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Action for Spain

Reactions to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers have shown a growing alarm amongst the British public at the relative decrease in British power in the world. It is necessary to have a realistic appreciation of the new power relations. But there is no need to despair of Britain's chance to exercise a progressive influence on international developments if she acts according to proclaimed principles where this lies largely within her power. Her policy towards Spain, Italy and the occupied zone of Germany - the three countries with which this issue of "Europe Speaks" is concerned - is therefore of very great importance.

IN the statement issued by Franco in the early hours of December 29th- after the last cabinet meeting of the year - he proclaims that "there is not a Spanish problem". One could easily agree with the declaration that there is not a Spanish problem, for there are many Spanish problems. The present time is most opportune for a review of these problems. There has been a flaring up of political activity on the Spanish issue, not only among Spanish exiles, but also on the part of the allied nations.

The people of Spain have hardly had a chance to realise that the war is over. To most continental peoples peace has meant the possibility to breathe once more the air of freedom. True, in many cases this new freedom was not in every respect beneficial, but at any rate the ordinary men and women saw again the chance to start on a new road. They could join in the work of rebuilding the continent in accordance with the ideals shared by all sincere fighters for freedom.

Suppression and Isolation

Nothing of the kind has happened in Spain. Franco's recent Bill of Rights is, in fact, a Bill of concessions which can be withdrawn whenever the Government chooses. The 18b regulation has its Spanish counterpart in the "administrative arrests". With one difference: In Britain they were the exception, in Spain they are the rule. Executions for political crimes are less numerous now than they have been, thank to foreign protests and pressure, but people still get long terms of imprisonment for saying what every British citizen is entitled to say whenever he likes. A rigid press censorship keeps Spain isolated from the outside world.

This year's budget allocated to defence exactly the same amount as last year - when Franco could still claim that he had to maintain the country fully armed to face the double threat from the allies and the Axis. Salutes, uniforms and other outer signs of Falangism may be vanishing, but the local administration is everywhere firmly in the hands of those against whom the mass of the people fought for three years: the landed gentry, the nominees of the Church and of other privileged classes. Their appointment is by decree. Among them the spirit of revenge against the people who fought them in the Civil War is still alive.

There is an opposition in Spain. Not content with her many privileges, even the Church might oppose Franco more openly if she were not afraid that in the struggle someone else might get the better of her. The Catholic newspaper El Debate[1], which was suspended many months ago, remains withdrawn as a visible sign of a measure of non-co-operation. The precepts of the encyclical Rerum Novarum form the political basis of a Catholic campaign against a régime too pagan for their taste, against a State which assigns to the Army many of the positions which traditional Spanish Catholicism would wish to see reserved for itself. The Falange, too, arouses Catholic opposition on the grounds of certain privileges they enjoy such as the supply of paper for their publications at special rates under Government control.

Extent of the Opposition

Discontent among the monarchists is reflected in their declarations - such as the note of the Duke of Alba[2] on leaving London - which often contain fairly strong words against the régime. The monarchists might be allies in the struggle for the defeat of Franco, but republicans can hardly forget that practically the whole monarchist movement joined hands with Franco in the Civil War. This fact - their brotherhood in blood - and the fact that they are men of great influence in the State and local administration, accounts for the leniency with which Franco tolerates their recurring outbursts of anger. Moreover, if the monarchist conspiracy were to succeed, Franco might still expect to withdraw gracefully.

There is also an underground movement, now unified in the "Democratic Union", which embraces every party except the communists. But in view of the efficiency and power of the police its influence cannot go far beyond those who are willing to take grave risks. As a rallying point for the leaders, however, its importance must not be underestimated.

Socially the country is back to the old days of control by the Army, Church and landlord - just where the Republic started - and economically, though there is no hunger, there is hardship and social inequality to a far worse degree than at any time within the present century. Controlled foods are not sufficient to go round. Black market foods fetch prices far above the common man's purse and wages have continually lagged behind the rising cost of living.

