resume their business and reclaim their property? The SPLM is planning two different currencies – what do you think of this proposal?

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)/returnees
Why did you return? Do you plan to return? What are you expecting in the way of opportunities and obstacles? Do you expect people to return in great numbers? Where will they go? Are the local communities prepared to receive them? Will the North encourage IDPs to return or does the North have an interest in keeping them – as cheap labour, for example? When exiled Sudanese return from abroad they might wish to get involved in politics. Is there a place for them in the SPLM?

Dialogue/reconciliation
Do you see a need to bring North and South together, and if so, how? Can you imagine a dialogue between intellectuals from North and South, say, or between youth groups? What kind of reconciliation does Sudan need? Is it like Kosovo or South Africa? Does Sudan need a framework like a truth commission? What is the priority: North-South, South-South, North-North? What role do you see for religious leaders? Muslim leaders: Developing new curricula is widely discussed among the Catholics – are you involved in that?
Do you think the media have a particular responsibility in this context?
How often did you use to travel to the north/south?

**International response**
Do you see a need for supervision by the international community? Do you see a particular role for Europeans? Would UN peacekeeping forces help?
Once a peace agreement is signed an influx of aid may be expected. How will the country manage to cope with it?
Have the organizations shown an increased readiness to cooperate amongst themselves?
Do you feel the advice of those with local knowledge is appreciated or followed?

**Conclusion**
Are there any questions which we haven’t asked but should have?
Do you have a question to put to us?
Can you recommend other persons whom we should meet?
# Annex 9: Analysis Grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict lines</th>
<th>Main groups of actors</th>
<th>Escalating and deescalating factors</th>
<th>Alliances / Competitions</th>
<th>Possible scenarios</th>
<th>International Response</th>
<th>Possible future areas of action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (including conflict issues)</td>
<td>Jakarta vs. Acehnese civil society</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia, Indonesian Parliament, Acehnese Civil Society</td>
<td>Lack of trust Law on Governing of Aceh / possible disappointments: (possible escalation if it won’t be passed or if it contains too many exceptions) - share of revenues: (dispute over natural resources)</td>
<td>- opposition conservative parties (possible alliance with military) vs. ruling parties</td>
<td>Generally little role for IC in peace process, however, because of support of local government possible opening need assessments ought to be conducted through communities capacity building for CSOs Need for a mediator for peace process after Aceh Monitoring Mission leaves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example: Conflict Analysis Aceh

Example: Conflict Analysis Aceh

Example: Conflict Analysis Aceh

Example: Conflict Analysis Aceh

Example: Conflict Analysis Aceh

Example: Conflict Analysis Aceh

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1 The conflict lines may also include the differentiation between the vertical and horizontal level.
Annex 10: Protocol of the Midterm Review

Conflict and Peace Analysis, Sudan Workshop II, Khartoum, 31 March – 8 April 2004

Agenda
I. General impressions
II. Potential conflicts/scenarios/challenges
III. Added value of FES/DED
IV. Potential for peace/prerequisites for lasting peace and potential activities

(I did not take place for lack of time)

I. General impressions (especially compared to the southern trip)
Personal/subjective impressions of all team members in the form of a feedback session

II. Potential conflicts/scenarios
Method: Compare with those identified in the first workshop

Workshop I: Cross-cutting corruption and lack of education – not big issues mentioned in Khartoum

1. IDPs/diaspora – returnees
   ⇒ Were mentioned by some, but apart from some international agencies and southern church representatives not much elaborated on or seen as a potential problem
   ⇒ Incorporate displaced/refugees in/from Darfur
   ⇒ IDPs and economic questions: not much reflection so far, only starting, as general economic situation has further deteriorated

2. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR)
   ⇒ Mentioned when specifically asked, but without any real awareness of potential conflicts arising out of re-integration attempts, e.g.
   ⇒ Peacekeeping forces mostly welcomed – but composition disputed
   ⇒ Interviewees, especially northerners, are not aware of the real situation and potential conflicts relating to DDR in the south

3. Weak structures/weak state
   ⇒ Role of security organs/"real power" in Sudan?
   ⇒ One-party state, no inclusiveness regarding parties and ethnic composition
   ⇒ Government of Sudan (GoS) divided
   ⇒ Demographic composition not fully taken into consideration
   ⇒ Existing violence and conflicting ethics
⇒ Sharia mentioned as an obstacle to democratization/disputed issue
⇒ Lack of accountability/transparency/checks and balances
⇒ Lack of skills and capacity: concerning parties and community-based organizations (CBOs)
⇒ Positions contested by those coming from outside: not an issue mentioned by northerners

4. Market structures
⇒ NOTE: ECONOMY is an issue – Sadik el Mahdi and some others, especially from the younger generation, were the first to mention poverty as a major problem during the interviews, so this might be a potential action field; as well as “war economy” (some research done already, expert can provide contacts/papers)
⇒ Big business is completely controlled by ruling party members

5. Language
⇒ Only Beja representative identified this as a problem

6. Lack of basic services and infrastructure
   Only mentioned by NGOs and Beja/Darfurians
   ⇒ Health
   ⇒ Education
   ⇒ Access to clean water

7. Racism/tribalism
   Not specifically mentioned except by southerners living in the north, Beja and Darfurians

8. Natural resources
   ⇒ Only mentioned by Beja (especially gold and fertile land)

9. Civil society
   ⇒ Lack of necessary skills
   ⇒ Newly founded government-related “NGOs”, networks already “undermined”
   ⇒ Mutual mistrust
   ⇒ Not much contact between northerners and southerners

10. International response
    Problem: Seen as “the saviour” and safeguard of democratization
11. External actors/vested interests
   Mentioned only in connection with the composition of peacekeeping forces

12. Democratization
   - No confidence in own capability
   - No confidence in willingness of those responsible for new set-up to come
   - First priority for northerners to give peace a chance and seen as main area of conflict

III. Added value of commissioning agencies
   - Providing additional, skilled staff
   - Readiness to really listen to people and plan accordingly (this study cited as example)
   - Widespread confidence and trust, especially by civil society organizations, e.g. through constant presence and maintaining a non-biased approach, mainly among northern groups; providing a kind of “safe heaven” and addressing key issues
   - German organizations generally have a good reputation
   - Shift to new areas of activity could become added value
   - Experience with IDPs (DED)
Annex 11: Recommendations grid

This table facilitates the formulation of recommendations, making them transparent and easily comprehensible. It may be used in a presentation to the client organization or as a basis for jointly formulating recommendations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics and time horizon</th>
<th>Specific measures</th>
<th>Strategies and possible cooperation partners</th>
<th>Significance for the conflict</th>
<th>Impact hypothesis</th>
<th>Possibilities and risks for the client organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Annex 12:
Conflict Analysis Southern Thailand: An overview how we worked out the study

Conflic t Analysis
Southern Thailand
An overview how we worked out the study

Jost Wagner
Consultant
Prepared for the Sri Lanka Meeting of FES in February 2007

Why FES is engaged in Southern Thailand?

