• Introduction
  

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to provide an initial orientation on the structural characteristics, problems, and controversies which shape and define German federalism as it approaches the end of the first decade of the post-unification era. It focuses on the following:

• the structure of the Bundesrat as an intergovernmental organ of the German Länder;
• the intricate system of federal-Länder and Länder-Länder intergovernmental relations which is partly anchored in the constitution itself, but is also supplemented by a variety of other institutional networks;
• the fact that the Länder, notwithstanding substantial losses of their legislative powers, have remained the main administrators both of their own and of federal and European law;
• a financial constitution which, though predominantly based on shared taxes, gives the Länder a strong bargaining position by requiring the Bundesrat's consent to most of the relevant legislation;
• the capacities of the Länder to engage in international relations and EU affairs;
• and the judicial safeguards which exist to ensure the continued existence and vitality of the federal system.