Unification of Republican Forces

Just before the CORTES met in Mexico two months ago, a considerable advance was achieved towards the unity of the republican forces in exile. "The parties which are not represented in our Government are not in it because they decided so", said the President, Dr. Giral[3], in his ministerial address in Mexico City. The remark was obviously addressed to the Communist Party whose conditions for joining the Government were unacceptable to the rest of its members. The Government included all the Spanish Republican parties, the Republican Catalan Party, the Basque Nationalists, the Spanish Socialist Party and the socialist and anarchist trade unions. It does not include the Spanish Com-

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munist Party, the communist-controlled Catalan Socialist Party and the Negrin group. Some stormy scenes took place when the Cortes met in Mexico with 140 members of Parliament present out of 208 who are in exile, but on the whole the Government emerged successfully and ready to give a new lead to the Spanish democratic movements.

In the circumstances the absence of the Communist Party is to be regretted. It has in its ranks figures with high personal prestige abroad, such as Pasionaria[4], who got 87 messages of greetings from members of the British Parliament on her fiftieth birthday. The absence of Negrin from the Government is a net loss too - whatever one's opinion of Negrin's political attitude might be - on account of the prestige he enjoys. As to the absence of the Catalan Socialist Party, which had joined the Communist International during the war, it is of no importance since the party itself is in a state of decomposition. With the end of the war many of its members refused to continue under communist control, and the party has become a skeleton. Unfortunately, the old socialist parties of Catalonia have suffered enormously in consequence of this development.

Foreign Interference?

The Giral Government is now coming to Europe and will probably establish its headquarters in France.[5] The need to give it all possible prestige may before long lead to a broadening of its basis. But how? Negrin and the Communists may find the other parties ready to make some concessions if they themselves are willing to yield on certain points. But to the right of the parties included in the Government there are still huge masses of people who can hardly be said to be represented, and yet they are important and potentially powerful allies in the struggle to defeat Franco. These people, "the neutral masses" inside Spain, must somehow be enlisted to collaborate with the democratic forces. Among the monarchists there are many who would be ready to accept a referendum. On this point the Pretender[6] himself agrees with the socialist leader Prieto. If on the other hand it is true that the traditional Spanish Monarchy is hostile to democracy, it is also true that a Monarchy administered by republicans might be healthier than a Republic in the hands of the Army. Admittedly a referendum would violate what is called "republican legality". But has not this republican legality, have not the Constitution of 1936, the Cortes, the Government all been challenged by Negrin, Prieto and other republican leaders themselves? Consideration[s] of legality are not all-important in the attempt to end the Franco régime.

These are, however, problems of internal Spanish politics regarding which foreign interference may do more harm than good. Differences among republicans must be left to be solved by the republicans themselves. It may be very desirable that they should come to some kind of agreement with the monarchists in order to overthrow Franco, but this cannot be imposed from outside and, at any rate, the monarchists deserve no sympathy, for when they joined forces with Franco they forgot all about the democracy which they now pretend to cherish.

Foreign action is justified and desirable in so far as it gives a Democratic Spain the chance to make a fresh start. The Allies can and should make it clear that Franco is persona non grata in the comity of nations by all means at their disposal, in particular by economic blockade and support for the opposition. Synchronised with actions of Spanish republicans this should be sufficient to give the self-appointed ruler of Spain a death blow. Of course, it must be consistent and straight-forward action. It is no good attacking Franco in the House of Commons and allowing him to trade freely with Italy, however keen democratic Italy may be to have debts incurred by Mussolini repaid by Franco. There is no case for refraining from action from fear of uniting all Spaniards round Franco by forcing him to go. Spain is held together "in trembling and fear", not by loyalty to its ruler or to any of the tenets he claims to uphold.

At the time of writing, it is expected that very shortly the U.S.A., Britain and France will hold talks on the subject in an atmosphere averse to official Spain. Russia and Mexico never had diplomatic relations with Franco Spain. Of late, Panama, Guatemala and Venezuela have severed relations with him, and France - to all appearances - is only reluctant to do the same because she hopes that concerted and thus more effective action with the two other nations might be possible. The progressive forces in France are very much alive to the danger of a centre of fascist infection round the corner.