- Major domestic problem
- Request for support by partner of FES
- Weak civil society in the Southern region
- FES has developed expertise especially by the working group on peace development (FriEnt)
- FES has got contacts to a large number of key stakeholders and experts
- FES one of few international organisations that are allowed to work in the region although each activity has to be approved by the Thai government
Mapping the conflict / Desk Study

- Develop a good overview over the conflict
- Assessment of available literature; include information obtained from a few selected key persons in the FES network
- We decided to (mind) map the conflict in order to develop a joint understanding of the structure and dynamic of the conflict, identify the key actors as well as other internal and external forces
- Lead consultant developed a draft that was discussed and revised in an internal workshop

Next step: Identification of Interview Partners

- Conduct a brainstorming meeting in order to identify potential interview partners
- In the meeting participated the FES Team members and – if possible – selected external resource person
- Identify categories of stakeholders, e.g. politics, media, security, economic experts, civil society, etc.
- Brainstorming using the metaphor method – each person suggests resource person by writing them on cards and then they are sorted by the participants themselves and cross-fertilise each other
- In addition consult key stakeholders are consulted for suggestions
**Mindmapping the Interviewpartner**

- Conduct a shorter follow-up meeting
- Prioritize stakeholders as we have only limited capacity to conduct interviews
- Identify door openers who will establish contact to key stakeholders and introduce interview team
- Why: Conflict in the South is a very sensitive issue - interview partner might not speak openly about the conflict

**Develop the interview questions**

- Review the outcome of the desk-study workshop
- Identify gaps and information that has to be verified
- Develop set of questions, estimate time for conducting an interview
- Send questionnaire around in team for feedback, also refer to older studies for important questions that might have been overlooked
- Final version of questionnaire. As there were two separate trips to the South the questionnaire was revised as more experience with wording and time

**Conduct the interviews: Fieldtrip**

- Fieldtrips to the crisis areas (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat) were partly organised by respected partners of the FES network
- A number of ad-hoc interviews were conducted when the opportunity arose
- Due to security concerns and time constraints most interviews were conducted in the CS Hotel in Pattani by
- Sometimes interview partners were bringing another person (or even more) this made them feel more comfortable

**Discuss the newly learnt and visualise**

- After each trip or series of interviews members of the team sit down to discuss, summarise and visualise the newly learnt
- Special focus on scenario development and recommendations for areas of cooperation and activities
- All kinds of visualisation techniques used in order to develop a joint understanding of the situation
Develop scenarios and recommendations

- Scenario-building: three scenarios best-case, worst-case, realistic case
- Attempt to categorize the information collected into the three categories and blend it with the information of the desk-study
- Lesson learnt: only some of the interview partners are able to intellectually cope with such a question on an ad-hoc basis
- The coup d’etat lead to a complete review of the scenario analysis

Recommendation: Orientation towards impact

- Identify criteria for identifying focal areas
- First analyse most important framework conditions, for example:
  - Thailand policy towards foreign international NGOs interested in working on the conflict,
  - Security policy of Thailand
  - Germans bilateral policy with Thailand
  - the report of the National Reconciliation commission and its recommendations

Developing recommendations (contd.)

- Relevance: Which sectors and activities could contribute in a constructive manner to solving and mitigating the conflict in the South.
- Positive impact hypothesis: In which sectors FES and others could make a positive contribution
- Coherence: In which sectors German organisations have a comparative advantage in achieving tangible results in peace promotion or conflict prevention. Special focus on FES
- Objective and subjective demand: results of the interviews and the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Commission
- Financial capacity and methods and instruments used by FES

Example: Media

1st criteria: Relevance:

The media in Thailand is forming very much the general opinion about the conflict in the South in various ways, e.g.:
- Lack of competent analysis, rather sensational news with pictures of victims
- Nationalistic in media comments and editorials
- Lack of positive and background information on population in the crisis region
- Lack of discussion on peaceful approaches to the conflict
Attribution Gap

Journalists report in a conflict sensitive way

Advisers and funding

Develop training curriculum for conflict sensitive reporting

Curricula are used in trainings by selected organisations

Increased quality of reporting in the media

3rd Criteria: Coherence

FES Thailand has been working for several years on media issues as a focal area

Has good network of partners and contacts, e.g. Thai Journalist Association

=> Comparative advantage of FES

4th criteria: Objective and subjective demand

During the interviews a larger number of key stakeholders singled out the importance of working with the media in various ways:

- Dissemination of results of the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Commission with journalists
- Training journalists in conflict sensitive reporting
- Support for building up or improvement of community radios in the region

5th criteria: Capacity of FES

Given financial limitations and the instruments of FES it is advisable to work with well selected multiplicators and key stakeholders

- e.g. trainings, discussion fora, publications, selected advisory services
Finalise the study and get feedback

- Continuous monitoring the process in the conflict
- In Thailand two major events took place that justified a delay in finalising the study in order to keep it relevant
  a) Publishing a report of the National Reconciliation commission
  b) Coup d'état that overthrew the government of Thaksin Shinawatra and lead initially to some significant changes in the policy of the government of the South (Example: see right)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Security Structure</th>
<th>Organisation in the Southern border Provinces Administrative Centre (NSPAC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Operations Centre (NSOC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (NSPAC) (new NSP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Civilian Administrator</td>
<td>Southern Border Provinces (Central and Eastern agencies)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "NSP" refers to "National Security Program".
Annex 13: Executive Summary

Executive Summary of the conflict analysis for Pakistan

Five answers to five key questions

Katharina Hübner-Schmid (GTZ), Christian Wagner (SWP), 25 January 2005

1. Where is there a danger of tensions erupting into violence?

Torn between the needs of political stability and social change, the basic structures of the political system in Pakistan have changed little so far. The military continues to be the key political actor and has managed to maintain its position, as have the political elites, which have successfully preserved the status quo by reacting flexibly to the pressure for change. There are a number of regional flashpoints with a high potential for violent conflict such as Baluchistan (Quetta, Sui and Gwadar); North-West Frontier Province (South Waziristan); Punjab (the southern part and the region around Multan); and Sindh (Karachi and Hyderabad). These places might witness a further escalation of violence. However there is no separatist movement currently capable of threatening the territorial unity of the country and challenging the military. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s relative stability, guaranteed in the past by intricate networks of patronage involving the military, industrialists, big landowners and elements of the administration, must be regarded as explosive in the long term, since “this country needs a social revolution if it is to continue to develop”, as representatives of the World Bank stated in interviews in Pakistan. An increase in violence as a result of growing poverty – despite considerable economic growth – and growing frustration about the lack of prospects, especially among young men, is inevitable in the view of many Pakistani interviewees.