What will be the results of these discussions? The U.S.A. is perfectly aware that Spanish germs develop easily in Latin America, and Latin American dictatorial trends are a perpetual source of worry to them. Franco's recent decision to nationalise the telephones in Spain has interfered considerably with the links of Spanish Reaction with American capitalists. Britain is now more susceptible than ever to the pressure of public opinion. Spanish troubles receded to the background during the Second World War, but a Labour Government in power cannot ignore its idealistic aims. The way in which Britain deals with the Spanish question will rightly be considered as a test issue on which her policies will be judged.

An Urgent Appeal

The strength of the sympathies that exist for the cause of Republican Spain was reflected in the keen response given to a conference organised by the Emergency Committee in Aid of Democratic Spain on December 8th. The Committee is supported by the International Brigade Association, the Union of Democratic Control and the Council for the Defence of Civil Liberties; its appeal for support from national and local trade union and labour party bodies may not receive the attention which would correspond to the merits of the resolutions adopted by the conference, because the sponsoring bodies are known for acting usually under communist direction and not always in line with an international socialist policy. However, this must not prevent the labour and progressive movements from taking up the issue of Spain by all means at their disposal in order to bring home to the public the urgency of the Spanish question.

A civil war such as Mr. Bevin fears can be avoided only by swift and decisive action. Compromising with Franco over and over again, would, at this stage, only strengthen his hands. The public must realise also that the communist elements will become the stronger the greater the suffering inflicted upon the Spanish nation, and the delay in allied action. A growth in communist influence would certainly not be in the interest of a stable republican régime or of a united Spanish labour movement. It would endanger a sound and consistent European orientation of the Spanish Republic. If Britain lets Russia take the initiative in recognising the Republican Government, it is almost inevitable that Spain will lean towards Russia in European politics. These are facts which underline the urgency of immediate action by the Western powers, quite apart from the demoralizing effect of a doomed fascist régime still enjoying the support of the Democracies in the dawn of peace.

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Political Currents in Italy

By a Correspondent

Parts of this report, which deals in the main with Northern Italy, were written in November; it was completed in the end of December, prior to the handing back of most of the Northern Provinces to the Italian Government.

NORTHERN Italy has three different systems of government: Allied Military Government (A.M.G.), the Government in Rome and the Committees of National Liberation (C.L.N). In their everyday life the people do not notice the existence and interference of A.M.G. When the Allies entered Milan, the Northern Italian C.L.N. had already established their own order. They had arrested big industrialists, compromised by their collaboration with Fascism, and nominated prefects and mayors. The Allies looked at this new order rather suspiciously and hurried to occupy the Northern Italian towns before any further revolutionary changes could take place. They were, nonetheless, surprised at the amount of discipline and efficiency in existence. Since then they have accepted all the C.L.N. nominees and adopted them as advisers to the extent that the C.L.N. found it difficult to remain independent. The Allied officials would have liked to draw all these advisers into their own offices, but the C.L.N. insisted in keeping them apart. They established themselves as a kind of shadow government with commissars for the various departments corresponding in numbers to those set up by A.M.G.

A.M.G. is actually not so much a government as a mere bureaucracy. It has no government plan or policy (not even a policy to support American or English capital to "conquer" Italian industry - on the contrary, the absence of Anglo-Saxon investments is widely regretted by Italians). For lack of a positive aim, the A.M.G. administration just hampers and interferes, in a thousand different ways. But any Italian prefect strong enough to resist pressure can generally hold his ground very well if he is on the right side of existing regulations.

One of the main evils of A.M.G. is that it encourages regional autarchy. Different regions are under different A.M.G. sections which are not linked directly with each other, but only indirectly through the remote HQs in Rome. A.M.G. has the inevitable weakness of a military government imposed on a country whose problems are all civilian and in the main economic. Bureaucratic formalities hold up every decision. For instance, it took several weeks before a bridge was given back to the Italian authorities, although the shortening of the vital traffic between Rome and Venice by no less than 24 hours was at stake.