2. Where would the front lines be drawn, what would be the issues at stake?

The military has the dominant role in the state, and through its interests, discourse and presence in all social spheres currently maintains the framework for the continuing existence of a “closed society”. In comparison to India there is much less social mobility combined with fewer opportunities for social participation and co-determination. Nevertheless acceptance of the military in broad sections of society, especially in rural regions, continues to be high. The representatives of the two big political parties with nationwide influence (Pakistan People’s Party – PPP, Pakistan Muslim League – PML) are hardly regarded by the population as trustworthy alternatives, being personality-based, lacking in programmes, and in many cases having a feudal mindset. Although new social forces are arising, including the Islamic parties, they are not felt by the elites as a threat, as their number, influence and mobilization potential are slight. There is no alternative social or political force discernible at the national level which is capable of highlighting the need for social reforms and pushing ahead with them. The strength of the Islamist wing in the armed forces is unclear. President Musharraf is clearly trying to minimize the influence of such generals by means of a shrewd personnel policy.

The main conflict lines at the political and economic policy level are (1) ongoing conflicts between the centre and periphery at several levels (national level:
central government vs. provincial governments; regional level: Punjab vs. the other provinces; within the provinces: provincial government vs. local governments; and town vs. country). The contentious issues include political and economic decision-making powers, the right of the provinces or ethnic groups to be represented or have a say in the central government, and how the national tax revenues are to be shared between the central and provincial governments. Points at issue at the regional level include access, distribution and use of natural resources such as water, mainly in Sindh and Punjab, and gas, especially in Baluchistan. Little use has been made so far of existing national and regional conflict-regulating authorities such as the Council of Common Interests and Indus River Authority, which lack an operational implementation capability.

The result is that these conflicts lead to a cementation of existing enmities, such as that arising out of the perception of Punjabi predominance in the central government.

(2) **Conflicts between military and civil polity.** The conflicts between the military, the Pakistani middle class, the political and Islamic parties and extremist groupings for political, social and economic power and influence have intensified. Since Musharraf’s seizure of power the influence of the military on politics has been systematically extended and, through the agency of the National Security Council (NSC), even been enshrined in the constitution. The growing erosion of the rule of law and judicial independence can be clearly seen in the post facto legitimation of controversial constitutional amendments by decree (known as legal framework orders, or LFOs) of the Supreme Court. All actor groups in the civil polity also show a high degree of internal fragmentation, which since 2002 has increasingly been reflected in the splitting of all parties represented in parliament into factions in favour of Musharraf and his policies and those against him. The massive international financial and military assistance, especially from the U.S., props up and legitimizes Musharraf’s military regime.

(3) **Ethnic and religious instrumentalization and aggravation of existing conflicts.** This refers to the instrumentalization of historical ethnic and religious resentments. In the southern provinces this is reflected in an acute awareness of the dominant position of Punjabis and the under-representation of smaller ethnic sections of the population in politics, administration, commerce and the security apparatus. The tensions are reinforced by the extremely unequal distribution of land and property rights as well as unequal access to education and health care. The high rate of youth unemployment in both urban and rural regions drives young people to the madrasas, where they are exposed to fundamentalist ideas and mobilized and recruited by extremist or criminal groupings. Nevertheless the degree of popular support for the fundamentalist parties is still not very great. In the elections all the religious parties combined have so far failed to gain more than 10% of the seats. But they do have a mobilization potential in the cities, enabling them to make their political influence felt. The easy availability of small arms creates a climate of casual violence and creates a trigger-happy attitude to resolving conflicts (the “Kalashnikov culture”). Faced with this combination of family and social violence on the one hand and pervasive corruption on the other the state authorities (police and judiciary) tend to keep a low profile. Extremist groupings are supported by conservative forces in the military and secret services (Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI], Intelligence Bureau [IB]).
3. What actor groups would oppose one another and what actor groups would form alliances?

So far, the military has managed to preserve the “rigid status quo”, i.e. relative stability based on shifting ad hoc alliances with the patronage networks of the military, industrial and feudal elites, their parties, and the alliance of Islamic parties known as the United Action Front (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal – MMA). The cracks currently observable in the alliance of convenience between the military and the MMA, which criticizes such things as the government’s moves against the Koran schools, are not a threat to this stability. All they show is that the military is wooing new partners, such as the PPP, which might gain in clout as a result. Civil society in Pakistan is highly fragmented and politically polarized. The best one can hope for is the emergence of a broad front of representatives of critical media, human rights organizations, certain professional associations and socially legitimized NGOs. The international community has an important role to play in supporting the civil society organizations. Conflicts between “reformers” and “fundamentalists” are observable across the whole of society, including the military and secret services.

4. What is the role of the international dimension (links with Afghanistan and Kashmir, role of the U.S.)?

The attacks of 11 September changed Pakistan from a “pariah” into an ally of the West in the struggle against international terrorism. As a result important aspects of Pakistani foreign policy in previous years, such as support for the Taliban and militant groups in Kashmir, have dwindled noticeably. The attempt to internationalize the Kashmir conflict has failed, and Pakistan has agreed to enter into bilateral negotiations with India. The experience of the Iraq war and the revelations about A.Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling activities – inconceivable without the aid of the military – probably speeded up this process. Furthermore, Pakistan is too important as an ally of the U.S. and Europe in the struggle against terrorism. An intensive international investigation into the scale of nuclear smuggling would certainly have raised questions about the role of the military. There is no knowing what political consequences this would have had domestically. Meanwhile, the U.S. has recognized Pakistan (and India) as nuclear powers and is seeking their cooperation in the field of nuclear security. This seems to offer at least the beginnings of control over the nuclear programme.

Pakistan has so far refused to grant India most-favoured nation (MFN) status, as the military is sceptical about closer economic cooperation with India. The reasoning here is hard to follow, since Pakistani companies also have to vie with the competition from China. However economic cooperation, the relaxation of travel restrictions and a further expansion of confidence-building measures with India is also in the political interests of Germany and Europe if the process of economic and social rapprochement is to go on.

Pakistan’s change of course in foreign policy has ambivalent consequences for domestic policy. On the one hand we see a strengthening of reform impulses and modernizing forces through the commitment to the U.S., and on the other increased pressure from the Islamist forces as a result of this very trend. The Islamic parties oppose the reform of the Koran schools and have sharply criticized Musharraf’s continuing in office as president and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. As the change in foreign policy strengthens the position of both the reformists and the anti-modernizers, this could be another destabilizing factor on the home front.

5. Where are the openings for the political foundations and other DC organizations? What should their priorities be? Who are the main actors they should work with?

The international DC (IC) organizations should not overestimate their ability to influence the security apparatus. Nevertheless they ought to try to work towards reducing the political influence of the military ("professionalization"), creating a legal frame of reference (the military as part of the state, including clear budget lines) and imposing parliamentary control over the security forces. Without these prerequisites for social change and the strengthening of state institutions Pakistan’s transition to democracy cannot succeed.

In the medium term the IC organizations should begin at the interfaces between the military and political establishments. They could, for example, begin a dialogue with certain think tanks (National Reconstruction Bureau – NRB, National Development Council – NDC) and reform-minded actors in the security apparatus. Measures aimed at developing the abilities of parliamentarians are also conceivable. Here we could build on the experience of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ), the German Foreign Office, the political foundations, the Society for Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit – GTZ) and the Foundation for Science and Politics (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP), the Bundesakademie für Sicherheit (Federal Academy for Security – BAKS) and the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Military Academy).

The focal area of **good governance**, since 2003 a transitional area alongside energy, health and basic education in technical cooperation at government level, **should be expanded both on an issue-related and a regional basis** with a view to deliberately addressing previously omitted taboo areas and structural weaknesses\(^2\) of development cooperation. Priority could be given – in association with the political foundations and other bi- and multilateral donors – to the following areas:

- **Promotion of the rule of law** (reform of the police and judiciary, strengthening of the independence of judges and lawyers).
- **Creation of an awareness** on the part of the state authorities that **they are there to serve**. The efficiency of public administration should be improved, especially at provincial and local level. It is also necessary to build up a capacity for more co-determination and citizens’ ability to insist on their entitlements to **services** such as health and education, as enshrined in the constitution.
- **Inclusion of sexual equality and gender mainstreaming** in all focal areas of the German DC organizations, especially as regards the rule of law, capacity building and improvement of parliamentary work.

\(^2\) Cf. the taboo areas (pp. 4-5) and structural weaknesses (pp. 8-14) in the conflict analysis for Pakistan.
• **Taking advantage and strengthening of the operational capability** of existing conflict-regulation and infrastructure-related bodies such as the Council of Common Interests (conflict regulation between the centre and periphery at various levels) and the Indus River Authority (important for the power and water supply).

• **Improvement of parliamentary work** (promotion of young parliamentarians, strengthening of the parties’ programmes and infrastructure, build-up and strengthening of alternative security policy expertise, such as the concept of Human Safety).

Here too the existing experience of the BMZ, the German Foreign Office, the German Ministry of Interior (BMI), the political foundations and the GTZ may be drawn upon.

In the promotion of civil society groups and organizations projects/programmes should be geared to a “rights-based” approach (political, civil, economic, social, cultural and environmental rights) and building up a capacity in this field. In the long term this will strengthen and improve the currently rudimentary opportunities for civil society to bargain with the government, thus facilitating greater participation and a right to a say in its own affairs.

In the long term, attempts at dialogue between civil society groups, especially young people, should be intensified with a view to transforming the “threat scenario and perceived threat” between Pakistan and India. Here too the existing experience of the political foundations, the Evangelical Development Service (Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst – EED) and the GTZ may be drawn upon.

It is gratifying to report that the conflict analysis for Pakistan has contributed to a more intensive exchange of views on existing approaches and the conflict-sensitive orientation of the work of German DC organizations (the GTZ and the political foundations) in the field and in Germany. The first steps taken in the field should be continued and supported while more opportunities for creating synergy effects and the setting up of a joint conflict-monitoring system are explored.
**Annex 14: Programme for expert discussion**

**Expert discussion**

**Pakistan - “Vision of a moderate Islamic democracy”?**

Thursday, 1 July 2004, 4:30 – 6:30 p.m.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4:30 – 4:40 p.m.</td>
<td>Welcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The strategic significance of Pakistan - Is Germany headed for a conflict with Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratization measures in Pakistan - Progress or consolidation of old power structures?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. habil. Christian Wagner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fellow of the Foundation for Science and Politics (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social and political actors for democratic change - In whose interest is democracy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katharina Hübner-Schmid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultant for crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace development, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, FriEnt, conflict analysis consultant for Pakistan (on behalf of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after 6:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Snack and opportunity to continue the discussion in an informal atmosphere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Phase 2: Conflict Sensitive Project Planning

Annex 15: Planning grid for Conflict Sensitive Project Planning

Conflict Sensitive Project Planning Year...

1. Impact Hypotheses FES-...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective ...:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Aim ...:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Connection between Conflict, Strategic Objective and Project Aim:

(a) What is the connection between the conflict situation and the Strategic Objective?

(b) What is the connection between the Project Aim and the Strategic Objective?

Project Strategy:

(a) Arrange project activities under the respective Project Aim to Groups of Activities:
   Group of Activities 1:
   Group of Activities 2:
   Group of Activities 3:

(b) How does each Group of Activity contribute to the Project Aim?
   Group of Activities 1:
   Group of Activities 2:
   Group of Activities 3:
2. Impact Relations and indicators

a) Formulation of Impact Relations and risks for each Group of Activities

Formulate impact relations for each group of activities: What is the expected short-term (direct), mid-term and long-term impact? Which risks may hinder the implementation of activities? Which unintended impacts may occur after the implementation of activities?

Group of Activities 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact relations</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risks refer to developments outside the control of the project. Risks may hinder the implementation of activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Examples:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The approval by the respective government is essential for conducting the planned activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An attack worsens the conflict situation in a way that the implementation of activities becomes impossible.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended Impacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unintended impacts refer to developments within the control of the project. They may occur after the implementation of activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Example:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training of women’s networks in Afghanistan: Confrontation with the conservative groups in parts of society and in the government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b) **Formulation of Indicators for each Project Aim**

Develop indicators to see changes in attitude, behaviour and context (for definitions please refer to the guidelines: 2.4. “Deriving impact indicators”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in: Indicators</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 16: Examples of Conflict Sensitive Project Planning

Example One

Conflict Sensitive Project Planning 2006

Impact Hypotheses FES-Pakistan

**Strategic Objective 2:**
Citizens exhaust means to influence democratic governance at all levels

**Project Aim 1:**
Political parties have become more accountable to citizens

**Connection between Conflict Situation, Strategic Objective and Project Aim:**

(a) State the connection between the conflict situation (level, sector, actors, root causes) and the strategic objective. How does the strategic objective contribute to the transformation of the conflict situation?