A.M.G. is on the whole strongly anti-communist in tendency. Anti-communist papers of all kinds exploit this situation to the utmost as opportunities for indiscriminate attacks on Russia. There is little evidence that A.M.G. forces assist in the fight against banditry and in the establishment of public security, whilst at the same time they refuse to allow the Italian police forces to be sufficiently armed and motorised. Admittedly, there are many instances of good will and personal effort on the part of Allied officers, and generous help has been given by the Allies in relief work. Nevertheless, it is an almost unanimous opinion among Italians that only when A.M.G. has gone will Italy be able to get on with the work of reconstruction.

Rôle of Liberation Committees

The Committees of National Liberation have been and still are of much greater importance than such organisations have ever been in France. They embody not only the resistance against German occupation, but the experience of a very long struggle against Italian fascism, the leaders of these committees are the real anti-fascists "of the first hour".

In the North[7] the C.L.N. have constantly exercised a control over the activities of the local and industrial committees, preventing unlawful interference and eliminating irresponsible elements (often ex-fascists parading as heroic partisans). Their aim was not only to purge the country of the worst fascists, but also to prepare the future "action committees" through which the workers would be able to share in the control of their enterprises. But since the most pro-fascist among the big industrialists have enjoyed all kinds of protection, the purge of the smaller fry has been of little value. It has rather tended to make people cynical. The conception of the action committees has also rather degenerated into a mere propaganda slogan. The party leaders themselves who use these slogans do not seem to believe very much in them.

The C.L.N. have thus not become the organs of democratic government or of profound social and political change, for which the more idealistically minded antifascists had hoped. Yet they are even to-day the only legal source of the authority of the government. They have provided a valuable opportunity for people of different parties to meet, to discuss, to take decisions on many practical problems, and it is in the main due to them that the sometimes strained relations between the parties have never degenerated into civil strife. Even when the leaders at the top quarrelled or wanted to withdraw from the C.L.N. (as, for instance, happened with the Liberals), the representatives of the same parties in the villages or towns did not desert the committees. At a time, when this was most necessary, the C.L.N. have acted as centres of united effort.

The legal Italian authorities, though nominated by the C.L.N., had of course to be ratified by the A.M.G. What would happen in the case of conflicts between these two powers? According to a decision taken during the underground period, those officials who lost the confidence of the C.L.N. would have to resign. Recently the Allies, represented by the openly profascist American Captain Fournier[8], asked the authorities and the people of Cremona to sever all relations with the local C.L.N. All the officials immediately tendered their resignations. Finally, after a compromise was effected, the conflict was settled. The fact that the Italian authorities have never become agents of the occupation powers has greatly strengthened their position.

Regional, Provincial and Local Autarchy

The Italian government is only a de facto one, because de jure the Italian administration has no direct relation with Rome. But ministers travel freely between the two zones and the decrees of the government in Rome are as a rule applied in the whole country. The main officials of the central government are the prefects who have the power, if they do desire, to destroy any establishment of municipal socialism and even of any real local self-government. Actually, the prefects are above all interested in their own province. Often, they develop strong tendencies towards a state of provincial autarchy, forbidding, for instance, the export of wine, eggs, wood, milk, so as to use these goods as a bargaining weapon in their relations with heads of other provinces. By frequent meetings of the prefects, some of these obstacles to a unified administration are overcome, but only by persuasion and compromise, and therefore very slowly. To the regional autarchy of A.M.G. and the provincial autarchy of the prefects, the various C.L.N. add their local autarchic tendencies. It is a tribute to the practical sense of the Lombards and Piedmontese that under these conditions, things function as well as they do. It is much more doubtful whether this system will stand the strain of the winter plus increased unemployment.