(b) State the project aim and explain how and by what means it contributes to the achievement of the strategic objective.

**Conflict Situation and Strategic Objective:**

A structural weakness of the country that fuels the escalation of conflict is the exclusion of large parts of the society from participation in political decision-making processes. The ruling elite still holds on to a feudal mindset that, instead of servicing the people, sought to maintain a balance between all influential patronage networks and maximize its own dividends. Political parties are elite-dominated and based on socio-economic interests rather than aiming at the welfare of the whole society which, again, is highly fragmented along ethnic, religious, class, and geographical lines.

It is thus important to support citizens to use and exhaust the means provided to them through the legal and political setup of the country and to enable them to actively and effectively participate in democratic decision-making.

**Project Aim and Strategic Objective:**

Political parties are the central organizational body of citizens in a parliamentary democracy. However, the parties are not rooted in the Pakistani society, they are elite-dominated and driven by the interest of clientelist networks, and face strong deficiencies in both organizational and operational professionalism, and programming. The lack of access to and influence on the agendas of political parties together with their weakness in the current political setup particularly on the local level force citizens to fall back on other means including violence to draw attention to their needs.

In line with the aim of the project, political party workers at the district level will receive need-based training on all relevant ideological, organizational and structural issues to enable them to set up efficient structures at the local level and engage in a constructive dialogue with other political parties and potential voters. This should strengthen inner-party democracy and build up pressure on the party leadership to take people’s concerns into account.
Project Strategy:

(a) State project activities under this project aim (cf. track sheet) and allocate them to groups of activities.

(b) Explain the expected impact of each group of activities and how they contribute to the project aim.

(a) Group of Activities 1:

JM 1-4: Offering need-based training for party workers and office holders at all levels

Group of Activities 2:

JM 5-10: Organizing a series of democracy fairs to establish an interface between different political parties and citizens in areas most strongly dominated by elites.

Group of Activities 3:

(b) Explanation of Project Strategy

Trained party members and office holders would have an improved understanding of their political role as advocates of the people and act accordingly. In the longer run, a constructive dialogue between parties would evolve at the local level and the pressure for inner-party democracy would increase. The dialogue would eventually lead to clear-cut programmatic differences between the parties. Since the process would undermine the power of the traditionally influential families, including the ruling elite at the federal level, they can be expected to put up resistance.

2. Conflict-Related Impact Relations and Indicators for Groups of Activities

The formulation of conflict-related impact relations and the development of indicators for a particular group of activities should focus on its specific contribution to conflict transformation.

(a) Formulate impact relations for each group of activities and state what assumptions must hold true to achieve a particular impact. Assumptions are factors outside the project management’s control that may act upon the linkages within the impact relations.

(b) State for each step possible negative or positive unintended impacts that may be elicited by a particular group of activities.

(c) Develop for each step one or more indicators by which progress towards an expected impact can be measured. Make sure that the indicators are specific, measurable, objectively verifiable (the information collected is the same even if it is collected by different people) and practical.
**Group of Activities 1:**
Training for party workers and office holders on all levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact relations</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic values and ideas widely promoted and accepted</td>
<td>Constructive dialogue between parties and the public on citizens’ concerns, increased accountability</td>
<td>Increased trust in political parties and democratic institutions and procedures reduces tensions and violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic values and modern party structures are understood as effective means to achieve their party’s goals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained party members able to utilize their influence to reform party structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising tension between leadership and basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in:</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Party members actively promote the concepts within the party</td>
<td>Firmness on issues, local concerns effectively promoted within the party hierarchy</td>
<td>More professional and democratic management, increased voter turnout</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Group of Activities 2:**
Democracy fairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact relations</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A new culture of dialogue on issues promoted and public visibility of parties increased</td>
<td>Constructive dialogue between parties and the public on citizens’ concerns, increased accountability</td>
<td>Increased trust in political parties and democratic institutions and procedures reduces tensions and violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factors outside project management’s control that must hold true to achieve the short-term impact of the activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment of parties to use constructive dialogue as means for political competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party members on local level get opportunity to act as advocates of people’s interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising tension between leadership and basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in:</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Parties developed distinctive programmes and commit themselves to constructive dialogue</td>
<td>Firmness on issues, local concerns effectively promoted within the party hierarchy</td>
<td>Increasing membership, increased voter turnout</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Example Two

Conflict Sensitive Project Planning Year 2007
FES Indonesia

1. Impact Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective:</th>
<th>CSOs contribute to the strengthening of democracy and stabilization of peace in Aceh.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Aim:</td>
<td>The implementation of Law of Governing of Aceh (LoGA) is based on democratic values and good governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Connection between Conflict, Strategic Objective and Project Aim:

(a) What is the connection between the conflict situation and the Strategic Objective?

Conflict situation:
- Level: regional level (within Aceh)
- Sector: social, political, economic, lack of rule of law
- Actors: CSOs, government institutions, syariah institutions, military, civilian
- Root causes: decades of separatist conflict between central-periphery elites, economic imbalance, poverty in Aceh, inability to access Aceh resources by the locals.

Relation of Strategic Objective and conflict transformation:
CSOs and strong civil society can influence the decision-making process of a government, to make them accountable and responsive to people’s needs. It helps to transform the conflict from violent horizontal conflict into a constant public consultation.

(b) What is the connection between the Project Aim and the Strategic Objective?

The democratic implementation of LoGA and good governance contributes to the empowerment of CSOs in Aceh. In turn this will strengthen the CSOs capacity in strengthening the democracy and stabilisation of peace in Aceh.

Project Strategy:

(a) Arrange project activities under the respective Project Aim to Groups of Activities:

Group of Activities 1:
- a. Trainings on Engagement in Local Governance.
- b. Trainings on Capacity Building in Controlling the Local Government.
- c. Workshop on TNI off budget revenue: Analysing the Role of Local Governance in Security Sector Reform.

Group of Activities 2:
Discussion Forums on Islam, Pluralism, and Democracy

(b) How does each Group of Activity contribute to the Project Aim?
The civil society groups are more aware about the importance, and empowered, to participate actively in the local governance.