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The political parties of to-day represent only a small minority of the population. Therefore the existing coalition government - though the only possible one - is not felt to be a really representative government. The leaders of the new parties are often called "the new hierarchy". The growth of fascist and semi-fascist groups, such as Giannini's[9] "Uomo Qualunque", and many other signs of political unrest and conflict have received wide publicity in Britain in connection with the recent overthrow of the Parri[10] Government.

The Danger of Clericalism

By now the greatest single force in the country is probably the Democratic Christian Party, whose chief, Alcide de Gasperi[11], has followed Parri as Prime Minister. Its main mass support comes from the peasants. If this party becomes the leading one after the election, Italy may see years of clericalism and Vatican reign, despite the progressive and left tendencies which exist in this party (much less, however, than in Don Sturzo's[12] Popular Party after 1918).

Strangely enough, the danger of such a prospect is hardly ever referred to in left papers, although there is a very old and strong anti-clerical tradition in the ranks of the Italian left. Umberto Calosse[13], a leading socialist writer, commenting in the Avanti on a conversation he had with the Pope, even speaks about the deep sense of reverence he felt in face of an authority which originated so many centuries ago. Other socialists and also the communists have declared that anti-clericalism belongs to the past.

In view of this moderation on the Left[14], the offensive and crude clericalism on the Catholic side is the more striking. There was, for instance, the Pastoral Letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Milan, Monsignor Schuster[15] (one of Mussolini's strongest supporters during the Abyssinian war) asking the priests of his diocese to impress upon the people that it would be a deadly sin to vote for any anti-Catholic party. Gronchi[16], who is regarded as one of the most progressive Catholic political leaders, has written a veiled apology of the Franco régime, praising Franco for having kept out of the war and insisting on the difference between Spain and totalitarian States.

How are we to explain this discrepancy between Catholic aggressiveness and progressive moderation? The Left has subordinated all other problems to the fight for the liquidation of the monarchy which is indeed the centre of social reaction. There is a strong republican feeling even among members of the Catholic Party (mainly in the North) which the Left parties want to bind to their anti-monarchist policy. This would not be possible if clericalism were to come to the foreground of the political debate.[17] It was indeed fatal for democracy in Italy that, thanks to the Allies (including Russia), it was not allowed to do away with the dynasty in the first months of liberation when there was practically unanimity on the issue and when the reactionary forces had not had time to gather strength again. The recent changes in the Italian Cabinet, which replaced Parri by a Catholic Prime Minister, de Gasperi (formerly Librarian in the Vatican), are now bound to provoke a stronger anti-clerical reaction in the country.

Relations between Socialists and Communists

A few words about the two workers' parties. The Socialist Party, because of Nenni's policy towards unity and even fusion with the communists, has lost a great chance of becoming a decisive factor in Italian politics. There are very large peasant and middle-class groups which are opposed to communism, but might have been won over by the socialists, had the latter not become almost identified with the communists.

It is now very difficult for the socialists radically to reverse their programme, without being thrown into the reactionary anti-communist camp. The strongly anti-communist and anti-Russian orientation of Socialist representatives like Saragat[18], the Italian Ambassador in Paris, is a real embarrassment for the party. The existence of A.M.G. has made many progressive people be suspicious of advocates of the "Western Bloc", such as Saragat. The spiritual conflict of progressive people was best described to me by a left Catholic, a teacher at the Catholic University of Milan: "On a world political scale, in case of conflict, I would side with the Anglo-Saxons against the Russian State. Inside Italy I feel in sympathy with the pro-Russian section of the people and in antipathy with its pro-English and pro-American sections, whose backbone are the new rich, the ex-fascists, the reactionaries of all kinds". This conflict is not typical for Italy alone, but illuminates a crucial point in European developments.

However, Pietro Nenni himself has now gone back to the fusionist programme. Silone[19] was never in favour, but has been more "centrist" than Saragat. The Socialist party is definitely moving away from unilateral links with the communists, especially on the eve of the election. There are, however, very sharp divisions of opinion inside the party. The socialists are apparently trying to establish closer relations with the Catholic Party in the hope of thus furthering the prospects of future political stability.