2. Impact relations and indicators

a) Formulation of Impact Relations and risks for each group of activities

Formulate impact relations for each group of activities: What is the expected short-term (direct), mid-term and long-term impact?

Which risks may hinder the implementation of activities? Which unintended impacts may occur after the implementation of activities?

Group of Activities 1:

a) Trainings on Engagement in Local Governance.
b) Trainings on Capacity Building in Controlling the Local Government.
c) Workshop on TNI off budget revenue: Analysing the Role of Local Governance in Security Sector Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact relations</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Impact relations** | a) Awareness raising  
b) Basic network | a) Strong network  
b) a broader support from civilians for democratization | a) Loga is democratic.  
b) Local governance is democratic.  
c) (Syariah is democratic.)  
d) Peace is stable.  
e) Military is under the civilian control. |
| **Risks** | a) The government does not agree on the activity (no censorship).  
b) The selection of the participants makes the participants uncomfortable.  
c) The important participants do not take initiatives. | a) No access for communication among the participants.  
b) Participants do not spread their knowledge. | a) Violent conflicts erupt.  
b) Government are less democratic.  
c) Bureaucrats are less professional.  
d) Military is kicking back (covert intelligence) |
| **Unintended Impacts** | a) Open fights between participants. | a) Government becomes suspicious to FES activities.  
b) FES is in the government/intelligence blacklist. | a) Conflict erupts.  
b) FES is not trusted by partners.  
c) FES is persona non grata. |

( refer to developments outside the control of the project. Risks may hinder the implementation of activities.)

( refer to developments within the control of the project. They may occur after the implementation of activities.)
b) Formulation of Indicators

Develop indicators to see changes in attitude, behaviour and context. For definitions please refer to the guidelines: 2.4. “Deriving impact indicators”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in:</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participants:</td>
<td>Participants:</td>
<td>a) Public debate about laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) become more self confident.</td>
<td>a) make critical assessment about the government laws.</td>
<td>b) Media reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) become more open towards each other.</td>
<td>b) are able to express their values of democracy in their own words.</td>
<td>c) Public consultation on law formulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) are interested in the training.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) become more critical.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Group of Activities 2** (Discussion Forums on Islam, Pluralism, and Democracy):

a) Formulation of Impact Relations and risks for each group of activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact relations</td>
<td>Open discussions.</td>
<td>Democratic syariah institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td>Censorship from syariah dienst or government.</td>
<td>Public are not interested to talk about Islam, pluralism, democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended Impacts</td>
<td>Few interest from Acehnese. People are afraid to come.</td>
<td>People reject the discussion about democracy as western values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Formulation of Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in:</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Evaluation form shows that the participants are interested and willing to come again.</td>
<td>There is a public debate to follow up the topics of the discussions.</td>
<td>More progressive (women or men) in Syariah institution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 17: Training on planning methods and PCIA

(Please and Conflict Impact Assessment)
for Local Staff of FES in Asia

Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wednesday, 21st February</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(afternoon)</td>
<td>Arrival of participants and check-in at the Club Hotel Dolphin, Waikkala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception</td>
<td>Welcome dinner at the hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.00-22.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thursday, 22nd February</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening</td>
<td>Welcome, introduction into the programme (Armin Hasemann)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.00-09.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 1</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment as part of the project management cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.30-11.00</td>
<td>I: Instruments within FES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(input with practical examples by Marei John)</td>
<td>Kursbogen and annual report as tools to I Reflect framework conditions, II Set general objectives, III Set project targets, IV Formulate indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00-11.30</td>
<td>Coffee/Tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.30-12.30</td>
<td>II: The individual steps of PCIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(input by Armin Hasemann)</td>
<td>Short overview: I Conflict Analysis, II Conflict Sensitive Planning, III Conflict Monitoring, IV Conflict-related Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 2</td>
<td>(Re-) Focusing a project to address a conflict situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.30-13.15</td>
<td>I: Conflict analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(practical input prepared by Jost Wagner)</td>
<td>Deduction, formulation and role of recommendations: I Political/Strategic, II Topic related, III Target-group related, IV Strategy related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Activity and Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.15-14.45</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 14.45-16.15  | **II Conflict sensitive project planning: Choosing a strategy**  
(input by Marei John, introduction into group work by Armin Hasemann)  
Various practical examples of conflict transformation within FES: from Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand. Which types of intervention and strategies can be found? |
| 16.15-16.45  | Coffee/Tea           |
| 16.45-17.30  | **II Conflict sensitive project planning: the practical steps**  
(practical input by Armin Hasemann and Zahid Ahmed)  
Introduction into the CSPP tool and short exercise on Risk Assessment. Split-up into working groups for the next day. |
| Closing      | Reflection Groups    |
| 17.30-18.00  |                      |

**Friday, 23rd February**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening</td>
<td>Welcome, flashback, programme of the day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00-9.30</td>
<td>(Re-) Focusing a project to address a conflict situation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Session 2 (continues) | II Conflict sensitive project planning: the practical steps (continues)  
(group work and presentation)  
I Formulating impact hypotheses, II Analysing impact relations, III Assessing risks, IV formulate indicators |
| 11.00-11.30  | Coffee/Tea           |
| 11.30-12.00  | **II Conflict sensitive project planning: the practical steps (continues)**  
(group work evaluation, moderated by Marei John)  
Analysing the tools: I Experience with CSPP, II CSPP and Kubo - similarities and differences, III Implications for the formulation of the Kubo |
| Session 3    | Ensuring the Quality: The need of constant monitoring and evaluation |
| 12.00-12.30  | I Conflict monitoring  
(introduction by Zahid Ahmed, ppt)  
Developing a monitoring framework: guidelines and practical examples |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.30-13.30</td>
<td>I Conflict monitoring (continues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(group work, country-related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing a monitoring framework: applying the guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.30-15.00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.00-16.00</td>
<td>II Conflict-related impact assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(input and discussion by Zahid Ahmed and Armin Hasemann)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How can impact be measured? A practical approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.00-16.30</td>
<td>Coffee/Tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 4</td>
<td>Conflict transformation in Asia: An Outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.30-17.30</td>
<td>The guidelines, the toolkit and other ways to get help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(input and discussion moderated by Marei John)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience and expectations: I Tools and instruments from a practical point of view, II The Topic Centre for Civil Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.30-18.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, 24th February</td>
<td>Check-out of hotel and departure of participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(after breakfast)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 18: Risk and Impact assessment tool

With the help of the Positive and Negative Impact Analysis presented below, which was developed by Responding to Conflict (RTC) and has been adapted for these guidelines, it is possible to either analyse activities within a specific conflict context with regard to their anticipated impact (and thus drawing the arrows from the activity towards the factors). It is also possible to use this tool for risk assessment and thus drawing the arrows from the factors towards the activity in order to visualize possible risks the activity is undergoing. It helps, in particular, to raise awareness of the indirect and possibly unintended impacts of the activity.

Factors that have a positive or negative impact from outside on the accomplishment of the project aim are entered in the outside columns of the diagram. Then the planned project activities are entered one after the other in the middle column and related to these external factors. A distinction is made here between attitudes, behaviour and structures. The following symbols are used to represent the relationship:

\[\text{positive impact},\]
\[\text{negative impact},\]
\[\text{uncertain impact},\]

i.e. strengthening of the positive forces or the weakening of the negative forces

i.e. strengthening of the negative forces or undermining of the positive forces

i.e. more information is required
### Positive Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Negative Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systems or institutions reducing structural forms of violence.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>i.e.: discrimination, denial of rights and liberties, segregation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Negative Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feelings and values of a group/society in favour of peace or peace-related initiatives; directly/indirectly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>i.e.: hatred, fear, mistrust, racism, sexism, intolerance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Negative Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction/elimination in violent behaviours. E.g. reduction in crime rate, murders (honour killing etc.), torture etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>direct physical violence (visible violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>i.e.: killing, beating, intimidation, torture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Risk Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Factors</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Negative Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour</td>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following diagram, which was filled in using an example from Afghanistan, illustrates the potential applications (representation incomplete!):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Factors</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Negative Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Structures</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relative peace</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coordination of UN activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of legal framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presence UNAMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Weak government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>- High unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Voc. training a priority</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Many ex-soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local demand/support</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Opium production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Women/youth demand</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gov. willing to cooperate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- High expectations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behaviour</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Behaviour</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Loya Jirga</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sporadic killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Return of refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Limited movement of women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Active trading</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Starting reconstruction activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Viable impact hypotheses can be formulated on the basis of this analysis. In addition, the tool permits fine tuning during the project strategy and in the shaping of the individual project activities in order to raise awareness for unintended impacts.
## Impact Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Factors</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Negative Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour</td>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 19: Adapted Track Sheet / “Kursbogen”

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Kursbogen Regionalprojekt...
Jahr... Teilprojekt...
Bewilligungszeitraum...
BMZ-Projektnummer...

What is the connection between the conflict situation and the strategic objective? How does the Strategic Objective contribute to the conflict transformation?

Strategic Objective 1:

Project Aim 1 –What is the connection between the Project Aim and the Strategic Objective? Which unintended impacts may occur?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Aim 1</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Date/Location</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If necessary up to 3 Indicators, which monitor changes in attitude, behaviour and context.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups of Activities: How does a group of activities contribute to the Project Aim? Which unintended impacts may occur?
Phase 3: Conflict Monitoring
Annex 20: Terms of reference for partners conducting conflict monitoring

Division for International Cooperation
Afghanistan Office -
Kabul, Shahr-e-Nau, Char Rahi Hajji Yaqub, Tel.: +87 (0)76 – 304 25 ;
mail: almut@fes.org.af – Web: www.fes.org.af

Terms of Reference
Cooperation between FES Afghanistan and CPAU on Conflict Monitoring
Kabul, 4 November 2004

Assigning Party: FES Afghanistan, Almut Wieland-Karimi (Country Representative)
Contractor: Cooperation of Peace and Unity (CPAU), Muhammad Suleman (Director)

Background
The FES sees Impact Monitoring as the key to good impact assessment and project management and is therefore currently developing a methodology on how to integrate conflict monitoring as well as project-related impact monitoring within its project work. As part of this process FES is cooperating with CPAU (Cooperation of Peace and Unity) to develop an integral methodology of conflict monitoring for its work in Afghanistan as part of PCIA (Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment).

Overall PCIA Process:
- Conflict Analysis (See Conflict Analysis Afghanistan)
- Development of Impact Hypotheses as part of Conflict-Sensitive Project Planning
- Conflict Monitoring
- Project-Related Impact Monitoring and Evaluation

Aims and Objectives of Cooperation with CPAU in Conflict Monitoring
- Implementation of conflict monitoring based on Draft Guidelines, which can be integrated into FES projects to regularly assess the conflict dynamics and their relation to the project. This includes:
  - Answering questions such as: what kind of information needs to be collected from whom, where and at what time in order to assess these dynamics (see list already drawn up).
  - The development of a set of conflict indicators or criteria in areas relevant to FES’s work in order to measure the dynamics of the conflict situation (mainly on a political level).
- Development of updated written analysis on the dynamics of the conflict situation and their causes based on these indicators (structuring of the information collected).

Procedure
- Update and assess areas relevant to FES
• Update and assess relevant sources of information
• Develop set of criteria/indicators to select relevant information
• Analyze and document information
• This process should be seen as a test phase. Once results have been presented, a decision can be made on how to proceed.

FES to provide to CPAU
• A copy of the Executive Summary of the Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan written by Bernt Glatzer
  ➢ A copy of the Impact Hypotheses and relations of FES projects.
  ➢ A copy of the DRAFT guidelines for Conflict Monitoring written by Nele Förch, including a list of already identified Sources of Information.
  ➢ A copy of the Methodological Framework for Conflict Analysis

Results and Outputs
1. Written results to be delivered by CPAU
• A reader on a practical concept of Conflict Monitoring containing a
• revised and completed version of a concept of Conflict Monitoring (1-2 pages)
• revised set of Sources of Information (in the form of a list/table)
• Set of Conflict Indicators or Criteria (not more than 20) on how to analyze relevant information
• two-page structured analysis of current dynamics and developments of the conflict (an update of the conflict analysis)
• revision of areas of work of FES (relevant or not relevant) and recommendation of relevant Starting Point for FES projects in order to respond to these developments.