As in France, the Communist Party has by far the strongest hold over the industrial urban workers. It has an intelligent leadership and a great prestige because of its brilliant and tragic record in the anti-fascist and resistance fight. Russia's and Tito's policy towards Italy have made things very difficult for them. If from the English and American side anything like the reasonable treatment of Italy or any constructive plans at all would emerge, the odds would be even greater against the communists. At their recent party congress there was some outspoken criticism from the rank and file of Scoccimarro's[20] very moderate and statesmanlike report. Togliatti, the leader of the party, is also not immune from criticism, which comes mainly from the syndicalist wing. In contrast to the moderate governmental attitude of the top leaders, the local communists often take the initiative to foster strikes and agitation among farmers, which embarrass the party and are grist to the mills of the anti-communist forces, especially when accompanied by acts of violence.

The Future of Italian Democracy

The prospects for Italy may seem rather black in the immediate future, and the picture would be even darker if we were to describe the economic situation and the problems arising out of the international settlement. Yet on a long-term view and when compared with the state of other European countries, prospects are much brighter.

Amidst the general ruin of Europe, Italy may fare relatively well, economically and politically. It will have a prosperous textile industry. The loss of her colonies will force her to invest capital in the "colonial" Italian south, at last transforming its agriculture, and this will be all to the good. Her inclusion in a wider market will of course be necessary to develop her agriculture and specialised industries (abandoning the great autarchy) and to make possible structural changes in her industry which has relied on heavy protectionism for so long.

In my view it is indirectly through changes in the economic structure (breaking protected monopolies)[21] and Italy's inclusion in a wider market, at once more liberal and more planned, rather than through any direct political revolution, that the Italian deadlock can be broken. In Italy, like in all Latin countries, I have gained the strong impression that the game of present party politics cannot solve the problems. Unlike more advanced countries, where the problem is that of adapting political institutions to productive realities, the primary need here is to change these productive realities themselves.

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The Ruhr Miners

Since the British government has now taken over the Ruhr coal mines, it has a direct responsibility for taking steps to secure a rise in the output of coal. As our correspondent points out, such steps must include improvements in the conditions of the miners.

THE coal mining industry in the Ruhr to-day is short of about 180,000 skilled underground workers. The experienced miners are, on the whole, getting too old to carry on in the industry and are, moreover, completely exhaused from the strain of the war years. Yet, they are desperately needed to-day, as it falls to them to train new labour for the mines. It is therefore in the interest of the whole industry that care should be taken of their physical and psychological welfare.

Efforts to improve the food supplies have been made by the Allied authorities, and they are greatly appreciated by the miners here. But without a further increase in concentrated food, mainly fats and proteins, they will not be fit to carry on for long. However valuable works canteens may be as an emergency measure, the miners do not regard them as a solution as long as their families remain inadequately fed. Moreover, the fact that they cannot have their meals together with their families creates a great amount of dissatisfaction, which in turn reacts unfavourably upon their working capacity. In order to solve problems of this kind in a satisfactory way it is essential that miners' representatives should be included on the Board of the Supply Centre (Versorgungszentrale) in Essen.

In view of the general housing shortage the question of providing accommodation for new recruits to the industry is as urgent as it is difficult. It is essential that the newcomers should be drawn quickly into the life of the mining community. Otherwise they will not settle down, but try to change their jobs as soon as possible. It would be best to find them lodgings with miners' families, and this should be taken into consideration when dealing with the housing problem. The housing authorities should have the right to requisition houses for the purpose of accommodating miners. Unfortunately, at present the local authorities are often not at all helpful. In many cases they bluntly refuse permission to the miners to move into their locality.

This situation could be improved through the setting up of miners' councils with a special say in the allocation of houses. It is not too early to re-start the work of miners' building societies in order to make provisions for miners eventually to acquire houses as their property, which is an indispensable condition for their settling permanently in a mining community.