2. Participation in workshops and consultations with FES by CPAU
• Starting from 1 November and continuing until 15 December on a weekly basis (not more than three hours a week)

3. Timeframe
• Written results should be delivered to FES Afghanistan by 15 December

4. Financial Compensation
• 13 working days at 80 Euros per day: 1,040 Euros to be paid after the delivery of results
  ➢ 10 working days for producing written results
  ➢ 3 working days (six times half a day) for participation

Dr. Almut Wieland-Karimi, Country Representative, FES Afghanistan
Muhammad Suleman, Director, CPAU
### Annex 21: Data and Information Sources for Conflict Monitoring (Pakistan)

#### Division for International Cooperation - Pakistan Office (Islamabad) -
Islamabad, 1-B (South), Street 35, F-8/1 – P.O.Box 1289 – Tel.: +92 (0)51 – 228 14 21, 22 – Fax: 228 14 23 – E-mail: hasemann@fes.org.pk

#### Non-Governmental Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>WHAT / WHEN</th>
<th>WHERE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact: Dr. Inayat Ullah (Social Scientist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact: I.A. Rehman (Director)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency)</td>
<td>Status of Democracy</td>
<td>Quarterly State of Democracy Reports Issue-related Briefing Papers</td>
<td>Available online: <a href="http://www.pildat.org/publications.html">www.pildat.org/publications.html</a> or contact <a href="mailto:info@pildat.org">info@pildat.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact: Ahmad Bilal Mehbub (Chief Executive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPDC (Social Policy and Development Centre)</td>
<td>Political Economy, Water Politics</td>
<td>Irregular Reports</td>
<td>Available online: <a href="http://www.spdc-pak.com">www.spdc-pak.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact: Dr. Kaiser Bengali (Managing Director)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Government Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>WHAT / WHEN</th>
<th>WHERE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEC (National Economic Commission)</td>
<td>National Economy</td>
<td>Annual National Budget and Economic Survey</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>TOPIC</td>
<td>WHAT / WHEN</td>
<td>WHERE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG (International Crisis Group)</td>
<td>Issue-related Conflict Monitoring</td>
<td>Reports and Briefings</td>
<td>Available online: <a href="http://www.icg.org">http://www.icg.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency International</td>
<td>Political Corruption</td>
<td>Issue-related Reports</td>
<td>Available online: <a href="http://www.transparency.org/publications">www.transparency.org/publications</a> or contact <a href="mailto:gcr@transparency.org">gcr@transparency.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And similarly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral Donors</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Donors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Organizations and Embassy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants and other Sources inside Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants and other Sources outside Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Product: Quarterly Update
Annex 22: Conflict criteria

The following list of criteria stems from a brainstorming session at the FES Afghanistan.

- The overall security situation
- The level of transparency of/in the government
- Level of corruption
- The extent of information given by the government to the people
- The readiness/accountability of the government to listen to the people/civil society, etc.
- Competence and performance of central government
- Control of central government and cooperation with provincial and district governments, and structure of central government
- Level of people’s participation in the political process
- Participation of women and men in the political process
- Level of people’s awareness/understanding of the political processes
- Understanding of rights and duties of political parties
- Level of business and economic activities (including unpaid work)
- Power of war and drug lords
- Transformation of warlords into politicians
- Level of tolerance between those who stayed and returnees.
- The level of Afghan vs. ethnic identity
- Freedom of the media
- Access to education
- Access to health
- Presence/impact of international forces (military, political, developmental)
- Performance and competence of Afghan security forces.
- Efficiency and effectiveness of DDR process
# Phase 4: Conflict-related Impact Assessment

## Annex 23:
**Evaluation Grid: Conflict-related Impact Assessment**

### I) Relevance Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Conflict lines, actors, escalating / deescalating factors based on the conflict analysis (Phase 1)</th>
<th>2. Recommendations based on the conflict analysis (Phase 1)</th>
<th>3. Changes in the conflict dynamic / conflict analysis (Phase 3)</th>
<th>4. Possible changes in the recommendations due to results from Phase 3</th>
<th>5. State which original project strategy / groups of activities were chosen (Phase 1)</th>
<th>6. Is the current project strategy (i.e. the groups of activities) in the light of possible changes in the recommendations (see 3. and 4.) still valid? Which adjustments have to be made?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td>depending on the conflict dynamic recommendations may or may not change</td>
<td></td>
<td>A modification may include reconsidering the design of activities and / or the choice of partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>-&gt; Possibly this step can lead to a new recommendation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This would then in turn require a new project strategy / group of activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>-&gt; or an old recommendation needs to be completely revised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The old strategy then would not be relevant any longer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II) Verification of the indicators and impact relations formulated during CSPP

a) Indicators for each Project Aim

*please refer to the respective CSPP sheet*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in:</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Impact Relations for each Group of Activities

*please refer to the respective CSPP sheet*

Group of Activities 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact relations</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended Impacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 24:
List of guiding questions used during the impact analysis of the FES Projects “Young Professional Network (YPN)” and “Jamhoori Maidan” (Democracy Fairs) in Pakistan

CSPP Sheet:
Project Activity Group 1: Young Professionals Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact chain</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selected youth develop clear vision, skills and courage for social and political changes in a constructive and non-violent manner</td>
<td>A larger number of youth becomes politically and socially active through involvement in relevant bodies and structures</td>
<td>Youth plays its due role in public life and decision making and unfolds its potential as change agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risks

Assumptions

During the planning step no assumptions or unintended impacts were expected.

Unintended Impacts:

Change in:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in:</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Youth take keen interest in relevant topics and debates and generate own contributions</td>
<td>Youth increasingly represented as members and leaders in key bodies and structures</td>
<td>An alternate leadership is ready to address structural weaknesses and causes of conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guiding Questions:

- What is your vision for political change in Pakistan?
- Which issues will be most relevant in the future?
- How do you want to achieve this?
- What would be needed? How can obstacles be overcome?
- What are your contributions?
- In which other organizations / bodies besides the Young Professionals Network are you a member?
- With which other organizations / institutions do you interact (“networking with other networks”)?
### CSPP Sheet:
**Project Activity Group 2:**
Democracy fairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact chain</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A new culture of dialogue on issues promoted and public visibility of parties increased</td>
<td>Constructive dialogue between parties and the public on citizens’ concerns, increased accountability</td>
<td>Increased trust in political parties and democratic institutions and procedures reduces tensions and violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Short-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Mid-term Direct Impact</th>
<th>Long-Term Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment of parties to use constructive dialogue as means for political competition</td>
<td>Party members on local level get opportunity to act as advocates of people’s interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Untended Impacts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>During the planning step no assumptions or unintended impacts for the short and mid-term impact were expected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in:</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Parties developed distinctive programmes and commit themselves to constructive dialogue</td>
<td>Firmness on issues, local concerns effectively promoted within the party hierarchy</td>
<td>Increasing membership, increased voters turn-out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Guiding Questions:
- Has your party developed a party programme? If yes, when?
- What are other mechanisms besides the Jamhoori Maidan you use for interaction with other parties?
- What are /were your plans after the Jamhoori Maidan?
- How does you the party you represent interact with the citizens?