No wage increases have taken place in the mining industry since 1933, whilst the cost of living has risen by about 40 %. The miners have increased their income only by working longer hours and by raising output. On account of the great exhaustion of the workers, overtime and Sunday work (which under the Nazis was compulsory two or three times a month) had largely to be stopped. The recent cancellation of the regular extra three-quarters of an hour per day meant in effect a wage cut of 10 %, and was resented the more since at the same time the newly introduced meals in the works canteens involved an extra expense amounting to 15 % of the weekly wage for some groups and 10 % for others.

In addition the miners have suffered a 50 % reduction of both their old age pensions and their sickness benefits, a special hardship in view of the fact that pensions for civil servants and clerical workers have remained unaltered.

The Ruhr miners realise fully that under the present circumstances they cannot demand a reduction in working hours, however badly they need it in their present state of exhaustion. Nevertheless it is very unfortunate that the Military Government should have introduced the eight-hour day as the normal working time. During the inter-war years after very bitter struggles the miners had succeeded in obtaining the recognition of the seven-hour day, at least in principle, although they have hardly ever worked it in practice. All collective agreements were based upon the seven-hour day, and the eighth working hour was considered as overtime.

Trade unionists will understand what it meant for the Ruhr miners to lose such a hard-won social achievement. Psychologically it would have made all the difference in the world to them if their right to the seven-hour day had been acknowledged. They would have been the more willing to work eight hours as a special contribution to the reconstruction of their own country and of those countries devastated by Nazi Germany.

It is obvious to us that coal must be the main item in the list of reparation demands, and the Ruhr miners are prepared to do their share in fulfilling these demands. They are anxious, however, that they should not have to foot the bill alone. They desire to see the burden of reparation payments fairly distributed amongst the whole of the German population. The miners are very apprehensive lest the present possibilities of forced recruitment and the other extraordinary powers of the Military Government authorities might foist upon them such a low standard of living and such hardships in general that they would be unable to bear them in the long run.

The recent arrests of the leading Ruhr industrialists caused great satisfaction among miners and strengthened their hopes that all supporters of the Nazi régime will be eliminated from important positions. The miners are convinced that suitable and reliable people can be found for all these posts. But they have very good reason to believe that without the consultation and co-operation of their representatives this aim will not be achieved. Their loyal and effective support could no doubt be secured, especially if the miners as well as the technical and clerical employees are given responsibilities in the running of the industry.

It is the more regrettable that trade union developments in the coal mining area are still in a sadly backward stage. The miners have been very disappointed that in spite of promises received from the Allies immediately after the collapse, their own efforts to create a working trade union machinery have been discouraged rather than welcomed. The North German Coal Control authorities have shown very little understanding of trade union matters. The Ruhr miners are asking to be allowed to create a united trade union organisation to cover the whole of the Ruhr district. Only such a body could put an end to the chaos which exists at present as regards social and labour legislation in this area. They would gladly welcome any support that might be given by experienced British trade unionists to the building up of their new trade union movement.

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Forebodings from the Rhine

THE dismissal in October, 1945, of Dr. Fuchs[22] from the office of President of the Northern Rhine Province to which he had been appointed by the Allies a few months before, was warmly welcomed by all German anti-fascists, and rightly so, for Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Konrad Adenauer[23] (the Mayor of Cologne who was dismissed at the same time as Dr. Fuchs) were amongst the "most stubborn representatives of reactionary political Catholicism in the Rhineland". The hopes of German democrats ran high. They expected that Dr. Fuchs' successor would be a progressive man, willing and able to tackle energetically the hitherto badly neglected tasks of physical and moral reconstruction in this ravaged province.

Unfortunately, the choice of Dr. Lehr [24]proved to be a jump from the frying pan into the fire: it certainly made a most discouraging impression upon the progressive elements in that important industrial district. The following facts concerning Dr. Lehr's record and his first measures in his new office, especially the appointment of his collaborators, may illustrate the reasons why they fear a new era of cultural reaction, nationalism and militarism has started.

Dr. Lehr is the son of a general of the old Imperial Army. He is about sixty years of age and has considerable experience as an administrator during the Weimar Republic. He was known for his autocratic practices and belonged to the German National party, the party of the big industrialist Hugenberg, which was extremely conservative and had a military organisation of its own, the ill-famed Stahlhelm. Dr. Lehr always had, and still has, definite associations with German heavy industry.

Unfortunately, Dr. Lehr's candidature for the post of President was not opposed by the Social Democrats, during the negotiations between the parties, the Social Democrats were promised the position of Vice-president, which traditionally carries with it the control of the department of General Administration, the most important in local government. Furthermore, assurances were given to the Social Democrats that they would be assigned the economic and the welfare departments. The distribution of posts which Dr. Lehr actually carried out after his appointment proved, however, a blatant breach of faith with the Social Democrats. Although a Social Democrat, Dr. Stoewer[25], was appointed as Vice-President, he did not become head of the General Administration department. Contrary to the practices which had been customary in the past, Dr. Lehr assigned this department to a different official, who in this case happened to be the former deputy of his predecessor, Dr. Fuchs. Amongst the nine departmental chiefs, there is only one Social Democrat (the same Dr. Stoewer who was put in charge of the welfare department, the smallest of all), and in the whole administrative apparatus there are only four Social Democrats and one Communist (in the department for Labour) out of a staff of well over fifty high-ranking officials. In view of the fact that during the last pre-Hitler elections in the Rhineland the Social Democrats and Communists together obtained about 35 per cent. of the votes, this proportion appears to be especially incongruous.

Some of Dr. Lehr's appointments are particularly interesting. Dr. Gildemeister, Landrat Greinert and Count Metternich[26] (nomen est omen) had been members of the National Socialist Party since 1933.[27] As early as 1932, Count Metternich wrote articles for a Nazi cultural organisation, the so-called Militant National Socialist League for German Culture. Although he now holds a relatively unimportant post in the educational department, there is good reason to believe that he will misuse his position as an official for propagating nationalist ideas. Another sinister character is Dr. Janich[28] a former official in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. From 1929 to 1933 he was head of the department for fighting National Socialism. Strangely, however, he did not relinquish his position in the Ministry when the Nazis seized power. In 1934 he was entrusted with the task of working out a scheme for building up the Gestapo. Two years later he was pensioned off. Thereupon he established himself as a lawyer in Berlin and became a member of the National Socialist Lawyer's Association.

Many obstacles stand in the way of carrying the process of denazification to its logical conclusions, i.e., to deny positions of influence also to German nationalists and reactionaries of the type of Dr. Lehr. This point may be illustrated by some quotations from an appeal sent a few weeks ago to the American military Government (General Eisenhower in Frankfurt). The appeal which was signed by Cardinal Faulhaber for the Catholic Church and Bishop D. Meiser[29] for the Protestant Church in Bavaria, pleaded for individual treatment of Nazi members, pointing out that wholesale dismissals of Nazis, without any consideration of the very different reasons which made people join Nazi organizations, was a violation of justice. There is some truth in this statement, as everybody knows who has had to take part in the purges carried out in Germany. However, the basic social and political conceptions of these Church dignitaries (who are certainly greatly respected by the Allied authorities) are revealed in the following passage:

"With regard to the recent action of the Military Government which caused a great shock among the German people, namely the arrest of 102 leading German bankers and industrialists, the Church authorities of both Christian denominations expect an immediate individual investigation into the charges made against these people. ...

"It will be found that a large number of these men - though they may at one time have supported the Nazi Party by their names - took no part in the preparations for war, in the methods of warfare, in the accompanying horrors such as the mass murders of non-Aryans and in the mad prolongation of the war. ...

"Our people are particularly grieved that the arrested have not been informed of the reasons for their detainment, and that they have to wait for many weeks without even a first hearing. If it appears still necessary to keep them under control, this could surely also be achieved by house arrest on their word of honour or on bail."

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